


CUI//NOFORN

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

JUNE 13, 2023



## (U) Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces

**Controlled by: DoD-OIG**  
**Controlled by: Audit/Readiness and Global Operations**  
**CUI-Category: OPSEC, INTL**  
**LDC: FEDCON, NOFORN**  
**POC: Assistant Inspector General for Readiness and Global Operations, [REDACTED]**

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

CUI//NOFORN





# (U) Results in Brief

## (U) Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces

(U) June 13, 2023

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the 7th Army Training Command (7th ATC) trained the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to operate and maintain U.S.-provided advanced platforms, such as crew-served weapons or radar systems, that were approved for transfer to Ukraine in 2022.

(U) This report is the first in a series on the DoD's training of the UAF. Subsequent products will discuss the DoD's training of the UAF to operate and maintain the Patriot long-range air defense missile system and the DoD's collective training of UAF brigades.

### (U) Background

(U) From August 2021 through May 2023, the United States has provided \$22 billion in defense articles and services to Ukraine through 39 presidential drawdowns. Presidential drawdowns allow the United States to deliver defense articles and services from DoD stocks to foreign countries and international organizations to respond to emergencies. Through presidential drawdowns, the United States has transferred equipment, such as military vehicles, artillery, and surveillance systems, to Ukraine. The presidential drawdowns also authorize the DoD to train the UAF on this equipment. We used the terms platform and platform training to refer to the equipment and training that we included in the scope of this report.

### (U) Findings

(~~CUI~~) From April through December 2022, the 7th ATC facilitated training for [REDACTED] UAF personnel on platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine. Specifically, the 7th ATC facilitated operational and maintenance training for 17 platforms, including howitzers, mortars, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems. Based on our analysis of the training provided and platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine, we did not identify any instance when the 7th ATC did not provide UAF-requested operational or maintenance training.

(U) We observed two classroom-based training events on artillery targeting and interviewed 7th ATC officials and a UAF liaison officer during visits to Grafenwoehr, Germany, in October and December 2022. We identified obtaining translated materials, such as technical manuals, for the platforms on which the UAF trained to operate and maintain as the biggest challenge that the 7th ATC faced in providing training. For example, 7th ATC officials explained that there was a backlog of technical manuals requiring translation because the presidential drawdowns had not approved the manuals for foreign disclosure.

(~~CUI~~//NF) Because of the training the 7th ATC provided, the DoD ensured that [REDACTED] UAF personnel were familiar with how to operate and maintain DoD-provided defense articles. The backlog of translated materials may have negatively impacted the training on some platforms. For example, UAF could not study technical manuals during their instruction if the manuals were not available in Ukrainian. [REDACTED] cleared for release all documents, including technical manuals, to Ukraine for the equipment approved for transfer up to [REDACTED] and for future equipment transfers. We determined that, as of January 2023, the 7th ATC had translated materials for 15 of the 17 platforms for which it facilitated training in 2022,



# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces*

### **(U) Findings (cont'd)**

~~(CUI//NF)~~ and that the UAF did not request translated materials for 2 of the platforms. Therefore, we determined that [REDACTED] improved the DoD's ability to translate and provide the UAF with the materials needed to operate and maintain DoD-provided platforms.

### **(U) Recommendations**

(U) We are not making recommendations in this report; however, we will continue to analyze the DoD's training of the UAF and measures the DoD takes to ensure its training is effective. We may recommend actions related to that analysis in a subsequent product in this series covering training of the UAF to operate and maintain the Patriot long-range air defense missile system and the DoD's collective training of UAF brigades.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500**

June 13, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY EUROPE AND AFRICA  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of DoD Training of Ukrainian Armed Forces  
(Report No. DODIG-2023-086)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We are providing this report for information and use. This report does not contain recommendations. We coordinated a discussion draft of this report with officials from the U.S. European Command, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, and the 7th Army Training Command. The 7th Army Training Command concurred with our report without providing comments, and the U.S. European Command and U.S. Army Europe and Africa did not provide comment. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the audit. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Richard B. Vasquez".

Richard B. Vasquez  
Assistant Inspector General for Audit  
Readiness and Global Operations



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## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the 7th Army Training Command trained the UAF to operate and maintain advanced U.S. platforms, such as crew-served weapons or radar systems, that were approved for transfer to Ukraine in 2022. We also determined whether DoD personnel experienced any challenges while conducting the training.

(U) This report is the first in a series of products on the DoD's training of the UAF that we will publish. Subsequent products will discuss the DoD's training of the UAF to operate and maintain the Patriot long-range air defense missile system and the DoD's collective training of UAF brigades. For the remainder of this report we will use the terms platform and platform training to refer to the equipment and training that we included in the scope of this report.

### (U) Background

(U) From August 2021 through May 2023, the United States has provided \$22 billion in defense articles and services through 39 presidential drawdowns. United States Code authorizes presidential drawdown authority, which allows for the delivery of defense articles and services from DoD stocks to foreign countries and international organizations in response to emergencies.<sup>1</sup>

(U) Through presidential drawdowns, the United States has provided Ukraine equipment, such as military vehicles, artillery, and surveillance systems. In addition to providing equipment, presidential drawdowns authorize the Military Service that provided the equipment to train the UAF to operate and maintain the equipment transferred.

*(U) Presidential drawdowns authorize the Military Service that provided the equipment to train the UAF to operate and maintain the equipment transferred.*

<sup>1</sup> (U) Section 2318, title 22, United States Code.

## ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities for Training the UAF***

(U) The Army is providing platform training to the UAF on equipment it provided through presidential drawdowns at training ranges at the Grafenwoehr Training Area and Hohenfels Army Barracks, Germany.<sup>2</sup> Each location supports different training missions. For example, the Grafenwoehr Training Area has multiple ranges that allow for live-fire exercises of multiple platforms, including artillery and tanks. Hohenfels does not offer the same live-fire support capability as the Grafenwoehr Training Area, but it can support unit-level simulated combat operations. The four following commands are primarily responsible for training the UAF.

- (U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa
- (U) Security Assistance Group-Ukraine
- (U) 7th Army Training Command
- (U) Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine

(U) Presidential drawdowns also required the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force to send military equipment to Ukraine. Therefore, we met with and sent requests for information to personnel from the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force to understand their roles and responsibilities for training the UAF. Officials from each of these Military Services explained that while they may provide subject matter expertise for training provided by the Army or other partner nations, they did not conduct training specific to equipment provided to the UAF.<sup>3</sup> According to these officials, most of the equipment the Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force provided to the UAF did not require training because it was not complicated to use. For example, the Air Force provided the UAF 9mm pistols and grenades through presidential drawdowns. We also learned that some DoD organizations, for example, the U.S. Army Security Assistance Training Management Office, facilitated training of the UAF.

### ***(U) U.S. Army Europe and Africa and Security Assistance Group-Ukraine***

(U) The mission of U.S. Army Europe and Africa (Army Europe-Africa) is to provide ready, combat-credible land forces to deter and if necessary, defeat aggression from any potential adversary in Europe and Africa. Army Europe-Africa also serves as a Combined Joint Force Land Component Command to conduct military operations ranging from contingency responses to large-scale, ground combat operations.

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<sup>2</sup> (U) The Army also trained the UAF to operate and maintain the Patriot long-range air defense missile system at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. A subsequent product in this series will discuss the training provided at Fort Sill.

<sup>3</sup> (U) A Navy official stated that a subcommand provided Patrol Boat training, but it did not occur at Grafenwoehr Training Area. Therefore, the training was outside the scope of this audit.

(U) Initially, Army Europe–Africa was the lead Army command responsible for overseeing U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, but the DoD established the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine in November 2022 to assume that responsibility. The Security Assistance Group–Ukraine’s mission is to coordinate security force assistance to Ukraine and work with U.S. allies and partners to coordinate the training and equipping of the UAF.

### ***(U) 7th Army Training Command***

(U) The 7th Army Training Command is a subordinate command of Army Europe–Africa and is responsible for delivering forces that are ready, trained, and equipped for military operations. The 7th Army Training Command provides resources for training and readiness for Army Europe–Africa assigned and allocated forces throughout the U.S. European Command area of operations. The 7th Army Training Command oversees the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine.


### ***(U) Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine***

~~(U)~~ The Army established the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine in 2015, with the mission of training, equipping, and providing doctrinal assistance to the UAF, and tasked National Guard units with completing 9-month rotational deployments to Ukraine’s Combat Training Center to conduct this mission. However, [REDACTED], the U.S. European Command repositioned the assigned National Guard unit from Ukraine to Grafenwoehr. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] days before Russia invaded Ukraine. In April 2022, the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine began training the UAF at Grafenwoehr.

(U) Among other responsibilities, the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine develops programs of instruction and ensures that trainers and the UAF have adequate resources during training. For example, the Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine coordinates classroom and range space, housing and food, and access to clothing (cold weather uniforms, shirts, and boots) required for training exercises. The Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine does not execute the training, but it coordinates with operational units stationed in the U.S. European Command area of responsibility to come to Grafenwoehr and conduct the training.


*(U) The Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine coordinates classroom and range space, housing and food, and access to clothing (cold weather uniforms, shirts, and boots) required for training exercises.*

(U) The operational units tasked with executing the training bring their own organizational equipment and ammunition to facilitate the training. For example, there are no howitzers or High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) permanently located at Grafenwoehr for training the UAF. Therefore, according to Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine personnel, the operational unit that provided HIMARS training brought HIMARS from its own inventory to train the UAF. In addition, according to 7th Army Training Command personnel, the 21st Theater Support Command provided the ammunition to the unit providing the training, and the unit transported the ammunition to Grafenwoehr for the training exercises. Figure 1 shows examples of the M777 Howitzer, M119 Howitzer, and HIMARS platforms for which the 7th Army Training Command facilitated training.



(U) In this report, we referred to the 7th Army Training Command and Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine, collectively, as “7th ATC.” Figure 2 displays the commands responsible for training the UAF.

(U) Figure 2. Commands Responsible for Training Ukrainian Armed Forces



(U) \* According to an Army Europe-Africa official, the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine is still at initial operating capability and its final command relationship with the United States Army Europe and Africa may change.

(U) Legend

(U) Command Level	Officer in Charge
★★★★	General
★★★	Lieutenant General
★★	Brigadier General
♁	Colonel

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

## ***(U) Identifying Training Requirements for the Ukrainian Armed Forces***


(U) Coordinating training for the UAF starts when the President authorizes equipment transfers to Ukraine through presidential drawdowns. Liaison officers from the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine meet with officials from the Ukraine Ministry of Defense to determine the platforms on which the UAF will require training. According to Security Assistance Group-Ukraine officials, when the United States and Ukraine determine that the UAF need training on U.S.-provided advanced platforms, Army Europe-Africa, Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, 7th ATC, and operational units in Europe have specific responsibilities for implementing the training requirement. According to Security Assistance Group-Ukraine officials, if a presidential drawdown contains complex platforms that the United States has not previously issued to Ukraine, Ukrainian officials or Security Assistance Group-Ukraine can request training for UAF personnel on that platform. Security Assistance Group-Ukraine officials explained they generate a training memorandum that specifies the training requirements, and then Army Europe-Africa identifies an operational unit that will go to Grafenwoehr to train the UAF on the designated platform.

(U) The operational unit is required to collaborate with the Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine to develop a program of instruction that meets the requirements established in the training memorandum.<sup>4</sup> A UAF officer further explained that Ukrainian personnel observe the training and receive feedback from UAF trainees in order to make improvements to the program of instruction for the next iteration of the training. Figure 3 illustrates an overview of the process that Security Assistance Group-Ukraine officials described for developing a program of instruction.

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<sup>4</sup> (U) A program of instruction is the course curriculum for the platform on which the UAF are training to operate or maintain.

(U) Figure 3. Program of Instruction Development Process



(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

### (U) What We Reviewed

(U) To determine the total number of students trained and the corresponding platforms on which they trained, and whether the 7th ATC provided operational or maintenance training (or both) to the UAF, we reviewed the 28 programs of instruction facilitated by the 7th ATC during 2022. From our review, we determined that the 7th ATC facilitated training for 17 platforms in 2022; however, the programs of instruction alone did not provide enough detail to determine whether the 7th ATC provided training for all advanced platforms approved for transfer to the UAF.

(U) Therefore, we reviewed Presidential Drawdowns 1 through 21 and identified 16 platforms that we concluded would require DoD training of the UAF.<sup>5</sup> For example, we concluded that the HIMARS would require training because the UAF did not have experience using this platform. Finally, to ensure training was provided to the UAF for all of the platforms that we identified, we selected a nonstatistical sample of 15 of the 16 platforms, and we cross-referenced the platform name to the programs of instruction provided by the 7th ATC.<sup>6</sup> This review helped us determine

<sup>5</sup> (U) We selected platforms authorized in Presidential Drawdowns 1 through 21 because those drawdowns included platforms authorized for transfer to Ukraine through FY 2022. The President issued Presidential Drawdown 1 on August 27, 2021 and Presidential Drawdown 21 on September 15, 2022.

<sup>6</sup> (U) After completing our universe, we learned that the UAF used one platform, the [REDACTED]. Therefore, we concluded that the UAF likely would already have known how to operate and maintain this platform and we did not include it in our nonstatistical sample.

(U) whether the 7th ATC provided training on advanced platforms approved for transfer to the UAF. See the Appendix, “Scope and Methodology,” for a detailed description of our audit universe and nonstatistical sample.

## **(U) Review of Internal Controls**

(U) DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.<sup>7</sup> We did not identify internal control weaknesses related to the DoD’s training of the UAF on U.S.-provided advanced platforms. We will provide a copy of the final report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the Army.

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<sup>7</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ Internal Control Program Procedures,” May 30, 2013 (Incorporating Change 1, June 30, 2020).



## (U) Finding

### (U) Although the Army Trained the UAF to Operate and Maintain Equipment Transferred to Ukraine, Challenges Existed

~~(CUI)~~ From April through December 2022, the 7th ATC facilitated training for [REDACTED] UAF personnel on platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine. Specifically, the 7th ATC facilitated operational or maintenance training for 17 platforms, including howitzers, mortars, and the HIMARS. Based on our analysis of the training provided and platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine, we did not identify any instance when the 7th ATC did not provide UAF-requested operational or maintenance training.

(U) We observed two classroom-based training events on artillery targeting and we interviewed 7th ATC officials and a UAF liaison officer during visits to Grafenwoehr in October and December 2022. We identified obtaining translated materials, such as technical manuals, for the platforms on which the UAF trained as the 7th ATC's biggest challenge in providing the training. For example, 7th ATC officials explained that, at the beginning of October 2022, there was a backlog of technical manuals requiring translation because the presidential drawdowns had not previously approved the manuals for foreign disclosure.

~~(CUI//NF)~~ Because of the training the 7th ATC provided, the DoD ensured that the [REDACTED] UAF personnel who attended training were familiar with how to operate and maintain DoD-provided defense articles. The backlog of translated materials may have negatively impacted the training of some platforms. For example, UAF could not study technical manuals during their instruction if the manuals were not available in Ukrainian. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We determined that, as of March 2023, the 7th ATC had translated materials for 15 of the 17 platforms for which it facilitated training in 2022, and that the UAF did not request translated materials for 2 of the platforms. Therefore, we determined [REDACTED] [REDACTED] improved the DoD's ability to translate and provide the UAF with the translated materials needed to operate and maintain DoD-provided platforms.

## (U) The DoD Provided Training but Challenges Existed

~~(CUI)~~ From April to December 2022, the 7th ATC facilitated training for [REDACTED] UAF personnel on platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine under presidential drawdown authority. Specifically, the 7th ATC facilitated operational or maintenance training for 17 platforms, including howitzers, mortars, and the HIMARS. We observed two classroom-based events on artillery targeting and interviewed 7th ATC officials and a UAF liaison officer during our fieldwork. As a result, we identified obtaining translated materials, such as technical manuals, for the platforms on which the UAF trained to operate and maintain as the 7th ATC’s biggest challenge.

### (U) The Army Provided Training on 17 Platforms

~~(CUI)~~ From April to December 2022, the 7th ATC facilitated training for [REDACTED] UAF personnel on platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine. We found that the 7th ATC developed 28 specialized programs of instruction for 17 platforms that the United States approved for transfer to the UAF.<sup>8</sup> The 28 programs of instruction include operational training on platforms, such as artillery, precision guided munitions, rocket launchers, radars, and multiple military vehicles. In addition, the 28 programs of instruction developed by the training unit and the 7th ATC included maintenance training for multiple platforms such as the M777 and M119 howitzers, and the HIMARS. Table 1 shows a summary of the 17 platforms on which the 7th ATC facilitated training for the UAF.

(U) Table 1. Summary of Platform, Type of Training, and Number of UAF Trained at Grafenwoehr Training Area

<del>(CUI)</del> Platform Name	Type of Platform	Training Provided (Y/N)		Total Classes Provided	Total Number of Personnel Trained
		Operational	Maintenance		
FMTV	Tactical Vehicle	■	■	1	1
HIMARS	Artillery Rocket Launcher	■	■	1	1
HMEE	Excavating Vehicle	■	■	1	1
M1089	Military Truck	■	■	1	1
M109	Tracked Artillery	■	■	1	1
M113	Armored Vehicle	■	■	1	1
M119 Howitzer	Artillery Cannon	■	■	1	1
M120	Mortar	■	■	1	1

<sup>8</sup> (U) One platform could have multiple programs of instruction. As a result, the total number of programs of instruction (28) was greater than the number of unique platforms (17) on which the UAF trained.

(U) Table 1. Summary of Platform, Type of Training, and Number of UAF Trained at Grafenwoehr Training Area (cont'd)

(CUI) Platform Name	Type of Platform	Training Provided (Y/N)		Total Classes Provided	Total Number of Personnel Trained
		Operational	Maintenance		
M777 Howitzer	Artillery Cannon	■	■	■	■
M950	Excavating Vehicle	■	■	■	■
MCLIC	Mine Clearing Vehicle	■	■	■	■
Precision Guided Munition	Munition	■	■	■	■
Puma	Unmanned Aerial System	■	■	■	■
Q-64 Sentinel	Radar	■	■	■	■
■	Drone Detector	■	■	■	■
Stinger	Shoulder Mounted Rocket Launcher	■	■	■	■
TOW ITAS	Anti-Tank Missile Launcher	■	■	■	■
					■ (CUI)

(U) \* The UAF received this training as part of the HIMARS training; therefore, we did not add these numbers to the total reflected in the table.

**(U) Legend**

- (U) FMTV            Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
- (U) HIMARS        High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems
- (U) HMEE          High Mobility Engineer Excavator
- (U) MCLIC         Mine Clearing Line Charge
- (U) TOW ITAS      Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided Improved Target Acquisition System

(U) Source: The Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine.

(U) Officials from the 7th ATC stated that operational units did not train the UAF personnel to U.S. Army standards or doctrine because Ukraine sent its personnel to Grafenwoehr for training for a short time. Consequently, 7th ATC officials stated they developed programs of instruction to train the UAF on critical tasks and skills needed to operate and maintain the platforms, which

..... (U) Officials from the 7th ATC stated that operational units did not train the UAF personnel to U.S. Army standards or doctrine because Ukraine sent its personnel to Grafenwoehr for training for a short time.

(U) enabled the UAF to rapidly return to the fight in Ukraine. For example, the operational training provided to the UAF for the M119 howitzer was 6 days; by comparison, advanced individual training for a cannon crewmember in the U.S. Army lasts 7 weeks. Similarly, the M119 howitzer maintenance program of instruction was 9 days, but artillery mechanic advanced individual training in the U.S. Army lasts 15 weeks. A Ukrainian official explained that short-duration programs of instruction were sufficient because the UAF attending platform training were, generally, experienced fighters who needed only familiarization training with the platforms provided through the presidential drawdowns.

(U) Officials from the 7th ATC also explained that they performed after action reviews after most blocks of instruction, and they included periods of retraining, if needed. 7th ATC officials added that the after action reviews included feedback from UAF officials, and 7th ATC personnel applied those lessons learned from prior courses to upcoming training when needed. We reviewed programs of instruction and verified that after action reviews were included in the 7th ATC-provided training. 7th ATC officials told us that during a recent live-fire training event, a Ukrainian general explained to 7th ATC and other Army officials that one training scenario was not realistic. The operational unit providing the training used the Ukrainian general's feedback to update the training scenario for the next day.

(U) In April 2023, 7th ATC officials also told us that commanders of the operational units providing the training completed written assessments of UAF performance and provided those assessments to Security Assistance Group-Ukraine and Army Europe-Africa officials. We are not making a recommendation in this report on whether the 7th ATC should include a formal evaluation of the individual members of the UAF in its training. However, we are continuing audit work in this area and may address this topic in a subsequent product in this series as warranted.

(U) Because of the nonstandard nature of the training, we did not make a qualitative assessment of the UAF training; rather, we reviewed the programs of instruction to determine whether the 7th ATC facilitated operational and maintenance training for the UAF. For example, the 7th ATC facilitated two programs of instruction for the HIMARS:

- (U) operational training with modules on conducting fire missions and concealing the vehicle during operations, and
- (U) maintenance training modules including troubleshooting the vehicle chassis and performing periodic maintenance.

(U) We also learned that the DoD established the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell–Ukraine (RDC–U) in Jasionka, Poland, to assist UAF maintenance personnel maintain and repair U.S.-provided equipment. The RDC–U facilitates remote maintenance sessions through telephone, video, and chat among U.S. maintenance personnel and the UAF. A 7th ATC official stated that the maintenance training they provided at Grafenwoehr included a briefing on the RDC–U. UAF personnel learn about the RDC–U’s capabilities and receive the contact number.<sup>9</sup>

(U) Figure 4 shows a HIMARS similar to those on which the 7th ATC facilitated operational and maintenance training for the UAF.



<sup>9</sup> (U) The DoD OIG recently announced an audit related to the DoD’s maintenance of equipment transferred to Ukraine that will include additional detail on the capabilities of the RDC–U. Project No. D2023-D000RH-0088.000, “Audit of DoD Maintenance Operations for Military Equipment Provided to Ukraine,” February 21, 2023. The objective of this audit is to determine whether the DoD is efficiently and effectively providing maintenance support for U.S. weapon systems and equipment provided for Ukraine operations.

### ***(U) No Critical Gaps in Specialized Training Identified***

(U) We determined that the 7th ATC provided training, as requested by the UAF, for all advanced platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine in our sample. Specifically, we identified a nonstatistical sample of 15 advanced platforms that we concluded would require training and determined that:

- (U) the 7th ATC facilitated training for 9 of the 15 platforms,
- (U) DoD organizations outside the scope of our audit provided 2 of the trainings,
- (U) the UAF did not request any training for 4 of the platforms, and
- (U) the UAF did not request maintenance training for 2 of the platforms.

(U) 7th ATC officials explained that there were various reasons for why the UAF would not request training on platforms approved for transfer, such as the UAF already knowing how to use the platforms or the platforms being simple enough to operate without training. As we explained in the background of this report, we included in our review platforms that we concluded would require training. However, during the audit we learned that not all of the platforms that we chose to include were difficult to operate. For example, 7th ATC officials explained that the Switchblade 300 was an easy drone to operate, and the UAF were proficient in using drones and did not need training for it. In addition, equipment such as the AT4, did not require training because it is a simple, single use launcher that is discarded after firing. Furthermore, the TPQ/AN-49 radar was provided to Ukraine in 2015 after Russia's annexation of Crimea. Therefore, the UAF already knew how to operate this radar. Finally, we determined that two other DoD components facilitated training for 2 of the 15 platforms.<sup>10</sup> Table 2 summarizes the 15 platforms we included in our nonstatistical sample, whether training was provided for those platforms, and explains the reasons for those platforms that did not include training.

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<sup>10</sup> (U) Two organizations that are not affiliated with the 7th ATC provided training in 2023, which was beyond the scope of our audit. However, we noted this training in our report because we believed this information provided a more complete description of the training the DoD provided to the UAF.

(U) Table 2. Summary of Platform and Type of Training

(CUI) Platform Name	Type of Platform	Operational Training Provided (Y/N)	Maintenance Training Provided (Y/N)	Explanation for Gaps in Training
M119 Howitzer	Artillery Cannon	■	■	
M777 Howitzer	Artillery Cannon	■	■	
HIMARS	Artillery Rocket Launcher	■	■	
M120	Mortar	■	■	
Javelin	Shoulder Mounted Rocket Launcher	■	■	Platform first delivered to Ukraine in 2018; training not requested
Stingers	Shoulder Mounted Rocket Launcher	■	■	Shoulder-fired launcher; maintenance training not requested
AT4	Shoulder Mounted Rocket Launcher	■	■	Shoulder-fired launcher; training not requested
MCLIC	Mine Clearing System	■	■	
Switchblade 300	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	■	■	Handheld drone; training not requested
■	Drone Detector	■	■	Handheld device; maintenance training not requested
■	Counter Unmanned Aerial Vehicle	■	■	Another DoD component facilitated this training in 2023
TPQ/AN-49	Radar	■	■	Platform first delivered to Ukraine in 2015; training not requested
Q-64 Sentinel	Radar	■	■	
TPQ-AN-36	Radar	■	■	Another DoD component facilitated this training in 2023
M113	Armored Vehicle	■	■	

(CUI)

(U) Legend

(U) HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems

(U) MCLIC Mine Clearing Line Charge

(U) Source: The Joint Multinational Training Group–Ukraine.

### ***(U) Lack of Foreign Disclosure Approval Led to Backlog of Translated Materials***

(U) During our visits to Grafenwoehr in October and December 2022, we observed that obtaining materials translated from English to Ukrainian, such as technical manuals, for the platforms on which the UAF were trained to operate and maintain was the 7th ATC’s greatest challenge. Army Europe–Africa and 7th ATC officials stated that there was a backlog of translated materials because obtaining foreign disclosure approval from the foreign disclosure office that owns the platform was a lengthy process.

(U) According to Army Regulation 380-10, foreign disclosure approval is the legal transfer of classified or controlled unclassified information available to an authorized representative of a foreign government.<sup>11</sup> Army Europe–Africa officials explained that when presidential drawdowns authorized the transfer of platforms to Ukraine from August 2021 through early October 2022, the drawdowns did not include authorizations allowing foreign disclosure of the translated materials, such as technical manuals, for each platform approved for transfer.

(CUI//NF) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

[Redacted] Technical manuals are important to training because they provide instructions on how to operate, troubleshoot, and maintain platforms, and are useful tools for the UAF to study during and after training. Army Europe–Africa personnel stated they had to obtain foreign disclosure approval for each platform before beginning translation of technical manuals, which created a backlog.

*(U) Army Europe-Africa personnel stated they had to obtain foreign disclosure approval for each platform before beginning translation of technical manuals, which created a backlog.*

(CUI//NF) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

<sup>11</sup> (U) Army Regulation 380-10, “Foreign Disclosure and Contacts with Foreign Representatives” July 14, 2015.



(U) A 7th ATC official believed that not having translated materials available during training reduced the effectiveness of the training. This official stated that having translated materials, such as technical manuals, available would have enabled UAF personnel to more thoroughly prepare for classes by reviewing the technical manuals during breaks in the instruction, and that the students could have come to class with more detailed questions.

~~(CUI)~~ In January 2023, 7th ATC personnel provided spreadsheets that listed which documents were translated or were pending translation into Ukrainian. We analyzed the data to determine whether translated materials were available for all 17 platforms for which the 7th ATC facilitated UAF training. We determined that translated materials existed for 15 of the 17 platforms. There are no translated materials for two platforms, the [REDACTED] and Puma unmanned aerial system, because Ukraine did not request that the DoD translate documents for those platforms. A Joint Multinational Training Group-Ukraine official did not identify any concerns regarding the lack of translated materials for these two items.

~~(CUI//NF)~~ [REDACTED] removed the primary challenge on the foreign disclosure approval process, we are not making recommendations on this issue. We are conducting in-depth analysis of linguist and translation issues during our on-going work related to the Patriot long-range air defense missile system and collective training of UAF brigades. We plan to report on that analysis in the next product in this series.

## (U) Summary

~~(CUI)~~ Because of the training the 7th ATC provided, the DoD ensured that the [REDACTED] UAF who trained at Grafenwoehr in 2022 were familiar with how to operate and maintain DoD-provided defense articles. We did not perform a qualitative assessment of the training; however, officials from the 7th ATC stated that Army units did not train the UAF to the same standards to which a U.S. Army unit would train. 7th ATC officials explained that the UAF trained on the most critical tasks and skills needed to operate and maintain the platforms so that UAF personnel could rapidly return to the fight in Ukraine. We did not identify any critical gaps in platform training. We also determined that the maintenance training included instruction on how to access support at the DoD's Remote Distribution and Maintenance Cell, located in Jasionka, Poland. Training records showed that the UAF completed 28 programs of instruction that included operational or maintenance training (or both) for 17 platforms.

(~~CUI//NF~~) The backlog of translated materials may have negatively impacted the training of some platforms; for example, a 7th ATC official explained that having translated technical manuals available during training would have enabled UAF personnel to better prepare for classes and ask more detailed questions during the training. However, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Therefore, we determined that [REDACTED] improved the DoD's ability to translate and provide the UAF with the materials they needed to operate and maintain the DoD-provided platforms.

(U) We are not making recommendations in this report; however, we will continue to analyze the DoD's training of the UAF and measures the DoD takes to ensure its training is effective. We may recommend actions related to that analysis in a subsequent product in this series covering training of the UAF to operate and maintain the Patriot long-range air defense missile system and the DoD's collective training of UAF brigades.

## **(U) Appendix**

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### **(U) Scope and Methodology**

(U) We conducted this performance audit from October 2022 through May 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

(U) The scope of this audit included platform training provided to the UAF at Grafenwoehr Training Area from April 2022 through December 2022. This included training on platforms approved for transfer to Ukraine under Presidential Drawdown 2021-03, signed on August 27, 2021, through Presidential Drawdown Authority 21, signed on September 15, 2022. We conducted this audit at the 7th ATC training area in Grafenwoehr, Germany.

(U) We conducted site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations.

- (U) U.S. European Command headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) U.S. Army Europe-Africa headquarters in Wiesbaden, Germany
- (U) 7th ATC headquarters in Grafenwoehr, Germany

(U) As a result of our teleconferences and site visits we requested and reviewed documentation related to:


- (U) program of instruction development and execution,
- (U) operational orders and fragmentary orders related to specialized training and collective training,
- (U) training schedules, and
- (U) presidential drawdown authority.

### **(U) Audit Universe and Sample Selection**

(U) To ensure that the DoD provided training for advanced equipment authorized for transfer to the UAF, we selected a nonstatistical sample of 15 of 16 platforms that were authorized for transfer to Ukraine in Presidential Drawdowns 1 through 21. To develop our nonstatistical sample, we created a universe of platforms that we concluded would require training. Specifically, we identified advanced platforms, such as radars, howitzers, and shoulder-mounted rocket launchers. Then we reviewed Presidential Drawdowns 1 through 21 and determined that 16 platforms

(U) met our criteria for inclusion in our universe. Finally, we selected 15 of the 16 platforms for inclusion in our nonstatistical sample. Table 3 shows the universe of advanced platforms we identified and our nonstatistical sample of 15 platforms.

*(U) Table 3. Complex Platform Universe and Our Nonstatistical Sample*



(U) We did not consider the following types of equipment as advanced nor did we include them in our universe:

- (U) small arms such as handguns, assault rifles, sniper rifles and machine guns;
- (U) vehicles without significant weaponry such as sport utility vehicles;
- (U) first aid kits;
- (U) ammunition, independent of the size of the ammunition; and
- (U) body armor.

(U) To determine whether the DoD trained UAF on all of the platforms in our nonstatistical sample, we compared the platform names to the programs of instruction provided by the 7th ATC and ensured there was a program of instruction for each platform. We then interviewed 7th ATC officials to understand why the DoD had not trained the UAF to operate and maintain those platforms in our sample for which we did not find a corresponding program of instruction.

(U) Finally, to determine whether challenges existed with translating materials for the platforms that the United States approved for transfer to Ukraine, we met with 7th ATC personnel to discuss the translation efforts, we met with Army Europe-Africa Foreign Disclosure Office personnel to understand the foreign disclosure process, and we analyzed a log of translated materials.

(U) This report was reviewed by personnel from the the U.S. European Command and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the U.S. European Command and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency about the CUI treatment of their information. If the U.S. European Command and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency did not provide any, or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

## **(U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance**

(U) We assessed internal controls and compliance with laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the DoD's internal control activities for developing UAF training requirements on U.S.-provided advanced equipment. Internal control activities are actions

(U) management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control systems, which includes the entity's information system.

(U) We determined that the Security Assistance Group-Ukraine, U.S. Army Europe and Africa, and the 7th ATC implemented control activities for authorizing and developing programs of instruction that train the UAF on how to operate U.S.-provided advanced equipment. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

### **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this audit or to support our audit conclusions.

### **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued one report related to the training of Ukrainian Armed Forces.

### **(U) DoD OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2022-110, "Audit of the Training Ranges in the U.S. European Command," July 7, 2022

(U) [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>7th ATC</b>	7th Army Training Command
<b>FMTV</b>	Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles
<b>HIMARS</b>	High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
<b>HMEE</b>	High Mobility Engineer Excavator
<b>MCLIC</b>	Mine Clearing Line Charge
<b>RDC-U</b>	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell-Ukraine
<b>TOW ITAS</b>	Tube-Launched, Optically Tracked, Wireless-Guided Improved Target Acquisition System
<b>UAF</b>	Ukrainian Armed Forces





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