

Voyager Fleet Card Program



AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 22-006-R23 | February 23, 2023



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Highlights

Background

The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for the commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for each of its roughly 236,500 vehicles. Site managers at the delivery units maintain the Voyager cards for drivers at the unit to use.

These site managers are responsible for obtaining driver personal identification numbers (PIN), reconciling high-risk transactions, disputing transactions, maintaining transaction supporting documentation, performing semi-annual driver certifications, and securing the Voyager cards. Each driver is assigned a unique PIN for their Voyager card purchases. Drivers are responsible for securing their PINs and providing a receipt to their site managers. During fiscal years 2021 and 2022, the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted 14 Voyager card-related audits. During this audit, we found issues that required immediate attention. This resulted in the OIG issuing a management alert related to premium fuel purchases and PINs.

What We Did

Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of the Postal Service's fleet card program and identify opportunities for improvement. For this audit, we summarized previous audit findings and recommendations, interviewed Postal Service management, and engaged with a contractor to assess industry best practices for fleet card management.

What We Found

We found Voyager card policies to be generally adequate and in line with best practices. However, management did not always follow policy for PIN management, supporting documentation, transaction reconciliation, and Voyager card security. This occurred because site managers did not always take required training, did not have refresher training, were not aware of proper security procedures, and did not have a standard check-in and check-out procedure for Voyager cards at the time of our audits. Although the Postal Service offers Voyager card training for site managers, all 14 of our audits identified training issues or that management was unaware of their responsibilities, and Voyager cards were not listed on the afternoon checklist to remind site managers to check them in at the end of the day.

Recommendations

We recommended management establish a procedure for site managers to take required training before they have access to Fleet Commander Online and Fuel Asset Management System; create periodic training and require remediation training for site management failures; and update the appropriate checklists to include Voyager cards.

Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

February 23, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: CARA GREENE
VICE PRESIDENT, CONTROLLER

ANGELA CURTIS
VICE PRESIDENT, DELIVERY OPERATIONS

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Kelly Thresher".

FROM: Kelly Thresher
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Field Operations

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Voyager Fleet Card Program
(Report Number 22-006-R23)

This report presents the results of our audit of Voyager Fleet Card Program.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Brian Newman, (A) Director, Financial Controls, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the Voyager Fleet Card Program (Project Number 22-006). Our objective was to determine the effectiveness of the U.S. Postal Service's fleet card program and identify opportunities for improvement. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about this audit.

Background

The Postal Service operates one of the largest vehicle fleets in the U.S. In fiscal year (FY) 2022, the Postal Service used 236,500 motor vehicles primarily to deliver and collect mail for city routes. It spent \$795 million in delivery vehicle fuel, and \$703 million on vehicle service.

Every Postal Service-owned vehicle is assigned a credit card, called a Voyager Fleet card (Voyager card), to pay for its commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance. A major bank operates the program and Voyager¹ provides a weekly electronic transaction detail file of all Voyager card transactions to the Postal Service's Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) eFleet application.²

Site managers³ at delivery units maintain the Voyager cards for drivers at the unit. These site managers


are responsible for obtaining and maintaining driver personal identification numbers (PIN) through the Fleet Commander Online (FCO) system,⁴ reconciling "high-risk" transactions, disputing transactions, filing transaction supporting documentation, performing semi-annual driver certifications, and securing the Voyager cards.

Each driver is assigned and must use a unique PIN for purchases on a Voyager card. Drivers are responsible for securing their PIN and providing a receipt for any purchase to their site manager. Drivers must use their unique PIN in conjunction with the Voyager card that is assigned to the vehicle. This ensures that purchases are tied to a specific vehicle, as well as to the employee responsible for that vehicle.

From FY 2021 through FY 2022, the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted 14 Voyager-card-related audits nationwide.⁵ These audits had 34 findings, 55 recommendations, \$188,351 in monetary impact, and \$1,720,940 in other impact related to Voyager card processes and procedures. See Figure 1 for a map of Voyager card audit locations. All recommendations, which were addressed to local site management, have been closed as May 23, 2022.

Figure 1. Voyager Card Audit Locations

Source: OIG created map using locations of Voyager card audits conducted.



1 Voyager Fleet Systems, Inc., is owned by a major bank, which is the contractor for the program.
2 The internet portal used to monitor expenses incurred from the operation and maintenance of postal-owned vehicles. The system allows authorized users to display and reconcile expenses charged to Voyager cards.
3 The manager of an operation to which the vehicles are assigned and who has the responsibility for Voyager card reconciliation and fraud prevention.
4 A Voyager system used to add, cancel, and replace cards, PINs, and vehicles.
5 For details about each audit see [Prior Audit Coverage](#).

The objectives for these audits included determining whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed; Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled; and local vehicle, fuel, and oil expenses were appropriate and properly supported at the unit being audited.

To support this audit, we combined the findings from previous reports and used an industry contractor to determine areas for improvement. Specifically, this contractor reviewed Postal Service policy and procedures and provided suggested improvement opportunities and industry best practices related to fleet card management.

During the course of this audit, we found issues that required immediate attention. This resulted in the OIG issuing a management alert⁶ related to premium fuel purchases and PINs. Our objective for the management alert was to report issues related to Voyager fleet card fuel purchases and Voyager PIN management. Specifically, we found:

- From April 2020 through June 2022,⁷ Postal Service employees purchased 14.9 million gallons of premium – rather than unleaded – fuel. Postal Service policy requires that vehicles certified for unleaded gasoline are required to be fueled with unleaded regular or gasohol. During our audit scope, gallons of premium fuel purchased increased by over 100 percent and total costs increased by more than 320 percent. The cost difference between premium fuel and regular fuel resulted in the Postal Service overspending by about \$5.1 million. In July 2022, the Postal Service’s Transportation Strategy Office started an initiative that focuses on reducing premium fuel purchases.
- The Postal Service did not always properly manage PINs for Voyager cards, specifically those with improper user names or Employee Identification Numbers (EIN).
 - We analyzed active PINs from April 2021 through June 2022 and determined that site managers assigned employee names that were not in compliance with naming conventions for PINs.

We identified 61,770 purchases, totaling \$3.6 million with improper PIN names.

- We analyzed active PINs and identified 133,491 of 512,148 PINs (26 percent) contained blank EINs or zeros in place of the EINs. From April 2021 through June 2022, Postal Service employees made about 10.8 million transactions, totaling about \$419 million using Voyager card PINs with improper EINs.

Based on these findings we recommended management:

- Implement updates to the FAMS to flag premium fuel transactions as “high-risk”⁸ on the Reconciliation Exception report.
- Deactivate remaining PINs with improper names.
- Deactivate or update PINs with missing EINs.
- Enhance controls in the FCO system to prevent all zeros from being entered as EINs and disallow site managers from certifying semiannual reviews of PINs with EINs that are blanks or all zeros.

In addition, the findings resulted in \$5,066,930 in questioned costs⁹ and \$420,124,270 in disbursements at risk.¹⁰ Management agreed with all the findings, recommendations, and monetary impact and the target implementation date for all recommendations is June 30, 2023.

Because we previously reported on these issues, we will not be making recommendations related to premium fuel and improper PIN user names or EINs.

Finding 1: Voyager Card Training

Our analysis, in conjunction with the contractor’s review, found the Postal Service generally has sufficient policies for the management of their Voyager Fuel Card program. However, we found Postal Service site managers did not always follow the policies related to Voyager card program oversight, and, because of that, the Voyager fleet card program was not always effective. Specifically, the units we audited had issues with PIN integrity and transactions’ supporting documentation and reconciliations due to insufficient training procedures.

6 Voyager Card Program -- Internal Control Issues, Report No. 22-006-1-R23, October 7, 2022.

7 In a Postal Service fiscal year, Q1 is October through December; Q2 is January through March; Q3 is April through June; and Q4 is July through September.

8 “High-risk” transactions include vehicle exceeding tank capacity, non-fuel items, and duplicate transactions.

9 A cost the OIG believes is unnecessary, unreasonable, or an alleged violation of law, regulation, or contract.

10 Disbursements made where proper Postal Service internal controls and processes were not followed.

Employee PINs were not properly managed at 11 of the 14 units we audited. Specifically:

- Eleven units had drivers who were sharing PINs with each other, and one of these units had a driver who shared a PIN with a vendor.
- Nine units had former employees with active PINs and three of those units had former employee PINs still being used by active drivers.
- Three units had employees with multiple active PINs.
- Three units had active PINs for employees that never worked at the unit.
- Nine units did not properly review PINs semi-annually.

Voyager card transactions' supporting documentation and reconciliations were not properly managed at all 14 units we visited. Specifically:

- Eight units were missing receipts to support fuel purchases.
- Seven units did not complete required forms for suspicious transactions they disputed while completing their monthly reconciliations. Additionally, these units did not notify the OIG's Office of Investigation of the potentially fraudulent activity.
- Six units had transactions flagged as "high-risk" that were not properly reconciled or disputed.
- All 14 units contained reconciliations improperly marked as completed, even though they were not fully completed.

Through our review, as well as our contractor's review, we determined Postal Service policies adequately addressed the audit issues we identified. If policy had been followed, the units we audited would not have had PIN or transaction reconciliation issues.

These issues occurred due to insufficient training procedures. Although the Postal Service has Voyager card training for site managers and policy requires site managers to take the initial training before accessing systems, all 14 of our audits identified training issues or that management was unaware of their responsibilities, despite having previously taken the training. There were no system restrictions to prevent a site manager without training from using

FAMS or FCO for Voyager card duties. In addition, site managers were not required to take refresher training and did not receive consistent feedback about Voyager card management.

According to policy, the site manager responsible for the Voyager card program must take the *eFleet Card for Site Manager Training*¹¹ and the *Voyager Fleet Commander Online Training*.¹² Our contractor described training best practices as including the following:

- Establish a standardizing onboarding training procedures for drivers.
- Evaluate the knowledge base of managers and drivers to determine if additional training is necessary.
- Establish on-going training or refresher training.

When site managers are not properly trained to manage Voyager cards, there is an increased risk of unauthorized purchases or internal control issues. See [Appendix B](#) for a breakdown of issues related to previous Voyager card audits.

Recommendation #1

We recommend the **Vice President, Controller**, establish a prerequisite for site managers to take required training before they are granted access to Fleet Commander Online and the Fuel Asset Management System.

Recommendation #2

We recommend the **Vice President, Controller**, create periodic refresher training for all site managers and require remediation training for site management oversight failures.

Finding 2: Voyager Card Security Issues

During our audit review, we noticed that Voyager cards were not always properly secured. During fieldwork visits, we conducted an inventory of active cards onsite. Eight of the 14 audits identified lost or stolen Voyager cards that were not reported to the contractor bank or the OIG's Office of Investigations.¹³

These issues occurred because unit management were not aware of the policy to effectively manage Voyager cards to reduce the risk of unauthorized access, and the policy was not specific about how to secure Voyager cards. At the time of our audits, the Postal Service did not have a Standard

¹¹ Explains the history and operations of the Voyager fleet card. Provides instruction on how to manage and reconcile purchases made with the card.

¹² Postal Service staff use the Fleet Commander Online application to create and manage Voyager card PINs.

¹³ Upon receipt of the USPS Voyager Card Account Maintenance Request Form, Voyager will cancel the existing card and issue a replacement.

Operating Procedure (SOP) for a signing Voyager cards in and out.

Postal Service policy¹⁴ states site managers are responsible for securing all Voyager cards. In addition, policy¹⁵ requires that drivers must immediately notify the site manager if a card is lost or stolen, and the manager must immediately notify the Postal Service's contracted bank.

Since we conducted our Voyager audits, the Postal Service updated the Voyager card SOP¹⁶ to state fleet cards must be kept in secure locations, which aligns with industry best practices. The new SOP also states that a process must be in place for drivers to sign for the card associated with the vehicle they will be operating and to ensure the card is returned to the same secure location at the end of the vehicle's usage.

While the updated SOP requires drivers to sign for Voyager cards, an additional control will assist management with verifying that Voyager cards are secured daily. We reviewed the PM All Clear Tasks list to be completed daily by delivery unit management, and determined that other accountable property, like arrow keys, were listed but Voyager cards were not. Updating the tasks, combined with the policy training in finding 1, will help management reduce the risk that Voyager cards are not secure at the end of the day.

We saw the effects of missing Voyager cards during our audits. Because of lost or missing Voyager cards, four of the 14 units audited had employees inappropriately purchase fuel with personal funds, then reimbursed with money orders or cash. Additionally, when Voyager cards are not properly secured, lost, or stolen, they could be used to make unauthorized and improper purchases.

Recommendation #3

We recommend the **Vice President, Delivery Operations**, add a task to verify that Voyager cards are secure to the daily PM All Clear Tasks list.

Management's Comments

Management agreed with all findings and recommendations.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated they will direct eAccess approving managers to require proof of training for new users prior

to approving their requests for FAMS or FCO. In addition, for current users, the Program Office will work with Headquarters National Training to require training for FAMS and FCO users. If the current users do not complete the training by a due date, their access to FAMS and FCO will be revoked. The target implementation date is September 30, 2023.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated a directive from the Vice President, Controller, will require site managers to complete fleet card training for managers and FCO refresher training annually. In addition, the Program Office will work with Headquarters National Training to require training for FAMS and FCO users for site failures identified through field accounting reviews or by the OIG. Training must be completed within 30 days from the date assigned or access to FAMS and FCO will be revoked. These training requirements will be included in an update to the Voyager Fleet Card Standard Operating Procedures. The target implementation date is September 30, 2023.

Regarding recommendation 3, management stated they will add a task to the evening all clear tasks list in delivery units to verify that Voyager cards are secure in the facility. The target implementation date is March 31, 2023.

See [Appendix C](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

Evaluation of Management's Comments

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations in the report, and planned actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

All recommendations require OIG concurrence before closure. The OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. The recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

¹⁴ Standard Work Instruction, Voyager Fleet Card - At A Glance for Site Managers, revised February 2019.

¹⁵ *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 5.2, Lost/Stolen Cards, October 2021.

¹⁶ *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 2.1, Types of Card & Usage.

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Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

To conduct this audit, we summarized previous audit findings and recommendations, interviewed Postal Service management, and engaged with a contractor.

We conducted this performance audit from April 2022 through February 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform

the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on January 25, 2023, and included their comments where appropriate.

We did not assess the reliability of any computer-generated data for the purposes of this report.

Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Elizabeth, NJ, Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Elizabeth, NJ, Post Office.	21-066-R21	2/10/2021	\$0
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Brick, NJ, Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit is to determine whether high-risk Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled, and Voyager card Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) were properly managed at the Brick Post Office, New Jersey.	21-069-R21	3/3/2021	\$0
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Monroe, NY, Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Monroe, NY, Post Office.	21-125-R21	4/28/2021	\$0
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Chino, CA, Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit is to determine whether Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled, and Voyager cards PINs were properly managed at the Chino, CA, Chino Post Office.	21-135-R21	5/13/2021	\$0

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Hemet, CA Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Hemet, CA, Post Office.	21-133-R21	5/19/2021	\$0
<i>Vehicle, Fuel, and Oil Expenses - Woodlawn Station Post Office, Birmingham, AL</i>	The objective is to determine whether local vehicle, fuel and oil expenses at the Woodlawn Station, Birmingham AL, Post Office were appropriate and properly supported.	21-148-R21	7/30/2021	\$47,553
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Wilmington, NC, Magnolia Station</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Wilmington, NC, Magnolia Station.	21-176-R21	8/3/2021	\$0
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Norwalk, CT, Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed, and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled, at the Norwalk, CT, Post Office.	21-210-R21	9/7/2021	\$1,829
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Pittsburgh, PA, Penn Hills Branch</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed, and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Pittsburgh, PA, Penn Hills Branch.	21-209-R21	9/8/2021	\$65,062
<i>Vehicle, Fuel, and Oil Expenses - Pratt and Metropolitan Station Post Offices, Brooklyn, NY</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether vehicle, fuel, and oil expenses for the Pratt and Metropolitan Station POs were appropriate, properly supported, and processed.	21-217-R21	10/6/2021	\$40,850

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Baltimore, MD, Raspeburg Station</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled, and Voyager card Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) were properly managed at the Raspeburg Post Office, Baltimore, MD.	21-174-R22	10/8/2021	\$10,111
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Philadelphia, PA, Paschall Station</i>	The objectives of this audit were to determine whether: Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled, and Voyager card PINs were properly managed and whether Vehicle, fuel, and oil expenses incurred were appropriate, properly supported, and processed.	21-230-R22	12/14/2021	\$7,640
<i>Voyager Card Transactions - Acredale Station, Virginia Beach, VA</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled, and Voyager cards PINs were properly managed at the Acredale Station, Virginia Beach, VA.	21-241-R22	2/11/2022	\$1,023
<i>Fuel Expenses, Cash, Stamps and Money Orders - Charlotte, NC, Ballantyne Station Post Office</i>	The objective of this audit was to determine whether the Ballantyne Station PO properly purchased fuel and accounted for fuel cards, cash, stamps, and money orders.	22-018-R22	3/14/2022	\$23,126

Appendix B: Prior Audit Issues

Project Number	Location	PIN Mgt. Issues	Missing Documentation & Reconciliation	Card Security Issues	Training	Reimbursed Drivers
21-066	Elizabeth, NJ, Post Office	✓	✓		✓	
21-069	Brick, NJ, Post Office	✓	✓		✓	
21-125	Monroe, NY, Post Office	✓	✓		✓	
21-135	Chino, CA, Post Office	✓	✓		✓	
21-133	Hemet, CA, Post Office	✓	✓		✓	
21-148	Woodlawn Station Post Office, Birmingham, AL		✓	✓	✓	✓
21-176	Wilmington, NC, Magnolia Station	✓	✓		✓	
21-210	Norwalk, CT, Post Office	✓	✓	✓	✓	
21-209	Pittsburgh, PA, Penn Hills Branch	✓	✓	✓	✓	
21-217	Metropolitan and Pratt Station Post Offices, Brooklyn, NY		✓	✓	✓	✓
21-174	Baltimore, MD, Raspeburg Station	✓	✓	✓	✓	
21-230	Philadelphia, PA, Paschall Station	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
21-241	Acredale Station, Virginia Beach, VA	✓	✓	✓	✓	
22-018	Charlotte, NC, Ballantyne Station Post Office		✓	✓	✓	✓
Total		11	14	8	14	4

Source: OIG analysis of Voyager card audit issues.

Appendix C: Management's Comments

CARA M. GREENE
Vice President, Controller



February 17, 2023

John Cihota
Director, Audit Services

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Voyager Fleet Card Program (Project Number 22-006)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the audit report, *Voyager Fleet Card Program*.

Management agrees with the OIG's findings.

Recommendation #1:

We recommend the Vice President, Controller, establish a prerequisite for site managers to take required training before they are granted access to Fleet Commander Online (FCO) and the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS).

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management will direct eAccess Approving Managers to require proof of training from new users prior to approving requests for FAMS and/or FCO. For current users, the Program Office will work with HQ National Training to require HERO trainings for FAMS and FCO users. If training is not completed by the due date, their access to FAMS and FCO will be revoked immediately.

Target Implementation Date: September 2023

Responsible Official: Executive Manager, Corporate Accounting

Recommendation 2:

We recommend the Vice President, Controller, create periodic refresher training for all site managers and require remediation training for site management oversight failures.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Periodic Refresher Training: A directive from the VP, Controller, will require site managers to complete the *SM: eFleet Card: Site Manager* (FAMS & FCO) training in HERO annually. This training will be provided to current users through the HERO system based on a list of current users.

Site Management Oversight Failures: The Program Office will work with HQ National Training to require HERO trainings for FAMS and FCO Users when site failures occur and identified either through the field accounting review or by the OIG. If training is not completed within 30 days from the date assigned, their access to FAMS and FCO will be revoked immediately.

475 L'ENFANT PLAZA SW
WASHINGTON DC 20260
WWW.USPS.COM

These training requirements will be included in an update to the Voyager Fleet Card Standard Operating Procedure.

Target Implementation Date: September 2023

Responsible Official: Executive Manager, Corporate Accounting

Recommendation 3:

We recommend the Vice President, Delivery Operations, add a task to verify that Voyager cards are secure to the daily PM All Clear Tasks List.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management will add a task to the evening all clear tasks in delivery units to verify Voyager cards are secure in the facility.

Target Implementation Date: March 2023

Responsible Official: Director, Fleet Management

Respectfully Submitted,

E-SIGNED by Cara.M Greene
on 2023-02-16 09:54:02 CST

Cara M. Greene
VP, Controller

E-SIGNED by ANGELA.H CURTIS
on 2023-02-17 10:57:04 CST

Angela Curtis
VP, Delivery Operations

cc: Manager, Corporate Audit Response Management

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UNITED STATES



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