NSA Office of the Inspector General Releases Three Reports

17 February 2016

The National Security Agency (NSA) is releasing today three reports by NSA's Inspector General about the Agency's compliance with a current and former statute authorizing electronic surveillance. The reports detail steps NSA has taken to adhere to the law and highlight the importance of these legal authorities to the Agency's national security mission. They also reveal some procedural and other deficiencies that have been subsequently corrected. NSA reported the incidents to Congress as required. All three reports – more than 300 pages total – confirmed that there had been no cases of intentional violation of laws. NSA released the reports under a Freedom of Information Act request. They are being published on NSA.gov to help raise public awareness of the Agency's foreign intelligence mission and to highlight the Agency's ongoing commitment to compliance with the law. The NSA Inspector General's rigorous, independent, and continuous reviews are an essential part of the Agency's extensive oversight.

These reports, issued over a five-year period beginning in 2010, concern NSA activities conducted pursuant to two authorities: Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), which authorizes targeted surveillance of foreign persons located outside the United States in certain cases, and Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which was replaced last year by the USA FREEDOM Act. NSA itself initiated two of the reports, and one was requested by members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Below are highlights from these NSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) reports.

NSA OIG report ST-14-0002. This report, issued on February 20, 2015, was compiled by the NSA OIG at the request of members of the Senate Judiciary Committee. The OIG reviewed the controls implemented by NSA in carrying out activities pursuant to two FISA authorities. The first was Section 702, which was enacted as part of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and authorizes the targeting of non-U.S. persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States to acquire critical foreign intelligence information. This collection authority is one of the Intelligence Community's most significant tools for the detection, identification, and disruption of terrorist threats to the United States and its allies. The second authority examined by the OIG was Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act. Pursuant to Section 215, NSA was authorized to collect in bulk certain telephone metadata. This program operated from 2006 until its termination by statute on November 28, 2015. Section 215 was amended by the USA FREEDOM Act, which was enacted on June 2, 2015, and became effective on November 29, 2015. The USA FREEDOM Act made significant changes to NSA's authority to collect telephone metadata pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and was not the subject of the OIG's review, so significant portions of the report are no longer relevant to NSA's activities.

The report presents a detailed, comprehensive picture of the operation of the Section 702 program. Specifically, it describes the extensive internal and external oversight and compliance regime,

including access restrictions, training requirements, and technical controls – as well as limits on data retention and dissemination of information. The report also notes a number of unintentional compliance failures and describes the controls put in place to mitigate recurrence. The report further notes that Section 702 contributes significantly to NSA's mission.

NSA OIG report, ST-11-0009. This report focused solely on Section 702 and was issued on March 29, 2013. It reviewed the system of management controls that NSA implemented, including training, access, and multiple levels of review and oversight. The OIG did not identify any areas of noncompliance. It recommended several areas in which controls over compliance with Section 702 could be improved, including a lack of clear guidance to analysts, inadequate documentation, and insufficient training in some instances. In each case, NSA's Signals Intelligence Directorate agreed with the OIG's recommendations and implemented corrective action plans.

NSA OIG report AU-10-0023. This report, which covered only certain aspects of NSA's implementation of Section 702, was issued on November 24, 2010. Specifically, the report reviewed the process by which NSA transitioned from collection pursuant to Section 702 to other authorities under FISA. The OIG identified the lack of a standardized process, which created the potential for gaps in lawful surveillance coverage. The Agency has since implemented an improved transition process. Moreover, Section 701 of the USA FREEDOM Act subsequently clarified surveillance procedures in that regard.

The National Security Agency is tasked with a complex foreign intelligence mission and is dedicated in its respect for U.S. laws and policies. There is a robust internal and external oversight structure in which all three branches of government play a key role, as well as a rigorous internal compliance program. The three NSA OIG reports published *here* are intended to help raise public awareness of the Agency's mission and to highlight ongoing commitment to compliance with the law.

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NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY/CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE



(U) Final Report of the Audit on the FISA Amendments Act §702 Detasking Requirements

AU-10-0023 24 November 2010

> DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSS Manual 1-52 DATED: 08 January 2007 DECLASSIFY ON: 20320108

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Approved for Release by NSA on 02-11-2016. FOIA Case #80120 (litigation)

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(U) NSA OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

(U) The NSA Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducts audits, investigations, inspections, and special studies. Its mission is to ensure the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of NSA operations, provide intelligence oversight, protect against fraud, waste, and mismanagement of resources, and ensure that NSA activities are conducted in compliance with the law. The OIG also serves as an ombudsman, assisting Agency employees, civilian and military, with complaints and questions.

(U) Intelligence Oversight

(U) The OIG Office of Intelligence Oversight reviews NSA's most sensitive and high-risk programs for compliance with the law.

(U) Audits

(U) The OIG Office of Audits within the OIG provides independent assessments of programs and organizations. Performance audits evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of entities and programs and assess whether NSA operations comply with federal policies. Information Technology audits determine whether IT solutions meet customer requirements, while conforming to information assurance standards. All audits are conducted in accordance with standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States.

(U) Investigations and Special Inquiries

(U) The OIG Office of Investigations administers a system for receiving and acting on requests for assistance and complaints about fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Investigations and special inquiries may be undertaken as a result of such requests and complaints (including anonymous tips), at the request of management, as the result of questions that surface during inspections and audits, or at the initiative of the Inspector General.

(U) Field Inspections

(U) The Office of Field Inspections conducts site reviews as part of the OIG's annual plan or by management request. Inspections yield accurate, up-to-date information on the effectiveness and efficiency of field operations and support programs, along with an assessment of compliance with federal policy. The Office partners with Inspectors General of Service Cryptologic Components and other Intelligence Community Agencies to conduct joint inspections of consolidated cryptologic facilities.

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AU-10-0023



OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

24 November 2010 IG-11226-10

TO: DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) §702 Detasking Requirements (AU-10-0023) — ACTION MEMORANDUM

1. (U) This report summarizes the results of our audit of the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) §702 Detasking Requirements (AU-10-0023) and incorporates management's response to the draft report.

2. (U//FOUO) As required by NSA/CSS Policy 1-60, *NSA/CSS* Office of the Inspector General, actions on OIG audit recommendations are subject to monitoring and follow-up until completion. Therefore, we ask that you provide a written status report concerning each planned corrective action categorized as "OPEN." If you propose that a recommendation be considered closed, please provide sufficient information to show that actions have been taken to correct the deficiency. If a planned action will not be completed by the original target completion date, please state the reason for the delay and provide a revised target completion date. Status reports should be sent to Assistant Inspector General for Follow-up, at OPS 2B, Suite 6247, within 15 calendar days after each target completion date.

3. (U//FOUO) We appreciate the courtesy and cooperation extended to the auditors throughout the review. For additional information, please contact ______on 963-0957 or via e-mail at

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36


George Ellard Inspector General

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AU-10-0023

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(U) EXECUTIVE	SUMMARY	(b) (3)

(b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)

(U) OVERVIEW

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), has strengthened Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection, particularly against terrorist targets. From September 2008 to March 2010, the number of SIGINT reports that incorporated FAA §702 sourced collection

(TS//SI//NF) Under the law, collection under FAA §702 must cease in certain circumstances, potentially resulting in a gap in coverage. To regain coverage, NSA must transition to another authority for continued collection, such as a FBI FISA Order. The Agency does not have a consistent process to ensure a seamless transition from FAA §702 authority to FBI FISA Orders.

(U) HIGHLIGHTS

	coverage exist
TS//SI//REL TO US	SA, FVEY) Analysis of detasking for FAA §702 compliance

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

J) Significance of	(b) (1)
	(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024)
H/SI//REL_TO-USA, FVEY) Need for standardize	
S//SI//NF) The Agency lacks a standardized p	process
'9//SI//NF) The Agency lacks a standardized p	brocess

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)

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I. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) Background

(b) (1)	-(TS//SL//NE)_Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act	
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)	(FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), enhances surveillance against foreign nationals outside the United States.	
	§702 effectively broadened	
	access to critical targets of interest, particularly terrorists. From September 2008, when FAA was implemented, to March 2010, the number of Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) reports that incorporated §702 sourced collection	
(b) (1)		
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36		
	(TS//SI//NF) Collection under FAA §702 must cease under certain circumstances. Detasking is required when a target is determined to be entering or to have entered the United States	
	Collection also must cease when a target is found to be a U.S. person (USP)	
(b) (1) (b) (3) -P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 USC 3024(i)	To regain coverage of such a target, collection must transition to another authority, for example, a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) FISA Order. The transition from FAA §702 to another authority may not be seamless, thereby creating a gap in coverage and potentially causing a risk to U.S. security. This audit assessed the circumstances and extent of the FAA §702 coverage gap by examining tasking and detasking records, FBI FISA data, traffic collected and purged, and SIGINT reporting.	


(U) FAA §702

(TS//SI//NF) FAA §702 allows NSA to use the assistance of U.S. telecommunications and Internet service providers to target non-USPs outside the United States. After the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence file a joint certification that certain statutory requirements have been met and the certification is approved by the FISA Court (FISC), NSA may conduct foreign intelligence surveillance of the content of communications. The certification includes an affirmation that the surveillance targets only non-USPs reasonably believed to be outside the United States. The certification is submitted to the FISC and typically is approved for one year. Acquisition under a certification must adhere to targeting and minimization procedures approved by the Court. As of August

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(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(U//FOUO) Other, FISA authorities provide alternative means to obtain collection against foreign intelligence targets when NSA must stop collection (detask) pursuant to FAA §702.

• (U) FAA §704

(U//FOUO) Other Acquisitions Targeting USPs Outside the United States. A FISC Order is required, but surveillance techniques are not reviewed by the court.

• (U) FAA §705b

(U//FOUO) Joint Applications and Concurrent Applications. When a FISA Order that authorizes surveillance of a target inside the United States is in place, the Attorney General can authorize targeting while the USP is reasonably believed to be outside the United States.

(U) FBI FISA Order

(S//SI//REL TO FVEY) The FBI is authorized under a FISC Order to perform searches and electronic surveillance against agents of a foreign power. Under FISC docket number (known as the Raw Take Sharing Order) dated July 2002, NSA is able to receive most FBI FISA collection.

(U) Increased use of FAA §702 Authority


(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) According to analysts in the Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID), collection under FAA §702 authority is productive and grew in the 19 months between September 2008 and March 2010. Increased tasking under FAA §702 authority has resulted in increased SIGINT reporting. The Agency has also experienced an increase in compliance-related detaskings of selectors.

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(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

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II. (U) FINDING AND RECOMMENDATION

(U) FINDING: Gaps in Coverage Exist

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

- (TS//SI//NF) Although FAA §702 has provided important SIGINT collection, the Agency has experienced _____coverage gaps when _____transitioning from FAA §702 to another authority.

The Agency does not have a consistent process to ensure a seamless transition from FAA §702 authority to FBI FISA Orders.

(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(U) FAA §702 Implementation

(U) FAA §702 procedures

(TS//SI//NF) FAA §702 requires that NSA adopt procedures to ensure that its collection targets are non-USPs reasonably believed to be outside the United States and to ensure that the Agency does not intentionally acquire communications known to be purely domestic. NSA must also establish minimization procedures that reasonably balance its foreign intelligence needs against the privacy interests of USPs with respect to the collection, retention, and dissemination of information.

(U) FAA §702 detaskings for compliance

(U//FOUO) In certain circumstances, NSA must detask selectors to maintain compliance with FAA §702 and approved targeting and minimization procedures. There are three broad reasons for detasking.


(U) Roamers

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The foreign target is initially believed to be overseas, but it is subsequently determined that the target has entered the United States

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
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
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	(U) Audit universe of FAA §702 detaskings (U) Audit universe of FAA §702 detaskings (TS//SI//NF) To determine the extent of the coverage gaps, we identified every Digital Network Intelligence (DNI) and Dialed Number Recognition (DNR) selector that was detasked to comply
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36	with FAA §702 after enactment of the FAA in July 2008. By examining tasking records and SV's
(1) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (3)-50 USC 3024(i)	PAA/FAA Incidents database, we identified relevant detasked DNI and DNR selectors. These selectors were drawn from FAA §702 certifications
(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36	(U// FOUO) Contribution of collection under FAA §702 authority to reporting (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) From September 2008 to March 2010, FAA §702 collection contributed to an increasing percentage of reporting. Overall, the increase was from percent to percent.
-(\$//3)	1//REL TO USA, FVEY) Percentage of Reports with Contributions from FAA (September 2008 - March 2010)
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


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



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
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
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


	(TS//SI//NF) NSA, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the FBI	
(b)(1)		
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36		
	2. (TS//SI//REL_TO_USA, FVEY) Learning experience:	5
	-(TS//SI//NF)	Ļ
and the second se		
(b)(1)		
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)		
	-(TS//SI//NF) Selectors Associated with	
(b)(1)	- (TS//SI//NF) -	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-30	5	
	-(TS//SI//NF)	
	-(TS//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) These selectors had been placed under FAA §702 coverage	(b)(1)
	because they were used by several persons associated with	(b)(3)-P.L.
(b)(1)		
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	(TS//SI//NF) analysts initially did not know who to contact	(b)(1)
(b)(3)-50 030 5024(1)	about obtaining alternative coverage and were not clear about what could be obtained from FAA §705b tasking and how this	(b)(3)-P.L.
	tasking Ultimately, the analysts	
⁴ (S//SI/REL_TO U	SA, FVEY)	(b)(3)-P.L.
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


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Successful completion within this timeframe is contingent upon direct involvement from SV and S1 as they are owners of mission components that are directly tied to the transition process (see Appendix C for full text of management comments).

(U) OIG Comment


(U) Planned actions meet the intent of the recommendation.



DOCID: 4273445 AU-10-0023 -TOP-SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-(U//FOUO) Strict guidance on detasking (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) Strict guidance from DoJ and OGC (TS//SI//NF) (b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) (U) Action taken (TS//SI//NF) the DIRNSA, along with the (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 Attorney General and the acting Director of National Intelligence, filed with the FISC FAA §702 certification renewal documents related to targeting and minimization procedures for the (TS//SI//NF) NSA learned that the FISC was concerned with the proposed changes to the minimization procedures. DoJ and NSA are exploring alternatives to address the matter while continuing to operate under the existing procedures.

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(U) ACRONYMS AND ORGANIZATIONS



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(U) APPENDIX A

(U) About the Audit

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(U) ABOUT THE AUDIT

(U) Objectives

(U) The audit objective was to document the circumstances and the extent of dropped Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) collection as a result of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) §702 restrictions.

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) Conducted from February to August 2010, the audit examined the gaps in coverage when a selector is required to be detasked for compliance with FAA §702 and the measured effect of the lost coverage.

(U//FOUO) We reviewed current policies and laws pertaining to FAA §702. We obtained access to the Protect America Act (PAA)/FAA Incident database and reviewed reported incidents from 10 July 2008 (when the FAA became law) through 4 March 2010 and documented actual instances when SIGINT collection was stopped to comply with §702. See Appendix C – Data Analysis for our data sources.

(C)-We interviewed representatives from the following organizations: Signals Intelligence Directorate (SID) Oversight and Compliance

	(SV),	Office of General
(b)(1)	Counsel (OGC),	and
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	and the second	In
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	addition, we met with	and documented the

collection transfer from NSA to FBI.

(U) SID Oversight and Compliance

(U//FOUO) To gain an understanding of the Agency's process for documenting and reporting incidents and violations, we met with the SV staff. We obtained for our analysis information from SV's PAA/FAA Incidents database on selectors that were detasked because of FAA §702 restrictions.


(U) Office of General Counsel

(U//FOUO) We met with the OGC FAA liaison to gain the overall legal perspective of the implementation of FAA §702. We also met with the Acting General Counsel to discuss the nature of collection restrictions that are inherent in NSA's legal authorities. In addition, we discussed whether the current law is sufficient for NSA to achieve its mission goals.

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generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions according our audit objectives. We believe

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that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions according to our audit objectives.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) The Office of the Inspector General has not performed any previous audits or inspections on FAA §702.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) To perform this audit, we used data that originated from the the SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents, and (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 databases. We used the data to conduct a gap analysis on selectors that were detasked for FAA §702 compliance reasons. We did not determine the validity of these databases; however, we validated the data across multiple sources to ensure an accurate depiction of the data as used for our analysis.

(U) Management Control Program

(U//FOUO) As part of the audit, we assessed the organization's control environment pertaining to the audit objectives, as set forth in NSA/CSS Policy 7-3, *Internal Control Program*, 14 April 2006. We found that SV4's 2010 statement of assurance reported that a lack of upgrades of Information Technology systems and software application and lack of training and staffing could impede the SV4 mission.

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(U) APPENDIX B

(U) Data Analysis

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(U) DATA ANALYSIS

(U) Identification of Detasked Selectors

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U//FOUO) We used the SV PPAA/FAA incidents database and the as sources of selectors that were detasked to maintain compliance with FAA §702.

(U//FOUO)

SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database

(U//FOUO) We examined the SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database, which contains a record of reportable incidents under the PAA/FAA. A reportable incident under PAA/FAA is one of the following:

(U/FOUO) The conduct of any SIGINT activity (collection, processing, retention or dissemination) using PAA collectors in a way that contravenes the terms of the PAA or the terms of the specific certification under which you are operating.⁶ This includes any activity that runs counter to the Director's affidavit or the associated exhibits that describe the process for determining foreignness, the minimization procedures, or the targets authorized for collection under the certification.

(U//FOUO) The conduct of any SIGINT activity using PAA collectors without having a certification in place to cover the target being collected.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) We reviewed the records in the SV PAA/FAA Incidents database from 10 July 2008 (the inception of FAA) to 4 March 2010 and determined that there were a total of incidents.

(U/FOUO) The records in the database are categorized by incident type. This allowed us to determine those that met the criteria for our review of detaskings related to compliance. The relevant incident types for further review are:

(b)(1)	<u>-{S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY}</u> Roamers into the US
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	• (S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)
	• -{S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY} Targets identified as a USP after

tasking under §702

(U//FOUO) Incident types such as "analyst error" and "tasking error" did not relate to detasking to maintain compliance with §702; therefore, we eliminated these types of records from our review.

⁶ (U) PAA was the predecessor to FAA.

	(U// FOUO) 	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	requests. To ensure that we obtained records of all detaskings related to §702 compliance, we requested from tasking records a record of detaskings for any of the three following reasons ⁷ :	
	 User is a USP User is entering the United States User is in the United States 	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	-(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) The main purpose for requesting detasking records from was to search for selectors that were	
	detasked citing a reason "user is entering the United States" and that were not captured as incidents in the SV PAA/FAA Incidents database because they were detasked before the user actually roamed into the United States.	
	(U) Audit universe $(U//FOUO)$ We compared the results of the query with the selectors identified in the review of the PAA/FAA Incidents database and identified additional selectors that were detasked for compliance purposes.	
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY) From our review of the SV PAA/FAA Incidents and detasking records, we identified a total universe of unique selectors that were detasked for compliance reasons. The detaskings covered the FAA §702 certifications:	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	We were able to identify both detasked DNI and Dialed Number Recognition (DNR) selectors from the <u>SV PAA/FAA</u> Incidents database and detasked DNI selectors from detasking records. The breakout of the selectors are detailed in the following table:	

⁷ (U//FOUO) did not formally include a "detask reason" field until an upgrade was performed in February 2009; therefore, our search within detasking records was performed for the date range February 2009 to (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 March 2010.

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(5//F650)
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(U//FOU) Detasked Selectors by Source and Type

Source	Туре	§702 Selector Type	Description	Time Frame	No. of Detasked Selectors
SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database			Compliance-related detaskings since July 2008	July 2008 to March 2010	
SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database			Compliance-related detaskings since July 2008	July 2008 to March 2010	
SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database			Compliance-related detaskings since July 2008	July 2008 to March 2010	
SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database			Compliance-related detaskings since July 2008	July 2008 to March 2010	
detasking record		1	Compliance-related detaskings since February 2009	February 2009 to March 2010	
detasking record			Compliance-related detaskings since February 2009	February 2009 to March 2010	
Total		1	1		


(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Audit Sample for Gap Analysis

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	reasons under the cert 2010. We concentrated o because of the signifance number of FAA §702 task SIGINT production. We a frame for review and the f of records necessary to co <u>\$702</u> detaskings were selectors. We were u because of a lack of traffic (S//SI//REL TO USA, FV (gaps in coverage in days) missed collection as a res	ere deta tificatio n the s of the l ings, an lso bas ocus on nduct nable t c or tas EY) Ou and co	sked for co n from Feb electors fro FAA §702 c nd the key ed our deci n selec the analysis 0 conduct a king inform r analysis ollection cov	ollection for complia oruary 2009 to Marc m the certification ollection, including role it plays in sions regarding the tors on of the availant s, and the majority re were detask an anlysis of sel nation or both.	ance ch on the e time ability of the ectors gaps
	selectors.	÷.			o)(1) o)(3)-P.L. 86-36
	Database	Туре	§702 Selector Type	Selectors Reviewed (February 2009 to March 2010)	
	SV4 PAA/FAA Incidents database	-	J.		
	detasking records				
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	Total				
			10110	LUDDI TO HEA MIT	Par-


(S//SI//REL TO USA, FVEY)



(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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(U) APPENDIX C

(U) Full Text of Management Comments

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(U) SID and OGC Management Responses

	FF PROCESSING FC						
OIG	EXREG CONTR 2010-895				KCC CONTROL N	UMBER	
THRU				ACTI	APPROVAL	EXREG SUSPENS 15 Nov 20	
SUBJECT				님	SIGNATURE	KCC SUSPENSE	
FISA Amen	SID Response to Draft A dments Act 702 Detaskin				INFORMATION	ELEMENT SUSPE	INSE
DISTRIBUTION							_
objective wa of FAA 702	DUND: (U/ /FOUO) The <i>i</i> as to document the circum restrictions. The draft A GC) to review for factual	nstances and t udit report wa	he exten as provid	t of dro led to	pped SIGIN	T collection nd Office of	as a result General
below, <u>(S//S</u> accou DISCUSSIC	L //NF) Recommendation ints de-tasked from FAA ON: (U// FOUO) The att <u>a</u> t the subject report. The	: Establish a 702 collection	n. Lead	Action A) is th		n OGC. red SID/S2 a	
below, <u>(S//SI</u> accou DISCUSSIC response to t	L/NF) Recommendation ints de-tasked from FAA ON: (U// FOUO) The at <u>tas</u>	: Establish a 702 collection ched documer defer	n. Lead	Action A) is th for th	e consolidat eir response	n OGC. ed SID/S2 a to this taske (b)((b)((b)(nd OGC r.
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below, <u>(S//S)</u> accou DISCUSSIC response to t (b)(This SPI	L/NF) Recommendation ints de-tasked from FAA ON: (U// FOUO) The attact the subject report. The (3)-P.L. 86-36	: Establish a 702 collection ched documer defer defer	n. Lead nt (TAB red to COMINT/	Action A) is th for th	ne consolidat eir response N upon remov	n OGC. ed SID/S2 a to this taske (b)((b)(; (b)(; al of encl(s).	nd OGC t. 3)-P.L. 8(3)-50 US(
Delow, <u>(S//S)</u> accou DISCUSSIC response to t (b)(This SPI OFFICE	L/NF) Recommendation ints de-tasked from FAA ON: (U// FOUO) The attac the subject report. The (3)-P.L. 86-36	: Establish a 702 collection ched documer defer	n. Lead	Action A) is th for th	e consolidat eir response	n OGC. ed SID/S2 a to this taske (b)((b)(; (b)(; al of encl(s).	nd OGC t. 1) 3)-P.L. 8(3)-50 US(
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oelow. (S//S) accou DISCUSSIC response to the (b)(This SPI OFFICE ID DIR 102 122 132 132	L/MF) Recommendation ints de-tasked from FAA ON: (U//FOUO) The attact the subject report. The (3)-P.L. 86-36 F may be downgraded and mate NAME AND DATE A/17/10 WATE (47/17)	rked SECRET//0	n. Lead nt (TAB red to red to <i>COMINT//</i> PPROVAL OFFICE	Action A) is the for the NOFOR	ne consolidat eir response N upon remov NAME AND DA 86-36	n OGC. eed SID/S2 a to this taske (b)((b)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)(i)	nd OGC r. 3)-P.L. 8(3)-50 US(
opelow. (S//S) accou DISCUSSIC response to the (b)(This SPI OFFICE DIR 02 12	L/MF) Recommendation ints de-tasked from FAA ON: (U//FOUO) The attaction the subject report. The (3)-P.L. 86-36 F may be downgraded and mate NAME AND DATE A/17/10 email/11/10/10	Establish a 702 collection ched documer defer rked SECRET//0 COORDINATION/A SECURE PHONE 963-3335 963-3121	n. Lead nt (TAB red to COMINT//	Action A) is the for the NOFOR)-P.L.	ne consolidat eir response N upon remov NAME AND DA 86-36	n OGC. ed SID/S2 a to this taske (b)((b)(; (b)(; al of encl(s).	nd OGC r. 1) 3)-P.L. 8(3)-50 US(3)-50 US(

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I. (U) SUMMARY

(U//FOUO) As requested, this correspondence provides the Office of and Office of General Counsel's (OGC) statements of (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 concurrence (or non-concurrence) with the recommendation contained in the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) draft audit report on the transition gap NSA encounters when targets of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act (FAA) §702 collection must be de-tasked from this collection authority. This memorandum also provides OIG with the results of and OGC's review of the draft report for factual accuracy.

II. (U) CONCURRENCE WITH RECOMMENDATION

(S//St//NF) Recommendation : Establish a process for NSA coverage for accounts de-tasked from FAA 702 (b)(1) collection. (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

(U) Lead Actionee: SID with OGC.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (U) Concur/Non-Concur & Estimated Completion Date: and OGC concur with OIG's recommendation. Corrective action is underway and will be completed as soon as possible. Successful completion within this timeframe is contingent upon direct involvement from SV and S1 as they are owners of mission components that are directly tied to the transition process.

-(TS//SI//NF) Comment: Although there is a current process for the Signals	
Intelligence Directorate (SID) coverage of targets of interest,	
OGC does not dispute OIG's substantive finding that the current process does not	
appear to be universally understood by SID's personnel. In	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
response to this finding and recommendation, OGC and individuals from SID, to	
include personnel, are working on improving the current process	
coverage of targets that must be dropped from FAA 702	
collection. OGC and SID personnel have already initiated discussions to	
establish a clearer process for NSA coverage for selectors de-	
tasked from FAA 702 collection. OGC and personnel have begun drafting a	
comprehensive standard operating procedure (SOP) for analysts to follow when	
as appropriate. The SOP will	
also include a quick reference guide and checklist for analysts. OGC will engage	
with the Department of Justice (DoJ) as	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

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(b)(1)(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i) necessary to ensure that the new process addresses OIG's finding and recommendation.

(b)(1)

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	-(TS//SI//NF) In the short term, has initiated a series of training sessions for (b)(3)-P.L. 86	-36
(b)(3)-50 USC 30	²⁴ members of the division and branch leadership teams to raise awareness of the	
	process The purpose of the	
	training is to establish branch and division level Points of Contact (POCs) who will	
	be able to assist analysts through the process. Additional Video	
	Teleconferencing Center (VTC) sessions will be scheduled to include the extended enterprise.	
(b)(3)-P.L. 86	3-36	
	-(TS//SI//NF) Finally, an e-mail alias has been created that includes technical and	
	policy experts in The purpose of this group is to assist the division and branch	
	POCs as they work with the analysts on the process. Members of the	
	group will also ensure that timely resolution is reached for selectors de-tasked from	
	FAA 702.	
	III. (U) REVIEW FOR FACTUAL ACCURACY	
	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
	(U//FOUO) OIG Comment: The OIG does not agree with the that all suggested	
	changes were due to inaccuracies or misleading statements. In most cases, these	
	suggested changes were based on interpretations of the report and new	
	information. We made the appropriate changes to update and clarify areas of the	
	report.	
	Topol L	
	inaccuracies or misleading statements that should be corrected in the final version	
	of OIG's report on the gap NSA encounters when targets of FAA 702	
	collection must be de-tasked from this collection authority. These factual	
	inaccuracies do not affect concurrence with the report's recommendation that	
	SID and OGC establish a new process	
	targets that must be dropped from FAA 702 collection. The	
	following constitutes specific suggested corrections:	
	(b)(1)	
	(U) Correction 1 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36	
	(b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)	
	(S//SI//NF) Highlights Section (page i): On page 'i' in the "Highlights" section, the	

report contains a sentence that says

(S//SI//NF) Comment: This statement implies that NSA would have been able to obtain probable cause on all of those selectors and would have been able to transition to another authority. Believe we should clarify that we cannot transition all selectors in all circumstances.

(U) Correction 2

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

-(S//SI//NF) Gaps in Coverage Exist (page 5): Under the FINDING (top of the page), it states "...the Agency has experienced coverage gaps when transitioning from FAA702 to another authority."

-(S//SI//NF) Comment: This statement implies that NSA should be able to transition to another authority in all instances. This is not the case. Believe we should clarify that we cannot transition all selectors in all circumstances. While the need for a "higher legal standard" is mentioned on the bottom of page 6, believe we need to be up front with the fact that some selectors will not transition.

(U) Correction 3

-(S//SI//NF) Effective Collection Priority (ECP) (page 8): This section states that the average ECP was 2.52 indicating that "the average ECP was 2.52, indicating that these selectors are of high priority."

(S//SI//NF) Comment: Believe we need to add	context to this statement. We would
imagine that most if not all	has an (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
ECP that falls into the 1-3 range. Probably all on the ECP.	selectors are of high priority based

(U) Correction 4

 (TS//SI//NF)
 Selectors not retasked (page 11): The table at the top of the page indicates that

 (b)(1)
 (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(TS//SI//NF) Comment: We think it is important to add a footnote that indicates that the analysts were told that they did NOT have to perform thorough research to try to recall why the selector was not retasked. Below is an excerpt from an email exchange between OIG and indicating that the analyst did not have to perform research if they did not remember why the selector was not retasked.

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(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)

- (TS//SI//NF) We agree with your assertion that the analysts simply note that they do not recall what happened to the selectors if they cannot remember. Our intention was not to require people to spend hours trying to recall information to answer our survey, which is why there is a "don't recall" option in the first question(b)(1)

(U) Correction 5

(TS//SI//NF) (TS//SI//NF) Comment:

(U) Correction 6

(TS//SI//NF) Need for consistent process (page 11): The document states that,

(b)(3)-50 USQ 3024(i)
(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(b)(1)

(TS//SI//NF) Comment: We think it is important to note that some selectors will take longer to transition compared to others based on the circumstances. The probable cause standard is higher than the standard associated FAA 702 tasking. This statement implies that we should always be able to transition quickly. It may take time and a lot of back and forth between __________before we (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 reach the probable cause standard. We realize this is addressed in the Case Studies on page 13 but we think it should be stated up front.

(U) Correction 7	
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(S//SI//REL) Footnote 3 (page 14): States that	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(TS//SI//NF) Comment:	(b)(1)
	(b) 3)-P.L. 86-36
- TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORM	V

b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Correction 8

(TS//SI//NF) First Paragraph (page 15): "The analysts also may not have been

	(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (b)(3)-50 USC 3024(i)
- (TS//SI//NF) Comment:	

(U) Correction 9

-(TS//SI//NF) Action Taken (page 18): This section discuss	es the new procedures	(b)(1)
which are supposed to provide relief on some	scenarios.	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
(TS//SI//NF) Comment: Unfortunately,	provisions were	(b)(1)
removed from the new procedures so we will not see any	relief	(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36
based on the new procedures. OGC would have details o and where we stand.	n exactly what occurred	

III. (U) OGC - REVIEW FOR FACTUAL ACCURACY

(U//FOUO) OIG Comment: The OIG does not agree with the OGC that all suggested changes were due to inaccuracies or misleading statements. In most cases, these suggested changes were based on OGC's interpretations of the report and new information. We made the appropriate changes to update and clarify areas of the report.

(S//SI//NF) The following lists areas of the report where OGC identified factual inaccuracies that should be corrected in the final version of OIG's report on the transition gap NSA encounters when targets of FAA 702 collection must be de-tasked from this collection authority. These factual inaccuracies do not affect OGC's concurrence with the report's recommendation that SID and OGC establish a new process targets that must be dropped from FAA 702 collection. The following constitutes OGC's specific suggested corrections:

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(U)	Correction	1
1-1		-

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(S//SI//NF) Highlights Section (page i): On page 'i' in the "Highlights" section, the report contains a sentence that says the issue of a

is currently under review by DoJ. This statement is factually incorrect. In July 2010, DoJ attempted to persuade the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) to allow tasking to continue under one version of the

but the FISC

refused to accept the proposed change to NSA's FAA targeting and minimization procedures that the Government proposed to address this problem. OGC's understanding is that the FISC concluded such a change would conflict with statutory restrictions contained in the FAA legislation itself. Therefore, DoJ is no longer reviewing this issue in the manner mentioned in the draft report. Instead, DoJ is reviewing two different draft legislative proposals that attempt to close the transition gap. One proposal was drafted by NSA and the other proposal was prepared by DoJ's National Security Division.

(U) Correction 2

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

-(S//SI//NF) Introduction: On page 2, the "Introduction" section of the draft report contains the following sentence:

(U) As drafted, this sentence is factually inaccurate. The sentence should be revised to read:

-(S//SI//NF) "Under FISC docket number (known as the Raw Take Sharing Order) dated July 2002, NSA is able to receive most FBI FISA collection directed against the FBI's counterterrorism targets."

-TOP SECRET//COMINT//NOFORN-

(U) Correction 3

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

-(S//SI//NF) Finding that Gaps in Target Coverage Exist: Page 6 of this section of the draft report contains the following sentence:

-(S//SI//NF) "To avoid a break in coverage, other authorities must be sought if the target remains of interest and is an agent of a foreign power (§704, §705b, and/or FBI FISA)."

-(S//SI//NF) This sentence is inaccurate as drafted since it implies that the listed authorities are the only possible authorities available to resume coverage. The sentence should be revised to read:

-(S//SI//NF) "To avoid a break in coverage, other authorities must be sought if the target remains of interest and is an agent of a foreign power (e.g., §704, §705b, FBI FISA, etc.)."

(U) Correction 4

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

-(S//SI//NF) Finding that Gaps in Target Coverage Exist: Page 6 of this section of the draft report contains the following statement:

-(S//SI//NF)- "For non-FAA §702 coverage, a higher legal standard, individualized probable cause, is required to secure a FISA order.


-(S//SI//NF) Although the statement is accurate as drafted, for completeness OIG may wish to note that, in some cases, the Government may simply not be able to assemble facts sufficient to satisfy the probable cause standard.

(b)(1) (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

(U) Correction 5

-(TS//SI//NF) Discussion of lack of process	On pages
15 to 16 of this section of the draft report, there is a discuss experienced in regaining coverage of selectors associated v	
	Since the report says
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formal probable cause determination.

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