




INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of War

APRIL 30, 2026



Management Advisory: Physical Security Concerns Identified at Travis Air Force Base



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April 30, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

SUBJECT: Management Advisory: Physical Security Concerns Identified
at Travis Air Force Base (Report No. DOWIG-2026-077)

This final Management Advisory informs the Air Mobility Command (AMC) of significant physical security risks from improperly stored weapons at Travis Air Force Base (AFB), California, that are awaiting transport to their final destination. Lacking a dedicated secure facility, personnel temporarily stored weapons awaiting shipment in a non-compliant annex. This storage method does not comply with Department of the Air Force Manual (DAFMAN) 31-101, Volume 2, which requires such a facility to have an intrusion detection system or be continuously manned.¹ AMC officials acknowledged the non-compliance and are implementing corrective actions to resolve the security deficiencies. We conducted this evaluation from July 2025 through February 2026 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

We provided copies of the draft management advisory and requested written comments from the AMC on the recommendation. The management comments are included in this advisory. AMC officials agreed with our recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved and open.

To observe the improvements in storage and materiel handling of air cargo at Travis AFB during a follow-up to an ongoing evaluation, we visited the Mechanized Materials Handling System (MMHS) Annex at the Industrial Maintenance Complex on Travis AFB on September 24 and 25, 2025.² While directly observing and interviewing 60th Air Mobility Wing (AMW) officials in charge of handling, storage, and shipping air cargo, including sensitive items, we identified physical security deficiencies that do not comply with DAFMAN 31-101, Volume 2. Officials from the 60th AMW at Travis AFB stated that they stored Security Risk II weapons, such as M4 carbines awaiting shipment to military installations, in the MMHS Annex on a short-term basis for 12 hours to up to a week. According to 60th AMW officials, seven civil service employees manage and maintain the MMHS facility. MMHS officials also stated that civilian employees man the facility from 7:00 a.m. to midnight, with no personnel regularly operating in the MMHS Annex overnight and no intrusion detection system in place.

¹ DAFMAN 31-101, Volume 2, "Physical Security of Sensitive Conventional Arms, Ammunition, & Explosives (AA&E)," June 11, 2024.

² DoW Office of Inspector General Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128-000, "Follow-up Evaluation of the DoW's Tracking and Accountability of Presidential Drawdown Equipment Provided to Taiwan," announced July 7, 2025.

Storage of Security Risk II weapons in the MMHS Annex during non-working hours is not in accordance with the physical security requirements identified in DAFMAN 31-101, Volume 2. DAFMAN 31-101, Volume 2, states that an intrusion detection system must protect structures containing weapons unless the areas are continuously manned or under constant surveillance to detect unauthorized entry. Although 60th AMW security officials stated that the MMHS Annex remains closed at all times and only vetted mechanics have access to its interior, they also confirmed that the MMHS Annex does not have an intrusion detection system and is not manned during the overnight hours.

Officials from the 60th AMW unsuccessfully requested funding from Headquarters Air Force and the AMC in 2021 to construct a multiple-pallet cage connected to the recently upgraded MMHS Annex that would be certified to store weapons.³ Although the Air Force funded the base contract for the materiel warehouse and equipment, the multiple-pallet security enclosure was an unfunded contract option item. Officials from the 60th AMW stated that, in the absence of this multiple-pallet cage, their personnel placed cargo pallets of weapons in the MMHS Annex on a temporary basis awaiting transport.

As a result of the MMHS Annex not meeting DAFMAN 31-101, Volume 2, physical security requirements for storing weapons, the weapons stored inside this annex have an increased risk for unauthorized access and theft.

Recommendation, Management Comments, and Our Response

Recommendation 1

We recommend that the Commander of the Air Mobility Command develop and implement corrective actions for the storage and physical security of in-transit weapons at the Mechanized Material Handling System Annex on Travis Air Force Base in accordance with Department of the Air Force Manual 31-101, Volume 2.

Air Mobility Command Comments

The AMC Director of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection (AMC/A4C), responding for the AMC Commander, agreed and stated that the MMHS Annex, as described, does not comply with policy. The Director stated that the AMC will take action to remedy the non-compliance using available resources and in accordance with policy. Specifically, the Director stated that the AMC/A4C, in coordination with AMC/A4 Security, will notify the 60th AMW to incorporate the required repairs and modifications using Facilities Sustainment, Restoration, and Modernization funds or other available and required funding streams to correct the issues identified in this management advisory, as well as develop and implement a corrective action plan.

³ An upgrade to replace the MMHS Annex at Travis AFB was completed in 2025. Officials from the 60th AMW stated that the old MMHS Annex at Travis AFB included an external multiple-pallet cage with an intrusion detection system that was certified to store weapons. This capability is not currently available at the upgraded MMHS Annex. As a result, instead of in an external, certified, multiple-pallet cage, 60th AMW officials told us that they store Security Risk Category II weapons on the secured fourth level of the MMHS. Officials from the 60th AMW requested funding to restore this capability for use in site operations.

The Director also stated that the AMC/A4C funded the Airfield Integrated Defense Action Plan contract that is comprehensively assessing airfield security at all continental U.S. locations that fall under the AMC's purview. The Director stated that the site visit at Travis AFB is underway, and a draft site assessment is expected by June 26, 2026, that will provide recommended requirements to resolve any capability gaps regarding airfield security.

The Director stated that these requirements will be submitted to the AMC/A4C by the end of June 2026 to develop integrated priorities lists by the end of September 2026 for all requirements across all funding streams for submission for centralized funding as part of the FY 2028 through FY 2032 cycle.

Furthermore, the Director stated that in the interim, AMC/A4 Security and AMC/A4 Air Transportation and Traffic Management will coordinate with the 60th AMW to identify acceptable workarounds up to and including manning or equipment solutions.

Our Response

Comments from the AMC Director of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection addressed the specifics of the recommendation. Therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when the AMC Director of Logistics, Engineering, and Force Protection provides us with documentation demonstrating that it has implemented interim solutions for the storage and physical security of in-transit weapons at the MMHS Annex on Travis AFB, and provides us with a funded corrective action plan that is in accordance with DAFMAN 31-101, Volume 2.

If you have any questions or would like to meet to discuss this evaluation, please contact [REDACTED]. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.



Bryan T. Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations

Management Comments

Air Mobility Command



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE HEADQUARTERS AIR MOBILITY COMMAND

24 March 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Air Mobility Command (AMC) Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Management Advisory: Physical Security Concerns Identified at Travis Air Force Base (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.001)

This is the AMC response to the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) draft Management Advisory, "Physical Security Concerns Identified at Travis Air Force Base" (Project No. D2025-DEV0PC-0128.000). The AMC/A4 concurs that the facility as described does not comply with policy. AMC will take action to remedy this using available resources and in accordance with policy.

The AMC/A4C, in coordination with AMC/A4S, will notify the 60 AMW to incorporate the required repairs and/or modifications via dFSRM and/or cFSRM (pending costs and approval thresholds) or other available/required funding streams to correct issues identified in this management advisory, and develop and implement a corrective action plan.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The DOD OIG recommends "that the Commander, Air Mobility Command develop and implement corrective actions for the storage and physical security of in-transit weapons at the Mechanized Material Handling System Annex on Travis Air Force Base in accordance with Department of the Air Force Manual 31-101, Volume 2" per the 25 February 2026 Memorandum to the AMC Commander.

RESPONSE: AMC/A4C has funded the Airfield Integrated Defense Action Plan (AIDAP) contract that is comprehensively assessing airfield security at all Continental United States (CONUS) locations that fall under AMC's purview. The site visit at Travis Air Force Base (AFB) is underway and the draft site assessment is expected by 26 June 2026 and will provide recommended requirements to resolve any capability gaps regarding airfield security.

These requirements, as well as any other known requirements, will be developed into projects by the 60th Civil Engineer Squadron and submitted at the quarterly Facilities Board for Installation Commander approval and prioritization. This prioritized list will be submitted to AMC/A4C by the end of June 2026 to develop Integrated Priorities Lists by the end of September 2026 for all requirements across all funding streams for submission for centralized funding as part of the FY28-32 cycle. Pending the FY28 Construction Task Order being approved in April 2027, funds will be approved to award the required contracts.

Additional out-of-cycle funding opportunities using decentralized funding may support partial or full resolution depending on cost estimates and approval thresholds. This may include FY26 End of Year funding or decentralized funds available pending FY27 budget and appropriations.

AIRMEN – MISSION – COMMITMENT

Air Mobility Command (cont'd)

In the interim, AMC/A4S and AMC/A4T will coordinate with 60 AMW to identify acceptable work-arounds up to and including manning or equipment solutions. These interim solutions may have an impact to operations which must be assessed and accepted at the appropriate levels.

3. The point of contact [REDACTED] Command Civil Engineer, AMC/A4C, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] or via email at [REDACTED].

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NY.D. [REDACTED]

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ANTHONY D. BABCOCK, Brig Gen, USAF
Director of Logistics, Engineering & Force
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR

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