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
U.S. Department of Defense

Followup Audit on the U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

Results in Brief

Followup Audit on the U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East

July 1, 2021

Objective

The objective of this followup audit was to determine whether the Army implemented corrective actions identified in Report No. DODIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," June 26, 2017, in the Heavy Lift VIII (HL8) contract to improve oversight and performance.

Background

Army Contracting Command–Rock Island (ACC-RI) awarded four HL7 contracts on May 12, 2011, to provide personnel, equipment, and materials necessary to haul cargo and equipment throughout Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. At the end of the period of performance for the HL7 contracts, the ACC-RI contracting officer issued three extensions that transitioned into the HL8 contract. The HL8 contract was awarded on February 28, 2018, to provide personnel, equipment, and materials necessary to haul cargo and equipment throughout the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility.

USCENTCOM covers 20 nations in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, and operates with subordinate Service component commands, such as U.S. Army Central (USARCENT). USARCENT provides continuous oversight and control of U.S. Army operations and exercises administrative control of all U.S. Army forces throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia. The 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) (1st TSC) is a subordinate unit under

Background (cont'd)

USARCENT and the requiring activity for the HL8 contract. The 1st TSC is responsible for overseeing contractor performance and managing the contract requirements and all cargo movements throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia. A Movement Control Battalion (MCB) provides movement planning and in-transit visibility of all ground transportation movement under the HL8 contract. U.S. Army Transportation Battalions are assigned to perform MCB tasks. ACC-RI provides global contracting support to the Army and is the contract office that awarded the HL8 contract.

Report No. DODIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," identified that:

- the Army ordered an average of 39 percent more assets than were needed,
- Army requirement review boards did not require adequate information to validate the number of HL7 assets requested, and
- ACC-RI included excessive guaranteed minimum payments to each of the HL7 contractors.

As a result, the Army wasted $53.6 million throughout the life of the HL7 contracts on services that it did not require.

Finding

We reviewed management actions taken in response to the six recommendations from Report No. DODIG-2017-095 and determined that USCENTCOM and the Army fully implemented corrective actions to address five of the recommendations and did not fully address one recommendation. We determined that:

- the 1st TSC worked with USARCENT, ACC-RI, and MCB officials to validate requirements for HL8 and developed procedures to address poor mission planning and wasted assets (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 1.b);
- the 1st TSC updated its requirement review process standard operating procedures to require specific documents that the requesting units must submit to the review board so that the

Results in Brief

Followup Audit on the U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East

Finding (cont'd)

validation authority could make an informed decision (Report No. DODIG-2017-095, Recommendation 1.c);

- USARCENT updated its policies for the review of transportation requests by relocating the review board from Kuwait to USARCENT headquarters in South Carolina to improve decision making, and conducting training on the review of requirements packages (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 2);

- USCENTCOM established an Execute Order that directed supported units to use the Trans-Arabian Network (TAN), USARCENT to report all TAN movements in biweekly status reports, and USCENTCOM to perform quarterly assessments of the TAN (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 3); and

- ACC-RI established a more reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum and structured the contract so that contractors would obtain the $1 million minimum for services that were actually required (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 4).

However, the 1st TSC did not fully implement corrective actions for one recommendation. The 1st TSC did not develop a systemic process for collecting actual HL8 usage data or implement a system for forecasting HL8 requirements (Report No. DODIG-2017-095, Recommendation 1.a).

As a result of the 1st TSC officials not fully implementing Recommendation 1.a from the prior report, USARCENT and 1st TSC officials cannot rely on the HL8 usage data that is being collected to monitor HL8 contract performance or identify and address poor mission planning that could lead to wasted HL8 assets. Therefore, the Army may continue to waste HL8 assets similar to the $53.6 million in wasted assets identified in the prior audit of the HL7 contract.

Recommendations

Although we are not making new recommendations, one of the six recommendations we reviewed during this audit remains open. We encourage the 1st TSC Commander to fully implement corrective actions to address the intent of Recommendation 1.a from the prior report (Report No. DODIG-2017-095). Specifically, the 1st TSC Commander should provide supporting documentation showing consistent data that is based on actual loading and delivery dates and evidence that the information is reported uniformly across the different operating areas and deployed MCBs. In addition, the 1st TSC Commander should provide supporting documentation showing that the 1st TSC is forecasting data to identify trends in heavy lift usage that allows the Army and 1st TSC to better anticipate future customer needs.

Management Comments and Our Response

The 1st TSC Deputy Commanding Officer agreed with the recommendation to implement a systemic process for collecting heavy lift asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders.

The comments from the 1st TSC Deputy Commanding Officer were responsive and addressed the finding of the report. Therefore, Recommendation 1.a from Report No. DODIG-2017-095 is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once management provides documentation demonstrating that the agreed-upon actions are completed. Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, U.S. Central Command	None	None	DODIG-2017-095: 2
Commander, U.S. Army Central	None	None	DODIG-2017-095: 3
Executive Director, Army Contracting Command–Rock Island	None	None	DODIG-2017-095: 4
Commander, 1st Sustainment Command (Theater)	None	DODIG-2017-095: 1.a	DODIG-2017-095: 1.b and 1.c

Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.

- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.

- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 1, 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
          AUDITOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Followup Audit on the U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift Commercial
          Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East
          (Report No. DODIG-2021-097)

This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit.
We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on
the finding and on the unresolved recommendation from Report No. DODIG-2017-095.
We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report.
These comments are included in the report.

The 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) Deputy Commanding Officer agreed to address
Recommendation 1.a from Report No. DODIG-2017-095; therefore, we consider the
recommendation resolved and open. As described in the Management Comments and
Our Response section of this report, we will close the recommendation when you provide us
documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are
completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific
actions in process or completed on the recommendation. Send your response to either
followup@dodig.mil if unclassified or rfunet@dodig.smil.mil if classified SECRET.

If you have any questions, please contact me at ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮.

Richard B. Vasquez
Assistant Inspector General for Audit
Readiness and Global Operations

Contents

Introduction

Objective

The objective of this followup audit was to determine whether the Army implemented corrective actions identified in Report No. DODIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII (HL7) Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," June 26, 2017, in the Heavy Lift VIII (HL8) contract to improve oversight and performance. See the Appendix for our scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the audit.

Background

Heavy Lift Contracts

Army Contracting Command–Rock Island (ACC-RI) awarded four HL7 contracts on May 12, 2011. The HL7 contracts provided personnel, equipment, and materials necessary to haul cargo and equipment throughout Kuwait, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. The HL7 contracts had a not-to-exceed $900 million indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contract with a base year and four option years. Subsequently, the ACC-RI contracting officer issued two 6-month extensions that extended the HL7 contracts to August 2017. According to the contracting officer, an additional 9-month extension was added through May 2018 to allow an orderly and efficient transition to the HL8 contract.

On February 28, 2018, ACC-RI awarded the HL8 multiple-award contract to four contractors. The HL8 contract provides personnel, equipment, and materials necessary to haul cargo and equipment throughout the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility. The HL8 multiple award contract was a not-to-exceed $550 million indefinite-delivery indefinite-quantity contract with a base year and four option years. Under the HL8 contract, ACC-RI could award firm-fixed-price task orders to the four contractors. As of November 1, 2020, ACC-RI awarded 49 task orders and 40 modifications, valued at $146.8 million.

Summary of Report No. DODIG-2017-095

On June 26, 2017, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued Report No. DODIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," which identified that the Army did not adequately manage the HL7 contract requirements. Specifically, the report outlined that the Army ordered an average of 39 percent

more assets than it needed throughout the life of the HL7 contract. The Army's inadequate management of the HL7 contract requirements occurred because the 1st Sustainment Command (Theater) (1st TSC) did not:

- analyze HL7 asset usage for intra-Kuwait movements,
- continuously evaluate HL7 requirements so it could increase or decrease orders based on operational need, or
- identify and correct the inefficiencies in the Army's planning and execution of theater transportation missions.

In addition, Army requirement review boards did not require adequate information to validate the number of HL7 assets requested on HL7 task orders. The Army over-ordered HL7 services because it did not properly plan the Trans-Arabian Network (TAN) task order and did not take appropriate measures to ensure full operational use of the TAN. Finally, ACC-RI included excessive guaranteed minimum payments to each of the HL7 contractors, which prompted the Army to order services to meet the guaranteed minimums rather than what was actually required within that period of performance.

As a result, the Army wasted $53.6 million throughout the life of the HL7 contract on services that it did not require. The report contained six recommendations and as of May 1, 2020, four recommendations remained open, and two were closed. The DoD OIG recommended that the 1st TSC Commander:

- implement a systemic process for collecting heavy lift asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders (Recommendation 1.a);
- review instances of poor mission planning and execution that resulted in ordering wasted assets in the Heavy Lift program, track the trends that led to inefficiencies in the program, and implement corrective actions to prevent those inefficiencies from reoccurring (Recommendation 1.b); and
- update the requirement review process standard operating procedures (SOP) to ensure that requirements packages that are submitted to the review boards include all information that is necessary for the validation authority to make an informed decision (Recommendation 1.c).

The DoD OIG also recommended that the Commander of U.S. Army Central (USARCENT) develop updated procedures to ensure that requirement review boards are validating the entire requirement that the 1st TSC is requesting (Recommendation 2). In addition, the DoD OIG recommended that the USCENTCOM Commander direct supported units to use the TAN, establish metrics for TAN

movements, perform quarterly assessments of the TAN performance and effectiveness, and continue to monitor TAN performance to determine whether directives had the intended impact on its usage (Recommendation 3).

Finally, the DoD OIG recommended that the ACC-RI Executive Director establish a more reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum on the HL8 contract to ensure that the Army does not pay for services that it will not use. The DoD OIG recommended that this could be done by either lowering the guaranteed minimums or by spreading the guaranteed minimum over a longer period, such as the life of the contract (Recommendation 4).

HL8 Contract Roles and Responsibilities

There are five primary commands that have important roles in facilitating HL8 transportation missions in the Middle East—USCENTCOM, USARCENT, the 1st TSC, the Movement Control Battalion (MCB), and ACC-RI.

U.S. Central Command

USCENTCOM is one of the 11 unified combatant commands within the DoD and covers 20 nations in the Middle East and Central and South Asia. The HL8 contracts are performed throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. USCENTCOM does not have military units permanently assigned to the command; however, USCENTCOM operates with subordinate Service component commands, such as USARCENT.

U.S. Army Central

USARCENT is headquartered at Shaw Air Force Base, South Carolina, and has a forward headquarters in Kuwait with area support groups in Kuwait, Qatar, and Jordan. USARCENT is USCENTCOM's U.S. Army component command and serves as the Coalition Forces Land Component Command. USARCENT provides continuous oversight and control of U.S. Army operations throughout the region. USARCENT exercises administrative control of all U.S. Army forces in the Middle East and Central and South Asia, which includes supplying, equipping, training, servicing, administrating, and maintaining forces. When directed by USCENTCOM, USARCENT serves as the component command responsible for commanding and controlling Joint and Coalition forces engaged in sustained military operations, including disaster relief and crisis response. The 1st TSC is a subordinate unit under USARCENT.

1st Sustainment Command (Theater)

The 1st TSC provides mission command and operational sustainment support to Army, Joint, and multinational forces in support of USCENTCOM's area of operations. The 1st TSC is the requiring activity for HL8 contract and is responsible for overseeing contractor performance and managing the contract requirements. The 1st TSC is responsible for managing cargo movement 24 hours a day, 7 days a week throughout the Middle East and Central and South Asia.

Movement Control Battalion

A Movement Control Battalion (MCB) is a U.S. Army Transportation Battalion that is assigned to the 1st TSC for 9-month rotational deployments. The MCB provides asset allocation, movement planning, and in-transit visibility of all ground transportation movement under the HL8 contract. The MCB is established to coordinate the execution of cargo movement to support military operations across the different operating areas covered by the HL8 contract.

Army Contracting Command–Rock Island

Army Contracting Command–Rock Island (ACC-RI) provides global contracting support to the Army. ACC-RI is the contract office that awarded the HL8 contract and provides the contracting officer for the contract. The contracting officer responsibilities for the HL8 contract include awarding task orders and reviewing bids.

Review of Internal Controls

DoD Instruction 5010.40 requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system of internal controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the effectiveness of the controls.[1] We identified that the 1st TSC did not develop a systemic process for collecting HL8 usage data or implement a system for forecasting HL8 requirements. We will provide a copy of the report to the senior official responsible for internal controls in the Department of the Army.

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[1] DoD Instruction 5010.40, "Managers' Internal Control Program Procedures," May 30, 2013.

Finding

Recommendation From Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Still Needs To Be Fully Implemented

USCENTCOM and U.S. Army officials took some corrective actions, but did not fully implement a previous recommendation from Report No. DODIG-2017-095; therefore, additional improvements are needed to ensure that HL8 is properly managed. We reviewed the six recommendations from DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2017-095 and determined that USCENTCOM and the Army fully implemented five recommendations. We determined that:

- the 1st TSC worked with USARCENT, ACC-RI, and MCB officials to validate requirements for HL8 and identified instances of poor mission planning and execution that resulted in wasted assets (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 1.b);

- the 1st TSC updated its requirement review process SOP to require specific documents that the requesting units must submit to the review board so that the validation authority could make an informed decision (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 1.c);

- USARCENT updated its policies for the review of transportation requests by relocating the review board from Kuwait to USARCENT headquarters in South Carolina to improve decision making, and conducting training on the review of requirements packages (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 2);

- USCENTCOM established an Execute Order that directed supported units to use the TAN, USARCENT to report all TAN movements in biweekly status reports, and USCENTCOM to perform quarterly assessments of the TAN (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 3); and

- ACC-RI established a more reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum and structured the contract so that contractors would obtain the $1 million minimum for services that were actually required (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 4).

However, the 1st TSC did not fully implement corrective actions for one recommendation. The 1st TSC did not develop a systemic process for collecting actual HL8 usage data or implement a system for forecasting HL8 requirements (Report No. DODIG-2017-095 Recommendation 1.a). As a result of the 1st TSC officials not developing a systemic process for collecting actual HL8 usage data or implementing a system for forecasting HL8 requirements, USARCENT and

1st TSC officials cannot rely on the HL8 data that is being collected to monitor HL8 contract performance or identify and address poor mission planning that could lead to wasted HL8 assets. Therefore, the Army may continue to waste HL8 assets similar to the $53.6 million in wasted assets identified in the prior audit of the HL7 contract.

USCENTCOM and U.S. Army Officials Took Some Corrective Actions, but Did Not Fully Implement a Previous Recommendation

USCENTCOM and U.S. Army officials took some corrective actions, but did not fully implement a previous recommendation from Report No. DODIG-2017-095; therefore, additional improvements are needed to ensure that HL8 is properly managed. We reviewed the six recommendations from the previous DoD OIG report and determined that USCENTCOM and the Army fully implemented five recommendations and did not fully implement corrective actions for one recommendation.

Officials Took Actions That Met Intent of Five Recommendations

Officials from the 1st TSC, USARCENT, and ACC-RI took actions that met the intent of five of the six recommendations from Report No. DODIG-2017-095. While these organizations did not always perform the actions outlined in their responses to the prior report, the actions taken did meet the intent of the recommendations.

The 1st TSC Developed Procedures to Hold Customers Accountable For Wasted HL8 Assets and Identify Inefficiencies

In Report No. DODIG-2017-095, the DoD OIG recommended that the 1st TSC Commander review instances of poor mission planning and execution that resulted in ordering wasted assets, track the trends that led to inefficiencies, and implement corrective actions to prevent those inefficiencies from reoccurring. USARCENT officials responded on behalf of the 1st TSC Commander and stated that the 1st TSC established an HL8 mission planning and execution working group to identify inefficiency trends and to apply corrective actions as necessary. Furthermore, the MCB and 408th Contract Support Brigade officials were developing a movement control team handbook to establish controls for managing HL8 mission execution.

To verify that the corrective actions were implemented, we interviewed officials from USARCENT, the 1st TSC, ACC-RI, and the MCB to determine how each organization reviews, certifies, and approves requirements. We determined that the 1st TSC, USARCENT, ACC-RI, and the MCB developed working relationships and maintained open communication to review wasted assets

and identify inefficiencies. We reviewed the 420th MCB Movement Control Handbook (MCB Handbook) to determine what controls were established for managing HL8 mission execution.[2]

The MCB Handbook defined five noncompliance categories of wasted assets and implemented corrective actions to address those wasted assets. The MCB Handbook established that customers were noncompliant if they:

- canceled movement requests with less than 24 hours' notice,

- requested incorrect quantities of transportation assets,

- did not properly plan and stage cargo for movement within contracted time constraints,

- did not properly plan or missed scheduled host-country custom inspections, or

- did not update movement status or close out movement requests after completion.

To hold noncompliant customers accountable, the MCB developed a spot report for customers whose actions during HL8 missions met one of the noncompliance categories.[3] The spot report identified the noncompliant customer, the customer's point of contact information, and a narrative section that detailed how the customer wasted the requested transportation assets. The MCB entered the spot reports into a spreadsheet tracker to provide visibility of the transportation requests and which noncompliance categories applied. Furthermore, the MCB would take the following actions against the noncompliant customer.

- First violation: This violation results in a report being generated by the 1st TSC.

- Second violation (within 30 days of the first violation): The MCB requires that the first Officer Level 5 (O-5) within the customer's chain of command sign a memorandum for record describing why the customer did not follow established procedures.

- Third violation (within 30 days of the first violation): The MCB requires that the first Officer Level 6 (O-6) within the customer's chain of command make all movement requests and provide a memorandum for record documenting the need for the request.

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[2] 420th MCB Movement Control Handbook, "Ground Transportation for Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and the Arabian Peninsula," October 8, 2018.

[3] A spot report is issued to a customer that does not coordinate efficiently in preparing equipment for transport, misses equipment loading or unloading appointments with the transportation contractor, or orders too many or too few transportation assets, resulting in transport delays or wasted HL8 assets.

The noncompliance category violations apply for every movement request until the customer is no longer within the original 30-day period. We obtained a listing of all reports from August 2020 through February 2021 and found that the MCB issued 142 reports for violations of the MCB Handbook with no second or third violations within the original 30-day window. For example, four units received reports due to last minute cancellations within the 24-hour time limit. We determined that the 1st TSC did not develop formal working groups mentioned in the response to the prior report. However, the coordination and communication between USARCENT, the 1st TSC, ACC-RI, and the MCB addressed the intent of the recommendation to identify inefficiency trends and wasted assets. Finally, the MCB Handbook was updated to establish controls for holding customers accountable regarding the reports and restrictions imposed when HL8 assets are wasted; therefore, the actions taken by USARCENT, the 1st TSC, ACC-RI, and the MCB meet the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, Recommendation 1.b is closed.

The 1st TSC Updated its Requirement Review Board Standard Operating Procedures

In Report No. DODIG-2017-095, the DoD OIG recommended that the 1st TSC Commander update the requirement review process SOP to ensure that requirements packages for task orders include all information that is necessary to make an informed decision. USARCENT officials responded on behalf of the 1st TSC Commander and stated that the requirement review board SOP was updated to include additional information on requesting additional HL8 assets and to include the required documents that the validation authority needs to make an informed decision.

We reviewed the 1st TSC's Operational Contract Support SOP (1st TSC SOP) dated April 13, 2019, and found that the 1st TSC had updated the 1st TSC SOP to outline the required documents for creating the requirements review packages.[4] In the updated SOP, the 1st TSC identified up to 17 documents that HL8 customers must include in the requirements package submitted to the requirements review boards.[5] Examples of the documents that were in the requirements package include justification memorandums, cost estimates, and performance work statements for each requested task order. To verify that the requirements packages contained the mandatory documents, we requested the last five requirement packages from USARCENT. Our review of the five requirements packages determined that each

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[4] 1st TSC Operational Contract Support Standard Operating Procedure, April 13, 2019.

[5] The SOP establishes the requirements for each document, and the requestor has to determine which documents are applicable to their request. For example, a sole-source justification would not be included if the purchase is not a sole-source purchase.

package contained the mandatory documents as required by the 1st TSC SOP. Based on the April 2019 1st TSC SOP and our review of the last five requirements packages, we determined that actions taken met the intent of the recommendation, and therefore, Recommendation 1.c is closed.

USARCENT Updated Policies to Improve Requirement Review Process

In Report No. DODIG-2017-095, the DoD OIG recommended that the USARCENT Commander develop updated procedures to ensure that requirement review boards are validating the entire requirement that the 1st TSC is requesting. USARCENT officials responded that USARCENT would relocate the review board to Shaw Air Force Base to ensure a higher level of review, provide training on requirement package reviews, and update the operational contract support SOP to improve the requirements review process.

We reviewed the Fragmentary Order that the USARCENT Commander issued in December 2018 and verified that it approved the relocation of the Coalition Acquisition Review Board from Kuwait to Shaw Air Force Base, in South Carolina.[6] We interviewed a USARCENT official to determine whether the move had improved the coalition acquisition requirements review process. The USARCENT official stated that the relocation improved the analysis and review during the assessment of requirements, and that USARCENT now has better assurance that the requirement aligns with strategic plans and the operational environment.

The Fragmentary Order establishes that a requirement valued at $250,000 or more must be validated through a requirement review board. We determined that USARCENT incorporated the Fragmentary Order requirement review and validation process into the USARCENT Coalition Acquisition Review Board SOP. We reviewed this SOP and identified that the 1st TSC is responsible for validating all requirements valued at $5 million or less, and USARCENT is responsible for reviewing packages over $5 million. USARCENT officials stated that the 1st TSC did not submit any requirement packages over $5 million, and therefore all requirements packages followed 1st TSC review policies.

The 1st TSC incorporated procedures for reviewing requirement packages into the 1st TSC SOP. The 1st TSC SOP establishes the voting members who review the requirements packages. The voting members include the 1st TSC Chief of Staff and representatives from Army functional components such as Logistics, Engineering, and Information Technology. A representative from the requiring activity justifies the requirement to the voting members, who then approve, postpone, or deny

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[6] USARCENT Coalition Acquisition Review Board Fragmentary Order, December 2018.

the proposed requirement package. Finally, the 1st TSC Chief of Staff is the approval authority for requirements under $250,000, and the 1st TSC Deputy Commanding General is the approval authority for requirements equal to and above $250,000. We requested the last five requirement packages from USARCENT to verify that each package contained the appropriate levels of review based on the dollar thresholds established. Out of the five requirement packages reviewed, three packages were valued under the $250,000 threshold and two packages were valued at more than $250,000. The three packages under $250,000 were approved by the 1st TSC Chief of Staff in accordance with the 1st TSC SOP. The remaining two packages, valued at more than $250,000, were reviewed by the appropriate review board members and were approved by the 1st TSC Deputy Commanding General as required. As a result, all five requirement packages were approved by the necessary approval authority according to policy.

According to a USARCENT official, on April 2, 2020, USARCENT conducted training for the voting members on their roles and responsibilities when assessing the requirements package. According to a USARCENT official, the training was designed to help voting members appropriately assess the requirement packages, while taking into account historical usage data in order to forecast future needs. We reviewed the training slides and verified that they identified the roles and responsibilities for each voting member, outlined the steps of the review board process, established common questions to ask during the review, and listed the documentation and information required for a requirements package review. We determined that the updated procedures and training met the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, Recommendation 2 is closed.

USCENTCOM Directed Use of the TAN and Monitored TAN Performance

In Report No. DODIG-2017-095, the DoD OIG recommended that the USCENTCOM Commander direct supported units to use the TAN, establish metrics for TAN movements, perform quarterly assessments of the TAN performance and effectiveness, and continue to monitor TAN performance. In response to Report No. DODIG-2017-095, USCENTCOM officials stated that the command published an Execute Order directing all USCENTCOM components to use the TAN. The Execute Order also directed USARCENT to provide command and control over TAN cargo movements and report all TAN movements in biweekly status reports. Finally, the Execute Order directed USCENTCOM's Deployment and Distribution Operations Center to perform strategic oversight of the TAN.

We found that in January 2017, USCENTCOM issued the Execute Order directing:

- all USCENTCOM components to use the TAN for cargo transportation throughout the different operating areas covered by the HL8 contract,

- the USCENTCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center to advise and support USARCENT in the development of metrics and quarterly assessments of TAN performance and effectiveness,

- USARCENT to provide command and control over the TAN cargo movements,

- USARCENT to provide a biweekly status report of all TAN cargo movements, and

- USCENTCOM to provide quarterly assessments of TAN performance and effectiveness.[7]

In addition, the USCENTCOM Execute Order establishes metrics that are used to evaluate the TAN's performance and effectiveness. The 2017 version of the USCENTCOM Execute Order establishes metrics that include an assessment of the processing time for customs paperwork, border clearance time, and total transit time. The 2019 version of the USCENTCOM Execute Order updated the metrics to include timeframes for submission of transportation requests and total transit time, percentage of requests that met equipment load dates, and the amount of equipment transported within each request that met the requested delivery date and actual load date. We reviewed the FY 2020 third and fourth quarter assessments and found that USCENTCOM used the metrics established by the 2019 version of the USCENTCOM Execute Order to assess the TAN's performance and effectiveness. We requested examples of biweekly reports issued at the end of FY 2020, and USARCENT provided biweekly reports from the end of July 2020 through September 2020 to show that USARCENT was producing the biweekly status report of TAN cargo movement. We determined that USCENTCOM directed the use of the TAN for cargo movement and monitored TAN movement. Therefore, Recommendation 3 will remain closed. However, due to the unreliable HL8 usage data resulting from a lack of corrective actions in response to Recommendation 1.a from the prior report, we could not determine whether the quarterly assessments and biweekly reports improved performance on the HL8 contract. We discuss this topic more fully on the next page.

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[7] To address the recommendation, USCENTCOM published "U.S. Central Command Trans-Arabian Network Execute Order," dated January 2017, and later updated the Execute Order in March 2019.

ACC-RI Established a More Reasonable Guaranteed Minimum for HL8 Contracts

In Report No. DODIG-2017-095, the DoD OIG recommended that the ACC-RI Executive Director establish a more reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum on the HL8 contract to ensure that the Army does not pay for services that it will not use by either lowering the guaranteed minimums or by spreading the guaranteed minimum over a longer period, such as the life of the contract. During the prior audit, the audit team determined that ACC-RI chose to award each of the four HL7 contractors a $10 million guaranteed minimum purchase on the first task order, which generally had a period of performance that overlapped the fourth quarter of 2011 and the first quarter of 2012. The DoD OIG determined that the Government did not use 44 percent of the services it ordered on those task orders, and that it appeared that the ACC-RI contracting officer ordered the services to meet the guaranteed minimum requirements rather than what was actually required for the cargo movements. The DoD OIG discussed its concerns with the ACC-RI contracting officer, who stated that ACC-RI would establish a more reasonable and achievable guaranteed minimum on the HL8 contract. We reviewed the performance work statement for the HL7 and HL8 contracts and found that the ACC-RI contracting officer decreased the guaranteed minimum from $10 million guaranteed on the HL7 contracts to $1 million on the HL8 contract. We determined that the ACC-RI contracting officer restructured the guaranteed minimum section by lowering the guaranteed minimum in the HL8 contract. Therefore, Recommendation 4 will remain closed.

The 1st TSC Needs To Improve Asset Usage Tracking and Forecasting

In Report No. DODIG-2017-095, the DoD OIG recommended that the 1st TSC Commander implement a systemic process for collecting heavy lift asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders. USARCENT officials responded on behalf of the 1st TSC Commander and stated that a tracking tool was developed to analyze daily heavy lift asset utilization. In addition, an auditable transportation system of record would be implemented as a long-term solution to more accurately forecast task order requirements.

We requested and analyzed the 1st TSC's HL8 daily equipment usage data from FY 2019 and FY 2020 (24 months) and interviewed 1st TSC personnel to determine whether the corrective actions stated in USARCENT's response to the prior report were implemented. We found that the 1st TSC did not develop and implement a systemic process for collecting uniform HL8 usage data. When we requested the

HL8 asset usage data for FY 2019 through FY 2020, we were provided four different trackers—Plan Process and Operations (PPO) South, PPO North, and two different TAN trackers from two different MCBs rotations covering the period requested. While reviewing the four trackers, we identified the following discrepancies.

- The trackers did not have consistent data elements across the different operating areas covered by the HL8 contract. For example, the PPO South tracker contained the least amount of data and contained only the date, the quantity of daily transportation movement requests, and quantity of assets used. However, the PPO North and TAN trackers included more-detailed data. For example, the trackers contained transportation movement request numbers, in-transit visibility status, type and quantity of equipment transported, requested load and delivery dates, and actual load and delivery dates. Although both the PPO North and TAN trackers had columns for actual load and delivery dates, the TAN tracker's columns were not always completed.

- The trackers did not contain the same type of data fields within the same operating area after different units rotated in as the MCB. For example, the PPO South tracker had only transportation movement requests, quantity of HL8 assets required, and quantity of equipment for the first 5 months of data provided. After first 5 months, the trackers had ammunition and customs movements data fields added.

- The TAN tracker daily usage calculations were based on customers' anticipated load and delivery dates, which did not always coincide with actual delivery dates. For example, a unit submitted four transportation requests for movements in August 2020. These requests contained requirements for 38 trucks for a scheduled load on August 8, 2020, and delivery on August 14, 2020, for a total of 7 days. However, three of the movements were not completed until August 21, and the final movement was completed on August 23. If 1st TSC officials used the anticipated transportation dates to calculate total usage, they would report 38 trucks used for 7 days, resulting in a reported usage of 266 days (38 trucks times 7 days). However, if actual dates were used, the usage would be 550 days (29 trucks times 14 days and 9 trucks times 16 days), for a total difference in daily usage of 284 trucks. The following table shows how using the anticipated days instead of the actual days would result in the 1st TSC under-reporting its usage of HL8 equipment.

Table. Difference Between Anticipated and Actual Usage Days for Selected Movement Requests

Transportation Movement Request	Number of Trucks Requested	Anticipated Days Used	Actual Days Used	Total Days of Anticipated Usage	Total Days of Actual Usage	Difference Between Anticipated and Actual Usage (in Days)
0135-007	10	7	14	70	140	70
0135-008	9	7	14	63	126	63
0135-010	9	7	16	63	144	81
0135-011	10	7	14	70	140	70
Total	**38**			**266**	**550**	**284**

Source: The DoD OIG.

- The trackers were missing data during the 24 months requested. Specifically, the TAN trackers were missing 7 months of data, while the PPO South tracker was missing 6 months of data. For example, the 1st TSC did not have the usage data for the month of October 2018 and from February 2020 through July 2020. According to 1st TSC officials, when units rotated out and a new unit became the MCB, there was no archiving of historical asset usage data; therefore, the 1st TSC officials did not have any additional data to provide the audit team.

Additionally the 1st TSC did not implement a forecasting system for future HL8 task order requirements. The 1st TSC implemented the Transportation Coordinators' Automated Information for Movement System and the Global Distribution Management System with the intent for the systems to provide the ability to forecast HL8 task order requirements. However, when we requested forecast data for the last 2 years, 1st TSC officials provided screenshots of the systems, and we determined that the systems only provided information on the location of transportation assets during movement. We asked 1st TSC officials how the systems would be used for forecasting and the 1st TSC officials stated that the systems could not provide the ability to forecast task order requirements.

To manage the HL8 contracts effectively, Army officials still need to implement a uniform, systemic process for collecting usage data based on actual dates of equipment loading and delivery. The systems should contain consistent data that is based on actual loading and delivery dates, and the information should be reported uniformly across the different operating areas and deployed MCBs. With systemic usage data, the 1st TSC can track the efficiency of HL8 customers using equipment contracted on task orders.

Furthermore, Army officials should implement a usable system to forecast task order requirements based on reliable usage data. Accurate and reliable usage data will allow 1st TSC officials to identify trends in heavy lift usage and better anticipate future customer needs. Because Army officials did not implement corrective actions for Recommendation 1.a, this recommendation will remain open. Therefore, we request that Army and 1st TSC officials reassess the actions taken in response to Recommendation 1.a to implement a systemic process for collecting Heavy Lift asset usage and forecasting HL8 requirements to ensure corrective actions meet the intent of the recommendation.

The Army is Still at Risk of Wasting Heavy Lift Assets

As a result of 1st TSC officials not fully developing a systemic process for collecting actual HL8 usage data or implementing a system for forecasting HL8 requirements to track actual usage data, the Army may continue to waste HL8 assets similar to the $53.6 million in wasted assets identified in the prior audit of the HL7 contract. The prior report determined that the 1st TSC was not monitoring asset usage during the HL7 contract performance period, and included recommendations that the 1st TSC develop a systemic process for collecting and analyzing usage data. For this audit, we attempted to analyze the overall performance of the HL8 contracts. However, we were unable to perform this work because the 1st TSC had not fully implemented the corrective actions in response to the prior report, and the usage data that the 1st TSC provided for the HL8 contracts were unusable and incomplete. In this report, we determined that the 1st TSC included the anticipated movement dates in its data, which do not always match the amount of time it actually took to complete the transportation. Because the data provided do not always contain the actual movement dates, we could not use the data to determine the exact amount of assets used during the HL8 contracts. In addition, we were provided complete usage data for only 12 of the 24 months we requested, and without complete data, we could not determine whether performance had improved on the HL8 contracts.

In addition to our inability to assess overall performance of the HL8 contracts, the lack of consistent usage data could also affect the 1st TSC's ability to manage these contracts. While the 1st TSC implemented processes to hold units accountable for wasted assets, the lack of consistent usage data could reduce the 1st TSC's ability to identify instances of poor mission planning and address these wasted assets. For example, if the 1st TSC does not track actual asset usage or have complete historical data for equipment movements, the 1st TSC will not be able to identify units in theater that requested equipment movement, but wasted the transportation assets by not having equipment ready for movement or canceling equipment movement without prior notification. Furthermore, if units are not

tracking uniform usage data, the 1st TSC would not be able to perform consistent reviews and analyze trends accordingly. In addition, the benefits of USARCENT and 1st TSC implementing the biweekly reviews and quarterly assessments are limited because of the lack of accurate historic usage data. If USCENTCOM and Army officials continue to use the inaccurate usage data to assess contractor performance on the HL8 contracts, Army officials will not be able to accurately forecast and plan future contract requirements, and will continue to waste heavy lift assets.

Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response

1st TSC Deputy Commanding Officer Comments

The 1st TSC Deputy Commanding Officer agreed with the recommendation to implement a systemic process for collecting heavy lift asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders. The Deputy Commanding Officer stated that the 1st TSC will issue a requirement for the standardization of the PPO South, PPO North, and PPO TAN Trackers to ensure consistent and relevant reporting that takes into consideration the deficiencies outlined in the report.

Furthermore, the Deputy Commanding Officer stated that oversight and standardization will be done by the 1st TSC Support Operations, Operational Command Post, Transportation Operations Branch. The Transportation Operations Branch will also conduct a review of the PPO Trackers on a weekly basis after any relief in place of the MCB. The Transportation Operations Branch chief will review the trackers and then the trackers will be placed in repository on the 1st TSC Share Drive at the Movement Control Point. Once standardization has been achieved, a consistent monthly roll-up encompassing PPO North, PPO South, and PPO TAN should be produced for review with individual node trackers as the supporting documentation.

Our Response

The comments from the 1st TSC Deputy Commanding Officer were responsive and addressed the finding of the report. Therefore, Recommendation 1.a from Report No. DODIG-2017-095 is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once management provides documentation demonstrating that the agreed-upon actions are completed.

Appendix

Scope and Methodology

We conducted this performance audit from August 2020 through May 2021 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Criteria and Guidance Reviewed

We reviewed USCENTCOM, USARCENT, and 1st TSC guidance for requirement review boards, tracking daily HL8 usage data, and holding units accountable for wasting HL8 transportation assets as stated in management comments to Report No. DODIG-2017-095. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- 420th MCB Movement Control Handbook, Ground Transportation for Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and the Arabian Peninsula
- 1st TSC Requirements Review Board Standard Operating Procedures
- 1st TSC Operational Contract Support Standard Operating Procedures
- 1st TSC Trans-Arabian Network Handbook
- USARCENT Coalition Acquisition Review Board Fragmentary Order
- USARCENT Coalition Acquisition Review Board Standard Operating Procedures
- USCENTCOM Trans-Arabian Network Execute Order

Data Request and Interviews

We interviewed officials from USCENTCOM, USARCENT, and 1st TSC officials to obtain examples of quarterly assessments, biweekly reports, Fragmentary Order, accountability reports, requirements packages and updated SOPs to determine whether the corrective actions have been implemented. We obtained HL8 usage data from FY 2019 through FY 2020 to determine whether USCENTCOM, USARCENT, and 1st TSC officials are accurately tracking and monitoring the transportation asset usage data. In addition, we interviewed ACC-RI contract officials to gain a better understanding of the HL8 contract administration and execution and to obtain the quantity of HL8 task orders, modifications, and obligated and expensed values for the four HL8 contract as of November 1, 2020.

Heavy Lift VIII Oversight and Performance Review

We reviewed the six recommendations from Report No. DODIG-2017-095 to verify whether the Army officials have implemented the corrective actions and addressed the intent of the recommendations. Specifically, for the four open recommendations, we determined whether the actions implemented by management have addressed the findings in the prior report and meet the intent of the recommendations. For the two closed recommendations, we obtained and reviewed current supporting documentation to verify that the Army officials are continuously performing the corrective actions to meet the intent of the recommendations to keep the recommendation closed. Specifically, we conducted the following review of each recommendation.

- **Recommendation 1.a:** We reviewed the 1st TSC's quarterly reports and HL8 daily usage data from FY 2019 through FY 2020 to determine whether the 1st TSC implemented a uniform process for collecting daily usage data and established a consistent schedule for analyzing usage data. Also, we reviewed screenshots from the 1st TSC forecasting systems to determine whether the systems would help the 1st TSC accurately forecast task order requirements.

- **Recommendation 1.b:** We interviewed officials from USARCENT, 1st TSC, ACC-RI, and MCB to determine how each organization reviews, certifies, and approves requirements. We reviewed the 420th MCB Movement Control Handbook and identified five noncompliance categories and reporting requirements when customers violated the five categories. We obtained a listing of all the reports from August 2020 through February 2021 for violations of the noncompliance categories. We reviewed three of those reports to determine whether the 1st TSC implemented corrective actions to address those wasted assets in accordance with the noncompliance categories.

- **Recommendation 1.c:** We reviewed the 1st TSC Review Board SOP to determine whether the 1st TSC outlined the required documents that make up the requirements review packages. We requested the last five requirement packages issued in FY 2020 to determine whether each package contained the documents as required by the Review Board SOP.

- **Recommendation 2:** We reviewed the Fragmentary Order to verify that the USARCENT Commander approved the relocation of the Coalition Acquisition Review Board to Shaw Air Force Base. We interviewed a USARCENT official to determine whether the relocation has improved the coalition requirements review process. We reviewed the April 2, 2020 training slides that outlined voting member roles and responsibilities, the steps during the coalition requirement review process, the common

questions to ask during the review, and the list of documents needed for the requirement package. We reviewed the USARCENT Coalition Review Board SOP and verified that the coalition review process was included.

- **Recommendation 3:** We reviewed the USCENTCOM Execute Order to verify that the language required the use of the TAN, and required USARCENT to provide oversight of TAN movements, conduct biweekly status reports of TAN movements, and conduct quarterly assessments of TAN performance. We reviewed USCENTCOM's FY 2020 third and fourth quarter quarterly assessments to verify that the Execute Order metrics were used to assess the TAN performance. Also, we reviewed the USARCENT biweekly reports from the end of July through September 2020 to determine whether USARCENT was monitoring TAN movements.

- **Recommendation 4:** We reviewed the performance work statement for the HL7 and HL8 contracts to determine whether the guaranteed minimum section in the performance work statements was updated to show a decrease from $10 million guaranteed on the HL7 contracts to $1 million on the HL8 contract for services that were actually required.

To assess performance on the HL8 contract, we obtained and attempted to review HL8 transportation asset data to determine whether the ordered transportation assets aligned with the amount of assets used under the HL8 contract. However, the HL8 usage data were unreliable, and we were unable to assess actual HL8 usage. The previous audit team, which included DoD OIG personnel deployed to Kuwait, met with the contractors performing work on the HL7 contract to obtain usage data to assess performance on the HL7 contract. Due to travel restrictions for DoD personnel during the coronavirus disease–2019 pandemic, we could not travel to the USCENTCOM area of responsibility to meet with the HL8 contractors. Therefore, we could not compare the use and nonuse of transportation assets under the HL7 contract to the HL8 contract to determine whether the corrective actions have improved performance under the HL8 contract.

Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

We assessed internal controls and compliance with the laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. Specifically we assessed:

- information and communication – use quality information. We reviewed the HL8 usage data for accuracy and completeness;

- control activities – design control activities. We reviewed USCENTCOM and Army policies to ensure that they established requirements for periodic reviews of contract performance; and

- monitoring – remediate deficiencies. We reviewed 1st TSC policies on monitoring HL8 contract performance and how they identify, report, and track wasted HL8 assets and the implementation of corrective actions to remediate the waste of HL8 assets.

However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

We were provided the HL8 transportation usage asset data for TAN and PPO North and South tracker tools. According to the 1st TSC official, the usage data tracker tools are populated using the Transportation Movement Requests submitted by the requesting units. After review of the tracker tools, we determined that the usage data were unreliable and unusable. The data did not always contain actual equipment loading and delivery dates and did not have consistently reported data elements across the different operating areas covered by the HL8 contract or by the different units rotating in as the MCB assigned to the 1st TSC. As a result, we did not use computer-processed data for our report.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued two reports discussing the oversight and performance under the heavy lift programs. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

DoD OIG

Report No. DODIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," June 26, 2017

> The Army did not adequately manage the HL7 contract requirements. Specifically, the Army ordered an average of 39 percent more assets than it needed throughout the life of the HL7 contracts. In addition, Army requirement review boards did not require adequate information in order to properly validate the number of HL7 assets requested on HL7 task orders. Also, ACC-RI included excessive guaranteed minimum payments to each of the HL7 contractors, which prompted the Army to order services to meet the guaranteed minimums rather than what was actually required within that period of performance.

Report No. DODIG-2017-035, "The Army Did Not Have Assurance That Heavy Lift Contractors in Kuwait Complied With Contract Requirements," December 15, 2016

The Army did not provide effective oversight and administration of the HL7 contracts in Kuwait. Specifically, HL7 contracting officer's representatives did not regularly perform surveillance of each contractor or type of vehicle under contract and did not consistently document surveillance results. Furthermore, the administrative contracting officer did not address contracting officer's representatives identified deficiencies with the contractors because the administrative contracting officer and the quality assurance specialist did not regularly communicate with the contracting officer's representatives or review and analyze customer complaints and surveillance results from the contracting officer's representatives to identify systemic deficiencies to communicate with the contractors. In addition, the official contract file was incomplete and did not contain critical documentation, the procuring contracting officer did not officially evaluate the performance of two contractors as required by the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and the HL7 contracting officer's representatives were not properly trained or appointed.

Management Comments

1st Sustainment Command (Theater)

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TST THEATER SUSTAINMENT COMMAND
382 THIRD AVENUE, BLDG 1467
FORT KNOX, KY 40121

ACTS-SPO   1 June 2021

MEMORANDUM FOR Inspector General, Department of Defense, 4800 MARK Center Drive, Alexandria, VA 22350-5000

SUBJECT: Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General (DoDIG) Audit Report DoDIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," dated 26 Jun 2017, Recommendations 1a, Project No. D2020-D000RG-0165.

1. The 1st Theater Sustainment Command (1st TSC) conducted a thorough review of the DoDIG-2017-095 Audit. The audit focused on U.S Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII (HL7) Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East. The audit concludes that the 1st TSC did not analyze HL7 asset usage for intra-Kuwait movements, which resulted in the Army requirement review boards not having adequate information to validate the number of HL7 assets requested on HL7 task orders which led to over-ordering of HL7 services. The DoD OIG recommended that the 1st TSC Commander implement a systemic process for collecting heavy lift asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders.

2. The 1st TSC concurs with recommendation to implement a systemic process for collecting heavy lift asset usage and establish a consistent schedule for analyzing usage information in order to use quantitative and qualitative factors when forecasting requirement quantities on future task orders. Therefore, The 1st TSC MCP SPO will issue standardization for the Plan Process and Operations (PPO) South, PPO North, PPO TAN Trackers to ensure consistent and relevant reporting that takes into consideration the deficiencies outlined by DoDIG in their Final Report .

3. Oversight for historical record keeping and standardization of the information kept, will be performed by the MCP TOB section and reviewed by the TOB chief. Implementation of the program will be checked forward in theater by 1st TSC SPO Operational Command Post (OCP) Transportation Operations Branch (TOB) and Forward personnel through review of the trackers on a weekly basis for the first two months and no less than on a monthly basis thereafter. 1st TSC SPO OCP/Forward TOB will also conduct a review of the PPO Trackers on a weekly basis after any Relief in Place (RIP) of the Movement Control Battalion. The review of the trackers will be completed after they are emailed the 1TSC MCP TOB section, reviewed by the TOB chief, and placed in repository on the 1st TSC Share Drive at the MCP. Once standardization has been achieved and a consistent monthly roll-up encompassing all

1st Sustainment Command (Theater) (cont'd)

SUBJECT: Department of Defense, Office of the Inspector General (DoDIG) Audit Report DoDIG-2017-095, "U.S. Army's Management of the Heavy Lift VII Commercial Transportation Contract Requirements in the Middle East," dated 26 Jun 2017, Recommendations 1a, Project No. D2020-D000RG-0165.

Nodes (North, South, TAN) should be produced and submitted to the 1st TSC SPO OCP/Forward TOB for review with individual node trackers as the supporting documentation. 1st TSC SPO request that all future contact for Audit information including request for supporting documentation be submitted and received to, through and from the 1st TSC SPO MCP TOB.

4. The point of contact for this memorandum is ███████████, office phone number is ████████; email at: ████████████████.
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Daniel A. Bartlett
COL, LG
Deputy Commanding Officer, 1TSC

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

1st TSC	1st Sustainment Command (Theater)
ACC-RI	Army Contracting Command–Rock Island
HL7	Heavy Lift VII
HL8	Heavy Lift VIII
MCB	Movement Control Battalion
PPO	Plan Process and Operations
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
TAN	Trans-Arabian Network

Whistleblower Protection
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