




# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

MARCH 9, 2022



## Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals at Camp Atterbury, Indiana





**INSPECTOR GENERAL  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
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March 9, 2022

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY MATERIEL COMMAND  
COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY NORTH  
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Management Advisory: DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals  
at Camp Atterbury, Indiana (Report No. DODIG-2022-070)

The purpose of this management advisory is to provide officials responsible for receiving, housing, supporting, and preparing Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement location with the results from our site visit to Task Force Camp Atterbury, Indiana (TF CAIN) at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The team visited TF CAIN from November 1 through 5, 2021. We conducted the work on this project with integrity, objectivity, and independence, as required by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General.

We conducted our review of TF CAIN operations at Camp Atterbury as part of the "Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals (Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000)."<sup>1</sup> The objective of this audit is to determine whether the DoD adequately planned and provided support for the relocation of Afghan evacuees. The audit team visited Camp Atterbury to review housing and other facilities, security, medical care, and costs associated with the effort. Despite having limited time to plan for this massive effort, TF CAIN personnel housed and sustained Afghan evacuees.<sup>2</sup> However, TF CAIN personnel did experience challenges, such as communicating with Afghan evacuees, tracking medical records, and addressing security incidents.

The 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment from Fort Hood, Texas, was the main unit supporting TF CAIN until October 23, 2021, when the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment from Fort Hood, Texas, replaced them. These units provided personnel, equipment, and supplies to support the effort.

<sup>1</sup> DoD OIG Project No. D2021-D000RJ-0154.000, "Audit of DoD Support for the Relocation of Afghan Nationals," announced on August 23, 2021.

<sup>2</sup> DoD, interagency, and non-governmental organization personnel supported TF CAIN. However, for the purpose of this report, we refer to TF CAIN personnel as DoD personnel.

## Operation Allies Refuge

On July 14, 2021, the President announced Operation Allies Refuge, with the Department of State (DOS) as the lead Federal agency, to support the relocation of Afghan evacuees who previously supported the U.S. Government and were in the process of completing their Special Immigrant Visa applications.<sup>3</sup> Applicants' immediate family members were also included in the relocation effort. During Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Freedom's Sentinel, the U.S. Government employed Afghans in supporting roles to assist in these operations. Due to that employment, some Afghans, their families, and close friends faced serious and ongoing threats. According to a statement by the President on August 30, 2021, the DoD executed the largest airlift in U.S. history, evacuating more than 120,000 people from Afghanistan in just 17 days. The DOS activated the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force and requested and received DoD support in the form of temporary housing, sustainment, and other support at suitable DoD facilities both within and outside the continental United States.<sup>4</sup>

## Operation Allies Welcome

On August 29, 2021, the President announced that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would serve as the lead Federal agency for Operation Allies Welcome, coordinating ongoing efforts across the U.S. Government to resettle vulnerable Afghans in the United States, including those who worked for the United States and Coalition forces since 2001.<sup>5</sup> The DHS processed, screened, and vetted Afghans in coordination with the DoD, the DOS, and other Federal agencies. The DOS and the Department of Health and Human Services are responsible for the final resettlement and integration efforts.

### ***DoD Roles and Responsibilities Supporting Operation Allies Welcome***

On August 15, 2021, the Secretary of Defense directed the U.S. Northern Command to provide temporary housing, sustainment, and support inside the United States for Afghan evacuees, their families, and other individuals at risk from the Taliban. As the DoD's lead combatant command for Operation Allies Welcome, the U.S. Northern Command provided housing and security at U.S. military installations. As of February 19, 2022, all remaining Afghan evacuees had been resettled from the last U.S.-based military installation supporting the relocation of Afghan evacuees under Operation Allies Welcome.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> In 2014, Congress amended the Special Immigrant Visa program to provide U.S. visas for translators and interpreters who performed "sensitive and trusted activities" for the U.S. Government in Afghanistan.

<sup>4</sup> The DOS led the Afghanistan Coordination Task Force that included experts from various U.S. Government agencies, including the DoD, the DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services.

<sup>5</sup> Operation Allies Refuge was the operation to airlift at-risk Afghan evacuees, who supported the DoD, out of Afghanistan. Operation Allies Welcome is an ongoing effort across the U.S. Government to support these Afghan evacuees as they resettle in the United States.

<sup>6</sup> The following U.S.-based military installations supported Operation Allies Welcome: Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, New Jersey; Fort McCoy, Wisconsin; Fort Bliss, Texas; Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico; Camp Atterbury, Indiana; Fort Pickett, Virginia; Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia; and Fort Lee, Virginia. Those installations processed their final evacuees between November 17, 2021, and February 19, 2022.

## Camp Atterbury Operations and Task Force CAIN

On August 31, 2021, the U.S. Northern Command formed TF CAIN at Camp Atterbury to support Operation Allies Welcome with the mission to safely receive, house, support, and prepare Afghan evacuees for movement to their final resettlement locations. Camp Atterbury, located in south central Indiana, is a 36,000-acre Indiana National Guard facility that serves as a major training and maneuver area for individual, collective, and joint training.

On September 1, 2021, 511 Service members from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, arrived to support TF CAIN.<sup>7</sup> On September 3, 2021, the first 65 Afghan evacuees arrived. Afghan evacuees continued to arrive throughout September and October 2021.

As of October 28, 2021, TF CAIN had received 7,171 Afghan evacuees—382 had departed through the resettlement process and 607 had voluntarily left, leaving 6,182 Afghan evacuees on the installation awaiting resettlement. Following our site visit, TF CAIN continued to resettle Afghan evacuees. On January 25, 2022, TF CAIN closed after resettling the last remaining Afghan evacuees.

As of October 22, 2021, TF CAIN was composed of 2,486 DoD personnel. TF CAIN also used contracted support for sustainment and medical services. In addition, TF CAIN included interagency partners and non-governmental organization (NGO) personnel that conducted or assisted with a wide variety of activities, including immigration processing and hosting activities such as English classes for Afghan evacuees.

## Afghan Evacuee In-Processing at Camp Atterbury

Upon arrival at Camp Atterbury, Afghan evacuees received an initial medical screening and provided biometric data that TF CAIN personnel uploaded into the Hummingbird system.<sup>8</sup> TF CAIN personnel immediately escorted any evacuees with serious medical conditions to local hospitals. After the initial screening, TF CAIN personnel escorted Afghan evacuees without medical conditions to a reception area where each evacuee received a coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) test. Lastly, TF CAIN provided Afghan evacuees with identification badges that listed their Hummingbird number and created a listing of all the evacuees entering Camp Atterbury to maintain population accountability. After completing in-processing in the reception area, TF CAIN issued Afghan evacuees personal hygiene items and escorted them to the housing barracks.

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<sup>7</sup> The 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, replaced the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, on October 23, 2021.

<sup>8</sup> The Hummingbird system is a DOS-owned database used to support Operation Allies Welcome. The system captures Afghan evacuee identification data, such as name, date of birth, and passport number; medical data, such as lab results, vaccinations, and medical exams; and biometric data, such as fingerprints and photos for immigrants seeking resettlement.

## Afghan Evacuee Sustainment Procedures and Observations

TF CAIN housed and sustained Afghan evacuees using both existing structures on the installation as well as newly established spaces. The task force used existing hard structures for housing barracks and dining, shower, and laundry facilities. The task force also used existing hard structures and multipurpose tents for worship spaces, donation storage and distribution sites, and classrooms. The task force provided Afghan evacuees with hot meals, drop-off laundry services, and job search assistance.

### ***Barracks Housing Provided to Afghan Evacuees***

As of November 22, 2021, TF CAIN personnel were using 60 hard structures as barracks to house Afghan evacuees. Of those 60 barracks, 19 housed men, 34 housed women and children, and 7 were used for medical isolation. TF CAIN personnel stated that they separated men from the women and children, even if there were married couples or families. TF CAIN personnel explained that they separated men and women because the barracks housing the Afghan evacuees did not provide suitable privacy. Specifically, most barracks were large, open rooms with group restroom facilities and open showers. For married couples or families, TF CAIN tried to house a husband in barracks adjacent to his wife and children. In addition, TF CAIN personnel allowed husbands in the women and children's barracks and said that men and women could interact outside together without restriction.

TF CAIN personnel also explained that of the 60 barracks, 7 were used for housing Afghan evacuees in medical isolation to prevent the spread of communicable diseases, such as tuberculosis and COVID-19. Further, TF CAIN personnel stated that they dedicated two existing hard structures to serve as maternity housing to accommodate new mothers and their families for up to two months after birth.<sup>9</sup>

TF CAIN personnel housed Afghan evacuees in two distinct areas at Camp Atterbury—the northern and southern barracks areas. The northern barracks consisted of seven two-story brick structures. The 53 southern barracks were mostly one-story concrete block structures. According to TF CAIN personnel, TF CAIN separated the barracks living area into six mayoral cells, one in the northern barracks area and five in the southern barracks area.<sup>10</sup> TF CAIN personnel explained that the housing units in the northern barracks area each had a desk that was staffed 24 hours per day, 7 days per week by personnel from TF CAIN. Housing units in the southern barracks area were smaller than the housing units in the northern barracks area and did not have desks staffed by TF CAIN personnel. Instead, each block in the southern barracks area had a mayoral cell. TF CAIN personnel stated that they staffed the desks in the northern barracks and mayoral cells in the southern barracks with military

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<sup>9</sup> According to TF CAIN personnel, the two buildings used for maternity housing were buildings regularly used to house Service members, retirees, U.S. Government agencies, DoD contractors, civilians operating on a military base, and their friends and families.

<sup>10</sup> The northern barracks consisted of the 1100 and 1300 living quarters blocks and the southern barracks consisted of five blocks of living quarters, the 500, 400, 300, 200, and 100 blocks. The blocks in both barracks areas consisted of several buildings.

personnel. The mayoral cells provided a conduit for Afghan evacuees to ask questions, raise concerns, and settle disputes. In addition, TF CAIN personnel explained that the mayoral cells published lists of scheduled recreational activities and helped keep Afghan evacuees informed of appointments for medical and resettlement processing. Furthermore, the mayoral cells distributed clothing and supplies to Afghan evacuees by assigned blocks.<sup>11</sup> The staffed desks also provided general supplies, such as diapers, formula, and toilet paper. At the time of our site visit, TF CAIN personnel from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, oversaw each staffed desk and mayoral cell.

### *Northern Barracks Area*

The northern barracks area had 7 buildings capable of housing 3,021 people. TF CAIN personnel stated that as of November 2, 2021, the northern barracks area was housing approximately 2,500 Afghan evacuees. TF CAIN personnel explained that three buildings housed men and four buildings housed women and children. Each building had a front desk stocked with general supplies, such as diapers, formula, soap, and shampoo. According to TF CAIN personnel, two Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 12th Cavalry Regiment, attended the desk 24 hours per day, 7 days per week.

In addition, TF CAIN personnel stated that they established a clothing distribution site in the northern barracks area where Afghan evacuees could visit once per week to obtain clothing, shoes, and coats. Figure 1 is an example of a building in the northern barracks area used to house Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury.



Figure 1. Northern Barracks Area Housing for Afghan Evacuees at Camp Atterbury  
Source: Indianapublicmedia.org.

<sup>11</sup> The northern barracks mayoral cell distributed clothing and supplies differently than the southern barracks due to the different barrack configurations. The northern barracks had a central desk located in each building and the southern barracks did not. Therefore, the northern barracks used the central desk in each building to serve as a general supply distribution site, while the southern barracks used separate, stand-alone buildings for distribution sites.

## ***Southern Barracks Area***

The southern barracks area had 53 buildings, capable of housing 3,979 Afghan evacuees. At the time of our site visit, the southern barracks area was housing 2,686 Afghan evacuees. The barracks were arranged either as open bay housing with bunk beds on each side of the bay, or as individual rooms with single beds. According to TF CAIN, each block had its own mayoral cell and clothing distribution site. Figure 2 is an example of a building in the southern barracks area used to house Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury.



## ***Amenities Provided to Afghan Evacuees***

During the walkthrough of TF CAIN, the audit team observed the operations designed to provide sustenance for Afghan evacuees.

### ***Food and Water***

The northern and southern barracks areas each had one dining facility and the evacuees could use only the dining facility located in their barracks area. TF CAIN personnel said that each dining facility was contractor-operated and served three hot meals per day. TF CAIN personnel said that the two dining facilities combined served approximately 14,532 meals each day. During the site visit, the audit team observed no lengthy wait times for Afghan evacuees during a lunch serving. According to TF CAIN personnel, TF CAIN issued each Afghan evacuee a meal card with the evacuee's name and identification number.<sup>12</sup> TF CAIN personnel scanned each meal card as Afghan evacuees entered the food service line at their assigned

<sup>12</sup> The four-digit meal card number was different than the Hummingbird number.

dining facility. TF CAIN personnel stated that Afghan evacuees also had access to unlimited snacks and water at facilities throughout Camp Atterbury. In addition, the audit team observed pallets of water available for Afghan evacuees placed throughout Camp Atterbury.

### ***Restroom and Shower Facilities***

TF CAIN personnel reported that there were 175 restroom facilities with 887 showers and between 3 and 44 toilets each, available for Afghan evacuee use across the northern and southern barracks areas. The 175 restroom facilities had open group showers and restrooms. TF CAIN personnel stated that because the restroom facilities had group showers and restrooms, lack of privacy was one of the reasons they decided to separate male and female housing. TF CAIN personnel stated that contractor personnel cleaned the showers and restrooms two to three times per day. TF CAIN personnel explained that contractor personnel only provided the cleaning supplies for restroom and shower facilities in the medical isolation housing. Afghan evacuees living in medical isolation housing were responsible for cleaning the facilities to prevent contractor personnel from spreading communicable diseases throughout the installation.

### ***Laundry Facilities***

The audit team observed both drop-off and coin-operated laundry facilities at Camp Atterbury. TF CAIN personnel explained that Afghan evacuees had to use their own money if they chose coin operated laundry; however, TF CAIN would provide them with laundry detergent. TF CAIN personnel stated that the drop-off laundry services were contractor-operated. TF CAIN personnel stated that the contract was originally for 6,000 bags of laundry per day with a 48-hour turnaround time; however, because many Afghan evacuees preferred to wash their own laundry, the task force reduced the contract scope to 3,500 bags of laundry per day.

### ***Worship and Multipurpose Spaces***

Designated tents and buildings on Camp Atterbury served as spaces for worship and multipurpose uses. Specifically, the northern barracks area had four tents—one for religious activities, one for COVID-19 testing, and two for multipurpose use. In addition, NGOs used buildings to provide classes for Afghan evacuees. TF CAIN personnel stated that the task force used tents and buildings as spaces for donation storage and distribution. The donation spaces facilitated the storage and distribution of coats and shoes received during winter clothing donation drives held for Afghan evacuees.

Figure 3 is an example of one building used for shoe distribution for Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury.



Figure 3. Building Used for Donated Shoe Distribution for Afghan Evacuees  
Source: The DoD OIG.

### ***Donations***

The State of Indiana established donation collection sites at 10 National Guard Armories across the state and used the State of Indiana Department of Corrections to sort donated items before delivering them to Camp Atterbury. Donated items included shoes, coats, blankets, diapers, and formula. In addition, TF CAIN personnel stated that an international NGO operated a donation warehouse at Camp Atterbury and played an important role supplying shoes.

### ***Cultural and Educational Activities***

NGOs also played an important role in organizing the cultural and educational opportunities offered to Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury. For example, NGOs organized and taught various classes, such as adult English language classes, “Living in America” classes for teenagers, art therapy workshops, and group exercise classes. The audit team observed NGO staff providing childcare services while mothers attended an English class. In addition, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services conducted a weekly job search class which led Afghan evacuees through skill set assessments to determine suitable career options.

### ***Information Dissemination***

TF CAIN personnel said they established multiple methods to communicate information to Afghan evacuees. Specifically, TF CAIN personnel opened a central information center, used cell phones for messaging, and established the Strategic Communications Board to discuss information dissemination to the Afghan evacuees.

TF CAIN opened an information center in the southern barracks area for Afghan evacuees to get information related to lost luggage, the immigration process, and the resettlement process. Multiple agencies supported the information center, including the DOS, the DHS, and the International Rescue Committee. TF CAIN personnel staffed the information center five days per week.

TF CAIN personnel stated that the majority of Afghan evacuees had personal cellular phones, so the members of the mayoral cells individually texted information regarding scheduled appointments to evacuees. TF CAIN personnel also communicated information regarding appointments in person or by posting lists that were in Pashto, Dari, and English. In addition, TF CAIN used the encrypted message service WhatsApp to communicate more broadly to evacuee cell phone users. The WhatsApp text messages were sent in Pashto, Dari, and English, and all messages had an audio option in each language for users who preferred listening to reading text.

TF CAIN also established the Strategic Communications Board that met every other week to discuss information the task force wanted to disseminate to the collective Afghan evacuee population, such as safety information, community rules of behavior, and information about activities and events. TF CAIN personnel and the DOS participated in these communication board meetings. Additionally, TF CAIN personnel stated that they met weekly with Afghan elders at the Food Council meeting to discuss any issues that Afghan evacuees had regarding the food served at the dining facilities. The Food Council was a TF CAIN group that received Afghan evacuees' comments on food and worked with the dining facility contractor to remedy concerns.

## ***Sustainment Challenges***

The audit team conducted a walkthrough of the housing facilities at Camp Atterbury and identified several safety deficiencies. For example, in the northern barracks, TF CAIN shut off a fire alarm system due to system failure because Afghan children kept pulling the fire alarms. When the audit team discussed the fire alarm system with TF CAIN personnel, TF CAIN personnel stated that they had mitigated this safety concern in accordance with Unified Facilities Criteria 1-201-02 by putting a 24-hour fire watch in place.<sup>13</sup> In addition, contractor personnel did not maintain spill containment trays around the contractor-supplied fuel tanks, generators, and heating units. This lack of maintenance on the spill containment trays created standing water in some trays, and resulted in other trays no longer catching spills. Lack of maintaining spill containment trays is an environmental risk because the spill containment trays are required to prevent spills from contaminating the soil and entering ground water. The audit team notified TF CAIN of the issue with the spill containment trays during the site visit and TF CAIN personnel stated that they would take immediate action to address it. According to TF CAIN personnel, as of December 2021, TF CAIN had repaired all of the spill containment trays but one. In addition, TF CAIN scheduled the final spill containment tray for repair.

<sup>13</sup> According to the DoD's Unified Facilities Criteria 1-201-02, "Assessment of Existing Facilities For Use In Military Operations," June 01, 2014, a 24-hour fire watch is a mitigating factor for a lack of a fire notification system, and consists of an on-duty person with a portable horn or sounding device to notify all occupants in event of a fire.

During walkthroughs of multiple barracks, the audit team met with Afghan evacuees to discuss their perceptions of housing, food, and receiving essential items. Afghan evacuees expressed frustration with the type and quality of food served at the dining facilities. For example, the audit team spoke to Afghan evacuees who stated that they did not like seafood; instead, they wanted Afghan bread and other culturally appropriate food. However, the contractors that operated the dining facility continued to serve fish. In addition, Afghan evacuees expressed frustration with clothing distribution. Specifically, several Afghan evacuees complained that they did not receive the same number of clothing items as evacuees in other blocks. During the audit team's site visit, TF CAIN personnel explained that they recently began using Afghan evacuees' Hummingbird and building numbers to track what each Afghan evacuee received from the clothing distribution sites. This helped to ensure even clothing distribution among the Afghan evacuees and identify gaps in clothing items. For example, TF CAIN personnel stated that they purchased a bulk buy of winter coats. During the audit team's site visit, the TF was distributing the coats to all Afghan evacuees.

During our walkthrough of Camp Atterbury and in our discussions with Afghan evacuees living at Camp Atterbury, the audit team observed Afghan evacuees raising their concerns to TF CAIN personnel about the types and quality of the food as well as clothing distribution. TF CAIN personnel explained to the audit team that the task force had a process in place to receive Afghan evacuees' concerns. Specifically, Afghan evacuees could communicate issues through the mayoral cells or, for food-related issues, through the Food Council meetings. TF CAIN personnel explained to the audit team that both methods facilitated addressing concerns. For example, TF CAIN personnel stated that the Food Council meetings had resulted in a solution to Afghan evacuees' concerns regarding food quality. Specifically, discussion during the Food Council meetings resulted in TF CAIN directing the contractor to hire an Afghan cook for one of the dining facilities.

Based upon discussions with Afghan evacuees, the audit team determined that Afghan evacuee dissatisfaction could have been mitigated with more communication regarding the task force's actions to improve those issues identified by Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury. While the audit team was onsite, TF CAIN personnel explained that they were working on communication challenges by disseminating information using WhatsApp, opening the information center, and establishing the Strategic Communications Board. The audit team viewed the task force personnel actions as steps taken towards improving communication with Afghan evacuees.

## **Afghan Evacuee Medical Procedures and Observations**

TF CAIN provided medical in-processing and medical treatment for Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury. TF CAIN medical personnel consisted of both U.S. Navy personnel and contracted medical personnel. U.S. Navy medical personnel performed medical in-processing that included providing medical exams and administering immunizations in support of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Contracted medical personnel performed medical treatment that included pharmacy services and check-ups with doctors.

## Medical Exams and Vaccinations

Upon entry at Camp Atterbury, each Afghan evacuee received a medical exam that included a temperature check, physical, and basic screening for communicable diseases and conditions, such as measles or scabies. TF CAIN medical personnel said that they documented mandatory physicals and vaccines for Afghan evacuees on a SF 600, “Chronological Record of Medical Care.” TF CAIN and the inter-governmental organization assisting in the resettlement process retained copies of the record of medical care.<sup>14</sup> TF CAIN personnel said that completed SF 600 forms were mandatory for an Afghan evacuee’s departure. At departure from Camp Atterbury, TF CAIN provided Afghan evacuees with a copy of their medical records, which included the SF 600.

TF CAIN medical personnel provided Afghan evacuees with the 13 vaccines required by age group recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. The following table provides the list of the 13 immunizations.

*Table. Required Immunizations for U.S. Immigration*

Required Immunizations	
1. Measles, Mumps, and Rubella	8. Influenza
2. Polio	9. Pneumococcal Pneumonia
3. Tetanus and Diphtheria	10. Rotavirus
4. Pertussis	11. Hepatitis A
5. Haemophilus Influenza Type B	12. Meningococcal
6. Hepatitis B	13. COVID-19
7. Varicella	

Source: The DoD OIG.

TF CAIN medical personnel said that due to a measles outbreak with the initial groups of Afghan evacuees arriving at Camp Atterbury, TF CAIN medical personnel administered the measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) and varicella vaccines first. TF CAIN medical personnel established a mass vaccination drive to ensure Afghan evacuees received the MMR and varicella vaccinations first. TF CAIN medical personnel said that the State of Indiana provided specialized medical protections for pregnant women and infants not available at TF CAIN, as pregnant women and infants of a certain age cannot receive the MMR vaccine. Once Afghan evacuees received the MMR and varicella vaccines, TF CAIN medical personnel administered the remainder of the 13 age-appropriate immunizations recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including polio, COVID-19, and flu vaccines all at once.<sup>15</sup> The medical requirement form for departure, the SF 600, required full vaccination against measles;

<sup>14</sup> The U.S. General Services Administration Chronological Record of Medical Care, SF 600, is a continuous record of a patient’s medical history.

<sup>15</sup> For Afghan evacuees that in-processed later when there was not an outbreak and no measles concern, TF CAIN personnel followed normal vaccination routines. MMR and varicella vaccine doses must be administered separately as they are live virus vaccines; all other required vaccines can be administered together.

therefore, all Afghan evacuees had to be cured of measles as well as vaccinated with the MMR vaccine to complete medical processing. The U.S. Northern Command reported that as of November 5, 2021, TF CAIN had vaccinated 100 percent of Afghan evacuees against MMR, varicella, COVID-19, and polio.

### ***Health and Wellness Medical Services***

TF CAIN had three main facilities for medical care—medical in-processing, urgent care, and non-urgent care. U.S. Navy medical personnel staffed the medical in-processing building and provided initial screenings, immunizations, and other care to arriving Afghan evacuees. The urgent care facility had a triage desk staffed by contracted medical personnel, and the facility provided urgent medical care for Afghan evacuees not requiring a hospital visit. The urgent care facility’s medical personnel also stabilized Afghan evacuees with serious medical conditions until contractor-provided ambulances transported them to a local hospital. Contracted medical personnel staffed the non-urgent care facility and provided non-urgent medical care, including obstetrics and gynecology. In addition, TF CAIN dedicated 5 buildings with a combined capacity of 84 beds to isolate Afghan evacuees with communicable diseases and other conditions requiring quarantine.

### ***Specialty Care***

Contracted medical personnel provided several specialties onsite, minimizing the need for Afghan evacuees to travel off the installation for care. Contracted medical care provided maternity and postpartum care, obstetric and gynecological care, pediatric care, and mental health care. Figure 4 is a picture of an examination area. In addition to care at medical facilities, contracted medical personnel provided pediatric and mental health care during field visits to the Afghan evacuees’ barracks. During the audit team’s site visit in November 2021, TF CAIN personnel stated that they were planning to provide dental care in the near future. Later, TF CAIN medical personnel informed the audit team that dental care services began on November 14, 2021.



Figure 4. Examination Area at Task Force CAIN Non-Urgent Medical Care Facilities  
Source: The DoD OIG.

### ***Emergency and Specialty Medical Care Off Camp Atterbury***

TF CAIN military medical personnel, contracted medical personnel, and local hospitals coordinated emergency care and specialty medical care for Afghan evacuees not available on Camp Atterbury. TF CAIN had six contracted ambulances located next to the Camp Atterbury

medical buildings. TF CAIN used the ambulances for emergency medical transports to five hospitals near Camp Atterbury. TF CAIN medical personnel said that their procedures required U.S. military personnel, and an interpreter if available, to accompany any Afghan evacuee inside the ambulance when traveling off Camp Atterbury for medical care. TF CAIN personnel said that when transports for Afghan evacuees requiring off-post care became more regular, TF CAIN arranged to have interpreters and Soldiers stationed at the hospitals they used for added security and ease of operations.

TF CAIN medical personnel stated that they had positive relationships with the local and state community hospitals and public health officials. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that they maintained regular communication with state and local public health care officials and hospitals. They also held town halls with local hospitals to educate the surrounding local communities and State of Indiana medical personnel on the medical needs and health of TF CAIN's Afghan evacuee population.

### ***TF CAIN Contracted Mental and Behavioral Health***

TF CAIN offered mental and behavioral health capabilities onsite. According to TF CAIN personnel, contracted medical support included 11 licensed clinical social workers, 2 to 3 public health service officers, and 2 case workers. TF CAIN personnel said there were also volunteers from Indiana Public Health Services, including behavioral health psychologists.

TF CAIN contracted medical personnel stated that five social workers were onsite 24 hours per day, 7 days per week. TF CAIN personnel stated that if contracted case workers suspected child abuse by an Afghan evacuee, they could refer the case to the DHS and Child Protective Services for investigation. During the audit team's site visit, TF CAIN contracted medical personnel stated there had been five alleged child abuse cases referred before our site visit, but the DHS and Child Protective Services had not yet taken action. According to TF CAIN personnel, TF CAIN recorded and monitored these cases and reported them to the U.S. Army North for inclusion in the overall tracking of reported criminal activity at installations housing Afghan evacuees.

TF CAIN contracted medical personnel stated that TF CAIN had mental and behavioral health teams perform field visits to mayoral cells and housing blocks 5 days per week. TF CAIN contracted medical personnel stated that the purpose of these field visits was to conduct mental health check-ins, as well as to educate and encourage discussions about mental health among the Afghan evacuees. Members of an Army medical team trained to treat combat stress, originally tasked with supporting Service members, also accompanied the contracted medical personnel during field visits to teach basic stress relief tactics to Afghan evacuees. TF CAIN contracted medical personnel said that field visits for mental health also helped medical teams identify high-risk mental and behavioral cases before Afghan evacuees became a danger to themselves or others.

## ***Medical Challenges***

Although TF CAIN provided medical care for its Afghan evacuee population, TF CAIN had several medical challenges that included medical records tracking, latent tuberculosis concerns, and COVID-19 testing.

### ***Tracking Medical Records***

TF CAIN medical personnel stated that there were issues with duplicate entries of Afghan evacuees in the DOS-owned Hummingbird database due to multiple spellings of names and incorrect dates of birth. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that it took them about a week to validate patient information from the Hummingbird system and for TF CAIN medical personnel to purge the Hummingbird system of approximately 4,000 duplicate and incorrect entries. Because of these initial problems with the Hummingbird system, TF CAIN medical personnel stated that it was initially difficult to match Afghan evacuees to Hummingbird entries, and therefore difficult to match Hummingbird entries to medical records. TF CAIN medical personnel informed the audit team during the site visit that they were confident that they were now correctly matching people to medical records. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that there were recent discussions related to adding medical processing numbers to Afghan evacuees' meal cards and whether that would assist with more accurately tracking patients and their medical records.<sup>16</sup> TF CAIN medical personnel explained that the meal card was the most accurate form of identification on Camp Atterbury since every Afghan evacuee (or in the case of children, their parent or guardian) carried the meal card and scanned it regularly for food.

### ***Latent Tuberculosis Concerns***

TF CAIN medical personnel stated that latent tuberculosis was a major concern.<sup>17</sup> Specifically, in the first group of Afghan evacuee arrivals, TF CAIN medical personnel said that approximately 1,000 Afghan evacuees at TF CAIN tested positive for latent tuberculosis and 2 Afghan evacuees tested positive for tuberculosis. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that the two Afghan evacuees with tuberculosis were isolated and received treatment onsite. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that when medically cleared Afghan evacuees leave voluntarily or resettle, public health guidance requires Afghan evacuees with latent tuberculosis to report back to TF CAIN's medical personnel, as well as local health authorities where the Afghan evacuee resettled. TF CAIN medical personnel said that an Afghan evacuee must contact the local health authorities who would then communicate to TF CAIN medical personnel that the

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<sup>16</sup> TF CAIN personnel said Afghan evacuees carry one meal card with a four-digit meal code, and a Hummingbird card that lists a personal Hummingbird number, a processing status (intake, biographical form, biometrics, and medical physical), and a color code to indicate current block and building assignments.

<sup>17</sup> According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, persons with latent tuberculosis infection do not feel sick and do not have any symptoms. They are infected with tuberculosis, but do not have tuberculosis disease. Persons with latent tuberculosis infection cannot spread tuberculosis to others. Overall, without treatment, about 5 to 10 percent of latent tuberculosis cases will develop into tuberculosis disease.

local health authority was aware of and monitoring the Afghan evacuee's latent tuberculosis. TF CAIN medical personnel were concerned that this would be difficult to track, especially as more Afghan evacuees resettled throughout the country.

TF CAIN medical personnel explained that they were addressing this through coordination with the DOS and local health authorities in the areas where Afghan evacuees with latent tuberculosis were resettling. Once an Afghan evacuee resettled and contacted, as required, the local health officials about their latent tuberculosis status, TF CAIN medical personnel would share patient records and notify local health authorities of the required followup care to protect the health of both the Afghan evacuees and the local population where the Afghan evacuee resettled.

### *COVID-19 Safety Measures*

On September 3, 2021, the U.S. Army North Commander ordered all personnel on installations supporting Operation Allies Welcome to wear a mask and required the testing of Afghan evacuees for COVID-19 through rapid antigen testing every 72 hours to ensure the health and safety of all personnel and to prevent the spread of COVID-19.<sup>18</sup> According to TF CAIN medical personnel, TF CAIN provided Afghan evacuees with education related to health and hygiene, including the prevention of communicable diseases such as COVID-19. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that masks were available for all Afghan evacuees. However, during our walkthroughs, the audit team observed only a limited number of Afghan evacuees wearing masks inside barracks and other nonmedical buildings. In contrast, the audit team observed that nearly all Service members and contractors were wearing masks when inside non-medical buildings. All Service members, contractors, and Afghan evacuees that we observed wore masks in medical buildings.

TF CAIN personnel did not meet the U.S. Army North requirement to use rapid antigen testing to test Afghan evacuees for COVID-19 every 72 hours because there were too many individuals to test with such frequency. TF CAIN personnel stated they tested Afghan evacuees every 5 to 7 days in groups according to their assigned housing block. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that they routinely tested Afghan evacuees for COVID-19 at the following times:

- upon arrival in the United States,
- during an initial U.S. Customs and Immigration Services medical screening,
- during medical in-processing at Camp Atterbury, and
- every 5 to 7 days, by assigned housing block.

COVID-19 tests were also administered whenever Afghan evacuees exhibited COVID-19 symptoms, or after known exposure to someone with the disease. On October 28, 2021, the U.S. Army North issued an order removing the requirement for Afghan evacuees to receive COVID-19 rapid antigen testing every 72 hours.

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<sup>18</sup> Rapid antigen testing for COVID-19 uses a nasal swab to determine if person is infected with COVID-19.

The U.S. Northern Command reported that on November 5, 2021, TF CAIN had vaccinated 100 percent of eligible Afghan evacuees against COVID-19. TF CAIN medical personnel stated that almost all TF CAIN personnel (Service members and contracted personnel) were also vaccinated against COVID-19 and were on track to be fully vaccinated soon. TF CAIN personnel stated that as of the audit team's site visit, 100 percent of uniformed medical personnel were vaccinated.

## **Afghan Evacuee Security and Accountability Procedures and Observations**

To provide security and accountability within the Afghan evacuee barracks area of Camp Atterbury, TF CAIN security personnel, including Camp Atterbury Garrison Command Soldiers, Military Police (MP), and other Soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment, implemented security measures for the Afghan evacuees.<sup>19</sup> According to TF CAIN security personnel, the security measures included conducting routine patrols, performing regular barracks sweeps, and establishing quick response forces that were on standby and prepared to respond to disturbances as necessary.<sup>20</sup> In addition, TF CAIN security personnel stated they had well-rehearsed riot protocols and procedures if such an event occurred on Camp Atterbury. TF CAIN also self-audited and purged duplicate Hummingbird records of Afghan evacuees, and issued assurance cards tied to the Hummingbird number to provide better accountability.<sup>21</sup> The task force also instituted unique identifiers on meal cards, which were different than their Hummingbird numbers, to better track individual guests and families throughout the day.

### ***Accountability Observations***

During our site visit, the audit team observed several accountability procedures. Specifically, TF CAIN security personnel used the Hummingbird system, meal cards, and assurance cards for accountability purposes.

### ***Accountability Through the Hummingbird System***

Because TF CAIN was established later than some of the other installations supporting the Operation Allies Welcome mission, TF CAIN security personnel stated they were able to use the DOS-owned Hummingbird system as soon as Afghan evacuees arrived. TF CAIN personnel stated that task force personnel validated the Hummingbird records and removed duplicates, resulting in a more accurate roster of Afghan evacuees. TF CAIN personnel used this updated list of Afghan evacuees and their uniquely assigned identifiers from the Hummingbird system to track accountability of evacuees on Camp Atterbury.

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<sup>19</sup> TF CAIN used Soldiers from supporting units that were not law enforcement to conduct patrols and basic security monitoring. Additionally, the DHS was onsite as the lead Federal agency to support TF CAIN. Therefore, for the purpose of this report, we refer to DoD and DHS personnel as TF CAIN security personnel.

<sup>20</sup> The quick response force is an armed MP unit ready to assist patrolling MPs during crisis.

<sup>21</sup> According to the DOS liaison at Camp Atterbury, TF CAIN personnel successfully purged duplicate Hummingbird records of Afghan evacuees.

### ***Accountability Through Meal Cards***

TF CAIN personnel developed a meal card system to assist in tracking meal distribution that served as another method of accounting for Afghan evacuees. The meal card system provided Afghan evacuees with a unique identifier different from their Hummingbird number. In the event a meal card was lost, TF CAIN issued a new card. TF CAIN personnel scanned the meal cards at the designated dining facility, which created a tracking record of the date, time, and location the evacuee received a meal. TF CAIN personnel stated that Afghan evacuees could only use their meal cards at their assigned dining facility (northern or southern barracks area), and TF CAIN personnel would direct Afghan evacuees to their assigned dining facility if they attempted to use their meal card at the other area's dining facility. This meal card system ensured evacuees used their assigned dining facility and prevented meal shortages. TF CAIN personnel also entered the Afghan evacuees' meal card numbers into a spreadsheet when they received clothing so TF CAIN personnel could track clothing issuance. The meal card numbers provided TF CAIN security personnel with information about which individuals received clothes and food and which did not. If an individual did not scan for a meal at all during a day, TF CAIN personnel could check on that individual.

### ***Accountability Through Assurance Cards***

TF CAIN security personnel stated that they also implemented assurance cards with individual Hummingbird numbers to assist with tracking Afghan evacuees throughout the DOS assurance process.<sup>22</sup> Once Afghan evacuees completed each step in the process, TF CAIN personnel punched their assurance cards to show that they had completed that step, which provided transparency to evacuees by showing their completed steps in the assurance process. This was another way TF CAIN tracked an Afghan evacuee's processing status in order to determine whether they were ready for relocation.

### ***Security Observations***

Although TF CAIN security personnel implemented security measures, we found security-related challenges, including insufficient physical security around Afghan evacuee barracks areas and inconsistent security patrols for the women's barracks. The audit team also determined that TF CAIN security personnel handled security infractions of Afghan evacuees at a lower level than appropriate. Specifically, TF CAIN security personnel stated that they often diffused situations and counseled the Afghan evacuees after crimes were committed, but did not refer cases to the appropriate law enforcement agency for investigation.

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<sup>22</sup> The assurance process is a three-step procedure for Afghan evacuees, mandated by the DOS, to complete their resettlement to a sponsor family. Specifically, the International Rescue Committee assists DOS agents in monitoring and tracking Afghan evacuees through the three-step process of biometrics, medical assurance, and the assurance background check before resettlement can occur.

## ***Education of Afghan Evacuees in American Law and Culture***

According to TF CAIN security personnel, their priority was to assist in the education of Afghan evacuees who committed minor infractions at Camp Atterbury.<sup>23</sup> TF CAIN leadership stated they focused on educating Afghan evacuees in American law and culture instead of punishing them for minor incidents, such as littering or vandalism. The audit team observed that TF CAIN established this practice at multiple levels of security as Soldiers tried to educate Afghan evacuees by teaching rather than referring them to law enforcement. TF CAIN leadership also established a Misconduct Review Board that, through a ticketing process, gave a maximum of three warnings per individual for minor incidents. According to the standard operating procedures of TF CAIN's Misconduct Review Board, after receiving three warnings, the individual would appear before the board composed of DoD, DOS, and DHS personnel who would decide on an appropriate administrative punishment. According to TF CAIN security personnel, the Misconduct Review Board had not yet met at the time of the site visit. TF CAIN leadership published guidance and supplied each evacuee with a list of "Community Rules," outlining basic rules ranging from "remain in living areas" to "males are only allowed in female sleeping areas from 8 a.m. to 8 p.m."

## ***Physical Security of the Afghan Evacuee Area***

TF CAIN security personnel informed the audit team of a concern with the fencing around the Afghan evacuee barracks areas. According to TF CAIN security personnel, there were gaps in the fence and only a few patrols along the fencing perimeter, which resulted in several security incidents. For example, in one instance, teenage Afghan evacuees left the base through a hole in the fencing and walked to a nearby campground where they took bikes from campers to explore the area. In another instance, a food delivery driver met Afghan evacuees near the edge of the camp to deliver prohibited items, such as alcohol. In response to these security incidents, TF CAIN security personnel stated that they were working to increase patrols in areas of concern. The audit team's review of MP daily journals from November 6 through November 29, 2021, showed several instances of the increased patrols successfully preventing Afghan evacuees from approaching the boundary or controlled areas.<sup>24</sup> For example, on November 24, 2021, the TF CAIN MP journal documented the MP redirecting five male Afghan evacuees who were on the roadway running alongside the base fence back to the barracks.

Finally, the audit team observed that the process for entering the main gate required the use of paper records, which caused a backup of vehicles trying to enter the installation and allowed room for error as security personnel had to review more than 50 pages of the

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<sup>23</sup> TF CAIN personnel described education as teaching Afghan evacuees that particular behavior, including criminal behavior, is unacceptable in the United States even though it may have been acceptable in Afghan culture. Specifically, TF CAIN security personnel stated that they would defuse any potential situation and then educate Afghan evacuees on American societal norms rather than escalating the case for investigation.

<sup>24</sup> MP journals are daily journals that document security incidents at a task force-level and are distributed to all members of the TF CAIN security team.

approved personnel roster. TF CAIN security personnel stated that they were considering uploading the list onto iPads to make the process more efficient; however, they did not have money budgeted for purchasing iPads.

### ***Post Access***

During the site visit, the audit team observed TF CAIN security personnel properly screen personnel who entered the post through the main gate. TF CAIN security personnel explained that Camp Atterbury was previously an open post, but when the U.S. Northern Command established TF CAIN, personnel needed to be on an access roster to enter.<sup>25</sup> The audit team observed TF CAIN security personnel checking identification cards against the access roster to verify that visitors had approval to access the post. TF CAIN security personnel updated the access roster daily. Figure 5 is a photo of the main gate.



Figure 5. Camp Atterbury Main Gate  
Source: The DoD OIG.

### ***Inconsistent Security Patrols for Women's Barracks***

During the audit team's walkthrough of the barracks and discussions with members of the mayoral cells and Afghan evacuees, the audit team learned that TF CAIN security personnel provided inadequate security for the women and children's barracks. Specifically, one TF CAIN official responsible for security patrols stated that his unit did not conduct any patrols in the women and children's barracks because the unit did not have female Soldiers. In another barracks block, female Afghan evacuees said that they were scared of the male Soldiers who came into their barracks on patrol during early morning hours. While it is understandable for male security personnel to be reluctant to enter women's barracks, not conducting security patrols is not an acceptable solution because it leaves women and children in these barracks vulnerable to violence and exploitation. For example, TF CAIN security personnel stated there were instances where male Afghan evacuees used pebbles to prop open the doors in women's barracks in order to have access at night. The audit team raised this concern to TF CAIN leadership while onsite. TF CAIN leadership explained TF CAIN did not have enough female Soldiers to conduct all-female patrols of women's barracks, but stated that TF CAIN security personnel would ensure future patrols included at least a female Soldier or linguist. The audit team's review of MP journals from November 6 through 29, 2021, showed that TF CAIN personnel conducted security patrols in women's barracks. For example, on November 25, 2021, TF CAIN personnel identified male Afghan evacuees in the women's barracks late at night, and the MPs successfully removed the men and issued them warnings.

<sup>25</sup> An open post is a state-owned post that any civilian with identification (driver's license or identification card) may enter.

## *Improper Escalation of Alleged Criminal Activity*

Through meetings with TF CAIN security personnel and Afghan evacuees, we determined that TF CAIN security personnel did not consistently refer allegations of criminal activity to the authorities with law enforcement.<sup>26</sup> Specifically, TF CAIN security personnel and Afghan evacuees told the audit team about multiple alleged felonies and misdemeanors that the evacuees committed on Camp Atterbury, but which the security personnel did not report to the proper law enforcement organization. TF CAIN security personnel stated that they were unaware of any legal or internal administrative consequences resulting from any alleged felony or misdemeanor offenses committed by Afghan evacuees at Camp Atterbury.

TF CAIN security personnel repeatedly stated there had been no felonies or misdemeanors prosecuted from Camp Atterbury. This was despite both documentation in the MP journals and verbal accounts from Service members and Afghan evacuees of spousal and child abuse, assault, theft, prostitution, and other crimes. TF CAIN security personnel responded to defuse situations by separating the two parties, but did not detain those involved or refer the alleged crimes to local or Federal law enforcement for further investigation. TF CAIN security personnel only documented the allegations in the MP journal. In discussions with TF CAIN security personnel, the audit team determined that TF CAIN handled these alleged crimes internally at the mayoral cells-level instead of reporting to local and Federal law enforcement for investigation. TF CAIN security personnel stated that they handled these offenses by stopping the act if it was still occurring and advising the offender not to do it again. If TF CAIN security personnel responded after the alleged crimes had occurred and could not locate a witness to provide a statement, MPs did not continue to investigate or refer the case. Dealing with these alleged crimes internally resulted in no consequences to the alleged perpetrators and did little to deter future offenses or protect victims of these crimes.

During the exit brief, the audit team raised the concern that TF CAIN did not report alleged felonies and misdemeanors to proper law enforcement authorities. TF CAIN leadership stated that they would ensure that TF CAIN personnel were aware that crimes should be reported and handled through appropriate law enforcement channels. To determine whether TF CAIN security personnel resolved this concern, the audit team reviewed TF CAIN's MP journals of security incidents for the three weeks following the site visit (November 6 through 29, 2021). The MP journals documented proper escalation of alleged felonies and misdemeanors to the respective Federal or state agencies with law enforcement authority. For example, TF CAIN personnel reported instances such as physical altercations to the Johnson County Sheriff's department.

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<sup>26</sup> On Camp Atterbury, TF CAIN did not have law enforcement jurisdiction over Afghan evacuees and should have referred misdemeanors and felonies committed by Afghan evacuees to external law enforcement. For Camp Atterbury, any misdemeanor was in the jurisdiction of the County Sherriff's department. Any felony was DHS jurisdiction and should have been referred to the appropriate agency within the DHS. The Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives team onsite explained that unless the crime was alcohol, tobacco, firearms, and explosives related, TF CAIN would need to refer the crime/incident to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the DHS investigations, or another authorized agency.

## Financial Costs of Task Force CAIN Operations

In an August 19, 2021 memorandum, the DoD Deputy Comptroller established cost reporting requirements and procedures for DoD Components supporting the relocation effort.<sup>27</sup> The Deputy Comptroller required DoD Components to submit weekly flash reports of all direct and reimbursable costs associated with the relocation of Afghan evacuees and directed the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to provide additional reporting instructions to DoD Components. The Deputy Comptroller also stated that the DoD Financial Management Regulation provided instruction on reporting the cost of contingency operations.<sup>28</sup>

TF CAIN used the existing Logistics Civil Augmentation Program cost-plus-fixed-fee contract to support the Operation Allies Welcome mission. As of February 2, 2022, the existing Logistics Civil Augmentation Program estimate for Camp Atterbury's support for Operation Allies Welcome was \$366.5 million.

We are providing this management advisory for information and use. This advisory identifies challenges observed during our site visit to TF CAIN, located at Camp Atterbury, Indiana. The audit team provided this information to the TF CAIN Commander during an exit conference on November 5, 2021. The TF CAIN Commander agreed with our concerns and TF CAIN began discussing ways to resolve these concerns. Because TF CAIN ended Operation Allies Welcome on January 25, 2022, this management advisory does not include any recommendations for management action.

The interagency partners, as well as the commands directly and indirectly responsible for the relocation of Afghan evacuees, should read this advisory to be aware of the challenges and opportunities for improvement regarding the in-processing, sustainment, and physical security for the relocation of Afghan evacuees.

We considered management's comments on a discussion draft copy of this advisory when preparing this final memorandum. A written response is not required. If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED].



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Readiness and Global Operations

<sup>27</sup> Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Comptroller, "DoD Support to the Department of State for Afghan Special Immigration Visa (SIV) Applicants," August 19, 2021.

<sup>28</sup> DoD Financial Management Regulation 7000.14-R, volume 12, chapter 23.



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