
# NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



# Semiannual Report to Congress

1 April 2025 to 30 September 2025







# Message from the Deputy Inspector General



I am pleased to submit the Semiannual Report (SAR) for the National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS)—hereinafter referred to as NSA—Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the period ending 30 September 2025.

The OIG continues to create positive change through impactful and independent oversight. We are committed to evaluating our processes, making sure we are a strong, efficient, and timely watchdog focused on the top challenges facing NSA. The team is also committed to continuing our proactive outreach and communication with NSA, emphasizing the critical role of whistleblowers in ensuring a properly functioning Government.

As demonstrated in the pages that follow, the OIG's critical oversight encompasses multiple areas, including:

- The Audits and Evaluations Division provides an independent check on a wide breadth of programs and operations throughout NSA: authorities and mission-related activities, civil liberties and privacy, cybersecurity and technology, mission and mission support, financial audits, and procurements.
- The Inspections Division provides oversight across the NSA enterprise to address identified risk areas and NSA's ability to promote effective, efficient, and economical management of an organization, site, or function. Inspections may recommend improvements and identify best practices across a broad range of topics.
- The Investigations Division operates our Hotline—ensuring whistleblowers have an independent means through which they can communicate confidentially with the OIG and raise concerns—and investigates criminal matters with our law enforcement partners, as well as administrative matters involving employee misconduct, with an emphasis on allegations of whistleblower reprisal, procurement fraud, and intelligence misuse.

Highlights from this reporting period include the Audits and Evaluations Division's discovery of foreign partner activities funding that did not fully comply with congressional requirements for reporting cryptologic support; the Investigations Division's uncovering of procurement fraud that resulted in criminal prosecutions and the substantiation of a whistleblower reprisal case; and the Inspections Division's identification and quick reporting of critical deficiencies at a site, which resulted in expeditious efforts to resolve them.

I am pleased to report that NSA fully supported our team and agreed to all our recommendations to improve. NSA continued to work diligently on implementing both current and past recommendations.

It is an honor to lead such a talented and dedicated team of professionals whose impactful oversight work protects taxpayer dollars and supports and protects national security interests through detection and deterrence of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Kevin B. Gerrity Deputy Inspector General

# Highlights

## Investigations



Conviction

8

Whistleblower Retaliation



1,620 Hotline Processed



**17** New Investigations

**73** Closed Investigations



168 New Inquiries

167 Closed Inquiries

## **Monetary Recoveries**



## **Disciplinary Actions**



### Reports



**258** 

Total Open Recommendations



243

Total Closed Recommendations



**3** Audits



4

**Evaluations** 



7 Inspections



# Contents

Message from the Deputy Inspector General	
Highlights	i
Information Related to Interference by NSA	
Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports Issued	2
Information Regarding Management Decisions	6
Compliance With Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA)	7
Investigations	8
Audits, Inspections, Evaluations, and Investigations of Senior Government Employees Closed and Not Disclosed to the Public	1
Appendix A: Peer Review	12
Appendix B: Recommendations Made Before the Reporting Period for Which Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed, and All Outstanding Recommendations in the Past 12 Months	13
Appendix C: Abbreviations List	17
Appendix D: Index of Reporting Requirements	18



# Information Related to Interference by NSA

The OIG experienced no attempts by NSA to interfere with our independence. NSA fully cooperated with our work, did not refuse to provide or attempt to delay or restrict access to records or other information, and did not constrain our budget to limit the capabilities of our Office.



# Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports Issued

For the following reports, NSA agreed with the OIG's recommendations. These recommendations will assist NSA to be more effective and efficient.

### **Audit Reports**

Independent Auditors' Report on the Performance Audit of the National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) Implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) of 2014

An independent public accounting firm performed a review of the effectiveness of NSA's information security programs' compliance with FISMA. The period of testing was 1 October 2024 through 31 May 2025. The review noted that NSA designed, documented, and implemented certain enterprise and system-level controls associated with the operation of its information security management program. However, 13 findings were identified pertaining to 5 (Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, and Recover) of the 6 Cybersecurity Framework functional areas. The findings existed because NSA management did not consistently implement and enforce information technology (IT) security policies and procedures in accordance with applicable Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Departmental, and NSA requirements. Per OMB guidance, an agency's information security program is considered effective if it achieves a maturity of Managed and Measurable, or above (a score of at least 4 out of 5). Based on the evaluation results, the independent public accounting firm determined that NSA's overall information security program did not meet the OMB definition of effective as of 31 May 2025. The OIG review of the FISMA performance audit disclosed no instances where the independent public accounting firm did not comply, in all material respects, with applicable standards.

### **Audit of Foreign Trading Partner Activity**

The OIG found that NSA did not fully comply with the congressional requirements for reporting funding for certain foreign cryptologic support and did not effectively track and manage the execution of certain projects.

FY 2025 Statement of Standards for Attestation Engagement 18, Management of NSA's Description of its System Supporting the Performance of Financial Processing Services and the Suitability of the Design and Operating Effectiveness of its Controls

The OIG contracted with an independent public accounting firm to perform an examination of NSA's description of its system supporting the performance of financial processing services on behalf of another U.S. Government organization, and to perform an examination of the suitability of design and operating effectiveness of controls to achieve the related control objectives stated in the description, for the period 1 October 2024 through 30 June 2025. The examination noted that NSA's



description fairly presented the system that was designed and implemented, and that controls were suitably designed and operated to effectively provide reasonable assurance that the control objectives were achieved.

### **Inspection Reports**

### Inspection of a U.S. Special Liaison Office

The OIG performed an inspection of a U.S. Special Liaison Office. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

### Joint Inspection of a Field Site

The OIG performed a joint inspection of a field site. During the inspection, the OIG noted issues related to site investment, deferred maintenance, and infrastructure deficiencies that the OIG believed warranted prompt attention. Therefore, a quick reaction report was issued.

### **Sugar Grove Research Station**

The OIG performed an inspection of the Sugar Grove Research Station. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

### Joint Inspection of NSA Alaska

The OIG performed a joint inspection of NSA Alaska. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

### Inspection of NSA Cryptologic Representative, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

The OIG performed an inspection of NSA Cryptologic Representative, Central Intelligence Agency. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

### Inspection of a Field Site

The OIG performed an inspection of a field site. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

### Joint Inspection of NSA/CSS Hawaii

The OIG performed a joint inspection of NSA/CSS Hawaii. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.



### **Evaluation Reports**

# Evaluation of NSA's FY 2024 Application of Classification Markers, Compliance with Declassification Procedures, and the Effectiveness of Declassification Review Processes

The OIG conducted an evaluation of NSA's application of classification markers, compliance with declassification procedures, and the effectiveness of its declassification review processes. This review is the third and final annual review directed by Congress. We found that:

- NSA was not fully compliant with applicable Departmental, Intelligence Community, and NSA classification requirements for FY 2024.
- NSA was fully compliant with, and effectively implemented, declassification procedures for FY 2024.

### Evaluation of NSA's FY 2024 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019

The OIG's Evaluation of NSA's FY 2024 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 (PIIA) determined that NSA was compliant with PIIA. The OIG also identified ways that NSA could improve the completeness and accuracy of its PIIA reporting and its PIIA review process.

# NSA's Implementation of Section 529B of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2024

After the former NSA Director requested the OIG conduct an evaluation of NSA's implementation of diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI)-related Executive Orders (EO), Presidential Memorandums, and related guidance, as well as compliance with certain provisions of the FY 2024 NDAA, the OIG identified that NSA did not comply with Section 529B of the NDAA for FY 2024. The OIG issued a quick reaction report because the matter warranted NSA's prompt attention before completion of our ongoing evaluation.

Section 529B prohibited NSA from filling any vacancies with responsibilities for matters relating to DEI. The OIG found NSA did not comply with Section 529B and identified at least five filled vacancies that included DEI responsibilities after the enactment of the NDAA. We did not consider our review to be inclusive of all potential instances of noncompliance throughout the NSA enterprise, and recommended that NSA conduct a review of all DEI-related NSA positions to determine all instances of noncompliance with Section 529B. NSA agreed with this recommendation and conducted a review. NSA found no further instances of noncompliance with Section 529B and reported their findings to the OIG. After our review, this recommendation was closed. There are no open recommendations for this report.

#### **Evaluation of NSA Processes**

The OIG reviewed NSA effectiveness and compliance with certain processes and practices, and identified areas for improvement. We issued recommendations on how to ensure compliance with related policies, address areas of noncompliance, and improve documentation retention.



# Total Dollar Value of Questioned Costs and Funds Put to Better Use During the Reporting Period

No questioned costs or funds put to better use were identified in OIG reports during this reporting period.



# Information Regarding Management Decisions

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (Title 5 U.S. Code [U.S.C.] Chapter 4) (IG Act), defines "management decision" as the evaluation by the management of an establishment of the findings and recommendations included in an audit report, and the issuance of a final decision by management concerning its response to the findings and recommendations, including actions concluded to be necessary. For OIG audits and evaluations, management's decision to agree or disagree with a recommendation, and submission of a corrective action plan, occur prior to issuance of the final report. For OIG inspections, management's decision to agree or disagree with a recommendation occurs prior to issuance of the final report, and their submission of a corrective action plan occurs shortly after issuance of the final report.

There were no management decisions made during this reporting period with respect to reversing or changing the initial management decision for an audit, inspection, or evaluation issued during a previous reporting period.



# Compliance With Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA)

NSA reported in its Agency Financial Report for FY 2024 that it is not in substantial compliance with Section 803(a) of the FFMIA. Specifically, it is not in compliance with federal financial management systems requirements or applicable federal accounting standards. NSA's target for compliance is FY 2028.



# Investigations<sup>1</sup>

### **Criminal Cases**

### Two Charged in a Conspiracy to Defraud the U.S. Government; One Subsequently Pled Guilty

Two individuals were charged, and one subsequently pled guilty in the District of Maryland for their involvement in a conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Government related to the sale of information technology (IT) products and services to the federal Government. The individual who pled guilty faces a maximum penalty of five years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine the individual's sentence after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.<sup>2</sup>

### Suspensions and Debarments

The OIG previously reported that six individuals were charged in the District of Maryland for their involvement in various schemes to rig bids, defraud the U.S. Government, and pay bribes and kickbacks related to the sale of IT products and services to the federal Government. Four of the six individuals subsequently pled guilty. One of the six individuals and three associated entities were suspended from Government contracting.<sup>3</sup> Two of the six individuals were debarred from Government contracting for a period of approximately three years.

### Actions Taken by NSA

During the reporting period, NSA notified the OIG of disciplinary decisions for 36 employees based on OIG reports: 8 employees were terminated or resigned in lieu of removal, 3 employees received a suspension of 30 days or more, 13 employees received a suspension of fewer than 30 days, and 12 employees received written reprimands or counseling.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> The suspension of one of the entities was subsequently lifted due to mitigations provided by the entity.



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In accordance with reporting requirements in this Semiannual Report, senior Government employees are defined as those in General Grade (GG)-15 and higher or any commissioned military officer in pay grades O-6 and above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.

### **Investigative Statistical Tables**

Category	Total ª
Number of Investigative Reports	74
Number of Persons Referred to the Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution	79
Number of Persons Referred to the State and Local Prosecuting Authorities for Criminal Prosecution	0
Number of Indictments and Criminal Informations That Resulted From Prior Referrals	2
Total Number of Convictions from Investigations	1

Note: <sup>a</sup> Statistical tables were developed by compiling data from the OIG's internal Investigations Division database.

### Summary of Closed Significant Investigations

### **Investigations Involving Whistleblower Retaliation**

The OIG closed eight separate investigations into allegations of whistleblower retaliation:

- One of the investigations determined that two NSA employees, which included one senior Government employee and one non-senior Government employee, reprised against an NSA employee for making protected disclosures by reassigning the employee, rescinding the employee's Contracting Officer Technical Representative appointment letter, and canceling a monetary incentive award intended for the employee.
- Seven of the investigations determined that eight senior Government employees, and two non-senior Government employees, did not reprise against NSA affiliates for making protected disclosures.

#### Investigations Involving non-NSA Affiliated Senior Government Employees

• One investigation did not substantiate an allegation that three senior Government employees unaffiliated with NSA failed to comply with certain policies.

# Investigations Substantiating Misconduct Involving Senior Government Employees

#### Time and Attendance Fraud

The OIG substantiated that three senior Government employees submitted false and inaccurate timesheets totaling 187.5 hours, for a loss of \$17,368 to the Government.

See "Summary of Closed Significant Investigations" section above for other substantiated senior Government employee cases.



### Substantiated Investigations of Whistleblower Retaliation

See "Summary of Closed Significant Investigations" section above.

# Semiannual Reports on Investigations of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

Under Title 50 U.S.C. § 3235, the OIG is required to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information, and to do so no less frequently than once every six months. For purposes of this section, unauthorized public disclosure of classified information means the unauthorized disclosure of classified information to a journalist or media organization.

During the period from 1 April 2025 through 30 September 2025, the OIG did not open or complete any investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information.



# Audits, Inspections, Evaluations, and Investigations of Senior Government Employees Closed and Not Disclosed to the Public

This Semiannual Report discloses to the public all audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations involving senior Government employees closed during the reporting period.



# Appendix A: Peer Review

### Peer Reviews Conducted by Other OIGs

During this reporting period, the CIA OIG performed a peer review of NSA OIG investigations that covered the period 1 November 2023 through 5 November 2024. The CIA OIG found that the system of internal safeguards and management procedures for the investigative function of the NSA OIG in effect for the period ended November 2024 is in compliance with quality standards established by CIGIE. These safeguards and procedures provide reasonable assurance that the NSA OIG is conforming to professional standards in the planning, execution, and reporting of its investigations.

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer review of the NSA OIG.

### Peer Reviews Conducted by NSA OIG

The NSA OIG did not complete a peer review of another OIG during this reporting period.

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer reviews performed by the NSA OIG.



# Appendix B: Recommendations Made Before the Reporting Period for Which Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed, and All Outstanding Recommendations in the Past 12 Months

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
03/31/2011	AU-11-0001	0001-3
06/28/2013	AU-13-0004	0004-5
07/23/2015	JT-15-0002	1015
07/14/2017	AD-17-0001	0001-1
12/29/2017	AU-16-0018	0018-18
08/01/2018	JT-18-0001	2314
09/21/2018	ST-17-0003	0003-19
09/28/2018	ST-17-0001	0001-7
09/28/2018	ST-17-0001	0001-8
09/28/2018	ST-17-0001	0001-14
07/11/2019	IN-19-0002A	2902
08/28/2019	JT-18-0003	1509
10/02/2019	AU-18-0002	0002-1
10/02/2019	AU-18-0002	0002-4
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-4
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-6
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-7
06/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-8
06/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-9
06/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-12
06/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-18
06/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-23
06/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-25
07/01/2020	ST-18-0009	0009-1
07/01/2020	ST-18-0009	0009-5
07/01/2020	ST-18-0009	0009-8
07/14/2020	JT-19-0001	1608
07/14/2020	JT-19-0001	2601

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
09/21/2020	AU-19-0001	0001-3
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-1
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-2
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-3
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-4
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-5
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-8
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-9
09/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-12
12/17/2020	AU-18-0012	0012-5
03/31/2021	ST-19-0003	0003-16
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-1
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-2
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-3
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-6
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-9
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-12
08/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-15
09/28/2021	JT-20-0001	1311
09/28/2021	JT-20-0001	1502
09/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2109
09/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2301
09/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2304
09/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2437
09/29/2021	EV-21-0002	0002-11
09/30/2021	AU-20-0007	0007-15
01/21/2022	IN-21-0001	2301
02/09/2022	EV-20-0005	0005-2



Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
02/09/2022	EV-20-0005	0005-3
02/09/2022	EV-20-0005	0005-10
06/30/2022	AD-21-0006	0006-4
09/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-5
09/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-20
09/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-21
09/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-22
09/19/2022	JT-21-0002	2302
09/19/2022	JT-21-0002	2404
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-1
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-2
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-4
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-5
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-6
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-7
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-9
09/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-10
11/17/2022	AD-23-0002	0002-04
05/02/2023	AU-22-0001	0001-3
05/02/2023	AU-22-0001	0001-4
05/02/2023	AU-22-0001	0001-11
05/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-23
05/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-24
05/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-25
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	1003
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	1607
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2001
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2101
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2301
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2601
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-1
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-6
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-8
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-9
02/12/2024		0000 10
	AU-22-0009	0009-10
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009 AU-22-0009	0009-10

Report	Report Number	Recommendation Number
Date		0009-13
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009	
02/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-19
02/21/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-4
02/21/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-5
02/21/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-6
02/21/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-7
02/21/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-8
02/21/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-9
04/10/2024	AU-22-0004	0004-20
05/29/2024	EV-23-0016A	0016A-1
05/29/2024	EV-23-0016A	0016A-2
06/18/2024	JT-21-0001	1519-S
06/18/2024	JT-21-0001	1520-S
06/18/2024	JT-21-0001	1522-S
07/09/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-3
07/09/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-7
07/09/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-8
09/10/2024	JT-24-0001A	0001A-QRR-1
09/10/2024	JT-24-0001A	0001A-QRR-2
09/30/2024	IN-23-0004A	0004A-1
09/30/2024	IN-23-0004A	0004A-2
Outs	tanding Recom	
10/01/0001	in the Past 12 N	
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-1
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-2
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-3
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-4
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-5
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-6
10/04/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-7
10/16/2024	IN-23-0003B	2903
10/16/2024	IN-23-0003B	2905
11/07/2024	IN-23-0003C	0003C-QRR-2a
11/07/2024	IN-23-0003C	0003C-QRR-2b
11/07/2024	IN-23-0003C	0003C-QRR-2c
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1518-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1519-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1520-S



Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1705-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2101
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-1
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-2
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-3
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-4
11/26/2024	EV-23-0015B	0015B-1
12/03/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-1
12/03/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-2
12/03/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-3
12/03/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-10
12/23/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-1
12/23/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-2
12/23/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-3
12/23/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-4
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1101
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2101
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2105
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2119
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2402
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2403
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2601
03/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2603
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	1301
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	1401
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	1402
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	1502
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	1601
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	1602
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	2001
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	2301
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	2601
04/11/2025	IN-24-0002	2602
05/06/2025	JT-24-0002A	0002A-1
05/06/2025	JT-24-0002A	0002A-2
05/06/2025	JT-24-0002A	0002A-3
05/06/2025	JT-24-0002A	0002A-5

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
05/06/2025	JT-24-0002A	0002A-6
05/16/2025	EV-25-0001	0001-1
05/16/2025	EV-25-0001	0001-2
05/16/2025	EV-25-0001	0001-3
06/09/2025	EV-25-0004A	0004A-1
06/10/2025	IN-23-0003	1405
06/10/2025	IN-23-0003	2101
06/10/2025	IN-23-0003	2401
06/10/2025	IN-23-0003	2501
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1304
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1506
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1507
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1509
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1512
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1514
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1515
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1604
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	1605
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2001
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2101
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2104
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2501
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2502
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2503
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2505
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2506
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2507
06/13/2025	JT-23-0002	2601
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	1001
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	1104
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	1203
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	2101
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	2102
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	2103
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	2402
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	2501
07/02/2025	IN-23-0001	2601



Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1501
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1502
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1503
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1504
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1505
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1506
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	1601
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	2401
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	2402
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	2403
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	2501
08/04/2025	IN-24-0003	2502
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-1
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-2
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-3
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-4
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-5
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-6
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-7
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-8
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-9
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-10
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-11
08/05/2025	EV-23-0016	0016-12
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-1
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-2
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-3
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-4

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-5
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-6
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-7
08/08/2025	AU-22-0009B	0009B-8
09/12/2025	EV-25-0003	0003-3
09/12/2025	EV-25-0003	0003-4
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1101
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1202
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1503
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1504
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1505
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1507
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1516
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1518
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1521
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	1605
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2003
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2101
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2102
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2103
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2105
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2402
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2501
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2502
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2601
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2602
09/24/2025	JT-24-0001	2603



# Appendix C: Abbreviations List

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CSS	Central Security Service
DEI	Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion
EO	Executive Order
FFMIA	Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
GG	general grade
IG	Inspector General
IT	information technology
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NSA	National Security Agency
NSAH	NSA/CSS Hawaii
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PIIA	Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019
SAR	Semiannual Report
U.S.C.	United States Code



# Appendix D: Index of Reporting Requirements

IG Act Reference <sup>a</sup>	Reporting Requirements	Page
§405(b)(1) <sup>b</sup>	Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies relating to the administration of programs and operations	2-4
§405(b)(2)	Recommendations made before the reporting period for which corrective action has not been completed	13-16
§405(b)(3)	Summary of significant investigations closed during the reporting period	9
§405(b)(4)	Identification of the total number of convictions during the reporting period resulting from investigations	8
§405(b)(5)(A)	Listing of each audit, inspection, or evaluation	2-4
§405(b)(5)(B)	Total dollar value of questioned costs and the dollar value of recommendations that funds be put to better use	5
§405(b)(6)	Information regarding any management decisions	6
§405(b)(7)	Information described under Section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996	7
§405(b)(8)	<ul><li>(A) Results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period; or</li><li>(B) A statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General</li></ul>	12
§405(b)(9)	List of any outstanding recommendations from any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General that have not been fully implemented	12
§405(b)(10)	List of any peer reviews conducted by the Inspector General of another Office of the Inspector General during the reporting period	12
§405(b)(11)	Investigative statistical tables	9
§405(b)(12)	Description of metrics used for statistical tables of investigations	9
§405(b)(13)	Each investigation conducted by the Office where allegations of misconduct were substantiated involving a senior Government employee or senior official	9
§405(b)(14)	Detailed description of any instance of whistleblower retaliation	9-10
§405(b)(15)(A)	Information related to interference by the establishment including with budget constraints to try to limit oversight	1
§405(b)(15)(B)	Information related to interference by the establishment, including attempts to resist or object to oversight activities, or resisted or significantly delayed access to information	1
§405(b)(16)(A)	Detailed descriptions of each inspection, evaluation, and audit conducted that is closed and was not disclosed to the public; and	11
§405(b)(16)(B)	Detailed descriptions of each investigation involving a senior Government employee that is closed and was not disclosed to the public	11
§405(b)(note)	Public Law 110-181 §845, Final, completed contract audit reports	NA

Note: <sup>a</sup> Citations are to the IG Act of 1978, as amended (Title 5 U.S.C. Chapter 4). <sup>b</sup> Requirement covered by §405(b)(5)(A).





# How to Reach Us

9800 Savage Road, Suite 6247 Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

### HOTLINE

PHONE: 301.688.6327

FAX: 443.479.0099

https://oig.nsa.gov

