



**U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF AUDITS**

Final Audit Report

**THE AUDIT OF THE U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT'S FACILITIES, SECURITY, AND
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE**

**Report Number 2024-IAG-021
December 22, 2025**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Audit of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management Office

Report No. 2024-IAG-021

December 22, 2025

Why Did We Conduct the Audit?

The objective of our audit was to determine whether the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management (FSEM) office adequately trained staff, maintained building safety equipment, conducted required drills, and followed policies and procedures during fiscal year (FY) 2024. Specifically, we assessed whether FSEM (1) ensured that Protective Security Officers and other Physical Security staff received required training; (2) conducted testing and preventative maintenance of building safety equipment in the Theodore Roosevelt Building; (3) sent out Everbridge notifications in accordance with operating instructions; (4) conducted fire, active threat, and shelter-in-place drills, as required; and (5) followed policies and procedures for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) card management and the Situation Room.

What Did We Audit?

The Office of the Inspector General completed a performance audit of OPM's Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management office. Our audit fieldwork was conducted from November 20, 2024, through April 17, 2025, at OPM's headquarters, located in Washington, D.C.



Michael R. Esser
*Assistant Inspector General
for Audits*

What Did We Find?

We determined that FSEM completed training for Physical Security staff and Protective Security Officers as required and FSEM regularly conducted reviews of building safety equipment. However, we identified issues affecting the overall effectiveness of FSEM's operations. Specifically, we determined that:

- The Situation Room was closed for 17 out of 732 shifts during FY24, which did not align with FSEM's *Organizational Overview* policy that requires 24 hours a day, 7 days a week operation to provide real time situational awareness to OPM.
- FSEM is required to complete daily shift logs documenting Situation Room activities. We found inconsistencies in task details and missing information in all 54 daily logs that we sampled and tested.
- FSEM did not complete the full set of drills identified in the *FY 2024 OPM Security Plan*, including unannounced fire drills, shelter in place drills, and active shooter training and drills.
- We could not confirm that FSEM completed monthly PIV access control reviews, including implementing requested changes from Authorized Approving Officials as outlined in the *Standard Operating Procedure Card Reader Access, March 20, 2024*.
- There is no documented process for the approval of messages that are sent out by the Everbridge Emergency Notification System.

In addition, FSEM's management expressed concerns regarding the lifecycle status of certain building countermeasures, noting that older equipment may not be capable of detecting newer technologies entering the building.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAO	Authorized Approving Officials
EMS	Emergency Management Specialist
FPS	The Federal Protective Services
FSEM	Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
OPM	U.S. Office of Personnel Management
PIV	Personal Identity Verification
PSO	Protective Security Officer
Security Services	Office of Security Services
TRB	Theodore Roosevelt Building

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I. BACKGROUND

This audit report details the findings, conclusions, and recommendations resulting from our performance audit of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management (FSEM) office. The audit was performed by OPM's Office of the Inspector General (OIG), as authorized by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (5 U.S.C. §§ 401-424). FSEM manages the agency's personal and real property, building operations, space design and layout, mail management, realty, safety, physical security, and occupational health programs. FSEM provides security and suitability and national security clearance determinations for OPM personnel and directs the operations and oversight of OPM's preparedness and emergency response programs. The organization also oversees publishing and printing management for internal and external design and reproduction. During this audit, we conducted testing related to FSEM's physical security and emergency management responsibilities.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

Physical Security is responsible for ensuring the protection of OPM personnel, visitors, and assets at the Theodore Roosevelt Building (TRB) in Washington, D.C. This includes the implementation of various safety protocols, countermeasures, and physical security standards to mitigate risk and maintain a secure working environment. As a part of its responsibilities, Physical Security oversees the activities of contracted Protective Security Officers (PSOs), who typically serve as the first point of contact for visitors in the TRB.

Under guidance from the Federal Protective Services (FPS), Physical Security ensures that PSOs meet federal standards for training, performance and qualifications. To align with FPS' guidance, OPM follows the *U.S. Office of Personnel Management Security Plan 2024 (Security Plan)*, which outlines procedures, safeguards, and required training to ensure PSOs are equipped to respond to security risks effectively and maintain the safety of the TRB.

Physical Security also conducts weekly checks of all pieces of their security equipment in the TRB in accordance with the *Security Plan*. Security equipment includes guard booths, personal identity verification (PIV) card readers, vehicle barriers, x-ray machines, magnetometers, turnstiles, TRB entrance doors, and surveillance cameras. Weekly countermeasure sheets are completed by indicating whether each piece of equipment is functioning properly or not. If a piece of equipment is not functioning properly, FSEM either replaces the machinery, tries to troubleshoot the faults in the equipment, or contacts the appropriate party to deal with the situation.

In addition to building safety and countermeasures inspections, Physical Security is also responsible for managing and conducting the access control review process for personal entry into secure areas. In accordance with the *Standard Operating Procedures Card Reader Access, March 20, 2024*, Physical Security initiates a monthly review process to ensure access to restricted areas is properly controlled.

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Emergency Management directs the operations and oversight of the OPM's preparedness and emergency response programs, including continuity and mission resiliency, *the Occupant Emergency Plan*, continuity of government programs, and the Situation Room. The Situation Room is required to operate 24 hours a day, 7 days a week (24/7) and is staffed with nine Emergency Management Specialists (EMS) who rotate shifts between day and night watch, requiring one person at any given time.

In addition, Emergency Management is responsible for managing the Everbridge Emergency Notification System (Everbridge²), which sends mass communication updates to the OPM workforce regarding public safety concerns.

PREVIOUS OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORTS

The OIG's Office of Evaluations issued report number 4K-CI-00-16-053, dated April 7, 2017, titled *Evaluation of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management's Insider Threat Program*. This report stated that the Office of Security Services (Security Services) did not have a process in place for insider threat personnel to verify that all cleared employees were meeting training requirements and that Security Services did not have a process in place to ensure cleared employees submitted their Employee Foreign Travel Questionnaires timely after foreign travel. Security Services addressed these issues, and both recommendations were closed at the time of the report's issuance.

The OIG's Office of Evaluations issued report number 4K-FS-00-20-012, dated May 26, 2020, titled *OPM's Physical Security Risk Assessment Process*. Per the report, Security Services needed to improve controls for monitoring OPM's physical security risk assessment results. In addition, Security Services' staff did not record assessment results in its security assessment database and its management did not perform ongoing monitoring or separate quality control reviews to ensure program objectives were met. Two recommendations were made to improve controls for monitoring OPM's physical security. Management concurred with both recommendations, and they were both closed at the time of the report issuance.

The OIG's Office of Evaluations issued report number 2023-OEI-002, dated August 28, 2024, titled *Evaluation of OPM's Personal Property Management Process*. The report states that OPM's Personal Property Management Policies and Procedures manual is outdated and the current manual does not formally document the division between OPM's program offices involved in managing the personal property management process. Additionally, the manual does not meet all of the U.S. General Services Administration requirements for the management of federal personal property. OPM has not conducted an agency-wide inventory since 2014, which has led to inaccuracies in the current inventory records. Three recommendations were made to improve the personal property management process. All three recommendations are in a resolved

² Everbridge is a mass communication platform specializing in critical event management. The platform helps OPM proactively manage and respond to various critical events, including severe weather, information technology outages, workplace violence, and more.

status, meaning there is a corrective action plan to address the issues, but it has not been completed.

II. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

OBJECTIVES

The objectives of our audit were to determine whether FSEM adequately trained staff, maintained building safety equipment, conducted required drills, and followed policies and procedures. Specifically, the objectives were to determine if FSEM:

- Ensured that Protective Security Officers and other Physical Security staff received the required training;
- Conducted testing and preventative maintenance of building safety equipment in the TRB;
- Sent out Everbridge notifications in accordance with the operating instructions;
- Conducted fire, active threat, and shelter-in-place drills; and
- Followed policies and procedures for PIV card management and the Situation Room.

The recommendations included in this final report address the objectives.

SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards as established by the Comptroller General of the United States. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

We performed our audit fieldwork from November 20, 2024, through April 17, 2025, at OPM's headquarters, located in Washington, D.C. The scope of our audit covered the following items from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024:

- Training for the Protective Security Officers and other Physical Security staff working in the TRB;
- Situation Room Day and Night Shift Operating Instructions and Logs;
- Everbridge system notifications that were sent or could have been sent;
- Fire, active shooter, and shelter-in-place drills performed and/or required to be performed; and
- PIV access control reviews.

In addition, our scope included the list of building safety equipment in use at the TRB as of December 1, 2024, and documentation regarding testing of this equipment.

To accomplish the audit objectives noted above, we:

- Interviewed FSEM personnel from Emergency Management and Physical Security;
- Reviewed policies, procedures, and relevant laws that govern safety equipment, safety drills, PIV cards, emergency notifications, and the Situation Room;
- Sampled and tested training documentation and required re-certifications for the Physical Security employees and Protective Security Officers;
- Sampled and tested building safety equipment reports; and
- Conducted observations of the use and condition of the building safety equipment, the location of first aid kits and automated external defibrillator devices, the operation of the Situation Room, and the testing of the Everbridge Emergency Notification System.

In planning our work and gaining an understanding of Emergency Management and Physical Security responsibilities, we considered, but did not rely on, Emergency Management and Physical Security's internal control structures to the extent necessary to develop our audit procedures. These procedures were substantive in nature. We gained an understanding of management procedures and controls to the extent necessary to achieve our audit objectives. The purpose of our audit was not to provide an opinion on internal controls, but merely to evaluate whether key security procedures were followed and to identify any breakdowns in processes related to training, equipment maintenance, access reviews, and emergency preparedness.

Our audit included such tests and analysis of FSEM's policies, procedures, internal controls, and other documentation as deemed necessary under the circumstances. For this audit, we did not rely heavily on computer processed data. Instead, we primarily reviewed hard copy records such as training binders and daily shift logs and conducted physical walkthroughs of the facility to observe implementation of security protocols. While limited computer-generated data was reviewed, such as system generated access lists, we did not evaluate the effectiveness of the general and application controls over computer-processed data. We believe that the data was sufficient to achieve our audit objectives.

We selected the following samples from our audit universes:

Audit Area	Audit Universe	Total Sample Size	Sample Selection Methodology
Situation Room Shift Logs for Shift Verification	732	715	There were 2 shifts per day for 366 days from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024, totaling 732 shifts. However, 17 shift logs were

Audit Area	Audit Universe	Total Sample Size	Sample Selection Methodology
			not provided, leaving 715 shifts selected for review.
Situation Room Shift Logs for Task Evaluation	715	54	We used IDEA ³ software to randomly select logs from various shifts. ⁴
Protective Security Officers	35	35	We selected all 35 PSOs who worked at the TRB during October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024.
PIV Access Control Reviews	12	12	We selected all 12 monthly PIV access control reviews conducted during October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024.
TRB Building Safety Equipment	62	62	We selected all 62 pieces of safety equipment in the TRB as of December 1, 2024.
TRB Building Safety Equipment/Countermeasures Reviews	52	31	We selected all 52 weekly countermeasure reviews conducted from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024, and were provided with 31 countermeasure reviews.

The samples selected during our review were not statistically based. Consequently, the results from our samples were not projected to the populations.

³ IDEA® is a comprehensive data analysis tool, from Caseware, that analyzes data for the purposes of sampling.

⁴ We selected a total of 54 logs including 40 from all 9 Emergency Management Specialists, 3 Sunday logs, 3 logs from the first Wednesday of the month, and 8 logs corresponding to the opposite shifts on dates with missing logs.

III. AUDIT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The sections below detail the results of our audit of the Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management office. We determined that all PSOs and other Physical Security staff received the required training. We also found that Physical Security has security controls and countermeasures in place to ensure that the building's safety equipment is working efficiently. Physical Security conducted weekly inspections of building safety equipment located in the TRB, which included testing and preventive maintenance to ensure that security controls and counter measures remain operational and effective.

In addition, we identified the following issues affecting the overall effectiveness of FSEM's operations.

A. Emergency Management

1. Situation Room

According to Policy *FSEM-001-OD* Emergency Management is required to maintain a 24/7 Situation Room which provides situational awareness to the OPM Director and leadership on events affecting federal staff and operational status of the federal workforce.

We requested logs for all 732 expected shifts (366 days x 2 12-hour shifts per day) from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024, and identified that FSEM's Situation Room was closed for 17 shifts. Therefore, only 715 Situation Room daily event logs (logs) were completed. Each closure represented approximately one 12 hour shift where an EMS was unavailable to report for duty and a substitution was not available.

We sampled 54 out of the 715 day and night shift logs that were completed from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024, and determined that for all 54 logs, Emergency Management had no internal controls or monitoring activities in place to ensure that the EMS completed all daily logs thoroughly and accurately in accordance with operating log instructions. Emergency Management has several EMS that work in the Situation Room and the completion of the daily logs varied, sometimes widely, in the level of detail provided and the number of tasks recorded in the log. Details of our results were provided to FSEM separate from this report. FSEM stated that the operating instructions are not a policy; they are only a guide for the EMS.

Day Shift Operating Instructions 001 and *Night Shift Operating Instructions 002* indicate that daily logs shall be completed for each shift. There are a total of 27 tasks listed in each of the Day and Night Shift Operating Instructions. The EMS is responsible for completing the daily events log from the time they assume duty until the EMS is relieved of duty. This log is emailed to the supervisor at the close of each shift. While FSEM states that its Operating Instructions are a guide for the EMS, the instructions do not state that these are suggestive guidance. The instructions detail how the 27 tasks should be completed and state that the logs shall be completed for each day and night shift. Therefore, the EMS must complete the daily logs, including all 27 tasks, in accordance with the instructions.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* states that management should design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risk including procedures to verify that critical tasks are completed and documented and that agencies should establish monitoring activities to ensure internal controls are effective. Principle 10.03 also states that the internal control and all transactions and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. The documentation may appear in management directives, administration policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained.

Not having 24/7 staffing coverage of the Situation Room increases the risk that FSEM may not be able to respond to emergencies, monitor real time situations, and enforce basic oversight protocol, ultimately compromising operational readiness.

In addition, inconsistent completion of the Situation Room logs may result in an increased inability to confirm whether critical operational tasks were performed and creates a risk of operational inefficiencies.

Recommendation 1

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management monitor staffing levels and maintain a reserve pool of qualified Emergency Management Specialists to include on-call personnel, cross training, and contingency plans to ensure Situation Room coverage as outlined in Policy *FSEM-001-OD*.

FSEM's Response:

"FSEM Management concurs with the recommendation but highlights ongoing challenges in addressing staffing needs. The recent FSEM reorganization, which is still pending approval and may be overcome by events, included staffing plans to cover unforeseen absences. However, due to strict security clearance requirements and the time needed for personnel to become proficient, maintaining a reserve pool of qualified watch officers is not cost-effective. Despite multiple funding requests—both during the annual budget cycle and out-of-cycle submissions—OPM leadership has repeatedly failed to recognize staffing deficiencies, deny funding, and refuse necessary hiring actions. This has led to a reduction in the Situation Room's operational posture from 24/7 to 15/5, undermining FSEM's ability to maintain mission readiness."

OIG Comment:

We acknowledge FSEM Management's concurrence with the recommendation, as well as the challenges cited regarding staffing shortages, security clearance requirements, and funding limitations. However, while we recognize constraints, the current reduction in the Situation Room's posture from 24/7 to 15/5 presents a significant risk to mission readiness and emergency response capability. The reliance on pending organization or future budget actions without

interim mitigation measures leaves a continuing vulnerability. We continue to recommend that FSEM implement feasible corrective actions, such as expanded cross training of existing personnel or temporary surge support agreements, to strengthen coverage until a longer-term staffing solution is secured.

Recommendation 2

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management establish internal controls to ensure Emergency Management Specialists complete all required tasks as outlined in the *Day Shift Operating Instructions 001 and Night Shift Operating Instructions 002* and document them thoroughly and accurately within the daily logs.

FSEM's Response:

“FSEM management concurs with the recommendation and will take several steps to ensure compliance with the Day and Night Shift Operating Instructions (OI-001/002):

- **Training:** A refresher session will be held to reinforce documentation and task completion protocols.
- **Internal Monitoring:** Bi-weekly audits will be conducted to review daily event logs and ensure accuracy.
- **Corrective Actions:** If deficiencies are found, corrective measures such as additional training or performance improvement plans will be implemented.
- **Continuous Improvement:** Ongoing reviews and updates of the operating instructions will be conducted to maintain relevance and effectiveness.

These actions will help ensure thorough, accurate task completion and documentation moving forward.”

Recommendation 3

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management conduct periodic reviews to ensure completion of daily tasks as outlined in the shift operating instructions.

FSEM's Response:

“FSEM Management concurs with this recommendation. In response, the Emergency Management Supervisor has initiated a thorough review of all Situation Room Operating Instructions to ensure alignment with current operational requirements. Moving forward, a formalized process will be implemented, where one employee will be designated each month to conduct the daily review of shift tasks as outlined in the operating instructions. This assignment will rotate to ensure cross-functional involvement and continuity of the review process. Additionally, the Emergency Management Supervisor will monitor the effectiveness of this approach through periodic audits and feedback to ensure consistent task completion and operational readiness.”

Recommendation 4

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management implement required, not suggestive, guidance detailing the responsibilities and procedures for Situation Room shift log completion.

FSEM's Response:

“FSEM Management concurs with the recommendation and recognizes the need for clear, mandatory guidance regarding the Situation Room Shift Log completion. The Emergency Management Supervisor will conduct a comprehensive review of all relevant operating instructions and incident response checklists to ensure that they are updated with specific, required procedures and responsibilities logging completion of tasks. These revisions will establish clear expectations for all personnel and ensure consistent adherence to best practices. Additionally, the Supervisor will monitor the implementation and compliance of these procedures through regular audits and staff training to reinforce accountability and operational efficiency.”

2. Emergency Drills

We reviewed *41 Code of Federal Regulations* 102-74.360, which requires federal agencies to conduct at least one fire drill annually. Based on FSEM's *U.S. Office of Personnel Management Security Plan 2024 (Security Plan)*, we identified additional procedures that Physical Security should coordinate annually with OPM employees and first responders, such as shelter in place drills, active shooter training for OPM employees conducted by FPS, and an active shooter drill.

We requested documentation for drills that occurred from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024. We determined that only one announced fire drill, in August 2024, was conducted in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations and that no other drills that were outlined in the *Security Plan* were performed. FSEM stated that Personnel Security was unable to conduct the drills annually due to scheduling conflicts with Physical Security, Emergency Management, the OIG, and FPS, all of whom are required for the scheduling and execution of the drills. In addition, FSEM stated, “while shelter-in-place and active threat drills are not mandatory, they are considered best practices for maintaining a secure environment. The Security Plan is not a set of policies or procedures but rather a strategic initiative aimed at enhancing the preparedness of the OPM workforce. This includes conducting both announced and unannounced drills, such as evacuation, shelter-in-place, and active threat drills.” Furthermore, FSEM regularly holds monthly planning sessions. However, there were multiple instances where OPM leadership denied multiple requests to implement the planned drills.

The lack of drills and training fails to meet the requirements outlined in the *Security Plan*, which states, “Security and Emergency Actions coordinates annual training with OPM employees and first responders on an annual basis. The following training and exercises are executed and evaluated. Fire Drills, at least one (1) announced and one (1) unannounced. Shelter-in-Place

drills, at least one (1) announced and one (1) unannounced. Active Shooter training for OPM employees conducted by FPS[.] CPR, First Aid and AED [automated external defibrillator] Training[.] OPM plans to initiate full scale active shooter exercise in the TRB during FY-17[.]” The *Security Plan* “outlines the procedures and measures employed by [OPM] to address security needs at various risk levels and respond effectively during instances when undesirable events occur.” Therefore, we believe the expectation is for OPM to carry out the annual activities that are listed in the *Security Plan*.

While we agree that OPM has met the requirements of 41 *Code of Federal Regulations* 102-74.360, failure to conduct the drills outlined in OPM’s *Security Plan* puts employees and visitors at risk as OPM may be unprepared to effectively respond to all types of emergency situations.

Recommendation 5

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management work with all necessary parties (e.g., OPM leadership, OPM’s Office of the Inspector General, and the Federal Protective Services) to establish a schedule for executing all annual drills and training and to establish a contingency plan that allows for alternate dates for conducting drills/training if scheduling conflicts arise.

FSEM’s Response:

“FSEM concurs with this recommendation and has already taken steps to improve the coordination of annual drills and training. In Q4 FY2024, FSEM established a Drill Working Group to lead planning efforts and developed a proposed FY25 Drill and Test Schedule, currently under OPM leadership review. Once approved, FSEM will implement the schedule and establish contingency plans to address potential conflicts. FSEM remains committed to ensuring timely and compliant execution of all future drills and exercises.”

Recommendation 6

We recommend that Facilities, Security and Emergency Management consider revising the *U.S. Office of Personnel Management Security Plan 2024* to clearly distinguish between required items and those that are considered best practices or suggestive initiatives.

FSEM’s Response:

“FSEM concurs and agrees that distinguishing the required elements from best practices in the OPM Security Plan will improve clarity and compliance. During the next review, Emergency Management will collaborate with the Security team to clearly differentiate mandated requirements from suggested practices, especially for drills, training, and operations. This will help stakeholders understand their obligations and prioritize resources. FSEM remains committed to maintaining a clear, actionable, and compliant Security Plan.”

3. Everbridge Procedures

We determined that there is no documented process for the approval of Everbridge notifications or guidelines established for the review of messages that should be sent out.

The Everbridge Emergency Notification System was procured in October 2023; however, it was not fully operational until October 2024. As part of the Situation Room operating instructions, the EMS conducts test notifications from Everbridge twice daily to ensure it is operational. Everbridge has the capability to send emails, text messages, and phone alerts to warn employees about weather, traffic, protests, and other events that might cause disruption and even dangerous situations. The Situation Room is responsible for alerting employees if such a situation occurs. Failure to do so could result in employees and others possibly being put in danger.

After the system was deemed fully operational in October 2024, there were six instances where the Situation Room prepared a notification, but for various reasons OPM leadership chose to send alerts via email instead of using Everbridge. Although emails were sent via an alternate method, not having documented policies or procedures which discuss when the Everbridge system should or should not be used may result in instances where employees and the general public are not notified of critical events.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* states that management should clearly document "internal controls and all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. The documentation may appear in management directives, administrative policies, or operating manuals, in either paper or electronic form. Documentation and records are properly managed and maintained."

Recommendation 7

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management create a formal policy to outline instances where Everbridge should or should not be utilized, to include the flow of approvals for the notifications.

FSEM's Response:

"FSEM concurs with the recommendation to formalize ENS usage guidelines and has developed a Critical Information Requirements (CIR) Matrix to guide consistent, appropriate use of the system. The CIR Matrix, defining activation scenarios and approval processes, has been presented to OPM leadership and is pending approval. Once approved, FSEM will incorporate it into a formal ENS policy to standardize roles, responsibilities, and notification procedures. This will improve emergency communication coordination within OPM."

B. Physical Security

1. Access Control Reviews

We requested documentation to verify the effectiveness and completeness of FSEM's monthly card reader access review process, which includes emails and documentation sent to Authorized Approving Officials (AAO), from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024. We determined that FSEM sent the requests to the AAOs each month; however, we could not determine if all AAOs responded, confirming access changes or validations, nor could we determine if requested changes were implemented by FSEM.

The Access Control Review process consists of Physical Security sending an email at the beginning of each month to all AAOs, requesting a business justification for personnel requiring access to designated restricted areas. These emails include an attached list of individuals who have access to specific groups or areas. The AAOs were asked to review the list and respond with any necessary updates, such as additions or removals. Based on the AAO's response, FSEM makes the requested changes. This reoccurring review helps ensure only authorized personnel maintain access and that updates are made timely and are documented.

Physical Security provided evidence that the required emails, as outlined in *Standard Operating Procedure Card Reader Access, March 20, 2024*, were sent at the beginning of each month from October 1, 2023, through September 30, 2024. However, we only received 2 out of the expected 12 responses from AAOs, confirming changes or verifying the accuracy of the lists. Furthermore, we were unable to confirm that the requested changes from the AAOs were implemented. The individual who previously managed this process, including maintaining records of AAO responses and verifying changes, has retired, leaving a gap in historical recordkeeping.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office's *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, Principle 10.03, states that internal control, all transactions, and other significant events need to be clearly documented, and the documentation should be readily available for examination. The documentation may appear in management directives, administration policies, or operating manuals and may be in paper or electronic form. All documentation and records should be properly managed and maintained.

Failure to maintain documentation of AAO responses, as well as the confirmation of changes, poses a security risk as unauthorized individuals may retain access to secure areas while authorized individuals may lack required access. Additionally, the inability to verify compliance with the review process could undermine the effectiveness of access control procedures.

Recommendation 8

We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management implement a centralized system to properly manage, store, and maintain all documentation related to the access control review to include responses from Authorized Approving Officials and access changes.

FSEM's Response:

“FSEM Management concurs with the recommendation. A centralized ... system has been created on the Physical Security share drive to collect documentation regarding access control to include but not limited to Authorized Approving Officials responses and access changes.”

C. Area of Improvement**1. Equipment Life Cycle**

We confirmed that Physical Security has established countermeasures to ensure the functionality and reliability of building safety equipment. However, at the end of the audit, FSEM leadership expressed concerns about the life cycles for the magnetometers and x-ray machines. FSEM stated that the average lifespan for the equipment is 5 years; however, the current equipment was purchased over 15 years ago and they no longer make the parts for the equipment. In addition, FPS informed FSEM that “the issue with older equipment is that some of the auto-detect technology may not be up to date with some newer technologies for introducing items into the facility meant to cause harm ... The newer technology has settings adjustments to help catch some of these items.” In 2023, a life cycle management document was submitted to OPM leadership for consideration; however, a vast majority of items were deferred. If OPM cannot purchase new X-Ray machines and magnetometers, they have the option to lease the equipment, including a warranty, through FPS.

We have not received documentation to support FSEM's statements; however, we are open to assessing their concerns if we receive the documentation that we requested separate from this report.

APPENDIX



UNITED STATES OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT

Washington, DC 20415

June 25, 2025

Memorandum For: Norbert Vint
Deputy Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General

From: Christopher Beckman
Director
Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management

Subject: Draft Report on the Audit of Facilities, Security, and Emergency:
Report Number 2024-IAG-021

Christopher Beckman
Digitally signed by Christopher Beckman
Date: 2025.06.25 10:15:47 -04'00'

The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management (FSEM) administers the agency's personal and real property, building operations, space design and layout, realty, safety, security, and occupational health programs. FSEM provides personnel security and suitability and national security clearance determinations for OPM personnel and directs the operations and oversight of OPM's preparedness and emergency response programs. FSEM also oversees publishing and printing management for internal and external design and reproduction.

The following memorandum is in response to the OPM Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report on the Audit of Facilities, Security, and Emergency (report number 2024-IAG-021). In this report, OIG identified areas of improvement concerning the issues affecting the overall effectiveness of FSEM's operations. Responses to the recommendations including planned corrective actions, as appropriate, are provided below.

Recommendation 1: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management monitor staffing levels and maintain a reserve pool of qualified Emergency Management Specialists to include on-call personnel, cross training, and contingency plans to ensure Situation Room coverage as outlined in Policy FSEM-001-OD.

Management Response: FSEM Management concurs with the recommendation but highlights ongoing challenges in addressing staffing needs. The recent FSEM reorganization, which is still pending approval and may be overcome by events, included staffing plans to cover unforeseen absences. However, due to strict security clearance requirements and the time needed for personnel to become proficient, maintaining a reserve pool of qualified watch officers is not cost-effective. Despite multiple funding requests—both during the annual budget cycle and out-of-cycle submissions—OPM leadership has repeatedly failed to recognize staffing deficiencies, deny funding, and refuse necessary hiring actions. This has led to a reduction in the Situation Room's operational posture from 24/7 to 15/5, undermining FSEM's ability to maintain mission readiness.

Recommendation 2: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management establish internal controls to ensure Emergency Management Specialists complete all required tasks as outlined in the Day Shift Operating Instructions 001 and Night Shift Operating Instructions 002 and document them thoroughly and accurately within the daily logs.

Management Response: FSEM management concurs with the recommendation and will take several steps to ensure compliance with the Day and Night Shift Operating Instructions (OI-001/002):

- **Training:** A refresher session will be held to reinforce documentation and task completion protocols.
- **Internal Monitoring:** Bi-weekly audits will be conducted to review daily event logs and ensure accuracy.
- **Corrective Actions:** If deficiencies are found, corrective measures such as additional training or performance improvement plans will be implemented.
- **Continuous Improvement:** Ongoing reviews and updates of the operating instructions will be conducted to maintain relevance and effectiveness.

These actions will help ensure thorough, accurate task completion and documentation moving forward.

Recommendation 3: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management conduct periodic reviews to ensure completion of daily tasks as outlined in the shift operating instructions.

Management Response: FSEM Management concurs with this recommendation. In response, the Emergency Management Supervisor has initiated a thorough review of all Situation Room Operating Instructions to ensure alignment with

current operational requirements. Moving forward, a formalized process will be implemented, where one employee will be designated each month to conduct the daily review of shift tasks as outlined in the operating instructions. This assignment will rotate to ensure cross- functional involvement and continuity of the review process. Additionally, the Emergency Management Supervisor will monitor the effectiveness of this approach through periodic audits and feedback to ensure consistent task completion and operational readiness.

Recommendation 4: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management implement required, not suggestive guidance detailing the responsibilities and procedures for Situation Room Shift Log Completion.

Management Response: FSEM Management concurs with the recommendation and recognizes the need for clear, mandatory guidance regarding the Situation Room Shift Log completion. The Emergency Management Supervisor will conduct a comprehensive review of all relevant operating instructions and incident response checklists to ensure that they are updated with specific, required procedures and responsibilities logging completion of tasks. These revisions will establish clear expectations for all personnel and ensure consistent adherence to best practices. Additionally, the Supervisor will monitor the implementation and compliance of these procedures through regular audits and staff training to reinforce accountability and operational efficiency.

Recommendation 5: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management work with all necessary parties (e.g., OPM leadership, OPM's Office of the Inspector General, and the Federal Protective Services) to establish a schedule for executing all annual drills and training and to establish a contingency plan that allows for alternate dates for conducting drills/training if scheduling conflicts arise.

Management Response: FSEM concurs with this recommendation and has already taken steps to improve the coordination of annual drills and training. In Q4 FY2024, FSEM established a Drill Working Group to lead planning efforts and developed a proposed FY25 Drill and Test Schedule, currently under OPM leadership review. Once approved, FSEM will implement the schedule and establish contingency plans to address potential conflicts. FSEM remains committed to ensuring timely and compliant execution of all future drills and exercises.

Recommendation 6: We recommend that Facility, Security and Emergency Management consider revising the U.S. Office of Personnel Management Security Plan 2024 to clearly distinguish between required items and those that are considered best practices or suggestive initiatives.

Management Response: FSEM concurs and agrees that distinguishing the required elements from best practices in the OPM Security Plan will improve clarity and compliance. During the next review, Emergency Management will collaborate with the

Security team to clearly differentiate mandated requirements from suggested practices, especially for drills, training, and operations. This will help stakeholders understand their obligations and prioritize resources. FSEM remains committed to maintaining a clear, actionable, and compliant Security Plan.

Recommendation 7: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management create a formal policy to outline instances where Everbridge should or should not be utilized, to include the flow of approval for the notifications.

Management Response: FSEM concurs with the recommendation to formalize ENS usage guidelines and has developed a Critical Information Requirements (CIR) Matrix to guide consistent, appropriate use of the system. The CIR Matrix, defining activation scenarios and approval processes, has been presented to OPM leadership and is pending approval. Once approved, FSEM will incorporate it into a formal ENS policy to standardize roles, responsibilities, and notification procedures. This will improve emergency communication coordination within OPM.

Recommendation 8: We recommend that Facilities, Security, and Emergency Management implement a centralized system to properly manage, store, and maintain all documentation related to the access control review to include responses from Authorized Approving Officials and access changes.

Management Response: FSEM Management concurs with the recommendation. A centralized a system has been created on the Physical Security share drive to collect documentation regarding access control to include but not limited to Authorized Approving Officials responses and access changes.

FSEM appreciates the opportunity to respond to this draft report. If you have any questions regarding FSEM's responses, please contact **Deleted by OIG. Not relevant to report.**



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