

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

Fiscal Year 2014 Information Technology Internal Controls

Audit Report

Report Number FT-AR-15-005

March 30,2015





OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

Highlights

Our objective was to evaluate and test key financial reporting infrastructure-level internal controls over information systems at Postal Service Information Technology (IT) and Accounting Services and related IT organizations. Background

The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006 required the U.S. Postal Service to begin complying with sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act in fiscal year (FY) 2010. Specifically, management must assert on the effectiveness of the internal control structure over financial reporting. We conducted this audit to support the independent public accounting firm's overall audit opinions on the Postal Service's financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting.

The information technology (IT) infrastructure-level environment includes processes needed to administer, secure, and monitor key financial reporting systems. Our objective was to evaluate and test key infrastructure-level internal controls over information systems. We limited the scope of our audit in FY 2014 to the primary financial reporting infrastructure-level controls management identified to fully mitigate SOX risks. Further, our audit did not address the entire IT environment but only in-scope, SOX financial reporting systems.

What The OIG Found

We identified opportunities to strengthen certain key financial reporting infrastructure-level internal controls that would reduce the risk of compromised information resources. During our audit, management remediated issues we identified regarding server management. For security log reviews, management will evaluate the control and procedures due to the recent cyber intrusion incident. We will review these actions as part of future oversight work.

Management also remediated five issues we identified regarding mainframe management approvals, badge access reviews, password policy, server management, and fire suppression inspections. We agreed with the actions taken to address the issues.

Other infrastructure-level internal controls that we tested were properly designed and operating effectively. Specifically, both and database password security and account suspension settings and the database operating system separation of duties controls properly functioned.

Further, management remediated 12 issues from prior years related to protecting servers against malicious threats and improving job process monitoring. Management is currently remediating eight issues reported during FYs 2011 and 2012 related to managing configuration baselines, and testing patches to operating systems and databases.

The issues identified do not prevent reliance on infrastructure-level controls for accurate and timely financial reporting. Corrective actions should reduce the risk of additional compromises that can harm the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information resources, including financial data; and preserve customer confidence in the Postal Service's brand. However, these actions do not entirely mitigate the effects of a recent cyber intrusion incident. Management developed a multiple phase remediation plan and has already implemented one phase for the cyber intrusion incident. They plan to implement subsequent phases in FY 2015.

What The OIG Recommended

We made no recommendations because management has actions planned by June 30, 2015, or took corrective action to resolve the issues noted during the audit.

Transmittal Letter

FROM:	
	John E. Cihota Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Finance and Supply Management
SUBJECT:	Audit Report – Fiscal Year 2014 Information Technology Internal Controls (Report Number FT-AR-15-005)
	results of our audit of the Fiscal Year 2014 Information trols (Project Number 14BM003IT000).
	eration and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have ditional information, please contact Lorie Nelson, directo 48-2100.
Attachments	
cc: Julie S. Moore Corporate Audit and	Response Management

Table of Contents

Cover
Highlights1
Background1
What The OIG Found1
What The OIG Recommended2
Transmittal Letter
Findings5
Introduction5
Conclusion5
Server Management6
Security Log Reviews7
Management Approvals7
Badge Access Reviews8
Password Policy8
Server Management9
Fire Suppression Inspections9
Status of Open Information Technology
Issues Reported in Prior Years
Recommendations
Appendices
Appendix A: Additional Information
Background13
Objective, Scope, and Methodology15
Prior Audit Coverage17
Appendix B: Prior Years' Information Technology Issues Closed in Fiscal Year 201418
Appendix C: Status of Open Information Technology Issues Reported in Prior Years21
Appendix D: Trademark Information
Contact Information

Findings

Introduction

This report presents the results of our audit of Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 Information Technology Internal Controls (Project Number 14BM003IT000). We conducted this self-initiated audit in support of the independent public accounting (IPA) firm's overall audit opinions on the U.S. Postal Service's financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting.¹ Our objective was to evaluate and test key financial reporting infrastructure-level internal controls² over information systems at Postal Service Information Technology (IT) and Accounting Services and related IT organizations. We limited the scope of our audit in FY 2014 to the primary controls management identified to fully mitigate Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act³ risks. Further, our audit did not address the entire IT environment but only in-scope SOX financial reporting systems. During the audit, we met regularly with the IPA firm and Postal Service representatives to report and discuss remediation efforts, testing tools, initial test results, and control deficiencies.⁴ See Appendix A for additional information about this audit.

We identified opportunities to strengthen certain key financial reporting infrastructure-level internal controls that would reduce the risk of compromised information resources. The Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, as amended, requires annual audits of the Postal Service's financial statements. In addition, the SOX Act was enacted to strengthen public confidence in the accuracy and reliability of financial reporting. Section 404 of SOX requires management to state responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls over financial reporting. The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act of 2006⁵ requires the Postal Service to comply with Section 404 of SOX.

The Postal Service's Management Controls and Integration group oversees testing for finance issues and reports to the Office of Controller. The IT Compliance Management Office (CMO) tests and maintains compliance for the IT infrastructure-level controls and reports issues to the vice president, Information Technology. These infrastructure-level controls are referred to as IT SOX master controls,⁶ including both general computer and application-specific controls.

The Postal Service Board of Governors contracted with an IPA firm to express opinions on the Postal Service's financial statements and internal controls over financial reporting. Our audit augments the IPA firm's opinion.

Conclusion

We identified opportunities to strengthen certain key financial reporting⁷ infrastructure-level internal controls that would reduce the risk of compromised information resources.⁸ During our audit, management remediated issues we identified related to **server** management. For **security** log reviews, management will evaluate the control and procedures due to the recent cyber intrusion incident.⁹ We will validate corrective actions taken or to be taken as part of future oversight work. Management also

¹ The IPA firm maintains overall responsibility for testing and reviewing all IT controls. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) coordinated audit work with the IPA firm to ensure adequate coverage.

Infrastructure-level controls are designed to mitigate risk associated with the infrastructure (for example, database, operating system, and so forth) supporting in-scope financial applications. These controls are either general in nature or application unique. A key control is designed to prevent or detect financial statement misstatements.
 Public Law 107-204, enacted July 30, 2002.

Public Law 107-204, enacted July 30, 2002.
A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control deficiency.

⁴ A control deficiency exists when the design or operation of a control does not allow management, in the normal course of performing its assigned functions, to prevent or detect and correct misstatements timely.

⁵ Public Law 109-435, enacted December 20, 2006.

⁶ A uniquely named control designed to mitigate risks associated with the infrastructure (for example, database, operating system, and so forth) supporting in-scope financial applications. IT SOX master controls are either general in nature (such as addressing security parameters) or application-unique (tailored specifically for the accounting reporting application).

⁷ Our review did not address the entire IT environment but only SOX in-scope financial reporting systems.

⁸ Information resources are all Postal Service information assets, including information systems, hardware, software, data, applications, telecommunications networks, computer-controlled mail processing equipment, and related resources and the information they contain.

⁹ The Postal Service issued a notification on November 10, 2014, that a cyber intrusion had occurred, that compromised employee data, customer care data, and, potentially, workers' compensation claims data. While management has developed a multiple-phase remediation plan and implemented one phase, they plan to implement subsequent phases in FY 2015.

remediated five issues we identified regarding

management approvals, badge access reviews,

password

policy, server management, and fire suppression inspections. We agreed with management's corrective actions to address the five issues.

Other infrastructure-level internal controls that we tested were properly designed and operating effectively. Specifically,

database software controls functioned properly when we tested the password security and account suspension settings. Additionally, the **security** operating system separation of duties controls properly restricted developer access to the production environment.

Further, management remediated 12 issues from prior years related to protecting servers against malicious threats and improving job process monitoring. Management is currently remediating eight issues reported during FYs 2011 and 2012 related to managing configuration baselines, and testing patches to operating systems and databases.

The issues identified do not prevent reliance on infrastructure-level controls for accurate and timely financial reporting. Corrective actions should reduce the risk of additional compromises that can harm the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information resources; and preserve customer confidence in the Postal Service brand. However, these actions do not entirely mitigate the effects of a recent cyber intrusion incident. See Appendix B for corrective actions.

Based on the audit results, we are not making any recommendations. Accordingly, management chose not to formally respond to this report.

Server Management

stand-alone ¹⁰ server failed all	According to mana bly with configuration baseline standards in effect at the t	gement, this occurred
lowever, as standards changed, the	were not updated.	
	Management addressed this issu	e in October 2014.
The OIG has not validated the corrective action ta to recommendation.	aken but will test this issue as part of future oversight wo	rk. Therefore, we made

Security Log Reviews ¹⁴ operates properly,¹⁵ the process used to identify suspicious activity during While the control for security log reviews for AD needs improvement. To assist their reviews, the automatically generates a report for the Directory Services and Server Engineering group¹⁷ to determine whether any suspicious activity exists. report review, the Directory Services and Server Engineering group executes a separate After the management was aware of this issue but did not correct the program. Due to the recent cyber intrusion incident of the Postal Service's information systems and an ongoing investigation, IT CMO management stated they were temporarily discontinuing discussions regarding this process improvement. However, as part of the response to address the cyber intrusion incident, the CMO will completely evaluate the control and procedures and expects to resolve this issue in Quarter 3, FY 2015. The OIG will validate the corrective action as part of future oversight work. Therefore, we made no recommendation. By continuing to improve controls in these areas, management can reduce the risk of a security compromise and increase the likelihood of timely detection to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information resources and data. **Management Approvals** System Software Branch (SSB) management did not post approvals to the IT Procedures Artifact Library (artifact library) timely.²² Specifically, the 17 This group provides several IT services, including user authentication and controls to information resources, deployment of software, hardware validation, and server hardening and backup.

were reset and uploaded to the artifact library²⁷

on October 30, 2013, to await approval. However, management did not meet the control procedures²⁸ requirement to post the baseline approvals annually within 10 days after October 31.²⁹ In these cases, the approvals were not completed until May 22, 2014, and June 11, 2014. This occurred due to recent changes to the control procedures. Instead of approving all baselines on one document, the revised procedures required management to upload a separate approval for each baseline to the artifact library. By the time management understood the new procedures, they had overlooked three of the four approvals. If management does not post mainframe approvals timely, there is no assurance that management is reviewing the configuration baseline changes and recording the according to the change management process. This could lead to security weaknesses in the

or subsystem.³⁰

Management posted separate approvals for each configuration baseline by the November 10, 2014, deadline. Therefore, we made no recommendation.

Badge Access Reviews

For the April 2014 quarterly badge access review³¹ at Eagan IT and Accounting Services, we determined although the reviews were completed, a management analyst responsible for posting the results to a specified mailbox³² did not ensure one of the responses was posted in a timely manner.

Failure to properly maintain a record of access to a controlled area increases the risk of use by unauthorized personnel that could result in physical failure of infrastructure components. Based on our audit, the employee resolved the issue. We retested the July 2014 access review and did not find any issues. Therefore, we made no recommendation.

Policy			
management did not assign the	9	■ to the	group
■ in the . ³⁵ T	he overrides the se	ettings for the default	.36
		we made no recommendation.	
27 The IT Procedure Artifacts Library serves as the re	epository for SOX and non-SOX re	elated IT procedures related to various IT acti	vities, such as mainframe security.
29 The IT CMO maintains the IT Procedure Library.			
32 That email is kept in the HCS SOX Artifact Facilitie	es mailbox.		·


Server Management

The Postal Service Engineering Team set the password expiration for the administrator account to the

³⁷ to 90 days in the **acco**⁸ environment rather than 30 days as required.³⁹ This occurred because management is in the process of converting the operating system from the and did not change the settings to meet Postal Service policy when moving the **acco**⁸ servers from the test to the production environment. System administrator accounts are more susceptible to a password brute-force attack. A better protects information resources from accidental or intentional unauthorized use, modification, disclosure, or destruction. As a result of our audit, management set

Fire Suppression Inspections

IT and Accounting Services management did not conduct fire suppression systems inspections in a timely manner.⁴³ In the **Condent Condent Con**



45 Control procedure, DCTR 03: Reviewing Data Center Environmental Controls Procedure, dated April 22, 2013.

Status of Open Information Technology Issues Reported in Prior Years

During our control tests in FY 2014, we reviewed the status of prior years' open issues. The OIG confirmed the CMO closed 12 issues identified in earlier reports (see Appendix B for actions taken). Likewise, the CMO continued remediation efforts on eight issues (see Appendix C for details regarding the remediation efforts on these issues). Table 1 summarizes the status of corrective actions taken in FY 2014 on prior years' issues.

Table 1. Summary of Corrective Actions Taken in FY 2014

	ls	ssues Identified by	Fiscal Year		
Status	2010	2011	2012	2013	Total
Remediation in progress	0	4	4	0	8
Issues closed with confirmation from the OIG	2	4	3	3	12
Total	2	8	7	3	20

Source: CMO Integrated Audit Weekly Coordinator Meeting.

Recommendations

Based on the audit results, we are not making any recommendations. Accordingly, management chose not to formally respond to this report.

Appendices

Click on the appendix title to the right to navigate to the section content.

Appendix A: Additional Information	13
Background	13
Objective, Scope, and Methodology	15
Prior Audit Coverage	17
Appendix B: Prior Years' Information Technology Issues Closed in Fiscal Year 2014	18
Appendix C: Status of Open Information Technology Issues Reported in Prior Years	21
Appendix D: Trademark Information	23

Appendix A: Additional Information

Background

The Postal Service's SOX Management Controls and Integration group oversees testing for finance issues and reports to the Office of Controller. The IT CMO tests and maintains compliance for infrastructure-level controls and reports issues to the vice president, Information Technology. These infrastructure controls are referred to as IT SOX master controls, including both general computer and application-specific controls.

The services for the Postal Service. The Service Center provides infrastructure services for nearly 32,000 Postal Service locations. Each site includes multiple service organizations that deploy and support systems and applications; provide accounting and finance activities; and perform application development, enhancement, and system maintenance that enable the Postal Service to achieve its business objectives. These organizations currently relevant to SOX Section 404 compliance.⁴⁸

The IT SOX master control environment consists of eight process areas:

- Application General
- IT Governance
- Operating System
- Database
- Infrastructure
- Operations
- Application-Unique
- Company-wide

For FY 2014, we were responsible for testing five process areas shown in Table 2.

⁴⁶ We did not test any IT SOX master controls in St. Louis in FY 2014.

⁴⁷ The IT CMO considers these significant business applications supporting a SOX in-scope business process.

⁴⁸ The IT CMO determined these IT systems have a comprehensive impact on the IT control environment or are relied on by SOX in-scope applications for coverage of controls.

Table 2. IT SOX Master Control Process Area

Description
This area is composed of the three types of operating systems that support financial and IT-related applications.
This area encompasses the numerous database structures that support either financial or infrastructure applications.
This area is composed of the individual security software applications that provide centralized user authentication and access to operating systems and standardized job scheduling tools.
This area encompasses several functions with broad impact in supporting Postal Service IT functionality.
This area contains several security monitoring functions, such as those provided by the Corporate Information Security Office (CISO). This includes the Computer Incident Response Team's (CIRT) efforts to monitor and assess security systems and network resources and provide comprehensive responses to computer security incidents.

Source: Postal Service IT SOX Master Control Index Report.



Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate and test key financial reporting infrastructure-level internal controls over information systems at Postal Service IT and Accounting Services and related IT organizations. In consultation with the IPA firm, we limited the scope of our audit in FY 2014 to key financial reporting infrastructure-level IT controls.⁵⁷ Our audit did not address the entire IT environment but only SOX in-scope financial reporting systems. After our initial reviews and before final testing was completed, management adjusted the status of several controls. For example, management removed associated with the IT Operations process area, because the CMO determined that the job scheduling controls were duplicative and reviews were covered through existing eAccess controls.⁵⁸ Additionally, management of another job scheduling control⁵⁹ by applications⁶² from the

control. Finally, management removed the timeliness criteria to better meet the baseline objective for a data transfer control.⁶³ We concurred with these changes to these infrastructure-level controls and adjusted our work accordingly.

To accomplish our objective, we interviewed administrators, observed master control processes and procedures, and reviewed applicable Postal Service policies. We judgmentally and randomly selected samples of SOX in-scope applications, servers, and SOX-related notifications for detailed control testing and analysis. We reviewed (37 percent)⁶⁴ IT SOX master controls designed to mitigate risks associated with a IT components. We tested master controls, including those associated with configuration baselines, separation of duties, configurations, security log monitor configurations, security monitoring, data restoration, and testing documentation. We also monitored corrective action taken on issues open from prior years' reviews and performed assessments as appropriate.

Table 3 shows the number of IT SOX master controls we tested for each infrastructure component to support SOX in-scope financial and infrastructure applications.

57 The primary controls that management has identified to mitigate SOX risks.




Table 3. Infrastructure Components Tested by IT Process Area

IT Process Area	Infrastructure Components (Number of IT SOX Master Controls)	Subtotal by Area
Operating System		
Database		
Infrastructure		
Operations		
Company-wide		
Total		

Source: OIG analysis.

We conducted this audit from January 2014 through March 2015⁶⁷ in accordance with the standards of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) and the standards applicable to financial audits contained in the *Government Auditing Standards* issued by the comptroller general of the U.S. Those standards require we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to limit audit risk to a low level that is, in our judgment, appropriate for supporting the overall audit opinion on financial statements. Those standards also require considering the results of previous engagements and following up on known significant findings and recommendations that directly relate to the audit objectives. An audit also requires a sufficient understanding of internal controls to plan the audit and determine the nature, timing, and extent of audit procedures to be performed. The evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our conclusion based on our audit objective.

We supported the IPA firm in obtaining reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements were free of material misstatements (whether caused by error or fraud). Absolute assurance is not attainable because of the nature of audit evidence and the characteristics of fraud. Therefore, an audit conducted in accordance with the PCAOB and *Government Auditing Standards* may not detect a material misstatement. However, external auditors and the OIG are responsible for ensuring that appropriate Postal Service officials are aware of any significant deficiencies that come to our attention. We provided a copy of this report to management on January 15, 2015. Management chose not to respond formally to this report.

We assessed the reliability of computer-generated data by reviewing configuration files obtained from the audited systems and interviewing appropriate managers knowledgeable about the data. We also reviewed existing information about the data and the operating systems/platforms that produced them. We found the data from the

⁶⁵ The CIRT database experienced a hardware failure, which prevented us from testing the control. The OIG reported separately on this issue, *Backup and Recovery* of *Essential Data* (Report Number IT-MA-14-001, dated August 20, 2014)

⁶⁶ Information Systems Security is part of the Corporate Information Security Office.

⁶⁷ The scope of our audit was October 1, 2013, through September 30, 2014.

application⁶⁸ to be reliable for reviewing selected controls associated with the **sector**, and **sector**, and **sector**, and **sector**, we also reviewed the code walkthrough and script validation provided by the IT CMO. This confirmed that the scripts did not contain elements that would manually insert values, and that the scripts would return error messages in the event data from the server could not be read. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact (in millions
Fiscal Year 2013 Information Technology Internal Controls	IT-AR-14-003	3/26/2014	None
Report Results: The infrastructure-le we identified opportunities that would the In addition to issues identified in FY 2 and reported in FYs 2010 through 20 actions to address 15 prior year issue	help control owners better mana application and strengt 013, we reported on managemen 12. Management agreed with the	ge change management policies hen administrator access controls nt's corrective actions taken on op recommendations. We also conf	and job scheduling procedures for s for workload scheduling software. ben issues identified during FY 2013 firmed management took corrective
Fiscal Year 2012 Information Technology Internal Controls	IT-AR-13-003	1/28/2013	None
Report Results: Many of the infrastru- However, we identified opportunities t and database activity, as well as seco in FY 2012, we reported on managem 2011. Management agreed with the re- complete corrective actions on five iss	to strengthen certain internal con ondary reviews of actions taken in nent's corrective actions taken or ecommendations, resolved 13 iss	trols over security monitoring of n response to database monitorin n open issues identified during FY sues associated with five of the re	g. In addition to the issues identified 2012 and reported in FYs 2010 and
Fiscal Year 2011 Information Technology Internal Controls	IT-AR-12-003	1/9/2012	None
Report Results: The infrastructure-le we identified opportunities for manage and data back-up and restoration ope from the FY 2010 review. Management corrective action on the issues consol	ement to strengthen certain inter erations. In addition to the issues nt agreed with the recommendation	nal controls over operating syster identified in FY 2011, we reported ions. Management resolved one i	ns, databases, 1999 , job scheduling, d on the status of unresolved issues

⁶⁸ For FY 2014, the IT CMO developed this application to continuously monitor the configuration settings associated with four IT SOX master controls across five platforms (16 controls).

Appendix B: **Prior Years' Information Technology Issues Closed in Fiscal Year 2014**

		(GET ⁶⁹ Identification Number)
Des	cription and Action Taken to Close Issue	CMO Tracking Number
lss	ues Identified in FY 2010	
1.	did not perform vulnerability scans on servers servers to ensure the agent is loaded or running. Management implemented a reconciliation process between the 70 and the Critical report on a quarterly basis for all servers.	Compliance_Chk (2010-774) FY10.OIG.OE.DCE.07.023
2.	ISS relied upon the server listing from the inaccurate and to determine which and and and servers to scan to establish whether the agent is running. Management implemented a reconciliation process between the agent and the agents report on a quarterly basis for agents servers.	Compliance_Chk (2010-827) FY.10.OIG.OE.DCE.07.036
lss	ues Identified in FY 2011	
3.	Semi-annual reviews of access to resources do not address the control objective because they fail to consider the authorizations granted to the individual user. Instead, the reviews focus only on the authorizations granted via the user's membership in a group. The Production Operations Branch remediated the job scheduling review process and updated the IT Procedure Library. The files provided now show the individual permissions and role assignments in the Privileges and Active tabs.	Review_Job_Schd (2011-341/342) FY11.OIG.OE.DCE.CTM-EM Job Schd Review
4.	Three profiles do not comply with the password expiration policy. Management performed a coordinated team effort to reconcile counts against accounts registered in the second se	_Parm_Config (2011-433) FY11.IT_CMO.OE.SOX.07.TRDA Non Approved Non Expiring PW
5.	Management did not create tickets to monitor and track unresolved issues in the area timely. Management revisited corrective actions taken and worked with the control owner to identify additional procedures to mitigate the risk of not creating tickets in the prescribed timeframe. OIG verified the revised control addressed the issues previously identified.	Job_Mntr (2011-370) FY11.OIG.OE.DCE.DTS Job Failure Remedy Ticket Timing

- to monitor business and IT SOX-related issues. Each issue is assigned a
- r. Additionally, the IT CMO maintains records of less significant issues (known as process improvements) the does not report. is a central repository for all server assets in host computing. It is driven by a combination of configuration discovery

IT SOX Master Control

and data put in by the customer.

69 Management uses the

70 The

71

offers protection for desktops and servers against malicious behaviors, blended threats, and known and unknown attacks.

Des	scription and Action Taken to Close Issue	IT SOX Master Control (GET ⁶⁹ Identification Number) CMO Tracking Number
6.	Management used a methodology of drawing sample job changes in the change management system ⁷² (change requests (CR)), , which may have circumvented their ability to identify any changes made external to the standard change management process. Management updated the methodology for referencing CR tickets in the system. Management also began providing a report of all job changes, which included the description field to utilize as the source population for testing. Subsequent OIG testing verified that management approval was obtained for all job changes via the referenced CR ticket number; therefore, the control was operating as designed.	_Chgs_via_CR (2011-398) FY11.OIG.DE.DCE.SOX.Job Schd Chgs via CR
lss	ues Identified in FY 2012	
7.	A copy of the sector records used to update information in the vulnerability management tool was not retained as required. Management updated procedures to make sure they retained an artifact document of sector records and uploaded the artifact to the appropriate library, as stated in the control.	Compliance_Chk (2012-081) FY12.OIG.OE.DCE.CSP Compliance Check Retention of CMDB Extract
8.	Twenty-five of 45 SOX in-scope production servers (on the servers) were not reporting intrusion detection events to the servers and were not detected by current monitoring efforts. The servers Engineering team implemented changes to their servers configuration monitor ⁷⁴ for changes to the log configuration files and the process monitor for sending email alerts to the Engineering team.	_Log_Mntr_Config (2012-094) FY12.OIG.DEOE.UNIX_Sec_ Log_Mntr_Config.z/linux servers
9.	The script used within the vulnerability scans performed did not confirm whether the intrusion detection software was running or reporting. Management replaced the script with new scanning software and instituted a reconciliation process for the scanning the script on a quarterly basis for all servers with agents installed.	Compliance_Chk (2012-104) FY12 OIG DE DCE WIND_CSP_ Compliance Chk Cannot Be Verified

In a computer system environment, change management refers to a systemic approach to keep track of the detail of the system. For example, what operating system release is running on each computer and which fixes have been applied. 72

⁷³ 74 75

collects and correlates security events from across the network, even though other products, such as antivirus and firewall applications, generate the events. is an open source systems management tool for centralizing and automating configuration management. is a software suite, consisting of a console, intelligent agents, and Knowledge Modules, which system or database administrators can use for security event monitoring.

Description and Action Taken to Close Issue CMO Tracking Number Issues Identified in FY 2013 administrators did not always follow normal version control policy ⁷⁶ for modifying the the formation AE ⁷⁸ scheduled) ⁷⁷ used to monitor critical CA Workload Automation AE ⁷⁸ scheduled 10. jobs. Management updated the CA Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the change management practices for modifying the tused to monitor critical CA Workload Automation AE Frocess Improvement) 11. not exist as required. Management updated the CA Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. Image: Ca Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. Image: Ca Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. Image: Ca Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. Image: Ca Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. Image: Ca Autosys – Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. Image: Ca Autosys – PW_Parm_Config 11. not exist as required. Management than days. Additionally, future occurrences may not be detected because the IT SOX master control (PW_Parm_Config) states that reviewers should obtain evidence of password settings from administrators. These administrators could alter the passwor			IT SOX Master Control (GET ⁶⁹ Identification Number)
 administrators did not always follow normal version control policy⁷⁶ for modifying the mathematical policy⁷⁶ scheduled jobs. Management updated the mathematical policy⁷⁶ scheduling Procedure to include the change management practices for modifying the mathematical policy⁷⁶ to used to monitor critical CA Workload Automation AE scheduled jobs. A mathematical policy⁷⁶ policy⁷⁶ to monitor critical CA Workload Automation AE scheduled jobs. A mathematical policy⁷⁶ to monitor critical CA Workload Automation AE scheduled jobs. A mathematical procedure that documents critical jobs does not exist as required. Management updated the mathematical policy⁷⁶ CA Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. The mathematical password expiration setting for the administrator account was set to mathematical policy and maintaining the list. The mathematical policy and maintaining the list. The mathematical policy and maintaining the list. The mathematical policy and the password expiration setting for the administrator account was set to mathematical policy and maintaining the list. The mathematical policy and the password settings before or after providing the evidence to the reviewers. Management changed the password expiration setting to 30 days. Additionally, management updated control method policy and policy and	Description and Action Taken to Close Is	ssue	1
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 11. not exist as required. Management updated the CA Autosys – Job Scheduling Procedure to include the location and process for storing the listing of critical job and maintaining the list. The password expiration setting for the administrator account was set to days, rather than days. Additionally, future occurrences may not be detected because the IT SOX master control (PW_Parm_Config) states that reviewers should obtain evidence of password settings from administrators. These administrators could alter the password settings before or after providing the evidence to the reviewers. Management changed the password expiration setting to 30 days. Additionally, management updated control PW_Parm_Config to include instructions 	 policy⁷⁶ for modifying the monitor critical CA Workload A 10. jobs. Management updated the Procedure to include the change mana the model to monitor critical CA) ⁷⁷ used to utomation AE ⁷⁸ scheduled CA Autosys – Job Scheduling gement practices for modifying	(Process Improvement) FY13.OIG.PI.DCE.
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Appendix C: Status of Open Information Technology Issues Reported in Prior Years

		IT SOX Master Control (GET Identification Number)	Report and Associated Recommendation Number				
Condition of Control per Prior OIG AssessmentCMO Tracking Number(Target Completion Date)							
Issu	Issues Identified in FY 2011						
1.	The OIG noted concerns with the method used to determine the universe of databases to be monitored. In FY 2012, management began a remediation effort that clarified the need for an automated discovery tool to identify a complete list of servers in their environment, as well as automated processes to sustain the configuration data within	_Log_Mntr_Config (2011-316) FY11.OIG.OE.DCE.SOX.	IT-AR-12-003, Recommendation 1 (FY 2015 Q1)				
		Completeness of Monitoring					
2.	Critical patches were not installed for at least 6 months on databases supporting seven in-scope applications. Management has drafted an patch policy that incorporates the use of an enterprise tracking system to monitor patches from vendor release to implementation in production. However, management has not determined how to define timeliness for the numerous circumstances that applications requiring database patches encounter.	Mgmt (2011-413) FY11.OIG.OE.DCE.SOX Patch Management	IT-AR-12-003, Recommendation 1 (FY 2015, Q4)				
3.	Management did not change the password for on seven sampled servers and had other application and user accounts in the local account environment on 22 sampled servers. Despite remediation of previously found accounts, subsequent testing by management or the OIG disclosed additional accounts that were not properly configured. Management is reviewing the registration process in the account provisioning software and devising a plan to address the systemic problem.	_Parm_Config (2011-440) FY11.IT.CMO.OE.DCE.SOX PW Parm Config	IT-AR-12-003, Recommendation 1 (FY 2015, Q2)				
4.	We identified issues associated with the patching process, including the absence of documentation provided in patch evaluation assessment, inadequate process and artifacts to ensure that all servers are patched, and absence of test plans and results of testing within the patch management process artifacts. Management is working with the associated parties to revise patching procedures.	Patch_Mgmt (2011-442) FY11.OIG.OE.DCE.SOX Patching Process	IT-AR-12-003, Recommendation 1 (FY 2015, Q4)				

Cor	ndition of Control per Prior OIG Assessment	IT SOX Master Control (GET Identification Number) CMO Tracking Number	Report and Associated Recommendation Number (Target Completion Date)
lssı	ues Identified in FY 2012		
5.	The current process for action configuration baseline compliance effectively demonstrates perpetual failure of this SOX control. The control is defined such that SOX production servers should have "configuration baselines [that] meet or exceed the configuration baselines established by management." The decision to equate the configuration baseline with hardening standards is problematic because the three hardening standards for the are inconsistent and may include unnecessary elements or exclude necessary elements for a configuration baseline that supports reliable and timely financial reporting. In addition, elements of the hardening standards duplicate other SOX controls for the action environment.	Config_Baseline (2012-097) FY12.OIG.DE.DCE Config Baseline Hardening Standards	IT-AR-13-003, Recommendation 8 (FY 2015, Q1)
6.	Management did not include 113 SOX in-scope servers in its review of server server configurations.	.Config_Baseline (2012-099)	IT-AR-13-003, Recommendation 6 (FY 2015, Q2)
		FY12.OIG.OE. Config Baseline. Review	
7.	Management does not follow the required process for documenting baseline discrepancies and remediation plans for servers. Specifically, management did not get approval for the remediation plans or correctly identify corrective actions for each discrepancy found and track each discrepancy to completion.	.Config_Baseline (2012-100)	IT-AR-13-003, Recommendation 6 (FY 2015, Q2)
		FY12.OIG.OE. Config Baseline.Execution of Procedure	
8.	Existing patch testing procedures are out of alignment with current Midrange group practices. Both the procedures and current practices require adjustment to improve the patch history of individual servers and provide assurances the control environment is operating effectively.	esting_Doc (2012-131)	IT-AR-13-003, Recommendation 9 (FY 2015, Q4)
		FY12.OIG.OE.DEC.07 Testing.Doc Testing and Tracking of Patches	

Appendix D: Trademark Information

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BMC Software, Inc.: and and
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IBM Corporation:
Microsoft Corporation:
Oracle Corporation:
Symantec Corporation:
Teradata (Corporation) Operations, Inc.:
The Attachmate Group, Inc.:
The Open Group:

⁷⁹ A trademark ([™]) is the name or symbol used to identify goods purchased by a particular manufacturer or distributed by a particular dealer and to distinguish them from products associated with competing manufacturers or dealers. A trademark that has been officially registered and is, therefore, legally protected is known as a Registered Trademark ([®]).



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