



Semiannual Report to Congress

October 1, 2021 - March 31, 2022

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General



A MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



Joseph V. Cuffari

I am pleased to submit our Semiannual Report to Congress summarizing the work and accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General (OIG) from October 1, 2021 through March 31, 2022. We have made tremendous improvements to DHS OIG since I came on board in July 2019. That progress is demonstrated in the quantity and quality of our work and the morale of our employees, which are at all-time highs. Our [FY 2022 Annual Workplan](#) is helping us drive performance and measure success. We continue to transform our organization and are grateful to the Government Accountability Office, the National Academies of Public Administration, and others, who have helped support our continued process improvements across our organization.

Our greatest resource continues to be our employees and the relationships we have with Congress, the Department, and our external stakeholders. I am extremely proud of, and grateful for, our more than 750 professional, career employees and their integrity, dedication, and commitment to excellence.

In total, during this reporting period, we issued 35 reports containing 81 recommendations to improve DHS's programs and operations. In addition, we initiated 263 investigations, closed 296 investigations, and issued 265 investigative reports. Our investigative activities resulted in 45 arrests, 62 convictions, and \$63.8 million in recoveries, restitutions, and fines.

One of our top priorities is detecting and deterring pandemic-related fraud. During the pandemic and through the end of this reporting period, we have received more than 7,000 COVID-related complaints, initiated 268 investigations, and identified approximately \$288 million in potential fraud loss to DHS.

During this reporting period, we also reported on a wide range of other high-priority, high-risk areas, including:

- [Border Security](#)
- [Preparedness and Resilience](#)
- [Cybersecurity](#)
- [Counter Terrorism](#)

As the Department performs its tremendous mission, we will continue to provide rigorous, independent, and objective oversight, to promote excellence, integrity, and accountability across the Department. Thank you for your support of our work.

Sincerely,

JOSEPH V
CUFFARI
Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

Digitally signed by
JOSEPH V CUFFARI
Date: 2022.05.20 14:56:17
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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AND DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROFILES

The [Homeland Security Act of 2002](#) officially established the Department of Homeland Security, as well as an OIG in the Department by amendment to the [Inspector General Act of 1978](#). By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, ensures DHS OIG's independence. This independence is fundamental to our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse as well as provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress about the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations. The DHS OIG is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and operates from approximately 30 locations across the country.

OIG Offices

- Executive Office
- Office of Audits
- Office of Counsel
- Office of External Affairs
- Office of Innovation
- Office of Inspections and Evaluations
- Office of Integrity
- Office of Investigations
- Office of Management

DHS Components and Offices

- Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
- Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)
- Management Directorate (MGMT)
- Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CISOMB)
- Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
- Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
- Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
- Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO)
- Office of Inspector General (OIG)
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
- Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
- Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
- Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE)
- Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
- Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)
- Privacy Office (PRIV)
- Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
- United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

SUMMARY OF OIG ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

During this reporting period, DHS OIG completed audits, inspections and evaluations, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department's programs and operations.

Audits provide essential transparency over DHS-level programs and operations and are concentrated in promoting effective governance and accountability across the DHS, ensuring taxpayer funds are used effectively and efficiently.

Inspections and evaluations provide systematic and independent assessments of the design, implementation, and results of DHS operations, programs, and policies to determine their efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability. They may include reviews of high-profile or particularly sensitive matters.

Investigations address alleged violations of law that impact the DHS's programs, operations, facilities, and personnel. Priority is given to investigations of suspected violations of criminal and civil statutes. Investigators work closely with prosecutors and other law enforcement organizations.

Reports Issued to DHS

In this reporting period, we issued 35 audit and inspection reports (see [Appendix 1](#)), containing 81 recommendations, and 265 investigative reports.

¹ Investigative work often involves several law enforcement agencies working on the same case. OIGs may conduct cases with other OIGs, other Federal law enforcement agencies, and State or local law enforcement entities. Investigative Receivables and Recoveries reflect the results of criminal and civil cases that were ordered plus any voluntary repayments during the fiscal year. In criminal cases, the dollar value reflects the restitution, criminal fines, and special assessments resulting from successful criminal prosecutions. The dollar value in civil cases reflects the number of damages, penalties, settlements, and forfeitures resulting from successful civil actions. Voluntary repayments include the amount paid by the subject of an investigation or the value of government property recovered before prosecutorial action is taken. These totals do not reflect the dollar amounts associated with recovered items, such as original historical documents and cultural artifacts, whose value cannot be readily determined.

Financial Impact


In this reporting period, we did not identify questioned costs or funds put to better use, but the Department recovered or deobligated \$11,093,744. (See [Appendix 1](#).) We reported \$63,823,432 in recoveries, restitution, and fines from investigations.¹

TYPE OF IMPACT	AMOUNT
Questioned Costs	\$0
Funds to be Put to Better Use	\$0
Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/ Deobligated	\$119,516,196
Funds Recovered/Deobligated	\$11,093,744
Recoveries, Restitution, and Fines from Investigations	\$63,823,432

Investigations

We initiated 263 investigations and closed 296. Our investigations resulted in 45 arrests, 38 indictments, 62 convictions, and 18 personnel actions. In accordance with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, we have included information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

INVESTIGATIONS ACTIVITY



TYPE OF INVESTIGATION*

NUMBER


Open Investigations as of 10/01/2021	922
Investigations Initiated	263
Investigations Closed	296
Open Investigations as of 03/31/2022	889
Investigative Reports Issued	265
Investigations (persons) Referred for Federal Prosecution	47
Investigations (persons) Accepted for Federal Prosecution	43
Investigations (persons) Declined for Federal Prosecution	70

Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution 2

Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities 36

* All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is DHS OIG's investigations case management system.
 Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

INVESTIGATIONS RESULTS



Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, fraud, or abuse affecting the programs and operations of the Department.

COMPLAINT ACTIVITY OCCURRING OCTOBER 1, 2021 TO MARCH 31, 2022

NUMBER

Total Hotline Complaints Received	32,726
Complaints Referred (outside of DHS OIG)	27,081
Complaints Closed	32,681

Note: Complaints referred and closed include complaints received in a prior period.

Whistleblower Protection Unit

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. WPU primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act*, 10 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1034; *Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information, Presidential Policy Directive 19; Security Clearances and Classified Information*, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the *Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees*, 41 U.S.C. § 4712. Additionally, in certain instances, WPU conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, and the *Whistleblower Protection Act*, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9).

WPU Activity During Current SAR Period

Complaint Intake

During this SAR period, WPU received 186 complaints, which it reviewed for allegations of whistleblower retaliation. Entering the period, WPU had 2 pending complaints to resolve. Therefore, combining the 186 received with the 2 pending from last period, WPU reviewed 188 complaints during the SAR period. Of those, WPU declined to open an investigation for 173 complaints during the intake process. Investigations were opened on 3 complaints, leaving 12 complaints currently pending.

WPU INTAKE COMPLAINTS OCTOBER 1 TO MARCH 31, 2022

NUMBER

Pending Complaints Entering this Period	2
Complaints Received by WPU During Period	186
Total Complaints Reviewed by WPU during Period	188
Complaints Declined During Intake Process ²	173
Complaints Converted to Investigation	3
Total Complaints Pending at End of Period	12

Investigations

WPU closed six whistleblower retaliation investigations during the SAR period, including three investigations closed with a report of investigation. WPU closed more investigations than were opened, resulting in a decrease in overall pending investigations.

² Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency, or allege whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION INVESTIGATIONS**OCTOBER 1, 2021 TO MARCH 31, 2022****NUMBER**

Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period	54
Investigations Opened During Period	3
Investigations Closed During Period	6
Investigations Pending at End of Period	51

Update Related to a Prior Substantiated Report of Whistleblower RetaliationW18-USCG-WPU-02539

As reflected in the previous SAR, WPU substantiated allegations that an enlisted member in the Coast Guard was retaliated against for reporting alleged harassment in violation of the [Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034](#), in W18-USCG-WPU-02539.

In addition to the administrative action reported in the previous SAR against the responsible management officials who remain in the Service and who were found to have retaliated against the complainant, the Coast Guard reports its Personnel Service Command (CG-PSC) reviewed the enlisted evaluation reports (EER) of the petty officer who was subject to retaliation. CG-PSC determined that the member's marks on two EERs (dated May 31, 2017 and April 1, 2018) appeared to have been lowered because he took action to notify his chain of command of allegations of bullying. The Coast Guard raised all impacted marks.


The Coast Guard previously reported that it evaluated the member's updated marks and determined that the member would not have been eligible to advance sooner had the higher marks been in the record in 2017 and 2018. In subsequent conversations, the member stated that

he believed the Coast Guard had improperly calculated whether he would have advanced to E-7 in 2018 had he not received the retaliatory marks in his evaluation that made him ineligible to sit for the service-wide exam that is required for enlisted advancement. CG Personnel Service Command reconsidered its calculations and determined that the Coast Guard could not definitely conclude whether the member would have advanced in 2018 without the retaliatory marks. In light of that conclusion, the Assistant Commandant of Human Resources exercised her discretion under COMDTINST M1000.2C to promote the member to E7, effective on the earliest date that other members in his year group promoted (January 1, 2018). She also directed that he be awarded retroactive pay at the higher rank for all duties performed from the time of advancement to present. This action was communicated back to the member, and he acknowledged receipt.

HIGHLIGHTS OF SIGNIFICANT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

During this reporting period, we issued 35 new reports and 81 recommendations to the Department; we closed 135 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods.

OIG ACTIVITY OCTOBER 1, 2021 TO MARCH 31, 2022



In this report, we highlight our pandemic response oversight activities and a number of audits, inspections, and evaluations we conducted. Our work is risk-based and aligns with the Department’s strategic mission areas outlined in the [DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2024](#):

- Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats
- Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches
- Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure
- Preserve and Uphold the Nation’s Prosperity and Economic Security
- Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience
- Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

We have also highlighted several investigations we conducted during the reporting period.

Pandemic Response

During this reporting period, OIG completed five reports related to the coronavirus of 2019 (COVID-19) response, including:

- [Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS’ Benefits Delivery During the COVID-19 Pandemic \(OIG-22-12\)](#);
- [FEMA Did Not Always Accurately Report COVID-19 Contract Actions in the Federal Procurement Data System \(OIG-22-07\)](#);
- [Medical Processes and Communication Protocols Need Improvement at Irwin County Detention Center \(OIG-22-14\)](#);
- [CISA Should Validate Priority Telecommunications Services Performance Data \(OIG-22-15\)](#); and
- [Management Alert – Reporting Suspected Fraud of Lost Wages Assistance \(OIG-22-28\)](#).

In addition, two other reports were indirectly related to COVID-19. OIG also has 13 COVID-related projects in progress. Between January 2020 and March 31, 2021, DHS OIG has received more than 7,000 COVID-related complaints resulting in approximately 268 high impact investigations, while identifying approximately \$288 million in potential fraud loss to the government. To date, our COVID-related investigations have resulted in 17 indictments, 8 criminal informations, 15 convictions, and more than \$2.5 million in fines, restitutions, and recoveries.

DHS OIG is one of nine mandated IGs participating in the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), which was established as a committee of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) by the CARES Act. The PRAC's mission is to promote transparency and ensure coordinated, comprehensive oversight of the Government's spending and COVID-19 pandemic response to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The PRAC is tracking more than \$5 trillion in payments to individual citizens, loans for businesses, and support for hospitals and other medical providers, as well as economic relief for impacted businesses, industries, and state, local, and tribal governments.⁴

See [video summaries](#) of select OIG pandemic-related and other reports.

³ A federal prosecutor may, without going to the grand jury, file charges in a document called a "criminal information." An information sets forth the same kinds of allegations and facts that would be contained in an indictment. *Reporting on Criminal Cases - Journalists Guide*, <https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/reporting-criminal-cases-journalists-guide#criminal-complaints>.

⁴The PRAC hosts a comprehensive website — <http://www.pandemicoversight.gov> — with valuable interactive data visualizations and maps to track pandemic funds.

Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches

DHS helps maintain national security by managing the flow of people and goods into the United States. DHS' border security approach focuses on four goals: (1) securing and managing air, land, and maritime borders; (2) preventing and intercepting foreign threats so they do not reach U.S. soil; (3) enforcing immigration laws; and (4) properly administering immigration benefits.

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We continue to evaluate the Department's operations to secure our borders, safeguard and facilitate trade and travel, enforce immigration laws, and properly administer immigration benefits.

[ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities \(OIG-22-01\)](#)

For the first time at DHS OIG, we conducted a systemic review of segregation in detention. We determined that ICE did not always comply with segregation reporting requirements and did not ensure detention facilities complied the National Archives and Records Administration's records retention schedule requirements. We made three recommendations to improve ICE's oversight and reporting of segregation at detention facilities. ICE concurred with all three recommendations.

[Management Alert – Immediate Removal of all Detainees from the Torrance County Detention Facility \(OIG-22-31\)](#)

We issued this management alert during an ongoing spot inspection of the Torrance County Detention Facility in Estancia, New Mexico. We determined that ICE must take immediate steps to address the critical staffing shortages that have led to safety risks and unsanitary living conditions at the Torrance County Detention Facility in Estancia, New Mexico. ICE did not concur with the recommendation.

[Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities \(OIG-22-03\)](#)

The objective was to assess the causes and impact of medical vacancies at ICE detention facilities and determine whether existing medical staffing plans and vacancies at detention facilities hinder ICE detainees' access to adequate medical care. We determined that factors such as remote locations, competing opportunities, difficulty recruiting medical staff, and cumbersome hiring processes affect ICE's ability to attract qualified staff. We made five recommendations to improve ICE's ability to maintain adequate medical staffing at detention facilities. ICE concurred with all five recommendations.

[USCIS' U Visa Program Is Not Managed Effectively and Is Susceptible to Fraud \(OIG-22-10\)](#)

The objective was to determine whether USCIS adequately managed the U Visa program — specifically, whether USCIS' adjudication process is adequate and if the program assists law enforcement with investigating and prosecuting crimes, as intended. We made five recommendations to help improve the U visa program. USCIS concurred with three of the recommendations and did not concur with two.

[Medical Processes and Communication Protocols Need Improvement at Irwin County Detention Center \(OIG-22-14\)](#)

The objective was to determine whether Irwin County Detention Center (ICDC), in Ocilla, Georgia, provided Immigration and Customs Enforcement detainees adequate medical care and adhered to COVID-19 protections. We did not review the gynecological procedure approval process for detainees at ICDC, which has been referred to our Office of Investigations. We determined ICDC generally met ICE detention standards, which specify that detainees have access to appropriate and necessary medical, dental, and mental health care.

However, our contract medical team's evaluation of ICDC's medical processes found the facility's chronic care, continuity of care, and policies and procedures inadequate. We made five recommendations to improve medical processes and communication protocols. ICE did not concur with four recommendations because the ICDC contract was terminated in October 2021. ICE concurred with one recommendation.

Other issued reports include:

[Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS' Benefits Delivery During the COVID-19 Pandemic \(OIG-22-12\)](#)

[Rio Grande Valley Area Border Patrol Struggles with High Volumes of Detainees and Cases of Prolonged Detention but Has Taken Consistent Measures to Improve Conditions in Facilities \(OIG-22-22\)](#)

[CBP Border Patrol Stations and Ports of Entry in Southern California Generally Met TEDS Standards \(OIG-22-26\)](#)

[CBP Officials Implemented Rapid DNA Testing to Verify Claimed Parent-Child Relationships \(OIG-22-27\)](#)

[FEMA Successfully Assisted HHS in Providing Shelter and Supplies to Unaccompanied Children from the Southwest Border \(OIG-22-35\)](#)

Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience

The Federal Government must remain capable of responding to natural disasters, physical and cyber-attacks, weapons of mass destruction attacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, and search and rescue distress signals. Following disasters, the Federal Government must be prepared to support local communities with long-term recovery assistance. The United States can effectively manage emergencies and mitigate harm by thoroughly preparing local communities, rapidly responding during crises, and supporting recovery. The Department's preparedness and resilience responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) build a national culture of preparedness; (2) respond during incidents; (3) support outcome-driven community recovery; and (4) train and exercise first responders.

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We conduct mandated, requested, and discretionary audits and evaluations to assess the Department's disaster response and recovery programs and operations to identify deficiencies and make recommendations for improvement.

[Management Alert: Reporting Suspected Fraud of Lost Wages Assistance \(OIG-22-28\)](#)

The objective was to determine to what extent FEMA ensured states and territories distributed supplemental state lost wages assistance (LWA) from the Disaster Relief Fund to eligible recipients. State Workforce Agencies (SWA) are not reporting identified or suspected instances of fraud to the DHS Office of Inspector General as required by law. According to a FEMA official, FEMA approved 38 of 54 administrative plans that did not include the reporting requirement because the requirement was not in the template FEMA originally gave the SWAs at the beginning of the disaster. We made two recommendations to FEMA that, when implemented, positions FEMA to combat LWA fraud and assists with the recovery of those funds to the DRF. FEMA concurred and implemented both recommendations.

[FEMA Continues to Phase Out Its Use of Alternative Contracting Methods to Administer the National Flood Insurance Program \(OIG-22-11\)](#)

The objective was to determine the extent and appropriateness of FEMA's use of alternative contracting methods to administer the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). We determined that FEMA continues to phase out its use of alternative contracting methods to administer the NFIP. Between fiscal year 2015 and FY 2021, FEMA used alternative contracts to pay about \$263.9 million for certain NFIP services. In using these alternative contracting methods, FEMA bypassed Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) contracting requirements and did not accurately report Federal dollars expended to procure and pay for NFIP services.

Unrelated to our audit objective, we found FEMA did not provide adequate oversight of the NFIP cash management process. Instead, FEMA relied heavily on self-certifications and external audits. As a result, FEMA was unaware why at least 2,000 policyholders' premium refund and claim payments remained uncashed.

We made three recommendations that, when implemented, should ensure payment of NFIP services under a FAR contract and strengthen FEMA's oversight of the NFIP cash management process. FEMA concurred with all three of the recommendations.

Other issued reports include:

[FEMA Did Not Always Accurately Report COVID-19 Contract Actions in the Federal Procurement Data System \(OIG-22-07\)](#)

[FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs \(OIG-22-25\)](#)

[FEMA Followed Its Declaration Request Policies, but Could Improve Its Records Management \(OIG-22-32\)](#)

Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats

DHS protects Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats by preventing nation-states and their proxies, transnational criminal organizations, and groups or individuals from engaging in terrorist or criminal acts that threaten the Homeland. The Department's counterterrorism responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) collect, analyze, and share actionable intelligence; (2) detect and disrupt threats; (3) protect designated leadership, events, and soft targets; and (4) counter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats.

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We continue to provide oversight of the Department's counterterrorism programs and operations and make recommendations to improve capabilities and mitigate threats.

[I&A Identified Threats prior to January 6, 2021, but Did Not Issue Any Intelligence Products before the U.S. Capitol Breach \(OIG-22-29\)](#)

The objective was to evaluate the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A's) responsibility for providing intelligence to state and local officials in advance of the January 6 events, and whether and how I&A fulfilled its responsibility. We found that I&A identified specific threat information related to the events on January 6, 2021, but did not issue any intelligence products about these threats until January 8, 2021. We made five recommendations to ensure that I&A is better equipped to respond to similar events in the future. I&A concurred with our recommendations.

[The Office for Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve Its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices \(OIG-22-33\)](#)

The objective was to determine the extent to which Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Office for Bombing Prevention (OBP) manages and assesses national capabilities to counter improvised explosive devices (C-IED).

OBP is not managing component participation or tracking milestone completion dates as required. We made three recommendations to improve OBP's management and assessment of C-IED capabilities. CISA concurred with all three recommendations.

[We also issued *Trusted Traveler Revocations for Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan \(OIG-22-13\)*.](#)

Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure

Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure are one of the most dynamic threats and significant strategic risks to the United States. The Department's cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) secure Federal civilian networks; (2) strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure; (3) assess and counter evolving cybersecurity risks; and (4) combat cybercrime.

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We conduct mandated and discretionary audits to evaluate DHS' compliance with cybersecurity-related Federal laws and Executive Orders to safeguard the Department's information systems and the Nation's critical infrastructure.

[DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts \(OIG-22-06\)](#)

The objective of this audit was to assess DHS' progress implementing the joint DHS/Department of Defense (DoD) cybersecurity efforts as required in the Cybersecurity Action Plan (CAP) and 2015 and 2018 memorandums. We determined DHS made some progress improving cybersecurity collaboration and coordination in accordance with the CAP and memorandums. We made five recommendations to improve ongoing joint efforts to implement the CAP and memorandum action items.

The Department concurred with all five recommendations.

We also issued [*CISA Should Validate Priority Telecommunications Services Performance Data \(OIG-22-15\)*](#).

Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security

The United States' prosperity and economic security are integral to DHS' homeland security operations, affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems. The Department's prosperity and economic security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) enforce trade laws and facilitate lawful international trade and travel; (2) safeguard the transportation system; (3) maintain waterways and maritime resources; and (4) safeguard financial systems.

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We continue to provide oversight of DHS' programs and operations affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems.

[*CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise \(OIG-22-34\)*](#)

Our objective was to determine to what extent the establishment of CBP's Centers of Excellence and Expertise has improved the assessment, collection, and protection of revenue. The absence of performance standards made it difficult to determine to what extent the establishment of the Centers improve these, but we identified several areas in which CBP could improve its compliance with the Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015 (TFTEA), and its procedural guidance for the Centers. We made five recommendations to strengthen CBP's procedures for assessing, collecting, and protecting trade revenue. CBP concurred with our recommendations.

We also issued [*DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking \(OIG-22-02\)*](#).

Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

Strengthening and integrating relationships between and among headquarters offices and operational components is critical to optimizing the Department's efficiency and effectiveness. The Department seeks to increase integration, clarify roles and responsibilities, champion its workforce, advance risk-based decision-making, and promote transparency and accountability. The Department's organizational responsibilities focus on three goals: (1) strengthen departmental governance and management; (2) develop and maintain a high performing workforce; and (3) optimize support to mission operations.

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We provide oversight of DHS' acquisitions, financial and performance management, information systems, mission support, and workforce areas to ensure the Department's activities and investments effectively support its mission.

[*S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects \(OIG-22-30\)*](#)

The objective was to determine whether the Science & Technology Directorate executes research and development projects in accordance with Federal and DHS guidelines, policies, and procedures. We determined S&T did not execute all research and development projects in accordance with Federal and DHS guidelines, policies, and procedures. We made five recommendations to improve the execution of research and development projects. S&T concurred with all five recommendations.

Other issued reports include:

[*DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain \(OIG-22-04\)*](#)

[*Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting \(OIG-22-08\)*](#)

[*DHS' Implementation of OIG Recommendations Related to Drug Interdiction \(OIG-22-09\)*](#)

[*Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds \(OIG-22-18\)*](#)

[*Review of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds \(OIG-22-17\)*](#)

[*Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds \(OIG-22-16\)*](#)

[*Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report \(OIG-22-19\)*](#)

[*Review of Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers' Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report \(OIG-22-20\)*](#)

[*Review of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report \(OIG-22-21\)*](#)

[*Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2021 Drug Control Budget Formulation Compliance Report \(OIG-22-23\)*](#)

[*Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds \(OIG-22-24\)*](#)

Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information

Section 5(a)(21)(B) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978* (IG Act) requires OIG to report "incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information, including the justification of the establishment for such action."

DHS Law Enforcement Preparation for and Response to the January 6, 2021 Events at the U.S. Capitol

During the previous reporting period, we included information about Secret Service's significant delay of OIG's access to Secret Service records, impeding the progress of our January 6, 2021 review. We continue to discuss this issue with Secret Service.

Investigations

The Office of Investigations investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and personnel actions.

The narratives below are a select sample of our completed investigations.

Theft of Government Software and Personally Identifiable Information (PII)

Jointly with the US Postal Service OIG and the Department of Justice (DOJ), we investigated multiple DHS OIG employees, including a former acting Inspector General, who executed a scheme to steal confidential and proprietary software from the government along with the PII of

DHS and USPS employees, so that a company owned by one of the conspirators could develop and sell a case management system to government agencies.

The former acting Inspector General pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit theft of government property and theft of government property. Another employee pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit theft of government property. A third employee was found guilty of conspiracy to defraud the U.S. government, theft of government property, wire fraud, aggravated identity theft, and obstruction at trial.

Exploitation of Iraqi P-2 Refugee Program

Jointly with the Department of State (State) Diplomatic Security Service (DSS), CBP, USCIS, and DOJ, we investigated an international criminal conspiracy that recruited foreign national U.S. Embassy Employees in Moscow, Russia and Amman, Jordan, who were defrauding the process of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program. This network, led by an Iraqi national who was watch-listed and on the U.S. no-fly list, engaged in and directed the theft of sensitive refugee applicant data, by accessing a database maintained by State and used by USCIS. The data was then used to manipulate the process by which Iraqi refugee applicants must abide, by creating and falsifying documents, coaching applicants prior to interview, or providing false endorsements of employment, which allowed applicants access into the program unlawfully, then ultimately to the US. This investigation identified 400+ individuals who successfully processed through the program and entered into the U.S. as a result of this conspiracy.

In 2021, one subject pleaded guilty to conspiracy to steal records and defraud the United States, conspiracy to launder money, computer fraud and abuse. He was later sentenced to 25 months confinement. In 2022, the main co-conspirator pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States and is pending sentencing.

An unsealed indictment also charges, the third subject, a Russian national who remains at large, with conspiracy to steal U.S. government records and to defraud the United States, theft of U.S. government records, conspiracy to launder money, and computer fraud and abuse.

Grant Fraud⁵

Jointly with the Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), we investigated the Fire Chief (and Grant Administrator) and the Assistant Grant Administrator of a local volunteer fire department for theft of Government funds and false Federal tax returns.

The U.S District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania previously accepted a guilty plea from the Assistant Grant Administrator for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Theft of Government funds) and Title 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (Fraud and False Statements on Federal Tax Returns) and sentenced him to 1 day of incarceration, 2 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of \$25,264.07 to the IRS and \$57,242.00 to FEMA.

The U.S District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania accepted a guilty plea from the former Fire Chief for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 641 (Theft of Government Funds) and Title 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) (Fraud and False Statements on Federal Tax Returns) and sentenced him to 46 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay restitution of \$619,126.00 to the IRS and \$1,590,257.00 to FEMA.

Identity Theft

Jointly with IRS-CI, U.S. Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), and the U.S. Secret Service, we investigated a FEMA Information Technology

⁵We reported this case in our September 2021 SAR. We are including it again in this SAR because the second individual was sentenced within this SAR reporting period.

Specialist Reservist (former) for hacking into a medical center computer network and stealing the personal identifying information (PII) of numerous individuals and then selling the PII on the dark web.

The U.S District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania accepted a plea agreement from the Information Technology Specialist for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (Aggravated Identity Theft) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy) and sentenced him to 84 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay \$987,090.00 in restitution to the IRS.

Wire Fraud

Jointly with the Small Business Administration (SBA) OIG, we investigated a FEMA Emergency Management Specialist (former) for creating a false identity and impersonating an SBA Supervisor and convincing an Economic Injury Disaster Loans Applicant to send a duplicate payment to a personal PayPal account.

The U.S District Court for the District of Maryland accepted a guilty plea from the Emergency Management Specialist for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud) and sentenced him to 6 months of home detention, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay \$8,737.00 in restitution.

False Claims Act

Jointly with the DoD OIG and the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service, we investigated a contractor company for improper and unallowable costs in contracts and subcontracts. The U.S. Government entered into a settlement agreement with the company. The company agreed to settle for \$1,043,475.00, of which \$57,267.58 will be allocated toward the U.S. Coast Guard for damages to resolve the allegations the company violated the False Claims Act.

Jointly with the General Services Administration OIG, we investigated a company that identified small business set-aside contracts and prepared quotes for small business conspirators to forward to the Government under the name of the small businesses. The U.S. Government entered into a settlement agreement with the company and its former Executive Vice President. The company agreed to pay \$48.5 million to resolve the allegations that it improperly manipulated Federal small business set-aside contracts around the country. DHS will receive restitution in the amount of \$108,074.24 from the settlement agreement.

Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits

We investigated a civilian who filed a claim with and received \$36,018.00 from FEMA for disaster assistance aid after claiming the Hawaii Kilauea Volcanic Eruption and Earthquakes destroyed his primary residence. The investigation revealed the civilian's reported damaged dwelling address was not his primary residence as he had claimed in his application for disaster assistance benefits from FEMA.

The U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii accepted a guilty plea with the civilian for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1040(a)(2) (Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits) and sentenced the civilian to 1 month of incarceration and 3 years of supervised release and ordered him to pay restitution to FEMA in the amount of \$36,018.00, a fine of \$10,688.00, and an assessment of \$100.00.

Structuring of Currency Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements

We investigated an ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) Deportation Officer (former) for conducting cash withdrawals and deposits to evade reporting requirements in order to misrepresent his financial status in a divorce proceeding with his then-wife.

The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California found the Deportation Officer guilty of Title 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3) (Structuring of Currency Transactions to Evade Reporting Requirements) and sentenced him to 15 months of incarceration and 1 year of supervised release.

Narcotics

We investigated an ICE ERO Deportation Officer (former) after he was arrested by the Los Angeles Police Department for violation of section 11366 of the California Health and Safety Code (Operating or Maintaining a Drug House). Approximately 780 marijuana plants, weighing approximately 60 pounds, and a pistol were recovered from the residence the Deportation Officer owned.

The U.S. District Court for the Central District of California accepted a guilty plea from the Deportation Officer for violation of Title 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),(b)(1)(C) (Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana) and sentenced him to 18 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay a \$15,000.00 fine.

Sexual Assaults

Jointly with CBP OPR, we investigated a Supervisory CBP Officer (former) for sexually assaulting a CBP Officer at a training facility. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Georgia accepted a guilty plea from the Supervisory CBP Officer for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) (Assault on Certain Officers or Employees) and sentenced him to 36 months of probation with special conditions of supervision imposed to include collection of a DNA sample, no communication with the victim, and submission to future searches.

Jointly with the FBI, we investigated an Army National Guard Soldier (former) for sexually assaulting another National Guard Soldier, while on duty, while both were deployed to the Southwest Border to provide border detection support. The Arizona Superior Court in Cochise County accepted a guilty plea from the Soldier for violation of A.R.S. § 13-1404 (A) (Sexual Abuse), a Class 5 Felony. The Soldier was sentenced to 60 days of incarceration followed by 36 months of supervised probation (to include sex offender rules and conditions). Additionally, the Soldier was discharged from the Army National Guard under Other Than Honorable conditions and will forfeit all veteran benefits.

Witness Tampering and Obstruction

Jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, we investigated a CBP Officer (former) for interfering with a local law enforcement criminal investigation in which the CBP Officer's son was the subject of the investigation. Our investigation revealed the CBP Officer used her access to CBP law enforcement databases to query information about the victim in her son's criminal case.

The Arizona Superior Court in Pima County accepted a guilty plea from the CBP Officer for violation of Arizona Revised Statute (A.R.S.) § 13-2316(A)(8) (Computer Tampering), a Class Six Felony. The CBP Officer was sentenced to 36 months of probation and was ordered to pay a \$1,000.00 fine to the Arizona Attorney General's Office Racketeering Fund with a surcharge in the amount of \$830.00, various court fees in the amount of \$480.00, and a monthly probation fee of \$65.00.

INVESTIGATIONS OF SENIOR GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Per requirements described in the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*,⁶ OIG conducted the following investigations involving senior government employees where allegations of misconduct were either substantiated, or unsubstantiated and not disclosed to the public.

Substantiated

We investigated a **senior official (SES)** for alleged bribery and conflict of interest. We determined the senior official used their official position and government resources to promote a pilot project involving a product sold by a private company associated with the senior official's former supervisor. We found no evidence indicating the senior official received bribes. The senior official resigned from employment with DHS during this investigation. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on February 15, 2021, and was declined on March 3, 2021.

We investigated a **senior official (SES)** for alleged conflict of interest. The investigation found evidence of conflict of interest and also revealed the senior official took a loan from a company he owned without reporting the asset/liability on his annual ethics filings or state and federal tax filings. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on November 12, 2021, and was declined on November 23, 2021. Criminal prosecution of the senior official was declined in lieu of administrative remedies available to DHS. This investigation was referred to the appropriate DHS component for evaluation and administrative action.

We investigated a **manager (GS-15)** for alleged time and attendance irregularities. We found evidence the manager did not work complete duty days, did not report to work on several days, and did not take leave when absent. We were unable to substantiate the allegation that

the manager was unresponsive to phone calls and emails while away from the office. The manager retired from DHS during the investigation. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on March 25, 2020, and was declined on March 25, 2020.

Unsubstantiated and not disclosed to the public

We investigated a **senior official (SES)** for alleged prohibited personnel actions. The senior official allegedly engaged in a prohibited personnel action involving the promotion of a DHS employee. The senior official was alleged to have directed the announcement of a position in a manner that obstructed other qualified candidates from competing for the position, thereby giving an unfair advantage to the DHS employee. We found the allegation was unsubstantiated.

We investigated a **manager (GS-15)** for an alleged conflict of interest. The manager allegedly had a personal relationship with representatives of a contract company and caused an emergency COVID-19 contract to be awarded to the company without competition. The manager also allegedly steered a 2018 contract award to the contract company. We found the allegations were unsubstantiated.

We investigated **two managers (GS-15)** for alleged abuse of authority. We found that the allegation was unsubstantiated.

We investigated a **retired manager (GS-15)**, working as a contractor, for an alleged violation of the Federal lifetime post-employment ban regarding working on matters in which he participated personally and substantially and/or the 2-year post-employment ban related to working on matters that were under his official responsibility while he was employed as a manager. We found the allegations were unsubstantiated.

⁶Public Law 114-317 § 4(c)(1)(D)(19).

CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS

The Office of Inspector General did not testify before Congress during this period.⁷ We held more than 40 meetings and briefings with Members of Congress, committees, and their staffs during this reporting period. The Inspector General personally briefed numerous Members who sit on committees with jurisdiction over DHS regarding DHS OIG's complete portfolio of work.

Legislative and Regulatory Reviews

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DHS programs and operations and to make recommendations about the impact of such legislation and regulations on (1) the economy and efficiency of DHS programs and operations, and (2) the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in DHS programs and operations.

At the request of bi-partisan staff members of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, we provided technical drafting assistance for H.R. 4349, or the "*Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Authorization Act.*"



⁶ Since 2003, OIG has been asked to testify before Congress 168 times.

OTHER OIG ACTIVITIES

Oversight of Single Audits

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires Inspectors General take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with *Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards* (GAGAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a fiscal year to obtain an audit, referred to as a “Single Audit” (per the Single Audit Act, as amended by Public Law 104-156). Non-Federal auditors perform these single audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure the non-Federal auditors perform their Single Audit work in compliance with GAGAS, and to determine that the audit results are properly reported.

During this reporting period, we completed 122 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by the non-Federal auditing firms (independent public accountant organizations). These 122 desk reviews encompass \$693,795,660 Federal grant spending, of which \$289,304,093 was for direct DHS grants. We did not complete any quality control reviews.

Sixty-one percent of our reviews did not disclose any quality issues, or only minor issues that did not require corrective actions. The remaining 39 percent contained errors needing correction in future filings, as identified below.⁸

⁸ Some of the Single Audit submissions had several errors, so arithmetically there are more errors noted than 39 percent of 122 letters would indicate.

PROBLEMS WITH:	NUMBER
Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards	17
Audit Report	15
Corrective Action Plan	11
Standard Form Accompanying Report	9
Findings	7
Incorrect Risk Assessment	7
Prior Report	4
Other	3
Single Audit Report Submitted Late	2



APPENDECIES

Appendix I: Reports

- [Reports with Monetary Findings](#)
- [Resolution of Reports and Recommendations](#)
- [Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months](#)
- [Reports with Open Recommendations Older Than 6 Months](#)
- [Audit and Inspection Reports Issued](#)
- [Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated](#)

Reports and Recommendations with Questioned or Unsupported Costs

	<u>Carryover</u>	<u>Issued</u>
Number of Reports	32	0
Number of Recommendations	69	0
Questioned Costs	\$8,058,731,047	\$0
Unsupported Costs	\$7,179,288,745	\$0

Reports and Recommendations with Funds Put to Better Use

	<u>Carryover</u>	<u>Issued</u>
Number of Reports	13	0
Number of Recommendations	29	0
Funds Put to Better Use	\$2,971,409,106	\$0

Resolution of Reports and Recommendations⁹

Reports & Recommendations Open Older Than 6 Months

Period Ending	# Reports with Recommendations > 6 Months	# Recommendations Open and Unresolved > 6 Months
9/30/2021	25	42
3/31/2022	22	33

Current Report Inventory

	# Reports
Reports with open recommendations at the beginning of the period	160
Reports issued to DHS this period	35
Reports with recommendations closed this period	43
Reports with open recommendations at the end of the period	152

Active Recommendations

	# Reports
Open recommendations at the beginning of the period	568
Recommendations issued this period	81
Recommendations closed this period	135
Open recommendations at the end of the period	514

⁹ Since 2003, OIG has issued 11,376 recommendations. DHS has taken action to address all but 568 of them. This appendix excludes investigative reports.



Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec No.	DHS Comp.	Reason Code*
5/4/2015	OIG-15-85	DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts	1	SEC, DSEC, COS	B
9/27/2017	OIG-17-112	Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness	6	TSA	C
10/24/2017	OIG-18-04	(U) FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable	2, 3, 4	TSA	B
1/5/2018	OIG-18-36	ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)	2	ICE	B
9/19/2018	OIG-19-17	FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security Is Questionable	1, 2	TSA	C
2/28/2019	OIG-19-23	Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents	1	CBP	B
7/31/2019	OIG-19-57	A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations	5	ICE	A
9/30/2019	OIG-19-66	FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds	1, 3	FEMA	A
3/24/2020	OIG-20-19	PALMS Funding and Payments Did Not Comply with Federal Appropriations Law	2, 8, 9	MGMT	A
4/6/2020	OIG-20-23	FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003	1, 2	FEMA	C
7/14/2020	OIG-20-52	CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border	1, 3	CBP, MGMT,PLCY	A
8/13/2020	OIG-20-59	HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive	4, 5	ICE, MGMT,PLCY, TSA	A
8/12/2020	OIG-20-60	FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003	1, 2, 3	FEMA	C
8/27/2020	OIG-20-66	DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA	1	CBP, DHS, ICE, Coast Guard, Secret Service	A

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Rec No.	DHS Comp.	Reason Code*
9/30/2020	OIG-20-77	Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019	2	MGMT	C
10/27/2020	OIG-21-02	CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry	1	CBP	B
2/1/2021	OIG-21-17	DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019	1	MGMT	C
3/15/2021	OIG-21-27	CBP Faced Challenges in Its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - For Official Use Only	3	CBP	A
3/30/2021	OIG-21-30	Violations of Detention Standards Amidst COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ	1	ICE	B
7/6/2021	OIG-21-43	FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges	1	FEMA	B
8/9/2021	OIG-21-53	U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs	1	CBP	A
9/22/2021	OIG-21-66	DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment	1	USCG, TSA	A

Totals **22 Reports**

33 Recs

*Reason Code Key

- A = DHS did not concur and has not changed its original position
- B = DHS did not provide timely/sufficient corrective action plan and/or ECD
- C = Disagreement on evidence and/or proposed corrective actions

Reports with Open Recommendations Older than 6 Months

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-12-18	FEMA's Process for Tracking Public Assistance Insurance Requirements	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-14-142	(U) Vulnerabilities Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening Operations	1	-	-	TSA
OIG-15-10	Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	20	-	-	DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, Coast Guard
OIG-15-140	DHS Can Strengthen Its Cyber Mission Coordination Efforts	1	-	-	PLCY
OIG-16-06	Fiscal Year 2015 Financial and Internal Controls Audit	15	-	-	CFO, DHS, FEMA, MGMT, NPPD, Coast Guard
OIG-16-54	Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-16-91	TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security	2	-	-	OGC, TSA
OIG-16-100	FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program – AFG Grants	1	\$7,124,893	-	FEMA
OIG-17-09	DHS Drug Interdiction Efforts Need Improvement	1	-	-	MGMT
OIG-17-10	The Secret Service Has Taken Action to Address the Recommendations of the Protective Mission Panel	2	-	-	Secret Service
OIG-17-12	Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	28	-	-	CBP, CFO, FEMA, NPPD, Coast Guard, Secret Service
OIG-17-14	Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports	1	-	-	TSA
OIG-17-22	DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)	1	-	-	SEC/DSEC/CO
OIG-17-38-D	FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Sheltering and Temporary Essential Power	2	-	-	FEMA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-17-49	Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information	4	-	-	CRCL, I&A, OGC, PRIV
OIG-17-51	ICE Deportation Operations	1	-	-	ICE
OIG-17-74-IQO	Oversight Review of the US Coast Guard Investigative Service	3	-	-	Coast Guard
OIG-17-112	Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness	3	-	-	TSA
OIG-18-16	Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	42	-	-	CBP, DHS, FEMA, Coast Guard, Secret Service
OIG-18-36	ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)	1	-	-	ICE
OIG-18-51	Department-wide Management of the HSPD-12 Program Needs Improvement	1	-	-	DHS
OIG-18-70	FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information	2	-	-	TSA
OIG-18-71	FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-18-73	DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012	2	-	-	COS, DSEC, SEC
OIG-18-78	USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement	3	-	-	USCIS
OIG-18-81	DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct	1	-	-	MGMT
OIG-18-83	CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport	4	-	-	CBP
OIG-18-88	Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program	2	-	-	Coast Guard
OIG-19-04	Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	28	-	-	CBP, DHS, FEMA, NPPD, Coast Guard, Secret Service
OIG-19-10	CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-19-15	The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively	1	\$1,768,768	-	NPPD

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-19-21	Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas	1	-	-	TSA
OIG-19-28	ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens	1	-	-	ICE
OIG-19-35	TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers	1	-	-	TSA
OIG-19-42	DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program	3	-	-	DHS
OIG-19-48	DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline	5	-	-	MGMT
OIG-19-49	CBP's Global Entry Program Is Vulnerable to Exploitation	2	-	-	CBP
OIG-19-52	FEMA's Cost Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-19-56	TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement	1	-	-	TSA
OIG-19-57	A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations	3	-	-	ICE
OIG-19-67	Limitations of CBP OFO's Screening Device Used to Identify Fentanyl and Other Narcotics	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-20-03	Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	5	-	-	DHS
OIG-20-06	DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families	3	-	-	CBP, MGMT, ICE
OIG-20-13	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges	2	-	-	ICE
OIG-20-15	FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-25	Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Transportation and Public Works	3	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-26	Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Education	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-28	TSA's Challenges With Passenger Screening Canine Teams - Sensitive Security Information	1	-	\$77,000,000	TSA

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-20-32	FEMA Needs to Effectively Designate Volunteers and Manage the Surge Capacity Force	3	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-33	TSA Needs to Improve Monitoring of the Deployed Advanced Imaging Technology System	1	-	-	TSA
OIG-20-34	CBP's ACAS Program Did Not Always Prevent Air Carriers from Transporting High-Risk Cargo into the United States	2	-	-	CBP, TSA
OIG-20-37	DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats	2	-	-	CISA
OIG-20-40	DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management	1	-	-	DHS
OIG-20-43	DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems	3	-	-	PLCY
OIG-20-46	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Collier County, Florida	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-48	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida	7	\$1,076,913	-	FEMA
OIG-20-50	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida	5	\$62,763	-	FEMA
OIG-20-51	Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants in Monroe County, Florida	14	\$384,329	-	FEMA
OIG-20-52	CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-20-53	DHS Is Not Coordinating the Department's Efforts to Defend the Nation's Food, Agriculture, and Veterinary Systems against Terrorism	1	-	-	CWMD
OIG-20-55	CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities - Law Enforcement Sensitive	7	-	-	CBP
OIG-20-57	FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Comply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-59	HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive	3	-	-	ICE, PLCY, TSA
OIG-20-61	Progress and Challenges in Modernizing DHS' IT Systems and Infrastructure	1	-	-	MGMT

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-20-62	DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain	2	-	-	CFO
OIG-20-66	DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA	1	-	-	CBP, DHS, ICE, Coast Guard, Secret Service
OIG-20-68	FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties	3	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-71	Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot	3	-	-	CBP
OIG-20-72	Oversight Review of the Office of the Chief Security Officer, Internal Security Division	1	-	-	DHS
OIG-20-73	DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018	3	-	-	DHS, MGMT
OIG-20-74	DHS Made Limited Progress to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act in Calendar Years 2017 and 2018	4	-	-	CISA
OIG-20-76	FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria	2	-	-	FEMA
OIG-20-77	Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019	2	-	-	CISA, DHS, MGMT
OIG-21-01	DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure	3	-	-	CISA
OIG-21-02	CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-06	DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives	2	-	-	PRIV
OIG-21-08	Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting	13	-	-	CFO, DHS
OIG-21-09	DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment	2	-	-	ICE, PLCY
OIG-21-11	TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program - Sensitive Security Information	2	-	-	TSA
OIG-21-13	CBP's Configuration Management Practices Did Not Effectively Prevent System Outage	1	-	-	CBP

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-21-14	Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning	3	-	-	MGMT
OIG-21-15	ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment	4	-	-	ICE
OIG-21-16	DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs	1	-	-	CBP, DHS, USCIS
OIG-21-17	DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019	1	-	-	CFO
OIG-21-18	CBP Needs Additional Oversight to Manage Storage of Illicit Drugs	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-19	CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of Its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance - Law Enforcement Sensitive	3	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-20	Better Oversight and Planning Are Needed to Improve FEMA's Transitional Sheltering Assistance Program	1	\$55,800,000	-	FEMA
OIG-21-21	CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain	1	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-22	Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for BioWatch - For Official Use Only	2	-	-	CWMD
OIG-21-24	FEMA Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight for the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-21-26	FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement	3	\$23,282,276	-	FEMA
OIG-21-27	CBP Faced Challenges in Its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - For Official Use Only	6	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-28	FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds	5	-	-	FEMA
OIG-21-29	DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge	3	-	-	CBP, SEC/ DSEC/ COS, ICE
OIG-21-31	DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities	2	-	-	FPS, SEC/DSEC/COS
OIG-21-33	Department of Homeland Security's FY 2020 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments	2	-	-	CFO

Report	Report Title	# of Recs	Questioned Costs	Funds to be Put to Better Use	DHS Comp.
OIG-21-35	DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees	3	-	-	CBP, ICE, TSA, DHS, FPS
OIG-21-36	ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal	1	-	-	ICE
OIG-21-38	DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program	2	-	-	MGMT
OIG-21-40	ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist	1	-	-	ICE
OIG-21-42	FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-21-43	FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges	1	-	-	FEMA
OIG-21-47	CBP Has Placed Travelers' PII at Risk of Exploitation	8	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-48	CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention	3	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-49	Review of the February 16, 2020 Childbirth at the Chula Vista Border Patrol Station	3	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-51	FY 2018 Audit of Science and Technology Bankcard Program Indicates Risks	2	\$63,213	-	S&T
OIG-21-52	TSA Did Not Assess Its EDCT Program for Surface Transportation Security	2	-	-	TSA
OIG-21-53	U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs	2	-	-	CBP
OIG-21-54	FEMA Prematurely Obligated \$478 Million in Public Assistance Funds from FY 2017 through FY 2019	2	-	-	FEMA
OIG-21-55	Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2020	1	-	-	I&A
OIG-21-56	USCIS Needs to Improve Its Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification Process	8	-	-	USCIS
OIG-21-57	ICE's Oversight of the Capgemini Contract Needs Improvement	3	-	-	ICE

Audit and Inspection Reports Issued

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	Total Questioned Costs ^(a)	Unsupported Costs ^(b)	Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c)
1/28/22	OIG-22-24	Review of U.S. Coast Guard's Fiscal Year 2021 Detailed Accounting Report for Drug Control Funds	-	-	-
2/4/22	OIG-22-25	FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs	-	-	-
2/7/22	OIG-22-26	CBP Border Patrol Stations and Ports of Entry in Southern California Generally Met TEDS Standards	-	-	-
2/8/22	OIG-22-27	CBP Officials Implemented Rapid DNA Testing to Verify Claimed Parent-Child Relationships	-	-	-
2/28/22	OIG-22-28	Management Alert - Reporting Suspected Fraud of Lost Wages Assistance	-	-	-
3/4/22	OIG-22-29	I&A Intelligence Prior to the January 6, 2021 Events at the Capitol	-	-	-
3/7/22	OIG-22-30	S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects	-	-	-
3/16/22	OIG-22-31	Management Alert – Immediate Removal of All Detainees from the Torrance County Detention Facility	-	-	-
3/23/22	OIG-22-32	FEMA Followed Its Declaration Request Policies, but Could Improve Its Records Management	-	-	-
3/28/22	OIG-22-33	The Office for Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve Its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices	-	-	-
3/31/22	OIG-22-34	CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise	-	-	-
3/31/22	OIG-22-35	FEMA Successfully Assisted HHS in Providing Shelter and Supplies to Unaccompanied Children from the Southwest Border	-	-	-
Totals		35 Reports	\$0	\$0	\$0

Notes and Explanations:

- ^(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.
- ^(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*.
- ^(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

Date Issued	Report Number	Report Title	OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share)	Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow)	Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed)	Amount DHS Recovered/
6/8/2016	OIG-16-98	FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - SAFER Grants	\$18,443,447	\$1,378,994	\$12,174,766	\$4,157,387
5/4/2020	OIG-20-29	Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the U.S. Virgin Islands Housing and Finance Authority	\$296,000,000	\$85,380,199	\$210,619,800	\$0
9/15/2020	OIG-20-63	FEMA Should Recover \$216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina	\$59,575,020	\$28,321,021	\$31,253,999	\$0
11/18/2020	OIG-21-10	FEMA Should Disallow \$12.2 Million in Disaster Case Management Program Grant Funds Awarded to New York for Hurricane Sandy	\$12,178,970	\$4,435,982	\$7,742,988	\$0
3/3/2021	OIG-21-24	FEMA Needs to Improve Guidance and Oversight for the Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grant	\$6,936,357			\$6,936,357
Totals		5 Reports	\$393,133,794	\$119,516,196	\$261,791,553	\$11,093,744

Appendix 2: Other OIG Activities

[Contract Audit Results Previous Peer Reviews of or by OIG Audit Operations Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public](#)

Contract Audit Results

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This Act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

During this SAR period, we issued eight contract audit reports, none of which identified unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs.

Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG Audit Operations

Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of or conducted by an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

OIG was not the subject of any peer reviews during this reporting period. There are no outstanding recommendations from previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG.

The date of the last peer review was March 2021 and conducted by Department of Education OIG.

Peer Reviews Conducted by DHS OIG

Secln October 2021, DHS OIG began conducting a peer review of the Department of Justice OIG's audit operations. DHS OIG expects to issue the results of this peer review in the next SAR period.

In February 2022, a peer review team made up of four OIGs, including DHS OIG, began a CIGIE peer review of the Defense Intelligence Agency OIG's projects conducted in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*. The peer review team also includes representatives from the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and U.S. Department of Energy OIGs. The peer review team expects to issue the results of this peer review in May 2022.

Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

During this reporting period, DHS OIG closed two audits.

Audit of Information Security Requirements on Selected CBP Contracts

The objective of our audit, initiated on August 25, 2021, was to determine to what extent CBP implemented controls to ensure sensitive information processed and stored by its contractors is safeguarded. On December 16, 2021, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued *DHS Privacy: Selected Component Agencies Generally Provided Oversight of Contractors, but Further Actions Are Needed to Address Gaps* (GAO-22104144). Based on the results of our limited testing and the findings in GAO-22-104144, we decided to close our audit of CBP without issuing a report.

Audit of DHS' Use of Advance Contracts to Address Migration at the Southern Border

The objective of our audit initiated on October 26, 2021, was to determine the extent to which DHS uses advanced contracting to address migration at the Southwest border. Our limited work determined that Immigration and Customs Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection are not required to use advanced contracting. As a result, we closed our audit of the DHS' Use of Advance Contracts to Address Migration at the Southern Border without issuing a report.



Appendix 3: Abbreviations

ACAS	Assured Compliance Assessment Solution
AFG	Assistance to Firefighters Grants
BSA	Bureau and Statistical Agent
CAFRA	Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000
CAP	Cybersecurity Action Plan
CARES Act	Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
CBP	U.S. Customs and Border Protection
CFO	Office of the Chief Financial Officer
CFU	COVID Fraud Unit
C-IED	counter improvised explosive devices
CISA	Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency
CISOMB	Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman
CG-PSC	Coast Guard Personnel Service Command
Coast Guard	United States Coast Guard
COS	Chief of Staff
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
CRCL	Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
CRS	Community Rating System
CTMC	Counterterrorism Mission Center
CWMD	Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
DATA Act	Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
DRF	Disaster Relief Fund
DSEC	Deputy Secretary
EDCT	Explosives Detection Canine Team
EER	Enlisted evaluation reports
ERO	Enforcement and Removal Operations
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FAST	Free and Secure Trade Program
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FLETC	Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers
FOD	Field Operations Division
FPS	Federal Protective Service
GAGAS	Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards
GAO	Government Accountability Office
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services
HSI	Homeland Security Investigations
HSPD-12	Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12
I&A	Office of Intelligence and Analysis
ICDC	Irwin County Detention Center
ICE	U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
IRS-CI	Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation
JFK	John F. Kennedy International Airport
LWA	lost wages assistance
MGMT	Directorate for Management
NFIP	National Flood Insurance Program
NPPD	National Protection and Programs Directorate
OBP	Office for Bombing Prevention
OFO	Office of Field Operations
OGC	Office of General Counsel
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OLA	Office of Legislative Affairs
OPA	Office of Public Affairs
OPE	Office of Partnership and Engagement
OPR	Office of Professional Responsibility
OPS	Office of Operations Coordination
PALMS	Performance and Learning Management System
PII	personally identifiable information
PLCY	Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans
PRAC	Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
PREPA	Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority
PRIV	Privacy Office
S&T	Science and Technology Directorate

SAFER	Staffing for Adequate Fire and Emergency Response
SAR	Semiannual Report to Congress
SAVE Act	Stop Asset and Vehicle Excess Act
SBA	Small Business Administration
Secret Service	United States Secret Service
SES	Senior Executive Service
STEP	Smart Traveler Enrollment Program
SWA	State Workforce Agencies
TEDS	National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search
TFTEA	Trade Facilitation and Trade Enforcement Act of 2015
TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TWIC	Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(U)	Unclassified
U.S.C.	United States Code
USCIS	U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
USPIS	U.S. Postal Investigation Service
WPU	Whistleblower Protection Unit



Appendix 4: Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, including Section 989C of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, are listed below.

REQUIREMENT:	PAGE(S):
Matters Referred to Federal Prosecutorial Authorities	6
Reports of Whistleblower Retaliation	7-8
Recommendations with Significant Problems	Nothing to Report
Highlights of Significant OIG Activities	9-18
Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information	15-18
Review of Legislation and Regulations	20
Reports with Questioned Costs	22, 26-34
Reports Recommending that Funds Be Put to Better Use	22, 26-34
Summary of Reports in which No Management Decision Was Made	23-25
Prior Recommendations Not Yet Implemented	24-33
Closed Investigations Involving Senior Government Employees that Were Not Disclosed to the Public Because Allegations were not Substantiated	19
Management Decision Disagreements	23-25

Revised Management Decisions

Nothing to Report

Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies

Nothing to Report

No Establishment Comment Received Within 60 Days of Report Issuance

Nothing to Report

Information Required by the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act

Nothing to Report

Semiannual Report to Congress

October 1, 2021 - March 31, 2022

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General

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Office of Inspector General, Mail Stop 0305
Attention: Hotline
245 Murray Drive, SW
Washington, D.C. 20528-0305

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