



OIG HIGHLIGHTS

ISP-C-16-18

MAY 2016
OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS
Bureau of Diplomatic Security

Compliance Follow-up Review of the Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat Programs Directorate

Key Findings

What OIG Inspected

OIG conducted a Compliance Follow-up Review of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat Programs Directorate from February 2 to 22, 2016.

What OIG Recommended

OIG reissued 3 of the 22 recommendations issued in the original report.

The reissued recommendations include establishing Memoranda of Understanding with U.S. military commands for all liaison positions; revising the Foreign Affairs Manual to include guidance for Post Security Program Reviews specific to high threat posts; and undertaking a comprehensive review of the structure, management, and manpower needs of the High Threat Programs Directorate and making adjustments as necessary.

- OIG determined that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and other bureaus had implemented 19 of the 22 recommendations issued in the report of the Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat Programs Directorate as of the completion of this Compliance Follow-up Review.
- The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, the Office of the Legal Adviser, and the Bureau of Human Resources had not established Memoranda of Understanding with U.S. military commands for three liaison officer positions. Department policy requires Memoranda of Understanding for Department detailees to other agencies.
- The Bureau of Diplomatic Security had not incorporated into the appropriate Foreign Affairs Manual section the changes in the Post Security Program Reviews specific to high threat posts.
- The Bureau of Human Resources had made considerable progress but had not yet completed a comprehensive review of the structure, management, and manpower needs of the High Threat Programs Directorate.



OIG

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors

ISP-C-16-18

Office of Inspections

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DOMESTIC OPERATIONS

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EVALUATION OF COMPLIANCE

Context

In September 2014, OIG published a report on the inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat Programs Directorate¹ (DS/HTP). A summary of key findings in that report included:

- DS/HTP suffered from significant staffing gaps and position shortages, and the Department needed to staff the directorate fully to meet its goals.
- DS/HTP served as an advocate for high threat posts in the Department and in interagency settings but did not have the authority to cause peer bureaus to implement its recommendations.
- The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) lacked a formal mechanism to expeditiously address the urgent needs of posts for which DS/HTP was responsible.
- The Benghazi Accountability Review Board report recommended specific actions related to personnel assignments, training, technical security systems, and regional security officer reporting that must be taken at high threat posts. DS/HTP had not formally incorporated these into the Post Security Program Review (PSPR) checklist for high threat posts.
- The Department had not issued any announcements informing Department personnel of DS/HTP's role and responsibilities, and the Department had not published the section on DS/HTP in the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM).

During the period between the publication of the inspection report in September 2014 and the start of the compliance follow-up review (CFR) on February 2, 2016, OIG tracked and analyzed the actions reported by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS), OBO, the Bureau of Human Resources (DGHR), and the Bureau of Information Resource Management (IRM) pertaining to the 22 recommendations contained in the inspection report. OIG determined that it would conduct an on-site CFR to evaluate the implementation of these recommendations.

Compliance Overview

For this CFR, OIG reviewed the recommendations in the original inspection report and determined the state of compliance. As a result, OIG closed 19 of the original 22 recommendations and reissued 3 (Recommendations 8, 10, and 12). This report provides an accounting of the Department's actions and OIG's determinations regarding the above recommendations.

¹ Report of the Inspection of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat Programs Directorate (ISP-I-14-23), issued in September 2014.

COMMUNICATION

Handbook and Standard Operating Procedures

In the 2014 inspection, OIG found that DS/HTP had little time for crafting policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs) during the directorate's start-up phase and therefore had not done so. The directorate was approaching its first turnover cycle in summer 2014. DS/HTP needed written policies and SOPs to ensure effectiveness in Washington and to provide the best service for posts abroad. According to 1 FAM 014.2(6.1), Key Organizational Practices, during major reorganizations of bureaus or offices in the Department, organizations should, at a minimum, communicate early and often to build trust, ensure consistency of message, and provide information to meet specific needs of employees. In addition, a directorate handbook would introduce incoming desk officers to their specific responsibilities and the role of the directorate. In the absence of these documents, OIG found that the directorate's capabilities and effectiveness could be diminished. OIG recommended that DS establish a set of SOPs and a handbook for DS/HTP (Recommendation 1).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that the directorate had established a wide variety of SOPs along with an orientation handbook for new employees. The orientation handbook and the SOPs provided guidance on several issues, including in-processing of new employees, training, travel, recurring meetings and tasks, policy coordination, and drafting of documents. OIG reviewed the DS/HTP SharePoint site and confirmed that directorate SOPs and policies were posted there. OIG concluded the directorate had established a set of SOPs and a handbook/orientation guide that explained how and with whom desk officers and other employees were expected to work.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 1.

Communicating the Role of DS/HTP

In the 2014 inspection of DS/HTP, OIG found that DS and the Department had not communicated the DS/HTP mission to Department employees. The Department had not issued a notice or cable informing Department personnel comprehensively of the directorate's roles and responsibilities. The Department had not published a section in the FAM defining the directorate's mission, responsibilities, and organizational structure. In addition, regional security officers were not briefing incoming U.S. employees at high threat posts on the directorate's role and mission. As a result, many employees, especially those at high threat posts, were unclear about the role of DS/HTP, including what it could and could not do for the posts. OIG made three recommendations to address these issues (Recommendations 2, 3, and 4).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that the Department had issued a worldwide notice in February 2015 communicating the mission and responsibilities of DS/HTP. DS/HTP explained that the Department Notice, which should be issued annually, would be reissued in spring 2016 after the arrival of a new Deputy Assistant Secretary (DAS). DS had also added a section to the FAM explaining the directorate's mission, responsibilities, and organizational structure. OIG verified

that DS/HTP had provided instructions to the Regional Security Officers at high threat posts to include information about the directorate's role and mission in their briefings of incoming U.S. employees.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendations 2, 3, and 4.

COORDINATION

Coordination Between DS/HTP and DS/IP

OIG's earlier inspection evaluated coordination between DS/HTP and the International Programs Directorate (DS/IP), which handled all posts in the world other than those identified as "high threat." OIG found that DS/HTP and DS/IP had no mechanism for realigning staff responsibilities between them in the event that the DS annual review of posts resulted in a change in the designation of high threat posts. World events could also dictate changes on a more immediate timeline than the annual reviews. Given that staffing changes would have to occur quickly to ensure continued effectiveness, OIG recommended that DS implement a formal process for realigning staff responsibilities between DS/HTP and DS/IP whenever the list of high threat posts changes (Recommendation 5).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that the Principal DAS for DS issued a memo in June 2015 establishing procedures for transferring post responsibilities between DS/HTP and DS/IP. The procedures included several topics that the directorates would need to discuss and several actions they would have to take, including communicating with other entities in the Department, establishing liaisons with the intelligence community, and conducting reviews of security information about the posts.

DS had not changed the posts covered by DS/HTP and DS/IP since the 2014 inspection. During the CFR, however, DS was conducting its annual review of high threat posts and was considering changing the list of posts covered by DS/HTP. The two directorates were meeting to discuss a range of issues involved in implementing the plan outlined in the June 2015 memo discussed above.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 5.

Coordination with OBO on Urgent Security Needs

In its inspection of DS/HTP in 2014, OIG found that OBO did not have a mechanism for addressing urgent security needs of overseas posts. As a result, DS/HTP was unable to secure consistently expeditious action by OBO. During the inspection, OBO's Director provided a draft proposal to inspectors for an "urgent security requirements" process that, if enacted, would include a biweekly senior-level meeting between OBO and DS, a weekly OBO working group meeting chaired by a Deputy Director, and the establishment of a dedicated staff-level administrator for urgent security requirements. OIG recommended that OBO and DS implement

a process for expediting responses to urgent requests for security upgrades and emergency construction projects (Recommendation 6).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that OBO had issued a memo, dated September 24, 2014, in which the OBO Director "identified the need to establish a process that is tailored to respond to the Department's most urgent security requirements." The memo led to the creation of an OBO-DS Senior Level Group—also known as the Security Requirements Working Group—and an OBO Working Group. A DS DAS and the OBO Deputy Director—a DAS equivalent—co-chair the Senior Level Group, which meets "bi-weekly to review all new requests for urgent security upgrades or projects and discuss the urgency and relative priority of these projects," and to "ensure that they are moving forward as expeditiously as possible and that any issues or obstacles are resolved and do not hinder their timely execution." The memo also provided for the OBO Deputy Director to chair the internal OBO Working Group and for an administrator to track urgent projects and support the OBO Working Group and the Senior Level Group.

OIG observed the February 4 meeting of the Senior Level Group. OIG also interviewed senior OBO and DS personnel involved in coordinating requests for urgent security upgrades and emergency construction projects. Those officials told OIG that they were generally satisfied that the Senior Level Group had led to expedited decision making on urgent security needs, although they shared a desire to achieve further improvements. OIG concluded that the two bureaus had implemented a process for urgent security upgrades and emergency construction projects.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 6.

Memoranda of Understanding with U.S. Military Commands Lacking

In the 2014 inspection, OIG found that DS did not have a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for each of the liaison officers assigned to Central Command, Special Operations Command, and the Joint Special Operations Command. DS did have an MOU for the liaison officer assigned to Africa Command. The liaison officers' primary responsibility was to support the bureau's coordination and communications with the military commands. Senior military officers who work with the liaisons told OIG that the liaison officers had enhanced the collaboration between the Departments of State and Defense.

At the time of the earlier inspection, the bureau had plans to discuss MOUs with the Central Command and Special Operations Command but had not initiated discussions with the Joint Special Operations Command. According to 1 FAM 263.1-3a(4), the DS Policy and Planning Division was responsible for developing and maintaining a record of such MOUs, which establish roles, responsibilities, and funding for the respective parties. OIG found that reduced productivity and ineffective relationships could occur in the absence of formal governing agreements. OIG recommended that DS, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser, should establish MOUs for all liaison positions (Recommendation 10).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that the Under Secretary for Management, in a December 23, 2014, memo, had issued guidance on the process of detailing Department employees to other agencies. This guidance included a requirement that MOUs be part of any detail assignment to another agency. DGHR had to approve such detail assignments, according to the memo. In September 2015, DS/HTP assigned a liaison officer to Africa Command, with which it concluded a reimbursable MOU in accordance with Department requirements. OIG also determined that DS/HTP was considering the establishment of two additional liaison officer positions in Central Command and Africa Command.

As in the earlier inspection, OIG found that three of four DS/HTP liaison officer details lacked MOUs. This problem would become more acute if plans for two new liaison officer positions were approved. This situation came about from a lack of senior-level engagement within DS, inadequate communication between bureaus, and staff turnover within DS. Multiple offices in DS and the Office of the Legal Adviser had been involved, but working-level DS employees did not have a clear and comprehensive understanding of the directorate's options and how to establish MOUs.

As a result, OIG revised and reissued Recommendation 10.

Recommendation CFR 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish Memoranda of Understanding for liaison positions. (Action: DS, in coordination with L and DGHR)

OFFICE OF REGIONAL DIRECTORS

Desk Officer Familiarization Visits to Posts

OIG found that, at the time of the 2014 inspection, some desk officers in the Office of Regional Directors had not yet visited the posts they were responsible for supporting. This reduced the ability of the desk officers to comprehend fully the specific security needs of their respective high threat posts and detracted from their overall effectiveness. OIG found that some of this problem was due to staffing gaps and workload issues. OIG recommended that DS/HTP establish a policy that desk officers conduct familiarization visits to their posts early in their assignments (Recommendation 7).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that the DAS for DS/HTP issued a memorandum in January 2015 outlining the requirement that desk officers make familiarization visits to their assigned posts within 90 to 120 days of starting their assignments. OIG also reviewed the information on all desk officers in DS/HTP to determine when they started their assignments and when they had conducted or planned to conduct their familiarization visits. The team concluded that DS/HTP was fulfilling the mandate established in the policy issued by the DAS and that this was in compliance with the recommendation.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 7.

Update of Post Security Program Review Guidance Needed

OIG found that PSPRs needed to be updated to include requirements specific to high threat posts. These reviews, which directorate staff members conducted through on-site visits, were an essential task of the directorate. Through the reviews, DS/HTP staff members were able to ensure that posts competently manage issues in 75 program areas, such as life safety, emergency preparedness, and information security programs. OIG found that several recommendations from the classified version of the Benghazi Accountability Review Board report specific to high threats posts had not been formally incorporated into the PSPR checklist. OIG recommended that the PSPR checklist be revised to include requirements specific to high threat posts and that the FAM be updated accordingly (Recommendation 8).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that DS/HTP had updated the PSPR checklist to incorporate requirements specific to high threat posts but that the FAM 414.3 update had not been completed. Among the changes that remained outstanding, DS needed to specify that PSPRs on high threat posts should be conducted at least once each year, rather than at the less-frequent intervals (up to 5 years) permissible for other posts.

OIG found that DS had implemented only the part of the recommendation that called for the PSPR checklist to include requirements specific to high threat posts. As a result, OIG revised and reissued Recommendation 8.

Recommendation CFR 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update the Foreign Affairs Manual to incorporate changes to the guidance on Post Security Program Reviews specific to high threat posts. (Action: DS)

OFFICE OF SPECIAL PROGRAMS

Adequate Manpower for the Operations Planning Staff

OIG found in 2014 that the Operations Planning Staff in the Office of Special Programs of DS/HTP was understaffed. This office was responsible for a range of special programs, including strategic and operational plans for official travel to high threat posts, the opening or reopening of such posts, lessons learned from completed operations, and promulgating the DS deliberate planning process throughout the bureau and the Department. The DS deliberate planning process is modeled on that of the U.S. Army.

At the time of the 2014 inspection, the staff had nine positions but only four of them were filled. Three of those four individuals were U.S. military officers on 1-year training assignments. The directorate did not have a plan to sustain staffing of the unit. OIG recommended that DS implement a plan to have enough manpower for the Operations Planning Staff. (Recommendation 9).

During the CFR, OIG determined that the staffing situation had improved since 2014. Of nine positions, eight were filled at the time of the CFR. The human resources staff was advertising the remaining position.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 9.

Personal Services Contracts for Explosive Ordnance Disposal Personnel

OIG in 2014 found that DS/HTP had hired—on personal services contracts—employees for certain high threat posts who were trained in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). These employees and DS disagreed on appropriate payment for when they were considered “on call.” This issue was important because DS guidelines required a 24-hour emergency response capability for all property under chief of mission authority in these high threat posts. In reviewing the personal services contracts for these employees, OIG found no provisions for on-call pay. If left unresolved, this issue could result in diminished EOD support. OIG recommended that DS should modify the personal services contracts for EOD personnel to clarify the policy on on-call pay (Recommendation 11).

During the CFR, OIG confirmed that the DAS for DS/HTP issued a memorandum for EOD personnel in January 2015 clarifying the policy on this issue. The memorandum stated that employees on call “must be available by telephone or similar device and, if so ordered, return within one hour to their duty station to perform urgent work.” Employees on call are not paid while in that status if no work is performed. In addition, no entitlement to premium or other extra compensation exists for on-call status.

OIG also verified that the personal services contracts for all EOD personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan had been modified according to this policy and that the personnel had signed their modified contracts.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 11.

HUMAN RESOURCES AND ADMINISTRATION

Organizational Analysis of DS/HTP in Process

In the 2014 inspection, OIG found that in establishing DS/HTP, the positions and organizational structure modeled those of DS/IP. Each desk officer had fewer countries to oversee than DS/IP counterparts, an approach that was intended to ensure the “deep focus” for which this directorate was created. Staffers, however, told inspectors that DS/HTP was “top heavy” and cited insufficient delegated authority, which made the directorate less efficient. The work requirements of office managers did not specify the areas in which each had decision-making authority. The directorate was also faced with several positions that were vacant or had staffing gaps. OIG found that “a review of the staffing and functions may identify additional staffing needs and the requirement to balance the workload more effectively.”

OIG recommended that DGHR undertake a comprehensive review of the structure, management, and manpower needs of DS/HTP and make necessary adjustments (Recommendation 12).

During the CFR, OIG found that the Bureau of Human Resources, Resource Management and Organization Analysis (HR/RMA) office had made considerable progress in implementing this recommendation. HR/RMA analyzed the current directorate structure and determined the appropriate resources and workforce mix necessary for DS/HTP to meet its current and future mandates. HR/RMA collected the data needed to assess the organization, including conducting surveys, reviewing documents, and interviewing most DS/HTP staff members and key leaders in DS. At the time of the CFR, HR/RMA had scheduled additional interviews. At the conclusion of the CFR, HR/RMA was finalizing its findings and recommendations and projected that it would conclude its report in April 2016.

OIG found that implementation was still pending on this recommendation, notwithstanding the progress so far achieved. As a result, OIG reissued Recommendation 12.

Recommendation CFR 3: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should undertake a comprehensive review of the structure, management, and manpower needs of the High Threat Programs Directorate and make necessary adjustments. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with DS)

Administrative Support

In the 2014 inspection report, OIG issued six recommendations to correct administrative deficiencies in DS/HTP. One was a recommendation to update position descriptions in the directorate (Recommendation 13). DS/HTP gave OIG copies of new position descriptions on all its employees. OIG conducted a spot check with four employees selected at random. They confirmed that the new position descriptions reflected accurately their current duties. As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 13.

The five other recommendations to correct administrative deficiencies were: to designate separate unit security officers and area custodial officers for DS/HTP and DS/IP (Recommendations 14 and 15), to implement a weekly duty roster (Recommendation 16), to change the rendezvous point for emergency evacuations (Recommendation 17), and to implement a new floor warden list for the directorate (Recommendation 18). OIG confirmed that DS/HTP had issued the required documents. As a result, OIG closed Recommendations 14, 15, 16, 17, and 18.

INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

IT Support

In the inspection of DS/HTP in 2014, OIG found that directorate staff members had not received prompt attention to their IT issues from IRM or the DS Office of the Chief Technology Officer. This was not consistent with the terms of the Master Service Level Agreement governing IRM's consolidated IT support. OIG recommended that IRM adhere to the performance targets of the agreement when resolving trouble tickets for DS/HTP (Recommendation 19).

During the CFR, OIG reviewed all the documentation and determined that the performance targets contained in the Master Service Level Agreement apply to consolidated Department support and not to individual bureaus or directorates.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 19.

Files Management

In the 2014 inspection, OIG found that DS/HTP had no policy regarding how files were created, disposed of, or stored and made a recommendation to establish a file management policy for the directorate. This policy was to define the responsibility for each individual to maintain directorate files, file naming conventions, and storage location (Recommendation 20).

Additionally, OIG found that DS/HTP received numerous, often redundant taskings and inquiries and had no mechanism in place to accurately track the workload. OIG recommended that DS/HTP establish a consolidated tracking system in one office for all taskers the directorate received (Recommendation 21).

During the CFR, OIG reviewed the records disposition schedule of DS/HTP and the corresponding concurrence memorandum from the Bureau of Administration. OIG reviewed the schedule and confirmed that the directorate had coordinated the establishment of an effective file management system in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Handbook and National Archives and Records Administration guidelines.

Additionally, OIG found that DS/HTP had established a policy for maintaining electronic files and confirmed that the policy was on the directorate's SharePoint page, which also listed directorate SOPs. OIG confirmed development of a SharePoint tasking tracker site that assigned tasks and maintained document control, and OIG reviewed the 2014 annual report and workload statistics on the taskings received by the directorate.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendations 20 and 21.

SharePoint Training

In the 2014 inspection report, OIG found that the DS/HTP staff was not using the directorate's SharePoint site and had not received SharePoint training. The report stated that DS/HTP staff members had not been trained in the use of SharePoint, even though the directorate maintained internal SharePoint collaboration sites on OpenNet and ClassNet and had responsibility for managing the Security Management Console platform, which regional security officers used to collaborate and share security documentation.

According to 13 FAM 022.5, managers and supervisors are responsible for evaluating job-related training effectiveness and ensuring that they and their employees have current and up-to-date training. SharePoint training was offered every 2 weeks to the directorate staff but was not mandatory. SharePoint training would increase staff effectiveness. OIG recommended that DS/HTP implement a plan that required staff members to complete SharePoint training (Recommendation 22).

During the CFR, OIG interviewed the directorate's SharePoint manager, who told OIG he had redesigned and rebuilt the DS/HTP SharePoint site since the 2014 inspection and had provided informal, tailored training to the staff about the site. He provided documentation on the use of the site by all directorate staff members.

As a result, OIG closed Recommendation 22.

CFR RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation CFR 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish memoranda of Understanding for liaison positions. (Action: DS, in coordination with L and DGHR)

Recommendation CFR 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update the Foreign Affairs Manual to incorporate changes to the guidance on Post Security Program Reviews specific to high threat posts. (Action: DS)

Recommendation CFR 3: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should undertake a comprehensive review of the structure, management, and manpower needs of the High Threat Programs Directorate and make necessary adjustments. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with DS)

PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
Deputy Assistant Secretary (Acting)	Andriy Koropecyj	9/2014
Resource Manager	Robert Schmidt	9/2015
Office of Regional Directors		
Office Director	Andriy Koropecyj	9/2014
Regional Director, African Affairs	Thad Osterhout	8/2014
Regional Director, Near East/South Central Asia	Steve Jones	9/2013
Regional Director, Iraq/Afghanistan	Arthur Balek	9/2015
Office of Special Programs		
Office Director (Acting)	Anthony Smith	8/2015
Deputy Office Director	Anthony Smith	8/2015
Operations Planning Chief	Lance Bailey	10/2012

APPENDIX A: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

This CFR was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors.

Purpose and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. CFRs assess the inspected entities' compliance with recommendations made in previous inspections and verify whether agreed-upon corrective actions for recommendations issued in previous reports were fully and properly implemented.

Methodology

During the course of this CFR, OIG reviewed 22 recommendations issued in the original inspection report and reported corrective actions; collected and reviewed documentation and conducted those interviews necessary to substantiate reported corrective actions; and reviewed the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and activities affected by this review.

For this CFR, OIG conducted 34 documented interviews in DS, DGHR, IRM, OBO, and the Office of the Legal Adviser. OIG also collected and reviewed 163 documents.

APPENDIX B: STATUS OF 2014 INSPECTION FORMAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish a set of standard operating procedures and policies and a handbook for the High Threat Programs directorate. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 2: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should publish annually a Department-wide notice communicating the role of the High Threat Programs directorate, its mission, and its responsibilities. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 3: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should publish guidance in the Foreign Affairs Manual delineating the High Threat Programs directorate's mission, responsibilities, and organizational structure. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 4: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should require all regional security officers at high threat posts to brief incoming U.S. direct-hire employees on the High Threat Programs directorate's role and mission. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 5: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should develop and implement a formal process for realigning the High Threat Programs directorate and International Programs directorate staff responsibilities as changes occur to the high threat posts list. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 6: The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should implement a process for expedited responses to urgent requests for security upgrades and emergency construction projects. (Action, OBO, in coordination with DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Open

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 7: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish a policy that desk officers in the early stage of an assignment in the High Threat Programs directorate will conduct or participate in a familiarization visit to the diplomatic posts for which they have primary responsibility. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 8: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should revise its Post Security Program Review checklist to include requirements specific to high threat posts and update the Foreign Affairs Manual accordingly. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Open

CFR Status: Revised and reissued as Recommendation CFR 2.

Recommendation 9: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should implement a plan to adequately staff the Operations Planning Unit of the High Threat Programs directorate. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 10: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Office of the Legal Adviser and the Bureau of Human Resources, should establish Memoranda of Understanding for all liaison positions. (Action: DS, in coordination with L and DGHR)

Pre-CFR Status: Open

CFR Status: Revised and reissued as Recommendation CFR 1.

Recommendation 11: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should modify the personal services contract to clarify on-call pay for emergency explosive ordnance disposal personnel. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 12: The Bureau of Human Resources, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should undertake a comprehensive review of the structure, management, and manpower needs of the High Threat Programs directorate and make necessary adjustments. (Action: DGHR, in coordination with DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Open

CFR Status: Reissued as Recommendation CFR 3.

Recommendation 13: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update position descriptions for the directorate of High Threat Programs staff members to accurately reflect current duties. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Open

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 14: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate in writing separate unit security officers for each directorate. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 15: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should designate in writing separate area custodial officers for each directorate. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 16: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should implement a weekly duty roster to conduct closing hour inspections in the High Threat Programs directorate. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 17: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should change the rendezvous point for High Threat Programs directorate personnel upon emergency evacuation of the building. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 18: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should update and implement a new floor warden list for the High Threat Programs directorate. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 19: The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, should adhere to the performance targets in the master service level agreement for domestic consolidated bureau information technology support when resolving trouble tickets for the directorate of High Threat Programs. (Action: IRM, in coordination with DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 20: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish a file management policy for the directorate of High Threat Programs that defines the responsibility for each individual to maintain directorate files, file naming conventions, and storage location. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 21: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should establish a consolidated tracking system, managed in one office, for all taskers the directorate of High Threat Programs receives. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

Recommendation 22: The Bureau of Diplomatic Security should implement a plan that requires directorate of High Threat Programs staff to complete SharePoint training. (Action: DS)

Pre-CFR Status: Closed

CFR Status: Closed

ABBREVIATIONS

CFR	Compliance Follow-up Review
DAS	Deputy Assistant Secretary
DGHR	Bureau of Human Resources
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
DS/HTP	Bureau of Diplomatic Security, High Threat Programs Directorate
DS/IP	Bureau of Diplomatic Security, International Programs Directorate
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
HR/RMA	Bureau of Human Resources, Resource Management and Organization Analysis
IRM	Bureau of Information Resource Management
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
PSPR	Post Security Program Review
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures

INSPECTION TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Compliance Response: A written response from the action office to which a recommendation has been assigned for action, informing OIG of agreement or disagreement with the recommendation. Comments indicating agreement shall include planned corrective actions and, where appropriate, the actual or proposed target dates for achieving these actions. The reasons for any disagreement with a recommendation must be explained fully. Where disagreement is based on interpretation of law, regulation, or the authority of officials to take or not take action, the response must include the legal basis.

Final Action: The completion of all actions that the management of an action office, in its management decision, has concluded is necessary to address the findings and recommendations in OIG reports.

Finding: A conclusion drawn from facts and information about the propriety, efficiency, effectiveness, or economy of operation of a post, unit, or activity.

Management Decision: When the management of an action office for an OIG recommendation informs OIG of its intended course of action in response to a recommendation. If OIG accepts the management decision, the recommendation is considered resolved. If OIG does not accept the management decision and the issue cannot be resolved after a reasonable effort to achieve agreement, the Inspector General may choose to take it to impasse.

Open Recommendation: An open recommendation is either resolved or unresolved (see definitions of recommendation status below).

Recommendation: A statement in an OIG report requiring action by the addressee organizations or officials to correct a deficiency or need for change or improvement identified in the report.

Recommendation Status:

Resolved: Resolution of a recommendation occurs when:

- The action office concurs with the recommendation (a management decision has been accepted by OIG), but the action office has not presented satisfactory evidence that it has implemented the recommendation or some alternative course of action acceptable to OIG.
- The action office informs OIG that it disagrees with all or part of the recommendation, and OIG agrees to accept partial compliance or noncompliance.
- Impasse procedures have led to a positive or negative final management decision.

Unresolved: An unresolved recommendation occurs when the action office:

- Has not responded to OIG.

- Has failed to address the recommendation in a manner satisfactory to OIG.
- Disagrees with the recommendation and did not suggest an alternative acceptable to OIG.
- Requests OIG refer the matter to impasse, and the impasse official has not yet issued a decision.

Closed: A recommendation is closed when one of the following situations applies:

- OIG formally notifies the action office that satisfactory evidence of final action (i.e., information provided by the action office that confirms or attests to implementation) on an OIG recommendation has been accepted. The closing of a recommendation from an OIG report does not relieve the responsible manager of the obligation to report to OIG any changed circumstances substantially affecting the problem areas addressed in the recommendation or report and the effectiveness of agreed actions to correct these problems.
- OIG acknowledges to the action office that an alternative course of action to that proposed in the recommendation will satisfy the intent of the recommendation and satisfactory evidence showing that the alternative action has been completed is provided to OIG.
- OIG agrees partial implementation is acceptable and has been completed.
- OIG agrees that noncompliance is acceptable.

CFR TEAM MEMBERS

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