



AUDIT REPORT

Voyager Card Transactions – Brick, NJ, Post Office

March 4, 2021



Report Number 21-069-R21



March 4, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR: LEGRETТА Y. ROSS-RAWLINS
ACTING MANAGER, SOUTH JERSEY DISTRICT

Michelle Lindquist

FROM: Michelle Lindquist
Director, Financial Controls

SUBJECT: Draft Report – Voyager Card Transactions - Brick, NJ, Post Office (Report Number 21-069-R21)

This report presents the results of our audit of Voyager Card Transactions - Brick, NJ, Post Office.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Dianna Smith, Operational Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Corporate Audit and Response Management

Background

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of Voyager Card Transactions - Brick, NJ, Post Office (Project Number 21-069). The Brick, NJ, Post Office is in the South New Jersey District of the Atlantic Area.¹ This audit was designed to provide U.S. Postal Service management with timely information on potential financial control risks at Postal Service locations.

Every Postal Service-owned vehicle is assigned a Voyager credit card that is used to pay for its commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance. U.S. Bank is responsible for operating the program and Voyager² provides a weekly electronic transaction detail file of all Voyager card transactions to the Postal Service's Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS)³ eFleet application.⁴ Site managers are responsible for monitoring Voyager card transactions in the FAMS eFleet application. FAMS provides a monthly Reconciliation Exception Report, capturing only transactions that are categorized as high-risk, which may be the result of fraudulent activity. Each month the Postal Service site manager⁵ is responsible for ensuring that their driver receipts are reconciled in FAMS. The review is critical since the Postal Service automatically pays U.S. Bank weekly for all Voyager card charges.

Transactions could be marked as high-risk in FAMS due to gallons of fuel purchased exceeding the allowed maximum amount for the vehicle, unleaded super and plus fuel purchases, and potential sharing of personal identification numbers (PIN). These are an indication of questionable transactions that indicate a high risk of fraud.

The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) used data analytics to identify offices with potentially fraudulent Voyager card activity. The Brick, NJ, Post Office had 1,119 transactions at risk from April 1 through September 30, 2020, totaling \$31,191. This included 330 Voyager card fuel purchases conducted using one supervisor's PIN and valued at \$9,603 and 271 Voyager card fuel purchases made by a second supervisor and valued at \$7,522. Of these 1,119 transactions, FAMS marked 127 as high-risk. These amounts were the highest in the Atlantic Area during this time.

¹ The South New Jersey District was in the Eastern Area prior to reorganization of Postal Service areas, districts, divisions, and regions, which was initiated in August 2020.

² Voyager Fleet Systems, Inc., owned by U.S. Bank, is the contractor for the program.

³ A cost management tool used for managing and controlling fuel costs.

⁴ A portal used to monitor expenses incurred from the operation and maintenance of postal-owned vehicles. The system allows authorized users to display and reconcile expenses charged to Voyager credit cards.

⁵ Manager of an operation to which the vehicles are assigned and who has the responsibility for Voyager card reconciliations and fraud prevention.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

The objective of this audit was to determine whether Voyager card PINs were properly managed and Voyager card transactions were properly reconciled at the Brick, NJ, Post Office. The scope of this audit included the Voyager card activity reconciliation process and management of Voyager card PINs from April through September 2020.

To meet our objective, we analyzed Voyager card transactions in FAMS and randomly sampled 77 of 127 high-risk transactions that required review. The transactions related to fuel purchases that exceeded the maximum allowed amount for the vehicle, too many fuel purchases made within a month, and duplicate transactions.

We relied on computer-generated data from FAMS. We did not test the validity of controls over this system; however, we verified transactions generated by FAMS against available on-site supporting documentation and interviewed unit management responsible for the process. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

We conducted this audit from December 2020 through March 2021, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on February 23, 2021 and included their comments where appropriate.

Finding #1: Management of Voyager Card PINs

Voyager card PINs were not properly managed at the Brick, NJ, Post Office. Specifically, supervisors did not always verify that information on the PIN list was current, accurate, and complete. One supervisor's PIN was used for 330 transactions valued at \$9,603 and another supervisor had 271 transactions valued at \$7,522 during the scope period. The two supervisors allowed new carriers to use their PINs and one of the supervisor's inappropriately shared their PIN with a vendor. Additionally, the supervisors did not deactivate the PINs of 17 former employees.

During our fieldwork, one of the supervisors provided a master PIN list dated December 2018. The supervisor stated that a new PIN list was requested from Voyager, but no response was received. The next day the supervisor provided an updated master PIN list but stated that it was incomplete because the names of a few new employees were missing. The supervisors designated to reconcile Voyager card transactions were not aware of the process to request a PIN through the Voyager Fleet Commander Online (FCO)⁶ application which assigns a PIN immediately. Also, the supervisors indicated they were not aware that they should not share PINs. Further, they stated it was easier

⁶ The Voyager Fleet Commander Online application is used by Postal Service staff to create and manage Voyager card PINs.

to allow new carriers to use their PINs since many carriers do not complete the probationary period. This avoids activating and deactivating a PIN in a short period of time.

The supervisor shared his PIN with a vendor to allow them to repair, purchase vehicle parts, and fuel vehicles as necessary. The supervisor stated the vendor picks up Postal Service vehicles from the Brick Post Office and drives them to their facility to be repaired.

Based on our review of Postal Service training records, we found that the supervisors and backup reconciler at this unit have not taken the required online eFleet Card *for site Manager*⁷ or FCO⁸ training. Additionally, the postmaster was not aware of the required training.

Postal Service policy⁹ states site managers are responsible for keeping their driver PINs up to date and verifying the information is accurate and complete. In addition, when an employee leaves the Postal Service or is transferred to a different unit, their PIN must be terminated. Further, the site manager must assign PINs to new employees with a PIN from the list and submit notification of the driver's name to Voyager Fleet Services. Only Postal Service employees can be assigned a PIN. Site managers are responsible for maintaining appropriate security and required to perform a semiannual formal review of PINs to avoid the possibility of fraud or misuse related to potential PIN compromise.

When Voyager card PINs are not managed properly, they could be used to make unauthorized and improper purchases. Further, when PINs are shared by employees, it might lead to possibility of fraud. We consider the 601 transactions valued at \$17,125¹⁰ as disbursements at risk.¹¹ We referred these issues to the OIG's Office of Investigations.

Recommendation #1: We recommend the Manager, South New Jersey District, instruct management to implement corrective action to (1) assign all employees Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) for Voyager card transactions and (2) maintain appropriate security to avoid the possibility of fraud or misuse related to potential PIN compromise.

Recommendation #2: We recommend the Manager, South New Jersey District, instruct management at the Brick Post Office to complete eFleet Card for Site Manager and Voyager Fleet Commander Online training.

⁷ *Voyager Fleet Card Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)*, Section 2.2.2 PIN Management, November 2016.

⁸ *Standard Work Instructions (SWI)*, U.S. Bank Voyager Fleet Card, PIN Process for Site Managers, February 25, 2019.

⁹ *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 2.2.2, PIN Management.

¹⁰ The total represents 330 transactions valued at \$9,603 and 271 transactions valued at \$7,522.

¹¹ Disbursements made where employees did not follow proper Postal Service internal controls and processes.

Finding #2: Voyager Card Reconciliation

Unit management did not always properly reconcile Voyager card transactions. Specifically, of the 77 high-risk transactions selected for review (relating to gallons of fuel purchased that exceeded the maximum allowed amount for the vehicle, too many fuel purchases within a month, and duplicate transactions), we identified:

- 38 of 77 transactions or 49 percent, totaling \$2,842, did not have receipts to properly support fuel purchases. Additionally, supervisors did not always ensure the driver vehicle number was recorded on the receipts and did not secure them. The supervisors stored the receipts in a container next to the registry cage.

Postal Service policy¹² states every attempt should be made to secure a receipt for each transaction. In cases where a receipt is not received, the manager must contact the appropriate individual to research and determine if the purchase was legitimate, annotate the review results with a comment within FAMS, and obtain from the individual hard copy documentation certifying the charge. Policy also requires the unit to retain receipts on file for two years.

- Unit management did not submit to U.S. Bank *USPS Voyager Account Dispute Forms*.

Postal Service policy¹³ requires site managers submit the *USPS Voyager Account Dispute Form* to Voyager Fleet Services and file a dispute within 30 days from when the first charge appears.

- Unit management did not notify the OIG of potential fraud or misuse.

Policy¹⁴ states that managers must notify the OIG of potential fraud or misuse.

Postal Service management stated they performed monthly reconciliations and flagged questionable transactions; however, they did not believe they should complete dispute forms and file them with U.S. Bank because they were familiar with the carriers and their routes. Further, although management kept some receipts on file, they did not require carriers with missing receipts to complete a *Missing Receipt* forms. The postmaster stated they were re-evaluating their process for Voyager card reconciliation and PIN management and would have the supervisors take the required training.

When Voyager card transactions are not properly reconciled and supporting documentation is not maintained, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service will be held financially responsible for unauthorized purchases. In addition, maintaining these records provides accountability of Voyager card transactions. Further, notifying

¹² *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 4.1, Responsibilities.

¹³ *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 5.1, Disputes.

¹⁴ *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 4.1, Responsibilities.

the OIG can help identify systemic and fraudulent activity and potential areas for postal-wide reviews.

Recommendation #3: We recommend the Manager, South New Jersey District, reiterate the requirements to (1) obtain and retain documentation for two years including the missing receipt forms and receipts and (2) complete, submit, and maintain a copy of *USPS Voyager Account Dispute Forms*, and other documentation that supports disputes with U.S. Bank for all potentially fraudulent transactions for the required period of two years.

Management's Comments

Management agreed with the findings and recommendations.

Regarding recommendation 1, management took immediate action and updated the PIN list as needed on February 19, 2021. Management updated and secured the PIN list with strict limited access to prevent fraud.

Regarding recommendation 2, all the required EAS employees completed the eFleet Card for Site Manager and Voyager Fleet Commander Online training on February 22, 2021.

Regarding recommendation 3, management created a binder system to retain receipts for two years. During a service talk on February 20, 2021, management reiterated the Voyager card policy for issuance, daily clearance of cards, receipts, and other applicable documentation. Further, management will reconcile transactions every three days, ensure carriers have receipts, follow-up with carriers that do not provide a receipt, and dispute charges as necessary.

Additionally, District Finance and Operations Program Support plans to perform a three-month follow-up review at the Brick Post Office to ensure continued compliance.

See [Appendix A](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

Evaluation of Management's Comments

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the findings and recommendations in the report. The corrective actions taken should resolve the issues identified in the report.

We reviewed management's subsequent documentation and found it adequate to resolve the issues identified in this report. We consider recommendations 1, 2 and 3 closed with the issuance of this report.

Appendix A: Management's Comments

DISTRICT MANAGER
SOUTH JERSEY DISTRICT



March 2, 2021

JOSEPH WOLSKI
DIRECTOR, AUDIT OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: Voyager Card Transactions-Brick, NJ, Post Office (Project Number 21-069-DRAFT)

Thank you to you and the team for providing a critical look at the Voyager Card process in Brick NJ. We agree with all the findings and disbursements at risk findings presented in your February 25, 2021 Draft Report.

I can assure you that this office and all other facilities in this district will be completing the Voyager training modules highlighted in this document. On Tuesday, February 23, the district manager sent a district wide e-mail mandating all EAS employees complete the e Fleet Card for Site Manager and Voyager Fleet Commander Online training by March 5, 2021. Finance and Operations Program Support will implement quarterly audits district-wide to ensure compliance with Voyager Program Policies and Procedures beginning in April 2021.

Recommendation #1:

We recommended the Manager, South Jersey District, instruct management to implement corrective action to (1) assign all employees Personal Identification numbers (PIN) for Voyager card transactions and (2) maintain appropriate security to avoid the possibility of fraud or misuse related to potential PIN compromise.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with the recommendation and disbursements at risk findings. Immediate action was taken to update the PIN list, ensuring the deactivation of duplicate PINS as well as the PINS which were shared. Management will ensure current correct PIN list and secure the list in a locked cabinet in the [REDACTED] with strict limited access to avoid fraud. District Finance and Operations Program Support will perform a three-month follow-up review at the Brick post office to ensure continued compliance.

Management requests this recommendation be closed with the issuance of final report.

Target Implementation Date:

Completed 2/19/2021

Responsible Official:

Postmaster-Brick NJ Post Office

Recommendation #2:

We recommend the Manager, South jersey district, instruct management at Brick Post Office to complete eFleet Card for Site Manager and Voyager fleet Commander Online training.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with the recommendation and disbursements at risk findings.
All required training had been completed for all form 50 EAS employees at the Brick post office.

Management requests this recommendation be closed with the issuance of final report.

Target Implementation Date:

Completed 2/22/2021

Responsible Official:

Postmaster-Brick NJ Post Office

Recommendation #3:

We recommend the Manager South New Jersey District reiterate the requirements to (1) obtain and retain documentation for two years including the missing receipt forms and receipts and (2) complete, submit, and maintain a copy of USPS voyager Account Dispute forms, and other documentation that supports disputes with U.S. bank for all potentially fraudulent transactions for the required period of two years.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with the recommendation. Management initiated a binder system which will be used for retaining for the required two years all receipts relative to each vehicle and reiterated this policy covering Voyager card issuance and daily clearing of cards, receipts, and all other applicable documentation in a service talk given to all employees on February 20th, 2021. Management will reconcile transactions every 3 days ensuring carriers initialing and dating of the receipts and follow up with employees providing no receipts and investigation and submission of any disputed charges as they occur. District Finance and Operations Program Support will perform a three-month follow-up review at the Brick post office to ensure continued compliance.

Management requests this recommendation be closed with the issuance of final report.

Target Implementation Date:

Completed 2/20/2021

Responsible Officials:
Postmaster-Brick NJ Post Office



LE GRETTA Y. ROSS-RAWLINS

cc: Manager, Corporate Audit Response Management (CARM)

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