


SECRET//NOFORN

Report No. DODIG-2020-055



INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

JANUARY 28, 2020



(U) Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities

Classified By: Michael J. Roark,
Deputy Inspector General-Evaluations
Derived From: Multiple Sources
Declassify On: 20450128

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

SECRET//NOFORN



Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities

January 28, 2020

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether warning intelligence information from the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOCEUR) and the JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC) provided senior officials adequate information to make decisions based on notification of a potential threat to U.S. or allied interests.

(U) As part of this evaluation, we determined whether USEUCOM's warning procedures incorporated the combatant commanders' responsibilities identified in DoD Directive (DoDD) 3115.16 and Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order, Modification 3.

(U) Background

(U) The DoDD 3115.16 establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides guidance for the Defense Warning Network within the DoD. The DoDD 3115.16 defines the Defense Warning Network as "a collaborative and integrated network made up of DoD organizations, that provides senior decision makers warning on emerging and enduring warning threats to U.S. and allied interests." An emerging warning concern is a newly identified issue relevant to national security that is significant enough to warrant temporary attention by the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Enduring warning threats are longstanding potential threats to U.S. interests, which are usually linked to contingency plans.

(U) According to the Defense Warning Network Handbook, Intelligence professionals provide leaders with warning about situations that may threaten national and allied nations' security interests. Timely and insightful understanding enables effective warning and allows decision makers the opportunity to avoid or mitigate the impacts of those threats.

Background (cont'd)

(U) The DoDD 3115.16 requires combatant commanders to "maximize red team capabilities in support of the warning mission and forward red team products to the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), for database integration, as appropriate."

(U) According to the Joint Publication 5-0, "red teams complement intelligence efforts by offering independent, alternative assessments and differing interpretations of information. This includes critical reviews of intelligence products, considering problem sets from alternative perspectives, and helping contribute informed speculation when reliable information is lacking."

(U) Findings

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) Recommendations Table

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander of United States European Command	None	1.a and 1.c	1.b

(U) NOTE: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations:

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.


(U) Contents

(U) Introduction.....	1
(U) Objective.....	1
(U) Background.....	1
(U) Finding.....	9
(U//FOUO) [REDACTED].....	9
(U//FOUO) [REDACTED].....	10
(U) JIOCEUR and JAC Officials Did Not Incorporate Red Team Capabilities Into the Warning Mission in Accordance With DoD Policy	14
(U) USEUCOM Warning Products Did Not Include Red Team Contribution.....	15
(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response.....	15
(U) Appendix	18
(U) Scope and Methodology	18
(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data	20
(U) Prior Coverage.....	20
(U) Management Comments	21
(U) United States European Command	21
(U) List of Classified Resources	23
(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations.....	24

(U) According to the DoDD 3115.16, an enduring warning problem is “a significant national security issue, usually linked to an operational plan or concept plan that is well defined and a longstanding potential threat to the interests of the U.S. and its allies.” Enduring warning problems focus attention, collection, and analysis on a specific threat and monitor the threat closely for a potentially indefinite period.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) Figure 1. Decision Space Visualization



(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) According to the DWN Handbook, intelligence professionals provide leaders with warning about situations that may threaten national and allied nations' security interests.² Timely and insightful warning allows senior decision makers the time to make decisions regarding the threats of foreign adversaries.

² (U) Joint Staff/J2 | Defense Warning Staff, "Defense Warning Network Handbook," November 2017.

focuses on the opportunities to counter and alter only those threats that have detrimental effects for the U.S. This includes US military or political decision cycles, infrastructure, COA [courses of action], or loss of governance.

(U) According to Joint Publication 5-0,

the red team complements intelligence efforts by offering independent, alternative assessments and differing interpretations of information. This includes critical reviews of intelligence products; considering problem sets from alternative perspectives; and helping contribute informed speculation when reliable information is lacking.⁴

(U) In addition, Joint Publication 2-0 states that “command red teams are organizational elements of trained, educated, and practiced experts that provide the Joint Force Commander an independent capability to conduct crucial reviews and analysis, explore plans and operations, and analyze adversary capabilities from an alternative perspective.” Furthermore, Joint Publication 2-0 states that

a properly trained and augmented red team can reduce the risk associated with long-term prediction of enemy reaction by using red team methodologies designed to analyze the situation from alternative perspectives. These perspectives should be based on knowledge of the adversary’s culture, doctrine, capabilities, and other relevant factors.

(U) Combatant Command Responsibilities Within the DWN

(U) The DoDD 3115.16, the DWN Handbook, and the DIA Instruction 3000.001 establish the responsibilities for the combatant commands within the warning mission.⁵ Effective warning relies on close collaboration among analysts, collectors, collection managers, operators, planners, policymakers, allies, and partners.

⁴ (U) Joint Publication 5-0, “Joint Planning,” June 16, 2017. A red team, for the purposes of this report, refers to a process within warnings intelligence that is normally focused on supporting plans, operations, and intelligence by providing alternative viewpoints from the perspective of adversaries, partners, and others.

⁵ (U) Defense Intelligence Agency Instruction 3000.001, “Defense Warning,” March 27, 2014.

(U) threat after factoring in constraints (such as limited collection and intelligence processing time). In addition, the DWN Handbook states that “Overall, Combatant Commands have responsibilities for warning, including the following:

- (U) Establishing and maintaining enduring warning problems and identifying, tracking, and alerting decision makers to emerging warning concerns.
- (U) Participating in the Defense Warning Council and assigning Defense Warning Advocates at the appropriate level, contributing to the warning Community of Interest, participating in the production of distinct DoD warning products, and maintaining up-to-date warning information on the DWN portal.⁶”

(U) Combatant Commanders receive warning analysis directly from the Combatant Command’s Intelligence Directorate (J2). For USEUCOM, the JIOCEUR warning team leads intelligence analysis efforts on theater-wide warning issues, including USEUCOM’s DWN products.⁷

(U) Combatant Command Intelligence Directorates (J2s)

(U) DIA Instruction 3000.001 states that the Combatant Command J2s, in compliance with the DoDD 3115.16, must “establish and maintain enduring warning problems to identify, track, and alert decision makers to emerging warning issues in accordance with the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program.” In addition, the Combatant Command J2s must

incorporate warning perspectives derived from, for example, possibilities-based analysis and red team analysis, into current, crisis, and strategic intelligence support to the DoD customers for policy, operations, plans, exercises, and collection; provide feedback from DWN customers in partnership with the Defense Warning Staff.

⁶ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

⁷ (U) The USEUCOM JIOCEUR warning team is composed of representatives from JAC’s production divisions and the JAC National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency element. Derived from USEUCOM JIOCEUR, “Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission Document,” April 2019.

(C//REL) [REDACTED] within JIOCEUR and its components. JAC analysts consistently monitor reporting to identify concerns and ensure that the USEUCOM Commander has the final approval on all warning decisions.

(U//FOUO)

(S//NF) USEUCOM produced warning intelligence products [REDACTED] that senior officials used to make decisions. USEUCOM analysts [REDACTED] for indications that would generate the need for a warning [REDACTED] derives from a variety of [REDACTED] support USEUCOM's [REDACTED] mission. The tasking of these collection efforts are based on intelligence requirements.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]:¹¹

1. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
2. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

~~(S//NF)~~ USEUCOM
Products [REDACTED]

(S//NF) [REDACTED] contributed to warning. [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. Based on a review of criteria, interviews, and observations, we concluded that the JAC products were produced by [REDACTED] analysts integrating information [REDACTED]

¹¹ (U) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹³ (U//FOUO) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) JIOCEUR and JAC Officials Did Not Incorporate Red Team Capabilities Into the Warning Mission in Accordance With DoD Policy

(U) JIOCEUR and JAC officials did not incorporate red team capabilities into the warning mission in accordance with the DoDD 3115.16 and JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3. According to the DoDD 3115.16, Combatant Commanders maximize red team capabilities in support of the warning mission, and according to the JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3, each JIOC must routinely employ red teams. Joint Publication 2-0 further identifies that red teams provide an independent capability to conduct crucial reviews and analysis, explore plans and operations, and analyze adversary capabilities from an alternative perspective. Additionally, the DWN Handbook identifies that red team capabilities should consider, anticipate, and portray the cultural perceptions and perspectives of adversaries, partners, and other actors. This technique models the behavior of an individual or group by anticipating how an actor would think and act on or react to a particular issue, scenario, or action.

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U//FOUO) [REDACTED]

(U) shifted resources to hire one full-time employee as a Warning Advocate Analyst to oversee warning-related red team functions in accordance with DoDD 3115.16 and JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, this recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once USEUCOM provides documentation showing that a Warning Advocate Analyst has been appointed to oversee warning-related red team functions in accordance with DoDD 3115.16 and JIOC Execute Order, Modification 3.

- b. (U) Amend the U.S. European Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission Procedures to include red team requirements, in accordance with the Department of Defense Directive 3115.16 and the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Execute Order, Modification 3.**

(U) U.S. European Command Comments

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, stated that the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate amended the USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission procedures to reflect red team aspects in warning activities. The Director stated that the new guidance directs alternative analysis production and publication aimed at each of USEUCOM's Defense Warning Network enduring warning problems and directs alternative analysis focusing on the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate's main analytic lines.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation. We verified that the updated USEUCOM JIOCEUR Indications and Warning Advocate Team Mission procedures reflected the new guidance identified in the Director of Intelligence's response. Therefore, the recommendation is closed, and no further comments are required.

- c. (U) Develop procedures to forward red team products to the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, for database integration, as appropriate, in accordance with the Department of Defense Directive 3115.16.**

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from April 2019 through December 2019 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors general on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(S//REL TO USA, FVEY) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

The scope of this project focused on USEUCOM's capability to perform warning intelligence. This project's scope did not include an evaluation of any other Combatant Commands' warning intelligence capabilities and did not evaluate the DoD's Defense Warning.

(U) Site Visits and Interviews

(U) We conducted site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations to perform our evaluation.

- (U) USEUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) JAC, Royal Air Force Station Molesworth, United Kingdom
- (U) U.S. Army Europe, Lucius D. Clay Kaserne, Wiesbaden, Germany
- (U) U.S. Air Forces Europe, Ramstein Air Base, Ramstein-Miesenbach, Germany
- (U) Marine Forces Europe, Panzer Kaserne-Barracks, Boblingen, Germany
- (U) U.S. Special Operations Command Europe, Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) Joint Staff J22, Pentagon, Washington, D.C.
- (U) Europe Eurasia Regional Center, DIA, Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, Washington, D.C.

~~(S//NF)~~ USEUOCM, and USEUCOM component-level criteria and products related to the DWN [REDACTED]. Furthermore, we reviewed USEUCOM's process to develop and produce warning products.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, there were no reports discussing warning intelligence.

(U) United States European Command (cont'd)

ECJ2

SUBJECT: Headquarters, U.S. European Command Response to Report No. D2019-DISPA2-0113.00, "Evaluation of U.S. European Command's Warning Intelligence Capabilities"

Advocate Analyst to oversee warning-related Red Team functions. We anticipate this hiring action to be complete in second quarter of FY20.

5. Recommendation 2: Amend ECJ2's Indications and Warning Advocate Team mission procedures to incorporate the use of Red Team capabilities, in accordance with REF C and REF E.


USEUCOM Response: ECJ2 amended the subject document to reflect Red Team aspects in warning activities. The new guidance directs alternative analysis production and publication aimed at each of USEUCOM's Defense Warning Network enduring warning problems. It further directs alternative analysis focusing on ECJ2's main analytic lines. The mission description for the amended ECJ2 Indications and Warning Advocate Team is enclosed.

6. Recommendation 3: Develop procedures to forward Red Team products to the Director of DIA for database integration, as appropriate, in accordance with REF C.

USEUCOM Response: ECJ2 will publish Red Team-related analysis to DIA systems per the above response to recommendation two. We interpret this as satisfying guidance in REF C to "forward Red Team products to the Director, DIA, for database integration." Of note, REFs B through F provide no guidance on applying Red Team functions to warning-related analysis. We interpret this as giving ECJ2 considerable latitude for how to incorporate Red Team analysis and publication. Many of the structured analytic techniques outlined in the U.S. Army's University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies Red Team Handbook are core DIA analytic tradecraft techniques that are taught to all DIA analysts as part of the mandatory Professional Analyst Career Education curriculum. These Red Team methods are also part of the DoD All-Source Analysis Professional Certification Program.

7. If you have questions, my point of contact is [REDACTED]. He may be reached at [REDACTED].



Encl
USEUCOM JIOEUR's Indications
and Warning Advocate Team Mission


THOMAS K. HENSLEY
Brigadier General, USAF
Director of Intelligence

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DWN	Defense Warning Network
J2	Intelligence Directorate
JAC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Center
JIOC	Joint Intelligence Operations Center
JIOCEUR	Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USEUCOM	United States European Command

SECRET//NOFORN



DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
DoD Hotline 1.800.424.9098

SECRET//NOFORN