Inspection of the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
What OIG Found
- Stakeholders from other Federal agencies and Department of State offices and bureaus described the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs as effective in the interagency policy formulation and implementation process.
- The Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Office integrated successfully into the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, but the bureau’s reorganization plan required further refinement.
- Bureau leadership, structure, and staffing were in transition throughout the inspection as the reorganization plan was designed to take effect in stages spanning several months.
- The bureau had addressed chronic problems in filling its overseas positions with some success, but recruiting for Embassy Dhaka remained especially difficult.
- The bureau lacked senior-level oversight of strategic planning and foreign assistance, as well as a process for measuring performance against goals and objectives.
- Spotlight on Success: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs’ Office of Press and Public Diplomacy used a multi-track training and support program to maintain effective grants administration in Afghanistan and Pakistan despite high turnover of U.S. officers and locally employed staff. In addition, the bureau’s customized risk assessment template for overseas public diplomacy grants monitoring merited consideration for Department-wide replication.

What OIG Inspected
OIG inspected the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs’ executive direction, program and policy implementation, resource management, and management controls.

What OIG Recommended
This report includes 7 recommendations. OIG made 2 recommendations to build on the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs’ reorganization plan and 5 recommendations to improve strategic planning, foreign assistance tracking, Government Technical Monitor training, and completion of Civil Service employee performance appraisals.

In its comments on the draft report, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with all seven recommendations. OIG considers the recommendations resolved. The bureau’s response to each recommendation, and OIG’s reply, can be found in the Recommendations section of this report. The bureau’s formal written responses are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix B.
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**CONTEXT**

South and Central Asia play an important role in U.S. foreign policy, particularly with respect to security issues. The prolonged war in Afghanistan and tensions between nuclear powers India and Pakistan dominate U.S. policy concerns. The region is home to almost a quarter of the world’s population, including one-third of the world’s Muslims and 850 million people under 30. Buoyed by India’s dynamic economy, South Asia is the fastest growing region in the world, and the United States is the region’s leading trading partner. Central Asia presents an opportunity for U.S. businesses with its rich energy resources. However, the region faces a host of security and stability challenges that threaten future prosperity and U.S. interests, including transnational terrorist groups, narcotics producers and traffickers, extreme poverty, undemocratic governance, corruption, climate change, food insecurity, geopolitical competition, and vulnerability to natural disasters.

The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) is the newest regional bureau in the Department of State (Department). In 1992, pursuant to Section 122 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (Public Law 102-138), the Department split the former Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs to establish a separate Bureau of South Asian Affairs. In late 2005, the Department shifted the five former Soviet Union republics of Central Asia from the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs into the new bureau, redesignating it as the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. With the creation of the Secretary of State’s Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (S/SRAP) in 2009, the country desks for Afghanistan and Pakistan transferred out of SCA to the new entity. However, in June 2017, the Department reintegrated S/SRAP’s Afghanistan and Pakistan offices and its policy, support, foreign assistance, and leadership functions into SCA.

SCA is responsible for the general conduct of foreign relations with 13 countries.¹ As described in 1 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) (2) and (5), the Assistant Secretary on behalf of the bureau also ensures the adequacy of U.S. policies for countries within the region and of the plans, programs, resources, and performance in implementing those policies. The Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs heads the bureau and oversees the U.S. Government’s overall direction, coordination, and supervision of interdepartmental activities within the bureau’s area of responsibility. The Assistant Secretary position was filled by a career Senior Foreign Service officer serving in an acting capacity at the time of this inspection.

SCA developed its FY 2015-2018 Joint Regional Strategy jointly with S/SRAP and the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia² in the Department, and with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs and the Bureau for Asia in the U.S. Agency for International Development. The strategy’s goals include:

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¹ SCA has 11 embassies; Embassy Colombo, Sri Lanka, covers issues for the Maldives, and Embassy New Delhi, India, covers issues for Bhutan.

² The Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs Office of Assistance Coordination continued to manage foreign assistance for the Central Asian countries provided by Congress under the Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account.
• A strategic partnership with Afghanistan.
• A more democratic Pakistan that plays a constructive role in the region.
• A strengthened U.S.-India strategic partnership.
• A more secure and stable South and Central Asia.

On August 21, 2017, the President announced a new, integrated regional strategy for South Asia that adjusted the U.S. Government’s approach to both Afghanistan and Pakistan and affirmed India’s participation in a resolution of the Afghanistan conflict. SCA planned to reflect the new priorities in the next Joint Regional Strategy. 3

As of October 1, 2017, SCA’s authorized staff comprised 62 Foreign Service and 85 Civil Service 4 employees organized into seven domestic offices supervised by four Deputy Assistant Secretaries (DAS) and a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (PDAS). Five of SCA’s offices led and coordinated Department and interagency policy activities within geographic areas of responsibility. The other two offices engaged on regional and multilateral issues and on public diplomacy. SCA shares an Executive Office (EX) with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Because the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed most EX operations during the fall 2016 inspection of the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, this inspection limited its review to those EX units or personnel that supported SCA and its overseas posts.

SCA’s missions operate in environments at high risk for political violence, crime, and terrorism. Five of the 27 posts designated for inclusion in the Department’s High Threat, High Risk Programs operate in SCA. 5 Six of the 19 SCA posts, including consulates, are unaccompanied or restrict dependents in some way. 6 Foreign Service employees at all SCA posts receive hardship differential incentive payments, with those at 14 posts receiving hardship differential incentives of at least 25 percent more than those serving at non-hardship posts.

In FY 2017, SCA managed approximately $775 million in operating funds, including funds for overseas operations in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approximately $47 million in non-public diplomacy foreign assistance program funding. Additionally, SCA’s Office of Press and Public Diplomacy managed approximately $92 million in grants and cooperative agreements. In FY

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3 On September 20, 2017, the Department advised all bureaus to await finalization of the State-USAID Joint Strategic Plan and then align their Joint Regional Strategies with it. Until the strategic planning process is complete and any updated strategy is approved, SCA’s FY 2015-2018 Joint Regional Strategy remains in effect.

4 This total includes 3 rehired annuitants and 2 detailees from other Federal agencies but does not include the bureau’s 25 contractors.

5 The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with regional bureaus, designates posts that are at particularly high threat or risk based on broad risk categories such as capability and political will of the host government to protect U.S. facilities, personnel, and interests; known or perceived threats against U.S. interests; and the vulnerability of U.S. facilities. SCA posts meeting this criteria are Islamabad, Karachi, Peshawar, and Lahore in Pakistan, and Kabul, Afghanistan.

6 Consulates General Lahore and Peshawar (Pakistan) permit no family members. Embassy Islamabad and Consulate General Karachi (Pakistan) and Embassy Kabul (Afghanistan) permit adult dependents only if they are employed at post. Embassy Dhaka (Bangladesh) permits only adult dependents, working or not.
2016, SCA played a policy coordination role involving more than $2 billion in foreign assistance administered by other bureaus and agencies.\(^7\)

In this inspection, OIG evaluated the bureau’s policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act.\(^8\) SCA’s organizational structure and staffing were in transition throughout the inspection, which began as the bureau was awaiting Department approval of its June 2017 reorganization plan. The Department approved the reorganization plan as the on-site inspection was concluding in late October 2017. However, some elements of the reorganization were scheduled to take effect in mid-2018. At the time of the inspection, the bureau had not yet reorganized all the offices or eliminated all the positions identified in its reorganization plan. Details and organizational charts are included below.

**EXECUTIVE DIRECTION**

**Tone at the Top**

OIG assessed bureau leadership on the basis of 322 interviews, 120 questionnaires completed by SCA staff, 10 questionnaires completed by Deputy Chiefs of Mission at SCA’s overseas posts, and OIG’s review of documents and observations of bureau events during the inspection. OIG also conducted 45 interviews with Department and interagency partners that elicited comments on SCA’s performance in the interagency policy process.

*Acting Assistant Secretary Drew on Broad Experience to Energize the Bureau*

The Acting Assistant Secretary injected new energy, direction, and a clear sense of mission to SCA’s team of foreign policy professionals in her first 4 months on the job. In addition to postings in South and Central Asia, the Acting Assistant Secretary, a Senior Foreign Service officer, served as U.S. Ambassador to Jordan, as White House Special Assistant for Russia and Central Asia, and as the Department’s Executive Secretary during her 28-year diplomatic career. This broad Washington and overseas experience enabled her to assume her role on 3 days’ notice and to respond effectively to time-sensitive mandates, including: absorbing S/SRAP, reducing staff, coordinating a bureau reorganization plan, and focusing the newly combined bureau on supporting the administration’s new South Asia strategy.

*Leadership Team Was Cohesive*

The Acting Assistant Secretary assumed SCA’s leadership without a full management team in place\(^9\) and with limited guidance about the bureau’s role in the Department’s evolving policy

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\(^7\) The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 vests primary responsibility in the Secretary of State for directing and leading all U.S. Government foreign assistance. See 22 U.S.C. § 2382(c).

\(^8\) See Appendix A.

\(^9\) When the Acting Assistant Secretary assumed her functions, only one of the four DAS positions was filled. Office directors filled the other DAS positions in an acting capacity.
formulation process. Bureau personnel consistently told OIG that the Acting Assistant Secretary and the Acting PDAS modeled the leadership principles described in 3 FAM 1214. In OIG personal questionnaires and follow-on interviews, bureau personnel lauded the Acting Assistant Secretary’s ability to absorb and master information quickly, her success at improving the relationship between S/SRAP and SCA, and her clear communication of priorities in a series of focused and inclusive meetings. Staff also described the productive partnership between the Acting Assistant Secretary and the Acting PDAS, melding the Acting Assistant Secretary’s strategic policy expertise with the Acting PDAS’ management and team building experience. The Acting Assistant Secretary established herself and the bureau as strong interagency players.

**Fast-Paced Operational Tempo Challenged Bureau Staff, Work-Life Balance**

The Acting Assistant Secretary set a fast-paced operational tempo, driven by the imperative to share SCA’s expertise and vision with other government policy makers in accordance with 1 FAM 112 and 1 FAM 170. In her first 2 months on the job, she traveled to Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, requiring 308 briefing papers. During that same timeframe, SCA also produced more than 75 information and action memos to Department leadership in support of diplomatic engagement by the Secretary and other senior officials. The Acting Assistant Secretary’s activism on a number of fast-breaking issues involved many extra hours for both her and her staff, a pace that staff feared would be difficult for them to sustain over time. In response to these concerns, bureau leadership formed a committee to propose ways to balance the region’s foreign policy demands with finite personnel resources. Acknowledging that she herself was not a model for work-life balance, the Acting Assistant Secretary streamlined and reduced some Front Office requirements during the inspection. However, the ability of SCA’s offices to meet bureau demands with existing personnel remained challenging, as discussed in the Restructuring and Staffing Bureau Operations section of this report.

**Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives**

The Acting Assistant Secretary and the bureau employed a range of tools and mechanisms to inform and advise the Secretary and his closest advisors on key policy issues. Over the course of the inspection, OIG observed that SCA was increasingly engaged in the policy formulation and implementation process. For example, SCA developed a range of options on a sensitive aspect of the Afghanistan reconciliation process, one of which was endorsed by the Secretary. SCA developed core messages for a major speech by the Secretary on U.S.-India relations and helped craft a framework for the administration’s new Indo-Pacific strategy. The Acting Assistant Secretary was the Department’s representative on an interagency team that travelled to Islamabad to seek progress on the President’s South Asia strategy. She also advocated for—and ultimately saw adopted—a U.S. Government position on the Rohingya refugee crisis that balanced U.S. equities in Burma with humanitarian and human rights priorities for the region. A cross section of senior leaders in the Department and the interagency community praised her policy acumen and engagement in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

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10 The Secretary established a “Policy Planning Process,” a new framework for the development and implementation of foreign policy. That framework continued to evolve over the course of the inspection.
The Acting Assistant Secretary also found ways to reach external audiences. She met with a range of public and private interlocutors, including the U.S.-India Business Council, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Center for American Progress, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, and Stanford University students. She supported public diplomacy through outreach events and media engagement. In her first 3 months as Acting Assistant Secretary, she participated in 11 public outreach events, 5 featuring open press coverage. She also represented the Department on an October 27, 2017, press roundtable that detailed key policy developments in the SCA region. In addition to her own personal engagement, she empowered her staff to participate in SCA’s public outreach.

**Strategic Planning Lacked Review Process and Senior Oversight**

SCA had no systemic process to measure policy and program performance against the goals and objectives in the FY 2015-2018 Joint Regional Strategy, as required by 18 FAM 101.4-3(b) and the 2015 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review. Additionally, OIG did not find evidence that SCA had instituted regular bureau-wide reviews to assess whether policies and programs continued to meet strategic needs, as required. Bureau employees confirmed these conclusions, as they consistently told OIG they had not monitored progress against the regional strategy’s goals and objectives since its preparation in 2014. Furthermore, bureau leadership had not incorporated responsibility for oversight of the strategic planning process in the work requirements statement or position description of any senior bureau official. The lack of a strategic review process risked undercutting the bureau’s ability to adjust strategy and budgets to results and to determine the optimal allocation of resources.

**Recommendation 1:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should institute a formal, periodic process to measure program and policy performance against strategic goals.

(Action: SCA)

**Integration of the Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Seen as Positive**

Department leadership, other agency stakeholders, and bureau personnel told OIG they welcomed the reintegration of S/SRAP into SCA. Interviewees told OIG that having a single entity to coordinate U.S. policy and programs for the entire region was a positive step in streamlining the policy making process and in enhancing regional synergies. SCA’s interagency partners told OIG that the integrated bureau was able to address regional issues more coherently, including India’s importance to Afghanistan’s future peace and prosperity, Afghanistan’s integration with its Central Asian neighbors, and the deployment of foreign assistance resources in support of regional policy objectives.

**Adherence to Internal Controls**

The joint Executive Office coordinated SCA’s annual internal control process that culminated in the Acting Assistant Secretary’s 2017 Annual Management Control Statement of Assurance. That statement included documentation of internal control reviews conducted by 11 embassies and SCA’s domestic offices. Five embassies reported one or more potential material weaknesses or significant deficiencies covering a range of issues including: vetting of newly hired local staff, employee association internal controls, staffing gaps due to diplomatic visa issuance delays, lack
of a building permit for a new embassy compound, or seismic risks for residential housing and operational space at several Central Asian posts.

Separate from the statement of assurance review process, OIG’s FY 2017 inspections of two SCA posts identified internal control weaknesses in bulk fuel management, cashier operations, overtime approval, and motor pool management. OIG made recommendations to address these weaknesses.\footnote{OIG, Inspection of Embassy Colombo, Sri Lanka (ISP-I-17-14, April 2017); OIG, Inspection of Embassy Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan (ISP-I-17-13, March 2017).}

The EX post management officers played a positive role in strengthening internal controls at SCA missions through site visits, regular use of Department management analytical tools, and vetting of statements of assurance. Consequently, they helped missions identify and correct internal control weaknesses.

**Task Management Process Improved but Still Needed Refinement**

A recurring theme in both the responses to OIG’s questionnaires and SCA staff interviews was the process for assigning work to the bureau’s drafting officers and providing timely feedback on their written products. Staff told OIG that priority taskers could sit for up to a half day in the Front Office before being forwarded to the desk officers, which resulted in an unnecessarily compressed turnaround time. Staff also stated that they often lacked clear in-person or written guidance from the tasking official, which resulted in multiple drafts attempting to respond to vague or third-hand guidance. Many drafting officers acknowledged, however, that the process was improving, with clearer guidance on formats both from the SCA Front Office and the Secretary’s office. OIG observations of the tasking and tracking process confirmed that staff assistants were appropriately trained, worked well in a team setting, and knew how to use the document tracking and clearance system. During the inspection, SCA began to implement some OIG suggestions regarding staff assistant scheduling and managing informal information requests to improve efficiency.

**RESTRUCTURING AND STAFFING BUREAU OPERATIONS**

**Staff Reduction and Reorganization Plan Timeline**

SCA experienced significant changes in its staffing and organization in a relatively short time. In November 2016, the Department notified Congress of its intent to reintegrate S/SRAP into SCA. In early 2017, the then-Acting PDAS formed a committee to study streamlining initiatives in response to the proposed integration. In March 2017, the President issued an Executive Order for reorganizing the executive branch,\footnote{Executive Order 13781, Comprehensive Plan for Reorganizing the Executive Branch, March 13, 2017.} and the Secretary followed with a mandate to reduce Department-wide staffing by 8 percent. On June 23, 2017, the Department named a new Acting Assistant Secretary and instructed her to submit a plan to reintegrate S/SRAP into SCA within a week. SCA submitted its initial integration and reorganization proposal on June 30, 2017, followed by a more detailed plan 2 weeks later. The latter identified 30 positions for elimination.
by combining personnel savings from the S/SRAP integration with staff reductions from consolidation of several other offices within the bureau. In late October 2017, the Under Secretary for Political Affairs approved SCA's reorganization plan with minor changes. Anticipating approval of the major elements of the plan, SCA made some adjustments to its structure during the inspection, notably establishing a fifth DAS position and assigning one DAS to oversee both the Office of Regional Affairs and the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy. The bureau expected to complete all elements of the reorganization within the next year.

13 Under the reorganization plan, the Office of Regional Affairs will be renamed the Office of Security and Transnational Affairs.
Figure 1: SCA Pre-Reorganization Structure

Assistant Secretary

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Front Office Staff

Regional Affairs
Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia
India Affairs
Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh Affairs
Central Asian Affairs
Press and Public Diplomacy Affairs

Figure 2: SCA Post-Reorganization Structure

Assistant Secretary

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary

Front Office Staff

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Pakistan Affairs
Office of Pakistan Affairs

Deputy Assistant Secretary for India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs
Office of India, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Afghanistan and Central Asian Affairs
Office of Afghanistan Affairs

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security and Transnational Affairs and Public Diplomacy
Office of Security and Transnational Affairs

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press and Public Diplomacy
Office of Press and Public Diplomacy Affairs

Office of Central Asia Affairs

Source: Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

Note: As of November 1, 2017, the merger of the Office of India Affairs and the Office of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs had not occurred, nor had the Office of Regional Affairs been renamed as the Office of Security and Transnational Affairs.
Reorganization Plan Review Needed to Ensure Resources Matched Priorities

OIG determined that SCA’s reorganization plan did not fully match goals and priorities with resources. According to 1 FAM 014.1, any proposed organizational structure should strive “to achieve a balance among mission needs, efficiency of operations, and effective employee utilization.” As a result of the Secretary’s dual mandate to integrate the staffs of S/SRAP and SCA, with associated personnel savings, and to reduce SCA base staffing by 8 percent as part of the Department-wide redesign, the bureau lost both staff and expertise. In addition, SCA based some of the staff reductions in its reorganization plan on assumptions that failed to materialize.

First, when SCA either eliminated or left unfilled a total of 12 positions in the Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan offices in anticipation of the reorganization plan’s approval, the President had yet to announce his new South Asia strategy. Rather than reducing the workload for all three offices as SCA anticipated, however, the new strategy actually intensified it. As a result, half of the non-administrative staff in the Afghanistan and Pakistan offices told OIG that they worked at least 2 additional hours each day, and several routinely worked 60- or 70-hour weeks in order to keep up with the workload. Second, SCA had anticipated a significant decline in foreign assistance funding based on the 2018 Congressional Budget Justification, which called for a 30 percent reduction in FY 2018 foreign assistance. Therefore, SCA’s reorganization plan proposed abolishing two grants management positions. However, foreign assistance funding for FY 2018 remained at its former level, meaning SCA’s proposed cuts in grants management could affect its ability to monitor and evaluate expenditures in accordance with the Department’s Federal Assistance Directive. Third, SCA’s reorganization plan proposed abolishing two of the three officer positions covering Bangladesh policy, programs, and public diplomacy. However, the Office of Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lankan Affairs devoted the equivalent of up to four Foreign Service and Civil Service positions to coordinate the U.S. response to the Rohingya refugee crisis.

On October 31, 2017, SCA had 21 vacant Civil Service positions that it intended to fill once the Department lifted its hiring freeze. If SCA does not review existing personnel resources in light of new priorities before it fills vacant positions, it may fail to balance the bureau-wide workload, match staff to priorities, and create the positive work-life balance that leadership identified as a priority.

**Recommendation 2:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should conduct a second, more comprehensive review of its staffing and skills inventory to achieve a balance among meeting mission needs, delivering efficient service, and managing employees effectively. (Action: SCA)

Bureau Took Steps to Mitigate Staffing Gaps at the Top

When the Acting Assistant Secretary joined SCA in late June 2017, only the Civil Service DAS position was officially encumbered\(^1\) due to the Department’s moratorium on filling DAS

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\(^1\) The Acting Assistant Secretary was officially assigned as the PDAS, although she immediately became Acting Assistant Secretary upon joining the bureau. The Acting PDAS during the inspection was the Executive Director of the joint Executive Office. One Office Director was serving as an Acting DAS, and one former Office Director was serving...
positions pending the Secretary’s Department-wide redesign. Bureau leadership had to find creative ways to mitigate the lack of management capacity to address new policy priorities, rationalize the processes of S/SRAP and SCA, and manage a heavier workload with 51\(^{15}\) fewer staff than S/SRAP and SCA had before integration.

To accomplish these goals, SCA asked the Bureau of Human Resources for a fifth DAS position and for informal, temporary approval to propose candidates for two other DAS positions until the Department-wide moratorium on DAS positions is lifted. As a result, one Office Director was dual-hatted as an Acting DAS at the conclusion of the inspection. SCA also reconfigured DAS portfolios. (See Figures 1 and 2, above.) Most of the leadership adjustments took place during the inspection. OIG observed the immediate benefits of this management structure when the Front Office had sufficient DAS capacity to ensure policy implementation during the Acting Assistant Secretary’s travel.

**Overseas Staffing: Critical Priority, But Difficulties Persist**

OIG found that challenges existed in staffing SCA overseas posts, despite reforms to Foreign Service bidding and career development processes intended to promote service in hardship posts and bolster bureau efforts to improve recruitment. SCA posts operate in difficult environments. For example, the Department authorized 26 evacuations at SCA posts since 2000. Five of 19 SCA posts had danger pay of 35 percent—the highest permitted—and 1-year tours of duty. Eleven posts had 2-year tours of duty, and the remaining three posts had 3-year tours of duty, all with hardship differential.\(^{16}\)

SCA had chronic difficulties filling its overseas positions. For the 2017 summer bidding season, SCA attracted, at most, one eligible Foreign Service bidder on 31 percent of its positions, leaving 108 of 345 total positions potentially unfilled. Sixty-three percent of the 345 positions were identified as exceptionally difficult to staff and critically important to SCA’s mission; such positions are known as Critical Need positions. In light of its staffing difficulties, OIG reviewed SCA’s internal processes for recruiting Foreign Service employees but identified no deficiencies that merited recommendations.

Instead, the problem of recruiting and retaining personnel at hardship posts requires coordinated action by other Department entities. For example, as a result of earlier decisions made by the Bureau of Human Resources and the Under Secretary for Management, SCA implemented a successful recruiting tool of providing employees serving in Afghanistan and Pakistan with a service recognition package of augmented pay and other benefits. For 2018, SCA filled 95 percent (76 of 80) and 99 percent (101 of 102) of available positions in Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively.

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\(^{15}\) This figure includes the 30 positions eliminated or proposed for elimination in the reorganization and Department-mandated staffing reductions plus the 21 vacant Civil Service positions awaiting the end of the hiring freeze.

\(^{16}\) Primary hardship factors in SCA are terrorism, political violence, harassment, environmental conditions, medical and hospital services, sanitation, social isolation, and education.
Staffing for Embassy Dhaka Was an Unmet Priority

Despite success in filling positions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, too few bidders showed interest in serving at several other posts in the region. One example is Embassy Dhaka. Bangladesh is a U.S. partner in the fight against transnational terrorism and in fostering democracy, trade, and stability in the region. At the time of the inspection, it was also absorbing refugees due to the ongoing Rohingya refugee crisis. Because it did not have SCA’s ability to offer additional benefits to its bidders, Embassy Dhaka could not compete with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it was left chronically underbid and understaffed.

As of November 1, 2017, 44 of 66 U.S. Department positions at Embassy Dhaka were filled. In October 2017, Embassy Dhaka received bids on 10 of 17 available positions, most for summer 2018. OIG advised SCA to work with the Bureau of Human Resources to find ways to staff this important post, such as 1-year tours of duty, individual waivers of the mandatory retirement age, extensions of time-in-service or time-in-class limits, or directed assignments.17

Bureau Leadership Gave Priority to Creating a Home Bureau Concept

The Acting Assistant Secretary assessed that one way to recruit and retain a cadre of professionals committed to the region and its issues was to emphasize a distinct SCA identity—a home bureau for both Foreign Service and Civil Service officers. The “SCA brand” would build on the bureau’s strengths, including negotiation, post-conflict development, diversity, and public diplomacy. Other regional bureaus have larger domestic offices and a wider range of overseas posts, from family friendly posts to unaccompanied hardship posts, to attract officers to repeat assignments. OIG found that the home bureau concept resonated with many SCA staff, who told OIG they were motivated by their contributions to U.S. diplomatic and national security goals and intended to seek more assignments in the region.

Eligible Family Member Employment Was a Significant Management Challenge

The 10 management officers in the region who responded to OIG’s field survey cited restrictions on eligible family member (EFM) employment as the most significant management challenge. The 10-month-long Department-wide hiring freeze prevented overseas posts from filling vacant EFM positions without specific exemption. The Department gave SCA hiring exemption to fill 86 of 213 newly vacant positions in 2017 (20 in Afghanistan, 28 in Pakistan, and 38 for the remainder of SCA countries). Nonetheless, 283 of 429 EFM positions were still vacant as of November 2017. This vacancy rate is of concern because EFM employment plays an important role in recruitment at posts that are difficult to staff. EFMs also fill essential jobs that enhance health, safety, and security such as security escorts, visa biometric clerks, and nurse practitioners.

POLICY AND REGIONAL OFFICES

At the time of the inspection, SCA had five geographic policy offices (Afghanistan Affairs; Pakistan Affairs; India Affairs; Central Asian Affairs; and Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs)

17 A precipitous decline in bidder interest occurred after political unrest in 2015 and a subsequent terrorist attack in 2016.
and two regional offices (Press and Public Diplomacy, and Regional Affairs). By the conclusion of the inspection, the bureau had consolidated the Office of Regional Affairs and the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy under one DAS; similarly, SCA consolidated the Office of Afghanistan Affairs and the Office of Central Asian Affairs under an Acting DAS. However, SCA had yet to rename the Office of Regional Affairs as the Office of Security and Transnational Affairs or merge the Office of India Affairs with the Office of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs.

Geographic Policy Offices

*Geographic Policy Offices Provided Effective Support to Overseas Missions*

SCA’s five geographic policy offices effectively supported overseas posts. As described in 1 FAM 013.1-4, 114.1(a)(1) and 114.1(b), country directors serve as a single focus of responsibility for leadership and coordination for Department and interdepartmental activities for their assigned countries. All 10 Deputy Chiefs of Mission who responded to OIG’s field survey agreed or strongly agreed that their country desk officers supported their needs. Nine of the 10 agreed or strongly agreed that the bureau represented their equities in Washington. OIG also found that the policy offices had developed productive interagency relationships.

*Two Geographic Offices Needed to Review Staffing*

OIG found that the Office of Afghanistan Affairs had an imbalance in its internal work distribution that resulted in extensive uncompensated overtime by its senior office leadership. The S/SRAP merger compounded this imbalance with the departure of a NATO liaison and experts in peace and reconciliation. Although SCA planned to rebuild those capacities when the hiring freeze ends, OIG advised the Office Director to take interim steps to address the problem. Specifically, OIG suggested distributing the office’s workload more evenly among employees to build greater expertise and develop staff, in accordance with 3 FAM 1214.  

SCA’s plan to merge the Office of India Affairs and the Office of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs as part of the bureau’s reorganization would eliminate seven employees and contractors from the combined office. Bureau personnel expressed doubt that the new structure would be sufficient to manage unanticipated events on the subcontinent, such as the refugee crisis in Bangladesh. OIG concurred and advised bureau leadership to reassess the planned staffing and structure of the combined office to ensure that it would be appropriately resourced and organized.

**Office of Press and Public Diplomacy**

The Office of Press and Public Diplomacy (PPD) effectively ensured that public diplomacy considerations and public opinion abroad were integrated into bureau strategic planning and policy development, as outlined in 1 FAM 114.2. PPD also provided strategic direction and support to overseas posts on public diplomacy programs and resources. The office’s Press Unit

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18 At the time of the inspection, the administration had not foreclosed the idea of situating a Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan elsewhere in the executive branch. Any decision to establish such a position outside the Department would affect the scope and focus of the Office of Regional Affairs.
coordinated the bureau’s fast-paced, often high-level press messaging. OIG found the Press Unit was consistently responsive to bureau leadership and to senior counterparts in the Department and the National Security Council. The unit also managed digital media outreach to U.S. audiences and supported engagement by SCA embassies with the largest overseas social media audience of any Department regional bureau.\(^\text{19}\)

**Office Was Working to Overcome Years of Leadership Gaps**

The office met its core operational goals despite a long-standing pattern of leadership gaps. Between 2014 and this inspection, one PPD office director and two deputy directors curtailed before concluding their 2-year assignments, and the Public Diplomacy DAS position was filled mostly on an acting basis by six different people. The current Office Director spent most of 2017 without a deputy while also serving as acting DAS from December 2016 until October 2017. PPD personnel consistently described to OIG the negative effect of absent or overstretched leadership on morale and operations. As the inspection started, a Deputy Office Director and newly designated DAS had just come on board, allowing the Office Director to return full-time to her normal duties. In interviews with OIG, staff welcomed the return to a fully staffed leadership structure and believed that the office was on a positive trajectory. Office leadership had begun to review office policies and procedures. In addition, consistent with 3 FAM 2162(a)(b), the Office Director sought to regularize and rebalance an office workforce that in 2016 had more contractors (11) than either Civil Service (10) or Foreign Service (9) positions. In late 2016, PPD converted four contractor positions to Civil Service and intended to complete additional personnel moves as soon as the Department’s hiring freeze was lifted to reduce reliance on contract staff in permanent portfolios.

**Grants Unit Effectively Oversaw Department’s Largest Public Diplomacy Grants Portfolio**

The PPD Grants Unit provided comprehensive oversight of the Department’s largest regional public diplomacy grants portfolio, with 445 open grants totaling $205 million at the time of the inspection. OIG reviewed 20 grants from FY 2016 and FY 2017 totaling more than $27 million and found them to be in compliance with the Department’s Federal Assistance Directive.\(^\text{20}\) Although embassy Public Affairs Sections executed all public diplomacy grants in the field, the unit’s grants officers had direct responsibility for all awards of more than $250,000 (166 open grants totaling $170 million). In an approach unique among the Department’s regional bureau public diplomacy offices, SCA formed the Grants Unit in 2010 to oversee the rapidly expanding

\(^\text{19}\) SCA embassies maintained a total of 25 Facebook pages that reached more than 19 million followers who engaged the content nearly half a million times per week. This engagement was led by the embassies in Pakistan and Bangladesh, each of which had approximately 5 million followers. More than 1 million followers engaged SCA embassy Twitter accounts more than 10,000 times per week.

\(^\text{20}\) OIG examined the largest FY 2016 public diplomacy grants for which the PPD Grants Unit had direct responsibility in Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, consisting of 12 grants accounting for just over 50 percent of all grant money awarded in those countries during FY 2016. OIG also considered the largest FY 2017 grants at the time of inspection in each of those four countries as well as in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Those eight grants represented just under 50 percent of the FY 2017 grant money that had been awarded at the time of the inspection in those six countries.
public diplomacy grant and cooperative agreement awards for Pakistan and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{21} Although more than 80 percent of the unit’s portfolio remained focused on those two countries, the unit supports the entire SCA region.

**Evaluation of Major Programs Would Improve Decision Making**

The Grants Unit had not commissioned formal evaluations of its major programs as encouraged by the Department’s Evaluation Policy in 18 FAM 301. The policy states that “all bureaus and independent offices are encouraged to conduct evaluations to improve their programs, projects, management processes, service delivery, or performance at a rate commensurate with the scale of their work, scope of their portfolio, [and] size of their budget.” The Department’s guidance on grants allows performance evaluation to be built into program costs. Since FY 2014, PPD has maintained contracts with two outside firms to assist Public Affairs Sections in Afghanistan and Pakistan with strategic planning, monitoring, and evaluation. PPD actively engaged the contractors for support in the first two areas but not for evaluations.\textsuperscript{22} Despite the unusually large program investments in these two countries, PPD had asked the firms to conduct only one major program evaluation in the 2 years prior to this inspection: a Congressionally mandated review of the Fulbright program in Pakistan. OIG urged the Grants Unit to increase evaluation of major programs to meet the Department’s evaluation policy goals of developing “evidence for better decision making” and to help the Department “measure results, provide inputs for policy, planning and budget decisions, and assure accountability.” Although not required, formal program evaluations would build on the unit’s strong program of individual grant monitoring.

**Spotlight on Success: A Model for Public Diplomacy Grants Training and an Innovative Template for Risk Assessment and Monitoring**

SCA’s Office of Press and Public Diplomacy used a multi-track training and support program to maintain effective grants administration in Afghanistan and Pakistan despite high turnover of U.S. officers and locally employed staff. During FY 2016 and FY 2017, the office’s Grants Unit trained an average of 35 Foreign Service officers each summer, held in-country and regional trainings attended by up to 70 locally employed staff, conducted regular interactive on-line sessions that reached between 5 and 60 people each, and held weekly conference calls with Grants Officer Representatives in Kabul and Islamabad. OIG’s most recent inspections of Embassy Kabul and Embassy Islamabad found well-administered grants programs at both posts, demonstrating the success of these training and support efforts.\textsuperscript{23}

Additionally, in FY 2017, the Grants Unit created and gained Department approval for a new risk assessment template customized for overseas public diplomacy grants. The template

\textsuperscript{21} The budget for public diplomacy operations in Afghanistan increased from $1.5 million in FY 2009 to $121 million in FY 2010. The budget for public diplomacy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, since the FY 2010 surge to date, has been funded through a mix of Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds) and Diplomatic Engagement Funds (.7 Public Diplomacy funds, both base Enduring Appropriations as well as Overseas Contingency Operations funds).

\textsuperscript{22} These contracts were indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity contracts, and contractors were paid only for work actually undertaken.

generates the elements for each grant’s monitoring plan based on the risk inputs—an innovation that the Department should consider replicating more generally to address what OIG previously had identified as a global pattern of non-compliance with risk assessment and monitoring plan requirements.24

Office of Regional Affairs

Office of Regional Affairs Provided Useful Support for Regional Initiatives

The Office of Regional Affairs generally supported SCA’s Front Office, geographic policy offices, and overseas posts. With the exception of weaknesses discussed below, OIG found that the office was effective as the bureau nexus for a broad range of political, political-military, and economic and commercial functions. Eight of 10 overseas posts that responded to OIG’s field survey stated that the office effectively supported their needs, as did the India, Central Asia, and Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh country directorates.25 During the inspection, the Office of Regional Affairs helped spearhead the development of a security architecture for the Indian Ocean region to support the President’s new South Asia strategy.

According to 1 FAM 175.5, the Director of the Office of Regional Affairs is responsible for “coordinating issues affecting the region as a whole, or those that cut across the lines of responsibility of other country directorates.” The office provides specialized support to other SCA offices on issues such as strategic planning and budgeting, multilateral diplomacy, foreign assistance policy planning, coordination and program management, and Leahy vetting.26

Office Was in the Process of Clarifying Portfolios, Organization, and Procedures

OIG found the Office of Regional Affairs’ reorganization plans, priorities, and procedures unclear. These issues, together with unresolved internal personnel frictions, reduced the office’s effectiveness. For example, at the time of the inspection, the office was still exploring how best to provide policy support to the Afghanistan and Pakistan country directorates. It had not resolved capacity shortcomings in the unit responsible for Leahy vetting and had not determined how to integrate and staff new responsibilities for legislative affairs and the $1.4 billion Afghanistan and Pakistan foreign assistance portfolios. OIG found that office leadership had not fostered collaborative relationships among its senior experts.

Additionally, OIG found that the office failed to establish standard operating procedures, define contractor roles and responsibilities, or implement consistent monitoring and evaluation mechanisms to help SCA’s leadership assess the impact of bureau policy initiatives. Employees

25 OIG did not query the Office of Afghanistan Affairs and the Office of Pakistan Affairs on this issue because they rejoined SCA only a few weeks before the inspection.
26 The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the Department of State from furnishing assistance to foreign security forces if the Department receives credible information that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d.
told OIG that they were still awaiting the new Office Director’s guidance on other portfolio and staffing changes stemming from the bureau’s reorganization plan.  

During the inspection, and consistent with 3 FAM 1214, the Office Director and Deputy Office Director began developing standard operating procedures for the office and realigning workload distribution. They obtained funding to work with the Foreign Service Institute’s School of Leadership to strengthen office cohesion and organization. Finally, OIG encouraged the Office of Regional Affairs to work with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor to fund a Leahy vetting position, consistent with support the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor provides to other regional bureaus.

FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

Coordination and Collaboration on Non-Public Diplomacy Foreign Assistance Generally Positive

Other Department bureaus and Federal agencies told OIG that non-public diplomacy foreign assistance coordination with SCA, and with S/SRAP prior to its reintegration, generally was positive and well-managed. SCA coordinated policy decisions for more than $2.03 billion in FY 2016 foreign assistance funding for the Department and other agencies. It directly managed more than $47 million in non-public diplomacy foreign assistance funding in FY 2017 through a portfolio of grants, voluntary contributions, and interagency agreements. OIG reviewed unliquidated obligations balances and found that they were being managed in accordance with 4 FAM 225(a).

Bureau Lacked Consistent Executive-Level Oversight of Foreign Assistance

The Acting Assistant Secretary’s stated goal to prioritize assistance coordination over management of discrete foreign assistance programs was consistent with best practices and recommendations in past OIG reports. At the time of the inspection, the Office of Regional Affairs had begun to develop a plan for coordinating foreign assistance bureau-wide in accordance with that goal. However, SCA had no senior official with primary responsibility for overseeing the monitoring and coordination of foreign assistance and for ensuring allocation of resources in accordance with SCA policy goals. As described in 1 FAM 014.1a (2) and 1 FAM 014.1b (1) and (3), Department operations should be organized to support efficiency of operations, meet Department priorities, and improve internal management. SCA lacked consistent direction and oversight for the range of its assistance programs, making it difficult to

27 SCA planned to consolidate bureau-wide strategic planning capabilities and foreign assistance coordination and oversight in the Office of Regional Affairs (to be renamed the Office of Security and Transnational Affairs as part of the reorganization plan). At the time of the inspection, foreign assistance was dispersed among SCA’s geographic offices.


29 This situation preceded the merger of SCA and S/SRAP and was evident in each of the two operations before the merger.
coordinate assistance in the region across Federal agency boundaries and to match bureau resources to overall strategic goals. OIG advised the Acting Assistant Secretary that the DAS overseeing the Office of Regional Affairs was the logical person to assume responsibility for foreign assistance coordination.

**Bureau Lacked Reliable Mechanisms to Track Foreign Assistance**

OIG consistently has found that the Department lacks the information technology systems necessary to track and report foreign assistance data. In 2015, OIG issued a recommendation that the Department develop a comprehensive plan to address foreign assistance tracking and reporting requirements, a recommendation with which the Department concurred. In a 2017 compliance follow-up review, OIG found that the Department had made limited progress in implementing the recommendation and strengthened and reissued it. In the absence of a Department-wide system, bureaus like SCA with responsibility for managing foreign assistance must still track and manage their own programs to comply with internal control standards.

However, SCA lacked bureau-level mechanisms, such as spreadsheets, standard operating procedures, or other bureau-wide documentation of programs, grants, and interagency agreements, to track financial and program data for its foreign assistance programs. The Government Accountability Office’s *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, Section 13.04, states that an effective internal control structure requires data from reliable internal and external sources for program monitoring. SCA had no bureau-wide documentation of programs, grants, interagency agreements, funds, obligations, or expenditures. The lack of a tracking mechanism for all SCA foreign assistance programs precluded bureau leadership from implementing effective internal controls, providing an accurate accounting of its foreign assistance programs, and monitoring and evaluating its programs successfully.

For example, SCA returned or was scheduled to return to the Department of the Treasury $19.92 million in cancelled FY 2009-2014 foreign assistance funds designated for use by Embassy Kabul. OIG found that the bureau did not have a system for identifying funds that could be reclassified. Guidance in 4 FAM 084.2 states that allotments should be made to provide for effective and efficient funds management in carrying out the intent of Congress. Without a process to reclassify foreign assistance funds before they cancel, the bureau cannot do so and therefore cannot make full use of resources available for programs.

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31 OIG, *Compliance Follow-up Review: Department of State is Still Unable to Accurately Track and Report on Foreign Assistance Funds*, (ISP-C-17-27, June 2017)

32 Appropriations expire if unobligated at the end of their period of availability. Consistent with 31 U.S.C. § 1552, the account is canceled on September 30th of the 5th fiscal year after the period of availability for obligation ends, at which time any unexpended balances are returned to the Treasury general fund.

33 Most foreign assistance appropriations contain a statutory authority enabling the Department to extend the period of availability using a process called reclassification. If used fully, reclassification can minimize or eliminate the need to return foreign assistance funds to the Treasury, allowing for more efficient use of funding.
Recommendation 3: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should implement a bureau-wide process to track foreign assistance that fully obligates foreign assistance appropriations and identifies and reclassifies foreign assistance funds before the funds cancel. (Action: SCA)

Non-Public Diplomacy Grants Files Were Missing Documentation

OIG reviewed all 10 of SCA’s open, non-public diplomacy grants (totaling more than $16 million) and found deficiencies in 7. The Foreign Assistance Directive requires that bureaus carefully review program and financial reports to detect fraud and potential problems. One grant worth almost $10 million had no assigned Grants Officer Representative (GOR). That grant had no GOR evaluations on file, and it was also was missing multiple progress monitoring reports. Overall, 60 percent of the grants lacked GOR designation letters, and all grants more than 3 months old lacked GOR evaluation reports. Employees told OIG they were unaware that they had to provide regular evaluations and that the missing designation letters were due to personnel transfers or lack of file updates. Department directives for Federal financial assistance consistently have required that GORs monitor assistance awards, including performance progress and financial reports. Monitoring generally is documented through evaluation reports that assess recipient performance against the award objectives and goals and identify areas of concern or improvement. As OIG has previously reported, the failure to maintain appropriate oversight of grants results in an unacceptable lack of internal control and exposes the Department to significant financial risk.

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should complete and file monitoring reports, Grants Officer Representative designation letters, and Grants Officer Representative evaluation reports for its non-public diplomacy grants. (Action: SCA)

Some Non-Public Diplomacy Grants, Other Foreign Assistance Programs Lacked Performance Indicators

Performance indicators for some of the bureau’s non-public diplomacy grants and other programs did not include measureable, outcome-oriented targets or baselines, making assessment of program progress nearly impossible. As described in the Department’s Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit, Section 3, performance indicators must be directly related to the outcome-based objectives they measure. OIG reviewed the bureau’s

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34 Depending on the date of the grant at issue, different guidance applied. Grants Policy Directive 42 applied to two grants OIG reviewed with an award date prior to March 13, 2015. That directive requires monitoring to ensure adherence to programmatic and financial responsibility and that intended goals have been accomplished. The Foreign Assistance Policy Directive (Chapter 3.01) applied to one grant OIG reviewed with an award date on or after March 13, 2015, but before May 20, 2017, and requires that bureaus carefully review program and financial reports to detect fraud and potential problems. The Foreign Assistance Directive issued May 20, 2017, applied to seven grants.

35 OIG, Management Alert – Grants Management Deficiencies (MA-14-03, September 26, 2014).


37 SCA reported program objectives and results in two primary documents: the Operational Plan, which reported program objectives and funding for the program; and the Performance Plan Report, which was compiled for the
program level indicators and found that 8 of 11 indicators reported in SCA’s FY 2016 Performance Plan Report were based on outputs rather than outcomes. In addition, 8 of 11 indicators did not have targets for FY 2016-2018, and 10 of 11 did not have starting baselines for FY 2016. The Bureau Resource Request lacked all required indicators and data. Based on interviews, OIG was unable to determine if employees fully understood the difference between outcome and output measures. The lack of baselines or targets made it impossible to determine if projects were meeting expected minimums or, in fact, if there was any change at all as a result of the project. In short, the lack of outcome-based indicators made it impossible to determine whether the project had achieved the desired results, and, as a result, neither the bureau nor the U.S. Office of Foreign Assistance was able to make objective funding decisions.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should measure all its project objectives with indicators that meet Department guidelines and use those indicators in required reports. (Action: SCA)

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Office of the Executive Director

The joint EX office provides financial management, general services operations, human resources, information technology, and post management support functions. Management officers at SCA posts who responded to OIG’s field survey gave uniformly high scores for EX’s administrative support. SCA domestic personnel also gave the office above average scores for its administrative support services.

Specifically, OIG reviewed performance evaluation, Foreign Service assignments, telework, training, compensatory time, contractor oversight, post management support, and premium class travel. OIG determined that EX performed in accordance with Department guidance and policies, with the exceptions discussed below.

Government Technical Monitors Did Not Attend Mandatory Training

SCA direct-hire employees serving as Government Technical Monitors did not understand their roles in monitoring the performance of SCA’s 25 contractors, which included monitoring quantity of work hours and preventing performance of inherently governmental functions. To ensure such understanding, the Department of State Acquisition Regulation System, Subsection 601.604(d), mandates training for all Government Technical Monitors. However, 13 of the 15 direct-hire Government Technical Monitors responsible for contractor performance oversight had neither completed mandatory training nor had performed all of their contractor oversight tasks previous fiscal year’s results and described the program’s performance against select performance metrics. It also reported results in the Bureau Resource Request provided to U.S. Office of Foreign Assistance in the Department to justify funding requests.

An outcome indicator focuses on change and is a measure of the extent to which a program objective is being achieved. An output indicator is a measure of activity. Output indicators do not measure change; they answer the question, “What is the immediate product of the activity?” (Department Program and Management Toolkit, Appendix F: Glossary).
duties. SCA senior management had not enforced the training requirement. Government Technical Monitors who do not understand their duties cannot determine if contractors are working the appropriate number of hours or if they are performing inherently governmental functions.

**Recommendation 6:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should require all Government Technical Monitors to complete mandatory training. (Action: SCA)

**Civil Service Performance Appraisals Were Late**

At the time of the inspection, SCA supervisors had yet to complete 9 of 47 (19 percent) Civil Service performance evaluations for the 2016 rating cycle, 8 months after the due date, which is contrary to the requirements of 3 FAH-1 H-2823.1d. SCA had, however, completed all Foreign Service employee evaluation reports for the 2016-2017 rating cycle, demonstrating that the bureau was capable of timely completion of employee performance evaluations. OIG determined that senior management had not enforced Department standards for timely completion of Civil Service appraisals. Failure to complete annual performance assessments deprives employees of feedback to help them achieve individual career development objectives and Department goals.

**Recommendation 7:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should complete the nine remaining Civil Service performance appraisals for the 2016 rating cycle. (Action: SCA)

**Bureau Security Program**

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security’s designated bureau security officer oversaw SCA’s security program and assisted EX and 14 unit security officers in developing policies and procedures to protect classified information and bureau personnel. The bureau security officer also supported positive security practices by providing training and guidance to unit security officers. OIG reviewed bureau security program implementation and identified no issues that merited a recommendation. However, OIG identified minor deficiencies, such as incomplete security container and after-hours check sheets. The bureau took necessary corrective actions during the inspection to address these issues.
RECOMMENDATIONS

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs. The bureau’s complete response can be found in Appendix B.

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should institute a formal, periodic process to measure program and policy performance against strategic goals. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the process to measure program and policy performance.

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should conduct a second, more comprehensive review of its staffing and skills inventory to achieve a balance among meeting mission needs, delivering efficient service, and managing employees effectively. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the bureau’s comprehensive review of its staffing and skills inventory.

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should implement a bureau-wide process to track foreign assistance that fully obligates foreign assistance appropriations and identifies and reclassifies foreign assistance funds before the funds cancel. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the bureau has implemented a process to track and reclassify foreign assistance funds.

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should complete and file monitoring reports, Grants Officer Representative designation letters, and Grants Officer Representative evaluation reports for its non-public diplomacy grants. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.
OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the bureau completed and filed monitoring reports, Grants Officer Representative designation letters, and Grants Officer Representative evaluation reports for non-public diplomacy grants.

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should measure all its project objectives with indicators that meet Department guidelines and use those indicators in required reports. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the bureau is measuring project objectives with indicators that meet Department guidelines and using those indicators in required reports.

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should require all Government Technical Monitors to complete mandatory training. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that all Government Technical Monitors have completed mandatory training.

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should complete the nine remaining Civil Service performance appraisals for the 2016 rating cycle. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: In its February 7, 2018, response, the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG’s Reply: OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the bureau completed the nine remaining Civil Service performance appraisals for the 2016 rating cycle.
### PRINCIPAL OFFICERS

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<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Start date</th>
<th>Actual Title</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acting Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>Alice G. Wells</td>
<td>06/26/2017</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretaries</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acting)</td>
<td>Howard VanVranken</td>
<td>05/22/2017</td>
<td>EX Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Press and Public Diplomacy and Office of Regional Affairs**</td>
<td>Daniel N. Rosenblum</td>
<td>10/02/2017 (07/2014)*</td>
<td>DAS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Pakistan Affairs (Acting)</td>
<td>David J. Ranz</td>
<td>07/03/2017</td>
<td>DAS Designee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of India Affairs and Office of Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh Affairs (Acting)</td>
<td>Thomas L. Vajda</td>
<td>07/03/2017</td>
<td>India Affairs Office Director</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Afghanistan Affairs and Office of Central Asia Affairs (Acting)</td>
<td>Henry S. Ensher</td>
<td>10/02/2017</td>
<td>DAS Designee</td>
</tr>
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**Source:** Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

*Mr. Rosenblum served as DAS for the Office of Central Asia Affairs from 07/2014 until 10/2017.

**At the time of the inspection, the Office of Regional Affairs had yet to be renamed the Office of Security and Transnational Affairs.

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39 Reflecting a bureau in transition, the column labeled “position” refers to the job the named incumbents were doing as the inspection concluded. The column labeled “actual title” lists the position title the incumbents officially encumbered during the inspection.
APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted between September 5 and November 30, 2017, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector’s Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and BBG. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation**: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.

- **Resource Management**: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.

- **Management Controls**: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

OIG uses a risk-based approach to prepare for each inspection; reviews, circulates, and compiles the results of survey instruments, as appropriate; conducts interviews with Department and on-site personnel; observes daily operations; and reviews the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the review. OIG uses professional judgment, along with physical, documentary, testimonial, and analytical evidence collected or generated, to develop findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

For this inspection, OIG conducted 322 documented interviews. OIG reviewed responses to personal questionnaires from 120 SCA employees and contractors, 10 questionnaires completed by deputy chiefs of mission, and 14 questionnaires completed by overseas management officers. SCA shares an EX with the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. Because OIG reviewed most EX operations during the October 2016 Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs inspection, this inspection limited its review to those EX units or personnel that support SCA and its posts.
APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C.  20520

February 7, 2018

TO:  OIG – Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM:  SCA – Alice Wells, Senior Bureau Official

SUBJECT:  Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of SCA

SCA has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

OIG Recommendation 1: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should institute a formal, periodic process to measure program and policy performance against strategic goals. (Action: SCA)

Management Response: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) agrees with this recommendation and is proactively introducing new processes to implement Department cable 16 State 122756 (Subject: Implementation of Strategic Progress Reviews, New Managing for Results Website, and Program Design and Performance Management) by the June 1, 2019 deadline provided to the Department by F and BP.

In October 2017, SCA designated the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for SCA’s Office of Regional Affairs as the senior official in the bureau responsible for strategic oversight and ensuring “the bureau’s ability to adjust strategy and budgets to results and to determine the optimal allocation of resources.”

In January 2018, the Deputy Assistant Secretary concluded a consultation process within the SCA bureau, which included discussions with the Offices of Afghanistan (SCA/A), Pakistan (SCA/P), India (SCA/I), Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Bhutan (SCA/NSB), Press and Public Diplomacy (SCA/PPD), Regional Affairs (SCA/RA), and the Central Asia unit within the Office of the Coordinator of U.S. Assistance for Europe, Eurasia and Central Asia (ACE) of the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs to determine how SCA can better manage foreign assistance resources. Chiefs of Mission at all SCA posts were also consulted and provided input.

This process culminated in a set of recommendations for a new business model for foreign assistance that will integrate practices across SCA offices in order to improve effectiveness. This model integrates diverse and complex SCA assistance portfolios, while introducing new processes to strengthen the bureau’s strategic oversight function, including in compliance with the 2016 Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act and 18 FAM 300 regulations. SCA is currently conducting further consultations with other stakeholders, including the Office of the Director of Foreign Assistance (F), USAID’s Asia Bureau and Office of Afghanistan and
Pakistan Affairs, and various State Department bureaus, after which the new business model will be finalized and put into place.

SCA will build a combined foreign assistance team by merging functions and personnel across all its offices as part of the bureau’s ongoing reorganization. To ensure effective monitoring of the bureau’s strategic progress, we will systematize management processes and augment existing staff. We will build the new team around five essential functions of foreign assistance coordination: 1) Policy Coordination; 2) Programmatic Coordination; 3) Budgetary; 4) Oversight; and 5) Knowledge Management.

**OIG Recommendation 2**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should conduct a second, more comprehensive review of its staffing and skills inventory to achieve a balance among meeting mission needs, delivering efficient service, and managing employees effectively. (Action: SCA)

**Management Response**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) accepts this recommendation. The Acting PDAS, in close conjunction with appropriate offices in SCA, NEA-SCA/HR-EX and DGHR, are reviewing Department and Bureau goals, office structures and individual position descriptions to ensure a balance between meeting mission needs, delivering efficient service, and managing employees effectively. As a result, and with the benefit of more than six months operation as a fully merged bureau, SCA has adjusted its proposed integration plan to bolster staffing on the India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Desks, in the Office of Regional Affairs, in the Office of Press and Public Diplomacy, and in the Front Office.

**OIG Recommendation 3**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should implement a bureau-wide process to track foreign assistance that fully obligates foreign assistance appropriations and identifies and reclassifies foreign assistance funds before the funds cancel. (Action: SCA)

**Management Response**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) accepts this recommendation. SCA is collaborating with the Comptroller and Global Financial Services (CGFS) and other regional bureaus to offer Subject Matter Expertise (SME) on how to modify the Global Financial Management System (GFMS) to better track Foreign Assistance funds.

SCA uses the Department’s State Assistance Management System (SAMS), which allows SCA/RA and SCA/PPD to have more autonomy to obligate foreign assistance funds as SAMS integrates directly into GFMS. Some ESF funds are passed to SCA posts overseas for obligation via the Regional Financial Management System (RFMS) or SAMS. On a monthly basis, NEA-SCA/EX/FM will continue to provide Data Warehouse obligation reports to SCA/RA and SCA/PPD offices. SCA/RA and SCA/PPD will further review, assess, and document actions taken to reprogram foreign assistance funds before expiration, including requests to reclassify foreign assistance funds, in coordination with the SCA Deputy Assistant Secretary in charge of foreign assistance, BP, OMB, and the Hill.

**OIG Recommendation 4**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should complete and file monitoring reports, Grants Officer Representative designation letters, and Grants Officer Representative evaluation reports for its non-public diplomacy grants. (Action: SCA)

**Management Response**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) accepts this recommendation. SCA Program Officers (PO) and the Grants Officer Representatives (GOR) currently review quarterly progress, mid-term, and final reports from grantees to monitor and measure progress towards targets, challenges faced, and general compliance with agreement terms.
On a quarterly basis, SCA’s Regional Affairs Office (RA) will complete quarterly monitoring reports for non-public diplomacy grants. SCA will use a monitoring template designed by the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, which documents observations on project status, challenges, successes, project objectives/outcomes, burn rates, technical assistance needs, and follow up questions for grantees. The GOR will complete this award monitoring instrument and will share with the PO. These reports will be stored in the grantee monitoring file and will include all grants managed by the bureau including those implemented by country offices.

SCA will continue to collect and store GOR designation letters in the grantee pre-award files.

**OIG Recommendation 5:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should measure all its project objectives with indicators that meet Department guidelines and use those indicators in required reports. (Action: SCA)

**Management Response:** The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) accepts this recommendation. SCA links all program and project objectives to indicators. SCA uses standard indicators developed by the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources (F), however, depending on the unique objectives of certain projects custom indicators may be needed when standard indicators do not provide the level of specificity needed to properly measure project performance. Reporting on indicators is included in regular (quarterly and ad hoc) reports submitted by project implementers, which are reviewed by SCA Program Officers and Grant Officer Representatives. SCA also reports on indicators to track overall program progress and results in the Department-wide annual Performance Plan and Report (PPR). The PPR is a joint product developed in coordination with USAID, which also uses the F standard indicators.

As noted in the response to OIG Recommendation 1, the Deputy Assistant Secretary responsible for foreign assistance recently concluded a consultation process within the bureau to determine how SCA can better manage foreign assistance resources. This exercise culminated in an overall set of recommendations for a renewed business model that integrates various established practices across SCA offices that will strive to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

Prior to the recent consultation process, SCA’s Office of Regional Affairs was actively responding to standards established in the Foreign Aid Transparency and Accountability Act (FATAA) of 2016 and the 18 FAM 300. These responses included phasing out the previous program design framework for SCA regional Economic Support Fund foreign assistance in favor of a newly drafted framework. The new program was designed in consultation with the Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, and directly follows the new Department-wide Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit (PDPR). Section 4 of the toolkit provides clear, standardized guidance on indicator design and how they link to broader project and program objectives. The new toolkit-guided program design will take effect beginning with FY2017 regional program funds, and will be in full compliance with department guidelines for the design and use of indicators for monitoring and evaluation. This new program design can be used as a model and pilot to redesign other programs and funding streams within SCA.

The SCA Office of Press and Public Diplomacy (PPD) is launching a comprehensive process to implement program design, monitoring, and evaluation throughout the region this year. The SCA/PPD tool kit responds to the standards of the FATAA and 18 FAM 300, and combines aspects of the PDPR and the tool kit designed by the Office of Policy, Planning, and Resources for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, that specifically addresses the monitoring and evaluation of public diplomacy programs.
**OIG Recommendation 6**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should require all Government Technical Monitors to complete mandatory training. (Action: SCA)

**Management Response**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) accepts the recommendation. In February 2018, NEA-SCA/EX issued a Management Notice reminding all employees of the required training for newly appointed GTMs and the annual recertification requirement. NEA-SCA/EX/GSD will track completion of the trainings for accountability. All GTMs will be fully trained no later than April 30, 2018. NEA-SCA/EX has also implemented a system to track GTM training requirements and compliance.

**OIG Recommendation 7**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs should complete the nine remaining Civil Service performance appraisals for the 2016 rating cycle. (Action: SCA)

**Management Response**: The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) accepts the recommendation. Of the nine appraisals referenced in this recommendation, seven have been completed. NEA-SCA/EX/HR is working closely with the two remaining employees, both of whom served extended details outside the Department for the periods in question, and their supervisors of record to expedite completion of those two appraisals.
APPENDIX C: FY 2017 STAFFING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agency</th>
<th>U.S. Direct-Hire Staff&lt;sup&gt;a&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Locally Employed Staff&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
<th>Total Staff</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Department of State</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Authorized)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service Domestic</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>62</td>
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<tr>
<td>Civil Service Domestic</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>85</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Domestic</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>0</strong></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Service Overseas</td>
<td>1,060</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,060</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Service National</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>545</td>
<td>545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal Overseas</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,060</strong></td>
<td><strong>545</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,605</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,202</strong></td>
<td><strong>545</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,747</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

**Note:** Numbers reflect staffing as of October 1, 2017.

<sup>a</sup> Domestic total includes 3 reemployed annuitants, 2 detailees, but does not include 25 contractors. Overseas total includes 10 Civil Service staff on excursion assignments.

<sup>b</sup> Does not include 5,682 locally employed staff working under personal services agreement.
# APPENDIX D: FY 2017 FUNDING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Funding Accounts</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Traditional Overseas Program Funding</td>
<td>$89,199,591</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Diplomacy</td>
<td>$26,343,820</td>
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<tr>
<td>Diplomatic and Consular Programs Reimbursements</td>
<td>$30,110,179</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public Diplomacy – Afghanistan Operations</td>
<td>$725,000</td>
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<td>Public Diplomacy – Pakistan Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Representation</td>
<td>$540,500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Recycling</td>
<td>$600,880</td>
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<tr>
<td>International Cooperative Administrative Support Services</td>
<td>$370,734,550</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Service National Separation Liability Trust Fund</td>
<td>$1,921,776</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Unconditional Gift Funds</td>
<td>$545,889</td>
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<td>Overseas Conditional Gift Funds</td>
<td>$782</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overseas Commercial Fees</td>
<td>$56,710</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
<td>$166,713,924</td>
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<tr>
<td>Afghanistan Overseas Contingency Operations – Public Diplomcy</td>
<td>$14,093,946</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan Overseas Contingency Operations</td>
<td>$51,730,546</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pakistan Overseas Contingency Operations – Public Diplomcy</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal – Operational</strong></td>
<td>$773,554,093</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Assistance Funding Accounts</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Global Health and Child Survival</td>
<td>$492,607</td>
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<tr>
<td>Human Rights and Democracy Fund</td>
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<td>Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds and Overseas Contingency Operations)</td>
<td>$4,482,822</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Assistance (Assistance to Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia)</td>
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<td>Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds, Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Initiatives)</td>
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<td>Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds, State Global)</td>
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<td>Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds, South and Central Asia Regional Funds)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign Assistance (Economic Support Funds, Overseas Contingency Operations, Global War on Terrorism)</td>
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<td><strong>Subtotal – Foreign Assistance</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>$820,621,141</td>
</tr>
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**Source:** Created by OIG based on data furnished by the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>DAS</td>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFM</td>
<td>Eligible Family Member</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EX</td>
<td>Executive Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAM</td>
<td>Foreign Affairs Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GOR</td>
<td>Grants Officer Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDAS</td>
<td>Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPD</td>
<td>Office of Press and Public Diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>S/SRAP</td>
<td>Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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