


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# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

DECEMBER 4, 2018



## Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

The document contains information that may be exempt from mandatory disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act.

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# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes*

December 4, 2018

### Objective

(U) We determined whether the internal communication processes of the geographic combatant command joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs) had weaknesses similar to the flaws in management processes at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) as identified in Report No. DODIG-2017-049, "Unclassified Report of Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products," January 31, 2017 (hereafter, the USCENTCOM Investigation).

(U) Specifically, we performed this evaluation in followup to the USCENTCOM Investigation, which identified several weaknesses and flaws in management processes that hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the USCENTCOM Intelligence Directorate, as well as the morale of the analytical workforce. See the Appendix for the scope and methodology used to meet the evaluation objective.

### Background

(U) The combatant command JIOCs plan, coordinate, and integrate the full range of intelligence operations in the combatant command's area of responsibility. Each combatant command organizes, trains, and directs its JIOC in accordance with the needs and guidance of its combatant commander. The JIOCs that we evaluated were composed of internal staff components of the Intelligence Directorate and separate direct reporting units. The Defense Intelligence Agency provides most, but not all, of the government civilian analysts who support the JIOCs' mission.

### Background (cont'd)

(U) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, "Analytic Standards," January 2, 2015, establishes standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products and articulates "the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices." Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013, extends these standards to the combatant commands.

### Finding

(U) U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command (NORAD/USNORTHCOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Intelligence Directorates and JIOCs (hereafter, the Intelligence Directorates) used a variety of internal communication processes to communicate with their workforces. These internal communication processes were used to assess intelligence production, raise analytic integrity issues, and provide feedback on intelligence production.

(U) However, we found improvements are needed in the following areas in order to further support communications and analytical integrity. Specifically:

- (U) Many military analysts lacked formal training on ICD 203 Analytic Standards when they arrived at their commands. This occurred because the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) did not develop or issue core analytic training standards across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise for military personnel.
- (U) USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and NORAD/USNORTHCOM did not have formal analytic integrity policies, and their Intelligence Directorates lacked introductory education regarding the analytic ombudsman program. They also did not routinely promote the analytic ombudsman program. This occurred because each commander implemented different informal analytic integrity policies and training programs for the analytic ombudsman, who addresses concerns regarding lack of objectivity, bias, politicization, or other issues in standards application in analytic products.



# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes*

### **Finding (cont'd)**

- (U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM's internal intelligence production review process was inconsistent across its Intelligence Directorate. Specifically, NORAD/USNORTHCOM's Intelligence Directorate component divisions developed different internal standard procedures for similar products. This occurred because the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Director of Intelligence did not provide standardized procedures for the divisions to follow.

(U) Without formal training on analytic standards, and standardized processes and procedures for analytic integrity and production review, there is less assurance that senior intelligence leaders, supervisors, and intelligence analysts will continue to be successful mitigating potential analytical integrity issues.

### **Recommendations**

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence examine current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate, as necessary, training standards based on a common essential body of knowledge, including Intelligence Community Directive 203, "Analytic Standards," January 2, 2015, for all entry-level and developmental intelligence professionals.

(U) We recommend that U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, and NORAD/U.S. Northern Command establish formal analytic integrity policies.

(U) We recommend that U.S. Africa Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Northern Command, and U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Directorates include an introduction to their analytic ombudsman program in their newcomer orientation.

(U) We recommend that U.S. Africa Command establish a second collateral duty analytic ombudsman or assistant analytic ombudsman at Royal Air Force (RAF) station Molesworth, United Kingdom.

(U) We recommend that the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency notify the combatant command analytic ombudsmen of dispute resolution and mediation training opportunities.

(U) We recommend that NORAD/U.S. Northern Command's Intelligence Directorate ensure that similar product lines have a standard approval and release processes across divisions.

### **Management Comments and Our Response**

(U) The USD(I), USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, NORAD/USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and the DIA agreed with the recommendations. The comments and planned corrective actions addressed all specifics of the recommendations, and no additional comments are required. Therefore, these recommendations are resolved and remain open.

(U) For two recommendations, NORAD/USNORTHCOM provided responses to a discussion draft of this report describing actions taken to introduce its analytic ombudsman program as part of newcomer orientation; and to develop standardized policies and procedures detailing approval and release processes for similar product lines. NORAD/USNORTHCOM provided an updated curriculum for its Intelligence Directorate Gateway orientation that includes an introduction to the analytic ombudsman and provided a memorandum, "NORAD and NORTHCOM (N-NC) J2 Analytic Production Review Process," October 3, 2018, that established a consistent review process for NORAD/NORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate analytical elements.



# Results in Brief

## *Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes*

### *Comments (cont'd)*

Therefore, we consider NORAD/USNORTHCOM's response to have addressed the specifics of these two recommendations; therefore, recommendations related to NORAD/USNORTHCOM analytic ombudsman training and standard approval and release processes across divisions are closed.

(U) For the recommendation to establish and formal analytic integrity policies, USEUCOM provided a copy of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Integrity Policy. The policy sets a command expectation for integrity in intelligence analysis and provides multiple venues to address concerns or issues about analytic integrity. It applies to all personnel,

military and civilian, assigned to Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe, including the Intelligence Directorate; Headquarters, USEUCOM; the JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC); the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Special Security Group; the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre; and the intelligence directorates of service components supporting USEUCOM. This policy met the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, this recommendation is closed.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the following page.

**Recommendations Table**

Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence	None	A.1	None
Commander, U.S. Africa Command	None	A.2.a, A.3.a, A.4	None
Commander, U.S. European Command	None	A.3.b	A.2.b
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command	None	A.3.c	None
Commander, U.S. Northern Command	None	A.2.c	A.3.d, A.6
Commander, U.S. Southern Command	None	A.3.e	None
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency	None	A.5	None

**Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed** – OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



**INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

December 4, 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND  
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal  
Communications Processes (Report No. DODIG-2019-032)

We are providing this report for your review. We conducted this evaluation from January 2018 through October 2018 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspections and Evaluations," published in January 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

We considered management comments on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Comments from the USD(I), USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, NORAD/USNORTHCOM, USSOUTHCOM, and the DIA addressed all specifics of the recommendations and conformed to the requirements of DoD Instruction 7650.03; therefore, we do not require additional comments.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Please direct questions to me at (703) 604-9187, DSN 312-664-9187, or [REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "M. Roark".

Michael Roark  
Deputy Inspector General for  
Intelligence and Special  
Program Assessments

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## Introduction

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### **(U) Objective**

(U) We determined whether the internal communication processes of the geographic combatant command joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs) had weaknesses similar to the flaws in management processes at U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) identified in Report No. DODIG-2017-049, “Unclassified Report of Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products,” (hereafter, the USCENTCOM Investigation), January 31, 2017.

(U) We initiated the USCENTCOM Investigation to address allegations that senior intelligence officials at USCENTCOM falsified, distorted, suppressed, or delayed intelligence products. The allegations, in essence, were that the intelligence was altered or suppressed to present a more optimistic portrayal of the success of USCENTCOM’s efforts to degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). The DoD OIG did not substantiate the allegation that USCENTCOM intelligence was being falsified, distorted, suppressed or delayed; but the DoD OIG did identify several weaknesses and flaws in management processes that hindered the effectiveness and efficiency of the USCENTCOM Intelligence Directorate, as well as the morale of the analytical workforce.

(U) We selected seven recommendations from the USCENTCOM Investigation as a guide to evaluate the internal communication processes at the Intelligence Directorates and joint intelligence operations centers (JIOCs) that support U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM), U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), and U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) to determine if similar issues exist throughout the other geographic combatant command Intelligence Directorates, and to determine whether the commands’ internal communications processes supported analytic integrity.

(U) The seven recommendations focus on internal communication processes and were selected for their measurability and broad applicability. The seven recommendations were (numbered in conjunction with the USCENTCOM Investigation):<sup>1</sup>

1. (U) Intelligence leaders should find ways to sustain a reasonable presence at the JIOC and to provide direct feedback. Intelligence leadership should implement methods to communicate with the entire workforce across locations and shifts, such as brown bag lunches, town halls, anonymous suggestion boxes (physical or virtual), and sessions with analysts, immediate supervisors, and middle managers.
3. (U) Intelligence leaders should provide guidance on raising or preventing ethical dilemmas or suspected improprieties. Leaders should communicate this to new arrivals and periodically reinforce with their entire force. They should also consider developing anonymous means, such as e-mail, suggestion box, or ombudsman, for analysts to raise concerns about analytic integrity.
4. (U) Intelligence leaders should implement after-action reviews with JIOC analysts and intermediate managers to professionally assess intelligence production, provide feedback, and identify ways to improve.
11. (U) The relationship, reporting responsibilities, and intelligence requirements that apply to DIA analysts detailed to combatant commands should be clarified, in writing, so that DIA employees and their supervisors clearly understand their roles and responsibilities.
13. (U) Intelligence leaders should consider adding a theater overview to newcomer orientations that includes the area of responsibility, key priorities, operational plans, and priority intelligence requirements so that analysts can better understand what is relevant to their audience.
14. (U) Intelligence leaders should provide new JIOC personnel with a briefing to introduce J-2 leaders, stress the integrity of the analytical process, and explain any tailored procedures, references (such as JP 1-02, service publications), and style guides. Intelligence leaders should include any specific local guidance on product reviews, coordination, and approval, and explain the importance of feedback and being open to criticism. Intelligence leaders should consider discussing the commander's preferences for intelligence, where intelligence is briefed, and coalition considerations.

---

<sup>1</sup> (U) The wording of each recommendation was altered so that they were not USCENTCOM specific. The phrase "especially during crisis work" was removed from Recommendation 1, as our focus was not on crisis action planning or procedures. The sentence "JICCEN should incorporate additional training to address any trends or systemic deficiencies identified in intelligence products" was removed from Recommendation 16, as our focus was not on intelligence products.

16. (U) Intelligence leaders should provide clear guidance and feedback to analysts on how intelligence products are reviewed and considered above the JIOC level.

(U) We conducted this followup evaluation to ensure similar weaknesses and flaws in management processes did not exist in other geographic combatant commands. See the Appendix for the scope and methodology used to meet the evaluation objective.

## **(U) Background**

### **(U) Joint Intelligence Operations Centers**

(U) Each combatant command has an assigned JIOC to integrate intelligence capabilities in support of the command's mission.<sup>2</sup> The combatant command JIOCs are the theater focal points which plan, coordinate, and integrate the full range of intelligence operations in the combatant command's area of responsibility. JIOCs are interdependent, operational intelligence organizations at the DoD, combatant command, or joint task force level that are "integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment."<sup>3</sup> The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) provides most, but not all, of the government civilian analysts who support the JIOCs' mission.


(U) Each combatant command organizes, trains, and directs its JIOC in accordance with the needs and guidance of its combatant commander.<sup>4</sup> The JIOCs that we evaluated were a combination of internal staff components of the Intelligence Directorate and separate direct reporting units. At some combatant commands, the JIOC was a separate unit that directly reported to Intelligence Directorates. At other combatant commands, the JIOC was part of the internal intelligence directorate staff. See Figure 1 for a notional combatant command JIOC organization.

<sup>2</sup>

<sup>3</sup> (U) Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013.

<sup>4</sup> (U) Joint Publication 2-0, page III-7.

(U) Figure 1. Notional Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Center Organization



(U) Source: Joint Publication 2-01, "Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations," July 5, 2017.

### ***(U) Intelligence Community Directive 203***

(U) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, “Analytic Standards,” January 2, 2015, establishes standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products and “articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices.”<sup>5</sup> Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” October 22, 2013, states that “[a]ll source intelligence should comply with Intelligence Community Directive #203, Analytic Standards,” thereby extending these standards to the combatant commands.

### ***(U) Analytic Ombudsmen***

(U//FOUO) ICD 203 defines the role of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) analytic ombudsman, who “addresses concerns regarding lack of objectivity, bias, politicization, or other issues in standards application in analytic products.” [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] This extended the ICD 203 requirement for analytic ombudsman programs to the combatant commands. The USD(I) requested that the DIA Director provide defense intelligence components with best practices for operating analytic ombudsman programs.<sup>6</sup>

### ***(U) Product Evaluation Boards***

(U) ICD 203 requires each Intelligence Community element to maintain a program of product evaluation using the Intelligence Community Analytic Standards as the core elements for assessment criteria. The results of analytic product evaluations are to be used to improve materials and programs for education and training in analytic knowledge, skills, abilities, and tradecraft.

<sup>5</sup> (U) ICD 203 analytic standards include objectivity, independence of political consideration, timeliness, and intelligence analysis that is based on all available sources of intelligence information. Additionally, products should describe the quality and credibility of underlying sources; properly express and explain uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments; properly distinguish between underlying intelligence information and analysts’ assumptions and judgments; incorporate analysis of alternatives; demonstrate customer relevance; use clear and logical argumentation; explain changes to or consistency of analytic judgments; make accurate judgments and assessments; and incorporate effective visual information where appropriate.

<sup>6</sup> (U) USD(I) Memorandum, “Implementing Analytic Ombudsman Programs,” January 6, 2017.

## ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence in the Internal Communication Process***

(U) DoD Directive 5143.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]),” October 24, 2014, establishes the responsibilities and functions of the USD(I) as the Principal Staff Assistant and adviser on intelligence to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. For defense intelligence analysis, the USD(I) is tasked with ensuring that analysis is aligned with Intelligence Community and DoD analytical concepts, methodologies, and tradecraft standards. For human capital and manpower management, the USD(I) develops policy and provides oversight of training, including joint intelligence training, certification, education, and professional development of personnel in defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. The USD(I) also ensures integration of defense intelligence standards into other training within the DoD and intelligence community, as appropriate.

## ***(U) Role of the Defense Intelligence Agency***

### ***(U) DIA Support to the Joint Intelligence Operations Centers***

(U) Joint Publication 2-01, “Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations,” July 5, 2017, states that the DIA Director “provides personnel and resources to support combatant command intelligence directorates and JIOCs; provides a DIA senior representative to each [combatant command] JIOC to advise on collection capabilities and [intelligence planning]; serves as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise global force manager for military intelligence personnel; and, along with the services, prepares, equips, trains, and deploys military intelligence personnel” in support of combatant command requirements.<sup>7</sup> In accordance with the “Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC) Execute Order (EXORD),” October 4, 2011, the DIA provides civilian analysts in direct support of combatant commanders.<sup>8</sup> The DIA maintains administrative control of the civilian analysts while they are assigned to the JIOC.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> (U) DoDI 5143.01, “Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]),” April 22, 2015, defines the Defense Intelligence Enterprise as “the organizations, infrastructure, and measures to include policies, processes, procedures, and products of the intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components of the Joint Staff, combatant commands, Military Departments, and other DoD elements that perform national intelligence, Defense intelligence, intelligence-related, counterintelligence, and security functions, as well as those organizations under the authority, direction, and control of the USD(I).”

<sup>8</sup> (U) “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” February 2018, defines “direct support” as “a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance.”

<sup>9</sup> (U) “DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” February 2018, defines “administrative control” as “direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support.”



*(U) Intelligence Training*

(U//~~FOUO~~) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3305.02, “DoD General Intelligence Training and Certification,” August 12, 2015, states that the DIA Director, as the DoD functional manager for general intelligence training and certification, “[e]stablishes and maintains general intelligence training standards and certifications ... in coordination with the DoD Components.” [REDACTED]

In June 2017, the DoD Director for Analysis sent a memorandum to the members of the Defense Intelligence Enterprise announcing that he was asking the General Intelligence Training Council to determine what existing analytic courses satisfied the key learning objectives derived from ICD 203.<sup>11</sup>

***(U) Combatant Command Intelligence Directorates and JIOCs***

*(U) U.S. Africa Command and USAFRICOM Intelligence Directorate–Molesworth*

(U) The U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) intelligence analysis mission is split between Stuttgart, Germany, and the USAFRICOM Intelligence Directorate–Molesworth (J-2M) at Royal Air Force (RAF) station Molesworth, United Kingdom. The USAFRICOM Director of Intelligence (J-2), located in Stuttgart, is a Navy rear admiral (lower half). The USAFRICOM Intelligence Directorate–Molesworth is a staff element of the overall USAFRICOM Intelligence Directorate. The USAFRICOM J-2M Director is an O-6 military officer.

*(U) U.S. European Command and JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC)*

(U) The U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) intelligence analysis mission is also split between Stuttgart and RAF Molesworth. The USEUCOM J-2, located in Stuttgart, is a U.S. Army brigadier general. The Joint Intelligence Operations Center–Europe (JIOCEUR) Analytic Center (JAC) at RAF Molesworth is a direct reporting unit to USEUCOM and is commanded by an O-6 military officer.

(U) At RAF Molesworth, the JIOCEUR Analytic Center is collocated with the USAFRICOM Intelligence Directorate–Molesworth and the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre, as well as other supporting organizations. These three separate organizations each report to their respective commanders.

<sup>10</sup> [REDACTED]

<sup>11</sup> (U) The General Intelligence Training Council, chaired by DIA’s Director of the Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, is a subordinate council to the DoD Intelligence and Training and Education Board. The General Intelligence Training Council assigned the issue to an advisory committee, which, as of July 2018, was still continuing to compile data, with the objective of creating a catalogue of existing core analytic training.

*(U) U.S. Northern Command and JIOC-North*

(U) The U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) Intelligence Directorate is located at Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado. The Commander of USNORTHCOM is also the Commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), and the commands share a common intelligence directorate. The NORAD/USNORTHCOM J-2 is an Air Force brigadier general. There was no differentiation between the Intelligence Directorate and JIOC-North. The NORAD/USNORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate had a pending internal staff reorganization that was announced following our site visit.

*(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and JIOC-Pacific*

(U) The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Intelligence Directorate is located at Camp H.M. Smith, Hawaii. The USINDOPACOM J-2 is an Air Force major general. JIOC-Pacific was a direct reporting unit to USINDOPACOM, and is located on Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam, Hawaii. The JIOC-Pacific Commander is an O-6 military officer.

*(U) U.S. Southern Command and JIOC-South*

(U) The U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Intelligence Directorate is located in Doral, Florida. The USSOUTHCOM Director of Intelligence is a Navy rear admiral (lower half). The JIOC-South Director was an O-6 military officer; however, JIOC-South is a staff sub-component (J23) of the Intelligence Directorate. USSOUTHCOM also has a network engagement team (NET) directorate, separate from the Intelligence Directorate, under a two-star director. The intelligence officers assigned to the NET comply with intelligence policies and procedures; however, they are under the operational control of the NET Director, not the Director of Intelligence (J-2).

## Finding

### **(U) Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Supported Analytic Integrity; However, Improvements Can Be Made**

(U) The USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, NORAD/USNORTHCOM, and USSOUTHCOM Intelligence Directorates and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) used a variety of internal communication processes, such as staff meetings, update briefings by analysts, emails, town halls, brown bag meetings, and in progress reviews, to communicate with the workforce. These internal communication processes were used to assess intelligence production, raise analytic integrity issues, and provide feedback on intelligence production.

(U) However, we found improvements are needed in the following areas in order to further support communications and analytical integrity. Specifically:

- (U) Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203 is an Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) product that the DoD applies to its Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Military analysts lacked formal training on the analytical standards contained in ICD 203 when they arrived at their commands. As a result, military analysts at the combatant commands were less proficient in applying ICD 203 standards to all-source intelligence products than their civilian counterparts, and required combatant commands to provide supplemental training. This occurred because the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I]) did not develop or issue core analytic training standards across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise for military personnel. In 2018, at the request of several combatant commands, the DIA authorized using up to 30 percent of Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) Essentials classroom seats for military personnel.
- (U) USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and NORAD/USNORTHCOM lacked formal analytic integrity policies, and the Intelligence Directorates at USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, NORAD/USNORTHCOM, and USSOUTHCOM did not educate new personnel on the analytic ombudsman program. As a result, some personnel in the Intelligence Directorates were not familiar with how to report analytical integrity issues. This occurred because each commander implemented different informal analytic integrity policies and training programs for their personnel about their analytic ombudsman programs.<sup>12</sup>

<sup>12</sup> (U) In accordance with Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013, page III-7, each combatant command organizes, trains, and directs its JIOC in accordance with the needs and guidance of its combatant commander.

- (U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM's internal intelligence production review process was inconsistent. Specifically, NORAD/USNORTHCOM's Intelligence Directorate component divisions developed different internal standard procedures for similar products. These different standards increased the risk of miscommunications between analysts and leadership regarding the intelligence production review process, which could result in inconsistency and ambiguity in the production and analytical review process. This occurred because the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Commander did not communicate standardized procedures for the divisions to follow.

(U) Without formal analytic standards training and standardized processes and procedures for analytic integrity and production review, there is less assurance that senior intelligence leaders, supervisors, and intelligence analysts will continue to be successful mitigating potential analytical integrity issues.

### **(U) Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Supported Analytic Integrity**

(U) The USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, NORAD/USNORTHCOM, and USSOUTHCOM Intelligence Directorates and JIOCs (hereafter, the Intelligence Directorates) used a variety of internal communication processes to communicate with the workforce. Recommendation 1 in the USCENTCOM Investigation states that intelligence leaders should find ways to sustain a reasonable presence at the JIOC and to provide direct feedback. Intelligence leadership should implement methods to communicate with the entire workforce across locations and shifts, such as brown bag lunches, town halls, anonymous suggestion boxes (physical or virtual), and sessions with analysts, immediate supervisors, and middle managers. For this review, effective communications includes formal policies that emphasized analytic integrity, held leaders accountable, emphasized the sharing of feedback, and fostered an understanding of the product development and the evaluation process. These internal communication processes were used to assess intelligence production, raise analytic integrity issues, and provide feedback on intelligence production.

(U) Internal communication processes varied by command, and each of the Directors of Intelligence and other senior intelligence leaders used multiple techniques to communicate, including e-mails, town halls, office hours, anonymous suggestion boxes, brown bag lunches, informal training, or sensing sessions to provide feedback to analysts and communicate with the workforce. Based on our focus group discussions, analysts in each of the Intelligence Directorates were generally aware of these communication processes.

(U) For example, each of the Intelligence Directorates had a Tradecraft or Product Evaluation Board made up of senior analysts outside of the product review chain to provide feedback to analysts and supervisors on intelligence production to improve analysts' tradecraft.<sup>13</sup> We also noted a best practice at USSOUTHCOM, which paired experienced product reviewers with developmental employees to share feedback and understanding of the product development and evaluation process. We did not observe the Tradecraft or Product Evaluation Boards at any of the Intelligence Directorates, but interviewed both reviewers and analysts who had products reviewed by the boards. We also reviewed command policies, and confirmed that each of the Intelligence Directorates' Tradecraft or Product Evaluation Board conducted quarterly reviews of 10 to 15 percent of finished intelligence products. The Intelligence Directorates reported the results of those reviews to the producers, senior management, and to the Defense Intelligence Agency, for consolidation and annual reporting to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The analysts and supervisors we interviewed stated that senior intelligence officers and analytic ombudsmen reviewed the results for any trends, and attempted to address any identified analytic shortfall areas through informal training venues.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Robust communications and information technology infrastructure were often required to support these internal communications because these components were often spread across multiple locations, and in the cases of USAFRICOM and USEUCOM, multiple countries. For example, during a briefing at USINDOPACOM, the Intelligence Directorate Senior Watch Officer, located at Camp Smith, presented information in person, while other information was presented via secure VTC by two civilian analysts and a foreign military intelligence officer from JIOC-Pacific at Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickam to update the USINDOPACOM Commander. [REDACTED]

## **(U) Military Analysts Lacked Formal Training on Analytic Standards**

(U) Military analysts lacked formal training on ICD 203 standards when they arrived at their command. A majority of the military all-source intelligence analysts we interviewed had no prior training on ICD 203 Analytic Standards through other courses, and were not eligible to attend the DIA's PACE training

<sup>13</sup> (U) See Background, Recommendation 4: Intelligence leaders should implement after-action reviews with JIOC analysts and intermediate managers to professionally assess intelligence production, provide feedback, and identify ways to improve.

prior to 2018 DIA decisions to open the course to military personnel. According to interviews with management and project evaluation board members, military analysts at the combatant commands were often less proficient in applying ICD 203 standards to all-source intelligence products than their civilian counterparts, and required combatant commands to provide supplemental training to fill the gap in this skillset. Each Intelligence Directorate identified shortfalls in analytic tradecraft training among military analysts. For example:

- (U) A senior NORAD/USNORTHCOM intelligence analyst stated that the majority of incoming military personnel at NORAD/USNORTHCOM had limited strategic analytic backgrounds and writing experience. This analyst stated that Service schools needed to teach analytic tradecraft, and that everyone needed the same quality of tradecraft training, emphasizing that it does not need to be the same course, but that the quality of training needs to be the same.
- (U) A senior USINDOPACOM analyst involved in the Tradecraft Evaluation Board stated that although writing for the intelligence community audience was fundamentally different from writing for the operational community, the results of the DIA's PACE courses and USINDOPACOM's locally developed training courses were obvious in product reviews.

(U) The lack of formal training occurred because the USD(I) did not develop or issue core analytic training standards across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise for military personnel. However, the DIA developed PACE courses to instruct its own civilian all-source intelligence analysts on the fundamentals of tradecraft and ICD requirements. The DIA tracks every DIA civilian employee's training progress. These requirements are uniform for all DIA employees, regardless of assignment. The DIA has two primary formal courses for its civilian all-source intelligence analysts. Foundational PACE is an 8-week course for recently hired members of the DIA analysis career field. PACE Essentials is a 2-week course for personnel who did not previously attend Foundational PACE. In 2018, at the request of several combatant commands, the DIA authorized using up to 30 percent of its PACE Essentials classroom seats for military personnel as DIA addressed its backlog of analysis career field personnel who needed PACE training. This allowed the combatant commands to use PACE courses to train some military personnel on ICD 203 Analytic Standards. The backlog of DIA civilian analysts who were required by the DIA to attend a PACE course was the condition that led to a recommendation in the USCENTCOM Investigation to have the USD(I) track and followup on the DIA's training and certification of all DIA employees serving at USCENTCOM.

(U) Additionally, each of the Intelligence Directorates identified or developed its own in-house training curriculum for military all-source intelligence analysts, in the absence of training-based standards from the USD(I). While we did not find any problems, the approaches varied in the absence of a standard, which could lead to different expectations and standards for developing intelligence analysts across the entire Defense Intelligence Enterprise. For example:

- (U) USSOUTHCOM developed a SOUTHCOM Analytic Tradecraft Review course by distilling the PACE Essentials course into a 1-week course taught by in-house adjunct PACE Essentials instructors on a quarterly basis. This course was intended for civilians who have not yet attended PACE Essentials and military personnel who are not yet eligible to attend PACE Essentials.
- (U) USEUCOM's Regional Joint Intelligence Training Facility provided analytic tradecraft training for the USEUCOM and USAFRICOM intelligence workforces at RAF Molesworth and in Stuttgart.
- (U) USINDOPACOM's JIOC developed a series of courses, collectively called "PACE Lite," covering the same tradecraft and approach to analysis as PACE Essentials.<sup>14</sup>
- (U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM used a combination of PACE Essentials; Intelligence Community Advanced Analyst Program courses, especially Advanced Analytic Writing and Briefing; and the ODNI Analysis 101 course to mitigate training shortfalls.

(U) Based on our interviews and focus groups, supervisors or product evaluation board personnel at each of the Intelligence Directorates noticed improvements in the quality of intelligence production from both military and civilian personnel who completed the DIA's PACE courses as well as the in-house training programs.

(U) On October 31, 2014, the DoD OIG issued a report, DODIG-2015-015, "Evaluation of DoD Intelligence and Training Education Programs for the Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce." This report found that the Defense Intelligence Enterprise lacked intelligence training program standards for common training needs and developmental skills, and recommended that the USD(I) "examine the current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate, as necessary, standards based on a common essential body of knowledge and essential body of work for all entry-level/developmental intelligence professionals." The recommendation to the USD(I) was closed by the DoD OIG when USD(I) provided updates to DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training and Certification," August 12, 2015, and DoDI 3305.14, "Joint Intelligence Training

<sup>14</sup> (U) Subsequent to our fieldwork, the "PACE Lite" series of courses was redesignated as the Joint Intelligence Training Academy Pacific (JITAP) Professional Development Program (PDP).

and Certification,” August 18, 2015. These instructions establish policy and procedures and assign responsibilities for intelligence training and certification but do not mandate baseline standards. Therefore, the USD(I) should examine the current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate, as necessary, training standards based on a common essential body of knowledge, including Intelligence Community Directive 203, “Analytic Standards,” January 2, 2015, for all entry-level/developmental intelligence professionals (Recommendation A.1).

## **(U) Combatant Commands Could Improve Integrity Policies and Awareness of Analytic Ombudsman Program**

(U) USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and NORAD/USNORTHCOM did not have formal analytic integrity policies, whereas USINDOPACOM and USSOUTHCOM did. In addition, the Intelligence Directorates at each of the combatant commands did not educate new personnel on the analytic ombudsman program. Recommendation 3 in the USCENTCOM Investigation stated that intelligence leaders should provide guidance on raising or preventing ethical dilemmas or suspected improprieties. The recommendation further stated that leaders should communicate this to new arrivals and periodically reinforce the guidance with their entire force. The report also recommended that intelligence leaders consider developing anonymous means, such as e-mail, a suggestion box, or an ombudsman, for analysts to raise concerns about analytic integrity. A USD(I) memorandum, “Implementing Analytic Ombudsman Programs,” January 6, 2017, recommended that the Defense intelligence components establish an analytic ombudsman.

(U) USINDOPACOM and USSOUTHCOM had formal analytic integrity policies that communicated analytic integrity expectations not only to the immediate Intelligence Directorate workforce, but also to subordinate and supporting commands. The USCENTCOM Investigation recommendation that we used as our criteria in this project was that intelligence leaders “should provide guidance for subordinates to raise any ethical dilemmas or suspected improprieties.” The USINDOPACOM’s and USSOUTHCOM policies stated that leaders at all levels were responsible for a command climate that promoted analytic rigor and integrity, and prevented undue external influence on intelligence analysis and production.<sup>15</sup> Both USINDOPACOM and USSOUTHCOM’s policies explicitly extended their intelligence analysis policies to their component commands and supporting commands, and listed the contact information for that command’s analytic ombudsman, the DIA’s analytic ombudsman, and other avenues for personnel to report a concern about analytic integrity.

<sup>15</sup> (U) USSOUTHCOM Memorandum, “U.S. Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) Analytic Integrity Policy,” February 9, 2017, and USPACOM Memorandum, “U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) Intelligence Analysis Policy,” November 10, 2016.



(U) USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and NORAD/USNORTHCOM used informal means to provide analytic integrity policy to the Intelligence Directorate personnel at their commands. For example, USAFRICOM's Director of Intelligence sent e-mails to the directorate's workforce that established baseline expectations from the directorate, as well as the responsibility to maintain analytic objectivity; however, this was not a formal policy and as such did not apply to component commands and supporting commands. During focus group sessions, some analysts expressed concern that their analytic policies and standards did not apply to their subordinate and supporting commands. Additionally, the USCENTCOM Investigation concluded that improved written policies and guidance could have mitigated some of the concern about intelligence products, and improved the intelligence production process. Some changes to intelligence production at USCENTCOM were not written policies, but were instead communicated through several e-mails, leading to miscommunication and interpretation of the guidance.

(U) Additionally, none of the combatant commands' Intelligence Directorates provided introductory education regarding and routine promotion of the analytic ombudsman program. We reviewed newcomer orientation materials and curriculum and interviewed analytic ombudsmen and training personnel at each of the Intelligence Directorates. These newcomer materials and interviews confirmed that each of the Intelligence Directorates had an analytic ombudsman to respond to concerns about compliance with analytic standards in accordance with USD(I) recommendations. However, several analytic ombudsmen were not routinely introduced during newcomer orientations for their Intelligence Directorates, even though a DIA Memorandum, "Best Practices for Analytic Ombudsman Programs," recommends that the onboarding process for new personnel should include information about the ombudsman program and that leaders should make the ombudsman program part of their ongoing communications to their workforces.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, Recommendation 3 in the USCENTCOM Investigation stated: "Intelligence leaders should provide guidance on raising or preventing ethical dilemmas or suspected improprieties. Leaders should communicate this to new arrivals and periodically reinforce with their entire force. Leaders should also consider developing anonymous means, such as e-mail, suggestion box, or Ombudsman, for analysts to raise concerns about analytic integrity."

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<sup>16</sup> (U) USD(I) Memorandum, "Implementing Analytic Ombudsman Programs," January 6, 2017, and DIA Memorandum "Analytic Ombudsman Program," January 31, 2017.

(U) The lack of formal policies and procedures and lack of introduction to the analytic ombudsman during newcomer orientations occurred because each Director of Intelligence implemented different informal analytic integrity policies and training programs for their analytic ombudsman. There is no regulation requiring a command policy on analytic integrity. According to Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Intelligence," October 22, 2013, page III-7, each combatant command organizes, trains, and directs its JIOC in accordance with the needs and guidance of its combatant commander. Instead of developing formal policies and procedures or introducing the ombudsman, as recommended by DIA best practices, commanders provided informal guidance and notification to the Intelligence Directorates' workforce. We found that informal guidance to, and reinforcement with, subordinates to raise any ethical dilemmas, suspected improprieties, or concerns about analytic integrity was sufficient. However, as a best practice, formal policies and procedures are effective means to communicate expectations, and directly address the intent of the USCENTCOM Investigation recommendation directed to that command's senior intelligence leaders to provide guidance for subordinates to raise any ethical dilemmas, suspected improprieties, or concerns about analytic integrity, and to periodically reinforce this guidance with their entire workforce. Therefore, USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, and NORAD/USNORTHCOM should establish formal analytic integrity policies (Recommendation A.2). In addition, we recommend that the Directors of Intelligence include an introduction to their analytic ombudsman program in their newcomer orientation (Recommendation A.3).

(U) The DIA's best practices for analytic ombudsman programs states that an analytic ombudsman should be approachable to the analytic workforce. USAFRICOM's analytic ombudsman was located in Stuttgart, Germany. As a result, the analytic ombudsman was not easily accessible to the analytic workforce at RAF Molesworth in the United Kingdom. Therefore, we recommend that USAFRICOM establish a second collateral duty analytic ombudsman or assistant analytic ombudsman at RAF Molesworth (Recommendation A.4). In addition, there is no formal training program for analytic ombudsmen. The DIA's "DIA Analytic Ombudsman Program," January 31, 2017, states: "While there is no formal training program, it is highly recommended that an ombudsman obtain training in dispute resolution/mediation, product evaluation, and complete PACE Essentials. An ombudsman must possess a thorough understanding of IC Analytic Standards (Intelligence Community Directive 203), be approachable, sensitive to bias (including their own), have effective interviewing and listening skills, a willingness to actively engage and challenge involved individuals, and a reputation for objectivity and integrity." However, analytic ombudsmen at most of the

Intelligence Directorates stated that there was no clear recommended training in dispute resolution or mediation for the analytic ombudsman position. Therefore, we recommend that the DIA notify the combatant command analytic ombudsmen of mediation training opportunities (Recommendation A.5).

## **(U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM's Internal Review Process for All-Source Intelligence Products Was Not Consistent Across Components**

(U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM's internal review process for all-source intelligence products was not consistent across components. Specifically, NORAD/USNORTHCOM's Intelligence Directorate divisions developed different internal standard procedures for reviewing similar products. For example, a NORAD/USNORTHCOM senior intelligence analyst stated that the review process for finished all-source intelligence products was dependent upon the guidance that different division leaders provided for each specific intelligence production line of effort, and was not codified in writing by the individual divisions or the Intelligence Directorate. The intelligence analyst added that the analysts needed a set of standardized tasks detailed in a formalized process in order to effectively complete the intelligence production review process. Although focus group discussions indicated that NORAD/USNORTHCOM's review process for finished all-source intelligence products was understood by analysts and reinforced analytic tradecraft standards, the internal standard procedures of the review process varied by division, and were not codified at the directorate level.

(U) This inconsistency occurred because the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Director of Intelligence did not provide standardized procedures for the divisions to follow. Following our visit, the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate began implementation of a planned internal reorganization to bring all of the analysis branches into a single division which would standardize review processes. The NORAD/USNORTHCOM Commander should direct Intelligence Directorates to develop policies and procedures detailing standard approval and release processes for similar product lines (Recommendation A.6).

## **(U) Conclusion**

(U) As a result, without formal core analytical training standards and standardized analytic integrity processes and procedures, there is less assurance that senior intelligence leaders, supervisors, and intelligence analysts will continue to be successful mitigating potential analytical integrity issues. The training could help provide assurance that senior intelligence leaders, supervisors, and intelligence analysts are as prepared as they possibly can be to successfully mitigate potential

analytical integrity issues. Each of the Intelligence Directorates expressed that there was value in establishing baseline ICD 203 core analytical training across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise for military and civilian analysts. The Intelligence Directorates noticed improvements in the quality of intelligence production from both military and civilian personnel who completed the DIA's PACE courses, which provide the fundamentals of analytical tradecraft and ICD requirements. Additionally, individuals who worked in the Intelligence Directorates that had formalized internal standards and codified internal intelligence production review processes had a better understanding of their roles and responsibilities in implementing internal communication processes at the geographic combatant command joint intelligence operations centers.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### ***(U) Recommendation A.1***

**(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence examine current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate, as necessary, training standards based on a common essential body of knowledge, including Intelligence Community Directive 203, "Analytic Standards," January 2, 2015, for all entry-level/developmental intelligence professionals.**

### ***(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Comments***

(U) The Geographic Combatant Command Intelligence Support Director, responding for the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, agreed with our recommendation and responded that the Office of the USD(I) is staffing a draft DoD Manual to address our concerns regarding training standards based on a common essential body of knowledge for all entry level and developmental intelligence professionals (both military and civilian analysts). He also stated that the draft DoD Manual 3305.AM, "DoD All-Source Analysis (ASA) Accreditation and Certification," establishes the ASA Certification Program Governance Council and Certification Program to promote a shared understanding of the all-source analysis essential body of knowledge and certify that all-source analysis personnel (military, civilian, contractor) possess the knowledge and skills associated with the competencies necessary to successfully carry out DoD-defined all-source analysis functional tasks. The draft DoD Manual also directs the combatant commands to incorporate the all-source analysis certification into the coding criteria of billets and submit requirements to the Joint Staff for the military all-source analysis certification program. Additionally, while core training options are explored,

developed and implemented, the commands and Services should continue to send junior/mid-grade military personnel, assigned to analysis billets, to the DIA's Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) Essentials course.

### *(U) Our Response*

(U) Management comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once DoD Manual 3305.AM, "DoD All-Source Analysis (ASA) Accreditation and Certification," is issued and we verify that it fully addresses the intent of our recommendation.

## **(U) Recommendation A.2**

**(U) We recommend that:**

- a. Commander, U.S. Africa Command establish an analytic integrity policy.**
- b. Commander, U.S. European Command establish an analytic integrity policy.**
- c. Commander, NORAD/U.S. Northern Command establish an analytic integrity policy.**

### *(U) U.S. Africa Command Comments*

(U) The USAFRICOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USAFRICOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. The director stated that USAFRICOM was staffing an analytic integrity policy with an expected completion date of January 2019.

### *(U) U.S. European Command Comments*

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation, and included a copy of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe Analytic Integrity Policy, dated November 15, 2018, with their response. The policy sets a command expectation for integrity in intelligence analysis and provides multiple venues to address concerns or issues about analytic integrity. It applies to all personnel, military and civilian, assigned to Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe, including the Intelligence Directorate; Headquarters, USEUCOM; JIOCEUR Analytic Center (JAC); Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) Special Security Group; the NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre; and the intelligence directorates of service components supporting USEUCOM.

*(U) U.S. Northern Command Comments*

(U) The NORAD/USNORTHCOM Deputy Director of Intelligence, responding for the NORAD/USNORTHCOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. NORAD/ USNORTHCOM was staffing an analytic integrity policy, with an expected completion date of January 2019.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) USAFRICOM and NORAD/USNORTHCOM management comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, Recommendations A.2.a and A.2.c are resolved but will remain open. We will close these recommendations once we verify that the analytic integrity policies were issued. USEUCOM management comments addressed the intent of the recommendation; therefore, Recommendation A.2.b is closed.

***(U) Recommendation A.3***

(U) We recommend that the:

- a. **Director of Intelligence, U.S. Africa Command include an introduction to its analytic ombudsman program as part of newcomer orientation.**
- b. **Director of Intelligence, U.S. European Command include an introduction to its analytic ombudsman program as part of newcomer orientation.**
- c. **Director of Intelligence, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, and Commander, JIOC-Pacific, include an introduction to their analytic ombudsman program as part of newcomer orientation.**
- d. **Director of Intelligence, NORAD/U.S. Northern Command include an introduction to its analytic ombudsman program as part of newcomer orientation.**
- e. **Director of Intelligence, U.S. Southern Command and Director, Network Engagement Team include an introduction to their analytic ombudsman program in their newcomer orientations.**

*(U) U.S. Africa Command Comments*

(U) The USAFRICOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USAFRICOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. USAFRICOM stated that the Stuttgart ombudsman provides introductory education material regarding the analytic ombudsman during a personal one-on-one in-processing with all newly assigned personnel, and that the RAF Molesworth ombudsman is building the program in Molesworth using the Stuttgart model.

*(U) U.S. European Command Comments*

(U) The USEUCOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USEUCOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. USEUCOM stated that following our visits to the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate in Stuttgart, Germany, and the JAC at RAF Molesworth, the JAC incorporated an overview and discussion of the analytic ombudsman program during the monthly required newcomer's briefing. This overview includes an introduction to the program and its intent, and provision of information on the three analytic ombudsmen assigned to JIOCEUR.

*(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Comments*

(U) The Chief of the Intelligence Director's Action Group, responding for the USINDOPACOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. USINDPACOM stated that a formal introduction to the Analytic Ombudsman was incorporated into the USINDOPACOM JIOC Orientation Course beginning in July 2018.

*(U) U.S. Northern Command Comments*

(U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM agreed with and provided responses to Recommendation A.3.d in a discussion draft of this report. Therefore, we did not require a written response to that recommendation. As part of its response to the discussion draft, NORAD/USNORTHCOM provided an updated curriculum for its Intelligence Directorate Gateway orientation that includes an introduction to the analytic ombudsman.

*(U) U.S. Southern Command Comments*

(U) The USSOUTHCOM Deputy Director of Intelligence, responding for the USSOUTHCOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. Specifically, the Deputy Director stated that USSOUTHCOM took immediate corrective action by including the analytic ombudsman as part of the newcomer orientation.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM management comments addressed all specifics of the recommendations; therefore, recommendation A.3.d is closed. USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USINDOPACOM, and USSOUTHCOM management comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, Recommendations A.3.a, A.3.b, A.3.c, and A.3.e are resolved but will remain open. We will close these recommendations once we receive and review the updated course curricula to verify that it addresses our recommendation.

***(U) Recommendation A.4***

**(U) We recommend that the Director of Intelligence, U.S. Africa Command's, establish a second collateral duty analytic ombudsman or assistant analytic ombudsman at RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom.**

***(U) U.S. Africa Command Comments***

(U) The USAFRICOM Director of Intelligence, responding for the USAFRICOM Commander, agreed with our recommendation. USAFRICOM stated that it established an analytic ombudsman at RAF Molesworth in April 2018.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Management comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we receive a copy of the designation letter for the analytic ombudsman at RAF Molesworth.

***(U) Recommendation A.5***

**(U) We recommend that the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency issue formal notification to the combatant command analytic ombudsmen of mediation training opportunities.**

***(U) Defense Intelligence Agency Comments***

(U) The Chief, Strategic Planning, Policy, and Performance Management, responding for the DIA Director, agreed with our recommendation, and stated that the DIA would use the next quarterly engagement to notify combatant command analytic ombudsmen of mediation training opportunities.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Management comments addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close this recommendation once we verify that DIA notified the combatant commands of the training opportunities.



***(U) Recommendation A.6***

**(U) We recommend that the Director of Intelligence, NORAD/U.S. Northern Command develop standardized policies and procedures detailing approval and release processes for similar product lines.**

*(U) U.S. Northern Command Comments*

(U) NORAD/USNORTHCOM agreed with and provided responses to Recommendation A.6 in a discussion draft of this report. Therefore, we did not require a written response to that recommendation. As part of its response to the discussion draft, NORAD/USNORTHCOM provided a memorandum, "NORAD and NORTHCOM (N-NC) J2 Analytic Production Review Process," October 3, 2018, that established a consistent review process for NORAD/NORTHCOM Intelligence Directorate analytical elements, and specified the role of branch Senior Intelligence Analysts and division Senior Intelligence Officers in the production and analytical review process.

*(U) Our Response*

(U) Management actions addressed all specifics of the recommendation; therefore, Recommendation A.6 is closed.

## Observation

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

## Appendix

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from January 2018 through October 2018 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in January 2012 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) This project scope did not look at the content of intelligence products, and was not based on any allegations that intelligence products had been manipulated and any of these commands. The project scope also did not focus on crisis action team procedures, organizations, or products.

(U) We performed site visits and interviewed personnel at the following locations:

- (U) USAFRICOM, Kelley Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) USEUCOM, Patch Barracks, Stuttgart, Germany
- (U) JIOC–Europe Analytic Center and USAFRICOM J-2M, RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom
- (U) USNORTHCOM, Peterson AFB, Colorado
- (U) USINDOPACOM and JIOC–Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith and Joint Base Pearl Harbor–Hickam, Hawaii
- (U) USSOUTHCOM, Doral, Florida
- (U) Defense Intelligence Agency, Joint Base Anacostia–Bolling, Washington, D.C.

(U) We reviewed applicable guidance, DoD directives, and instructions:

- (U) Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” October 22, 2013
- (U) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Execute Order, “Joint Intelligence Operations Center (JIOC)” 031640Z APR 06, as modified by Modification 3, 040001Z OCT 11
- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Memorandum, “Implementing Analytic Ombudsman Programs,” January 6, 2017

- (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness Memorandum, "Defense Equal Opportunity Management Organizational Climate Survey Usage and Data Sharing," November 20, 2015
- (U) DoD Directive 5105.21, "Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)," March 18, 2008
- (U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5143.01, "Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD[I])," April 22, 2015
- (U) DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training and Certification," August 12, 2015
- (U) DoDI 3305.14, "Joint Intelligence Training (JIT) and Certification," August 18, 2015
- (U) Intelligence Community Directive 203, "Analytic Standards," January 2, 2015

(U) We conducted a formal data call in which we requested the following information from each of the five geographic combatant commands that we visited:

- (U) JIOC or command policies or instructions pertaining to new employee orientation or training;
- (U) new employee orientation or training schedules, curriculum, handouts, syllabi, or personnel qualification standards for JIOC personnel;
- (U) JIOC or command policies or instructions pertaining to guidance for subordinates to raise any ethical dilemmas or suspected improprieties;
- (U) JIOC or command policies or instructions on the relationship, reporting responsibilities, or intelligence requirements for assigned DIA employees;
- (U) memorandum of understanding (MOU) or other agreements with the Defense Intelligence Agency regarding the relationship or reporting responsibilities of DIA employees assigned to the JIOC;
- (U) JIOC policies, instructions, or procedures for providing feedback to analysts or assessing intelligence production;
- (U) the date of the JIOC's last Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI) Organizational Climate Survey (DEOCS); and
- (U) the total number of personnel currently assigned to the JIOC, with a breakdown including the number of DIA personnel, military personnel (officer/enlisted), non-DIA government civilians, and contractors assigned.

(U) We interviewed senior intelligence leaders, and conducted sensing sessions and focus groups by pay grade and supervisory status with both supervisory civilian and military personnel and non-supervisory civilian and military personnel at each of the five geographic combatant commands that we visited. When the

workforce was located in different buildings or locations, we conducted sensing session interviews in each location. We interviewed the analytic ombudsmen at each of the geographic combatant command joint intelligence directorates. We also interviewed personnel from the DIA Directorate of Analysis and Office of Human Resources both before and after our site visits to the combatant commands.

(U) We conducted cross-sectional (one-time) census-style surveys to support focus group interviews during site visits, and to allow for wide participation and input into the evaluation. (See methodology for conducting surveys, below).

**(U) Specific Scope and Methodology for Census-Style Surveys**

(U) Prior to our site visits, we conducted an anonymous, cross-sectional (one-time), online, census-style survey at each of the Intelligence Directorates. We used the surveys only to determine any focus areas for sensing sessions during site visits, and to allow for wide participation and input into the evaluation. The surveys were anonymous, online through Max.gov, and participation required a passcode provided to command personnel by their directorate leadership.

(U//FOUO) [Redacted text block]

(U) We administered these surveys to provide context in advance of fieldwork. The surveys included five questions on command communications, four questions on ethical issues, and three questions on intelligence production.<sup>18</sup> The surveys also included eight demographic questions, and two free-response options following the command communications questions and the ethical issues questions. The results of each survey were kept within each command and we did not compare results across commands.

**(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

<sup>18</sup> (U) The USAFRICOM and USEUCOM surveys included a ninth demographic question to determine if the respondent was located in Germany or the United Kingdom. At the request of US PACOM’s Intelligence Directorate and JIOC–Pacific, we included US PACOM’s supporting reserve intelligence units in the survey; however, those results were separated from our summary results, and provided to that command’s leadership separately.

## **(U) Use of Technical Assistance**

(U) An operations research analyst and an information technology specialist from the DoD OIG Audit Directorate, Quantitative Methods Division, performed a review of our survey questions and methodology and reviewed survey results and advised us on the validity of sampling processes. In addition, the DoD Office of People Analytics performed a review of our survey questions and methodology. Further, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Manpower, Personnel, Education and Training (OPNAV N1) Assessment Branch Head and Navy Survey Program Manager (N1T) provided technical guidance for creating the online surveys.

## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the DoD Office of Inspector General issued four reports discussing combatant command joint intelligence operations centers.

(U) Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

## **(U) GAO**

(U) Report No. GAO-16-853, “Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex – DoD Partially Used Best Practices for Analyzing Alternatives and Should Do So Fully for Future Military Construction Decisions,” September 2013

GAO was asked by Congress to review DoD’s decision to consolidate and relocate the intelligence centers at RAF Molesworth to RAF Croughton, United Kingdom. This report described key considerations that influenced DoD’s decision and evaluated the extent to which DoD’s AOA process for its consolidation project aligns with best practices for such analyses.

(U) Report No. GAO-17-129, “Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex – DoD Needs to Fully Incorporate Best Practices into Future Cost Estimates,” November, 2016

GAO was asked to review analysis associated with consolidating and relocating the intelligence centers at RAF Molesworth. This report assessed the extent to which DOD’s cost estimate for the intelligence center consolidation at RAF Croughton aligned with best practices and described key reviews DoD has conducted since spring of 2013 related to an alternative location for intelligence center consolidation. GAO compared the Air Force’s February 2015 cost estimate with GAO best practices for developing federal cost estimates, reviewed key DoD analysis of Lajes Field as a potential alternative location for the intelligence centers, and interviewed DoD officials.

**(U) DoD OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2018-003, "Report of Investigation on Allegations Related to the Department of Defense's Decision to Relocate a Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex," October 30, 2017

This DoD OIG investigation involves allegations related to the Department of Defense's decision to relocate a Joint Intelligence Analysis Complex (JIAC) from RAF Molesworth to RAF Croughton. Specifically, concerns were raised by several members of Congress that, allegedly, senior DoD officials intentionally provided inaccurate or misleading information to Congress pertaining to the selection of RAF Croughton as the location for a consolidated USEUCOM and USAFRICOM intelligence center. The allegations, in essence, were that inaccurate or misleading information was intentionally provided to Congress to inflate the cost estimates to relocate the JIAC to Lajes Field, Azores, Portugal, as opposed to locating the JIAC at RAF Croughton.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2017-049, "Unclassified Report of Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products," January 31, 2017

The DoD OIG initiated this investigation to address allegations that senior intelligence officials at USCENTCOM falsified, distorted, suppressed, or delayed intelligence products. The allegations, in essence, were that the intelligence was altered or suppressed to present a more optimistic portrayal of the success of USCENTCOM's efforts to degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2015-015, "Evaluation of DoD Intelligence Training and Education Programs for the Fundamental Competencies of the DoD Intelligence Workforce," October 31, 2014

The overall objective was to evaluate how effective and efficient DoD intelligence training and education programs are in meeting the fundamental competencies of the DoD intelligence workforce and to identify best practices for standardization in the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. Specifically, the DoD OIG evaluated the training standards, policies, and entry-level training curriculums for the DoD intelligence functional areas of the DoD intelligence workforce.

# Management Comments

## (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence



INTELLIGENCE

**OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000

14 Nov 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Office of Inspector General  
Intelligence and Special Program Assessments

SUBJECT: Response to Draft for the Evaluation of CCMD Intelligence Directorate Internal  
Communication Processes Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0080.000

This is the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSDI) response to the DOD IG Draft report dated 26 OCT 2018 Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0080.000. The OUSDI appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the report. We concur with the report's findings and recommendations.

Based on our interpretation of the draft Evaluation of CCMD Intelligence Directorate Internal Communication Processes, most of the findings already have mitigation steps in place. There are a total of six recommendations and one specifically for the USD(I). That recommendation states, "the USD(I) should examine the current DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate, as necessary, training standards based on a common essential body of knowledge, including Intelligence Community Directive 203, "Analytic Standards," January 2, 2015, for all entry level/ developmental intelligence professionals." We currently have a draft DoD Manual in staffing with OGC that will address this concern and it is attached.

Without formal core training standards and standardized analytic integrity processes and procedures, there is less assurance that senior intelligence leaders, supervisors, and intelligence analysts will be able to successfully mitigate potential analytical integrity issues. Each of the Intelligence Directorates interviewed agreed that there would be value in establishing baseline core analytical training across the Defense Intelligence Enterprise for both military and civilian analysts. While core training options are explored, developed and implemented, the commands and services should continue to send junior/mid-grade military personnel, assigned to analysis billets, to DIA's Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) Essentials course. The report notes that Commands have seen improvements in the quality of intelligence production from both military and civilian personnel who have completed PACE. Until a better training system is established PACE provides baseline fundamentals of analytical tradecraft and standards which will in turn will mitigate potential analytical integrity issues.

My point of contact for this office is [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Handwritten signature of Richard E. Matthews in black ink.  
Richard E. Matthews  
Director, Geographic Combatant  
Command Intelligence Support



## (U) U.S. Africa Command



**HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND**  
UNIT 29951  
APO AE 09751-9951

J2

19 November 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) J2 Response to Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes (Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0080.00)

1. USAFRICOM J2 concurs with the U. S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General suggested improvements to further support analytic integrity and maintain good internal communications processes.
2. In the concluding recommendations of a 2015-16 investigation into allegations related to the objectivity and politicization of USCENTCOM intelligence products, a key recommendation was that USCENTCOM consider developing anonymous means, such as email, suggestion box, or Ombudsman, for analysts to raise concerns about analytic integrity. In September the 2016, recognizing the value that analytic ombudsman can bring to Defense Intelligence, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program Board of Governors (DIAP BOG) recommended that all Defense Intelligence components establish an analytic ombudsman program by December 2016. The Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), Marcel Lettre, endorsed the DIAP BOG recommendation in January 2017. Per the Under Secretary's request, the Defense Intelligence Agency provided ombudsman program establishment guidance to components quickly thereafter.
3. USAFRICOM J2 established an Ombudsman Program in January 2017, and is developing a formal Analytic Integrity policy letter to complement the informal structures already in place. This official J2 Analytic Integrity policy letter will emphasize analytic excellence, integrity and rigor in analytic thinking and practices.
4. Management actions:
  - a. Established an USAFRICOM J2 ombudsman in Stuttgart, Germany in January 2017, and a second ombudsman in RAF Molesworth, United Kingdom, in April 2018.
  - b. The Stuttgart Ombudsman provides introductory education material regarding the Analytic Ombudsman program during a personal one-on-one J2 in-processing/on-boarding with all newly assigned personnel. There is also a J2 SIPR Ombudsman sharepoint webpage and regularly posted educational notes in monthly training newsletters.
  - c. The Stuttgart Ombudsman attended "New Ombudsman" training in September 2018 provided by the United States Ombudsman Association, and will attend mediation training in fiscal year 2019.


## (U) U.S. Africa Command (cont'd)

d. The RAF Molesworth Ombudsman is building the program in Molesworth, United Kingdom, using the Stuttgart model and is seeking initial ombudsman training through the Defense Intelligence Agency and Office of the Director of National Intelligence this fiscal year. He has completed the analytic component of the training recommended by the Defense Intelligence Agency Ombudsman.

e. The draft J2 Analytic Integrity policy letter will be signed by Commander, USAFRICOM by January 2019.

5. Additionally, USAFRICOM J2 initiated an internal analytic tradecraft training program in October 2016. The program addresses gaps in analytic training of civilian and military members. The 12-module training program has two modules specifically for ICD 203 and ODNI tradecraft standards. The training has been delivered twice to USAFRICOM J2 analysts at RAF Molesworth and Kelley Barracks, as well as military and civilians at USARAF and the USAFRICOM JRISE at Ft. Meade, Maryland. Additionally, the training is hosted on a JWICS portal and each branch chief/senior intelligence analyst makes use of the material for small-group training sessions, as necessary to account for personnel rotations.

6. The POC for this report is [REDACTED] DSN [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Unclass email: [REDACTED] or SIPR email: [REDACTED]



HEIDI K. BERG  
RDML, USN  
Director, J2

## (U) U.S. European Command



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND  
UNIT 30400  
APO AE 09131

November 15, 2018

[REDACTED]  
Project Manager  
Department of Defense Inspector General  
4800 Mark Center Drive  
Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500

Dear [REDACTED]

United States European Command (USEUCOM) has reviewed the draft report Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes (Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0080.000) and concurs with the recommendations as stated in the report.

With regard to recommendation A.2.b, that USEUCOM establish an analytic integrity policy, following the best practices provided by the Department of Defense Inspector General staff, I have promulgated an analytic integrity policy letter to the JIOCEUR enterprise. A copy of this is attached at Enclosure 1.

With regard to recommendation A.3.b, the Commander of the Joint Intelligence Operations Center Europe (JIOCEUR) Analytic Center (JAC) originally promulgated the Command's analytic ombuds policy to the workforce in February 2017. Following the initial readout of the DoD IG evaluation team's on-site visits to the USEUCOM Intelligence Directorate (J2) in Stuttgart, Germany, and the JAC at Royal Air Force Molesworth, United Kingdom, the JAC incorporated an overview and discussion of the analytic ombuds program during the monthly required newcomer's briefing. This overview includes an introduction to the program and its intent, and provision of information on the three analytic ombuds assigned to JIOCEUR.

The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED] JIOCEUR Analytic Center, [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

LAURA A. POTTER  
BG, USA

Enclosures (1)

**(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command**

**COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND  
(USINDOPACOM)  
CAMP H M SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028**

15 November 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General Intelligence and  
Special Program Assessments

SUBJECT: Response to Draft for the Evaluation of CCMD Intelligence Directorate Internal  
Communication Processes Project No. D2018-DISPA2-0080.000

We concur with your recommendations and will address as appropriate. Please see the attached  
matrix for additional comments.

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Loren A. Johnson", is positioned above the typed name.

LOREN A. JOHNSON  
Chief, Director's Action Group  
USINDOPACOM, Directorate for Intelligence

## (U) NORAD/U.S. Northern Command



**NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND  
AND  
UNITED STATES NORTHERN COMMAND**



14 November 2018

MEMORANDUM FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: NORAD and USNORTHCOM Response to Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes

1. North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) agree with the recommendations.
2. Recommendations A.3.d and recommendation A.6 were previously closed and noted in the report. We consider NORAD and USNORTHCOM's response as addressing all the recommendations.
3. Attached is the suggested response for recommendation A.2.c. The attached letter will be staffed for Commander, NORAD and USNORTHCOM signature. The expected completion date is 31 January 2019.
4. NORAD and USNORTHCOM did not identify any words or sentences exempt from public release. We concur with the final report being released without FOUO markings.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, appearing to read "M. Childers".

MICHAEL W. CHILDERS  
DISL, DIA  
Deputy Director of Intelligence

Attachment:  
Draft NORAD and USNORTHCOM Analytic Integrity Policy Memo

**(U) U.S. Southern Command**REPLY TO  
ATTENTION OF.**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY**  
UNITED STATES SOUTHERN COMMAND  
9301 NW 33RD STREET  
DORAL, FL 33172-1217

26 November 2018

**SUBJECT:** Concurrence with DODIG Project D-2018-DISPA2-0080.00, Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes

USSOUTHCOM J2 Directorate has reviewed the DoD IG report and concurs with the report as written. The SCJ2 Directorate will continue to cultivate an environment for analysts to express their thoughts and opinions without restrictions—promoting analytical integrity. Finally, the SCJ2 Directorate has taken immediate corrective action by including the Ombudsman as part of the newcomer orientation.

Comments from SC JIOC and NET are:

JIOC Comment: "...we were evaluated correctly by the IG team. No additional comment."

NET Comment: Page 17: Last sentence: "...prefer it read something like: the intelligence officers assigned to the NET comply with intelligence policies and procedures; however, they direct report to the NET Director, not the J2."

The SCJ2 Directorate will continue to strengthen its program of analysis by applying best practices captured in the DoD IG report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "D. G. Daley".

DANIEL G. DALEY  
Deputy J2, DISES  
Directorate for Intelligence

# (U) Defense Intelligence Agency



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



U-18-0002/SPP

To: Department of Defense Inspector General  
4800 Mark Center Drive  
Alexandria, VA 22320-1500

NOV 21 2018

Subject: DIA Review of Draft *Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes*, Project Number D2018-DISPA2-0080.000

1. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) has reviewed the Department of Defense (DoD) Inspector General's Draft *Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes*, Project Number D2018-DISPA2-0080.000, and concurs with its recommendations.

2. Recommendation A.5 requires that the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) issue formal notification to the combatant command analytic ombudsmen of mediation training opportunities. DIA concurs with this recommendation. The DIA Analytic Ombudsman serves as the Program Manager for the Defense Intelligence Ombuds program and conducts an annual data call for all issues or disputes fielded by each organization's ombudsman. Additionally, the DIA Analytic Ombudsman conducts a quarterly Request for Information (RFI) for newly assigned ombuds personnel or in response to requests for assistance and training. The most recent data call/training reminder was issued the latter half of September 2018. DIA will use the next quarterly engagement to notify combatant command (CCMD) analytic ombudsmen of mediation training opportunities.

3. DIA requests removal of the final sentence in each CCMD description on pages seven and eight of the draft report due to classification concerns.



Ronald J. Ringuette  
Chief, Strategic Planning, Policy, and  
Performance Management (SPP)

## Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>DIA</b>	Defense Intelligence Agency
<b>ICD</b>	Intelligence Community Directive
<b>J-2</b>	Director of Intelligence
<b>JAC</b>	JIOC-Europe (JIOCEUR) Analytic Center
<b>JIOC</b>	Joint Intelligence Operations Center
<b>JP</b>	Joint Publication
<b>NORAD</b>	North American Aerospace Defense Command
<b>O-6</b>	Paygrade designation for a U.S. Navy Captain, or an Army, Air Force, or Marine Corps Colonel
<b>ODNI</b>	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
<b>PACE</b>	Professional Analyst Career Education
<b>RAF</b>	Royal Air Force (station)
<b>USAFRICOM</b>	U.S. Africa Command
<b>USCENTCOM</b>	U.S. Central Command
<b>USD(I)</b>	Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
<b>USEUCOM</b>	U.S. European Command
<b>USINDOPACOM</b>	U.S. Indo-Pacific command
<b>USNORTHCOM</b>	U.S. Northern Command
<b>USSOUTHCOM</b>	U.S. Southern Command



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