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
INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

SEPTEMBER 9, 2025



(U) Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members



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INDEPENDENCE ★ INTEGRITY ★ EXCELLENCE ★ TRANSPARENCY

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(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members

September 9, 2025

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD, Services, and National Guard have adequate policies and procedures in place to respond to reports of violent threats made by Service members.

(U) Finding

(U) The DoD, the Department of the Army (DA), and the Department of the Air Force (DAF) established policies that require medical providers to report all violent threats to the Services' law enforcement agencies, and all the Services established policies that require commanders and supervisors to report all violent threats to the Services' chain of command. However, each of the Services' policies do not specifically require commanders to report Service members who make violent threats against civilians or non-Government facilities or activities to the Services' senior leaders.

(U) The Services also established policies that the Services' installation law enforcement report violent threats to their military criminal investigative organization (MCIO). However, we reviewed a sample of violent threat investigations from 2023 and found that the DA (32 of 67 investigations) and the Department of the Navy (49 of 113 investigations) did not consistently follow their Service policy to notify their MCIO.

(U) Failure to consistently report violent threats to MCIOs could increase the risk of additional violent incidents by Service members.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Service Secretaries update Service policies to require commanders to report threats of violence by Service members against civilians or non-Government facilities and activities.

(U) We also recommend that the Director, Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (DACID) and the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) review the violent threat investigations not reported to them and conduct any additional investigative activity as needed.

(U) We recommend that the Secretaries of the Army and Navy develop procedures to standardize how their installation law enforcement personnel document their communications with Service MCIO personnel when notifying them of a violent threat.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) The DACID Assistant Director and the NCIS Acting Assistant Director agreed with our recommendations that violent threats that were not reported to them be reviewed, and conduct additional investigative activity as needed.

(U) The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Force Protection Analyst, responding for the Secretary of the Navy, agreed with our recommendation to standardize how Department of the Navy installation law enforcement personnel document their communication with NCIS regarding violent threats.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.

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(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Secretary of the Army	None	1, 6	None
Secretary of the Navy	None	2, 7	None
Secretary of the Air Force	None	3	None
Director, DACID	None	4	None
Director, NCIS	None	5	None (U)

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

September 9, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATION DIVISION
DIRECTOR, NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members (Report No. DODIG-2025-157)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) The following officials agreed to address all the recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are resolved but remain open—the Principal Deputy to the Provost Marshal General, responding for the Secretary of the Army; the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations' Acting Director for Operations and Plans, and Force Protection Analyst, responding for the Secretary of the Navy; the Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, responding for the Secretary of the Air Force, the Assistant Director, responding for the Director, Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division; and Acting Assistant Director, responding for the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service.

(U) We will close the recommendations when we receive documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [REDACTED] if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions or would like to meet to discuss the evaluation, please contact [REDACTED]. We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation.

Randolph R. Stone
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Space, Intelligence, Engineering, and Oversight

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(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD, Services, and National Guard have adequate policies and procedures in place to respond to reports of violent threats made by Service members.¹

(U) Background

(U) On October 25, 2023, Army Reserve Sergeant First Class (SFC) Robert Card from B Company, 3rd Battalion, 2nd Brigade, 108th Training Command, U.S. Army Reserve (USAR), murdered 18 people and injured 13 more in Lewiston, Maine. Maine law enforcement personnel found SFC Card deceased 2 days later with an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound.

(U) The Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office, Bath, Maine, reported that before the shooting, SFC Card told family members that he experienced auditory hallucinations. On May 3, 2023, SFC Card's ex-wife and son reported concerns about SFC Card's mental health to the Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office.

(U) On July 16, 2023, the B Company Commander reported to New York State Police that SFC Card made alarming comments during the unit's annual training at Camp Smith, New York. After these reports, SFC Card was referred to behavioral health services, which led to his 20-day admission for in-patient care at the Four Winds Psychiatric Hospital, a civilian facility located in Katonah, New York. On August 3, 2023, SFC Card was discharged from the Four Winds Psychiatric Hospital and returned to civilian status.

(U) On September 13, 2023, SFC Card made threatening statements to a member of B Company about how many people he could harm with a new scope for his firearm that he recently purchased. The B Company member notified the B Company Commander and First Sergeant who then coordinated with the Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office. SFC Card was not on active-duty status at the time he communicated the threats to his unit member. A Sagadahoc County Sheriff's deputy attempted to conduct a health and welfare check with SFC Card; however, the deputy was not able to make contact.

(U) In response to the October 25, 2023, shooting the DoD Office of Inspector General initiated this evaluation to assess how the DoD, Services, and National Guard respond to reports of violent threats made by Service members.

¹ (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for or requires safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

(U) DoD, Service, and National Guard Bureau Violent Threat Reporting Issuances

(U) The DoD and Services have issued several policies that provide instructions to medical personnel, commanders, and DoD law enforcement personnel on how to respond when a Service member makes a violent threat.² The Department of the Army (DA) and Department of the Air Force (DAF) Service policies also apply to the National Guard Bureau. The table lists the DoD law enforcement agencies discussed during this evaluation.

(U) Table. DoD law enforcement agencies by Service

(U) DoD Law Enforcement Agencies		
Military Services	Installation Law Enforcement	Military Criminal Investigation Organization
Department of the Army	Army Military Police	Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division
Department of the Navy	Naval Security Forces Marine Military Police Marine Criminal Investigation Division	Naval Criminal Investigation Services
Department of the Air Force	Security Forces	Office of Special Investigations

(U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Policies for Violent Threat Reporting for Medical Personnel

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 6490.04, “Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Military Services,” establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and prescribes procedures for the referral, evaluation, treatment, and medical and command management of Service members who may require assessment for mental health issues.³ Specifically, the policy states that medical providers must report to law enforcement, Service members who make threats “to kill or seriously injure a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable person, or to destroy property under circumstances likely to lead to serious bodily injury or death, and the Service member has the apparent intent and ability to carry out the threat.”

² (U) The criminal law associated with making violent threats is Uniform Code of Military Justice, Article 115 Communicating Threats (10 United States Code § 915), 2024—“Any person subject to this chapter who wrongfully communicates a threat to injure the person, property, or reputation of another shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.” The maximum punishment is a dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and 3 years confinement, 10 if the threat concerns the use of explosives.

³ (U) DoDI 6490.04, “Mental Health Evaluations of Members of the Military Services,” March 4, 2013, incorporating change 1, effective April 22, 2020.

(U) Army Regulation (AR) 40-66, “Medical Record Administration and Healthcare Documentation,” addresses policies for preparing and using medical reports and records.⁴ The regulation states that the military treatment facility commander will inform commanders of their Soldier’s medical or behavioral health condition to “avert a serious and imminent threat to health or safety of a person, such as suicide, homicide, or other violent action.”

(U) Air Force Instruction (AFI) 44-172, “Medical Operations, Mental Health,” provides guidance for the operation of the mental health services and the assessment and treatment of DAF personnel and beneficiaries.⁵ This instruction requires DAF healthcare providers to notify the Service member’s commander if they believe a Service member is a serious risk of harm to others.

(U) The Department of the Navy (DON) did not have a supplemental policy to DoDI 6490.04. However, DON senior medical personnel told us that the Service medical personnel should follow the DoD instruction requiring medical providers to notify law enforcement and the chain of command when a Service member makes a violent threat.

(U) Policies for Violent Threat Reporting for Commanders and Supervisors

(U) The Services have policies that require commanders and supervisors to report violent threats to law enforcement, as well as to their Service headquarters through their chain of command.⁶ The Service policies apply to the National Guard Bureau.

(U) Department of the Army

(U) The DA has three regulations that instruct commanders to report criminal offenses and threats to DA law enforcement, as well as published guidance from DA senior leadership providing instructions as to what offenses need to be reported to the Service’s operations center.

(U) AR 600-20, “Army Command Policy,” prescribes the policies and responsibilities of command, which includes military discipline and conduct.⁷ AR 600-20 requires commanders at all levels, including the Army Reserve and the Army National Guard, to report allegations of criminal behavior to law enforcement authorities.

⁴ (U) AR 40-66, “Medical Record Administration and Healthcare Documentation,” January 4, 2010.

⁵ (U) AFI 44-172, “Medical Operations, Mental Health,” November 13, 2015, certified current April 23, 2020.

⁶ (U) For the purposes of this report, the terms “commander” and “supervisor” refer to any person who is in the chain of command of a Service member making violent threats.

⁷ (U) AR 600-20, “Army Command Policy,” July 24, 2020.

(U) AR 195-2, “Criminal Investigation Activities,” establishes the policies on criminal investigation activities within the Department of the Army. AR 195-2 states that the offense of “Communicating threats” is the responsibility of the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division (DACID) if it is a death threat with the evidence of planning beyond the mere expression of ideation and any threat where an explosive device or parts of an explosive device, is found.⁸ Additionally, the Regulation states that all other threats—including terrorist and insider, to unlawfully kill, injure, or intimidate a person or to unlawfully damage or destroy certain property—will be reported to DACID for evaluation.

(U) AR 190-45, “Law Enforcement Reporting,” provides guidance for offense and serious incident reporting within the DA.⁹

(U) Army Executive Order 222-17, “Commander Critical Information Report Requirements,” lists the Headquarters, Department of the Army Senior Leader’s reporting requirements for Commander Critical Information Reports (CCIR) to the Army Operations Center.¹⁰

(U) The instructions in AR 600-20 and AR 190-45 apply to the Army National Guard when a Soldier is on title 10 or title 32 status.¹¹

(U) Department of the Navy

(U) The DON has issuances that instruct commanders to report criminal offenses to DON law enforcement and the Service’s operations desk. Also, the DON has issued instructions defining what criminal offenses Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) is responsible for.

(U) General Regulations, chapter 11, states, “persons in the naval service shall report as soon as possible to superior authority all offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice.”¹²

(U) Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.107A, “Mission and Functions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service,” establishes policy and assigns authorities and responsibilities of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) and its

⁸ (U) AR 195-2 “Criminal Investigative Activities,” July 21, 2020.

⁹ (U) AR 190-45, “Law Enforcement Reporting,” September 27, 2016.

¹⁰ (U) Army Executive Order 222-17, “Commander Critical Information Report Requirements,” October 25, 2023.

¹¹ (U) National Guard members serve simultaneously in their State National Guards and in the Army or Air National Guard of the United States. Title 10 status refers to title 10 of the United States Code. National Guard members serving under title 10 orders are in an equivalent Active-duty status as their active Component counterparts. Title 32 status refers to title 32 of the United States Code. National Guard members serving under title 32 status fall under the command and control of their state or territory governor.

¹² (U) “General Regulations, chapter 11,” September 3, 1997.

(U) relationship with other DON activities.¹³ The instructions designate NCIS as being primarily responsible for investigating serious criminal offenses. The instruction defines a major criminal offense and a serious crime as any criminal offense that is punishable under the UCMJ, or similar law, by confinement for a term of more than 1 year. The instructions allow NCIS to enter into agreements with DON law enforcement agencies regarding investigations into offenses meeting the definition of a significant criminal offense. The maximum confinement period for violent threats is 3 years unless the threat concerns the use of explosives, in which case the maximum confinement is 10 years.

(U) “Approved Consolidated Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Commander’s Critical Incident Report Criteria,” lists the types of incidents that commanders are required to report to the DON senior leaders.¹⁴

(U) Marine Corps Order 3504.2A, “Operations Event/Incident Report Reporting,” establishes the Operational Reporting system that United States Marine Corps (USMC) units at any level of command use to report significant events and incidents to the highest levels of the USMC.¹⁵

(U) Department of the Air Force

(U) The DAF regulations instruct commanders to report criminal offenses, as well as violent threats to DAF law enforcement, as well as published guidance from DAF senior leadership providing guidance as to what offenses need to be reported to the Service’s operations center.

(U) The Department of the Air Force Manual 1-101, “Commander Directed Investigations,” provides guidance to all individuals involved in a Commander directed investigation.¹⁶ The instruction requires commanders to ensure criminal allegations involving persons affiliated with the DoD or any property or programs are referred to Security Forces, Air Force Office of Special Investigation, or local law enforcement.

(U) AFI 71-101, “Special Investigations,” requires its installation law enforcement to notify Air Force Office of Special Investigations of a communicating a threat offense only when they have evidence an overt act was committed.¹⁷ AFI 71-101 applies to the Air Force, Air Force reserves, the Air National Guard and the United States Space Force.

¹³ (U) Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.107A, “Mission and Functions of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service,” June 19, 2019.

¹⁴ (U) “Approved Consolidated Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Commander’s Critical Incident Report Criteria,” February 2024.

¹⁵ (U) Marine Corps Order 3504.2A, “Operations Event/Incident Report Reporting,” August 7, 2013.

¹⁶ (U) Air Force Manual 1-101, “Commander Directed Investigations,” April 9, 2021.

¹⁷ (U) AFI 71-101, “Special Investigations,” Volume 1, July 1, 2019.

(U) Air Force Manual 10-206, "Operational Reporting," establishes and describes the DAF operational reporting system.¹⁸

(U) The Air Force Reporting Program Matrix that supplements Air Force Manual 10-206, "Operational Reporting," June 18, 2018, identifies reporting criteria within the DAF reporting system to provide national leaders, Senior DAF leadership, and intermediate commanders the information necessary for timely operational decisions.

(U) The instructions in Department of the Air Force Manual 1-101 and AFI 71-101 apply to the Air Force, Air Force Reserve, Space Force, and Air National Guard when on title 10 and on title 32 status.

¹⁸ (U) Air Force Manual 10-206, "Operational Reporting," June 18, 2018.

(U) Finding

(U) The DoD and the Services Generally Had Policies to Report Violent Threats; However, the Army and Navy Did Not Consistently Follow Policies to Notify Their Military Criminal Investigative Organizations

(U) The DoD, DA, and DAF established policies that require medical providers to report all violent threats to the Services' law enforcement agencies, and the Services established policies that require commanders and supervisors to report violent threats to the Services' chain of command. However, each of the Services' policies do not specifically require commanders to report Service members who make violent threats against civilians or non-Government facilities or activities to the Services' senior leaders through the Services' operations centers.

(U) The Services also established policies that required the Services' installation law enforcement to report violent threats to its military criminal investigative organization. However, we reviewed a sample of violent threat investigations from 2023 and found that the DA (32 of 67 investigations) and DON (49 of 113 investigations) did not consistently follow their Service policy to notify their military criminal investigative organization (MCIO). As a result, the impact of not properly notifying those responsible for responding to, and investigating, violent threats could result in additional violent incidents involving Service members.

(U) The DoD, DA, and DAF Have Policies That Require Medical Personnel to Report Violent Threats to Law Enforcement

(U) We reviewed the DoD and Service issuances and interviewed DoD and Service medical personnel, and found that the DoD, DA, and DAF have policies that require DoD medical providers to report violent threats to their respective law enforcement agencies or the Service member's command. The DON did not have a Service policy that required its medical providers to report violent threats to their respective law enforcement agencies. However, DON senior medical personnel told us the Service medical personnel follow the DoD instruction requiring medical providers to notify law enforcement and the chain of command when a Service member makes a violent threat.

(U) The DoD published DoDI 6490.04, establishing a requirement that medical providers must report to law enforcement, Service members who make threats “to kill or seriously injure a clearly identified or reasonably identifiable person, or to destroy property under circumstances likely to lead to serious bodily injury or death, and the Service member has the apparent intent and ability to carry out the threat.”

(U) The DA issued AR 40-66 that addresses policies for preparing and using medical reports and records. The regulation states that the military treatment facility commander will inform commanders of their Soldier’s medical or behavioral health condition to “avert a serious and imminent threat to health or safety of a person, such as suicide, homicide, or other violent action.”

(U) The DAF issued AFI 44-172, which included the instructions from DoDI 6490.04 and requires DAF healthcare providers to notify the commander concerned if they believe a Service member is a serious risk of harm to others.

(U) The Services Have Policies That Require Commanders and Supervisors to Report Violent Threats Through the Chain of Command to the Services’ Headquarters

(U) We reviewed the Services’ policies and found that the Services also have policies that require commanders to report violent threats against Government personnel, facilities and activities through their chain of command to the Services’ operation centers. However, we found that each of the Services’ reporting policies do not specifically require commanders to report Service members who make violent threats against civilians or non-Government facilities or activities to the Service’s senior leaders through the Service’s operations center.

(U) The Service operation centers are part of the Services’ headquarters and are responsible for reporting critical information to the Services’ senior leadership. Each Service requires information on specific critical situations and operations to be reported through the chain of command to the respective Services’ headquarters operation center. Leadership refers to these reports as a commander’s critical information report (CCIR). The purpose of the CCIR is to provide information on situations in a timely manner so that the Service leadership can make quick decisions accordingly. Each of the Services published criteria as to what situations or incidents require a CCIR to be submitted to the Services’ operation centers.

(U) CCIR Policies and Criteria for Violent Threat Reporting

(U) We reviewed the Service policies and criteria that require commanders to submit a CCIR report to the Service headquarters, through the chain of command.

(U) Department of the Army

(U) AR 190-45 establishes policies and procedures for offense and serious incident reporting within the Army. The regulation applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard, and the U.S. Army Reserve, unless otherwise stated. It outlines the types of incidents, the timeline, and the method in which commanders are required to submit reports to Headquarters, Department of the Army.

(U) Army Executive Order 222-17 lists the Headquarters, Department of the Army Senior Leader's reporting requirements for CCIRs to the Army Operations Center. Executive Order 22217 lists the following types of violent threats that commanders are required to report to the Army Watch Desk:

- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Navy

(CUI) The Secretary of the Navy issued "Approved Consolidated Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Commander's Critical Incident Report Criteria," which supplements Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3100.6K, "Special Incident Reporting Procedures," and directs DON senior leadership to submit critical incident reports from commanders.¹⁹ [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

as requiring a CCIR.

(U) Marine Corps

(CUI) Marine Corps Order 3504.2A establishes the Operational Reporting system that the USMC units at any level of command use to report significant events and incidents to the highest levels of the USMC. A Significant Incident Report is required for an event or incident—[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

¹⁹ (U) Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3100.6K, "Special Reporting (OPREP-3 Pinnacle, OPREP-3 Navy Blue and OPREP-3 Navy Unit SITREP) Procedures," August 10, 2021.

(U) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] A Significant Incident Report is also required for any other event or incident that, in the judgment of the unit commander, is of significant USMC interest.

(U) Department of the Air Force

(U) Air Force Manual 10-206 directs commanders to report crimes or criminal incidents to the Air Force Chief of Staff through the CCIR process if the incident:

- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (U) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Service Policies Do Not Require Reporting Threats to Civilians or Nongovernmental Facilities

(U) None of the Services' policies specifically requires commanders to report Service members who make violent threats against civilians or non-Government facilities or activities to the Services' senior leaders through their operations Centers.

(U) We interviewed the Service operations centers' leadership who told us that threats made by Service members against civilians and non-Government facilities and activities would require a CCIR, because each Services' reporting requirements allow for commanders to submit any incident not specifically listed if they determined it warranted a CCIR. However, we concluded that without a clear requirement in policy, threats made by Service members against civilians or non-Government facilities or activities could go unreported up the chain of command.

(U) The DA and DON Did Not Consistently Follow Their Policies to Notify Their MCIO to Review or Investigate Threats Made by Service Members

(U) DA installation law enforcement personnel did not consistently comply with the DA requirement to notify DACID when responding to a violent threat. Additionally, the DON did not consistently have documentation that NCIS was notified, responded, or declined jurisdiction. DAF law enforcement personnel consistently followed DAF policy when responding to a violent threat.

(U) We reviewed 211 investigations of violent threats by Service members that were conducted by DoD law enforcement personnel, 67 from the DA, 113 from the DON, and 31 from the DAF. The investigations were initiated and conducted from January 1, 2023, through December 31, 2023. We reviewed the investigations to determine whether Service law enforcement personnel complied with their Service's policies on responding to a violent threat.

(U) The following are examples of the types of threats we found that the DA and DON installation law enforcement personnel investigated, and the investigation contained no documentation that each Service's MCIO was notified:

- (CUI) [REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
- (CUI) [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

(U) Department of the Army Violent Threat Investigations

(U) Of the 67 DA investigations, we found that for 35 investigations, DA law enforcement complied with the notification requirements in AR 195-2 by notifying DACID of the violent threat. However, 32 investigation case files did not have documentation that DACID was notified.

(U) We asked DA law enforcement personnel why DACID was not notified. They told us that DACID would have been notified of the violent threats when they received the blotter reports.²⁰ We determined that this shortfall occurred because AR 195-2 requires notification to DACID but lacks a requirement in AR 195-2 to document the notification.

(U) Department of the Navy Violent Threat Investigations

(U) Of the 113 DON investigations, we found that for 64 investigations, DON law enforcement complied with the requirements of Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.107A by notifying NCIS of the violent threat. However, 49 investigation case files did not have documentation that NCIS was notified.

(U) We asked DON law enforcement personnel why NCIS was not notified of the violent threats. In an email notification to NCIS, DON law enforcement told us that that installation commanders set policy on how an incident is reported to NCIS. They also stated that the only required notifications to NCIS are for death cases, sexual assault, controlled substance and domestic violence offenses.

(U) We asked NCIS personnel why NCIS was not responding to violent threats since Secretary of the Navy Instruction 5430.107A assigns investigative responsibility to NCIS for violent threat offenses. NCIS personnel emailed us and stated that NCIS has investigative responsibility for violent threat offenses, but the instructions do not mandate that NCIS investigate all offenses. Additionally, NCIS personnel told us that NCIS considers several factors to determine whether to initiate a criminal investigation. These factors include, but are not limited to, the nature and sophistication of the crime, and whether the deployment of sophisticated investigative techniques is needed for fact finding purposes.

(U) Department of the Air Force Violent Threat Investigations

(U) Of the 31 DAF investigations, we found that DAF law enforcement complied with AFI 71-101 and notified Air Force Office of Special Investigations for each investigation.

²⁰ (U) DACID personnel receive the military blotter report and are responsible for reviewing its contents. The blotter report is a daily chronological record of Army law enforcement activities developed from reports, complaints, information, incidents, and related events. Each Department of the Army Installation maintains its own blotter. The complete blotter report is distributed to DACID.

(U) Impact of Not Properly Reporting Violent Threats

(U) When a Service member makes a violent threat, it is important to ensure the chain of command, installation law enforcement and the Service MCIOs are properly notified of the potential danger. Failure to consistently report violent threats to MCIOs could increase the risk of additional violent incidents by Service members, such as what occurred with SFC Card on October 25, 2023.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Army update Army Regulation 190-45 and Army Executive Order 222-17 to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians and non-Government facilities, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to the Service's Senior leadership through the operations center.

(U) Department of the Army Comments

(U) The Principal Deputy to the Provost Marshal General, responding for the Secretary of the Army, agreed and stated that revisions for Army Regulation 190-45 are scheduled for FY 2028. The Principal Deputy also stated they submitted the recommended update to Army Executive Order 222-17 (current version is 133-25) to Army G3 for consideration.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Principal Deputy addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that management officials updated the reporting requirements.

(U) Recommendation 2

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy update Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3100.6K and the Approved Consolidated Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Commander's Critical Incident Report to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians and non-Government, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to the Service's senior leadership through the operations center.

(U) Department of the Navy Comments

(U) The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Acting Director of Operations and Plans, responding for the Secretary of the Navy, agreed and stated that Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3100.6K will likely be updated within the next year.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that management officials updated the reporting requirements.

(U) Recommendation 3

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Air Force update Air Force Manual 10-206 and the Air Force Reporting Program Matrix to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians and non-Government, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to the Service's Senior leadership through the operations center.

(U) Department of the Air Force Comments

(U) The Air Force Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations agreed and estimated that the update will be completed by January 30, 2026.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that management officials updated the reporting requirements.

(U) Recommendation 4

(U) We recommend that the Director, Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division review the installation law enforcement investigations that we identified that were not reported to the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division and conduct any additional investigative actions they deem appropriate.

(U) Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division Comments

(U) The Assistant Director, responding for the DACID Director, agreed with the recommendation.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Assistant Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that the DACID's review of the investigations was completed.

(U) Recommendation 5

(U) We recommend that the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service review the installation law enforcement investigations that we identified that were not reported to Naval Criminal Investigative Service and conduct any additional investigative actions they deem appropriate.

(U) Naval Criminal Investigative Service Comments

(U) The Acting Assistant Director, responding for the NCIS Director, agreed with the recommendation.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Acting Assistant Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that the NCIS's review of the investigations was completed.

(U) Recommendation 6

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Army establish procedures to ensure that installation law enforcement personnel document notifications of violent threats with Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division personnel.

(U) Department of the Army Comments

(U) The Principal Deputy to the Provost Marshal General, responding for the Secretary of the Army, agreed with the recommendation.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Principal Deputy addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that standardized procedures have been implemented.

(U) Recommendation 7

(U) We recommend that the Secretary of the Navy establish procedures to ensure that installation law enforcement personnel document notifications of violent threats with Naval Criminal Investigative Service personnel.

(U) Department of the Navy Comments

(U) The Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Force Protection Analyst, responding for the Secretary of the Navy, agreed with the recommendation.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Force Protection Analyst addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, it is resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendation when we verify that standardized procedures have been implemented.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from February 2024 through August 2025 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We reviewed current DoD and Service policies that instruct Service members and DoD employees on what their responsibilities are when they receive information that a Service member has made a violent threat to harm DoD or civilian personnel or damage Federal, State, city, or civilian property.

(U) We reviewed 211 DoD law enforcement reports that involve Service members making violent threats that were opened on or after January 1, 2023, and closed (completed and adjudicated) on or before December 31, 2023, for compliance with DoD and Service policy requirements in place at the time of the investigation. Specifically, we reviewed a sample of 67 DA investigations; and all 113 DON and 31 DAF investigations.

(U) The DoD OIG Quantitative Methods Division selected a sample of 67 DA investigations of a universe of 212 investigations, using a 95 percent confidence level and 10 percent margin of error to calculate the sample size. The Quantitative Methods Division randomized and selected sample from the universe using the RAND() function in a spreadsheet to randomize the population and selected the sample of 67 investigations without replacements.

(U) We sent data call memorandums to each Service requesting a list of all current regulations that pertain to violent threat reporting. The request focused on DoD and Service issuances that instruct DoD personnel, such as commanders, supervisors, DoD law enforcement, medical and behavioral health personnel, on what actions they are required to take when they know that a Service member made a violent threat. We also requested DoD and Service issuances that assign investigative responsibility and investigative requirements for allegations of violations of Article 115, Uniformed Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), “Communicating threats.”

(U) Also, we sent a data call memorandum to each Service's law enforcement agencies and requested documentation of all reported incidents of a Service member investigated for article 115, UCMJ within the evaluation period.

(U) We developed an evaluation protocol for the investigations based on DoD and Service issuances that addressed the reporting requirements for DoD personnel when they know of a Service member making a violent threat. The protocol was the foundation for a relational database that served as a central repository for tracking report evaluation data.

(U) Our evaluation focused on whether the DoD member who received the initial threat, took the appropriate actions by notifying the appropriate DoD or civilian law enforcement agency and that the appropriate DoD law enforcement agency responded to the threat. Our findings were based on whether the DoD and Services had policies pertaining to reporting violent threats, whether the Services complied with its policy, and whether the Service policies provided clear instructions to DoD personnel as to what their required actions are. We reviewed the investigations in our sample to determine if law enforcement personnel complied with the Service policy when responding to a violent threat.

(U) We sent the list of case files to NCIS and DACID that did not contain documentation that the Services' installation law enforcement notified the Services' MCIOs of a violent threat. The MCIO was asked to verify if it had any record that the installation law enforcement notified them of the violent threat.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Use of Technical Assistance

(U) We worked with the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) Quantitative Methods Division (QMD) during our planning phase to determine the number of reports to review from each service.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) United States Army Reserve Command Report, "Findings and Recommendations, Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into the Suspected Suicide of SFC Robert R. Card II," March 7, 2024.

(U) The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) conducted an administrative investigation in the circumstances leading up to the shooting and issued a report on March 7, 2024. The USARC investigation concluded that the incident

(U) was preceded by a series of events beginning in the [Fall of 2022], which likely exacerbated his mental health issues leading up to his suicide. These events included a relationship breakup, his perception of others making derogatory statements about him, beginning the use of hearing aids, and conflicts with his son, other family members, and with his fellow USAR unit members. Family members became concerned with SFC Card's deteriorating mental state and reported their concerns, seeking assistance from local law enforcement authorities for the first time, on May 3, 2023.

(U) The relevant findings of the investigation concluded that SFC Card's company commander:

- (U) failed to follow up with the Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office to ensure that SFC Card's family physically secured SFC Card's privately owned weapons;
- (U) created unnecessary doubt when reporting the threats made by SFC Card to the Sagadahoc County Sheriff's Office by informing the sheriff's deputy that the unit member who reported the threat, "should not be trusted";
- (U) failed to cancel SFC Card's annual training orders following SFC Card's reporting mental health concerns to law enforcement and the unit;
- (U) failed to initiate a Commander's Critical Incident Report (CCIR) following SFC Card's family's report to law enforcement on May 3, 2023, on his mental health concerns;
- (U) failed to initiate a CCIR after SFC Card's release from the civilian behavior health hospital on August 3, 2023;
- (U) failed to initiate a CCIR for the incident on September 15, 2023, when a unit member reported that SFC Card threatened a mass shooting at the Butler U.S. Army Reserve Center in Saco, Maine;
- (U) failed to inform the Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division or the Army Insider Threat Hub on the threat reported by the unit member; and
- (U) failed to initiate or complete a Line of Duty determination regarding SFC Card's hospitalization and subsequent release in July 2023.

(U) In July 2024, the Department of the Army Inspector General published, "United States Army Inspector General Agency Review of the U.S. Army Reserve Command Army Regulation 15-6 Investigation into the Actions and Suicide of Sergeant First Class Robert R. Card II, U.S. Army Reserve," stating they reviewed the USARC investigation report and agreed with USARC's documented findings.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Department of the Army



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL GENERAL
2800 ARMY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20310-2800

DAPM-LE

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. Army Audit Agency

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report: Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members, Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000

1. Reference U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report, SAB, 11 July 2025.
2. This memorandum conveys the Office of the Provost Marshal General's (OPMG) response to the draft report regarding violent threat reporting procedures, concurring with Recommendations #1 and #6.
3. **Recommendation #1 (Page 13):** We recommend that the Secretary of the Army should update AR 195-45 and Army Executive Order 222-17 to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians and non-DoD facilities, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to the Service's Senior leadership through the operations center.
 - a. Concur. OPMG acknowledges the shortcomings in current reporting procedures and concurs with the finding that mandatory reporting through the respective command's operations center will enhance situational awareness and facilitate a more rapid and coordinated response to potential threats.
 - b. Corrective Action Plan. Revise AR 190-45 (Law Enforcement Reporting) and AR 190-30 (Military Police Investigations), to explicitly mandate reporting of all threats of violence against civilians, non-DoD facilities, or involving DoD personnel, dependents, or civilian employees to the respective command's operations center (G3/S3). The revision will clearly outline the reporting format, required information, and escalation procedures. EXORD 222-17 has had several revisions and is currently on revision EXORD 133-25, dated 15 May 2025. OPMG will provide reporting outline updates to G3 for consideration of reporting requirements.
 - c. Milestone Dates: Major revision of AR 190-45 is scheduled for FY2028, 4th Quarter. Publication of revised AR 190-45 will be in alignment with Army Publishing Directorate timelines for Army Regulation review and publications.
 - d. Justification. This action directly addresses the identified gap in reporting and ensures that senior leadership receives timely and comprehensive information

(U) Department of the Army (cont'd)

DAPM-LE

SUBJECT: U.S. Department of Defense Inspector General Draft Report: Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members, Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000

regarding potential threats. Utilizing the respective command's operations center as the central reporting point leverages existing communication channels and facilitates effective dissemination of information.

4. Recommendation #6 (Page 14): We recommend that the Secretary of the Army establish procedures to ensure that installation law enforcement personnel document notifications of violent threats with Department of the Army Criminal Investigative Division (DACID) personnel.

a. Concur. OPMG concurs with the finding that improved documentation of notifications to DACID is essential for effective investigation and tracking of violent threats. The report's findings, coupled with the U.S. Army Reserve Command investigation into the SFC Card case, demonstrate the importance of consistent communication and collaboration between installation law enforcement and investigative agencies.

b. Corrective Action Plan. Develop and implement a standardized procedure for installation law enforcement personnel (Directorate of Emergency Services/Provost Marshal General) to document all notifications of violent threats to DACID. This procedure will include an entry into Army Law Enforcement Reporting Tracking System (ALERTS) (or the most current Army Case Management System), to be completed and retained with the incident report. The entry will capture details of the notification, including date, time, method of communication, and the DACID personnel contacted.

c. Milestone Dates: Major revision of AR 190-45 is scheduled for FY2028, 4th Quarter. Publication of revised AR 190-45 and AR 190-30 will be in alignment with Army Publishing Directorate timelines for Army Regulation review and publications.

d. Justification. This action will ensure a clear audit trail of notifications to DACID, facilitating better coordination of investigative efforts and improving the Army's ability to respond to potential threats. The required entry will enhance data collection and analysis, allowing for identification of trends and potential areas for improvement.

5. The OPMG point of contact is [REDACTED]

STEWART.GEOFFREY.
THAYER
GEOFFREY T. STEWART
Principal Deputy to the Provost Marshal
General and Director, Defense Forensics
and Biometrics Agency

Digitally signed by
STEWART.GEOFFREY.THAYER
Date: 2025.07.30 12:21:37 -04'00'

(U) Department of the Navy



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20350-2000

5500
N3/
6 Aug 25

From: Director, Operations and Plans (OPNAV N3)
To: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)

Subj: OPNAV N3 RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN DODIG DRAFT REPORT
"EVALUATION OF DOD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO
REPORTS OF VIOLENT THREATS MADE BY SERVICE MEMBERS" (PROJECT
NO. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000)

Ref: (a) ETMS2 Tasker DON-250711-S2WS, DON Response Requested to Recommendations
in DODIG Draft Report "Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports
of Violent Threats Made by Service Members" (Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000)

1. In July 2025 OPNAV N3 was tasked via reference (a) to provide a response to
Recommendation 2 contained on page 13 of the draft report, "Evaluation of DoD Policies and
Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members (Project No.
D2024-DEV0SP-0073.00.)"

2. FINDING: Per Recommendation 2, the DoD OIG stated, "*We recommend that the Secretary
of the Navy should update Office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3100.6K and the
Approved Consolidated Chief of Naval Operations and Secretary of the Navy Commander's
Critical Incident Report to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians
and non-DoD facilities, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to
the Service's Senior leadership through the operations center.*"

3. RESPONSE: OPNAV N3 concurs with Recommendation 2, and will aggregate this
recommendation into the requirements for reporting as a Navy Unit SITREP when OPNAV
revises OPNAVINST 3100.6K. This instruction was last updated in 2021, and will likely be
updated within the next year by OPNAV N30.

4. My point of contact concerning this matter is [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


R. C. FERGUSON
Acting

(U) Department of the Navy (cont'd)

SELECT A CLASSIFICATION DoD ISSUANCE COORDINATION RESPONSE

COMPONENT COORDINATOR RESPONSE

[Click here to enter a date.](#)

SUBJECT: DON RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN DODIG DRAFT REPORT
D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000Directive-type Memorandum

On behalf of my Component, my formal response to recommendation #7 of the associated report is: Concur with comment. Below are comments for your consideration.

Language requiring all responses to reports of violent threats made by service members to be documented will be inserted in the draft OPNAVINST 5580.1 and when completed submitted for review, approval, and signature.

The point of contact for this action is [REDACTED]

7/28/2025

X

Double-click the 'X' to insert a digital signat...
or print and sign a hard copy.
Signed by: USN



Coordinating Official's Name: [REDACTED]
Coordinating Official's Position Title: Force Protection Analyst OPNAV N4I3
Coordinating Official's Component: USN

DD FORM 818, AUG 2016 SELECT A CLASSIFICATION

(U) Department of the Navy (cont'd)

SELECT A CLASSIFICATION

DoD ISSUANCE COORDINATION RESPONSE: Issuance Type and Number, "Title"

CLASS	#	PAGE	PARA	BASIS FOR NON-CONCUR?	COMMENTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND ORIGINATOR JUSTIFICATION FOR RESOLUTION	COMPONENT AND POC NAME, PHONE, AND E-MAIL
Choose an item.	1.	5	2.2b	<input type="checkbox"/>	Coordinator Comment and Justification: misspelled word (copes) Coordinator Recommended Change: copies Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:	
Choose an item.	2.	14	5.2d	<input type="checkbox"/>	Coordinator Comment and Justification: Misspelled word (treat) Coordinator Recommended Change: threat Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:	
Choose an item.	3.			<input type="checkbox"/>	Coordinator Comment and Justification: Coordinator Recommended Change: Originator Response: Choose an item. Originator Reasoning:	

DD FORM 818, AUG 2016

REPLACES SD FORM 818, WHICH IS OBSOLETE
SELECT A CLASSIFICATION

2

(U) Department of the Air Force



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON DC

2 August 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM: HQ USAF/A3
1480 Air Force Pentagon
Washington, DC 20330

SUBJECT: Department of the Air Force Response to DoD Office of Inspector General Draft Report, "Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members" (Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073)

This is the Department of the Air Force response to the DoDIG Draft Report, "Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service Members" (Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073). The DAF agrees with the report as written and welcomes the opportunity to improve policies and procedures to respond to reports of violent threats made by service members.

The AF/A3 (A3T) in coordination AF/A4 (A4S) and SAF/IG (OSI) will correct issues identified in this report by developing and implementing the corrective action plan outlined in the following recommendations:

RECOMMENDATION 3: The DoDIG recommends that the Secretary of the Air Force update Air Force Manual 10-206 and the Air Force Reporting Program Matrix to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians and non-DoD facilities, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to the Service's Senior leadership through the operations center.

DAF RESPONSE: AF/A3, agrees with the recommendation and will update Air Force Manual 10-206 and the Air Force Reporting Program Matrix to require commanders to report threats of violence against civilians and non-DoD facilities, or activities by Service members, dependents, or civilian employees to the Service's Senior leadership through the operations center. **Estimated Completion Date:** 30 January 2026

The AF/A3 point of contact is [REDACTED]

JOHN M. KLEIN, JR.
Major General, USAF
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations

(U) Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION DIVISION
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD QUANTICO
VA 22134-2253

CIDD-IOD

31 JUL 25

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Response to DoDIG draft report D2024-DEV0SP-0073

1. This memorandum is being generated to provide an official response to DoDIG Draft Report D2024-DEV0SP-0073.
2. The following response was provided in the closed out ETMS Action HQDA-250711-XS3B: "CID agrees to conduct a review of the installation law enforcement investigations that the evaluation identified that were not reported to Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division and conduct any additional investigative actions deemed appropriate in response to Recommendation #4."
3. The point of contact for this memorandum is [REDACTED]

HARTSOE,TEENA.M. Digitally signed by
ARIE [REDACTED] HARTSOE,TEENA.M. [REDACTED]
Date: 2025.08.01 10:21:04 -0400

TEENA M. HARTSOE
Assistant Director
Investigations and Operations Department

(U) Naval Criminal Investigative Service



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS
NAVAL CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE
27130 TELEGRAPH ROAD
QUANTICO VA 22134-2253

Ser 23/25U238
05AUG25

From: Melvin Griffin, Assistant Director (Acting), Naval Criminal Investigative Service

To: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG)

Subj: NCIS RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN DODIG DRAFT REPORT
"EVALUATION OF DOD POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR RESPONDING TO
REPORTS OF VIOLENT THREATS MADE BY SERVICE MEMBERS" (PROJECT
NO. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000)

Ref: (a) ETMS2 Tasker DON-250731-Q7XG, DON Response Requested to Recommendations
in DODIG Draft Report Evaluation of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports
of Violent Threats Made by Service Members" (Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000)

1. In July 2025, the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS) was tasked via reference (a) to
provide a response to Recommendation 5 contained on page 14 of the draft report, "Evaluation
of DoD Policies and Procedures for Responding to Reports of Violent Threats Made by Service
Members (Project No. D2024-DEV0SP-0073.000)".

2. FINDING: Per Recommendation 5, the DoD OIG stated, "*We recommend the Director,
Naval Criminal Investigative Service review the installation law enforcement investigations that
we identified that were not reported to the Naval Criminal Investigative Service and conduct any
additional investigative actions they deem appropriate.*"

3. RESPONSE: NCIS concurs with Recommendation 5, which requires the review of 46 USN
and USMC law enforcement cases that were not referred to NCIS. The SECNAVINST
5430.107A authorizes NCIS to conduct all investigations into major criminal offenses. Currently,
the USMC law enforcement utilizes field-level matrices when deciding to notify/refer criminal
investigations to NCIS. It is unclear what rubric USN law enforcement utilizes outside of the
SECNAVINST 5430.107A.

4. Please direct any questions concerning this memorandum to [REDACTED]

Melvin Griffin

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

- AFI** Air Force Instruction
- AR** Army Regulation
- CCIR** Commander’s Critical Information Report
- DA** Department of the Army
- DACID** Department of the Army Criminal Investigation Division
- DAF** Department of the Air Force
- DON** Department of the Navy
- MCIO** Military Criminal Investigative Organization
- NCIS** Naval Criminal Investigative Service
- USMC** United States Marine Corps

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