

LEAD INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS



OPERATION ENDURING SENTINEL

AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES RELATED TO

AFGHANISTAN



JANUARY 1, 2026–MARCH 31, 2026



Pursuant to Executive Order 14347, “Restoring the United States Department of War,” September 5, 2025, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DoD IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) use the secondary titles of the Department of War Inspector General (DoW IG) and Office of Inspector General (DoW OIG), respectively. The use of these secondary titles does not in any way affect the primary statutory title or authorities of the DoD IG under The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. Chapter 4, Inspectors General), or the authorities or responsibilities of the DoD IG or DoD OIG pursuant to any laws, regulations, or policies.

On the cover: Food supplies bound for Parwan province are loaded at the World Food Programme’s main warehouse in Kabul. (WFP photo)



We are pleased to present this Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) report to Congress on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES). This report discharges our quarterly reporting responsibilities pursuant to Section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

In October 2021, the Department of War (DoW) initiated OES as the U.S. mission to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against threats emanating from Afghanistan. The U.S. Government also engages in security cooperation activities with Central Asian and South Asian regional partners to build their border security and counterterrorism capacity.

This report describes the activities of the U.S. Government in support of OES, as well as the work of the DoW, the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to further the U.S. Government's policy goals in Afghanistan. This report also discusses the planned, ongoing, and completed oversight work conducted by the Lead IG agencies—the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs—and our partner oversight agencies. This report covers the quarterly reporting period January 1 through March 31, 2026.

Handwritten signature of Platte B. Moring, III in black ink.

Platte B. Moring, III
Lead Inspector General for OES
Inspector General
U.S. Department of War

Handwritten signature of Arne B. Baker in black ink.

Arne B. Baker
Acting Associate Inspector General
for OES
Senior Official Performing the Duties
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Handwritten signature of Van Nguyen in black ink.

Van Nguyen
Acting Deputy Inspector General
Performing the Duties of the
Inspector General
U.S. Agency for International
Development



IN THIS REPORT

Afghanistan Remains a Permissive Environment for Terrorist Groups

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- The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria-Khorasan (ISIS-K) continued to recruit and conduct attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and aspired to conduct operations abroad.
- The Taliban continued to allow al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) and the Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to operate in Afghanistan.
- The U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations (UN) said the Taliban continued to demonstrate “bad faith” regarding its counterterrorism commitments under the 2020 Doha Agreement.

U.S. Security Activity Under OES Remained Limited

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- The U.S. Government maintained the ability to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.
- State continued to fund border security, nonproliferation, and other security programs in neighboring Central Asian countries.

State Engages with Taliban to Secure Release of U.S. Detainee

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- The Taliban released Dennis Coyle, an American citizen who went missing in Afghanistan in January 2025.
- Several personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Qatar left the region due to Operation Epic Fury (OEF), including staff members who manage relations with the Taliban and relocation efforts for Afghans seeking U.S. visas.
- The U.S. Government has not provided humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan since January 2025, though two education programs for Afghans continued.
- Nearly half of Afghanistan’s population requires humanitarian assistance, according to the UN. OEF and Pakistani military operations in Afghanistan, as well as expulsions of Afghans by both Iran and Pakistan, exacerbated this crisis.

Operation Enduring Welcome Continues Wind Down

pp. 11–13

- More than 1,100 Afghans remained at Camp as-Sayliyah in Qatar awaiting resettlement to third countries.
- Camp as-Sayliyah sustained damage from shrapnel from Iranian missiles that targeted Qatar in response to OEF.
- State did not issue any Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) to Afghans during the quarter. No Afghan SIV applicants were excepted from the Presidential Proclamation that suspends entry into the United States for nationals of Afghanistan.

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MISSION UPDATE

Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES) is the Department of War (DoW) operation in the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility to contain terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan and protect the U.S. homeland by conducting over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations against those threats. Additionally, the United States seeks to protect U.S. citizens and secure the release of all Americans detained in Afghanistan.¹

OES began on October 1, 2021, following the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan. OES replaced Operation Freedom's Sentinel, which the DoW launched in 2015 after the United States ended combat operations in Afghanistan. Under Operation Freedom's Sentinel, U.S. forces trained, advised, and assisted Afghan security forces and conducted counterterrorism operations against the remnants of al-Qaeda.²

The Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy (OUSW[P]) reported no change to the OES mission or lines of effort and desired end states during the January 1 to March 31 reporting period.³

Food supplies bound for Parwan province are loaded at the World Food Programme's main warehouse in Kabul. (WFP photo)



FUNDING

For FY 2026, the Military Services requested an estimated \$218 million in funding for OES. This followed an effort in 2025 by the Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer (OUSW[C]) to revise how it calculated costs associated with OES.⁴ In previous fiscal years, the OUSW(C) had reported much higher obligations for OES—more than \$4.2 billion in FY 2025—but these figures included many costs that were unrelated to Afghanistan.⁵

As the Military Services made progress in separating other theater requirements from their OES funding line, the DoW’s planned allocation of FY 2026 funds changed. For instance, while the largest share of OES obligations in FY 2025 was for the Army, primarily personnel costs, the DoW did not request any OES funds for the Army in FY 2026.⁶ Meanwhile, the FY 2026 request included \$172.4 million (approximately 79 percent) for the Navy and Marine Corps, primarily operations tempo and facilities/base support.⁷

The OUSW(C) was unable to provide obligation data for the first half of FY 2026 because it was still working with the Services to calculate FY 2026 obligations.

SECURITY

In 2020, the United States and the Taliban entered into the Doha Agreement, under which the Taliban made various counterterrorism commitments. State said that while it has repeatedly urged the Taliban to fulfill its commitments under the agreement, the Taliban has not done so. The Taliban continues to give safe haven to terrorist groups in Afghanistan.⁸

THE VIOLENT EXTREMIST THREAT

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the United Nations reported that Afghanistan remained a permissive environment for terrorist groups.⁹ The United Nations expressed growing concern about the ability of terrorist groups operating in Afghanistan to exploit commercial satellite communications and use artificial intelligence.¹⁰ According to the report, terrorist organizations can use commercial satellites to deploy “cheap, fast, and relatively secure” communications in remote areas and demonstrated proficiency in using artificial intelligence, mainly for propaganda purposes designed to radicalize and recruit.¹¹

Table 1.

Estimated Force Size of Violent Extremist Organizations in Afghanistan and the Region

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP)	4,000–6,000
ISIS-Khorasan (ISIS-K)	2,000
Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)	200–300
Al-Qaeda	Fewer than a dozen core members

Source: DIA, vetting comment, 4/10/2026.

The United Nations reported that while the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria–Khorasan (ISIS-K) remained under significant counterterrorism pressure from the Taliban, al-Qaeda, and its affiliate, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), continued to “enjoy the patronage” of Taliban authorities. Similarly, the Taliban continued to allow Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) greater liberty and support, resulting in increased TTP attacks against Pakistan.¹² Of these groups, the TTP remained the largest in number. (See Table 1.)

The DIA reported that ISIS-K and al-Qaeda probably will seek to exploit Operation Epic Fury (OEF), the U.S.-Israel combat operations with Iran, to radicalize supporters through their media activity. The DIA noted that the war was a primary topic in ISIS-K radio broadcasts. AQIS has used the war as a propaganda narrative to recruit fighters in India.¹³

ISIS-Khorasan: According to State, ISIS-K likely remains one of the foremost terrorist threats to U.S. interests. ISIS-K aspires to attack the West, including the United States.¹⁴ Despite Taliban counterterrorism efforts, a deadly ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kabul during the quarter showed that the Taliban is unable to completely prevent ISIS-K from planning and conducting attacks in Afghanistan, State said.¹⁵ The DIA assessed that ISIS-K will remain capable of planning and conducting attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan and will continue to pose a persistent threat to U.S. regional interests and the U.S. homeland.¹⁶ State reported that ISIS-K's financial health was poor and weakened by recent counterterrorism actions against the group. However, ISIS-K continued to solicit donations through propaganda and collect funds using encrypted mobile platforms and cryptocurrency.¹⁷

ISIS-K also continued attacks in Pakistan, including a February 6 suicide bombing of a Shia mosque in Islamabad, likely carried out by an ISIS-K affiliate that trained in Afghanistan, the DIA said.¹⁸ In response, Pakistan launched attacks against ISIS-K in Afghanistan.¹⁹ ISIS-K continued to operate training camps in Pakistan.²⁰

Al-Qaeda: The United Nations reported that al-Qaeda “acted as a service provider and force multiplier for other terrorist groups” and offered training and advice, mainly to the TTP.²¹ The Taliban almost certainly provides sanctuary to AQIS. The DIA said that AQIS very likely maintained amicable relationships with Taliban members while ostensibly adhering to Taliban restrictions prohibiting militant activities.²² In Pakistan, AQIS conducts operations under the umbrella group Ittihad-ul-Mujahideen Pakistan to avoid Taliban scrutiny and deny involvement in attacks in Pakistan.²³

Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP): During the quarter, the TTP continued to target Pakistani security forces, prompting Pakistani retaliatory strikes in Afghanistan.²⁴ The DIA reported that the Taliban's continued provision of sanctuary to the TTP and uneven enforcement of security restrictions likely contributed to the persistent cross-border violence.²⁵ The DIA assessed that the continued fighting has not weakened the Taliban's monopoly on power in Afghanistan.²⁶ Though the TTP is not considered a terror target under OES, the U.S. Government has designated the TTP as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.²⁷ Some UN member states expressed concern that the TTP may deepen its cooperation with al-Qaeda-aligned groups, potentially leading to an “extra-regional threat.”²⁸

U.S. SECURITY ACTIVITY

Information on DoW activity during the quarter in support of OES is not publicly releasable. However, State reported that the United States is able to conduct over-the-horizon counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan.²⁹

During the quarter, State's Bureau of Counterterrorism worked to strengthen partnerships with key Central Asian governments and bolster their counterterrorism capabilities; improve the U.S. counterterrorism relationship with Pakistan; and leverage partners outside the region to advance U.S. counterterrorism efforts in South and Central Asia.³⁰

Despite Taliban counterterrorism efforts, a deadly ISIS-K suicide bombing in Kabul during the quarter showed that the Taliban is unable to completely prevent ISIS-K from planning and conducting attacks in Afghanistan, State said.

The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported in February that killings of former Afghan security force members continued, including 14 deaths during the period October 1 to December 31, 2025.

Regional border security: State continued border security programs in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to help secure borders against terrorism, drug trafficking, and other transnational crimes. Assistance provided during the quarter included train-and-equip mentoring, border post refurbishment assistance, and provision of early detection technology. State also funded detentions and investigations programming in Central Asia.³¹

Arms control and nonproliferation: State supported programs to help identify and mitigate chemical precursors and their supply chains in the region to prevent dual-use diversion of chemicals and other materials to Afghanistan.³²

Reprisals against former officials: State said that Taliban leaders appeared to uphold an August 2021 general amnesty prohibiting reprisal against former government employees and security personnel. However, the amnesty does not apply to former government officials involved in military opposition to the Taliban, State said.³³ The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) reported in February that killings of former Afghan security force members continued, including 14 deaths during the period October 1 to December 31, 2025.³⁴

U.S. Origin Equipment: State reported that during the ongoing conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Pakistani airstrikes targeted bases in Afghanistan, including Bagram Air Base, and destroyed ammunition depots and military equipment including items suspected to be U.S.-origin weapons.³⁵

DIPLOMACY AND ASSISTANCE

During the quarter, the U.S. Government's top priorities in Afghanistan remained mitigating terrorist threats to the U.S. Homeland emanating from Afghanistan and securing the release of all detained Americans.³⁶ The U.S. Government has not recognized any entity, including the Taliban, as the government of Afghanistan.³⁷

U.S. DIPLOMACY

U.S. Engagement with the Taliban: The United States did not hold any direct, bilateral engagements with the Taliban regarding its counterterrorism commitments during the reporting period.³⁸ However, U.S. officials engaged with Taliban representatives during the quarter to seek the release of detained Americans, State reported.³⁹

In March, Ambassador Waltz said that the Taliban continued to demonstrate “bad faith,” leaving the U.S. Government skeptical of the Taliban’s willingness to meet Afghanistan’s international commitments and obligations.⁴⁰ During the quarter, the Taliban intensified its restrictions on women and girls.⁴¹ Ambassador Waltz said that the international community would be more willing to fill Afghanistan’s \$1 billion humanitarian aid shortfall if the restrictions were lifted.⁴²

Afghanistan Affairs Unit: Since the suspension of the U.S. Mission to Afghanistan in 2021, the Afghanistan Affairs Unit at the U.S. Embassy in Doha, Qatar, has managed Afghan affairs for the U.S. Government.⁴³ The unit engaged with Qatar, which serves as the protecting power for U.S. interests in Afghanistan.⁴⁴ During the quarter, Qatari government officials conducted welfare visits to U.S. citizens detained in Afghanistan. Qatar also supported Department of Homeland Security efforts to repatriate Afghans subject to U.S. removal orders.⁴⁵

State reported that Afghanistan Affairs Unit representatives attended UN working group meetings in Qatar on the private sector and counternarcotics in Afghanistan as part of the UN’s Doha Process. The meetings included representatives from the United Nations, the Taliban, Afghan ministries, and other UN member states.⁴⁶

State reported that, due to risks associated with Iranian attacks during OEF, State placed all but 60 staff from the U.S. Mission in Qatar on ordered departure, including staff from the embassy, the Afghanistan Affairs Unit, and the Coordinator for Afghan Relocation Efforts.⁴⁷

U.S. detainee released: On March 24, Secretary of State Marco Rubio announced the release of Dennis Coyle, an American citizen who went missing in Afghanistan in January 2025.⁴⁸ The announcement came as State continued to accuse the Taliban of conducting “hostage diplomacy” to demand the release of an al-Qaeda operative detained at Guantanamo Bay.⁴⁹ State reported that several other Americans remained detained in Afghanistan.⁵⁰ On March 9, Secretary Rubio designated Afghanistan as a State Sponsor of Wrongful Detention.⁵¹ The designation permits several restrictive measures, such as prohibiting use of U.S. passports to travel to or through Afghanistan, sanctions, and restrictions on visas and foreign assistance.⁵²

Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS: In January, State and Treasury participated in a Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS focus group on ISIS-K. Participants committed to increase civilian-led efforts to curb ISIS-K terrorist travel, financing networks, access to resources, and use of the Internet for the purposes of recruitment and radicalization.⁵³

Sanctions: The Taliban remains a Specially Designated Global Terrorist group, which means that any Taliban assets within U.S. jurisdiction are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with the Taliban. State reported that it continued to review its policy toward Afghanistan, including the possibility of designating the Taliban as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which would prohibit individuals and entities from knowingly providing material support to the group.⁵⁴

Dennis Coyle, returning home from Afghanistan after his March 24, 2026, release from Taliban detention in Afghanistan. (U.S. Special Envoy for Hostage Affairs photo)



In a March UN Security Council briefing on Afghanistan, Ambassador Waltz questioned the size of the UNAMA budget, which he noted is the largest of any special UN political mission, even after a 15 percent cut in its 2026 budget.

Fund for the People of Afghanistan: Assets for the Afghan Fund, as it is known, grew to more than \$4.146 billion as of March 31, 2026.⁵⁵ The fund was set up by the United States in 2022 in coordination with the government of Switzerland and Afghan economic experts to enable \$3.5 billion of Afghan central bank reserves to be used for the benefit of the Afghan people while keeping the funds out of the hands of the Taliban.⁵⁶ However, absent its own administrative expenses, the Fund has made no disbursements to date, State reported.⁵⁷ Separately, in January, President Trump renewed the national emergency with respect to Afghanistan for 1 year, which freezes assets of Afghanistan’s Central Bank held in the United States.⁵⁸

UNAMA Mandate Renewal: During the quarter, State sought, and the UN Security Council approved, a 3-month technical rollover of the UNAMA mandate, to June 2026. State seeks to streamline the UNAMA mandate to be consistent with U.S. Government priorities before considering any further extension.⁵⁹ In a March UN Security Council briefing on Afghanistan, Ambassador Waltz questioned the size of the UNAMA budget, which he noted is the largest of any special UN political mission, even after a 15 percent cut in its 2026 budget.⁶⁰

U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM): The USAGM reported during the quarter that its Afghan service continued to broadcast in Dari and Pashto for audiences inside Afghanistan, despite recent funding cuts. The USAGM’s FY 2026 budget for Afghanistan is \$25 million, of which \$6 million was expended as of the end of the quarter.⁶¹

U.S. ASSISTANCE

On January 20, 2025, President Donald J. Trump issued an Executive Order to review foreign assistance programs for their consistency with U.S. policy.⁶² On April 4, 2025, the President instructed agencies to suspend any assistance that could possibly reach the hands of the Taliban. No U.S. foreign assistance has been provided to Afghanistan since then, State said.⁶³ Two education programs supporting Afghan nationals were allowed to continue because no financial resources were expended inside Afghanistan.⁶⁴

The Women’s Scholarship Endowment, which has a \$50 million endowment, provided full scholarships to 169 Afghan women enrolled in 8 universities in 7 countries.⁶⁵ Nineteen female students—recruited from Afghans previously processed to resettle in the United States but whose resettlement was terminated—were awarded scholarships to study in Oman during the quarter, according to the project implementer.⁶⁶

Supporting Student Success in Afghanistan is a nearly \$20 million program for Afghans pursuing undergraduate studies.⁶⁷ The current program is set to end in 2026. Deliberations regarding future education programming befitting Afghans is ongoing.⁶⁸ The program shifted to virtual instruction for the 2025-2026 academic year, State reported.⁶⁹ A 2026 survey showed that 80 percent of graduates—including women living in Afghanistan—are employed full-time, and 20 percent have started their own business or organization.⁷⁰

Afghanistan Humanitarian Update

During the quarter, the Afghan people experienced war with Pakistan, economic crisis, and massive refugee and migrant returns. These, along with health and food insecurity, contributed to a deteriorating humanitarian situation.⁷¹ According to the United Nations, approximately 21.9 million people, close to half of Afghanistan's population, require humanitarian assistance, including more than 11.6 million children.⁷² Afghans continued to face challenges in accessing humanitarian services, including due to Taliban interference with assistance delivery and restrictions on female aid workers.⁷³

Suspension of trade from Iran and Pakistan shook Afghanistan's fragile economy: Since the beginning of OEF, Afghanistan has experienced economic shocks in some cities, where as much as 40 percent of household goods come from Iran. In addition, fuel and food trucks were stuck at the Iranian border and remittance inflows decreased by 60 percent due to the closure of Iranian exchange houses.⁷⁴ Border crossings closed and trade with Pakistan remained suspended due to the ongoing Afghanistan-Pakistan conflict.⁷⁵

Refugee and internally displaced populations continued to grow: The UN Refugee Agency reported that more than 375,000 Afghans returned to Afghanistan from Iran and Pakistan during the quarter, in addition to 2.9 million who returned in 2025. Most of them were deported, arriving with limited resources to communities already under strain.⁷⁶ Additionally, Afghanistan continues to host an estimated 3.2 million internally displaced people, including 115,000 newly displaced as a result of the conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan.⁷⁷

Polio fears increased as health services were under greater strain: Hostilities between Afghanistan and Pakistan further strained Afghan health services, which were already suffering from shocks from an August 2025 earthquake and cuts to U.S. humanitarian aid funding.⁷⁸ Pakistani airstrikes damaged health facilities and prompted the closure of eight nutrition delivery sites.⁷⁹ State reported that the border closure disrupted polio surveillance by the U.S.-supported Global Polio Eradication Initiative during the quarter. Health experts consider polio in Pakistan and Afghanistan to be a single epidemic as they are the only countries to have never stopped polio transmission.⁸⁰

Food insecurity worsened: The United Nations reported that the estimated number of people facing acute food insecurity rose from 14.8 million to 17.4 million people between November 2025 to March 2026.⁸¹ Cross-border fighting exacerbated food insecurity because approximately 60 percent of staple food imports come from Pakistan.⁸²

State said a further U.S. assessment of conditions in-country, including risk of diversion of commodities by the Taliban, would be necessary to determine whether the United States will resume funding to the World Food Programme in Afghanistan.⁸³



Headquarters of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan in Kabul. (UN photo)

ENDURING WELCOME

State continued to wind down Enduring Welcome, the whole-of-government effort to relocate and resettle eligible Afghan allies and their families from Afghanistan to the United States.⁸⁴ As of the end of the quarter, State reported an unobligated balance of \$462 million for costs relating to the wind down and did not anticipate needing additional funding.⁸⁵ State reported that it plans to close Camp as-Saliyah, the facility in Qatar where thousands of Afghans were processed en route to the United States, by the end of September 2026.⁸⁶

Afghans in Qatar: During the quarter, more than 1,000 Afghans remained at Camp as-Saliyah.⁸⁷ (See Table 2.) Between 2024 and March 2026, the United States negotiated the resettlement of 74 Afghans to New Zealand, and 4 Afghans to Suriname.⁸⁸ State reported that 211 extended family members of American citizen DoW Service members remained at Camp as-Saliyah.⁸⁹

Table 2.

Afghan Population Remaining at Camp as-Saliyah, as of March 16, 2026

	FY 2025		FY 2026	
	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2
U.S. Citizens	0	0	0	0
U.S. Citizen Family Members	7	5	4	4
Legal Permanent Residents (LPR)	1	0	0	0
LPR Family Members	4	1	1	1
SIV Applicants	319	255	217	214
Family of Unaccompanied Children	164	164	144	124
Other Family Unification	220	220	232	228
Other Refugee Applicants	716	651	569	548
TOTAL	1,431	1,296	1,167	1,119

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 3/20/2026; State SCA/A vetting comment, 4/14/2026.

Table 3.

Afghans Who Voluntarily Repatriated to Afghanistan

		Cases	Individuals
FY 2025	October 1–December 31	2	6
	January 1–March 31	7	12
	April 1–June 30	25	65
	July 1–September 30	11	41
FY 2026	October 1–December 31	18	46
	January 1–March 16	10	34

Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 3/20/2026.

Table 4.

Relocation of Afghans, as of March 31, 2026

0 Afghans relocated during the reporting period from Afghanistan with U.S. Government support

55,182 identified eligible individuals in Afghanistan

40,368 have been in contact with State


Source: State SCA/A, response to State OIG request for information, 3/20/2026.

According to State, some Afghan nationals residing at Camp as-Sayliyah voluntarily returned to Afghanistan, including 204 who repatriated between October 1, 2024, and March 16, 2026.⁹⁰ State said that an estimated 150 Afghans had accepted payments for voluntary repatriations to Afghanistan.⁹¹ The payments consist of \$4,575 for the main applicant and \$1,145 per additional household member.⁹² Families with more than 9 members receive an additional \$381 per member.⁹³

The Afghanistan Affairs Unit’s consular section completed adjudication of all pending consular cases at Camp as-Saliyah, including all Afghan Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) cases.⁹⁴ At the end of the quarter, there were no SIV applicants at Camp as-Sayliyah waiting for final consular adjudication, State said.⁹⁵ All future visa adjudications for Afghan nationals, including for SIVs, will occur in the applicant’s country of residence or at other immigrant visa processing locations, State reported.⁹⁶

Impact of Operation Epic Fury: According to media reports, Camp as-Sayliyah sustained damage from shrapnel from Iranian missiles targeting Qatar.⁹⁷ State installed additional protection against missile debris and shrapnel at the compound.⁹⁸ On March 2, approximately 100 residents approached the front gate of the compound expressing their intention to depart. After dialogue with Camp as-Sayliyah staff, they returned to their residences, according to State and media reporting.⁹⁹

Figure 1.

Afghan SIV Issuances, July 2025 to March 2026

Camp as-Sayliyah personnel, including direct hire personnel, U.S. citizen third-party contractors, and others, continued to provide services to the Afghan residents, including food distribution, custodial support, interpretation, and medical care during the ordered departure.¹⁰⁰

SIV Issuance: State did not issue any SIVs to Afghans during the quarter.¹⁰¹ (See Figure 1.) Afghan SIV applicants were originally exempted from a June 2025 Presidential Proclamation restricting entry of nationals from 12 countries, including Afghanistan.¹⁰² However, a subsequent December 2025 Presidential Proclamation expanded the restriction to include Afghan SIV applicants as of January 1, 2026.¹⁰³ State said that as of March, it had issued four national interest exceptions to the December 2025 Presidential Proclamation, but none were for Afghan SIVs.¹⁰⁴

SIV Case Completion: In February, State informed all Afghan SIV applicants with incomplete applications that they must provide all supporting documentation for Chief of Mission review by June 5, 2026.¹⁰⁵ As of March 9, State issued 75 Chief of Mission approvals and 1,455 denials during the quarter. State expects to issue decisions in all pending cases by the end of calendar year 2029.¹⁰⁶ The approvals remain valid indefinitely unless State issues a notice to the applicant that it has been revoked.¹⁰⁷

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX A

Classified Appendix to this Report

A classified appendix to this report provides additional information on Operation Enduring Sentinel (OES), as noted in several sections of this report. The appendix will be delivered to relevant agencies and congressional committees.

APPENDIX B

About the Lead Inspector General

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. Sections 401-424), established in section 419 the Lead Inspector General (Lead IG) framework for oversight of overseas contingency operations. The Lead IG agencies are the Offices of Inspector General (OIG) of the Department of War (DoW), the Department of State (State), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID).

Section 419 requires the Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency to appoint a Lead IG from among the Inspectors General of the Lead IG agencies upon the commencement or designation of a military operation that exceeds 60 days as an overseas contingency operation or receipt of notification thereof.

Lead IG oversight of the operation “sunset” at the end of the first fiscal year after commencement or designation in which the total amount appropriated for the operation is less than \$100,000,000.

The Lead IG agencies collectively carry out the Lead IG statutory responsibilities to:

- Submit to Congress on a quarterly basis a report on the contingency operation and to make that report available to the public.
- Develop a joint strategic plan to conduct comprehensive oversight of the operation.
- Ensure independent and effective oversight of programs and operations of the U.S. Government in support of the operation through either joint or individual audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations.

The Overseas Contingency Operations Joint Planning Group serves as a primary venue to coordinate audits, inspections, and evaluations of U.S. Government-funded activities supporting overseas contingency operations, including those relating to the Middle East.

The Lead IG agencies use dedicated, rotational, and temporary employees, as well as contractors, to conduct oversight projects, investigate fraud and corruption, and provide consolidated planning and reporting on the status of overseas contingency operations.

APPENDIX C

Methodology for Preparing this Lead IG Report

This report complies with section 419 of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (codified at 5 U.S.C. sections 401-424), which requires that the designated Lead IG provide a quarterly report, available to the public, on each overseas contingency operation, and is consistent with the requirement that a biannual report be published by the Lead IG on the activities of the Inspectors General with respect to that overseas contingency operation. The Chair of the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency designated the DoW IG as the Lead IG for OES in November 2021. The Lead IG appointed the State IG to be the Associate IG for OES.

This report covers the period from January 1 to March 31, 2026. The three Lead IG agencies—DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG—and partner oversight agencies contributed the content of this report.

To fulfill the congressional mandate to report on OES, the Lead IG agencies gather data and information from Federal agencies and open sources. The sources of information contained in this report are listed in endnotes or notes to tables and figures. Except in the case of audits, inspections, investigations, and evaluations referenced in this report, the Lead IG agencies have not verified or audited the information collected through open-source research or from Federal agencies, and the information provided represents the view of the source cited in each instance.

INFORMATION COLLECTION FROM AGENCIES AND OPEN SOURCES

Each quarter, the Lead IG agencies gather information from the DoW, State, USAID, and other Federal agencies about their programs and operations related to OES. The Lead IG agencies use the information provided by their respective agencies for quarterly reporting and oversight planning.

This report also draws on current, publicly available information from reputable sources. Sources used in this report may include the following:

- U.S. Government statements, press conferences, and reports
- Reports issued by international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and think tanks
- Media reports

The Lead IG agencies use open-source information to assess information obtained through their agency information collection process and provide additional detail about the operation.

REPORT PRODUCTION

The DoW IG, as the Lead IG for this operation, is responsible for assembling and producing this report. The DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG draft the sections of the report related to the activities of their agencies and then participate in editing the entire report. Once assembled, each OIG coordinates a two-phase review process of the report within its own agency. During the first review, the Lead IG agencies ask relevant offices within their agencies to comment, correct inaccuracies, and provide additional documentation. The Lead IG agencies incorporate agency comments, where appropriate, and send the report back to the agencies for a second review prior to publication. The final report reflects the editorial view of the DoW OIG, State OIG, and USAID OIG as independent oversight agencies.

APPENDIX D

Completed Oversight Projects

From January 1 to March 31, 2026, the Lead IG and partner agencies did not complete any oversight projects.

APPENDIX E

Ongoing Oversight Projects

Table 5 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' ongoing oversight projects related to OES.

Table 5.

Ongoing Oversight Projects Related to OES by Partner Agencies, as of March 31, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Review of Asylum Application Adjudication Processing in Response to Ahmed vs. DHS (Project no. 24-015-ISP-USCIS)

To determine whether missed aliases or incomplete resolution of potential matches to derogatory records have increased following the Ahmed vs. DHS settlement agreement.

APPENDIX F

Planned Oversight Projects

Table 6 lists the titles and objectives for Lead IG and partner agencies' planned oversight projects related to OES.

Table 6.

Planned Oversight Projects Related to OES by the DoW, State, and USAID OIGs, as of March 31, 2026

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Audit of the Department of State's Counterterrorism Vetting (Project no. 25AUD053)

To determine whether State designed its risk-management and counterterrorism vetting procedures to prevent terrorist organizations from benefiting from U.S. foreign assistance funds.

Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Project no. 26ISP041.00)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Classified Inspection of Embassy Tashkent, Uzbekistan (Project no. 26ISP041.01)

To evaluate the programs and operations of the U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
(See the classified appendix.)

U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Review of Closeout Procedures for Terminated USAID Awards

To assess USAID's efforts to close out terminated awards in accordance with Federal regulations and USAID policies and procedures.

APPENDIX G

Hotline and Investigations

HOTLINE ACTIVITY

Each Lead IG agency maintains its own hotline to receive complaints specific to its agency. The hotlines provide a confidential, reliable means for individuals to report violations of law, rule, or regulation; mismanagement; gross waste of funds; or abuse of authority.

During the quarter, the DoD Hotline received 1 allegation and referred 1 case related to OES or Afghanistan. State OIG received 6 allegations and referred 5. USAID OIG received no allegations. In some instances, a case may contain multiple allegations.

INVESTIGATIONS

The DoW OIG's criminal investigative component, the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS), maintained investigative personnel in Bahrain and Kuwait, where they worked on cases related to OES and its predecessor Operation Freedom's Sentinel (OFS). DCIS agents also worked on OES/OFS-related cases from offices in Europe and the United States. State OIG and USAID OIG investigators worked on cases related to OES/OFS from Washington, D.C., El Salvador, Germany, Israel, South Africa, and Thailand.

During this reporting period, investigative branches of the Lead IG agencies and their partner agencies had 20 open investigations and closed 4 investigations. They made 1 referral to the Department of Justice during the period. The investigative agencies reported no indictment/information or convictions.

The Lead IG agencies and their partners coordinate investigative activities, deconflict potential or common targets, and interact for logistical and legal support. The investigative partner agencies consist of representatives from DCIS, State OIG, USAID OIG, the U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.



ACRONYMS

Acronym	
AI	Artificial Intelligence
AQIS	al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoW	Department of War
FY	fiscal year
ISIS-K	ISIS-Khorasan
Lead IG	Lead Inspector General
Lead IG agencies	DoD, State, and USAID OIGs
LPR	Legal Permanent Residents
OEF	Operation Epic Fury
OES	Operation Enduring Sentinel
OFS	Operation Freedom's Sentinel
OIG	Office of Inspector General

Acronym	
OUSW(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of War (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
OUSW(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy
SIV	Special Immigrant Visa
State	Department of State
TTP	Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan
UN	United Nations
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
U.S.	United States
USAGM	U.S. Agency for Global Media
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
VOA	Voice of America
WFP	World Food Programme



Map of Afghanistan



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