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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

September 16, 2024



(U) Summary of Oversight Reports on Security Assistance to Ukraine Issued From January 2020 Through February 2024, to Inform DoD Efforts to Support Israel and Other Future Security Assistance Efforts

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 16, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
AUDITOR GENERAL DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

SUBJECT: (U) Summary of Oversight Reports on Security Assistance to
Ukraine to Inform Possible DoD Efforts to Support Israel and
Other Future Security Assistance Efforts
(Report No. DODIG-2024-131)

(U) This report provides a summary of DoD Office of Inspector General reports issued between January 2020 and February 2024, related to the DoD's support to Ukraine and identified insights based on this area of oversight. We reviewed 31 reports from the DoD Office of Inspector General. Since this is a summary report, it contains no findings or recommendations; therefore, we did not provide a draft report for management comment.

(~~EU~~) If you have any questions, or would like to discuss the evaluation, please contact

[REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Bryan Clark".

Bryan T. Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Programs,
Combatant Commands, and Operations

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(U) Executive Summary

(U) Our review of 31 DoD OIG oversight reports issued between January 2020 and February 2024, found that the DoD has continued to face systemic challenges across a variety of areas related to security cooperation for Ukraine. We identified and summarized these challenges and respective recommendations that, if implemented, may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD efforts to support Israel and other future security assistance efforts.

(U) Based on our review of the 31 oversight reports for Ukraine, we identified systemic challenges related to the:

- (U) enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) of sensitive equipment provided to Ukraine;
- (U) accountability and control of U.S.-provided equipment, including inventory and property book concerns;
- (U) financial management of Ukraine supplemental funding, including inaccurate reporting of the DoD's use of funds;
- (U) intelligence sharing;
- (U) information and physical security; and
- (U) information operations.

(U) For these systemic challenges, we summarized key recommendations from these reports that should be considered for implementation, as applicable, when conducting security cooperation activities related to the challenges we have highlighted in this report. Lastly, we identified potential best practices for criminal investigations during security assistance operations.

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to summarize DoD OIG oversight reports from January 2020 through February 2024, related to DoD security assistance to Ukraine to highlight systemic challenges and recommendations made to address them. These systemic challenges and recommendations can be used by DoD leaders to inform possible DoD efforts to support Israel and other future security assistance efforts.

(U) Background

(U) Security Cooperation, Security Cooperation Policies, and Organizations

(U) DoD Directive 5132.03 defines security cooperation as the DoD's interactions with foreign defense establishments to build relationships to promote U.S. security interests, develop allied and partner nation military and security capabilities, and provide U.S. Forces with peacetime and contingency access to allies and partner nations.¹ Section 333, title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.), authorizes the Secretary of Defense, with concurrence from the Secretary of State, to conduct or support programs to provide training and equipment to foreign countries to build partner capacity. Building partner capacity is most often funded with U.S. Government appropriations and administered through foreign military sales infrastructure. Security assistance programs enable the United States to provide defense articles, military education and training, and other defense-related services to partner nations by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

(U) DoD Directive 5132.03 defines security cooperation organizations as DoD organizations located in foreign countries that are responsible for carrying out security cooperation management functions. Security cooperation organizations are the in-country DoD elements that manage the United States' foreign military financing and foreign military sales programs.

(U) In accordance with Public Law 114-92, Section 1250, the Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative is an authority that provides appropriate security assistance and intelligence support, including training, equipment, and logistics support, supplies and services, to military and other security forces of the Government of Ukraine.

¹ (U) DoD Directive 5132.03, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," December 29, 2016.

(U) Requirements and Procedures to Account For DoD Equipment

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.64 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides requirements and procedures for accounting for tangible DoD equipment and property.² In addition, the DoDI requires that the accountability of property management, which supports the lifecycle management of items, including the documentation of lifecycle events and transactions. DoDI 5000.64 helps DoD property managers, accounting and financial managers, and other officials understand their roles and responsibilities.

(U) DoDI 4140.66 requires the establishment of a registration and monitoring system for controlling the export or transfer of defense articles or defense services.³ Additionally, the DoDI designates the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Director as the DoD lead agent responsible for managing and implementing the DoD's Golden Sentry end-use monitoring (EUM) program and developing, implementing, and providing oversight of the registration and monitoring policy through EUM inspection and other means.

(U) Roles and Responsibilities For Security Assistance

(U) U.S. European Command's Security Assistance Activities

(U) The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), alongside allies and partners, executes globally integrated, multi-domain operations and exercises as part of the United States' commitment to European security. USEUCOM conducts security assistance operations and facilitates humanitarian assistance delivery to support Ukraine in response to the February 2023 Russian invasion.

(U) According to the USEUCOM Office of Defense Cooperation–Ukraine's mission statement, they partners with Ukraine's Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces to provide military equipment, training, familiarization events, and educational opportunities to support the modernization of Ukraine's military and bilateral foreign policy objectives, while engaging at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of defense activities. Key programs administered by the Office of Defense Cooperation

² (U) DoDI 5000.64, "Accountability and Management of DoD Equipment and Other Accountable Property," April 27, 2017.

³ (U) DoDI 4140.66, "Registration and End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and/or Defense Services," September 7, 2010, Incorporating Change 1, May 24, 2017.

(U) Public Law 110-181–National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Section 1228, "Tracking and Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to the Government of Iraq and Other Individuals and Groups in Iraq," January 28, 2008.

(U) Public Law 111-84–National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Section 1225, "Program to Provide for the Registration and End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and Defense Services Transferred to Afghanistan and Pakistan," October 28, 2009.

(U) include Foreign Military Sales or Foreign Military Financing, primarily for the purchase or U.S. grant provision of military equipment and training.

(U) Security Assistance Group-Ukraine's Support Activities for Ukraine

(U) The DoD established the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine (SAG-U), a three-star command, to be the single focal point for DoD support to Ukraine. The SAG-U coordinates weapons shipments, personnel training, and other efforts related to DoD support to Ukraine. The SAG-U monitors the use, disposition, and accountability of U.S. weapons provided to Ukraine to ensure that they are not diverted from their intended purpose and are used in accordance with end use agreements.

(U) Finding

(U) The DoD Faced Systemic Challenges in Performing Security Cooperation Activities in Ukraine That May Hinder Other Future Operations if Unaddressed

(U) Our review of 31 DoD OIG oversight reports from January 2020 through February 2024, related to the DoD's security cooperation activities in support of Ukraine found that the DoD has faced challenges across a variety of areas.⁴ We identified challenges in the accountability and control of U.S.-provided equipment related to Enhanced End Use Monitoring (EEUM) and Military Service property books. We also identified challenges related to financial management, intelligence sharing, information security, and information operations. We identified and summarized these challenges and respective recommendations that, if implemented, may improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DoD efforts to support Israel and other future security assistance efforts. Lastly, we identified best practices for collaboration with foreign partners in the conduct of criminal investigations.

(U) The DoD Has Challenges Accounting for Equipment that Requires EEUM

(U) Several DoD OIG oversight reports documented challenges with accounting for U.S.-provided sensitive equipment and equipment requiring EEUM in Ukraine.⁵ DoD policy requires that when the DoD provides donated equipment to foreign partners, it must maintain accountability and control of sensitive equipment such as weapons, ammunition, and night-vision devices, through and in some cases after transfer to the partner nation security forces, through EEUM. Without proper accountability and control, U.S.-provided weapons and equipment may be subject to loss, theft, or proliferation.

~~(EUH)~~ The DoD OIG identified challenges related to EEUM of military equipment provided to Ukraine. For example, DoD personnel could not always conduct EEUM or proper inventorying and did not consistently identify which equipment required

⁴ (U) A complete list of all oversight reports that we reviewed in this summary is located in the Scope and Methodology section.

⁵ (U) The DoD's EUM program includes defense articles requiring added physical security and inventory requirements. The DoD designates these defense articles as requiring EEUM.

(~~CU~~) EEUM.⁶ Specifically, DoD personnel could not always conduct EEUM of equipment provided to Ukraine because of restrictions limiting their ability to visit locations where equipment was used or stored highlighting the importance of sufficiently staffing DoD personnel in partner nation logistics hubs to conduct inventories before the EEUM equipment is transferred to Ukraine. When DoD personnel were able to conduct inventories, they were not always accurate because Defense Security Cooperation Agency personnel did not review and update the Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) to include all sensitive equipment and technology that required EEUM.⁷

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

(U) To address these challenges, the DoD OIG recommended that DoD personnel periodically update the SAMM to update the list of defense articles requiring EEUM; permanently mark serial numbers on EEUM equipment for verification; conduct serial number inventories of the EEUM equipment; and develop an information field within the Security Cooperation Information Portal to report lost or destroyed equipment that is unaccounted for and ensuring sufficient DoD staffing to track EEUM equipment in partner nations before it is transferred into the country.

(U) The DoD Has Challenges Maintaining Accountability of Equipment Transferred to a Partner Nation

(U) Several DoD OIG oversight reports identified systemic challenges with maintaining accountability of equipment transferred to a partner nation. DoD policy requires that personnel maintain accountability of equipment transfers, inventory classified or sensitive property, and maintain accountable records and receipt documentation with

⁶ (U) DODIG-2023-002, "The DoD's Accountability of Equipment Provided to Ukraine," October 6, 2022.

(U) DoDIG-2023-090, "Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring," June 28, 2023.

(U) DODIG-2024-043, "Evaluation of the DoD's Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine," January 10, 2024.

⁷ (U) DODIG-2023-074, "Management Advisory: DoD Review and Update of Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring," May 19, 2023.

(U) The SAMM update defines environment as an environment in which force protection limitations exist that could endanger USG personnel performing EEUM inventories. It also places a greater responsibility on the partner nation to conduct EEUM activities within its borders to compensate for the inability of USG personnel to fully execute their EEUM responsibilities due to the hostile environment. The SAMM uses the term "Security Cooperation Organization," which for Ukraine, is executed by the Office of Defense Cooperation-Ukraine.

(U) unique equipment identifiers. We identified that DoD Components were inconsistently maintaining equipment accountability documentation and were not completing equipment reconciliations in a timely manner.

~~(S)~~ DoD personnel did not properly account for, maintain, coordinate, or inventory defense items before transferring them to the Government of Ukraine (GoU). For example, DoD personnel did not complete all required forms, could not confirm that the quantities of defense items received matched the quantities of items shipped, and did not complete joint inventories of pre-positioned stocks during the transfer of accountability and equipment issuance. Additionally, property book officers could not always complete reconciliation of quantities of pre-positioned stocks in a timely manner [REDACTED]

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(U) To address these systemic challenges, the DoD OIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment complete the required documentation and identify each item by number before transporting equipment to Ukraine. Additionally, the DoD OIG recommended that Army personnel:

- (U) develop a checklist to inventory pre-positioned stocks;
- (U) address the accountability, maintenance, preparation, and certification of hazardous and sensitive equipment; and
- (U) develop a plan to inventory and sign lateral transfer agreements to account for the speed and volume of defense articles transferred to Ukraine.⁹

(U) The DoD Has Challenges With Financial Management of Ukraine Supplemental Funding

(U) DoD OIG oversight reports identified systemic challenges with the DoD's financial management of Ukraine supplemental funding. According to DoD policy, internal controls, procedures, and accounting systems must provide accurate financial records, proper identification, and recording of costs incurred to support contingency operations, such as foreign disaster relief. The reports identified two systemic challenges related to the DoD's financial management: inaccurate reporting of Ukraine

⁸ (U) DODIG-2024-028, "Management Advisory: The U.S. Army's Accountability of Equipment Transferred to Ukraine," November 15, 2023.

⁹ (U) A lateral transfer is the transfer of nonexpendable property from one organization to another.

(U) supplemental funds and a potential for the DoD to misuse appropriated funds for Ukrainian unit training due to weak internal controls.

(U) The DoD process for reporting the movement of funds to the Foreign Military Sales Trust Fund could result in inaccurate reporting of the execution of those funds.¹⁰ For example, DoD personnel inconsistently recorded allotments received and used journal vouchers that limited the DoD reporting through the Advana system. Additionally, the DoD used non-compliant systems with the Standard Financial Information Structure and required DoD personnel to use journal vouchers to account for budget execution of the Ukraine supplemental funds, including \$20.1 billion in disaster emergency funding.

(U) DoD personnel may have misused appropriated funds by training a Ukrainian unit that may have committed a gross violation of human rights, resulting in a violation of the Leahy Law, because they did not sufficiently document that Leahy vetting occurred for Ukrainian Armed Forces units that received DoD training.¹¹

(U) To address these systemic challenges, the DoD OIG recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer:

- (U) manually input accounting data instead of using systems that do not interface with Advana;
- (U) update business rules to address system noncompliance and to ensure accurate capture of budgetary status of the Ukraine supplemental funds; and
- (U) use summary journal vouchers and other adjusting methods to differentiate between transferable funds and appropriated funds to improve transparency.

(U) Additionally, the DoD OIG recommended that U.S. European Command personnel develop, document, and implement internal controls to ensure that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel received Leahy vetting and approval.

¹⁰ (U) DoDIG-2022-133, "Management Advisory: The DoD's Use of Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds," September 19, 2022.

(U) DoDIG-2022-112, "Management Advisory: The DoD's Use of Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds," July 8, 2022.

(U) Advana is the official reporting system for Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds. It is a common enterprise data repository and a centralized data and analytics platform that provides DoD users with common business data, decision support analytics, and data tools.

¹¹ (U) DODIG-2024-046, "Management Advisory: Leahy Vetting of DoD-Trained Ukrainian Armed Forces," January 27, 2024.

(U) The Leahy Laws refer to statutory provisions that prohibit the U.S. Government from providing assistance to a unit of a foreign security force when the Secretaries of Defense or State have credible information that the unit committed a gross violation of human rights, or when such credible information is available to them.

(U) The DoD Has Challenges With Intelligence Sharing, Information and Physical Security

(U) DoD OIG oversight reports identified challenges with the DoD's intelligence sharing and information and physical security.

(U) The DoD's Intelligence Sharing Challenges

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) The DoD's Information and Physical Security Systemic Challenges

(S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹² (U) DODIG-2023-122 "Evaluation of Intelligence Sharing in Support of Ukraine," September 13, 2023.

¹³ (U) DODIG-2024-002 "Management Advisory: The Protection of Sensitive Mission Data by the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Its Subordinate Commands," November 2, 2023.

¹⁴ (U) DODIG-2023-115, "Evaluation of Land-Based Security Controls for Equipment Being Transferred by Rail to Ukraine," September 6, 2023.

¹⁵ (U) DODIG-2024-109, "Management Advisory: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Classification and Information Security for Ukraine Assistance," July 11, 2024.

(U) To address these challenges, the DoD OIG recommended that Army personnel:

- (U) develop and implement a plan to ensure compliance with DoD information security policies;
- (U) provide Government-furnished automated information systems appropriate for the information stored and transmitted to conduct official business; and
- (S) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) The DoD OIG also recommended that Air Force personnel:

- (U) conduct a review of classification guidance,
- (U) provide equipment to enable personnel to transmit and receive classified information securely, and
- (U) incorporate guidance and lessons-learned into annual trainings and security refreshers.

(U) Potential Impacts to Future Security Assistance Operations

(~~EUH~~) The challenges that the DoD faces regarding EEUM, accountability of equipment, financial management of appropriated funding, intelligence sharing, information security, and physical security are applicable to current and potential future security assistance operations around the world. For example, challenges with sufficient personnel in theater or access to in-country equipment to conduct inventories could also be a challenge outside of Ukraine, [REDACTED], where boots on the ground or direct access to partners could be limited. Similarly, DoD reporting on the use of future appropriated funds may be negatively impacted by the challenges highlighted in this report. Lastly, the DoD will also need to address challenges related to intelligence sharing and information security, particularly in situation in which adversaries are likely to use influence operations or cyber capabilities to disrupt DoD activities. Applying the recommendations and best practices identified in this summary may help to prevent, overcome, or mitigate the impacts of these challenges when providing future security assistance.

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) This report provides a summary of DoD OIG reports related to the DoD's support to Ukraine and identified insights based on this area of oversight. We reviewed DoD OIG oversight reports from January 2020 through February 2024, in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the conclusions. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the conclusions.

(U) We reviewed previous security assistance-related oversight reports focusing on EEUM, property book, financial management, intelligence sharing, information security, and information operations. Specifically, we reviewed DODIG-2022-142, which summarized oversight reports from February 2015 to October 2021. The 2022 DoD OIG summary report identified eight systemic challenge areas with related lessons-learned, that serve as our baseline for this summary report. We also reviewed and summarized 31 oversight reports issued by the DoD OIG from January 2020, through February 2024 for EEUM, property book, and intelligence sharing, to determine the systemic issues, new challenges, lessons-learned, and areas of concern relating to the objective. Furthermore, we coordinated with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service to identify best practices for criminal investigation collaboration related to DoD support to Ukraine.

(U) We reviewed the following 31 DoD OIG oversight reports:

- (U) DODIG-2024-109, "Management Advisory: U.S. Air Forces in Europe Classification and Information Security for Ukraine Assistance," July 11, 2024
- (U) DODIG-2024-053, "Evaluation of the U.S. European Command's Planning and Execution of Ground Transportation of Equipment to Support Ukraine from Port to Transfer Locations," February 8, 2024
- (U) DODIG-2024-046, "Management Advisory: Leahy Vetting of DoD-Trained Ukrainian Armed Forces," January 17, 2024
- (U) DODIG-2024-043, "Evaluation of the DoD's Enhanced End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles Provided to Ukraine," January 10, 2024
- (U) DODIG-2024-041, "Management Advisory: Audit of Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine Restructuring Contract Award," January 5, 2024

- (U) DODIG-2024-028, “Management Advisory: The U.S. Army’s Accountability of Equipment Transferred to Ukraine,” November 15, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2024-002, “Management Advisory: The Protection of Sensitive Mission Data by the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine and Its Subordinate Commands,” November 2, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-117, “Audit of Army’s Oversight for Ukraine-Specific Logistics Civil Augmentation Program V Services in the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility,” September 18, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-122, “Evaluation of Intelligence Sharing in Support of Ukraine,” September 13, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-115, “Evaluation of Land-Based Security Controls for Equipment Being Transferred by Rail to Ukraine,” September 6, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-105, “Management Advisory: U.S. European Command Security Classification Guidance for Ukraine Assistance,” August 11, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-094, “Special Report: Lessons-Learned from DoD OIG Reports to Inform the DoD’s Ukraine Response,” July 20, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-092, “Management Advisory: DoD’s Transportation of Ammunition in Support of Ukraine,” July 5, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-090, “Management Advisory: Sufficiency of Staffing at Logistics Hubs in Poland for Conducting Inventories of Items Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring,” June 28, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-087, “Management Advisory: Basic Issue Items and Components of End Items Shortages in the Army’s Prepositioned Stock–5 Program,” June 15, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-086, “Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces,” June 13, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-084, “Evaluation of Accountability Controls for Defense Items Transferred Via Air to Ukraine within the U.S. European Command Area of Responsibility,” June 8, 2023

- (U) DODIG-2023-080, "Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center (JMWC)," June 6, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-076, "Management Advisory: Maintenance Concerns for the Army's Prepositioned Stock-5 Equipment Designated for Ukraine," May 23, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-074, "Management Advisory: DoD Review and Update of Defense Articles Requiring Enhanced End-Use Monitoring," May 19, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-053, "Evaluation of Army Pre-Positioned Equipment Issued in Response to Ukraine and the NATO Defense Forces," February 27, 2023
- (U) DODIG-2023-038, "Management Advisory: Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command's Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center (JMWC)," December 15, 2022
- (U) DODIG-2023-002, "Evaluation of DoD's Accountability of Equipment Provided to Ukraine," October 6, 2022
- (U) DODIG-2022-142, "Special Report: Lessons Learned From Security Cooperation Activities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa," September 29, 2022
- (U) DODIG-2022-133, "Management Advisory: The DoD's Use of Additional Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds," September 19, 2022
- (U) DODIG-2022-112, "Management Advisory: The DoD's Use of Ukraine Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2022 Funds," July 8, 2022
- (U) DODIG-2021-090, "Audit of Munitions Storage in the U.S. European Command," June 10, 2021
- (U) DODIG-2021-082, "Evaluation of Combatant Command Counter Threat Finance Activities," May 18, 2021
- (U) DODIG-2021-063, "Audit of the Host Nation Logistical Support in the U.S. European Command," March 23, 2021
- (U) DODIG-2020-121, "Evaluation of Department of Defense Enhanced End-Use Monitoring for Equipment Transferred to the Government of Ukraine," August 27, 2020

- (U) DODIG-2020-055, “Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities,” Internal Control Assessment and Compliance, January 8, 2020

(U) List of Classified Sources

- (U) **Source 1:** (U) Management Advisory: The U.S. Army's Accountability of Equipment Transferred to Ukraine (SECRET)
Declassification Date: November 15, 2033
Date of Source: November 15, 2023
- (U) **Source 2:** (U) Management Advisory: The Protection of Sensitive Mission Data by the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Its Subordinate Commands (SECRET)
Declassification Date: November 2, 2033
Date of Source: November 2, 2023
- (U) **Source 3:** (U) Evaluation of Intelligence Sharing in Support of Ukraine (SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: 50X1-HUM, 25X9
Date of Source: September 13, 2023
- (U) **Source 4:** (U) Evaluation of DoD Replenishment Plans for Equipment and Munitions Provided to the Government of Ukraine (SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: September 11, 2048
Date of Source: September 11, 2023
- (U) **Source 5:** (U) Evaluation of Land-Based Security Controls for Equipment Being Transferred by Rail to Ukraine (SECRET)
Declassification Date: September 6, 2048
Date of Source: September 6, 2023
- (U) **Source 6:** (U) Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center (JMWC) (SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: June 6, 2048
Date of Source: June 6, 2023
- (U) **Source 7:** (U) Management Advisory: Evaluation of U.S. Special Operations Command Joint Military Information Support Operations Web Operations Center (JMWC) (SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: December 15, 2047
Date of Source: December 15, 2022

- (U) **Source 8:** (U) The DoD's Accountability of Equipment Provided to Ukraine
(SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: October 5, 2047
Date of Source: October 6, 2022
- (U) **Source 9:** (U) Audit of Munitions Storage in the U.S. European Command (SECRET)
Declassification Date: June 10, 2046
Date of Source: June 10, 2021
- (U) **Source 10:** (U) Audit of Host Nation Logistical Support in the U.S. European
Command (SECRET)
Declassification Date: March 23, 2048
Date of Source: March 23, 2021
- (U) **Source 11:** (U) Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence
Capabilities (SECRET//NOFORN)
Declassification Date: January 28, 2045
Date of Source: January 28, 2020

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

DoDI	DoD Instruction
DoD OIG	DoD Office of Inspector General
EUM	End-Use Monitoring
EEUM	Enhanced End-Use Monitoring
SAMM	Security Assistance Management Manual
U.S.C.	United States Code
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command

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