


CUI

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of War*

MAY 6, 2026



## (U) Follow-up Evaluation of the DoW's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan

~~Controlled by: DoW-OIG~~

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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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## (U) Executive Summary

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### (U) Why We Did This Evaluation

(U) This is a follow-up evaluation to Report No. DODIG-2024-130, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan,” September 11, 2024 (the 2024 Report). In the 2024 Report, we determined that the DoW did not implement effective accountability controls for defense articles provided to Taiwan during the first presidential drawdown (PD). A PD is a means for the United States to rapidly transfer stocks of defense articles to other countries or international partners.

### (U) What We Found and Impact

(U) To address the recommendations in the 2024 Report, DoW Components implemented corrective actions for planning and accounting for shipments of PD defense articles with unique serial numbers, known as serialized defense articles, to Taiwan. Specifically, DoW personnel met all packaging and accountability requirements for identification, protection, and serviceability of M16 rifles during the air shipment (Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292).

(U) However, DoW Components did not properly package, label, or account for non-serialized equipment designated for Taiwan on Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292 in accordance with DoW and Air Force materiel readiness requirements. Air Force personnel at installations and the consolidation point did not properly package and label some non-serialized defense articles before shipping them to the aerial port of embarkation in the United States. After the transfer in Taiwan, we found deteriorated shipping containers; incorrect packaging with a mix of non-serialized articles, including M16 rifle slings, ammunition pouches, and magazines loosely piled together in large cardboard boxes; inconsistently marked and labeled shipping containers; and non-manifested defense articles included in Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292.

(U) According to Air Force officials, several factors caused the non-compliance, such as using Lackland Air Force Base, a non-standard aerial port of embarkation, without clear guidance. Additionally, the officials stated that the rapid pace of the operation resulted in skipping some mandatory procedural steps, such as Air Force installation requirements for reporting and correcting packaging and labeling discrepancies. As a result, the joint inventory team, led by the American Institute in Taiwan, could not efficiently and effectively account for the quantity and quality of non-serialized defense articles they received, which delayed the timely transfer of defense articles in Taiwan.

(U) Please see our recommendations on the next page.

## (U) Recommendations Table

(U) Responsible Management Official	Recommendation	Implementation Status
Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate, in coordination with Commander, Air Force Materiel Command	1. <a href="#">Consolidate existing regulations and Presidential Drawdown Taiwan lessons learned from Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292.</a>	<b>In-Process (April 30, 2026)</b>
	2. <a href="#">Develop and implement standard operating procedures for planning and executing Special Airlift Assignment Missions from alternate aerial ports of embarkation, including adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations</a>	<b>In-Process (April 30, 2026)</b>  (U)

(U) NOTE: The estimated completion dates are included in parenthesis in the Implementation Status column. Additionally, In Progress, Unresolved, and No Response recommendations are considered open recommendations.

**(U) Implementation Status:**

(U) **Closed** – The DoW OIG has verified that DoW management completed the corrective actions

(U) **In Progress** – The DoW OIG and DoW management have agreed on corrective action(s) that will address the recommendation. This recommendation is considered resolved in accordance with M-25-01, “Revised OMB Circular A- 50, Audit, Inspection, or Evaluation Follow-Up,” November 7, 2024.

(U) **Unresolved** – The DoW OIG determined that DoW management’s proposed actions described in their management comments do not address the recommendation.

(U) **No Response** – DoW management did not respond.

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## (U) Background

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(U) This project is a follow-up to Report No. DODIG-2024-130, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan” (the 2024 Report).<sup>1</sup> The 2024 Report found that the DoW damaged defense articles enroute to or at the aerial port of embarkation (APOE) before shipment, delivered deteriorated defense articles to Taiwan, and shipped defense articles to Taiwan that were non-compliant with DoW shipping standards.

(U) The objective of this follow-up evaluation was to determine whether the DoW effectively and efficiently implemented accountability and quality controls for the movement and delivery of defense articles provided to Taiwan using Presidential Drawdown Authority.<sup>2</sup> To answer the objective of this evaluation, we directly observed Special Airlift Assignment Mission (SAAM) 1292 from aircraft upload and departure from the APOE at Lackland Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, to arrival at the aerial port of debarkation, including transfer of the Presidential Drawdown (PD) defense articles to Taiwan partners.<sup>3</sup>

## (U) Multiple Organizations Are Responsible for Transferring Defense Articles to Taiwan Through Presidential Drawdown

### (U) *American Institute in Taiwan*

(U) The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is a nonprofit, private corporation established in January 1979 by the Taiwan Relations Act and is overseen by the U.S. Department of State.<sup>4</sup> The Taiwan Relations Act states that any “programs, transactions, or other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United States Government with respect to Taiwan shall, in the manner and to the extent directed by the President, be conducted and carried out by or through the American Institute in Taiwan...” The Department of State, through a contract with the institute, provides a large part of the AIT’s funding and guidance for its operations. In passing the Taiwan Relations Act, Congress also assumed an oversight role with respect to the institute’s operations.

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<sup>1</sup> (U) DoW Office of Inspector General Report No. DODIG 2024-130, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan,” September 11, 2024.

<sup>2</sup> (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for or requires safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

<sup>3</sup> (U) AIT personnel received and inspected the defense article shipment in Taiwan. We observed AIT personnel during their inspections; however, the AIT did not authorize us to perform an independent or additional inspection of the received defense articles.

<sup>4</sup> (U) Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 98–6, 93 Stat. 14 (1979), codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3305.

***(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency***

(U) The Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) serves as the central repository and manager of all relevant data, analysis, and other documents or materials for PD deliveries to Taiwan. DSCA officials stated that during the PD planning process, the DSCA requests that the Military Departments provide the required planning information. With this information, DSCA officials stated that they collect and coordinate the DoW's inputs to support the Department of State's efforts to seek Presidential Determination to establish a PD. DSCA officials stated that if a PD is authorized, the DSCA informs combatant commands and Military Departments of the authorized equipment and services for delivery through the release of PD execute orders (EXORDs). DSCA officials also stated that during drawdown execution, the DSCA works with the Services and other external stakeholders to ensure that the status of all property is tracked so that established limits for authorized drawdown assistance are not exceeded. The DSCA reports PD support to Congress.

***(U) Military Departments and Services***

~~(CUI//REL USA, TWN)~~ The Military Services provide the required equipment or services on receipt of the DSCA EXORDs. [REDACTED]

***(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command***

(U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) planners, in conjunction with AIT personnel, identify the required defense articles for transfer and coordinate with the Military Services, Joint Staff, and AIT personnel to build a PD package to support Taiwan's self-defense. Finally, USINDOPACOM personnel monitor the consolidation, shipment, and transfer of the defense articles in accordance with the PD EXORDs.

***(U) U.S. Transportation Command's Air Mobility Command***

(U) The U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) Air Mobility Command is responsible for coordinating and conducting airlift for PD defense articles to Taiwan and allocating airlift when USINDOPACOM validates Military Service SAAM requests.

## (U) DoW Components Transferred Defense Articles to Taiwan Through the PD Process

~~(CUI//REL USA, TWN)~~ As part of SAAM 1292, AIT personnel expected the Taiwan Ministry of National Defense to receive [REDACTED] M16s and associated magazines, [REDACTED] M16 slings, [REDACTED] M16 magazine pouches, [REDACTED] M50 gas masks, and [REDACTED] M61 gas mask filters on 30 air cargo pallets, for a total weight of 105,494 pounds.<sup>5</sup> Of the air cargo pallets, 22 contained M16s, and the other 8 pallets were a mix of boxes and crates of the M16 accessories, gas masks, and filters. SAAM 1292, completed in September 2025, was one of [REDACTED] SAAMs to Taiwan that the DoW completed from March to December 2025 as part of PDs 2 and 3. This airlift mission contained both serialized and non-serialized defense articles designated for transfer to Taiwan through PDs 2 and 3.<sup>6</sup> Originally, officials from the Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate (HAF/A4) planned to load non-serialized defense articles for SAAM 1292 at the Wright-Patterson AFB APOE, fly to the second APOE at Lackland AFB to pick up the serialized M16s, and then depart for Taiwan. In August 2025, however, HAF/A4 officials restructured the mission to employ Lackland AFB as the only APOE after determining that it would reduce SAAM 1292 transportation costs by approximately \$100,000.

<sup>5</sup> (U) A SAAM provides an exclusive service for a specific user at a desired movement time. The mission is characterized by its unusual nature, sensitivity, cargo urgency, and operational delivery to points other than established or routine routes.

<sup>6</sup> (U) We use the term “serialized” to refer to defense articles that are assigned serial numbers, such as M16 rifles, and “non-serialized” for defense articles that are not assigned serial numbers, such as M16 ammunition pouches and rifle slings.

## (U) Evaluation Results

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### (U) DoW Officials Met Packaging and Accountability Requirements for M16s, but Improvements Are Needed for Labeling, Packaging, and Shipping Non-Serialized Defense Articles

(U) DoW Components implemented effective corrective actions for planning and accounting for serialized PD defense article shipments to Taiwan in accordance with the recommendations in the 2024 Report. Specifically, DoW officials met all packaging and accountability requirements for identifying, protecting, and servicing M16 rifles during SAAM 1292. However, DoW Components did not properly package, label, or account for non-serialized equipment designated for Taiwan on SAAM 1292 in accordance with DoW and Air Force materiel readiness requirements. Air Force personnel at installations that provided the articles and the Wright-Patterson AFB consolidation point did not properly package and label some non-serialized defense articles before shipping them to Lackland AFB. After the delivery in Taiwan, we found deteriorated shipping containers; incorrect packaging with a mix of non-serialized articles, including M16 rifle slings, ammunition pouches, and magazines loosely piled together in large cardboard boxes; inconsistently marked and labeled shipping containers; and non-manifested defense articles included in SAAM 1292.<sup>7</sup>

### (U) DoW Officials Met All Packaging and Accountability Requirements for M16 Rifles During SAAM 1292

(~~CUI//REL USA, TWN~~) By directly observing the SAAM transportation process from APOE to aerial port of debarkation, we determined that the shipment of [REDACTED] M16s to Taiwan during SAAM 1292 met all packaging and labeling requirements for identification, protection, and serviceability. We observed Air Force personnel place each of the rifles into moisture-proof bags with attached identifying tags, as required by DoD Military Standards (MIL-STD)-2073 and MIL-STD-129R.<sup>8</sup> Air Force personnel then placed the bags into containers for the SAAM flight to Taiwan. All M16 containers displayed required cargo identification information. AIT personnel confirmed that SAAM 1292 completed constructive delivery in coordination with their counterparts in Taiwan before

<sup>7</sup> (U) We use the term “non-manifested” to refer to defense articles not listed on shipping documentation.

<sup>8</sup> (U) DoD MIL-STD-2073-1E, “Standard Practice for Military Packaging,” November 20, 2018 (Incorporating Change 4, April 22, 2019). DoD MIL-STD-129R, “DoD Standard Practice: Military Marking for Shipment and Storage,” September 19, 2007 (Updated February 18, 2023).

~~(CUI//REL USA, TWN)~~ the shipment's departure from the continental United States to Taiwan, in accordance with the DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual. Lastly, we confirmed that neither AIT personnel nor their Taiwan partners noted any quantity discrepancies or defense article quality deficiencies with the SAAM 1292 M16s.

## **(U) DoW Components Implemented Corrective Actions for Planning and Accountability of PD Defense Article Shipments to Taiwan in Response to the 2024 Report**

(U) To implement the recommendations in the 2024 Report, DoW Components took corrective actions for planning and accounting for serialized PD defense article shipments to Taiwan. Specifically, officials from the DSCA and USTRANSCOM provided more specific instructions in the EXORDs for PDs 2 and 3 for Military Service personnel to follow when executing PD SAAMs. Additionally, DSCA and AIT personnel established a constructive delivery process to allow Military Service and Taiwan partners to complete title transfer for PD defense articles before SAAM flights depart for Taiwan.<sup>9</sup> AIT and USINDOPACOM personnel also implemented a process to document shipment deficiencies and lessons learned during the PD delivery process using the production of "storyboard" documents following the conclusion of each SAAM. See Appendix B for a detailed overview of the corrective actions implemented following the release of the 2024 Report.

(U) AIT personnel confirmed that SAAM 1292 completed constructive delivery in coordination with their Taiwan partners before the shipment's departure from the continental United States to Taiwan, in accordance with the DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual. Figure 1 shows the boxes of M16s, and Figure 2 shows the palletized containers of M16s prepared for transportation Taiwan.

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<sup>9</sup> (U) The constructive delivery process allows Military Service personnel and Taiwan partners to complete title transfer of PD defense articles before physical delivery of the defense articles to Taiwan.



(U) Figure 1. M16s Boxed for Shipment at the Lackland AFB Gunsmith Shop, September 22, 2025  
(U) Source: The DoW OIG.



(U) Figure 2. M16 Pallets at Lackland AFB Prepared for Transport to Airfield for Onward Transportation to Taiwan, September 23, 2025  
(U) Source: The DoW OIG.

(~~CUI//REL USA, TWN~~) We determined that the SAAM 1292 shipment of [REDACTED] M16s to Taiwan met all packaging and labeling requirements for identification, protection, and serviceability. Lastly, we confirmed that neither AIT personnel nor their Taiwan partners noted any quantity discrepancies or defense article quality deficiencies with the SAAM 1292 M16s. Figure 3 shows M16s laid out for the joint inspection at the designated facility in Taiwan.



(U) Figure 3. M16s Displayed for Inspection on Arrival in Taiwan, September 26, 2025  
 (U) Source: The AIT.

## (U) Packaging and Labeling of Non-Serialized PD Defense Articles Needs Improvement

(U) DoW Components did not package, label, or account for some non-serialized defense articles designated for Taiwan on SAAM 1292 in accordance with DoW and Air Force materiel readiness requirements. DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 9, requires DoW Components to package and label PD shipments using MIL-STD-2073-1 and MIL-STD-129R, respectively.<sup>10</sup> Personnel at Air Force installations that provided the articles and the consolidation point at Wright-Patterson AFB did not properly package and mark all of the articles

<sup>10</sup> (U) DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 9, "DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures: Materiel Programs," February 16, 2018 (Incorporating Change 2, May 16, 2019).

(U) before shipping them to the APOE in the United States. Additionally, SAAM 1292 contained defense article quantity errors and non-manifested defense articles. Defense Logistics Manual (DLM) 4000.25 and Joint Service Regulation (JSR) 4145.04 identify these deficiencies as supply discrepancies.<sup>11</sup>

### **(U) DoW Personnel Inconsistently Marked and Labeled Containers for Non-Serialized Defense Articles**

(U) Upon delivery in Taiwan, we determined that at least 5 of the 8 pallets of non-serialized defense articles contained boxes and crates that were missing information markings that identified the defense articles they contained, and some were missing military shipping labels that identified the shipping address information for the defense articles. Therefore, the marking and labeling were not in accordance with MIL-STD-129R, which lists specific directions for materials used for container marking and includes specific requirements for visible and legible cargo information and shipping directions on shipping containers. Marking and labeling must either be human- or machine-readable to facilitate inventory accuracy. MIL-STD-129R also states that exterior defense article packaging should contain markings identifying the national stock numbers, quantities, and nomenclatures of the defense articles in each given container, along with other information as applicable. In addition, MIL-STD-129R states that exterior defense article packaging should have a military shipping label affixed to its surface to ensure the container arrives at the correct address and is accounted for.<sup>12</sup>

(U) We identified boxes from two pallets with partial information that was handwritten on the container in cursive writing instead of stenciled, machine printed, or hand printed, as directed by MIL-STD-129R. We also found several containers with markings and military shipping labels from previous shipments and shipping addresses still on their exterior surfaces. MIL-STD-129R states that all container markings not applicable to the shipment must be completely destroyed. DLM 4000.25 and JSR 4145.04 identify improper or missing identification markings or shipping labels as reportable packaging discrepancies. JSR 4145.04 states that discrepancies cause the shipment or package to become vulnerable to loss, delay, damage, or unnecessary expense to the U.S. Government. According to DLM 4000.25, the Air Force designed the Supply Discrepancy Report (SDR) program

<sup>11</sup> (U) DLM 4000.25, Volume 2, "Supply Standards and Procedures," December 11, 2025; JSR 4145.04, "Department of Defense (DoD) Stock Readiness Program," October 21, 2020 (Incorporating Change 1, March 13, 2023). In the 2024 Report, we found packaging and accountability deficiencies in the PD defense article shipments supporting PD 1 and determined that DoW Components needed to improve the accountability and packaging of PD Taiwan shipments.

<sup>12</sup> (U) In accordance with MIL-STD-129R, the military shipping label should include a transportation control number, transportation account code, port of embarkation and debarkation, package weight, required delivery date, package dimensions in cubic feet, and other shipping information as applicable.

(U) to promote evaluation, correction, and improvement of logistics operations, and discrepancies must be reported and investigated in accordance with established policies and procedures to prevent recurrence.

(U) Additionally, we found incorrect packaging on at least five of the eight pallets of non-serialized defense articles, including containers with a mix of M16 rifle slings, ammunition pouches, and magazines loosely piled together in large cardboard boxes. DoW personnel packaged a loose mix of more than one defense article type in many of these large, exterior containers, including unknown quantities of the slings, pouches, and magazines, which does not comply with MIL-STD-2073.<sup>13</sup> MIL-STD-2073 states that an exterior container enroute to a single destination must contain defense articles of the same stock number and carry intermediate containers “when the quantity to be shipped to the single destination permits the use of two or more intermediate containers in the exterior container.” Both the incorrect packaging of exterior containers and omission of interior containers when applicable are reportable packaging discrepancies identified in DLM 4000.25 and JSR 4145.04. However, officials from the Air Force Materiel Command (AFMC) confirmed that no SDRs were submitted for SAAM 1292.

### **(U) SAAM 1292 Contained Defense Articles Packaged in Deteriorated Shipping Containers**

(U) Upon delivery in Taiwan, we found that the Military Services consolidated and shipped defense articles in deteriorated cardboard containers and wooden crates on at least five of the eight cargo pallets. Several M16 ammunition magazines and magazine pouches were vulnerable to loss and weather damage through gaps and holes in cardboard containers. See Figure 4 for examples of loosely packed M16 ammunition magazines and magazine pouches in deteriorated containers. We found at least two large, wooden crates loosely held together by duct tape with defense articles inside. These taped crates contained equipment such as M16 magazine pouches that were visible where the crate walls had separated. Nails that formerly held the crates together protruded from the walls of the crate. See Figure 5 for examples of wooden crates held together with duct tape and with nails protruding. JSR 4145.04 states that shipping defense articles in a deteriorated container is a packaging discrepancy, defined as “any unsatisfactory condition because of improper or inadequate packaging that causes the shipment or package to become vulnerable to loss, delay, damage, or unnecessary expense to the U.S. Government.”

<sup>13</sup> (U) MIL-STD-129R defines a loose or unpacked item as “not tied, wrapped, or contained.”



(U) Figure 4. SAAM 1292 Ripped Boxes with M16 Magazines (Left) and Magazine Pouches (Right) Spilling Out in Taiwan, September 26, 2025  
(U) Source: The DoW OIG.



(U) Figure 5. SAAM 1292 Boxes Held Together with Duct Tape in Taiwan, September 26, 2025  
(U) Source: The AIT.

**(U) SAAM 1292 Contained Quantity Discrepancies and Non-Manifested Defense Articles**

(~~CUI//REL USA, TWN~~) During their inspection of SAAM 1292, AIT personnel identified that the shipment included quantity discrepancies and non-manifested defense articles. These non-manifested item discrepancies included [REDACTED] extra filter cartridges for the M65 mask and two tactical vests. See Figure 6 for one of two tactical vests, which unexpectedly arrived as part of SAAM 1292. During their inspection, AIT personnel also determined that the shipment contained an extra box of gas mask filter cartridges. This means that the DoW transferred [REDACTED] filter cartridges instead of the authorized quantity of [REDACTED]. Additionally, although AIT and Taiwanese partners did not expect any tactical vests to arrive as part of SAAM 1292, two vests in poor condition were included in the shipment. DLM 4000.25 identifies that the shipment of these defense articles represents a shipping discrepancy and should have been reported as such.



(U) Figure 6. One of Two Tactical Vests That Unexpectedly Arrived in Taiwan as Part of SAAM 1292, September 26, 2025  
 (U) Source: The AIT.

## (U) Several Factors Led to Accountability and Packaging Shortfalls During SAAM 1292

(U) Air Force officials cited several factors for non-compliance, such as establishing an APOE at a non-standard location without clear guidance on the delineation of responsibilities among materiel readiness personnel at the HAF/A4, Wright-Patterson AFB, and Lackland AFB. Additionally, these officials stated that late changes to the APOE location caused Wright-Patterson AFB personnel to skip some mandatory procedures.<sup>14</sup>

(U) HAF/A4 and AFMC logistics managers stated that the Air Force has multiple policies that should have prevented the packaging and labeling discrepancies we observed in Taiwan. However, an AFMC official told us that neither Air Force installation personnel sending equipment to Wright-Patterson AFB nor Wright-Patterson AFB personnel receiving the equipment followed those policy requirements for SAAM 1292. AFMC officials provided the following additional details.

- (U) If the equipment was in storage in these deficient containers, either at Wright-Patterson AFB or one of the Air Force sending installations, a routine inspection requirement for the Care of Supplies in Storage program should have found the discrepancies and corrected them.<sup>15</sup>
- (U) For poorly packaged and labeled containers that arrived at Wright-Patterson AFB, Logistics Readiness Squadron personnel at the sending installations were at fault for not correcting the discrepancies before shipment to Wright-Patterson AFB.
- (U) Logistics personnel at Wright-Patterson AFB receiving the shipments from Air Force installations were at fault for not submitting SDRs upon receipt of the poorly packaged containers and not forcing a correction of the discrepancies.

<sup>14</sup> (U) The standard APOE for PD Taiwan missions is Joint Base Lewis-McChord. Lackland AFB does not regularly function as an APOE. Wright-Patterson AFB's role in SAAM 1292 changed 1 month before mission execution to reduce transportation costs by approximately \$100,000. This decision shifted Wright-Patterson AFB from being one of two APOEs for the mission to a collection point for consolidation and truck movement of non-serialized defense articles to the Lackland AFB APOE. At Lackland AFB, SAAM 1292 aircraft loaded the non-serialized defense articles and M16s for airlift to Taiwan. Neither Wright-Patterson AFB nor Lackland AFB was the primary APOE designated in the PD 2 and PD 3 EXORDs, but the EXORDs gave the Service Components the option of choosing an alternate APOE location to decrease transportation costs.

<sup>15</sup> (U) Each Service Component has a Care of Supplies in Storage program that includes scheduled inspections of the supplies and their containers to ensure they are serviceable.

- (U) Wright-Patterson AFB AFMC personnel should have corrected the packaging and labeling discrepancies before palletizing the cargo and sending it to the APOE at Lackland AFB.<sup>16</sup> Despite the discrepancies we observed, no Air Force personnel submitted SDRs during SAAM 1292 preparation or execution.

(U) AFMC officials told us that they believed several factors led to mistakes by installation personnel in routine mission execution, such as not finding and correcting discrepancies and submitting SDRs. For example, the same AFMC officials stated that because of shortened mission timelines, the Air Force personnel likely found the SDR process too time-consuming to follow. However, the AFMC officials also stated that when time is critical, Air Force installation personnel should still correct shipping and packaging discrepancies when they are found during the mission and then submit the SDRs as time permits.

(U) After our return from Taiwan, we requested that HAF/A4 or AFMC officials send us any standard operating procedures or other directives that help Air Force installation personnel comply with routine but mandatory packaging, labeling, and supply discrepancy requirements while supporting SAAM shipments at an alternate APOE. The officials deferred to the DoW and Air Force policies in place. However, based on their lessons learned from SAAM 1292, they believed current guidance was insufficient.

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**(U) Recommendation 1. The HAF/A4 Director, in coordination with the AFMC Commander, should consolidate existing regulations and PD Taiwan lessons learned from SAAM 1292.**

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**(U) Recommendation 2. The HAF/A4 Director, in coordination with the AFMC Commander, should develop and implement standard operating procedures for planning and executing SAAMs from alternate APOEs, including adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations.**

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<sup>16</sup> (U) JSR 4145.04 states that deteriorated packaging discovered at the time of shipment, if not previously reported when received or discovered during an inspection of supplies in storage, is the shipper's responsibility to correct.

## **(U) Receiving Personnel Could Not Efficiently and Effectively Account for Non-Serialized Defense Articles Transferred to Taiwan Through SAAM 1292**

(U) As a result of shipping and packaging discrepancies, receiving personnel in Taiwan could not efficiently and effectively account for some of the SAAM 1292 non-serialized defense articles. Specifically, the M16 straps and ammunition pouches AIT personnel inventoried in Taiwan were not organized or packaged in a way to easily account for the quantities in each box, many boxes did not have necessary identification markings or labels for AIT personnel to identify the contents of the box without first opening it, and deteriorated containers put contents at risk of loss or damage. Because of poorly marked containers and inadequate packaging, AIT personnel could not independently verify the contents of these containers. This prevented the AIT from accurately accounting for the items and interfered with the efficient inventory of military equipment in Taiwan. Additionally, personnel in Taiwan had to account for some defense articles they received but did not request and that were not included in the shipment documentation.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

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### **(U) Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate**

#### **(U) Recommendation 1**

**(U) We recommend that the Director of the Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, consolidate existing regulations and Presidential Drawdown Taiwan lessons learned from Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292.**

#### ***(U) Management Comments***

(U) The HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, responding for the HAF/A4 Director, concurred with Recommendation 1.<sup>17</sup> The Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff stated that Air Force regulations and lessons learned will be consolidated and shared with the DSCA as the DoW's lead integrator for security cooperation activities and stated that these actions can be accomplished by April 30, 2026.

#### ***(U) Additional Management Comments***

(U) Although not required to comment, the Executive Director of the Air Force Materiel Command, responding on behalf of the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, concurred with Recommendation 1, and stated the recommended actions can be accomplished by April 30, 2026.

#### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff and the Executive Director of the Air Force Materiel Command addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when the HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, in coordination with the AFMC Executive Director, sends us a copy of the lessons learned document provided to the DSCA Director.

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<sup>17</sup> (U) Between the draft and final reports, we changed the recommendation numbers from 1.a and 1.b to 1 and 2, respectively, to improve clarity. The substance of the recommendations did not change.

## **(U) Recommendation 2**

**(U) We recommend that the Director of the Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, develop and implement standard operating procedures for planning and executing Special Airlift Assignment Missions from alternate aerial ports of embarkation, including adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations.**

### ***(U) Management Comments***

(U) The HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, responding for the HAF/A4 Director, partially concurred with Recommendation 2. Although he agreed that not all guidance was adequately followed in execution of the SAAM 1292 mission in support of the PD Taiwan movement, he did not agree with the recommendation to develop a new standard operating procedure for planning and executing SAAMs from alternate APOEs. He stated that, because the selection of a non-APOE site to serve as an APOE depends on specific resources available at that site, the HAF/A4 can better instruct each site with a fragmentary order or a memorandum tailored to a specific site, allowing greater operational flexibility.

(U) The HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff agreed with the second portion of Recommendation 2, stating that HAF/A4 instructions should ensure adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations. He stated that this task can be coordinated with Headquarters AFMC through an electronic tasker requiring acknowledgement from all major command Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection and Logistics Readiness Activities and stated that the task can be accomplished by April 30, 2026.

### ***(U) Additional Management Comments***

(U) Although not required to comment, the Executive Director for Air Force Materiel Command, responding on behalf of the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, partially concurred with Recommendation 2. The Executive Director agreed that instructions should be provided to alternate APOEs but stated that this could be better accomplished through a fragmentary order or memorandum, rather than an SOP tailored to the resources and limitations of the specific location.

(U) The Executive Director concurred with the second portion of Recommendation 2, pertaining to the importance of ensuring adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations.

(U) The Executive Director stated that the recommendation could be accomplished through an electronic tasker requiring acknowledgement from all MAJCOM A4Rs and Logistics Readiness Activities and stated the task can be accomplished by April 30, 2026.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff and the Executive Director of the Air Force Materiel Command addressed the specifics of the recommendation. We agree that the selection of a non-APOE site to function as an APOE can depend on specific resources available at that site, and the HAF/A4 can instruct each site with a fragmentary order or a memorandum tailored to a specific site and mission. We also agree that an electronic tasker, coordinated with Headquarters AFMC, is an official way to transmit instructions to Air Force installation logistics personnel to ensure they adhere to shipping, receiving, and storage regulations. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when the HAF/A4 Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, in coordination with the AFMC Executive Director, sends us:

- (U) an example of a HAF/A4 fragmentary order with instructions for establishing a non-APOE installation in support of a PD Taiwan SAAM mission and
- (U) a copy of the electronic tasker with implementation guidance to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations, with acknowledgement from the HAF/A4, to all major command Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection and Logistics Readiness Activities.

## (U) Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE  
WASHINGTON DC

2 April 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ USAF/A4  
1670 Air Force Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20330-1670

SUBJECT: HAF/A4 Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoD's tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000)

1. This is HAF/A4 response to the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) Draft Report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoD's tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000). HAF/A4 partially concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to provide the following response.

2. The HAF/A4LR in coordination with HQ AFMC will correct issues identified in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined from the following recommendations:

a. **RECOMMENDATION 1a:** The DoD OIG recommends that HAF/A4, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, consolidate existing regulations and Presidential Drawdown Taiwan lessons learned from Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292.

b. **RESPONSE:** HAF/A4 concurs with the DoD OIG's Recommendation 1 within the draft report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000). Air Force regulations and lessons learned will be consolidated and shared with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency as the DoD's lead integrator for security cooperation activities. Actions can be accomplished by 30 April 2026.

c. **RECOMMENDATION 1b:** The DoD IG recommends that HAF/A4, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, develop and implement standard operating procedures for planning and executing Special Airlift Assignment Missions from alternate aerial ports of embarkation (APOE), including adherence to shipping, receiving, and care of supplies in storage regulations at sending and receiving installations.

d. **RESPONSE:** HAF/A4 partially concurs with the recommendation. HAF/A4 acknowledges that not all guidance was adequately followed in execution of this Presidential

## (U) Director, Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate (cont'd)

Drawdown movement, however, HAF/A4 does not concur with the recommendation to develop a new standard operating procedure for planning and executing SAAMs from alternate APOEs. This guidance already exists at various levels and all Air Force sending and receiving units are required to adhere to existing regulations and guidance regarding the following: proper execution of packaging, labeling (*DoDM 4140.01, Vol. 9; DoD MIL-STD-129R; MIL-STD-2073-1E*), rectifying supply discrepancies (*DLM 4000.25, "Chapter 17—Supply Discrepancy Reporting"; JSR 4145.04; AFMAN 23-122; DAFMAN24-602V2*), and care of supplies in storage (*DAFMAN 23-300; DoDM 4140.70*). In addition, official policy and guidance from DSCA directs the proper execution of Presidential Drawdowns in the form of the *Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM)*, the *DSCA Handbook for Foreign Assistance Act, Drawdown of Defense Articles (2004)*, and DSCA-issued Execute Orders (EXORD). Though HAF/A4 agrees that instructions should be provided to the alternate aerial port of embarkation, HAF/A4 thinks this can better be accomplished through a FRAGORD, or memorandum at the time of need, or as required. The selection of a non-Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) depends on the specific resources available at that site. This inherent variability poses a challenge for standardization. For this reason, an SOP would be ill-suited for this context, as it would incorrectly assume that any location chosen as a non-APOE has the same resources and capabilities to execute all required tasks. In contrast, utilizing a FRAGO when the need arises allows plans to be tailored to the actual resources and limitations of the specific location chosen, providing essential operational flexibility. HAF/A4 does concur with the second portion of Recommendation 2, to ensure adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations. This task can be accomplished in coordination with HQ AFMC through an ETMS tasker requiring acknowledgement from all MAJCOM A4Rs and Logistics Readiness Activities. The task can be accomplished by 30 April 2026.

3. My point of contact for this project is [REDACTED] Chief, Distribution & Vehicle Management Branch, HAF/A4LR, [REDACTED] or via email at [REDACTED]

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ANTHONY R. BAITY, SES, DAF  
 Asst DCS/Logistics, Engineering & Force Protection

**(U) Executive Director, Air Force Materiel Command**

**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
HEADQUARTERS AIR FORCE MATERIEL COMMAND  
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE OHIO**

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: AFMC/CA  
4375 Chidlaw Road  
Wright-Patterson AFB OH 45433-5001

SUBJECT: HQ AFMC response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoD's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000)

1. This is the HQ AFMC response to the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) draft report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoDs" Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000). HQ AFMC partially concurs with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to discuss the provided response.

a. HAF/A4 in coordination with HQ AFMC will correct issues identified in this report, and develop and implement a corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendations:

(1) **RECOMMENDATION A:** The DoD OIG recommends that HAF/A4, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, consolidate existing regulations and Presidential Drawdown Taiwan lessons learned from Special Airlift Assignment Mission 1292.

(2) **RESPONSE:** HQ AFMC concurs with the DoD OIG Recommendation A within the draft report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoDs" Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000). Action can be accomplished by 30 April 2026.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION B:** The DoD IG recommends that HAF/A4, in coordination with the Commander of the Air Force Materiel Command, develop and implement standard operating procedures for planning and executing Special Airlift Assignment Missions from alternate aerial ports of embarkation, including adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations.

(4) **RESPONSE:** HQ AFMC partially concurs with the DoD OIG Recommendation B within the draft report, "Follow-Up Evaluation of the DoDs" Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000). Recommendation "B" states that standard operating procedures (SOP) be developed and implemented for planning and executing Special Airlift Assignment Missions from alternate aerial ports of embarkation. We agree that instructions should be provided to the alternate aerial port of embarkation. We feel this can better be accomplished through a FRAGORD, or memorandum at the time of need, or as required. The selection of a non-Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) depends on the specific resources available at that site. This inherent variability poses a challenge for standardization. For this reason, a SOP would be ill-suited for this context, as it would incorrectly assume that any location chosen as a non-APOE has the same resources and capabilities to execute all required tasks. In contrast, utilizing a FRAGO when the need arises allows plans to be tailored to the actual resources and limitations of the specific location chosen,

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## (U) Executive Director, Air Force Materiel Command (cont'd)

providing essential operational flexibility. AFMC concurs with the second portion of Recommendation B, to ensure adherence to shipping, receiving, and Care of Supplies in Storage regulations at sending and receiving installations. This task can be accomplished through a TMT tasker requiring acknowledgement from all MAJCOM A4Rs and Logistics Readiness Activities. The task can be accomplished by 30 April 2026.

2. My point of contact is [REDACTED] NH-04, HQ AFMC/A4R, [REDACTED] or via email at [REDACTED]

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LORNA B. ESTEP, SES  
Executive Director

## (U) Appendix A: Project Overview

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this follow-up evaluation was to determine whether the DoW effectively and efficiently implemented accountability and quality controls for the movement and delivery of defense articles provided to Taiwan using Presidential Drawdown Authority.

### (U) Project Timeline and Professional Standards

(U) We conducted this evaluation from July 2025 through February 2026 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) To address the objective of this evaluation, we examined the guidance, resources, and performance of the DoW’s provision of PD defense articles to Taiwan, focusing on the coordination and oversight of DoW headquarter elements. This included planning and shipping processes at DoW agencies and subordinate commands, including the Air Mobility Command, DSCA, USINDOPACOM, USTRANSCOM, and AFMC. The evaluation included data collection, observation, and analysis from APOEs, Taiwan aerial ports of debarkation, units transferring equipment, and handling and shipping processes and procedures at each location. In addition, we verified responsible stakeholders’ implementation of recommendations from the 2024 Report.

(U) We identified and reviewed laws and policy to understand the requirements for the transfer and accountability of defense articles to Taiwan through PD. Specifically, we reviewed the following criteria.

- (U) Air Force Manual 24-206, “Packaging of Materiel,” July 28, 2020
- (U) Department of the Air Force Instruction 24-602, “Cargo Movement,” December 20, 2023
- (U) Department of the Air Force Instruction 24-201, “Packaging, Handling, Storage and Transportation Acquisition and Sustainment Product Support Instruction,” June 21, 2022

- (U) Department of the Air Force Manual 23-300, “Materiel Management Procedures,” July 22, 2025
- (U) DLM 4000.25, “Chapter 17—Supply Discrepancy Reporting,” October 3, 2025
- (U) DSCA Manual 5105.38-M, “Security Assistance Management Manual,” October 3, 2003
- (U) DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 9, “DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures,” May 16, 2019
- (U) DoD Manual 4140.70, “DoD Supply Chain Management Procedures for Storage and Material Handling,” July 15, 2019
- (U) JSR 4145.04, “DoD Stock Readiness Program,” March 13, 2023
- (U) DoD MIL-STD-129R, “DoD Military Marking for Shipment Storage,” February 25, 2023
- (U) DoD MIL-STD-2073-1E, “DoD Standard Practice for Military Packaging,” November 20, 2018
- (U) Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-195, 75 Stat. 424-2 (1961)
- (U) Taiwan Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979)
- (U) Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, “Standard Process for Packaging, Handling, Storage & Transportation (PHS&T),” January 18, 2024

(U) We observed the completion of SAAM 1292 delivery to Taiwan in support of PDs 2 and 3 in September 2025 by conducting site visits at Lackland AFB, the SAAM’s APOE, to observe the packaging of materiel before departure. At Lackland AFB, we observed the inspection and packaging of M16s, as well as the loading process for SAAM 1292 defense articles before their departure for Taiwan. In Taiwan, we observed SAAM 1292 being unloaded at Taoyuan International Airport for temporary storage at the airport cargo terminal. At the cargo terminal, we accompanied AIT personnel and their Taiwan partners as they conducted an initial review of the palletized defense articles for noticeable packaging deficiencies or damage. Additionally, we issued requests for information from and conducted interviews with the following entities.

- (U) AFMC
- (U) AIT
- (U) Air Mobility Command and 18th Air Force
- (U) DSCA
- (U) Joint Staff

- (U) Office of the Under Secretary of War for Policy
- (U) USINDOPACOM
- (U) USTRANSCOM

(U) From July through November 2025, we obtained the following supporting documentation from stakeholders for defense articles transferred to Taiwan through PD.

- (U) Airlift schedules
- (U) Load plans
- (U) PD EXORDs
- (U) Shipping documentation, such as DD Forms 1348
- (U) PD shipping coordination spreadsheets
- (U) Photographs of cargo containing PD defense articles
- (U) Taiwan PD Process Guide
- (U) AIT SAAM storyboards

(U) We conducted interviews and follow-up correspondence with personnel involved in PD planning and execution from the DSCA, USTRANSCOM, USINDOPACOM, AIT, HAF/A4, and AFMC and collected, reviewed, and verified the planning and implementation documents the personnel provided. Through direct observation at the aerial port of debarkation at Lackland AFB and the APOE in Taiwan, we confirmed that the DSCA, Military Services, and other key stakeholders developed and implemented the PD processes recommended in the 2024 Report. During our direct observation of the AIT's PD defense article verification checks after delivery in Taiwan, we and AIT personnel documented supply discrepancies with some of the SAAM 1292 shipping containers. We confirmed the supply discrepancies with HAF/A4 and AFMC personnel after our return from Taiwan.

## **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

## **(U) Security Review Considerations**

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoW Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoW Components about the CUI treatment of their

(U) information. If the DoW Components failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoW Office of Inspector General (DoW OIG) issued one report discussing accountability for defense articles provided to Taiwan through PD. Unrestricted DoW OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

## **(U) DoW OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-130, “Evaluation of the DoD’s Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan,” September 11, 2024

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine whether the DoW effectively and efficiently implemented accountability and quality controls for defense articles provided to Taiwan using PD Authority, as well as assess the tracking and inventorying of the PD defense articles and sufficiency of the DoW’s processes to ensure that the PD defense articles met applicable standards. The DoW OIG found that the DoW did not effectively or efficiently implement accountability and quality controls for PD defense articles delivered to Taiwan from November 2023 through March 2024, with more than 340 pallets of PD defense articles sustaining water damage while they remained at the APOE for more than 3 months pending transport to Taiwan. This occurred because the Army did not request the SAAM flight for these defense articles until almost 2 months after the defense articles were sent to the APOE, and the port was not equipped with sufficient storage capacity or able to fully mitigate the defense articles’ exposure to adverse weather conditions. The DoW OIG also found that the DoW provided deteriorated and poorly packaged equipment and munitions to Taiwan. This occurred because the units sending the defense articles to Taiwan did not comply with shipping standards.

(U) The DoW OIG made two recommendations to the DSCA Director as part of this evaluation. First, the DoW OIG recommended that the DSCA coordinate with the Military Services, Joint Staff, USTRANSCOM, and other stakeholders to develop a plan to ensure that PD EXORDs for Taiwan explain each Military Service’s responsibilities and the timelines for shipping PD defense articles to ports of embarkation and delivering PD defense articles to ports of

(U) debarkation in Taiwan. Second, the DoW OIG recommended that the DSCA Director coordinate with the Military Services to update DSCA guidance to include processes for the Military Services to check the quality and quantity of defense articles before they leave the United States for situations in which U.S. personnel will not directly oversee the transfer of the defense articles to the recipients in Taiwan. The DSCA broadly agreed with these recommendations and carried out actions to implement them. Both recommendations are closed.

### **(U) Report Contact Information**

(U) The DoW OIG Evaluations Component produced this report. For questions, please contact Mr. Bryan T. Clark, Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations, Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations, at [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## **(U) Appendix B: Corrective Actions**

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### **(U) DoW Components Implemented Corrective Actions for Planning and Accountability of PD Defense Article Shipments to Taiwan in Response to the 2024 Report**

(U) We found that DoW Components implemented corrective actions for planning and accounting for serialized PD defense article shipments to Taiwan in accordance with the recommendations in the 2024 Report. Specifically, DSCA and USTRANSCOM officials provided more specific instructions in the EXORDs for PDs 2 and 3 for Military Service personnel to follow when executing PD SAAMs. Additionally, DSCA and AIT personnel established a constructive delivery process to allow Military Service and Taiwan representatives to complete title transfer for PD defense articles before SAAM flights depart for Taiwan. AIT personnel and USINDOPACOM officials also implemented a process to document shipment deficiencies and lessons learned during the PD delivery process through the production of storyboard documents following the conclusion of each SAAM.

### **(U) The DSCA and USTRANSCOM Provided Increased Specificity of PD Execution Instructions for Military Service Personnel in PD EXORDs**

(U) In response to a DoW OIG recommendation, DSCA and USTRANSCOM officials improved PD planning processes by increasing the specificity of instructions in the EXORDs for PDs 2 and 3 for Military Service personnel to follow when executing PD SAAMs. In the 2024 Report, the DoW OIG recommended that the DSCA coordinate with USTRANSCOM and other stakeholders to ensure that PD EXORDs for Taiwan explain each Military Service's responsibilities and the timelines for shipping PD defense articles to ports of embarkation and delivering PD defense articles to ports of debarkation in Taiwan. The DoW OIG recommended this because U.S. military units shipped PD 1 defense articles without closely coordinating their responsibilities and timelines for delivery to APOEs. This led to defense article damage from outdoor storage for several months at Travis AFB awaiting airlift to Taiwan.

(U) In response to this recommendation, the DSCA coordinated with USTRANSCOM and the Military Services to introduce a sequential process in the PD 2 and PD 3 EXORDs, providing a more detailed sequence of responsibilities related to the shipment of PD defense articles to ports of embarkation and debarkation. A USTRANSCOM official stated that with this process, Military Services must schedule their SAAM flights no later than 35 days before the shipment's available

(U) load date, providing AIT personnel and their Taiwan partners with sufficient time to coordinate the shipment’s arrival with USTRANSCOM, the DSCA, and the Military Services. The Services must submit their own SAAM requests, which USINDOPACOM must validate before USTRANSCOM coordinates airlift or sealift. Additionally, Services must pre-coordinate the transfer of defense articles to the APOE or seaport of embarkation and expedite defense article delivery once coordinated. Finally, units must avoid sending defense articles to the intended ports of embarkation until requested by the APOE and directed by the SAAM coordinator.

(U) The table provides a full breakdown of the updated DSCA six-step process explaining the sequence of responsibilities related to the shipment of PD defense articles to ports of embarkation and debarkation.

*(U) Table. Updated Sequential Delivery Process for PD Defense Articles to Taiwan*

(U) Step Number	Step Title	Step Description
1	Military Service SAAM Submissions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Military Service submits SAAM request 35 days before available load date</li> </ul>
2	SAAM Routed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SAAM routed to USINDOPACOM officials for validation and review</li> </ul>
3	Airlift Allocated	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Airlift allocated for SAAM flight approximately 14 days from available load date</li> <li>• Military Service pre-coordinates defense article movement to port of embarkation</li> <li>• AIT personnel inform their Taiwan partners of expected arrival date</li> </ul>
4	Military Service Delivers Palletized Cargo to APOE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defense articles arrive at APOE no later than 3 days before available load date</li> <li>• Military Service officials and Taiwan partner representatives sign DD Forms 1348 and send them to DSCA officials before SAAM departure from APOE</li> </ul>
5	Aircraft Loaded and Departs APOE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Defense articles loaded on aircraft at APOE and depart for Taiwan</li> </ul>

(U)

(U) Table. Updated Sequential Delivery Process for PD Defense Articles to Taiwan (cont'd)

(U) Step Number	Step Title	Step Description
6	Aircraft Unloaded at APOD, Defense Articles Inspected	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• AIT personnel confirm aircraft arrival at APOD* and aircraft unloaded in Taiwan</li> <li>• AIT personnel inspect defense articles as part of shipment</li> <li>• Verification of quantities from the DD Forms 1348 is sent by AIT personnel to DSCA and Military Services through the post-delivery storyboard<sup>18</sup></li> </ul> <p style="text-align: right;">(U)</p>

(U) \*Aerial port of debarkation.

(U) Source: The DoW OIG based on a process guide produced by DSCA officials.

### (U) The DSCA Established the Constructive Delivery Process to Ensure Defense Article Title Transfer for Taiwan PD Defense Articles

(U) In response to an additional DoW OIG recommendation, DSCA officials improved PD defense article accountability by establishing the constructive delivery process to allow Military Service and Taiwan representatives to complete title transfer for PD defense articles before SAAM flights depart for Taiwan. In the 2024 Report, the DoW OIG also recommended that the DSCA coordinate with the Military Services to update DSCA guidance to include processes for the Military Services to check the quality and quantity of defense articles before they leave the United States for situations in which U.S. personnel will not directly oversee the transfer of the defense articles to the recipients in Taiwan. The DoW OIG recommended this because no U.S. personnel in Taiwan were present to receive and sign over a PD 1 shipment to the Taiwan partners, and U.S. military units did not consistently comply with existing shipping standards when shipping PD defense articles to Taiwan.

(U) The DSCA implemented a process for Taiwan representatives to take custody of PD defense articles on SAAM shipments before the defense articles depart the United States. This process update clarifies that a partner-signed custody transfer document, such as DD Form 1348, constitutes “constructive delivery” of PD support

<sup>18</sup> (U) DD Forms 1348 serve as a receipt for turned-in property and are an important record for auditability. These forms include information such as the quantity and nomenclature of transferred defense articles, their national stock numbers, and their APOE and aerial port of debarkation.

(U) to a partner nation.<sup>19</sup> DSCA officials stated that this policy update is particularly relevant for the Taiwan drawdown effort because Services are routinely completing DD Forms 1348 with Taiwan representatives before physical delivery of PD defense articles to Taiwan. This process is the most efficient way to complete title transfer for PD defense articles upon arrival of SAAM flights to Taiwan.

### **(U) The AIT and USINDOPACOM Established the SAAM Storyboard Process to Document SAAM Shipment Deficiencies and Future Process Improvements**

(U) The AIT and USINDOPACOM further improved accountability of PD defense article shipments by collaborating to implement a process of documenting any shipment deficiencies or lessons learned during the PD delivery process through the production of storyboard documents following the conclusion of each SAAM. Beginning with SAAMs conducted for PD 2, AIT personnel use these storyboards to identify any defense article discrepancies related to the quantity and quality of arriving defense articles or their associated packaging and labeling, as well as best practices to minimize discrepancies with future shipments to Taiwan.

(U) AIT personnel confirmed that defense article and packaging quality largely improved since the 2024 Report, and defense article quantity discrepancies decreased for defense article shipments to Taiwan as part of PDs 2 and 3. Before SAAM 1292, which we followed from Lackland AFB to Taiwan in September 2025, AIT personnel documented only minor packaging and item quality deficiencies in SAAMs for PDs 2 and 3. These deficiencies included superficial rusting on 3 to 5 percent of M9 pistol cartridges shipped to Taiwan on one SAAM shipment, as well as one instance of a minor defense article quantity discrepancy that Military Service and AIT personnel corrected on a subsequent SAAM flight. AIT personnel also made several recommendations to Military Service and USTRANSCOM officials in these storyboard documents to further improve packaging quality and ease of intake and inspection upon arrival in Taiwan. Some of these recommendations included standardizing arriving pallet height below 85 inches for ease of transport in Taiwan, adding additional protective sheeting to arriving pallets to prevent rain damage, and ensuring obsolete shipping labels are removed from the pallets before shipment to Taiwan.

<sup>19</sup> (U) The DSCA's Security Assistance Management Manual states that "when title of defense articles provided under Presidential Drawdown Authority transfers from the Military Department to the designated partner representative before physical delivery, a DD 1348 signed by an authorized partner representative is required to document proof of title transfer. Physical delivery of the transferred materiel may occur after constructive delivery."

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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<b>AFB</b>	Air Force Base
<b>AFMC</b>	Air Force Materiel Command
<b>AIT</b>	American Institute in Taiwan
<b>APOE</b>	Aerial Port of Embarkation
<b>DLM</b>	Defense Logistics Manual
<b>DSCA</b>	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
<b>EXORD</b>	Execute Order
<b>HAF/A4</b>	Headquarters Air Force Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection Directorate
<b>JSR</b>	Joint Service Regulation
<b>PD</b>	Presidential Drawdown
<b>SAAM</b>	Special Airlift Assignment Mission
<b>SDR</b>	Supply Discrepancy Report
<b>USINDOPACOM</b>	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
<b>USTRANSCOM</b>	U.S. Transportation Command



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