



Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

AUD-SI-21-40

Office of Audits

August 2021

**(U) Audit of Official and Diplomatic
Passport Records Maintained by the
Bureau of Consular Affairs**

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION



HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

AUD-SI-21-40

(U) What OIG Audited

(U) A U.S. passport is an identity and citizenship document, allowing U.S. citizens to travel abroad. The Secretary of State has the authority to grant and issue U.S. passports. Within the Department of State (Department), the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) is responsible for adjudicating and issuing passports, including official and diplomatic passports, which are issued to individuals traveling abroad to carry out official or diplomatic duties on behalf of the U.S. Government or to family members of such persons.

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether CA maintains accurate and complete records of official and diplomatic passports. This audit was conducted in response to a referral from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). According to the referral, in 2019, TIGTA requested from CA information associated with diplomatic and official passports issued to Internal Revenue Service employees and appointees for the last 20 years. TIGTA found that the data provided by CA were incomplete.

(U) What OIG Recommends

(U) OIG is making one recommendation to address an internal control deficiency identified with the review and validation of information provided to Federal customers. On the basis of CA's response to a draft of this report, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action. A synopsis of CA's response to the recommendation offered and OIG's reply follow the recommendation in the Audit Results section of this report. CA's response to a draft of this report is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix B.

August 2021

OFFICE OF AUDITS

SECURITY AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

(U) Audit of Official and Diplomatic Passport Records Maintained by the Bureau of Consular Affairs

(U) What OIG Found

(U) OIG tested selected data elements for accuracy from a statistical sample of 113 official and diplomatic passport records and found that all data elements tested were accurate. Accuracy refers to the extent that recorded data reflect the actual underlying information, which for a passport record would be the original passport application. Specifically, OIG tested six data elements: surname, given name, date of birth, gender, Social Security number, and place of birth.

(U) OIG also found that CA's official and diplomatic passport records were complete. Completeness is the extent to which relevant data records and fields are present. OIG compared two external official and diplomatic passport record datasets with CA's database and found that all passport records included in the external datasets were included in CA's database. Specifically, OIG matched the passport numbers listed in the external datasets to records in CA's database.

(U) OIG determined that passport records were accurate and complete because CA staff followed the policies and procedures related to processing and tracking passport applications. As a result, users, both internal and external to the Department, who rely on passport records can confidently use the data to perform their duties.

(U) With respect to TIGTA's specific concerns about receiving incomplete data from CA, OIG found that CA's database included Internal Revenue Service passport records. However, OIG also found that CA had not implemented effective internal control activities to ensure that the data provided to TIGTA in response to its request were properly reviewed and validated. As a result, CA failed to meet its objective of delivering a high level of customer service and earning customer trust, which consequently impacted TIGTA's ability to conduct an audit of passport management and security at the Internal Revenue Service.

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(U) OBJECTIVE

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) maintains accurate and complete records of official and diplomatic passports.¹

(U) BACKGROUND

(U) A U.S. passport is an identity and citizenship document,² allowing U.S. citizens to travel abroad. By statute, the Secretary of State has the authority to grant and issue U.S. passports.³ The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) and the Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH) set forth guidance on passports. Within the Department of State (Department), CA is responsible for adjudicating and issuing passports.⁴ There are two entities within CA that adjudicate and issue official and diplomatic passports. Specifically, CA's Special Issuance Agency (SIA) adjudicates and issues most official⁵ and all diplomatic passports,⁶ and the Charleston Passport Center processes applications for official passports to be issued to designated Department of Defense personnel.⁷

(U) CA may issue an official passport to:

- An officer or employee of the U.S. Government traveling abroad to carry out official duties and family members of such persons.
- A U.S. Government personal services contractor traveling abroad to carry out official duties on behalf of the U.S. Government.
- A non-personal services contractor traveling abroad to carry out duties in support of and pursuant to a contract with the U.S. Government when the contractor is unable to carry out such duties using a regular or service⁸ passport.
- An official or employee of a state, local, tribal, or territorial government traveling abroad to carry out official duties in support of the U.S. Government.⁹

¹ (U) During the audit, OIG issued *Management Assistance Report: Accountability of Official and Diplomatic Passports of Separating Employees Needs Improvement* (AUD-SI-21-28, May 2021). See Appendix A for additional information.

² (U) 22 Code of Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) § 51.1.

³ (U) 22 United States Code § 211(a), "Authority to grant, issue, and verify passports."

⁴ (U) 1 FAM 251.1(d), "Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs (CA)."

⁵ (U) 8 FAM 503.1-8(b), "Adjudication of Special-Issuance Passport Applications."

⁶ (U) 7 FAH-1 H-122.4-3, "Passport Agencies and Centers in the United States."

⁷ (U) 8 FAM 503.1-8(b).

⁸ (U) According to 22 C.F.R. § 51.3(b), a service passport may be issued to a non-personal services contractor traveling abroad to carry out duties in support of and pursuant to a contract with the U.S. Government when exceptional circumstances make a service passport necessary to enable the individual to carry out his or her contractual duties.

⁹ (U) 22 C.F.R. § 51.3(c).

(U) CA issues a diplomatic passport to a Foreign Service officer or to a person having diplomatic or comparable status because they are traveling abroad to carry out diplomatic duties on behalf of the U.S. Government. Spouses and family members may also be issued diplomatic passports. A U.S. Government contractor may be issued a diplomatic passport when the contractor meets the eligibility requirements and the diplomatic passport is necessary to complete the contractual duties in support of the U.S. Government.¹⁰

(U) Passport Systems and Data

~~(SBU)~~ CA manages several passport systems. The Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) is used to store all current and archived consular data from around the world.¹¹ The CCD houses several tools that pertain to passport records, such as the Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS), which is the system used to track passport applications¹² and to adjudicate¹³ and issue passports.¹⁴

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]¹⁵

~~(SBU)~~ Applicants for either official or diplomatic passports are encouraged to submit computer-generated applications, which have a barcode that, when scanned, automatically populates passport record fields in TDIS. These fields include the applicant's name, date of birth, gender, place of birth, Social Security number (SSN), and address. During adjudication, a CA adjudicator compares the information provided on the application and citizenship evidence to the information in TDIS and corrects any errors or discrepancies.¹⁶ According to the FAM, the adjudicator "must verify the accuracy of all the information that will be printed in the passport," and must "not assume that the data on the TDIS . . . screen was entered correctly."¹⁷

[REDACTED].¹⁸ After the application is approved and the passport is printed, the passport information is verified. The application is then scanned into the Passport Record Imaging System Management subsystem, which allows access to the applicant's information for future reference. Throughout the process, CA tracks the application to prevent its loss. For example, passport processing staff count and compare the number of applications received to the packing slip to ensure all applications have been received. Additionally, passport staff are to complete the processing of one batch of

¹⁰ (U) 22 C.F.R. § 51.3(d).

¹¹ (U) 7 FAH-1 H-523, "The Consular Consolidated Database (CCD)."

¹² (U) 8 FAH-1 H-601.5-2(B), "Travel Document Issuance System (TDIS)."

¹³ (U) 8 FAM 1101.1-2(F), "TDIS/American Citizens Services (ACS) Adjudication Screen."

¹⁴ (U) 7 FAH-1 H-522, "Domestic Consular Systems."

¹⁵ (U) 8 FAM 1201.1-3, "What are ACRQ and PIERS [Passport Information Electronic Records System]?"

¹⁶ (U) 8 FAM 1101.1-1(a), "(U) Introduction."

¹⁷ (U) 8 FAM 1101.1-2(F).

¹⁸ (U) 8 FAM 701.2-1(f), "Annotating the Paper Passport Application."

applications before starting another batch, which helps to reduce the potential for misplacing an application.

(U) Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration Concerns

(U) In September 2020, OIG received a referral from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration (TIGTA). According to the referral, in 2019, during an audit of the Internal Revenue Service's (IRS) passport management and security controls,¹⁹ TIGTA requested from CA information associated with diplomatic and official passports issued to IRS employees and appointees for the last 20 years, as of March 31, 2019. Specifically, for each passport issued, TIGTA requested the applicant's name, passport number, passport type, issuance date, and passport status (e.g., cancelled, lost, or stolen).

(U) According to TIGTA officials, TIGTA received three separate passport datasets from CA. However, TIGTA found that the data provided in each dataset were incomplete. For example, some passport records had blank issuance and expiration date fields. Furthermore, the data identified only five passports that were issued in 2016 and indicated that no passports were issued to IRS employees from 2017 through 2019. However, IRS records indicated that more than 200 official or diplomatic passports were issued to employees between 2016 and 2019. Lastly, one dataset included only Department of Treasury employees and not IRS employees. According to TIGTA officials, CA officials could not explain why the database was providing incomplete data. Based on the missing records and data fields, TIGTA deemed CA's information as unreliable for use in its audit.

(U) AUDIT RESULTS

(U) Finding A: CA's Official and Diplomatic Passport Records Are Accurate and Complete

(U) According to the Government Accountability Office, accuracy refers to the extent that recorded data reflect the actual underlying information and completeness is the extent to which relevant data records and fields are present.²⁰ OIG tested the accuracy of selected data elements for a statistical sample²¹ of 113 official and diplomatic passport records and found that all data elements matched information from passport applications. OIG also compared two external²² official and diplomatic passport record datasets with CA's database and found that all passport records included in the external datasets were included in CA's database. OIG determined that passport records were accurate and complete because CA staff followed the policies and procedures related to processing and tracking passport applications. As a result,

¹⁹ (U) TIGTA, *Controls Over the Management and Security of Official Passports Need Improvement* (Reference Number: 2020-10-051, August 2020).

²⁰ (U) Government Accountability Office, *Assessing Data Reliability* (GAO-20-283G, December 2019).

²¹ (U) See Appendix A, "Sampling Methodology," for details of the sample.

²² (U) OIG obtained official and diplomatic passport records for IRS employees from TIGTA and for OIG employees.


users, both internal and external to the Department, who rely on passport records can confidently use the data to perform their duties.

(U) With respect to the incomplete data provided to TIGTA, CA officials stated that there are processes in place for reviewing and clearing data prior to release to Federal customers. However, there is not a formal written policy or standard operating procedures. CA officials recognize the need for formal written procedures and stated that they are formalizing procedures to address this deficiency.

(U) Accuracy Testing

(U) According to the Government Accountability Office, accuracy refers to the extent that recorded data reflect the actual underlying information.²³ OIG selected a statistical sample of 113 passport records to test for accuracy.²⁴ Specifically, OIG compared data from ACRQ for six data elements (i.e., surname, given name, date of birth, gender, SSN, and place of birth) with information in the original passport application.

~~(SBU)~~ Based on its testing, OIG identified only one discrepancy related to an SSN (two digits were transposed). Upon further review, OIG determined that the SSN in the passport application was incorrect and the data in the system was correct. A CA adjudicator identified the error in the passport application during the review process and noted the error on the application, as required by CA's procedures.



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(U) Completeness Testing

(U) According to the Government Accountability Office, completeness is the extent to which relevant data records and fields are present.²⁶ OIG tested the completeness of CA's official and diplomatic records by matching 1,032 official and diplomatic passport numbers provided by TIGTA (for IRS) and OIG to records in CA's database.²⁷ OIG initially matched 1,024 (99 percent) of 1,032 passport numbers. Of the eight passport numbers that did not initially match, seven were IRS passports, and one was an OIG passport.

(U) Upon further evaluation, OIG found that the seven IRS discrepancies were due to errors in IRS's passport records. Specifically, four IRS passport records had the prior passport numbers

²³ (U) Report GAO-20-283G.

²⁴ (U) See Appendix A, "Sampling Methodology," for details of the sample selection.

²⁵ (U) 8 FAM 403.5-6, "Records and the Social Security Number."

²⁶ (U) Report GAO-20-283G.

²⁷ (U) OIG used a spreadsheet created by CA based on a TDIS query. The spreadsheet contained data related to 847,880 official and diplomatic passports issued from FY 2016 through FY 2020.

listed for current passport issuance dates, and three discrepancies were due to typographical errors. OIG confirmed with IRS officials that the passport numbers in ACRQ were the correct passport numbers. The one OIG passport number that did not have a match was due to a blank passport number field in the data that CA provided. OIG confirmed in ACRQ that the passport record existed and that the passport number matched OIG's records. OIG also noted that the passport's status in ACRQ was listed as "replaced." A CA official stated that the blank passport number field was a result of how the data were queried in TDIS (i.e., the query parameter was passport records with an initial status of "issued," which would not have included passport numbers for "replaced" passports).

(U) OIG determined that CA staff followed procedures for processing and tracking passport applications from receipt to adjudication. Because CA staff are following policies and procedures for processing and tracking passport applications, CA is maintaining accurate and complete records of official and diplomatic passports and, as a result, users, both internal and external to the Department, who rely on passport records can confidently use that data to perform their duties.

(U) TIGTA Data

(U) In response to TIGTA's concerns about receiving incomplete data from CA, OIG reviewed the 847,880 official and diplomatic passport records provided to OIG by CA and found that none of the passport records had blank issuance or expiration date fields. Furthermore, the records showed that CA issued 652 official and diplomatic passports to IRS employees and their family members from FY 2017 through FY 2019 as opposed to the data provided to TIGTA, which showed that no passports were issued to IRS employees from FY 2017 through FY 2019.

(U) When asked about TIGTA's concerns, CA officials stated that CA's Office of Consular Systems and Technology ran a query in TDIS using sponsor codes²⁸ that are associated with IRS to obtain the data requested by TIGTA. CA's Office of Legal Affairs and Law Enforcement Liaison and the Office of Passport Integrity and Internal Controls reviewed the data before the data were released to TIGTA. SIA did not review the data. If SIA employees had reviewed the data, they would have recognized that it was incomplete. SIA employees would know, because of reimbursement data, the number of passports issued to IRS employees. CA officials also stated that, although there are processes in place for reviewing and clearing data prior to release to Federal customers, there is not a formal written policy or standard operating procedures. CA officials are formalizing procedures to address this deficiency.

(U) CA officials indicated that requests for passport information from other agencies are infrequent—there have been none since TIGTA's request in 2019. However, it is important that CA have effective internal control activities in place to ensure that quality data are provided to other Government agencies. Internal control is a process effected by an entity's management

²⁸ (U) A sponsor code is a unique code assigned to every U.S. Government agency that is used by SIA for reimbursement.

that provides reasonable assurance that the objectives of an entity will be achieved.²⁹ Management should establish control activities through policies and procedures to achieve objectives.³⁰ Because CA had not implemented effective internal control activities to ensure that the data provided to TIGTA in response to its request were properly reviewed and validated, it failed to meet its objective of delivering a high level of customer service and earning customer trust, which consequently impacted TIGTA's ability to conduct an audit of passport management and security at the IRS. Although OIG acknowledges that CA is developing internal control activities and associated procedures to help ensure that the incident with TIGTA is not repeated, OIG is making the following recommendation and will track its implementation through the audit compliance process to confirm that the identified deficiency has been fully addressed.

Recommendation 1: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Consular Affairs develop and implement policies and procedures for reviewing data provided to external entities to ensure that the data are accurate and complete.

(U) Management Response: CA concurred with the recommendation.

(U) OIG Reply: On the basis of CA's concurrence with the recommendation, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. The recommendation will be closed when OIG receives documentation demonstrating that CA has developed and implemented policies and procedures for reviewing data provided to external entities to ensure that the data are accurate and complete.

²⁹ (U) Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* 5 (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

³⁰ (U) Report GAO-14-704G.

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: (U) OIG recommends that the Bureau of Consular Affairs develop and implement policies and procedures for reviewing data provided to external entities to ensure that the data are accurate and complete.

(U) APPENDIX A: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

(U) The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether the Bureau of Consular Affairs (CA) maintains accurate and complete records of official and diplomatic passports.

(U) OIG conducted this audit from November 2020 to May 2021 in the Washington, DC, metropolitan area. The scope of this audit was all official and diplomatic passports issued between FY 2016 and FY 2020. OIG conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that OIG plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objective. OIG believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objective.

(U) To obtain background information for this audit, OIG reviewed Federal regulations, including Foreign Relations, 22 Code of Federal Regulations; Department of State policies relating to official and diplomatic passports included in the Foreign Affairs Manual and the Foreign Affairs Handbook; and CA standard operating procedures for passport services, such as data entry and quality control procedures. OIG also interviewed CA officials to gain an understanding of procedures used for processing and maintaining official and diplomatic passport records.

(U) To determine whether CA maintains accurate records of official and diplomatic passports, OIG tested a statistical sample of 113 passport records. Specifically, OIG tested the accuracy of six data elements for each passport selected for testing: (1) surname, (2) given name, (3) date of birth, (4) gender, (5) Social Security number, and (6) place of birth. OIG considered any of the six selected data elements that did not exactly match the application to be an error. To determine whether CA maintains complete records of official and diplomatic passports, OIG compared data from two external datasets (official passports issued to Internal Revenue Service employees and diplomatic passports issued to OIG employees), totaling 1,032 items, to data from CA's system. OIG considered passport numbers that did not match to be an error.

(U) Data Reliability

(U) OIG used computer-processed data to determine the universe of official and diplomatic passports issued by CA between FY 2016 and FY 2020. The data, which were provided by CA, were obtained from CA's Travel Document Issuance System. OIG also used information from the American Citizens Record Query and the Passport Records Imaging System Management subsystem. To determine the reliability of the official and diplomatic passport data, OIG surveyed users and managers of the Travel Document Issuance System, the American Citizens Record Query, and the Passport Records Imaging System Management subsystem on various aspects of the systems, such as system checks or controls for data accuracy, steps used to improve the data, and concerns about the usability of the data.

(U) OIG tested the accuracy of CA’s passport data by validating 6 data elements for 113 sampled passport records against the source documentation (i.e., the passport application). In addition, OIG assessed the completeness of CA’s passport data by comparing two external datasets of official and diplomatic passports against records in CA’s database. OIG determined that there were no errors in CA’s passport data (i.e., passport records were accurate) and all external passport records were included in CA’s database (i.e., passport records were complete). The Audit Findings section of this report includes details of the testing performed by OIG. Based on the work performed, OIG determined that the data provided by CA were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this audit.

(U) Work Related to Internal Control

(U) During the audit, OIG considered several factors, including the subject matter of the project, to determine whether internal control was significant to the audit objective. Based on this consideration, OIG determined that internal control was significant to this audit. OIG then considered the components of internal control and the underlying principles included in the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*¹ to identify internal controls that were significant to the audit objective. Considering internal control in the context of a comprehensive internal control framework can help auditors determine whether underlying internal control deficiencies exist.

(U) For this audit, OIG concluded that one of five internal control components from the *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*—Control Activities—was significant to the audit objective. This component includes the actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system, which includes the entity’s information system. OIG also concluded that one principle related to the selected component was significant to the audit objective, as described in Table A.1.

(U) Table A.1: Internal Control Components and Principles Identified as Significant

(U) Components	(U) Principles
(U) Control Activities	Management should implement control activities through policies.

(U) Source: OIG generated from an analysis of internal control components and principles from the Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

(U) OIG then interviewed pertinent officials, reviewed relevant documents, and performed a walk-through of the process to enter data related to official and diplomatic passports in CA’s systems to attain an understanding of the internal controls related to the component and principle identified as significant to this audit. In addition, OIG performed procedures to assess

¹ (U) Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

the design, implementation, and operating effectiveness of the key internal control principle. Specifically, OIG tested official and diplomatic passport data obtained from CA for accuracy and completeness.

(U) Internal control deficiencies identified during the audit that are significant within the context of the audit objective are presented in the Audit Results section of this report.

(U) Sampling Methodology

(U) The objectives of the sampling methodology were to determine whether selected data elements in passport records in CA’s database are accurate and whether the passport records in CA’s database are complete.

(U) To test the accuracy of the data elements, OIG obtained from CA a project universe of 847,880 official and diplomatic passports issued from FY 2016 through FY 2020. To determine the universe for sample selection, OIG included only those passports that were not expired as of November 30, 2020 (the date that the audit was announced), and passport records that had passport numbers with nine digits and that began with an “8” or “9.”² This resulted in a target universe of 764,847 official and diplomatic passports.

(U) OIG used a stratified statistical sampling design to select 113 passport records for accuracy testing.³ The strata used were: (1) official passports issued by the Charleston Passport Center; (2) official passports issued by the Special Issuance Agency; and (3) diplomatic passports issued by the Special Issuance Agency. Table A.2 details the items selected by strata.

(U) Table A.2: Stratified Sampling Design for Accuracy Testing of Official and Diplomatic Passport Data

(U) Issuing Agency	(U) Passport Type	(U) Number of Passports	(U) Percentage of Sample
(U) Charleston Passport Center	Official	45	40
(U) Special Issuance Agency	Official	50	44
(U) Special Issuance Agency	Diplomatic	18	16
(U) Total		113	100

(U) Source: OIG generated from official and diplomatic passport data provided by CA.

(U) To test for completeness, OIG obtained from the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration a list of diplomatic and official passports issued to employees of the Internal

² (U) Official passport numbers begin with the number “8” and diplomatic passport numbers begin with the number “9.”

³ (U) OIG computed a sample size of plus or minus 10 percent given a 95-percent confidence level, with 10 items added for potential missing samples.

Revenue Service from November 1994 through March 2019.⁴ OIG also used a list of diplomatic and official passports issued to OIG employees from September 2013 through March 2020. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration provided a universe of 2,501 passport records, and OIG's Office of the Executive Director provided a universe of 224 passport records, for a total universe of 2,725 passport records. OIG limited its testing to diplomatic and official passports that were not expired as of November 30, 2020. OIG also removed any duplicate records and any records that did not begin with the number "8" or the number "9." This resulted in a target universe of 1,032 official and diplomatic passport records. OIG performed a 100-percent review of the target universe.

(U) Prior Office of Inspector General Reports

(U) During this audit, OIG was alerted that a former Department of State employee had allegedly not surrendered their diplomatic passport upon separation from the Department. Department employees' entitlement to an official or diplomatic passport, in most instances, ends when they separate from the Department, and the passport must be surrendered for cancellation.

(U) OIG found that CA had not electronically cancelled one of the former employee's diplomatic passports. Based on that information, OIG performed additional steps to determine whether CA had cancelled other diplomatic or official passports once an employee had separated from the Department of State. OIG found that CA had not electronically cancelled 57 of 134 (43 percent) passports tested.⁵ In addition, of these 57 passports, 47 (82 percent) had not expired as of February 1, 2021, meaning they could still be valid. One reason for the deficiencies identified is that bureaus and offices did not always maintain proper accountability of passports and could not confirm whether separating employees had surrendered their passports for cancellation. OIG made one recommendation that is intended to improve the accountability of official and diplomatic passports of separating employees. As of June 2021, OIG considers the recommendation resolved, pending further action.

⁴ (U) The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration provided OIG with the same data it used for its audit of the Internal Revenue Service's passport management and security controls.

⁵ (U) OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Accountability of Official and Diplomatic Passports of Separating Employees Needs Improvement* (AUD-SI-21-28, May 2021).

(U) APPENDIX B: BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS RESPONSE



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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August 6, 2021

**ACTION MEMO FOR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
BENNING (CA)**

FROM: CA/PPT – Rachel Arndt

SUBJECT: CA Response to OIG Audit of Official and Diplomatic
Passport Records Maintained by the Bureau of Consular
Affairs

Recommendation: That you approve and send the response to the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG)'s Draft Audit of Official and Diplomatic Passport Records Maintained by the Bureau of Consular Affairs.

Decision: Approve Disapprove Discuss

Background

OIG found CA's special issuance passport records to be accurate and complete but noted an instance in 2019 in which CA provided an incomplete response to a request from the Internal Revenue Service regarding special issuance passports issued to its employees. While multiple PPT offices contributed to the response effort, PPT did not thoroughly review the data internally before sending it to the IRS.

OIG recommends CA develop and implement policies and procedures for reviewing data provided to external entities to ensure data are accurate and complete. PPT concurs with the recommendation and requests no edits to the draft audit.

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Attachments:

Tab 1 – Response to OIG’s Draft Audit

Tab 2 – OIG Draft Audit of Official and Diplomatic Passport
Records

Tab 3 – Transmittal from OIG

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Approved: CA/PPT – Rachel Arndt [RA]

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(U) ABBREVIATIONS

ACRQ	American Citizen Records Query
C.F.R.	Code of Federal Regulations
CA	Bureau of Consular Affairs
CCD	Consular Consolidated Database
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
OIG	Office of Inspector General
SIA	Special Issuance Agency
SSN	Social Security number
TDIS	Travel Document Issuance System
TIGTA	Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration

(U) OIG AUDIT TEAM MEMBERS

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WPEAOmbuds@stateoig.gov