



OIG HIGHLIGHTS

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What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent during October 2–October 26, 2015.

What OIG Recommended

OIG made 17 recommendations to U.S. Embassy Tashkent to strengthen consular management controls, expand the embassy's reporting and social media outreach, and improve interagency cooperation.

OIG made one recommendation to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to improve the seismic safety of the embassy's housing.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

March 2016

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs

Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan

What OIG Found

- The Ambassador steers the United States-Uzbekistan engagement in constructive ways, including the signing of agreements on counter-narcotics and the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.
- Washington end-users uniformly expressed satisfaction with Political/Economic Section reporting that provides the information needed to understand the United States-Uzbekistan relationship.
- American and locally employed staff members in Tashkent described the Ambassador's collaborative style, interest in a variety of views, and openness to suggestions, in keeping with the Department's leadership principles.
- The Consular Section did not comply with non-immigrant visa adjudication review standards, visa referral management and referral procedures, and consular management control requirements.
- The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations has not addressed the seismic risk by identifying suitable housing with the lowest possible risk to life safety as required by 15 Foreign Affairs Manual 252.6. The embassy has taken steps to prepare its staff for the aftermath of a major earthquake.
- The embassy's social media outreach is limited by its reliance on English, rather than Russian- and Uzbek-language material.
- The reporting and supervisory relationships among the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention regional office, its locally employed staff, the Political/Economic Section, and the Front Office are unresolved and contentious.
- Innovative Practice: The embassy produced a no-cost and reliable short message service for employees.



OIG

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors

ISP-I-16-12A

Office of Inspections

March 2016

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BUREAU OF SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS

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CONTEXT

Uzbekistan is a landlocked Central Asian country of more than 29 million people that borders Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan. Uzbekistan is under the authoritarian presidential rule of Islam Karimov, who was first elected president of an independent Uzbekistan in 1991. Transparency International rated Uzbekistan 166th of 175 countries in its 2014 Corruption Perceptions Index. Freedom House rated the country among the 10 "worst of the worst" in its 2015 Freedom of the Press report—a list that included Iran, Eritrea, Sudan, North Korea, and Turkmenistan. The Department Country Report on Human Rights for 2014 stated that the most significant human rights problems included torture and abuse of detainees by security forces; denial of due process and fair trial; an inability to change the government through elections; and widespread restrictions on religious freedom, including harassment of religious minority group members and continued imprisonment of believers of all faiths. The U.S. Secretary of State designated Uzbekistan as a Country of Particular Concern in 2014 for having "engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom."

In 2005, after the U.S. condemnation of the Uzbekistani Government's violent suppression of a public gathering in Andijan, the Uzbekistani Government severed the lease for the U.S. military base in the south that was supporting operations in Afghanistan, cut off military cooperation, closed most U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) partner organizations and most American non-governmental organizations, shut down American educational and cultural corners throughout Uzbekistan, and instituted strict controls on embassy communications and interactions with Uzbekistan authorities and the Uzbekistan people. In 2008, Washington and Tashkent began to re-engage, although the Government of Uzbekistan continues to limit official contacts and impose barriers to outreach activities.

Uzbekistan supports international efforts in Afghanistan, primarily by providing electricity, developing rail infrastructure connecting Afghanistan and Uzbekistan, and supporting the Northern Distribution Network logistics system serving North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Mission's strategic goals are to promote a sovereign and stable Uzbekistan, foster inclusive governance institutions, increase economic opportunities for Uzbek citizens, and improve perception of the United States and its values. USAID provided \$383.45 million in assistance to Uzbekistan during FY 1992–FY 2015. In FY 2015, the Department and USAID provided \$10.6 million in assistance, of which \$2.2 million was security related. The remainder was to improve the livelihoods of citizens through support for the agricultural sector, address the threat of infectious disease, increase citizen input into government decision making, and improve respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Additionally, the Department of Defense provided \$6.2 million in counter-narcotics assistance. In 2015, Uzbekistan received armored vehicles valued at \$49.6 million through the U.S. Excess Defense Articles program, for which the Government of Uzbekistan paid transportation costs estimated at \$20 million.

The U.S. Department of Defense, USAID, the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) are represented at the embassy. The Mission has a total authorized staff of 408, including 64 U.S. direct-hire positions. In FY 2015, the Mission's total budget was \$37.6 million, of which approximately \$15.4 million was for Department programs and operations. The new embassy compound was occupied in 2006.

OIG also conducted an assessment of embassy security, which is covered in a classified annex to this inspection report. The annex contains a discussion of the conduct of the security program and issues affecting the safety of mission personnel and facilities.

EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

OIG based the following assessments of the embassy's leadership on the results of 167 questionnaires completed by American and locally employed embassy staff members and 76 interviews conducted in Washington and at the embassy that included comments on Front Office performance and on the OIG's observation over 3 weeks of the Front Office's interactions with the Mission staff.

Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

American and locally employed embassy staff members told OIG of the Ambassador's collaborative style, interest in diverse views, and openness to suggestions, in keeping with the Department's leadership principles in 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (I) 1214. In mission-wide town hall meetings and other fora, the Ambassador has stressed the five values she wants the Mission to exemplify: gratitude, teamwork, partnership, opportunity, and balance. OIG observed her during country team meetings as she directed agencies and offices to coordinate on common issues, gave briefings on her meetings, listened to her staff, provided clear guidance and direction, and thanked individuals and offices for their work. She asked an officer who had recently attended an Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) course to brief an expanded country team composed of all U.S. direct-hire personnel on what he had learned. OIG observed her mixing freely with embassy staff in the corridors and cafeteria, participating in informal gatherings, and participating in community activities. American and locally employed staff members stated that they appreciated her visits to their offices and support for their programs.

The Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) arrived in mid-August after two assignments as director of offices dealing with the Central Asian region. The Ambassador has charged him with oversight of foreign assistance, interagency coordination, and internal management, including the First- and Second-Tour (FAST) staff program. Embassy staff members spoke positively of his accessibility and interest in their activities.

Execution of U.S. Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

The Ambassador brought years of regional experience to this assignment, with previous postings as U.S. Ambassador to the Kyrgyz Republic, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S.

Embassy in Kazakhstan, and as Director of the Central Asian Affairs office in Washington. Officials in Washington praised her interactions with their offices and her efforts to engage constructively with the Government of Uzbekistan, which is deeply suspicious of U.S. motives and goals and keeps the United States at arm's length. In the months since her arrival in January 2015, she has met with the President and key members of the government, including 10 meetings with the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Language in 2 FAM 113c(7), mandates that an ambassador maintain close relations with officials of host government departments, particularly those responsible for activities of major interest to the United States.

The Ambassador steers the U.S.-Uzbekistan engagement in constructive ways, including the signing of agreements on counter-narcotics and the U.S. Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act. She also reaffirmed that U.S. Government efforts to strengthen bilateral relations with Uzbekistan include a focus on the role of a vibrant and independent civil society. She posted on the embassy website a photo of herself with a prominent human rights activist whose mistreatment by Uzbekistan authorities the United States had raised to the Permanent Council of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Since 2006, the U.S. Secretary of State has designated Uzbekistan as a country of priority concern for limitations on religious freedom. With the Ambassador's support, embassy staff and visiting Department officials met with those religious communities willing to meet. Embassy representatives also attended a 2015 court case involving a lawsuit over government accusations of extremism.

Internal Controls

The Ambassador is aware of her chief of mission responsibilities in accordance with 2 FAM 022.7. She expressed support for internal controls, reminding the staff that fraud and misconduct cannot be tolerated, and reissuing management notices concerning illegal currency exchange and gift acceptance. The embassy has made it clear that action will be taken in accordance with regulations against those who cannot meet ethical standards. In the 14 months prior to the inspection, seven locally employed staff members were dismissed for misconduct or unethical behavior.

Prior to signing the 2015 Annual Chief of Mission Management Control Statement of Assurance, the Ambassador met with section heads and asked them to explain the vulnerabilities and controls in their sections. However, the Ambassador said she was unaware of the consular management control deficiencies described later in this report until OIG told her during this inspection.

OIG review of the Ambassador's claims for official residence and representational expenses and the embassy's gift records found a commitment to integrity and ethical values—in keeping with the first principle of internal control—that management should demonstrate a commitment to integrity and ethical values as set out in Government Accountability Office-14-704G Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government.

Attention to the Security of the Mission

The Ambassador has acted to fulfill the direction in the President's Letter of Instruction to Chiefs of Mission to take direct and full responsibility for the security of the U.S. Mission and all U.S. Government personnel on official duty abroad. The Regional Security Officer and other security personnel stated that the Ambassador and the DCM fully support the security program. OIG observed the Ambassador emphasize the importance of security in country team meetings, drawing attention to communication and other problems that had been revealed when two Molotov cocktails were thrown into the embassy compound in late September 2015. She also approved a review of the security memorandum of agreement between the embassy and the geographic Department of Defense combatant commander to ensure that security responsibilities are accurate with regard to Department of Defense personnel. Reaching beyond the official community as required by 2 FAM 113.1c(14) to advise, protect, and assist U.S. citizens abroad, the Ambassador hosted a town hall meeting for U.S. citizens. The purpose of the meeting was to reactivate the warden program¹ and explain to U.S. citizens what the embassy could and could not do in an emergency.

Earthquake Preparedness

In keeping with 12 FAH-1 H-741, embassy management has actively prepared for the aftermath of a major earthquake. Embassy leadership demands 100-percent participation in the embassy's emergency and evacuation radio network. Regardless of atmospheric and equipment challenges, an average of 84 percent of embassy staff members participated in monthly radio checks over the past 6 months. This percentage captures initial participation and does not count employees who missed the allotted times for radio checks but still eventually participated.

¹ Wardens are private U.S. citizens resident in the country who assist consular sections in disaster preparedness by alerting other resident U.S. citizens to emergency situations and passing on information from the embassy or Department (7 FAM 071 b).

Several embassy American employee homes are strategically located to support other American employees living in close proximity. These family rally points maintain redundant communications (radio and satellite phones), tents, large medical kits, food, stretchers, and excavation tools. Each of the nine homes visited by OIG maintained a crisis management kit in pre-positioned benches outside homes but inside each residence's compound. Each of these kits provides flashlights, batteries, medical kits, and enough food and water for four people for 3 days. The embassy staff completed a National Foreign Affairs

Training Center-sponsored crisis management exercise, with earthquake scenario in September 2014.

Tashkent Initiative Worthy of Emulation

The Ambassador has established 10 activities in which FAST staff must participate:

1. Do their own jobs well
2. Support embassy events
3. Write a substantive cable or official/informal
4. Act as control officer, site officer, or note taker
5. Participate in a community activity and act as a sponsor
6. Attend representational events, show up on time, and mingle
7. Learn Russian or Uzbek language and culture
8. Serve as duty officer
9. Speak in public
10. Build supervisory skills

Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leaders

The Ambassador and the DCM are committed to ensuring that the Mission's 17 FAST staff members (including those from other agencies) are well trained, properly counseled, and evaluated, as required by 3 FAM 2242.4a. In June 2015, the DCM and the FAST program coordinator recommended—and the Ambassador approved—a year-long FAST program schedule. The Ambassador and the DCM told OIG that their goal was for participants to gain exposure to the complete range of activities they will experience over their careers. Scheduled activities draw on the expertise of all embassy sections and agencies. The Ambassador herself hosted a brown bag on the topic of preparing events for ambassadors and senior visitors. In addition to scheduled activities, she arranged for FAST program participants to interact with visiting senior officials from the Department's Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs.

The FAST officers praised the embassy's program and the work of its coordinator, herself a FAST officer. At the time of the inspection, the FAST coordinator and the DCM were reviewing the results of a survey of FAST program participants to further tailor the program to their interests and needs.

Lack of a Representation Plan and Uneven Spending

Embassy Tashkent expended approximately \$13,000 of its \$21,418 in FY 2015 representational funding in the last 2 weeks of the fiscal year. Language in 14 FAM 221.2a addresses the

requirement to plan spending throughout the year. Embassy sections received budgets, but three of six sections had not used any representational funds by September 15, 2015. In addition, embassy personnel stated they had no representational plan to support the allocation of funds. The effect of not planning adequately is potentially wasteful spending at year end and demonstrates a lack of coordination among reporting, public outreach, and travel activities that should include use of representational funds.

Recommendation 1: Embassy Tashkent should implement a plan for expending representational funds throughout the fiscal year. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Interagency Working Groups Not Active

Embassy interagency working groups met infrequently, if at all, reducing their effectiveness in coordinating U.S. Government programs and policies across agencies. Embassy officers told OIG that informal exchanges of information within the mission were sufficient. Chiefs of Mission are charged under 18 FAM 005.1-6b and 18 FAM 005.1-7f with promoting a culture of interagency problem solving and leveraging a wide range of U.S. Government specialized expertise and assets under common objectives. The Law Enforcement Working Group did not meet during FY 2015. Implementation of end-use monitoring for \$49.6 million in armored vehicles was not coordinated among embassy offices that could benefit through their participation. USAID, CDC, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs all have assistance programs in the health sector. The embassy's Democracy Commission met semi-annually. The Political/Economic Section was unfamiliar with the largest U.S. Government democracy grant (\$990,000) managed by the Department.

Recommendation 2: Embassy Tashkent should institute regular meetings of the Law Enforcement Working Group, Democracy Commission, and Health Issues Working Group and include all relevant offices. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Relationship between Embassy and CDC Office Needs Improvement

The reporting and supervisory relationships among the CDC regional office at U.S. Consulate General Almaty and Embassy Tashkent's CDC locally employed staff, Political/Economic Section, and Front Office are unresolved and contentious. The Ambassador designated a Department officer to have daily oversight of—and the authority to task—locally employed CDC staff members stationed at Embassy Tashkent. This officer serves as the coordinator of CDC's operations in Uzbekistan in the absence of an American direct-hire CDC employee. However, the CDC regional supervisor in Almaty and the locally employed staff in Tashkent believe that such direction should come from the Almaty regional supervisors. CDC instructed its Tashkent staff to exclude the Department officer from its meetings. These conflicting instructions impacted the work of the Tashkent Political/Economic Section and CDC's locally employed staff. Officers from other embassy sections expressed concerns that the locally employed staff did not understand the rules of chief of mission authority or their obligations to participate, for example, in required embassy training. The effect is frustration and a climate of ill will among some locally employed

staff members, their regional supervisor, and the Political/Economic Section. CDC programs support the Integrated Country Strategy's health goals and receive funding from USAID and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, as well as CDC.

The President's Letter of Instruction and 2 FAM 113.1c(2), (3) charge Chiefs of Mission with having full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all U.S. Government Executive Branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander). Chiefs of Mission must keep fully and currently informed with respect to all activities and operations of the U.S. Government within that country and ensure that all U.S. Government Executive Branch employees in that country (except for employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander) comply fully with all applicable chief of mission directives.

Recommendation 3: Embassy Tashkent, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should resolve the reporting and supervisory relationship with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (Action: Embassy Tashkent, in coordination with SCA)

POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

Political/Economic Reporting

Washington end-users uniformly expressed satisfaction with Political/Economic Section reporting that provides the information needed to understand the U.S.-Uzbekistan relationship.

The Political/Economic Section's reporting plan focuses on the key elements of the Integrated Country Strategy. Challenges to completing the plan include personnel changes, the lack of an office management specialist, and the host government's system of requiring diplomatic notes for every meeting or activity. A law enacted in June 2015 requires non-governmental organizations to seek host government approval prior to meeting with personnel from any foreign government. These restrictions have made performing political/economic work in Uzbekistan even more difficult.

Political/Economic reporting is discussed further in the classified annex to this report.

Countering Violent Extremism

In keeping with Integrated Country Strategy goals, the Ambassador raises the threat the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant poses in Central Asia when she meets with Government of Uzbekistan officials. Embassy efforts to help Uzbekistan counter violent extremism are multifaceted. Political/Economic Section officers monitor anti-terrorism statements issued by Uzbekistan's civic and religious institutions, and the public affairs speakers program reaches out to religious audiences. The embassy works with Uzbekistani officials to secure dangerous radioactive materials and support non-proliferation. Programs organized by the Department and

USAID include countering violent extremism. Export Controls and Related Border Security programs and Drug Enforcement Administration programs train customs, airport, and border security officers to inspect for materials related to terrorist activity.

Embassy Does Not Use Record Emails

Embassy Tashkent and the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs exchange daily official-informal emails but never use record emails, as required in 5 FAM 443.2, even when the exchanges contain information that facilitates decision making and document policy formulation and execution. The embassy Front Office and the Political/Economic Section report that the State Messaging and Archive Retrieval Toolset (SMART), which is meant to record and retain record emails, is too cumbersome to use. Only the Consular Section uses record emails when sending reports on child abductions. Failure to use the SMART system hinders the Department's ability to retain and retrieve records, as required by the Federal Records Act.²

Recommendation 4: Embassy Tashkent should require that employees adhere to Department guidance and preserve record correspondence by using the record email system. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Political/Economic File Management Not in Accordance with Department and Federal Regulations

Embassy Tashkent does not enforce Department and Federal regulations on records management. The Political/Economic Section does not maintain centralized files. Officers have individual files based on their own filing systems that are maintained in personal folders. As a result, these files are not accessible to others and are not archived, retired, or readily retrievable if the action officer is absent or transfers. The problem is exacerbated by lack of an office management specialist in the section. The Federal Records Act³ and 5 FAM 410 require the Department to create and preserve records. Language in 5 FAM 414.5 and 5 FAH-4 H-214 requires a standardized filing by year, subject category, and geographic location for preserving record material, which includes substantive email reporting or deliberative process messages that are not sent by record email. The provisions of 5 FAH-4 H-218.3 require that electronic records be maintained in a manner that permits easy retrieval in a timely fashion.

Recommendation 5: Embassy Tashkent should implement a standardized filing system for the Political/Economic Section that complies with Department record management regulations. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

² Federal Records Act of 1950, as amended, 44 U.S.C. Chapters 31 and 33.

³ Ibid.

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) program is consistent with the embassy's Integrated Country Strategy goals and supports engagement with the host government by other agencies at the mission. The INL portfolio is focused on training law enforcement and judicial officials and conducting familiarization visits for host-government officials. The Grants Officer Representative for all INL grants is in Washington. For 2014, 25 INL activities totaled approximately \$389,000. The Political/Economic Officer responsible for INL programs received no INL training prior to arriving at the embassy in September 2015. Within a month of her arrival, she received a visit by INL Washington, had taken grants training via on-line courses offered by the Foreign Service Institute, and had applied to become a Grants Officer Representative.

Export Control and Related Border Security Cannot Conduct End-Use Monitoring

The Export Control and Related Border Security programs office was managed by temporary duty (non-accredited) U.S. officials for most of 2015. The office manages \$430,000 in annual programs. The Government of Uzbekistan mandates that only officials who it has accredited as resident diplomats can perform end-use monitoring. This requirement has precluded the office from conducting end-use monitoring of its assistance. End-use monitoring includes reporting on the disposition and use of Export Control and Related Border Security equipment provided to host governments.

Leahy Vetting

The embassy has been following the requirements for Leahy human rights vetting. Embassy Tashkent has processed more than 1,200 vetting cases over the past 3 years in accordance with Leahy laws and policies.⁴ Leahy laws and policies prohibit assistance to foreign security forces when credible information proves that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. The Department's Leahy vetting process assures that the Department has such information prior to providing training or assistance.

Political/Economic Section Personnel

The Political/Economic Section has no position for a U.S. direct-hire office management specialist. Until July 2015, the position was filled by an eligible family member. When that person departed, the position was advertised but no bidders have come forth. Lack of an office management specialist negatively impacts the section as officers try to add office management

⁴ The obligation to vet Department assistance and Department of Defense-funded training programs for foreign security forces units is in section 620M (a.k.a. the Leahy amendment) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and a comparable provision in the annual Department of Defense Appropriations Act. See <http://www.humanrights.gov/dyn/an-overview-of-the-leahy-vetting-process.html>.

specialist functions to their daily work responsibilities. OIG supports the embassy's FY 2017 Mission Resource Request for a U.S. direct-hire office management specialist position in the Political/Economic Section.

Public Diplomacy

The Public Affairs Section informs, engages, and influences Uzbekistani audiences in spite of the Government of Uzbekistan's restrictions that circumscribe the public diplomacy operating environment. These restrictions make it difficult for the embassy to engage with priority audiences, including youth, women, and civil society organizations. The embassy must request Government of Uzbekistan permission via diplomatic notes up to 30 days in advance to meet with government officials or citizens, to visit educational institutions, and to conduct cultural and exchange programs. Events may be canceled at the last minute. Further, the Government of Uzbekistan restricts its citizens from gathering in groups.

The section's Information Resource Center receives an average of 50 visitors daily who use the internet, read books, and participate in an English conversation club. The Information Resource Center could accommodate more users if the embassy had a larger U.S. Government-controlled space to house the center. The embassy's EducationUSA advising office offers virtual services to 7,000 Uzbekistani citizens and holds weekly sessions in person and via Skype. The Press Section conducts monthly press briefings and runs the embassy Facebook page.

Social Media Outreach in English, Not in the Languages of the Host Country

The embassy's social media outreach is hampered by its lack of Russian- and Uzbek-language material and its reliance on English. Russian media is understandably pervasive in Uzbekistan. A 2010 survey conducted by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe found that 90 percent of the population spoke Uzbek and 57–70 percent spoke Russian. English is the main compulsory foreign language taught in schools, but only 1 percent of respondents to a survey of students, teachers, professors, and bureaucrats use and read English. However, as of October, 92 percent of embassy tweets and 100 percent of ambassadorial tweets sent in 2015 were in English, as were the majority of Facebook entries. Embassy officials said that a strategic decision had been made in the past to offer the embassy's Facebook and other social media in English.

According to the Department's telegram, Social Media Guidance Cable #5: Social Media Strategy Framework for Overseas Missions (13 State 144458), dated October 18, 2013, embassies should set up opportunities for two-way engagement. It also states that an overarching strategic plan for social media engagement is essential to ensure that a mission's commitment of personnel and program resources delivers a measurable return on investment. The embassy cannot deliver its public diplomacy messages to the largest possible audience without using the language of the audience.

Recommendation 6: Embassy Tashkent should review its Public Affairs Strategic Plan and produce and implement a social media strategy to reach the Russian- and Uzbek-speaking audiences. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Programs Reach Audiences in Tashkent but Fewer Outside the Capital

The Public Affairs Section reaches a limited audience beyond Tashkent through exchanges, cultural presentations, and English-language programs and grants. English-language teaching is one area where the Government of Uzbekistan has solicited embassy cooperation to train English teachers. In 2015–2016, four English Language Fellows and Specialists will work at universities outside the capital. The embassy resumed its mini-scholarship program to teach English to 500 underserved youth outside Tashkent. Of the 234 grants (totaling approximately \$1.2 million) that the Public Affairs Section awarded in FYs 2014 and 2015, 77 (approximately \$525,000) were to implement projects partially or entirely outside Tashkent. OIG suggested that the embassy could expand its outreach by:

- Assisting exchange program alumni to organize communities of interest in sectors such as health, education, government, and civil society.
- Obtaining permission to offer education advising services and Department exchange programs at universities.
- Continuing to encourage the Ministry of Higher Education to establish U.S.-Uzbekistan university partnerships.
- Placing more English Language Fellows and Specialists in universities outside Tashkent.
- Creating more English mini-scholarship programs throughout the country.

Documentation of Risk Management and Monitoring of Grants Inadequate

The embassy does not document its risk management actions on grants awarded by its Democracy Committee, Alumni Outreach Committee, and Public Affairs Section and does not monitor and document performance of those grants, as required by the Federal Assistance Policy Directive Sections 2.03-A. and 3.01-C, dated March 13, 2015. OIG reviewed 15 Federal assistance files (totaling \$189,223) of the 54 FY 2015 grants (totaling: \$207,355) issued by the Public Affairs Section after March 13, 2015, representing 91 percent of the total value of those grants. The Public Affairs Officer stated that the embassy assesses a grant applicant's risk in achieving the award's objectives before making awards but does not document the assessments in grants files. Further, the embassy failed to create performance monitoring plans or conduct or document grant performance reporting for its grants. Failure to assess and document risk during the award period leaves the U.S. Government vulnerable to loss of funds, grantee fraud, or grantee failure to perform. Failure to develop and carry out a monitoring plan leaves the mission without the ability to verify that the grant objective is being carried out in the interest of the U.S. Government or that taxpayer dollars are well spent.

Recommendation 7: Embassy Tashkent should comply with the Federal Assistance Policy Directive for documentation of risk management and monitoring of grants. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Consular Management

The Consular Section experienced an average annual growth of 10 percent in immigrant visa applications and 20 percent in non-immigrant visa applications over the period FY 2010 through FY 2014. Applications increased from 3,629 to 3,957 for immigrant visas and from 9,728 to 16,180 for non-immigrant visas. Uzbekistan ranked third worldwide in the number of entrants in the 2015 Diversity Visa lottery, with approximately 1.4 million, increasing the complexity of the immigrant visa unit workload. In 2015, the Bureau of Consular Affairs added a FAST officer position in recognition of the increased visa workload. The section's U.S. citizen services workload is low, averaging 94 passport and 10 Consular Reports of Birth Abroad applications per year. This number has remained stable over the past 5 years. The Consular Section staff is cross-trained and functions as a single team.

Non-Compliance with Consular Management Controls

In five areas, the embassy does not comply with management control requirements for overseas posts, as delineated in 7 FAH-1 H-630-660, "Consular Management Controls." The FAH requires an Accountable Consular Officer (ACO), a Consular Systems Administrator (CSA), and a back-up for each. The ACO is responsible for daily oversight of fee collection and consular internal controls. The CSA assigns systems user roles that control access levels to consular systems. Officers designated as ACO and CSA should be tenured officers.⁵ The embassy has designated the Consular Section Chief as both ACO and CSA.

Areas where the Consular Section does not comply with 7 FAH-1 H-630-660 are:

- The embassy designated two back-up ACOs and CSAs, one of whom is untenured.
- During the period October 5–21, 2015, OIG observed that the ACO was not present to oversee the section's opening procedures. The ACO arrived at the office after the cashier had opened every day. Back-up ACOs should not routinely perform ACO duties.
- No transfer of accountability for controlled items from the ACO to the back-up ACO has been done since the ACO's arrival in September 2014, despite the ACO's extended absence on at least two occasions that would have required it.
- All four officers in the Consular Section have the combination to the ACO safe where controlled items are stored. Only the ACO and back-ups should have access to the ACO safe.
- Locally employed staff members have been granted higher-level access to consular computer systems than their positions require. Granting higher level access to computer systems increases risk and reduces accountability.

⁵ A tenured employee is an employee who has, within a 5-year probationary period, been conferred career status in the Foreign Service. Employees are reviewed for tenure by the Department's Commissioning and Tenure Board.

The Consular Section Chief did not identify these management control deficiencies in his reported review of consular management controls as had been certified in the Section's 2015 Annual Certification of Consular Management Controls. The section reported only minor discrepancies in management control requirements in six areas. The section did not report the major areas of non-compliance identified by OIG during this inspection, including improper assignment of consular systems access roles, the secure handling of controlled items, pre-screening of visa applicants by the local staff that encroaches on adjudication, non-immigrant visa adjudication reviews, and procedures and adjudications in the non-immigrant visa referral program. Management controls maintain the integrity of consular operations. When not implemented, the policies and procedures to prevent waste, fraud, mismanagement, and malfeasance are compromised.

Recommendation 8: Embassy Tashkent should implement an internal consular management controls program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Visa Referral Program Not Compliant with Visa Referral Systems Policy

The embassy did not comply with the visa referral management and referral procedures in the Worldwide Non-Immigrant Visa Referral Policy as described in 9 FAM Appendix K "Visa Referral Systems." OIG found referral form or data entry errors in 39 (45 percent) of the 86 visa referral cases adjudicated in FY 2015. In 58 cases (67 percent), the case notes did not document properly the validity of the referral or the adjudicating officer's decision. FAST officers adjudicated a total of 41 referral cases, including 33 cases that should have been adjudicated by the Consular Section Chief. The section's annual validation study on 2014 referrals was 4 months overdue. These errors occurred because the embassy did not comply with the visa referral management and referral procedures. A non-compliant referral program inhibits the ability to identify individual instances or patterns of fraud or abuse.

Recommendation 9: Embassy Tashkent should comply with the Worldwide Non-immigrant Visa Referral policy. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Visa Adjudication Reviews are Not Compliant with Standards

The embassy does not comply with the non-immigrant visa adjudication review standards in 9 FAM 41.113 PN17 (Review of Visa Issuances) and 9 FAM 41.121 N2.3-7 (Internal Review of Refusals), which require that reviews be performed on the day of issuance or refusal, or as soon as possible thereafter. OIG examined FY 2015 adjudications through September 20, 2015. The adjudication reviews of visa issuances did not meet the review standards for 73 percent of the 219 work days on which visas were issued and for 76 percent of the 184 work days on which visas were refused. The Regional Consular Officer based in Frankfurt reported to the Bureau of Consular Affairs and the embassy that the Consular Section Chief had not conducted any reviews between December 12, 2014, and May 26, 2015. OIG found that the Consular Section Chief had not conducted any reviews between July 2, 2015, and September 20, 2015. Systematic, regular reviews of non-immigrant visa adjudications are an important management and instructional tool to maintain the highest professional standards of adjudications. Such reviews

also ensure uniform and correct application of law and regulations and enhance U.S. border security. Absent such reviews, adjudicator training and uniformity of adjudications can be irregular and border security compromised.

Recommendation 10: Embassy Tashkent should comply with the Non-immigrant Visa Adjudication Review standard. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Consular Workspace Does Not Permit Adequate Line of Sight

The Consular Section workspace configuration does not comply with the "open and visible" work environment line of sight standard in 7 FAH-1 H-281 and 7 FAH-1 H-282, "Space Management." Panels exceeding the 42-inch standard separate the interview windows from the main work area. OIG learned this was done to protect the privacy of locally employed staff members. The Section added shelves to workstations that further obscure the line of sight. Work stations and offices for adjudicating officers to provide the greatest possible range of overlapping lines of sight are absent throughout the section. As a result, officers and supervisors cannot monitor operations, controlled items, printing stations, most of the central work area, interview windows, or the cashier booth to identify any occurrences of theft or malfeasance.

Recommendation 11: Embassy Tashkent should configure the Consular Section to comply with Department line of sight standards. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

Table 1: FY 2015 Staffing and Funding, by Agency

Agency	U.S. Direct-Hire Staff (authorized)	U.S. Local-Hire Staff (authorized)	Foreign National Staff (authorized)	Total Staff (authorized)	Total Operations FY2015 Funding	Total Foreign Assistance FY2015 Funding	Total Funding FY_2015
Department of State							
Diplomatic & Consular Programs	22	1	16	39	\$1,751,343		\$1,751,343
ICASS	7	13	254	274	\$8,576,300		\$8,576,300
Public Diplomacy	3	2	16	21	\$755,657	\$300,000	\$1,055,657
Diplomatic Security	4	0	7	11	\$354,482		\$354,482
Marine Security	8	0	4	12	\$121,000		\$121,000
Representation	0	0	0	0	\$25,217		\$25,217
Overseas Buildings Operations	1	0	0	1	\$1,534,939		\$1,534,939
International Narcotics & Law	0	0	1	1	\$73,000	\$740,000	\$813,000
ISN Export Control Coordination	1	0	2	3	\$117,000	\$540,000	\$657,000
Consular	4	1	9	14	\$468,555		\$468,555
Subtotal	50	17	309	376	\$13,777,493	\$1,580,000	\$15,357,493
Department of Defense							
Defense Attaché Office	4	0	2	6	\$227,218		\$227,218
Office of Military Cooperation	3	0	3	6	\$1,298,900	\$1,150,000	\$2,448,900
Army - Strategic Leadership Division Office	1	0	0	1	\$40,511		\$40,511
Army - Distribution Command	0	0	1	1	\$40,000		\$40,000
Special Projects Air Force - Counter Narcotics*	2	0	1	3	\$178,500	\$9,300,000	\$9,478,500
Defense Threat Reduction Agency	1	0	2	3	\$185,379		\$185,379
Subtotal	11	0	9	20	\$1,970,508	\$10,450,000	\$12,420,508
Department of Justice							
Drug Enforcement Administration	3	0	3	6	\$175,000		\$175,000
Subtotal	3	0	3	6	\$175,000		\$175,000
Department of Agriculture							
Department of Agriculture	0	0	1	1	\$25,000	\$50,000	\$75,000
Subtotal	0	0	1	1	\$25,000	\$50,000	\$75,000
Health and Human Services							
Center for Disease Control	0	0	5	5	\$500,000	\$750,000	\$1,250,000
Subtotal	0	0	5	5	\$500,000	\$750,000	\$1,250,000
USAID							
USAID	2	1	7	10	\$523,000	\$7,841,000	\$8,364,000
Subtotal	2	1	7	10	\$523,000	\$7,841,000	\$8,364,000
Totals	64	17	327	408	\$16,448,001	\$12,830,000	\$37,642,001

Source: Embassy Tashkent

Management Operations

The Department's overall 2015 International Cooperative Administrative Support Services score for Embassy Tashkent is 4.30 on a scale of 1 to 5, which exceeds both the regional and worldwide service scores. No service is rated below 4.00. Work and quality of life scores in OIG questionnaires exceeded the scores OIG collected for 117 diplomatic missions and posts over the past 5 years in 27 of 32 categories.

The Management Section led several cost-cutting and communication initiatives such as developing a comprehensive International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

improvement plan, reducing overtime costs for locally employed staff members by 25 percent in a single year, and implementing an embassy greening initiative.

The Management Counselor has yet to take the leadership training course that coincides with his grade level required by 13 FAM 312.2. OIG advised him to do so as soon as possible.

Seismic Studies of Embassy Housing

Embassy personnel occupy eight residences that received seismic hazard rating of “Very Poor” and eight residences that received seismic ratings of “Poor” in a 2012 Bureau of Overseas Operations (OBO) study. Embassy personnel occupy 38 (of a total of 54) residences that have not been evaluated for seismic adequacy, as required by 15 FAM 252.6. Tashkent is located in an active seismic zone. An earthquake almost completely destroyed the city in 1966. The OBO Natural Hazard program categorizes Tashkent as having a “very high” seismic risk. In accordance with 15 FAM 252.6d, embassies in high-risk seismic areas must address the seismic adequacy of residential units and seek housing that is the best suited for high-risk seismic areas. OBO has not addressed the findings of the 2012 study to reduce the seismic risk of the housing pool.

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Embassy Tashkent, should develop and implement a plan to mitigate the seismic risk in the embassy’s housing pool. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Embassy Tashkent)

Use of the Former Embassy Chancery Building for Public Events

The embassy moved to its new embassy compound in 2006. The former chancery, for which the United States paid \$2.45 million in advance for a 49-year lease, has been used for storage since then. In FY 2015, \$68,600 was spent to maintain the property. The building received a poor seismic rating in a 1996 survey. According to OBO, a 1998 seismic improvement study of the chancery estimated the cost of seismic strengthening at \$12.2 million. Planning for renovating the chancery was suspended when the Department decided to construct the new embassy compound. OBO officials told OIG that if a decision was made to use the old structure, a new study would be needed.

The embassy has begun to use the former chancery compound grounds—but not the chancery building itself—for public events. Embassy officials told OIG that the embassy would like to establish a new Information Resource Center in the building to expand public access. OIG advised the embassy to make a formal request to the Department for a seismic study and cost estimate.

Oversight of the Community Liaison Office Should be Clarified

The Management Officer directs activities of the Community Liaison Office (CLO) in violation of the terms of a nepotism waiver issued by the Office of Overseas Employment. The waiver specified that the Management Officer would not exercise purview over the CLO where his

spouse would be employed as an assistant. The Department directed that the DCM supervise the CLO and, should the Management Officer act as DCM, that his spouse be placed in Leave Without Pay Status. This supervisory relationship, whereby the DCM would supervise the entire CLO, avoided conflict with the prohibited conditions outlined in 3 FAH-1 H-8313. The determination stipulated that the embassy "take particular care" to ensure that personnel were aware of the reporting and supervisory arrangements in order to maintain internal controls and to ensure full compliance with ethics and nepotism laws. Nepotism leads to lowered morale, favoritism, and discrimination.

OIG found that the CLO staff meets periodically with the Management Officer without the DCM. Also, the Management Officer gives direct guidance to the staff, such as requesting that they accompany the maintenance teams as they perform pre-arrival housing inspections for American employees. The work requirements statements for the CLO staff designate the Management Officer as their direct supervisor. The DCM did not have the supervision of the CLO function as an element of his work requirements statement and did not enforce the terms of the waiver. The statement was revised during the inspection to include this responsibility.

Recommendation 13: Embassy Tashkent should implement the terms and conditions of the nepotism waiver regarding supervision of the Community Liaison Office. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

General Services Office

Contracting Officer's Representative Information Not Updated in Department Database

Two of 12 embassy Contracting Officer's Representatives are not listed in the Office of the Procurement Executive's online database, as required by the office's Procurement Information Bulletin No. 2012-15 Para 4 c. In addition, the database information for 7 of 10 Contracting Officer's Representatives is not current. The embassy staff was not aware that the information was not current, because they did not know how to generate a report of all entries. Absent such information, the Department and the embassy's Contracting Officer cannot verify the certification status of its Contracting Officer's Representatives.

Recommendation 14: Embassy Tashkent should, in coordination with the Office of the Procurement Executive, update the Contracting Officer Representative information in the online database. (Action: Embassy Tashkent, in coordination with A/OPE)

All Drivers Need Safe Driver Training

None of the 17 American mission personnel who are authorized to drive U.S. Government vehicles has received safe driving courses from instructors certified to teach the Smith System® Safe Driver Training® or other recognized safe driving courses approved by the Department's Office of Safety, Health, and Environment Management. Such training is required of all operators by the Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program for Overseas Posts, Chapter F Subchapter 4 (a) and (b) and 14 FAM 432.4c. This requirement applies to all employees under chief of mission

authority (14 FAM 432.4c). The embassy motor vehicle policy does not state that this requirement applies to all employees. The lack of safety training potentially increases the risk of vehicle accidents.

Recommendation 15: Embassy Tashkent should revise its motor vehicle policy to require compliance with Department guidance for driver training. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Unneeded Property Accumulated in Warehouse

The Department's Asset Management system identifies 525 items of embassy property—out of a total of approximately 3,300 items—that are due for replacement but have not been evaluated for appropriate disposition quarterly, as required by 14 FAH-1 H-712.2-2a. Embassy officials stated that they were unable to auction unneeded items in fall 2015 because the embassy lacks a suitable display area. According to 14 FAH-1 H-711, disposable property should not be allowed to accumulate in offices or warehouses. OIG observed a full warehouse with no free shelves and six shipping containers on the compound used to supplement warehouse space. Overcrowded warehouses and use of containers does not ensure that all personal property is controlled as prescribed in 14 FAM H-414 and undermines a secure, safe, efficient, and economical warehousing program, as required in 14 FAM 413.7.

Recommendation 16: Embassy Tashkent should dispose of unneeded items in accordance with Department property management policies. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Information Management

The Information Management Section meets the embassy's IT requirements. The section received an A+ rating from the Department's network and systems monitoring software, a 4.21 out of 5 rating on the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services customer support survey and a 4.06 out of 5 rating for customer support in OIG surveys. All recommendations in the 2015 Computer Security Assessment have been resolved. The Information Management Section, in coordination with the Department's Diplomatic Telecommunications Office, successfully implemented the Next Generation Enterprise Network that provides better network performance for the embassy. OIG reviewed the newly arrived Information Management Officer's project list. It includes expanding network bandwidth, modernizing the embassy's SharePoint site, planning to host regional technology courses in the training facility, and having information management staff participate in public diplomacy outreach programs with local students. During the inspection, the Information Management Officer deployed a free emergency text notification system.

OIG advised section managers on requirements to update the local configuration control board charter, monitor inventory, maintain a hard copy of the IT contingency plan at the alternate command center, and incorporate the section task list into a project plan with timelines within SharePoint. The section corrected deficiencies in these areas during the inspection.

Innovative Practice: No Cost – Short Message Service

Issue/Challenge:

In the event of an emergency, the Mission was unable to deliver text notifications to mobile devices.

Background:

Embassy Tashkent researched outside messaging providers used by overseas missions. Several providers charge for service and are unreliable.

Innovative Practice:

Embassy Tashkent produced a no cost and reliable short message service to employees.

Benefit:

Embassy Tashkent does not rely on third-party service providers and incurs no costs in comparison with messaging providers used by overseas posts.

Contact:

Mahmood Khattak, Information Management Officer, Email: KhattakMH@state.gov)

Equal Employment Opportunity

According to the Department's Office of Civil Rights, the embassy had no open EEO cases. The names and contact information of the EEO counselor and the EEO liaisons for the locally employed staff members were not publicized, as required by 3 FAM 1514.2a. OIG suggested that this information be added to mission bulletin boards. Also, OIG suggested EEO refresher training for the mission-wide locally employed staff and their EEO liaisons.

MISSION SUPPORT SERVICES

Employee Association

The American Embassy Employee Association reported a \$61,000 profit on sales of \$719,000 in 2014. The association is current on all reporting requirements. In April 2015, the Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs conducted an internal audit of the association and identified 28 areas requiring improvement. At the time of the inspection, 22 of the recommendations had been closed and 5 were open. The association board did not approve a recommendation to create a capital improvement plan.

The association has no information concerning its operation on the embassy's intranet site. OIG suggested that the charter, by-laws, policies, meeting minutes, and other documentation be

placed on the site for transparency purposes. The association files did not include ambassadorial approval for third country diplomats to use the commissary, as required by 6 FAM 545. The Ambassador signed such a letter during the inspection.

Accountant Necessary for Segregation of Duties

The general manager of the American Embassy Employee Association also serves as its accountant. The Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs Accounting Policy and Procedures Manual states that the optimum internal accounting control process includes the division of responsibility among different employees for a sequence of related actions and directs that an accountant without access to cash or accounts receivable prepare bank monthly reconciliations. The Office of Commissary and Recreation Affairs Accounting recommended in its April 2015 audit that the association separate accounting and cash handling responsibilities. The board of directors told OIG that it recognized that this lack of separation of responsibilities created an internal control vulnerability and that they intended to hire an accountant.

Recommendation 17: Embassy Tashkent should hire a non-embassy accountant for the employee association. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: Embassy Tashkent should implement a plan for expending representational funds throughout the fiscal year. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 2: Embassy Tashkent should institute regular meetings of the Law Enforcement Working Group, Democracy Commission, and Health Issues Working Group and include all relevant offices. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 3: Embassy Tashkent, in coordination with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, should resolve the reporting and supervisory relationship with the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (Action: Embassy Tashkent, in coordination with SCA)

Recommendation 4: Embassy Tashkent should require that employees adhere to Department guidance and preserve record correspondence by using the record email system. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 5: Embassy Tashkent should implement a standardized filing system for the Political/Economic Section that complies with Department record management regulations. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 6: Embassy Tashkent should review its Public Affairs Strategic Plan and produce and implement a social media strategy to reach the Russian- and Uzbek-speaking audiences. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 7: Embassy Tashkent should comply with the Federal Assistance Policy Directive for documentation of risk management and monitoring of grants. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 8: Embassy Tashkent should implement an internal consular management controls program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 9: Embassy Tashkent should comply with the Worldwide Non-immigrant Visa Referral policy. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 10: Embassy Tashkent should comply with the Non-immigrant Visa Adjudication Review standard. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

Recommendation 11: Embassy Tashkent should configure the Consular Section to comply with Department line of sight standards. (Action: Embassy Tashkent)

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PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
Chiefs of Mission:		
Ambassador	Pamela Spratlen	1/2015
Deputy Chief of Mission	Lesslie Viguerie	8/2015
Chiefs of Section:		
Management	Brian Anselman	8/2014
Consular	Ryan Haley	9/2014
Political/Economic	Gregory Winstead	4/2015
Public Affairs	Jon Larsen	11/2013
Regional Security	Michael Cygrymus	7/2014
Other Agencies:		
Department of Defense	Paul Schmitt	7/2013
Office of Military Cooperation	Adam White	6/2015
Defense Threat Reduction Agency	Gregory Cromwell	7/2015
U.S. Agency for International Development	John Riordan	2/2014
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration	Kenneth Niehl	10/2013

APPENDIX A: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Purpose and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- Policy Implementation: whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- Resource Management: whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- Management Controls: whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

Methodology

For this inspection, OIG conducted 224 interviews at Embassy Tashkent and in Washington; reviewed and calculated the results of 167 questionnaires completed by American and locally employed embassy staff members; and compiled, reviewed, and analyzed 718 documents from the embassy and Department bureaus and offices. OIG reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by this review.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACO	Accountable Consular Officer
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CLO	Community Liaison Office
CSA	Consular Systems Administrator
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAST	First- and Second-tour
ICASS	International Administrative Support Services
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Operations
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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