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United States Department of State

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May 2020

Follow-Up Audit of Department of State Efforts To Measure, Evaluate, and Sustain Antiterrorism Assistance Objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

MIDDLE EAST REGION OPERATIONS

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HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

AUD-MERO-20-32

What OIG Audited

The Department of State (Department) Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program trains civilian security and law enforcement personnel in foreign countries in counterterrorism techniques. The Department's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) jointly manage the ATA program. In 2018, the Department spent \$182 million to carry out the ATA program, with approximately \$28 million dedicated to efforts implemented in partner countries that fall under the Department's Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP).

OIG conducted this follow-up audit to determine whether DS and CT have implemented corrective actions to address previous recommendations related to the ATA program and whether those actions have improved the Department's efforts to measure, evaluate, and sustain ATA program objectives in EAP. OIG conducted fieldwork for this audit in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

What OIG Recommends

OIG made four recommendations to CT and DS to further improve the execution of the ATA program in the EAP region. On the basis of CT's and DS's responses to a draft of this report, OIG considers all four recommendations resolved, pending further action. A synopsis of the comments addressing the recommendations offered and OIG's reply follow each recommendation in the Audit Results section of this report. CT's response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix D, DS's response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix E, and Embassy Bangkok's response is reprinted in Appendix F.

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What OIG Found

DS and CT have implemented corrective actions to warrant closure of 13 previously offered recommendations related to the ATA program, including 1 that was closed in February 2020. Specifically, OIG found that DS and CT had established a monitoring and evaluation process for the ATA program and had improved coordination with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor to ensure that ATA-designated countries were eligible for assistance. In addition, DS established standard operating procedures for contract oversight, including developing a standardized reporting process. These procedures verify compliance with contract terms and conditions as well as receipt of and payment for goods and services and execution of contract modifications. Furthermore, DS implemented a process to ensure weapons and equipment transfers were properly recorded and appropriate for the partner country.

Notwithstanding the aforementioned progress, OIG found that DS and CT need to take additional steps to ensure the established monitoring and evaluation process is followed and desired program results are achieved and accurately reported in accordance with Department policy. Specifically, in the EAP region, OIG found that neither DS nor CT consistently 1) establish baseline data and performance targets or report outcome data for the ATA programs in the region; 2) establish sustainability measures and timelines to determine when partner countries could sustain their antiterrorism programs without U.S. Government support; or 3) include information about ATA programs funded with regional and Department of Defense funds in quarterly progress reports. These conditions occurred, in part, because DS and CT have not clearly delegated responsibilities for the execution of monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. Until these conditions are addressed, DS and CT will be unable to fully measure ATA program performance in the EAP region or demonstrate that ATA country program goals and objectives are being achieved as intended.

CONTENTS

OBJECTIVE	1
BACKGROUND	1
ATA Program Management and Oversight	2
Previous OIG Reports on the ATA Program	3
The ATA Program in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs	5
AUDIT RESULTS	7
Finding A: DS and CT Established a Monitoring and Evaluation Process and Made Progress in Oversight of Contracts and Equipment.....	7
Finding B: Additional Steps Are Needed To Ensure Full Compliance With Established ATA Program Monitoring and Evaluation Process	15
RECOMMENDATIONS	24
APPENDIX A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology	25
Prior Reports	26
Work Related to Internal Controls	26
Use of Computer-Processed Data	27
Detailed Sampling Methodology.....	28
APPENDIX B: Status of Recommendations from Prior OIG Audits	29
APPENDIX C: Critical capabilities assessed by DS	31
APPENDIX D: Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism Response	32
APPENDIX E: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Response	35
APPENDIX F: U.S. Embassy Bangkok, Thailand, Response.....	37
ABBREVIATIONS	39
OIG AUDIT TEAM MEMBERS.....	40

OBJECTIVE

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this follow-up audit to determine whether the Department of State (Department) Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) have implemented corrective actions to address previous OIG recommendations and whether those actions have improved the Department's efforts to measure, evaluate, and sustain Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP).

BACKGROUND

In response to three bombings of U.S. diplomatic and military facilities in Lebanon in 1983, Congress established the International Security and Development Assistance Authorization Act. The Act created the ATA program and authorized the President to provide assistance to foreign countries for the purpose of enhancing the ability of their law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in acts of international terrorism.¹ Congress established the following objectives for the ATA program:

- To enhance the antiterrorism skills of friendly countries by providing training and equipment to deter and counter terrorism.
- To strengthen the bilateral ties of the United States with friendly governments by offering concrete assistance in deterring terrorism.
- To increase respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.²

To achieve these objectives, DS's Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA Office) has provided counterterrorism training to more than 150,000 law enforcement personnel from more than 150 countries since 1983. The training includes topics such as bomb detection and disposal, cyber terrorism, tactical medicine, and crisis response, among others. In addition to training, ATA is intended to enhance partner nation law enforcement capabilities by providing equipment, consultations, and mentorships. The ATA program was allocated \$182.6 million in FY 2018.

¹ Pub. L. No. 87-195, pt. II, § 571, as amended by Pub. L. No. 98-151 § 101 (b)(2), 97 Stat. 972 (1983) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa).

² 22 U.S.C. § 2349aa-1, "Purposes."

ATA Program Management and Oversight

DS and CT jointly manage and oversee the ATA program worldwide. The Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) contains specific requirements for both DS and CT regarding the ATA program.³ The Department also publishes guidance on program monitoring and evaluation.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security Office of Antiterrorism Assistance

The FAM designates DS as the primary implementer of the ATA program for program administration and implementation, in coordination with CT.⁴ Specifically, DS's ATA Office is responsible for developing training curricula; selecting trainers; planning and executing training; collecting monitoring data; and submitting quarterly, annual progress, and financial reports to CT. The FAM also requires DS (in particular, DS/T/ATA), in conjunction with CT, to develop annual country implementation plans that are based on capabilities assessments of partner nation law enforcement.⁵ To manage and support the training, the ATA Office issues task orders against three indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contracts: a staffing contract awarded to Miracle Systems, LLC, that provides program management personnel;⁶ the Global Antiterrorism Assistance II contract awarded to DECO, Inc. that provides instructors with skills and background in law enforcement;⁷ and a facility maintenance contract awarded to Lumbee Tribe Enterprises, LLC, that provides support to training sites overseas.⁸ Additionally, the ATA Office awarded a warehouse contract to Olgoonik Federal, LLC, that provides equipment storage and shipping support.⁹

The Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism

The FAM designates CT as the principal advisor to the Department on International counterterrorism strategy, policy, and operations and the director of the Department's counterterrorism programs.¹⁰ CT is responsible for policy formulation, strategic guidance, and oversight for the ATA program.¹¹ In coordination with the Department's Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources, CT makes the final recommendation regarding which countries should receive ATA program assistance.¹² CT then develops strategic goals, conducts threat analyses,

³ 1 FAM 262.5-1, "Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA)."

⁴ 1 FAM 262.5-1 (1), "Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA)."

⁵ 1 FAM 262.5-1(A) (1), "Assessment, Review and Evaluation Staff."

⁶ Contract GS0-0Q-14-OADS-128, task order S-AQM-MA-17-F-2030.

⁷ Contract S-AQM-MA-17-D-0137, task order S-AQM-MA-17-F-2552. The Global Antiterrorism Assistance II contract was preceded by the Global Antiterrorism Assistance contract, which had been in effect since June 22, 2011.

⁸ Contract 19-AQM-M-18-D-0150, task order 19-AQM-M-18-F-4010.

⁹ Contract S-AQM-MA-17-C-0190.

¹⁰ 1 FAM 481.1a, "Coordinator for Counterterrorism (CT)."

¹¹ 1 FAM 262.5-1 (1), "Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA)."

¹² Department of State Memorandum of Agreement Between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, May 12, 2015, 4.

and provides budget projections for inclusion in multi-year country and regional strategies.¹³ Additionally, CT is responsible for coordinating with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) to ensure that countries and individuals participating in the ATA program have not committed human rights violations.¹⁴ This type of vetting is required by the Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.¹⁵

Department Monitoring and Evaluation Guidance

The FAM also states that bureaus “must develop a monitoring plan for their programs or projects and incorporate its use into program and project management.”¹⁶ A monitoring plan involves “regular, ongoing data collection against key performance indicators.”¹⁷ The Office of U.S. Foreign Assistance Resources and the Bureau of Budget and Planning published the Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit to help Department personnel better manage projects and programs.¹⁸ In keeping with the FAM’s own provisions, the Toolkit defines monitoring as “ongoing data collection against key performance indicators or milestones to gauge the direct and near-term effects of program activities and whether desired results are occurring as expected during program implementation and whether adjustments may be needed.”¹⁹ The Toolkit defines evaluation as “the systematic collection and analysis of information about the characteristics and outcomes of programs, projects, or processes as a basis for making judgements, improving effectiveness, and informing decision-makers about current and future activities.”

Previous OIG Reports on the ATA Program

Since 2012, OIG has issued three reports regarding the management and oversight of the ATA program.²⁰

First, in its 2012 report titled *Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs* (AUD-MERO-12-29, April 2012), OIG reported that DS and CT had not developed specific, measurable, and outcome-oriented objectives for the ATA program. OIG also reported that DS and CT had not established a means for evaluating progress against those objectives, nor had they established

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ 1 FAM 262.5-1 (4), “Office of Antiterrorism Assistance (DS/T/ATA).”

¹⁵ Section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2378d.

¹⁶ 18 FAM 301.4-3, “Monitoring.”

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Toolkit was published in February 2017 and superseded the previous guidance, *The Performance Management Guidebook*.

¹⁹ Department of State’s “Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit” February 2017, 42.

²⁰ In addition to the three reports on ATA, OIG also issued *Audit of Monitoring and Evaluating DOS Foreign Assistance in the Philippines* (AUD-MERO-19-39). Although the report did not focus specifically on ATA, it made two recommendations to DS and CT related to monitoring and evaluation. This audit did not examine compliance with these recommendations because the report was not completed before this audit was initiated.

a mechanism to determine when partner countries could sustain their own ATA programs without U.S. support. In addition, OIG reported that DS and CT were not consulting with DRL when selecting partner countries or to determine the type of assistance that should be provided to those countries. Furthermore, DS had not appointed a Contracting Officer's Representative (COR) to provide oversight of contractor-provided ATA program training or developed a standardized reporting process for ensuring that the contractor was meeting contract requirements. Finally, OIG reported that equipment records were incomplete, equipment provided to partner countries sometimes went unused or was incompatible with the partner country's existing equipment, and, in some instances, equipment provided exceeded the country's needs.

In May and November 2017, OIG issued compliance follow-up reviews that assessed whether the recommendations in its 2012 report had improved management in Pakistan and oversight of the ATA program in Afghanistan. In one report, *Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Pakistan* (AUD-MERO-17-37, May 2017), OIG reported that actions taken to address the April 2012 recommendations did not achieve the desired results necessary to measure the ATA program's effectiveness in Pakistan. In another report, *Although Progress Has Been Made, Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-18-16, November 2017), OIG reported that, although partial improvements in the monitoring and evaluation of the ATA program had been made, the actions taken to address recommendations from OIG's April 2012 report did not achieve desired results with respect to the monitoring and evaluation of the ATA program in Afghanistan.

DS and CT have since taken actions sufficient to close all 13 recommendations offered in OIG's 3 previous reports regarding the ATA program. (See Table B-1 in Appendix B for a summary of previous recommendations and the status.) Figure 1 identifies the countries that have been audited in prior OIG reports and the countries included in this audit.

Figure 1: Countries Reviewed in OIG’s Reports on the Antiterrorism Assistance Program



Boundary representation is not necessarily authoritative.

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Source: OIG-generated from an analysis of previous OIG reports on the ATA program and audit fieldwork specific to this compliance follow-up audit.

The ATA Program in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

The ATA Program receives funding from three sources in the EAP region. These sources include 1) bilateral and regional Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs funding, which is authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for the purpose of deterring international terrorism and halting the proliferation of nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional weapons;²¹ 2) the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund,²² which is authorized for the purpose of building partnerships in countries where terrorist networks are attempting to establish a foothold;²³ and 3) the Department of Defense, which provides funding as authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act.²⁴ Table 1 shows the sources and amounts of ATA funding allocated to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand from FY 2017 to FY 2019.

²¹ Section 581 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. 2349bb.

²² The Counterterrorism Partnership Fund is a CT-run program, also funded through Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs funds.

²³ Department of State, “Bureau of Counterterrorism – Programs and initiatives” Counterterrorism Partnership Fund, <https://state.gov/bureau-of-counterterrorism-programs-and-initiatives/>.

²⁴ 10 U.S.C. 16 § 333 “Foreign security forces: authority to build capacity.”

Table 1: ATA Funding Allocated to Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand from FY 2017 to FY 2019 (Thousands)

Country/Funding Source	FY 2017	FY 2018	FY 2019 ^b	FY 2017–2019
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs Funding				
Indonesia	\$ 4,500	\$ 4,500	\$ 0	\$ 9,000
Philippines	5,500	5,500	0	11,000
Thailand	1,000	600	0	1,600
Regional ^a	1,500	1,600	0	3,100
Subtotal	12,500	12,200	0	24,700
Counterterrorism Partnership Fund				
Indonesia	2,000	5,025	0	7,025
Philippines	20,500	11,000	0	31,500
Subtotal	22,500	16,025	0	38,525
National Defense Authorization Act Funding				
Indonesia			12,935	12,935
Total	\$35,000	\$28,225	\$12,935	\$76,160

^a The ATA Office conducts some training that includes participants from countries with active ATA programs in the EAP region. Currently, these participants include Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

^b As of February 2020, the ATA program is still spending down FY 2017 and FY 2018 allocations of Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related Programs and the Counterterrorism Partnership Fund funding in the EAP region; therefore, DS has not yet allocated FY 2019 funding.

Source: OIG analysis of ATA program funding data provided by DS.

The Government of Indonesia has participated in the ATA program since 2003, receiving 129 courses for 2,419 participants from FY 2017 to FY 2020. Courses conducted during this time included topics such as investigating terrorist incidents, explosive incident countermeasures, and investigating the dark web. Investigative skills training focused on building the capacity of Indonesia's primary counterterrorism units to conduct investigations that detect terrorist activity. In addition to training courses, the ATA program provides mentors who embed within police units to advise on topics such as crisis response, bomb disposal, and cyber-attacks.

The Government of the Philippines has participated in the ATA program since 1986, receiving 173 courses for 3,362 participants from FY 2017 to FY 2020. Courses conducted during this time included topics such as critical infrastructure security, crisis response, tactical medicine, and airport physical security. In addition, the ATA program offered courses to build the capacity of Filipino law enforcement to use digital forensic technology, investigate the dark web, and conduct social media investigations. Like the ATA program in Indonesia, the ATA program in the Philippines provides mentors who embed within police units to advise on crisis response, bomb disposal, and cyber attacks. In October 2019, U.S. and Philippine officials broke ground on a \$10 million counterterrorism training facility that will be jointly operated by the ATA program and specialized Philippine National Police units and provide training for law enforcement personnel from the Philippines and other ATA nations in the EAP region.

The Kingdom of Thailand has participated in the ATA program since 1989, receiving 32 courses for 559 participants from FY 2017 to FY 2020. Courses conducted during this time included topics such as interdicting terrorist activities, managing terrorist investigations, and identification of homemade explosives. These courses support ATA programmatic objectives to improve Thailand’s terrorist investigative capabilities as well as “their ability to search for, identify, render safe, mitigate, and dispose of improvised explosive devices...and collect related evidence to use for prosecution.”²⁵



Figure 2: ATA-trained explosive detection canine team in Thailand. (Source: OIG photograph taken October 2019).



Figure 3: ATA-trained personnel in Thailand operating explosive detection equipment. Vehicle was not provided by ATA program. (Source: OIG photograph taken October 2019).

AUDIT RESULTS

Finding A: DS and CT Established a Monitoring and Evaluation Process and Made Progress in Oversight of Contracts and Equipment

OIG found that DS and CT have implemented corrective actions to warrant closure of all 13 previously offered recommendations related to the ATA program, including 1 recommendation²⁶ that was closed in February 2020. OIG found that DS and CT had established a monitoring and evaluation process for the ATA program and had improved coordination with DRL to ensure ATA-designated countries were eligible for assistance. DS also established standard operating procedures for contract oversight, including developing a standardized reporting process, procedures that verify compliance with contract terms and conditions, as

²⁵ FYs 2018–2020 Thailand Country Implementation Plan, 1.

²⁶ In particular, OIG closed Recommendation 1 from OIG’s Management Assistance Report regarding the ATA program in Pakistan (AUD-MERO-17-37), called for CT, in coordination with DS, to implement a monitoring and evaluation system to include measuring program performance in accordance with Department guidance.

well as receipt of and payment for goods and services. Likewise, DS established standard procedures for executing contract modifications. Furthermore, DS implemented a process to ensure weapons and equipment transfers were properly recorded and appropriate for the partner country.

DS and CT Established an ATA Monitoring and Evaluation Process

In its April 2012 report, OIG reported that DS could not determine whether the ATA program was effective because it had not implemented a means for program evaluation. Accordingly, OIG recommended that the Department establish a monitoring and evaluation process. In this audit, OIG found that DS and CT had, in fact, established such a monitoring and evaluation process and was applying it to ATA programs reviewed in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand.

Capabilities Assessments and Country Implementation Plans

In May 2015, DS and CT executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that outlines joint responsibilities for assessing, monitoring, and evaluating the ATA program. For example, the MOA states that, once a country is selected to receive ATA, CT and DS should jointly produce a “capabilities assessment.”²⁷ In that assessment, DS evaluates the country’s law enforcement counterterrorism capabilities in border security, explosives incidents countermeasures, and forensic examinations, among others (see Table C-1 in Appendix C for a list of critical capabilities assessed by DS). For example, DS assessed the Thai explosive ordnance disposal teams and concluded they did not use screening procedures; therefore, DS recommended additional training. DS also assessed the responsiveness of the Indonesian police and concluded that the special operations branch needed improvement and that training was required. In addition, DS assessed the capabilities of Filipino crisis responders and concluded that few had training in tactical medicine and recommended that the responders obtain more training. The MOA states that capabilities assessments will be conducted for each country receiving ATA every 2 to 3 years, depending on program size.²⁸

The capabilities assessments and conclusions are then used to develop country implementation plans that identify training courses that meet CT’s and DS’s goals and objectives established for each partner country. For example, the implementation plan for Thailand recommends that DS provide “post-blast investigation” and “bomb technician mentorship” courses. The implementation plan for Indonesia states that the training “interdicting terrorist activities” should be provided. The implementation plan for the Philippines recommended training on “tactical medicine.” These country implementation plans are reviewed and approved by the Regional Security Officer at the U.S. Embassy, CT’s Office of Programs, and DS’s ATA Office.

²⁷ Department of State Memorandum of Agreement Between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, May 12, 2015, 8.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

Once the implementation plan is approved, DS's ATA Training Execution Division implements the trainings.

Monitoring and Evaluation Plans

The MOA between DS and CT states, “[m]onitoring provides an indication of progress against goals and indicators of performance, reveals whether desired results are occurring, and confirms whether implementation is on track.”²⁹ The MOA states that CT, in collaboration with DS, will draft monitoring plans for each partner nation receiving ATA and that “the method of and responsibility for data collection against each [draft monitoring plans] indicator will be jointly decided by DS and CT.” The MOA further specifies that DS will submit quarterly reports to CT that include “a list of courses implemented in the reporting period; a schedule of projected courses for the next three months; data on . . . indicators for which the ATA Office is responsible with accompanying narrative explanations; a list of courses canceled and why; success stories; noteworthy photos; and, course and student feedback . . .”³⁰

The MOA states that CT is responsible for evaluating “ATA program outcomes and progress toward achieving strategic goals and sustainability.”³¹ The MOA defines evaluation as “the systematic and objective collection and analysis of information about the characteristics and outcomes of programs and projects as a basis for judgments, to assess effects and impacts, improve effectiveness, and/or inform decisions about current and future programming.”³² CT sometimes contracts with third-party contractors to carry out these responsibilities. CT also consults with DS on whether to implement the recommended actions resulting from evaluations. CT is currently conducting a review of projects implemented in the Philippines and Indonesia that are funded by the Counterterrorism Partnerships Fund, some of which include antiterrorism training. Figure 4 summarizes the ATA monitoring and evaluation process.

²⁹ Department of State Memorandum of Agreement Between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, May 12, 2015, 9.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 10.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

³² *Ibid.*, 1.

Figure 4: The Antiterrorism Assistance Monitoring and Evaluation Process



Source: OIG analysis of the monitoring and evaluation process outlined in the 2015 MOA between DS and CT.

To assist in their monitoring and evaluation efforts, in 2019, DS and CT developed the ATA Monitoring Plan. The Plan lists program goals and objectives, as well as output performance indicators, and short- and long-term outcome performance indicators that DS and CT use to evaluate the progress toward meeting program goals and objectives.³³ Specifically, the Plan established 73 performance indicators across the 9 “functional areas,”³⁴ 35 output performance indicators, 20 short-term outcome performance indicators, and 18 long-term outcome performance indicators. According to the ATA Monitoring Plan, DS’s ATA Assessment and Monitoring Unit then develops individualized monitoring plans for each country. For illustrative purposes, Table 2 shows the objective and output and short- and long-term outcome performance indicators for Functional Area 1: Investigations.

³³ According to the Department’s *Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit*, “long-term outcome indicators describe system- or societal-level results, and can focus on behavior, normative, and policy changes the program seeks to achieve.” “Short-term outcome indicators describe the immediate effects of the program and often focus on changes to the knowledge and attitudes of the program’s beneficiaries or customers.” “Output indicators are the direct, tangible results of program activities.”

³⁴ The nine functional areas in the ATA Monitoring Plan are: 1. Investigations, 2. Border Security, 3. Crisis Response, 4. Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 5. Protection of National Leadership, 6. Law Enforcement Management, 7. Bomb Disposal Unit, 8. Countering Foreign Terrorist Fighters and Violent Extremism, and 9. Institutionalization.

Table 2: Objective and Output and Short- and Long-Term Outcome Performance Indicators for Functional Area 1 (Investigations)

Objective 1: Partner Nation’s law enforcement units will improve investigation capabilities to collect, organize, and share information regarding terrorist activities.

Performance Indicator 1.1 – Output Measures

- 1.1.a. Number of participants that completed ATA-provided investigations-related training.
- 1.1.b. Percentage of ATA-provided investigations-related training courses where scores increased by at least 25 percent from the Pre- to Post-Knowledge Survey.
- 1.1.c. Percentage of ATA-provided equipment delivered to training event in accordance with training delivery schedule.
- 1.1.d. Number of participants who completed the entire ATA-provided investigations package program.

Performance Indicator 1.2 – Short Term Outcome Measures

- 1.2.a. Percentage of participants who report using newly learned investigative knowledge and skills from ATA-provided training in operations.
- 1.2.b. Percentage of participants who stayed in an investigations-related unit following ATA-provided training in investigations.

Performance Indicator 1.3 – Long Term Outcome Measures

- 1.3.a. Percentage of terrorism-related cases in which ATA-provided knowledge and skills were used that were accepted for prosecution.
- 1.3.b. Percentage of successful prosecutions for terrorist activity.

Source: OIG analysis of ATA performance objectives and indicators specific to investigations provided by CT.

DS and CT Improved Coordination With DRL on Designating Countries Eligible for Assistance

In its April 2012 report, OIG reported that DS and CT were not consulting with DRL when selecting partner countries or engaging DRL to determine whether the countries were eligible for ATA program assistance. OIG recommended that DS and CT, in coordination with DRL, establish and implement a process that ensures effective consultation with DRL on the designation of countries eligible for assistance. In August 2012, OIG closed the recommendation on the basis of DS’s publication of its Office Policy Directive 06-2012, Modification 1. The Directive outlined how CT and DS will consult DRL. It explained that CT is responsible for consulting with DRL on program planning and that DS, along with the Regional Security Office at each applicable embassy, is responsible for coordinating the vetting of individual program participants to determine eligibility.

In this compliance follow-up audit, OIG confirmed that CT has consulted with DRL on program planning and provided updates when necessary, such as when CT considers establishing a program in a new country or when the human rights environment significantly changes within an existing partner country. For example, DRL officials said that CT and DRL communicated on the conduct of specific units, particularly whether they respected human rights, when

responding to the seizure of the city of Marawi in the Philippines in 2017 by local terrorist groups. As an additional protection to ensure human rights violators do not receive U.S. assistance, DRL officials reported that they have developed a system for flagging military and police units that have potentially committed human rights violations. DRL flags military and police units in the International Vetting and Security Tracking System, which is then used by DS's ATA Office for "Leahy vetting."³⁵ Previously, the International Vetting and Security Tracking System was used only to vet individual students.

DS Established Standard Operating Procedures for Oversight of Contracts

In its 2012 and 2017 reports, OIG reported the need for a standardized report process, procedures to verify compliance with contract terms and conditions, and procedures to verify receipt and payment of goods and services. The reports also identified a need to issue formal contract modifications before allowing changes to the terms and conditions of the contract.

Standardized Reporting Process Established

In its April 2012 report, OIG reported that DS was not providing adequate oversight of contractor-provided ATA program training.³⁶ OIG recommended that DS implement a standardized reporting process for in-country oversight of ATA contracts. In June 2013, OIG closed the recommendation after receiving confirmation that DS required personnel to provide written confirmation of contractor compliance with task order and contract requirements. As of September 2017, these requirements included a series of standardized reports incorporated into the contract.

In this compliance follow-up audit, OIG found that DS had implemented a standard reporting process. Specifically, OIG found that DS personnel collected training reports as directed by the Global Antiterrorism Assistance II Contract. These reports included an arrival report noting the status of instructors or all participants, an opening day report noting the number of course participants as cross-check with Leahy vetted participant list, a weekly training report noting course status and providing any significant events or concerns regarding ongoing training, a closing report noting completion status of the class, and after action reports. These reports were verified by Contracting Officer's Representatives (COR) involved with the ATA program. Finally, ATA Monitoring Unit personnel verify the effectiveness of the training as part of their monitoring and assessment process.

³⁵ According to DRL (<https://www.state.gov/key-topics-bureau-of-democracy-human-rights-and-labor/human-rights/leahy-law-fact-sheet/>), the term "Leahy vetting" refers to requirements outlined in two statutory provisions that prohibit the U.S. Government from using funds for assistance to units of foreign security forces in which credible information implicates that unit in the commission of a gross violation of human rights. One statutory provision applies to the Department, and the other applies to the Department of Defense. The provision relevant to the Department law was made permanent under section 620M of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. § 2378d.

³⁶ *Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs* (AUD-MERO-12-29, April 2012), 1.

Procedures To Verify Compliance With Contract Terms and Conditions Established

In its May 2017 report addressing the ATA program in Pakistan, OIG reported that the individual assigned to oversee ATA contract activities was not officially designated as a COR or Government Technical Monitor.³⁷ Moreover, the individual was not performing required oversight duties, such as documenting oversight activities and reporting to the Contracting Officer on whether the contractor is performing in accordance with contract terms. OIG recommended that DS develop and implement procedures to verify compliance with contract reporting requirements in the Global Antiterrorism Training Assistance contract as well as compliance with the reporting requirements in the MOA between CT and DS.

In this compliance follow-up review, OIG found that CORs were following procedures appropriate to each contract to ensure the goods or services complied with the contract terms and conditions. For example, the COR for the Global Antiterrorism Assistance II Contract ensured that instructors met necessary qualifications prior to being hired. In another example, the Miracle Systems COR ensured that contractors hired to act as program management personnel met the same Office of Personnel Management standards as direct-hire personnel would be required to meet.

Procedures To Verify Receipt and Payment of Goods Established

In its May 2017 audit report, OIG found that the COR was not ensuring that all contractually required reports were being submitted.³⁸ OIG recommended that DS develop and implement procedures to verify that the COR has appropriate documentation to support the receipt and payment of goods or services prior to approving invoices for payment in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Handbook.

In this compliance follow-up audit, OIG found that the CORs for the Global Antiterrorism Assistance II Contract and the Miracle Systems Contract verified receipt of services for their respective contracts, as discussed above. The direct-hire GS COR for the Olgoonik Warehouse contract verified the receipt of goods ordered from or shipped to the Northern Virginia warehouse.

Procedures To Verify Written Contract Modifications Established

In its May 2017 audit report, OIG found that the COR waived contractually required monthly program and financial management reports in lieu of undocumented weekly phone conferences with CT and DS officials. OIG recommended that the Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, develop and implement procedures to verify that the ATA program Contracting Officer is preparing and issuing written contract modifications when

³⁷ *Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Pakistan* (AUD-MERO-17-37, May 2017), 2.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 15.

necessary to alter the terms of a contract, in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Handbook. In September 2017, OIG closed Recommendation 4 on the basis of the Bureau of Administration's reminder to its DS contracts division to follow policies and procedures and a memorandum dated July 2017 that provided evidence of two recent modifications that formally documented changes made by the previous Contracting Officer.

In this compliance follow-up audit, OIG found that the CORs were physically collocated with the DS ATA Staff. OIG considers this sufficient oversight of the contracts and did not find any instances in which the contract terms and conditions were not followed.

DS Established Procedures To Ensure Recording of All Weapons Transfers

In its April 2012 report, OIG reported that DS was not maintaining accurate records of weapons transferred to partner countries.³⁹ OIG recommended that DS periodically validate its "End Use Monitor" database to correct the deficiency identified. In March 2014, OIG closed the recommendation when it received documentation describing DS's process of conducting quarterly inventory and bi-annual inspections of equipment transferred to partner countries. The documentation noted that, in alternating years, the Regional Security Officer reviews the partner country's inventory certification.

In this compliance follow-up audit, OIG confirmed that DS's ATA Office maintains several systems to track and monitor equipment that is transferred to partner countries. The first is a procurement tracking system that records the equipment needs lists and tracks the equipment procurement until it is received at the ATA warehouse in Virginia. Once received, the equipment is entered into a database called the Warehouse Information System Expert that tracks the equipment through delivery to the ATA country program. After receipt, each ATA country program adds the equipment to its own inventory or transfers the equipment to an officer or unit of the partner nation. For example, in Indonesia, the equipment is granted to an officer of the partner nation as part of graduation from an ATA course or is maintained on the inventory list at an ATA facility for training purposes. In contrast, in the Philippines, all equipment is used by the ATA program for training purposes and is maintained in that country's inventory. In addition, all weapons that are transferred are subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.⁴⁰ To comply with 22 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 2785, DS's ATA Office conducts end-use monitoring after transferring equipment to partner nations to ensure that the person receiving the equipment is using it in accordance with that law.⁴¹ OIG also found that DS's ATA Office developed and implemented an end-use monitoring inspection system that monitors a partner country's equipment every 3 years. Contractors working for DS stated that, prior to each inspection, they validate the equipment lists against the procurement tracking system and the DS warehouse information system to ensure their inventory lists are complete. Furthermore, OIG confirmed that the ATA Office conducted an end-use monitoring inspection

³⁹ OIG, AUD-MERO-12-29, 1.

⁴⁰ 22 U.S.C. § 120.1, "General Authorities, Receipt of Licenses, and Ineligibility."

⁴¹ 22 U.S.C. § 2785, "End-Use Monitoring of Defense Articles and Defense Services."

for Indonesia in 2017 and another for Thailand in 2018. The Philippines had not been inspected because it only began receiving equipment in 2018 and, therefore, the inspection should occur in 2021, in keeping with the 3-year inspection cycle. Finally, during audit fieldwork, OIG conducted a spot check on the equipment provided to the Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand ATA programs and found all weapons were recorded accurately.

DS Implemented a Process To Verify That Equipment Provided Is Appropriate

In its April 2012 report, OIG also reported that DS had purchased equipment that was sometimes not used, was incompatible with the partner country's existing equipment, and, in some instances, exceeded the country's needs. OIG recommended that DS establish a process for determining equipment needs. In November 2012, OIG closed the recommendation because DS had issued Office Policy Directive 08-2012, which required coordination between the various DS offices to ensure equipment purchased met the needs of the partner country.

In this compliance follow-up audit, OIG confirmed that multiple DS offices implemented measures to ensure that equipment provided to partner countries is appropriate and met the needs of the partner country. For example, OIG found evidence that the Training Management Division coordinates with the Regional Program Managers or Regional Security Officers on equipment needs. According to DS officials, closer coordination allows the Regional Program Managers or Regional Security Officers to have more input in determining the type and amount of equipment needed because they are more knowledgeable of the needs of the partner country. Finally, OIG found that the Assessment and Monitoring Unit is now assessing the need and appropriateness of the equipment during their monitoring activities in partner countries.

Finding B: Additional Steps Are Needed To Ensure Full Compliance With Established ATA Program Monitoring and Evaluation Process

Notwithstanding the progress outlined in Finding A of this report, OIG also found that DS and CT need to take additional steps to ensure the established monitoring and evaluation process is followed and that desired program results are achieved and accurately reported in accordance with Department policy. Specifically, in the ATA partner countries Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, OIG found that neither DS or CT consistently 1) establish baseline data and performance targets or report outcome data for the ATA programs in the region, 2) establish sustainability measures and timelines to determine when partner countries could sustain their antiterrorism program without U.S. Government support, and 3) include information about ATA programs funded with regional and Department of Defense funds in quarterly progress reports. These conditions occurred, in part, because DS and CT have not clearly delegated responsibilities for the execution of monitoring, evaluation, and reporting. Until these conditions are addressed, DS and CT will be unable to fully measure ATA program performance in the EAP region or demonstrate that intended ATA country program goals and objectives are being achieved.

DS Did Not Establish Baselines or Targets for All Performance Indicators

Department bureaus are required to develop performance indicators and collect baseline data for these performance indicators “before or at the start of a program or project to provide a basis for planning and monitoring subsequent progress.”⁴² In addition, bureaus must “set targets for each performance indicator to indicate the expected change over the course of each period of performance.”⁴³ For this compliance follow-up audit, OIG analyzed the fourth quarter DS quarterly reports submitted to CT in November 2019 and found that none of the reports included baseline data upon which to measure progress. Training courses held in Indonesia and the Philippines had 36 performance indicators in distinct functional areas. The Indonesia quarterly report, which included 14 performance indicators in the Investigations and Crisis Response functional areas, did not include any baseline values upon which to assess progress. The Philippines quarterly report included 22 performance indicators in the Border Security, Crisis Response, and Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience functional areas and likewise did not include baseline values upon which to assess progress.⁴⁴

OIG also found that the fourth quarter reports for Indonesia and the Philippines did not include performance targets for 12 of 36 (33 percent) performance indicators. Only 4 of 14 performance indicators in the Indonesia quarterly report included performance targets. Likewise, the Philippines quarterly report included performance targets for only 8 of 22 performance indicators in the Border Security, Crisis Response, and Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience functional areas.⁴⁵

Quarterly Reports Did Not Consistently Include Long-Term Outcome and Output Data

Bureaus are required to develop performance indicators to help determine whether “implementation is on track or if any timely corrections or adjustments may be needed to improve efficiency or effectiveness.”⁴⁶ The 2015 MOA between DS and CT states that DS’s ATA Office will collect data addressing the performance indicators and submit them to CT in quarterly reports for each ATA partner country program. OIG found that, although the MOA was signed in May 2015, DS did not submit quarterly reports to CT until November 2019. In addition, OIG analyzed the FY 2019 quarterly reports for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand and found the training courses executed during this time period should have been reported using 36 of the 73 performance indicators established in the Country Implementation Plan and tracked by performance goals in the Monitoring Plan.⁴⁷ According to the Monitoring

⁴² 18 FAM 301.4-3 “Monitoring.”

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ With respect to Thailand, no ATA program courses were held in the fourth quarter of FY 2019.

⁴⁵ Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, Quarterly Report Philippines, July – September 2019, 7.

⁴⁶ 18 FAM 301.4-3 “Monitoring.”

⁴⁷ ATA country implementation plans establish which performance goals will be tracked, and the Monitoring Plan establishes which performance indicators will be tracked on the basis of established performance goals.

Plan, the 36 performance indicators included 15 measuring outputs—10 measuring short-term outcomes and 11 measuring long-term outcomes.

OIG found, however, that the Indonesia and the Philippines quarterly reports included only 6 of the 15 (40 percent) output measures and none of the 11 included long-term outcome measures required by the FAM.⁴⁸ OIG analyzed the functional areas for which courses were executed during the fourth quarter of FY 2019 and found that the Indonesia quarterly report listed 14 performance indicators with 6 measuring outputs, 4 measuring short-term outcomes, and 4 measuring long-term outcomes. However, the quarterly report did not provide any data associated with long-term outcomes. Similarly, OIG found that the quarterly report for the ATA program in the Philippines listed 22 different performance indicators in functional areas for which courses were executed, with 9 measuring outputs, 6 measuring short-term outcomes, and 7 measuring long-term outcomes. The quarterly report did not provide data for any of the nine output indicators, nor did it include data for any of the seven long-term outcome indicators. Without these data, DS and CT are unable to track progress on performance indicators. Table 3 shows the number of performance indicators, both output and outcome measures, tracked by functional area for ATA program in Indonesia and the Philippines in the fourth quarter of FY 2019.

⁴⁸ The Thailand quarterly report stated that no courses were delivered during the fourth quarter of FY 2019 and, therefore, no performance indicators exist.

Table 3: Performance Indicator Data Reported in FY 2019 Fourth Quarter Reports Regarding the ATA Program in Indonesia and the Philippines

Country and Functional Area	Output Measures	Outcome Measures	
		Short-Term	Long-Term
Indonesia Performance Indicators			
Investigations			
Country Implementation Plan	3	2	2
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	3	2	0
Crisis Response			
Country Implementation Plan	3	2	2
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	3	2	0
Indonesia Subtotals			
Country Implementation Plan	6	4	4
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	6	4	0
Philippines Performance Indicators			
Crisis Response			
Country Implementation Plan	3	2	2
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	0	2	0
Border Security			
Country Implementation Plan	3	2	3
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	0	2	0
Critical Infrastructure Security			
Country Implementation Plan	3	2	2
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	0	2	0
Philippines Subtotals			
Country Implementation Plan	9	6	7
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	0	6	0
Total for Indonesia and the Philippines			
Country Implementation Plan	15	10	11
4 th Quarter FY 2019 Quarterly Report	6	10	0

Source: OIG analysis of Indonesia and Philippines DS/ATA Quarterly Reports, July–September 2019.

Monitoring and Evaluation System Does Not Measure Sustainability

According to the FAM, bureaus and independent offices, which include DS and CT, are required to conduct a situational analysis during the program design phase, which includes “a review of the current state or conditions surrounding the program or project idea that could affect its design, implementation, or outcome.”⁴⁹ In addition, according to the Department’s *Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit*, “sustainability issues should be considered during program design by conducting a Sustainability Analysis as part of your situational analysis.”⁵⁰ Moreover, the ATA Monitoring Plan establishes performance indicators for each of

⁴⁹ 18 FAM 301.4-2 “Program/Project Design.”

⁵⁰ Department of State’s “Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit” February 2017, 20.

the nine functional areas, including for “institutionalization,” with the objective that “Partner Nation will improve their ability to sustain ATA-provided training and infrastructure.”⁵¹

OIG analyzed ATA monitoring and evaluation documentation for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, including country implementation plans and quarterly reports from FY 2018 to FY 2020. OIG found that the “institutionalization” functional area was absent from the country implementation plans and quarterly reports for each of the three countries audited. That is, although documentation showed that the ATA program in each partner country had sustainability as a goal when the ATA program was designed, no evidence existed that DS or CT conducted a sustainability analysis for any of the ATA programs. For example, the FYs 2018–2020 country implementation plan for Indonesia states, “[t]he challenge for the ATA program in Indonesia is to continue to build and sustain the counterterrorism capacities of several key law enforcement units” and “[t]he ATA program will do this by more narrowly focusing its assistance on institutionalizing the capacity of a few select units.”⁵² However, the Indonesia quarterly reports—like those for Thailand and the Philippines—had no performance indicators that measured progress toward these goals.

According to DS’s ATA Office, during monitoring trips, it surveys training participants on aspects of sustainability, including whether the participants have shared what they have learned from their training with their colleagues, co-workers, or supervisors as well as the extent to which ATA training information had been incorporated into their organization’s training program or standard operating procedures. Additionally, in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, the ATA Office conducts “train-the-trainer” courses to enable partner nation officials to continue training others on the antiterrorism skills, knowledge, and techniques they have learned. For example, the ATA Office held a train-the-trainer course on Airport Physical Security in the Philippines. According to the ATA Office, participants in this training served as assistant trainers for a subsequent Airport Physical Security course. However, OIG found that ATA Monitoring Plans for Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines had no performance indicators upon which to measure progress toward sustainability, nor did they establish timelines for when these countries would be capable of sustaining their own antiterrorism program.

Quarterly Reports Did Not Contain Training Provided by All Funding Sources

OIG also found that DS’s ATA Office did not include discussion of three types of training in quarterly reports: regional training sponsored by EAP, training funded by the Department of Defense, and mentorship. OIG reviewed a list of ATA training activity conducted in the EAP region during the fourth quarter of FY 2019 as well as the quarterly reports DS submitted to CT for that quarter. OIG found that training, which accounted for approximately 25 percent of ATA participants in the EAP region for the fourth quarter of FY 2019, was not included in the quarterly report. Specifically, the ATA Office delivered 39 trainings in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, with 775 participants in the fourth quarter of FY 2019. However, DS quarterly

⁵¹ Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, Assessment and Monitoring Unit, *Monitoring Plan Summary*, 3.

⁵² Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, “Fiscal Years (FY) 2018-2020 Indonesia Country Implementation Plan,” 1.

reports only listed 30 trainings with 581 participants and omitted 3 regionally funded classes, 5 Department of Defense-funded classes, and 1 Counterterrorism Partnership Fund-funded mentorship. Table 4 shows the difference between courses held versus what was reported by DS in the fourth quarter of FY 2019.

Table 4: Training Held Versus Reported in FY 2019 Fourth Quarter Reports

Country/Region	Courses Held	Courses Reported	Students Trained	Students Reported
Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining & Related Programs Funding				
Indonesia	2	2	48	48
Philippines	1	1	15	15
Regional ^a	3	0	70	0
Subtotal	6	3	133	63
Counterterrorism Partnership Funds				
Indonesia	7	6 ^b	146	146
Philippines	21	21	372	372
Subtotal	28	27	518	518
National Defense Authorization Act Funding				
Indonesia	5	0	124	0
Total	39	30	775	581

^a Regional trainings included participants from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Of the three regional trainings, two were held in Thailand and one took place in Indonesia.

^b The unreported training funded by the Counterterrorism Partnership Funds consisted of a mentorship. A DS official stated that mentorships are not captured in quarterly reports because they are not training a group of participants.

Source: OIG analysis of ATA FY 2019 Fourth Quarter Reports provided by CT.

The 3 regional training events not reported by DS's ATA Office involved 70 participants from law enforcement agencies in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. The intent of the training is to increase the capabilities of law enforcement officers receiving the training and encourage cooperation among partner countries combatting terrorism. OIG attended an ATA regional training in Thailand in October 2019 with participants from Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. OIG observed the training participants discuss challenges posed by foreign terrorist fighters in the region and the development of a joint strategy for sharing counterterrorism information among the partner countries. When regional training events are not captured in quarterly ATA reports, CT does not have a complete picture of total participants trained, nor can it report the outputs and outcomes realized, such as the strategy for sharing counterterrorism information noted above, from relevant ATA activities throughout the year.

In addition, OIG found that 5 training courses that involved 124 participants in Indonesia were funded by Department of Defense National Defense Authorization Act funds⁵³ and were not included in quarterly reports. Although including the Department of Defense funds in the quarterly report is not required, doing so would provide holistic information to decision makers about the ATA program specific to the partner country.

Finally, DS's ATA Office did not report the results of a mentorship program implemented in Indonesia. Mentorships are designed to provide technical and managerial expertise to increase the capacity of the host nation in certain functional areas such as cyber investigations. The FYs 2018–2020 country implementation plan for Indonesia included mentorships in the functional areas of crisis response, bomb disposal unit, and cyber functional areas. According to an ATA official, mentorships are “effective in implementing real change within [police] units.” However, without reporting this information in the quarterly report, it is more difficult to determine whether the ATA program is meeting its overall performance objectives.

Roles and Responsibilities for Executing Monitoring and Evaluation Activities Is Needed

According to DS and CT officials, the conditions described above occurred in part because DS and CT have not clearly delegated responsibilities for the execution of monitoring, evaluation, and reporting, in accordance with Department policy. The 2015 MOA between DS's ATA Office and CT does not specify which bureau is responsible for establishing baseline data and performance targets or detail which bureau is responsible for reporting performance data on regional trainings and training courses funded by the Department of Defense. According to the MOA, “the method of and responsibility for data collection against each [performance] indicator will be jointly decided by CT and [DS/T/ATA].”⁵⁴ However, according to DS and CT officials, in the instances noted above, a joint decision on these topics was not documented in either the MOA or the Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Defense and, therefore, data collection was not consistently implemented in the ATA programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. As a result, important ATA program data points and information were not collected and reported, which makes it difficult to fully measure and evaluate the success of the program.

According to the Toolkit, establishing baseline data and performance targets for each performance indicator is essential to evaluating program success. Failure to establish baselines and targets for some performance indicators prevents the ATA Office from determining whether it is achieving the desired performance for those indicators. In addition, failure to collect and report data on all established performance indicators for each partner country inhibits the overall assessment of whether ATA program goals and objectives are being achieved and hampers any opportunity to adjust the ATA programs to achieve greater effectiveness. Similarly, evaluating only the performance of training sponsored and funded by

⁵³ Memorandum of Understanding Between the U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Office of Antiterrorism Assistance, March 28, 2018, 5.

⁵⁴ Memorandum of Agreement Between the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, May 12, 2015, 10.

DS and CT fails to account for contributions made through other ATA programs sponsored by EAP and the Department of Defense, as well as mentorship programs the ATA Office implements. Finally, without metrics on sustainability and timelines for when countries are expected to be capable of sustaining their own antiterrorism program, DS's and CT's ability to fully assess the totality of the partner countries' antiterrorism capabilities is hampered. Until these conditions are addressed, DS and CT will be unable to fully measure ATA program performance in the EAP region or demonstrate that ATA country program objectives are being achieved as intended. OIG is therefore offering the following recommendations.

Recommendation 1: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting data on each type of performance indicator, including baselines, output measures, and long-term outcomes.

Management Response: CT concurred with the recommendation, stating that it will work in coordination with DS to update the 2015 MOA. CT's response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix D of this report. DS also concurred with the recommendation, stating it will work with CT to update the 2015 MOA. DS's response is reprinted in full in Appendix E of this report.

OIG Reply: On the basis of CT's concurrence with the recommendation and actions planned, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation demonstrating that CT, in coordination with DS, has updated the 2015 MOA to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting data on each type of performance indicator, including baselines, output measures, and long-term outcomes.

Recommendation 2: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, establish a mechanism to report Department of Defense-funded Antiterrorism Assistance training and update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

Management Response: CT concurred with the recommendation, stating that it will work with DS to include Department of Defense-funded ATA training in existing reporting mechanisms and update the 2015 MOA. DS also concurred with the recommendation, stating it will work with CT to update the 2015 MOA.

OIG Reply: On the basis of CT's concurrence with the recommendation and actions planned, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation demonstrating that CT, in coordination with DS, has established a mechanism to report Department of Defense-funded ATA training and update the 2015 MOA to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

Recommendation 3: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, establish a mechanism to monitor regionally funded and mentorship Antiterrorism Assistance training programs and update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

Management Response: CT concurred with the recommendation, stating that it will take action, in coordination with DS, to establish a mechanism to monitor regionally funded and mentorship ATA training programs and update the 2015 MOA. DS also concurred with the recommendation, stating it will work with CT to update the 2015 MOA.

OIG Reply: On the basis of CT's concurrence with the recommendation and actions planned, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation demonstrating that CT, in coordination with DS, has established a mechanism to monitor regionally funded and mentorship ATA training programs and update the 2015 MOA to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

Recommendation 4: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, revise the Antiterrorism Assistance Monitoring Plan and quarterly report template to include measures on sustainability in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual and update the Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

Management Response: CT concurred with the recommendation, stating that it will take action in coordination with DS to revise the ATA Monitoring Plan and quarterly report template to include measures and progress data, as available, on sustainability in accordance with the FAM and update the 2015 MOA. DS also concurred with the recommendation, stating it will work with CT to update the 2015 MOA.

OIG Reply: On the basis of CT's concurrence with the recommendation and actions planned, OIG considers this recommendation resolved, pending further action. This recommendation will be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation demonstrating that CT, in coordination with DS, revised the ATA Monitoring Plan and quarterly report template to include measures on sustainability, in accordance with the FAM and update the MOA to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

Embassy Bangkok, Thailand, also provided comments to a draft of this report. Embassy Bangkok stated that the ATA program in Thailand helps the country "hold fast to the rule of law" and also helps strengthen the Mission's bilateral ties and security support throughout Thailand and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The Embassy stated that it is prepared to assist DS and CT in the implementation of the recommendations. Embassy Bangkok's response is reprinted in its entirety in Appendix F of this report.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting data on each type of performance indicator, including baselines, output measures, and long-term outcomes.

Recommendation 2: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, establish a mechanism to report Department of Defense-funded Antiterrorism Assistance training and update their 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

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Recommendation 4: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, revise the Antiterrorism Assistance Monitoring Plan and quarterly report template to include measures on sustainability in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual and update the Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

APPENDIX A: PURPOSE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit to determine whether the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and the Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism (CT) have implemented corrective actions to address OIG's previous recommendations related to the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and whether those actions have improved the Department of State's (Department) efforts to measure, evaluate, and sustain ATA program objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs (EAP). OIG conducted this compliance follow-up audit from September 2019 to February 2020 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that OIG plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objective. OIG believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the findings and conclusions based on the audit objective.

OIG faced delays in completing this work because of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting operational challenges. These challenges included limitations on in-person meetings and presence at our workplace, difficulty accessing certain information, prohibitions on travel, and related difficulties within the agencies we oversee, which also affected their ability to respond to our requests. This report relates to Overseas Contingency Operation Pacific Eagle and was completed in accordance with OIG's oversight responsibilities described in Section 8L of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

To answer the audit objectives, OIG reviewed the findings, recommendations, and compliance follow-up communication with the Department bureaus involved with OIG's three previous reports about the ATA program. Collectively, these reports contained 13 recommendations that were intended to improve the effectiveness and oversight of the ATA program (see Appendix B for a list of OIG's previous reports, the associated recommendations, management's response to the recommendations offered, and the status of each recommendation). OIG selected the EAP region for review because of the threat posed by terrorist organizations affiliated with the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria in the region. In addition, OIG had not reviewed the ATA program in the EAP region previously. OIG selected the ATA programs in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand because these countries received the greatest amount of ATA program funding.

OIG interviewed officials from DS; CT; EAP; and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) in Washington, DC. Within DS, OIG spoke with officials from the ATA Assessment and Monitoring Unit, the Training Curriculum Division, the Training Execution Division, the Training Management Division, and the Resource Management Unit. Within CT, OIG interviewed officials in the Office of Programs. OIG also interviewed officials at U.S. Embassies Jakarta, Indonesia; Manila, the Philippines; and Bangkok, Thailand, overseeing the ATA program in those countries. Furthermore, OIG observed training courses and interviewed course participants, local officials, and course instructors in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. OIG also observed an assessment conducted by DS's Assessment and Monitoring Unit in Manila.

OIG reviewed relevant Federal laws and regulations and the Foreign Affairs Manual for criteria related to strategic planning, monitoring and evaluation, vetting, contract management, and equipment end-use monitoring. To evaluate strategic planning, OIG reviewed the EAP Joint Regional Strategy; the DS and CT functional bureau strategies; integrated country strategies for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand; and the 2018 Country Reports on Human Rights.¹ To evaluate program management, monitoring, and evaluation, OIG reviewed and compared country capabilities assessments, country implementation plans, and FY 2019 fourth quarter reports for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand,. Finally, OIG reviewed documents relating to vetting and end-use monitoring reports provided by DS, DRL, and officials at Embassies Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok.

Prior Reports

As discussed in the Background section of this report, OIG referred to three prior reports focusing on the ATA program when performing audit work associated with this report. Those three reports are:

- *Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs* (AUD-MERO-12-19, April 2012)
- *Management Assistance Report: Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Pakistan* (AUD-MERO-17-37, May 2017)
- *Management Assistance Report: Although Progress Has Been Made, Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Afghanistan* (AUD-MERO-18-16, November 2017)

In these reports, OIG made 13 recommendations that all have been implemented and closed as of February 2020. (See Table B-1 in Appendix B for additional information about the recommendations offered.)

Work Related to Internal Controls

OIG performed steps to assess the adequacy of internal controls related to DS's and CT's implementation of corrective actions to address previous OIG recommendations related to the ATA program and whether those actions improved the Department's efforts to measure, evaluate, and sustain ATA program objectives in the EAP region. OIG identified control activities, information and communication, and monitoring as significant to the audit.

OIG determined design control activities to be a significant principle because they help OIG determine whether DS and CT established performance indicators to achieve objectives and designed controls to validate those indicators. OIG conducted interviews with officials

¹ U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2018, <https://www.state.gov/reports/2018-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/>.

responsible for establishing goals, objectives, and performance indicators for the ATA program, including officials from Embassies Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok. OIG also reviewed documentation of DS's and CT's program design and performance management systems for the ATA program and corroborated the information through interviews with officials at DS's ATA Headquarters in Dunn Loring, VA, and CT's Office of Policy in Washington, DC. OIG also reviewed documentation provided by DS and CT that addressed previous recommendations.

OIG determined the use of quality information to be a significant principle because DS and CT require such information to effectively manage and oversee the ATA program. Data collected and processed into quality information by DS are used by CT to assess progress toward strategic goals. OIG assessed the quality of information through interviews with officials from DS in Dunn Loring, VA, and CT in Washington, DC, and Embassies Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok. OIG also observed an assessment conducted by DS's ATA Assessment and Monitoring Unit in Manila, during which data were collected from ATA participants and local police officials. OIG also reviewed the FY 2019 fourth quarter progress reports for Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand and reviewed them against the Department's Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit and 2015 Memorandum of Agreement between DS and CT for the ATA program.

OIG determined performing monitoring activities to be a significant principle because DS and CT have joint responsibilities for monitoring program activities, according to the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement between DS and CT. This principle helps bureaus establish and operate monitoring activities and evaluate the results. OIG assessed monitoring activities through interviews with DS officials in Dunn Loring, VA, and CT officials in Washington, DC, and officials from, Embassies Jakarta, Manila, and Bangkok. OIG also reviewed documentation of monitoring activities and validated this information through interviews. OIG observed DS's ATA Assessment and Monitoring Unit perform monitoring activities in Manila. OIG also observed ATA trainings delivered in Manila and Phuket, Thailand, in October 2019. Significant deficiencies OIG found during this compliance follow-up audit are presented in the Audit Results section of this report.

Use of Computer-Processed Data

OIG used computer-processed data from DS to demonstrate the number of ATA trainings delivered and participants trained from FY 2017 to FY 2019 in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. OIG also used these data to assess the FY 2019 fourth quarter reports delivered to CT. OIG corroborated the accuracy of these data in email correspondence and interviews with officials responsible for ATA program monitoring and evaluation. In addition, OIG reviewed data from all three embassies and DS on the inventory and verification of equipment subject to the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Detailed Sampling Methodology

OIG selected a project universe to determine whether DS and CT implemented corrective actions to address OIG's previous recommendations related to the ATA program and whether those actions improved the Department's efforts to measure, evaluate, and sustain ATA program objectives in the EAP region. This project universe included all countries receiving ATA training from FY 2016 to FY 2020 in the EAP region. To determine the target universe, OIG obtained data on ATA from the Department's Congressional Budget Justifications, which showed that the Department requested a total of \$36.7 million for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and EAP regional funds from FY 2016 to FY 2018. OIG confirmed the accuracy of these data with DS officials. OIG determined the target universe using the following selection criteria: 1) level of funding and 2) whether countries had been flagged in a previous audit. On the basis of this criteria, OIG selected Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand for a 100-percent review of ATA training.

APPENDIX B: STATUS OF RECOMMENDATIONS FROM PRIOR OIG AUDITS

Table B-1: Status of Recommendations from Prior OIG Evaluations and Audits

Recommendation #	Current Status
Evaluation of the Antiterrorism Assistance Program for Countries Under the Bureaus of Near Eastern Affairs and South and Central Asian Affairs [AUD-MERO-12-29]	
1	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Counterterrorism, establish a monitoring and evaluation system that includes clearly defined and measurable outcome-oriented strategic goals and program objectives; measurable performance indicators that clearly link to strategic goals and program objectives; baseline data and annual performance targets for each indicator; and descriptions of how, when, and by whom performance data will be collected, analyzed, and reported. (Action: DS in coordination with CT.)	
2	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Counterterrorism, develop a definition for what constitutes a developmental ATA program, consistently apply that definition to country programs, and ensure that partner country sustainability timelines are established for developmental ATA programs. (Action: DS in coordination with CT.)	
3	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL), establish and implement a process that ensures effective consultation with DRL on the designation of foreign countries that are eligible for assistance through the Antiterrorism Assistance program as well as the training and equipment each designated country is to receive. (Action: DS and CT in coordination with DRL.)	
4	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security implement a standardized reporting process for in-country oversight of contracts for Antiterrorism Assistance program training in partner countries. (Action: DS.)	
5	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security periodically validate its End Use Monitor database to ensure that the database includes records of all weapons transfers. (Action: DS.)	
6	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security establish a process, before equipment is provided to partner countries, to determine whether the equipment will be used and whether the equipment is compatible with and at an appropriate level for the partner country. (Action: DS.)	
7	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security review the types of the remaining equipment for the Iraq program stored in the Northern Virginia warehouse, evaluate the equipment's utility, and determine an appropriate disposition. (Action: DS.)	

Recommendation #	Current Status
Management Assistance Report: Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Pakistan [AUD-MERO-17-37]	
1	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, implement a monitoring and evaluation system to include measuring performance in accordance with the requirements outlined in the Department’s Performance Management Guidebook and the Memorandum of Agreement executed between the Bureaus of Counterterrorism and Diplomatic Security’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.	
2	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement procedures to verify compliance with contract reporting requirements in the Global Antiterrorism Training Assistance contract and reporting requirements in the Memorandum of Agreement executed between the Bureaus of Counterterrorism and Diplomatic Security’s Office of Antiterrorism Assistance.	
3	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement procedures to verify that the contracting officer’s representative has appropriate documentation to support the receipt and payment of goods or services prior to approving invoices for payment in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Handbook.	
4	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Administration, Office of Logistics Management, Office of Acquisitions Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement procedures to verify that the Antiterrorism Assistance program contracting officer is preparing and issuing written contract modifications when necessary to alter the terms of a contract in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Handbook.	
5	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security complete a review of the \$4.2 million in weapons and equipment currently being stored for the Pakistan ATA program within 90 days and determine if the weapons and equipment can be used in other ATA programs.	
Management Assistance Report: Although Progress Has Been Made, Challenges Remain in Monitoring and Overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance Program Activities in Afghanistan [AUD-MERO-18-16]	
1	Closed, no further action required
Recommendation: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security develop and implement a policy to require that Contracting Officers and Contracting Officer’s Representatives overseeing Antiterrorism Assistance programs document program progress obtained from meetings and phone conferences held in lieu of contractor-submitted formal written program and financial reports, contract status reports, and annual reports.	
Source: OIG analysis of the implementation status of recommendations offered in previous reports relative to this engagement.	

APPENDIX C: CRITICAL CAPABILITIES ASSESSED BY DS

Table C-1: Critical Capabilities Assessed in the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand

Critical Capabilities	Country		
	Philippines	Indonesia	Thailand
Preventive Capabilities			
Land Border Security			Yes
Land Port of Entry Security			Yes
Maritime Border Security			
Maritime Port of Entry Security			
Airport of Entry Security	Yes	Yes	
Critical Infrastructure Security	Yes		
National Leadership Security			
Diplomatic Community Security			
Information Sharing and Analysis	Yes	Yes	Yes
Response Capabilities			
National Level Major Incident Command and Control		Yes	Yes
Police Special Operations	Yes	Yes	
Explosives Incident Countermeasures	Yes	Yes	Yes
Mass Casualty Incident Management			
Kidnapping/Hostage Incident Management	Yes		
Post-Incident Capabilities			
Police Investigative Capability	Yes	Yes	Yes
Post Blast Investigations	Yes	Yes	Yes
Crime Scene and Evidence Management	Yes	Yes	
Forensic Examination and Analysis	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prosecutorial Capability	Yes	Yes	
Emerging Threat Capabilities			
Countering Foreign Fighters and Violent Extremism		Yes	
Cyber Capabilities			
Cyber Investigations and Digital Forensics	Yes		
Digital Forensics and Open Source Investigations		Yes	
Sustainment Capability			
Institutionalization of AT/CT Training	Yes	Yes	Yes
Total Yes	13	13	9

APPENDIX D: BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM AND COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM RESPONSE



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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April 28, 2020

Read by _____

INFORMATION MEMO FOR INSPECTOR GENERAL BROWN – OIG/AUD

FROM: CT – Principal Deputy Coordinator John Godfrey

SUBJECT: (U) Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) Response to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report on the Follow-Up Audit of Department of State Efforts to Measure, Evaluate, and Sustain Antiterrorism Assistance Objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs

BLUF: (U) CT thanks the OIG team for their thorough review and transparent process. CT believes the draft report accurately captures both the significant progress CT and DS/T/ATA have made towards improving shared M&E processes and practices since 2012, as well as remaining areas for continued improvement. CT Bureau does not have edits, corrections, or comments specific to the text of the report; responses to the four recommendations, which were drafted in coordination with DS/T/ATA colleagues, are included below.

(U) OIG Recommendation #1: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting data on each type of performance indicator, including baselines, output measures, and long-term outcomes.

(U) CT Bureau Response to Recommendation #1: CT Bureau agrees with this recommendation and will work in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement.

(U) OIG Recommendation #2: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, establish a mechanism to report Department of Defense-funded Antiterrorism Assistance training and update their 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

(U) CT Bureau Response to Recommendation #2: CT Bureau agrees with this recommendation and will work in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security to include DOD-funded ATA training in existing reporting mechanisms, and update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement.

(U) OIG Recommendation #3: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, establish a mechanism to monitor

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-2-

regionally funded and mentorship Antiterrorism Assistance training programs, and update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

(U) CT Bureau Response to Recommendation #3: CT agrees with this recommendation and will take action in coordination with DS to establish a mechanism to monitor regionally funded and mentorship Antiterrorism Assistance training programs and update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement.

(U) OIG Recommendation #4: OIG recommends that the Bureau of Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, revise the ATA Monitoring Plan and quarterly report template to include measures on sustainability in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual, and update their Memorandum of Agreement to clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting and reporting this information.

(U) CT Bureau Response to Recommendation #4: CT agrees with this recommendation and will take action in coordination with DS to revise the ATA Monitoring Plan and quarterly report template to include measures and progress data, as available, on sustainability in accordance with the Foreign Affairs Manual and update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement.

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-3-

Approved: CT – John Godfrey, Principal Deputy Coordinator

Drafted: CT/P – Adam Foote, ext. 4-4630 and cell: (b) (6)

Cleared:

CT/P: Sam Pineda	(OK)
CT/P: Laurie Freeman	(OK)
CT/P: Tracey Swan	(OK)
CT/P: Andrew Hunsberger	(OK)
CT/P: Olga Kalashnikova	(OK)
CT/P: Mick Hogan	(OK)
DS/T/ATA: Gordon Hills	(OK)
DS/T/ATA: Anthony Smith	(OK)
DS/T/ATA: Jim Christopher	(OK)
DS/T/ATA: Jonathan Poole	(OK)

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APPENDIX E: BUREAU OF DIPLOMATIC SECURITY RESPONSE



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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May 1, 2020

INFORMATION MEMO TO INSPECTOR GENERAL LINICK – OIG

FROM: DS Michael T. Eyanoff

SUBJECT: Bureau of Diplomatic Security Response to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report on the *Follow-Up Audit of Department of State Efforts to Measure, Evaluate, and Sustain Antiterrorism Assistance Objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs*

OIG did not address any recommendations in the subject report directly to DS. OIG did request agreement or disagreement of coordinating entities identified in the recommendations, which did include DS.

DS Response (May 1, 2020): DS concurs with the intent of all four recommendations. DS will continue working with CT to update the 2015 Memorandum of Agreement on the Antiterrorism Assistance program to: clarify which bureau is responsible for collecting data on baselines, output measures, and long-term outcomes; include in quarterly reporting the DoD-funded training that DS performs at the request of DoD; monitor the Department's regionally-funded ATA training and mentorships implemented by DS; and indicate measures and assigned responsibilities on sustainability in the ATA Monitoring Plan for ATA programs implemented by DS.

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- 2 -

Approved: DS – Michael T. Evanoff []

Drafter: DS/T/ATA – Jim Christopher, (o) (571) 226-9649 (c) **(b) (6)**

Cleared: DS/DSS – TBrown (ok)
DS/EX – WTerrini (ok)
DS/EX/MGT – JSchools (ok)
DS/MGT/PPD – MScherger (ok)
DS/MGT/PPD Policy – LLong (ok)
DS/T – WBashnan (ok)
DS/T/ATA – ASmith (ok)
DS/ATA/AMU – GHills (ok)
M – BPeracchio (ok)
M/SS – RBrown (ok)
CT/P – AFoote (ok)
EAP/EX – CGreen (ok)

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APPENDIX F: U.S. EMBASSY BANGKOK, THAILAND, RESPONSE



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BANGKOK

THE AMBASSADOR

April 28, 2020

Norman P. Brown
Assistant Inspector General for Audits
Office of Inspector General
U.S. Department of State

Dear Mr. Brown:

Thank you for sharing your draft report *Follow-Up Audit of Department of State Efforts to Measure, Evaluate, and Sustain Antiterrorism Assistance Objectives in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs*. I am pleased to learn the Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Bureau of Counterterrorism (CT) have “established a monitoring and evaluation process” for the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program and “improved coordination with the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL) to ensure that ATA-designated countries were eligible for assistance.” I am likewise pleased the program has “established standard operating procedures for contract oversight” as well as “a process to ensure weapons and equipment transfers were properly recorded and appropriate for the partner country.” As noted in your report, the spot check conducted by your team during their October 2019 visit to post found all equipment associated with Thailand’s ATA program were recorded accurately.

Mission Thailand notes the OIG’s findings that recommend “additional steps to ensure the established monitoring and evaluation process is followed and desired program results are achieved and accurately reported.” Our Regional Security Office (RSO), in coordination with our Law Enforcement Working Group, is prepared to assist DS and CT implement those steps, as appropriate. We welcome the opportunity to measure effectively the performance of our program and to continue “demonstrat[ing] that ATA country program goals and objectives are being achieved as intended.” As discussed with your audit team during their aforementioned visit to post, we remain confident that our ATA program continues to “enhance the ability of [Thai] law enforcement personnel to deter terrorists and terrorist groups from engaging in international terrorist acts.”


Beyond just capacity building, our ATA program has given Thailand one more tool to hold fast to the rule of law and respect for national sovereignty. In the face of trends that threaten the latter, underwritten by the People’s Republic of China, our Mission has fortified the Department’s commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Our ATA program is a high-profile element of security assistance that reinforces that very promise to Thailand. In the same vein, our program continues to strengthen bilateral ties and security support of our Mission’s critical work throughout the Kingdom and ASEAN.

Our ATA program also continues to meet the important objective of “increas[ing] respect for human rights by sharing with foreign civil authorities modern, humane, and effective antiterrorism techniques.” DS and CT have recently supported, for example, expanding ATA programming to counter violence emanating from an ethno-nationalist insurgency in Thailand’s deep south, a conflict that remains a challenge for the Thais and a security concern for the Mission. This support complements our assistance to civil society and human rights groups to increase dialogue between religious communities and promote peace building.

I do not believe that any portion of the report as it pertains to Thailand needs to be redacted prior to publication on the internet.

Finally, I wish to highlight the excellent coordination with post by DS and CT on the planning and execution of our ATA program. Both bureaus have made a real effort to understand Thailand's counterterrorism capabilities and challenges, and how they align with bilateral and regional counterterrorism policy priorities. We look forward to backing the continued success of the Royal Thai Government to combat transnational terrorism, secure its lengthy borders, and respond appropriately to the ongoing insurgency in its southernmost provinces.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Michael DeSombre". The signature is written in a cursive, slightly slanted style.

Michael George DeSombre
Ambassador

ABBREVIATIONS

ATA	Antiterrorism Assistance
COR	Contracting Officer's Representative
CT	Bureau of Counterterrorism and Countering Violent Extremism
DRL	Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor
DS	Bureau of Diplomatic Security
EAP	Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
OIG	Office of Inspector General

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