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
# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

JULY 14, 2025



## (U) Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility



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# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility*

July 14, 2025

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD established program objectives, developed an assessment framework, met performance metrics, and met congressional reporting requirements for the effective execution of building partner capacity activities within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility in accordance with Federal laws and DoD regulations. In addition to this report, we issued Report No. DODIG-2025-080, "Management Advisory: Timeliness of Performance Evaluations for Contracts Supporting the DoD's Building Partner Capacity Efforts," on March 28, 2025. In that management advisory, we reported that performance evaluations were not completed for contractors supporting security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation.

### (U) Background

(U) According to DoD Instruction 5132.14, a "significant security cooperation initiative" is "the series of activities, projects, and programs planned as a unified, multiyear effort to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes... to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective." Additionally, a significant security cooperation initiative requires an initial assessment, an objective, and comprehensive performance management.

### (U) Findings

(U) The DoD established objectives for the four significant security cooperation initiatives within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility that we reviewed for FY 2022

### (U) Findings (cont'd)

(U) through FY 2024 for building partner capacity; however, the DoD did not fully develop assessments or perform monitoring for these initiatives. This occurred because officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy did not provide clear procedures and templates for assessments and monitoring of security cooperation. In addition, officials in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency did not provide adequate oversight of USINDOPACOM's submission of assessment and monitoring products.

(U) DoD officials attributed the lack of an effective assessment, monitoring, and evaluation program to issues with data management, the large scope of stakeholders across a variety of entities, and challenges staffing an assessment, monitoring, and evaluation workforce. As a result, the DoD cannot fully evaluate the effectiveness of building partner capacity efforts within the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility or identify lessons learned and best practices to inform future security cooperation efforts.

(U) Additionally, the DoD generally complied with congressional reporting requirements, including congressional notification requirements; however, the DoD did not always issue annual congressional monitoring reports in a timely manner. This occurred because DoD officials did not have the information systems or processes in place to ensure compliance with reporting requirements. Without timely, relevant, and accurate information, Congress cannot make evidence-based decisions to improve or eliminate ineffective security cooperation.

### (U) Recommendations

(U) Among other recommendations, we recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships develop an oversight process for assessment and monitoring products. Furthermore, we recommend that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, develop additional data management capabilities for assessment and monitoring functions and for congressional



# (U) Results in Brief

*(U) Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity  
in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility*

## **(U) Recommendations (cont'd)**

(U) reporting. Additionally, we recommend that the Director, USINDOPACOM, Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), develop instructions to establish the roles and responsibilities of security cooperation stakeholders for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirements.

## **(U) Management Comments and Our Response**

(U) The Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55), responding for the USINDOPACOM Commander; the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships agreed with all the recommendations. Of the 10 recommendations in the report, 3 recommendations are closed; the remaining 7 recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations when we verify that management has implemented corrective actions.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of the recommendations.

***(U) Recommendations Table***

<b>(U)</b> <b>Management</b>	<b>Recommendations Unresolved</b>	<b>Recommendations Resolved</b>	<b>Recommendations Closed</b>
Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command	None	A.3.c	A.3.a, A.3.b
Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency	None	A.2, B.2.a, B.2.b, B.2.c	None
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships	None	A.1, B.1.b	B.1.a (U)

**(U) Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.

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**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 14, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND  
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIPS

SUBJECT: (U) Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (Report No. DODIG-2025-125)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's audit. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) Management took action sufficient to address 3 of 10 recommendations in this report, and we consider the recommendations closed. We consider the seven remaining recommendations resolved and open. We will close these recommendations when the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command; the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency; and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [REDACTED] if unclassified or [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [REDACTED]

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Richard B. Vasquez".

Richard B. Vasquez  
Assistant Inspector General for Audit  
Readiness and Global Operations

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## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this audit was to determine whether the DoD established program objectives, developed an assessment framework, met performance metrics, and met congressional reporting requirements for the effective execution of building partner capacity activities within the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) in accordance with Federal laws and DoD regulations.<sup>1</sup>

(U) This report is the second and final product issued as part of this audit. This report focuses on the DoD's role in establishing objectives, completing assessments, monitoring performance, and reporting to Congress. We previously issued Report No. DODIG-2025-080, "Management Advisory: Timeliness of Performance Evaluations for Contracts Supporting the DoD's Building Partner Capacity Efforts," on March 28, 2025. In that management advisory, we reported that performance evaluations were not completed for contractors supporting the security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation (AM&E) program in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. See Appendix A for all prior coverage related to the objective.

### (U) Background

(U) DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5132.14 defines a "significant security cooperation initiative" (SSCI) as "the series of activities, projects, and programs planned as a unified, multiyear effort to achieve a single desired outcome or set of related outcomes...to realize a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective."<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the Department of Defense as Controlled Unclassified Information that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for, or requires, safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

<sup>2</sup> (U) DoDI 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise," January 13, 2017.

(U) Table 1 shows the specific title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.) and other authorities for building partner capacity and their purposes.

(U) Table 1. Authorities for Building Partner Capacity

(U) Authorities	Purpose
10 U.S.C. § 332 – Institutional Capacity Building	Directly support partner nation efforts to improve security sector governance and core management competencies necessary to effectively and responsibly achieve shared security objectives.
10 U.S.C. § 333 – Build Capacity / Train & Equip	Provide training and equipment to national security forces of foreign countries to build capacity of the forces to conduct operations such as counterterrorism, counter-weapons of mass destruction, counter-illicit drug trafficking, counter-transnational organized crime, maritime and border security, military intelligence, air domain awareness, and cyberspace security.
FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, section 1263 – Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (MSI)	Provide assistance and training to national security forces of foreign countries to increase multilateral maritime security cooperation and maritime domain awareness of foreign countries in the USINDOPACOM AOR.

(U)

(U) Source: The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s description of provisions in 10 U.S.C. § 332, “Friendly Foreign Countries; International and Regional Organizations: Defense Institution Capacity Building”; 10 U.S.C. § 333, “Foreign Security Forces: Authority to Build Capacity”; and the FY 2016 National Defense Authorization Act, section 1263, “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative.”


**(U) Building Partner Capacity Efforts Within USINDOPACOM**

(U) The USINDOPACOM AOR includes 38 nations comprising the Asia-Pacific region, which is home to more than half of the world’s population. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]<sup>3</sup> According to the DoD’s FY 2024 Budget for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, security cooperation and relationships with regional partners will strengthen a joint defense in the Indo-Pacific region.<sup>4</sup> Furthermore, the DoD’s FY 2024 Budget for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative explains that reliable deterrence cannot depend solely on U.S. capacity, and that interoperable, capable partners support the rules-based international order and complicate China’s aggression. Figure 1 shows the FY 2024 allocations for building partner capacity by country.

<sup>3</sup> (U) This value represents the cost estimates as listed on the FY 2024 SSCI resource allocation plan.  
<sup>4</sup> (U) DoD Budget, FY 2024, “Pacific Deterrence Initiative,” March 2023.

*(U) Figure 1. FY 2024 Allocations for Building Partner Capacity Within USINDOPACOM*



<sup>1</sup> (CUI) “Other” represents the combined remaining allocations for FY 2024 for [REDACTED]

<sup>2</sup> (U) “Regional” represents the regional allocations for multilateral collaboration of countries within a geographical region, such as Oceania or Southeast Asia.

(U) Source: DoD OIG analysis of FY 2024 SSCI resource allocation plan.

### ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities for Building Partner Capacity***

(U) According to Joint Publication 3-20, security cooperation involves planning and interagency coordination by many organizations from the department level down to the security cooperation organization and includes participating military units.<sup>5</sup> The main stakeholders have various responsibilities for planning, executing, and overseeing building partner capacity efforts.

### ***(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Policy***

(U) According to Joint Publication 3-20, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD[P]) is responsible for overseeing strategic policy and guidance, and for resource allocation for security cooperation programs and activities. In addition, the OUSD(P) oversees the security cooperation AM&E program. Under the authority of the OUSD(P), the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships (ODASD[GP]) is the focal point for security cooperation and building partner capacity subject matter expertise. The ODASD(GP) is the DoD lead for prioritizing, integrating, and evaluating bilateral and multilateral security cooperation.

<sup>5</sup> (U) Joint Publication 3-20, “Security Cooperation,” September 9, 2022.

### ***(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency***

(U) The Defense Security Cooperation Agency's (DSCA) mission is to advance U.S. defense and foreign policy interests by capacity building to empower allies and partners to respond to shared challenges. The DSCA represents the interests of the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy in security cooperation efforts and is responsible for providing DoD-wide security cooperation guidance and managing and executing many security cooperation programs. The DSCA collaborates with the ODASD(GP) and provides AM&E technical assistance to the geographic combatant commands (GCCs). In addition, the DSCA manages the development and maintenance of the information technology system, Socium.<sup>6</sup>

### ***(U) USINDOPACOM***

(U) According to DoD Directive (DoDD) 5132.03, the geographic combatant commanders, which include the USINDOPACOM Commander:

- (U) maintain responsibility for all security cooperation matters in their assigned AOR;
- (U) assess foreign partner defense and security capabilities, identifying capability requirements to support U.S. objectives and develop comprehensive approaches to building partner capabilities; and
- (U) provide guidance to, and oversight of, senior defense officials and chiefs of security cooperation organizations for planning and execution of security cooperation activities.<sup>7</sup>

### ***(U) Contractor Support***

(U) The DoD can use contractors to provide AM&E subject matter expertise and support services to the OUSD(P), DSCA, GCCs, and other security cooperation stakeholders. Among other support, the DoD tasked contractors to support the GCCs in their security cooperation planning and oversight efforts, including the development of AM&E products.

### ***(U) Requirements for Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Security Cooperation***

(U) Before the enactment of the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act, which added a provision to 10 U.S.C. § 383 for an AM&E program, there had been no comprehensive framework to judge the effectiveness of security cooperation.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> (U) Socium is the DoD enterprise-wide technology for planning, budgeting, collaboration, design, management, AM&E, and reporting of security cooperation activities. While the DSCA deployed Socium in FY 2020, the DSCA continues to add and refine the system's capabilities.

<sup>7</sup> (U) DoDD 5132.03, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," December 29, 2016.

<sup>8</sup> (U) Public Law 114-328, "National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017," § 1205, amended 10 U.S.C. and added § 383, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Programs and Activities."

(U) Following the new statutory authority, the OUSD(P) issued DoDI 5132.14 to establish policy and assign responsibilities for AM&E requirements. DoDI 5132.14 states that AM&E should help the DoD understand what security cooperation methods work and why, and apply lessons learned, and allow policymakers to identify and improve or eliminate ineffective security cooperation.

~~(CUI)~~ According to DoDI 5132.14, AM&E is required for all SSCIs, which are generally planned by the GCCs. DoDI 5132.14 also describes how SSCIs involve multiple security cooperation tools over multiple years to achieve a country- or region-specific objective or functional objective, such as maritime security (MARSEC).<sup>9</sup> As an example, Figure 2 illustrates the SSCI construct with underlying security cooperation programs and activities over multiple years for the [REDACTED] SSCI.

~~(CUI)~~ Figure 2. Illustration of [REDACTED] SSCI with Associated Programs and Activities




~~(CUI)~~ Source: DoD OIG presentation of [REDACTED] SSCI with associated security cooperation programs and activities, as identified by the DSCA.

<sup>9</sup> (U) The DoD plans security cooperation several years in advance. For example, the FY 2024 SSCI planning cycle, for using FY 2024 funds, started in FY 2022.

(U) According to the OUSD(P) annual guidance for SSCI submissions, the GCCs submit SSCIs for approval and funding annually, for both new-start and continuing SSCIs.<sup>10</sup> For continuing SSCIs, the GCCs should update initiative documents as needed with updated objectives, planning assumptions, and relevant AM&E findings.

(U) DoDI 5132.14 states that initial assessments are required for all SSCIs along with an initiative design document, which specifies specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, and time-bound (SMART) objectives. In addition, DoDI 5132.14 specifies that initiative design documents should contain a comprehensive performance management section, including indicators to measure SSCI achievements. DoDI 5132.14 defines an “indicator” as a quantitative or qualitative factor that provides a reliable means to measure achievement and help assess the performance of a security cooperation action. Therefore, for the purposes of this report, we refer to “indicator” in place of “metric” as originally stated in our objective. DoDI 5132.14 also describes monitoring and data collection to analyze and track trends. Figure 3 illustrates the security cooperation AM&E framework according to DoDI 5132.14 and the associated requirements for initial assessment, objective, and indicators.

(U) Figure 3. Security Cooperation AM&E Framework with Alignment of Requirements for Initial Assessment, Objective, and Indicators



(U) Source: DoD OIG presentation of DoDI 5132.14 information.

<sup>10</sup> (U) “FY 2022 SSCIs Guidance,” released on March 25, 2020; “FY 2023 Guidance for SSCIs,” released in April or May 2021; and “FY 2024 Guidance for SSCIs,” released on August 10, 2022. Because the guidance did not contain dates, DoD officials explained that they released the guidance through the correspondence and task management system and provided release date information.

(U) Title 10 of the U.S.C. contains multiple requirements for congressional notifications and monitoring reports of security cooperation programs and activities. Congressional notifications require detailed information, such as a statement of the purpose of the capacity-building support and its cost. The DoD is required to provide Congress monitoring reports on activities in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 332 annually, 10 U.S.C. § 333 semiannually, and the 10 U.S.C. § 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI annually. In addition, 10 U.S.C. §§ 383 and 386 require the DoD to provide Congress with annual reports on the AM&E program and all security cooperation executed during the previous year, respectively.

(U) We selected 4 SSCIs with a collective value of [REDACTED] for review from a [REDACTED].<sup>11</sup> For the 4 selected SSCIs, we reviewed 11 annual SSCI records for FY 2022 through FY 2024, which included [REDACTED] programs and activities associated with the initiatives. Table 2 shows the total annual records reviewed, the number of programs and activities within the initiatives selected for review, and the associated values.

(CUI)	SSCI	Annual Records Reviewed by Fiscal Years	Number of Programs & Activities Within the Initiative <sup>1</sup>	Value Total (in Millions)
		FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024		
	<sup>2</sup>	FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024		
		FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024		
	<sup>3</sup>	FY 2023 FY 2024		
	<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>		(CUI)

<sup>3</sup> (CU) The [REDACTED] SSCI began in FY 2023 and therefore did not have an FY 2022 record. Supporting documents also refer to this SSCI as [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] For the purposes of this report, we use [REDACTED] as indicated by FY 2024 documents.

(U) Source: DoD OIG summary of information provided by the DSCA for the SSCIs selected for review.

11 (EU) [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ Our review of the 11 annual SSCI records focused on the assessment and monitoring functions of the security cooperation AM&E framework and did not include the evaluation function. We also reviewed congressional notifications for the ■ programs and activities and the related congressional monitoring reports. See Appendix A for additional information about our scope and methodology. See Appendix B for a list of the security cooperation programs and activities associated with the four SSCIs we reviewed.

## (U) Finding A

### (U) DoD Efforts to Assess and Monitor Building Partner Capacity Within the USINDOPACOM AOR Need Improvement

(U) The DoD established objectives for the four SSCIs for building partner capacity within the USINDOPACOM AOR that we reviewed for FY 2022 through FY 2024; however, the DoD did not fully develop assessments or perform monitoring for these initiatives. Specifically, in all 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed, USINDOPACOM officials did not:

- (U) fully develop initial assessments of partners to inform initiative planning, or
- (U) perform or fully document monitoring to facilitate analysis and track trends affecting initiative execution.

(U) USINDOPACOM officials did not assess or monitor initiatives because OUSD(P) officials did not provide complete implementing guidance with clear procedures and templates for assessing and monitoring security cooperation. Additionally, the OUSD(P) and DSCA did not provide adequate oversight of USINDOPACOM's submission of assessment and monitoring products. Furthermore, DoD officials attributed the lack of an effective AM&E program to data management issues, including the absence of an information technology system, the large scope of security cooperation stakeholders across a variety of entities, and challenges staffing an AM&E workforce.

(U) As a result, the DoD cannot fully evaluate the effectiveness of building partner capacity efforts within the USINDOPACOM AOR or identify lessons learned and best practices to inform future security cooperation efforts. Without monitoring quantitative and qualitative measures toward achieving stated objectives, the DoD cannot make evidence-based decisions to improve or eliminate ineffective security cooperation programs and activities.

## (U) USINDOPACOM Officials Established Objectives for SSCIs

(U) USINDOPACOM officials established objectives in accordance with DoDI 5132.14 for the four SSCIs for building partner capacity we reviewed for FY 2022 through FY 2024. Specifically, in all 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed, USINDOPACOM officials established objectives using SMART principles and addressing the capability and capacity gaps of partner nations.

(U) According to DoDI 5132.14, geographic combatant commanders are responsible for facilitating coordination of subject matter experts and other stakeholders to develop initiative design documents, which should include a SMART objective. In addition, the DoDI explains that initiative design documents should include a problem statement with a description of the issue, also known as capability and capacity gaps, that the initiative seeks to address.<sup>12</sup>

~~(CUI)~~ For all 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed, USINDOPACOM established SMART objectives for building partner capacity. For example, the FY 2024

[REDACTED] SSCI objective stated, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] We determined that this objective fulfilled the specific and measurable principles because the stated objective focused on a single goal for a principal partner nation organization and establishes baseline information from which it can be measured for significant change. The objective also complies with the achievable principle because the SSCI record documented a theory of change, identified institutional shortfalls, and identified courses of action to address those shortfalls. In addition, the objective is relevant because it aligns with strategic-level objectives, such as the National Defense Strategy. It is also time-bound because it established milestones in the FY 2024 SSCI record. We determined that this objective, along with the objectives for the remaining 10 annual SSCI records, met the SMART principles.

~~(CUI)~~ In addition to reviewing SMART principles, we verified that the established objective addressed the identified capability and capacity gaps. In all 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed, we determined that USINDOPACOM officials identified capability and capacity gaps and addressed those gaps. For example, the capability and capacity gaps section of the three [REDACTED] annual SSCI records for FY 2022 through FY 2024 identified [REDACTED]

<sup>12</sup> (U) During our review, for FY 2022 and FY 2023 SSCIs, the DoD included initiative design document requirements within SSCI proposals, and for FY 2024 SSCIs, the DoD used Socium initiative data field entries.

(~~CUI~~) as [REDACTED] greatest capability challenge. This section further described

[REDACTED] as [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Therefore, we determined that the three [REDACTED] SSCI records from FY 2022 through FY 2024, along with the remaining eight SSCI records, established capability and capacity gaps with a documented problem statement or rationale and a description of the issue that the SSCI seeks to address.

## (U) USINDOPACOM Officials Did Not Fully Develop Assessments or Monitor SSCIs

(U) USINDOPACOM officials did not fully develop assessments or perform monitoring in accordance with 10 U.S.C. § 383 and DoDI 5132.14 for the four SSCIs we reviewed for FY 2022 through FY 2024. Specifically, in the 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed for the 4 SSCIs, USINDOPACOM officials did not:

- (U) fully develop initial assessments of partners to inform initiative planning, or
- (U) perform or fully document monitoring to facilitate analysis and track trends affecting initiative execution.

(U) Section 383, title 10, U.S.C., requires initial assessments of partner capability requirements, potential risks, baseline information, and indicators of efficacy for security cooperation programs and activities; and monitoring of implementation of such programs to measure progress in execution and achievement of desired outcomes. According to DoDI 5132.14, geographic combatant commanders are responsible for ensuring assessments and monitoring are undertaken for all SSCIs.

(~~CUI~~) According to the report to Congress on the AM&E program for FY 2022, the OUSD(P) required the combatant commands to phase in AM&E requirements for annual SSCI submissions since the enactment of AM&E legislation.<sup>13</sup> Additional explanation from ODASD(GP) officials clarified that initial assessments were always required in accordance with DoDI 5132.14, but performance monitoring was phased in, starting with the GCCs developing two pilot monitoring plans for approved FY 2021 SSCIs. The guidance for FY 2022 SSCIs directed the GCCs to finalize the two pilot monitoring plans and explained that the phased-in approach ensured time to onboard AM&E subject matter experts to help complete the requirement. USINDOPACOM selected [REDACTED]

<sup>13</sup> (U) "Report on Activities for FY 2022, AM&E Program in Support of the Security Cooperation Programs and Activities of the DoD," Report to Congress, Submitted Pursuant to section 383, title 10, U.S.C.

(U) ██████████ SSCIs for the two pilot monitoring plans approved for FY 2021. However, we could not validate the subsequent phased-in requirements of the USINDOPACOM SSCIs selected. Therefore, we reviewed the annual SSCI records for performance monitoring based on the requirements in DoDI 5132.14, which has been in effect since 2017. We discuss the unclear phased-in requirements and USINDOPACOM changes to SSCIs selected for monitoring later in this report.

### ***(U) USINDOPACOM Officials Did Not Fully Develop Initial Assessments for Security Cooperation***

(U) USINDOPACOM officials did not fully develop initial assessments of partners for SSCIs in accordance with DoDI 5132.14 in the 11 annual SSCI records for the 4 SSCIs we reviewed for FY 2022 through FY 2024. Additionally, USINDOPACOM officials did not assess ██████████ security cooperation programs and activities within the 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed for the initiatives.

(U) According to DoDI 5132.14, geographic combatant commanders are responsible for leading initial assessment efforts for all SSCIs. DoDI 5132.14 explains that initial assessments provide an understanding of the context, partner capabilities, and requirements, and establish a baseline for tracking progress before all SSCIs. Furthermore, DoDI 5132.14 provides specific elements that initial assessments should contain, including analysis of the partner's capabilities; potential risks; partner's political will and stability; and partner's absorptive capacity.<sup>14</sup>

(U) Although the OUSD(P) provided additional guidance for SSCI submissions, this implementing guidance did not clearly establish procedures or include a template for initial assessments. Specifically, the OUSD(P) provided additional guidance within DoD AM&E guidebooks, including discussion of a range of assessment types and the multiple levels (strategic, operational, and tactical) of AM&E focus.<sup>15</sup> The overview guidebook explains that the strategic-level focuses on SSCIs, the operational level focuses on funding authority or programs, and the tactical level focuses on activities. The assessment guidebook explains that stakeholders should

<sup>14</sup> (U) Absorptive capacity is the extent to which a partner can support, employ, and sustain assistance independently.

<sup>15</sup> (U) "DoD Assessment, Planning & Design, Monitoring, and Evaluation Overview for Security Cooperation," and "DoD Principles for Security Cooperation Assessment," both released in summer 2020. Because the guidance did not contain dates, DoD officials provided release date information.

(U) complete initial assessments before taking any action for an initiative because assessments are precursors to decision making and should identify options to guide planning. Furthermore, the assessment guidebook explains that findings from in-depth assessments help stakeholders complete SSCI planning documents, including proposals.

(U) In all 11 annual SSCI records, we found that SSCI proposals included general analysis of partners, such as capability and capacity gaps, constraints to proposed actions, political will, and absorptive capacity. However, besides the general information on SSCI proposals, USINDOPACOM officials did not provide evidence of in-depth initial assessments developed to identify options and guide strategic-level initiative planning. Furthermore, a DSCA official emphasized that as of April 1, 2024, no initial assessments for any USINDOPACOM SSCIs existed; however, some “pre-design assessments” for the associated security cooperation programs and activities were completed.<sup>16</sup>

~~(CUI)~~ Beyond the initial assessment requirements for all SSCIs, DoDI 5132.14 also encourages assessments before all security cooperation activities. To identify all the security cooperation programs and activities within the 11 annual SSCI records in our analysis, we reviewed the SSCI proposals and discussed the programs and activities with DSCA officials.<sup>17</sup> DSCA officials identified [REDACTED] programs and activities associated with the SSCIs, which we compared to the completed “pre-design assessment” documentation.

~~(CUI)~~ We found that USINDOPACOM officials did not assess [REDACTED] security cooperation programs and activities included in the initiatives. Table 3 shows the breakout of the number of programs and activities included in each initiative, the number without evidence of a pre-design assessment, and the corresponding SSCI.

<sup>16</sup> (U) For this report, we use the term “pre-design assessment” to also include an abbreviated baseline assessment review, which is authorized by the DSCA instead of a pre-design assessment. AM&E contractors facilitated the completion of pre-design assessments with inputs from security cooperation organizations of U.S. embassies, DoD Components, and other stakeholders.

<sup>17</sup> (U) We found inconsistencies with the identification of programs and activities within the SSCI proposals; however, DSCA officials explained that the SSCI process takes several years to move from proposal to congressional notification and ultimately execution, during which the names of programs change to reflect new decisions. According to DSCA officials, they led a multi-organizational search of electronic records to create a list of the programs congressionally notified or planned for notification under each SSCI. We provide additional details on this in our audit scope and methodology discussion within Appendix A.

(U) Table 3. SSCIs with Programs and Activities Without a Pre-Design Assessment

(CUI)			
SSCI	Fiscal Year	Number of Programs & Activities Within the Initiative*	Number of Programs & Activities Without an Assessment
[REDACTED]	FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024	1	1
[REDACTED]	FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024	1	1
[REDACTED]	FY 2022 FY 2023 FY 2024	1	1
[REDACTED]	FY 2023 FY 2024	1	1
Total	11	4	4 (CUI)

\*(U) DSCA officials’ list of security cooperation programs and activities within the initiatives, as of October 2023.

(U) Source: DoD OIG analysis of DSCA response of programs and activities within the initiatives and evidence of assessments.

(CUI) For example, for the [REDACTED] SSCI, USINDOPACOM officials completed a pre-design assessment for the one program associated with the FY 2023 initiative; however, they did not complete assessments for all the programs associated with the FY 2022 and FY 2024 initiatives. For the FY 2022 initiative, pre-design assessment documentation did not exist for one program [REDACTED] out of seven within the initiative. Similarly, for the FY 2024 initiative, pre-design assessment documentation did not exist for two programs [REDACTED] out of four within the initiative.

**(U) USINDOPACOM Officials Did Not Perform or Fully Document Monitoring for Security Cooperation**

(U) USINDOPACOM officials did not perform or fully document monitoring of security cooperation initiatives in accordance with DoDI 5132.14 in all 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed. Specifically, we determined that USINDOPACOM officials did not always document a logic framework, performance indicators, or data

(U) collection methodologies in all 11 annual SSCI records. We could not determine whether USINDOPACOM officials met performance indicators in the seven annual SSCI records applicable for FY 2022 and FY 2023 because officials did not collect the necessary data.<sup>18</sup>

(U) DoDI 5132.14 describes comprehensive performance management, including a logic framework, indicators and milestones, and guidance to relevant stakeholders regarding expectations, roles, data collection details, how results will be used and communicated, and recommendations on when to evaluate the program. DoDI 5132.14 also describes monitoring of outputs and outcomes of security cooperation initiatives. Specifically, DoDI 5132.14 assigns the geographic combatant commanders the responsibility of identifying SSCIs for AM&E and ensuring that monitoring is undertaken.

(U) As previously mentioned, while the OUSD(P) implemented a phased-in approach for performance monitoring, we could not validate the subsequent phased-in requirements of the USINDOPACOM SSCIs selected and therefore, reviewed the annual SSCI records for performance monitoring based on the requirements in DoDI 5132.14.

### ***(U) Logic Framework, Performance Indicators, or Data Collection Methods Not Fully Documented***

(U) USINDOPACOM officials did not fully document a logic framework, performance indicators, or data collection methodologies in accordance with DoDI 5132.14 in all 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.

(U) As part of comprehensive performance management, DoDI 5132.14 describes logic framework as visually describing activities and the planned process of contributing to initiative goals and achieving objectives. Additionally, DoDI 5132.14 describes indicators and milestones, ideally with baselines and targets, being tied to SMART objectives that quantitatively or qualitatively measure the outputs and outcomes of the security cooperation initiative. Furthermore, the performance monitoring guidebook describes how security cooperation managers should plan in 5-year time horizons and regularly collect data, at least annually, to allow for target adjustment and course correction in real time.<sup>19</sup> This guidance also explains that monitoring plans should document all indicators, including baselines and targets for each indicator, and data collection methodology and frequency at practical and useful intervals, at least annually.

<sup>18</sup> (U) Performance monitoring for FY 2024 was not applicable because the fiscal year was ongoing, and execution data were not yet available.

<sup>19</sup> (U) "DoD Standards and Guidelines for Security Cooperation Performance Monitoring," released in summer 2020. Because the guidance did not contain a date, DoD officials provided release date information.

(U) For FY 2022 through FY 2024, USINDOPACOM officials fully documented the logic framework in 6 of 11 annual SSCI records through an objective tree, 5-year plan, or performance monitoring plan (PMP).<sup>20</sup> However, USINDOPACOM officials only partially documented certain aspects of the logic framework in the remaining 5 of 11 annual SSCI records through an objective tree, 5-year plan, or PMP.<sup>21</sup> Table 4 shows how the logic framework was documented for the 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.

(U) Table 4. Logic Framework Documented for 11 Annual SSCI Records

(CUI) SSCI	Fully Documented	Partially Documented	Not Documented
[REDACTED]	FY 2023 FY 2024	FY 2022	
[REDACTED]	FY 2024	FY 2022 FY 2023	
[REDACTED]	FY 2023 FY 2024	FY 2022	
[REDACTED]	FY 2024	FY 2023	
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b> (CUI)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) For FY 2022 through FY 2024, USINDOPACOM officials did not document that performance indicators included measurable outputs in 4 of 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed. Additionally, USINDOPACOM officials only partially documented that performance indicators included measurable outputs in the remaining 7 of 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.<sup>22</sup> Table 5 shows whether performance indicators included measurable outputs for the 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.

<sup>20</sup> (U) We determined the logic framework to be fully documented if the programs and activities were shown on an objective tree or PMP that included details on the planned process of contributing to initiative goals and achieving objectives. For example, the objective tree or PMP detailed the objective, activities, strategic effects, long-term outcomes, short-term outcomes, and the outputs.

<sup>21</sup> (U) We determined the logic framework to be partially documented if the objective, activities, strategic effects, long-term and short-term outcomes, and the outputs were not on an objective tree or PMP but included certain aspects on a 5-year plan or PMP. For example, 5-year plans listed programs and activities but did not always define all activities, strategic effects, outcomes, or outputs contributing to initiative goals and achieving objectives.

<sup>22</sup> (U) We determined performance indicators to be partially documented if PMPs included only certain aspects of baseline data and targets to determine whether performance indicators were met. For example, PMPs defined indicators as a rubric, percent completion, or yes/no; and while the quantitative targets for the SSCI outcomes and outputs were provided, the baselines, targets, or both were not always filled in for all data collections.

(U) Table 5. Performance Indicators Documented for 11 Annual SSCI Records

(CUI) SSCI	Fully Documented	Partially Documented	Not Documented
[REDACTED]		FY 2023 FY 2024	FY 2022
[REDACTED]		FY 2023 FY 2024	FY 2022
[REDACTED]		FY 2023 FY 2024	FY 2022
[REDACTED]		FY 2024	FY 2023
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b> (CUI)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) For FY 2022 through FY 2024, USINDOPACOM officials fully documented data collection methods, responsibilities, and frequencies in 5 of 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.<sup>23</sup> However, USINDOPACOM officials did not document data collection methods, responsibilities, or frequencies in 5 of 11 annual SSCI records. Additionally, USINDOPACOM officials only partially documented data collection methods, responsibilities, and frequencies in the remaining 1 of 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.<sup>24</sup> Table 6 shows the data collection methods, responsibilities, and frequencies documented for the 11 annual SSCI records we reviewed.

<sup>23</sup> (U) We determined data collection methods to be fully documented if the PMP included data collection methodologies and frequencies. For example, USINDOPACOM officials detailed specific data collection intervals, data source, and collection points of contact for each indicator on the FY 2023 and FY 2024 PMPs.

<sup>24</sup> (U) We determined data collection methods to be partially documented if the PMP included only some baseline data and targets but left some items as “to be determined” if performance indicators were met.

(U) Table 6. Data Collection Methods, Responsibilities, and Frequencies Documented for 11 Annual SSCI Records

<del>(CUI)</del>	SSCI	Fully Documented	Partially Documented	Not Documented
		FY 2023 FY 2024		FY 2022
		FY 2024		FY 2022 FY 2023
		FY 2023 FY 2024		FY 2022
			FY 2024	FY 2023
Total		5	1	5 <del>(CUI)</del>

(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

***(U) Data for Performance Indicators Not Collected and Documented***

(U) We could not determine whether USINDOPACOM officials met performance indicators in accordance with DoDI 5132.14 in the seven annual SSCI records for FY 2022 and FY 2023 because officials did not collect related data.<sup>25</sup>

(U) According to DoDI 5132.14, geographic combatant commanders are responsible for monitoring SSCIs. The DoDI describes how data collected for each indicator should be organized systematically to facilitate analysis and track trends to support program management decisions. DoDI 5132.14 also states that data should be reported at planned intervals and that data “may be modified to reflect the situation on the ground.”

~~(CUI)~~ Under the OUSD(P) phased-in approach for monitoring, annual SSCI guidance required PMPs and annual monitoring reports (AMRs) for select SSCIs. The DSCA provided us with a list of SSCIs that USINDOPACOM initially selected for FY 2022 and FY 2023.<sup>26</sup> However, a former USINDOPACOM official changed the five selected SSCIs for FY 2023, and USINDOPACOM provided AMRs for different SSCIs, two of

<sup>25</sup> (U) Performance monitoring for FY 2024 was not applicable because the fiscal year was ongoing and would not have data available yet.

<sup>26</sup> ~~(CUI)~~ USINDOPACOM selected ~~(CUI)~~ as the SSCIs for the two pilot monitoring plans for FY 2022. Additionally, USINDOPACOM initially selected the following five FY 2023 SSCIs: ~~(CUI)~~

(CUI) which—the [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]—were part of our review.<sup>27</sup> These AMRs contained some information, including progress toward objective achievement, PMP changes, lessons learned, and barriers to success. However, USINDOPACOM officials did not document actual monitoring data for indicators from the PMPs.

## **(U) DoD Officials Did Not Provide Complete Guidance or Oversight, and Additional Challenges Complicated AM&E Implementation**

(U) OUSD(P) officials did not provide complete implementing guidance with clear procedures and templates for assessing and monitoring security cooperation initiatives. In addition, the OUSD(P) and DSCA did not provide adequate oversight of USINDOPACOM officials' submission of assessment and monitoring products. Furthermore, ODASD(GP), DSCA, and USINDOPACOM attributed the lack of an effective AM&E program to:

- (U) data management issues, including the absence of an information technology system, and
- (U) the number of security cooperation stakeholders, including challenges staffing an AM&E workforce and tailoring a program throughout all levels of the DoD.

(U) Finally, we determined that USINDOPACOM officials did not establish stakeholder roles and responsibilities for AM&E requirements, such as identifying who is responsible for data collection support from security cooperation organizations of U.S. embassies.

## ***(U) Implementing Guidance Is Needed with Clear Procedures and Templates for Assessments and Monitoring***

(U) OUSD(P) officials did not provide complete implementing guidance with clear procedures and templates for assessing and monitoring security cooperation initiatives. According to DoDI 5132.14, the OUSD(P) is responsible for developing policies and processes to standardize DoD security cooperation AM&E efforts and for providing DoD-wide guidance and templates. The OUSD(P) developed six DoD AM&E guidebooks and provided annual guidance for SSCI submissions. However, this implementing guidance did not clearly establish procedures for initial assessments and performance monitoring, which confused stakeholders on submission requirements.

<sup>27</sup> (CUI) A former USINDOPACOM J-55 official identified five different FY 2023 SSCIs: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

(U) Specifically, the annual guidance for SSCIs did not mention any assessments required for SSCI submissions. For example, the guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs included an attachment on “AM&E requirements,” but mentioned only the phased-in monitoring requirements for PMPs and AMRs. Furthermore, while the performance monitoring guidebook includes a PMP template and AMR template for DoD-wide use, the ODASD(GP) did not develop an initial assessment template.

(U) In addition, we found that the annual guidance for SSCIs contained unclear phased-in requirements for PMPs and AMRs, which DoD officials sometimes changed after publication. For example, the guidance for FY 2023 SSCIs included requirements that USINDOPACOM should submit complete PMPs for “proposed two-year approved SSCIs” in the FY 2023 cycle. However, when we asked for clarification, DoD officials responded that the concept of “proposed two-year approved SSCIs” was never implemented. Instead, DoD officials described that the OUSD(P) revised the requirement for USINDOPACOM to provide PMPs for the two SSCIs in the pilot program and an additional five SSCIs. Furthermore, the guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs included requirements that GCCs submit AMRs for the “FY 2021/FY 2022 SSCI monitoring pilots” and the “approved FY 2023 SSCIs submitted with full PMPs.” However, we found that a former USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55) official changed the FY 2023 SSCIs that USINDOPACOM initially selected to fulfill this requirement. Due to staff turnover, we could not determine why the former USINDOPACOM J-55 official selected five different SSCIs for monitoring. This change may have created confusion because USINDOPACOM did not complete AMRs for the five initially selected FY 2023 SSCIs and instead completed AMRs for the five FY 2023 SSCIs selected by the former USINDOPACOM J-55 official.

(U) In March 2024, when we discussed our concerns with ODASD(GP) and DSCA officials, ODASD(GP) officials explained that to develop the annual SSCI guidance and templates, they relied on AM&E conferences and the AM&E Working Group to identify best practices from the GCCs. Furthermore, ODASD(GP) officials stated that a strong demand from the GCCs in 2023 initiated coordination between the ODASD(GP) and DSCA to update AM&E templates and requirements to reduce redundancy in data collection and analysis by standardizing products.

(U) On April 10, 2024, the OUSD(P) formally tasked the GCCs with the FY 2026 SSCI process guidance and AM&E requirements. The guidance included:

- (U) an initial assessment template;
- (U) a revised PMP template, noted to be more robust and aligned with interagency best practices; and

- (U) a revised AMR template, renamed the “performance monitoring report” and noted to require responses based on indicator analysis from the PMP.

(U) Furthermore, the FY 2026 AM&E requirements for the GCCs included initial assessments for new-start SSCIs, objective trees for all SSCIs, performance monitoring reports for continuing SSCIs, and PMPs for all approved and funded FY 2026 SSCIs. Because the FY 2026 SSCI process guidance and AM&E requirements addressed the issues with implementing guidance and templates, we are not making a related recommendation.

### ***(U) Additional Oversight Is Needed for AM&E Product Submissions***

(U) The OUSD(P) and DSCA did not provide adequate oversight of USINDOPACOM’s submission of assessment and monitoring products. Specifically, DoD officials did not use the feasibility review and technical feedback processes to verify that USINDOPACOM completed effective assessment and monitoring products according to AM&E requirements.

(U) For our analysis of oversight actions for the FY 2022 through FY 2024 SSCI planning cycles, we found that the OUSD(P) and DSCA annually revised the criteria and processes for reviews of product submissions. Specifically, the guidance for FY 2022 SSCIs and the guidance for FY 2023 SSCIs referred to SSCI evaluation criteria and scoring. The criteria for feasibility consisted of various questions aligned to SMART principles for scoring the SSCI. While none of these questions explicitly mentioned AM&E requirements, some referred to the AM&E concepts. For example, for FY 2023 SSCIs, one question asked whether variables had been identified that could be measured to establish a baseline.

(U) The guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs introduced a new review process and explained that the ODASD(GP) and DSCA would co-lead SSCI design and feasibility reviews to ensure that GCCs met AM&E quality standards and other criteria. The guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs provided criteria for the review, which included questions aligned under three levels: (1) no risk acceptable, (2) moderate risk acceptable, and (3) low risk. For example, the “no risk acceptable” criteria contained questions related to AM&E, including one question on whether the SSCI had been informed by assessment and monitoring data.

(U) While the guidance revisions improved the incorporation of AM&E criteria into feasibility reviews, we found inconsistencies with the documented review results and determined that ODASD(GP) and DSCA officials did not ensure that USINDOPACOM corrected identified AM&E concerns. The following bullets highlight some of the inconsistencies we found.

- ~~(CUI)~~ For the [REDACTED] SSCI, DoD officials scored the FY 2022 SSCI a 10 out of 10 and the FY 2023 SSCI a 0 out of 10, in the measurable category related to AM&E, and then rated the FY 2024 SSCI as having significant design flaws or feasibility concerns that must be addressed in the AM&E category. Furthermore, the DSCA reviewer comments in the FY 2024 review stated, “It is unclear what assessment and monitoring data was used to inform the SSCI design.”
- ~~(CUI)~~ For the [REDACTED] SSCI, DoD officials scored the FY 2022 SSCI a 10 out of 10 and the FY 2023 SSCI a 6 out of 10, in the measurable category related to AM&E, and then rated the FY 2024 SSCI as ready to move forward despite having a comment of “it is unclear what AM&E products and/or assessment and monitoring data was used to inform the needs/capabilities assessment and the analysis of absorptive capacity.”

(U) Based on the audit results presented previously in this report on the lack of initial assessments and performance monitoring, the feasibility reviews for all 3 years for these SSCIs should have identified AM&E concerns. Furthermore, ODASD(GP) and DSCA officials could not provide evidence of corrective actions taken to address the identified AM&E concerns. DSCA officials explained that they provided feedback for FY 2024 SSCIs directly to the GCCs during video conferences and provided feedback to ODASD(GP) officials who monitored the SSCI documents for updates. ODASD(GP) officials explained that the FY 2024 SSCI planning cycle was the first occurrence of clearly incorporating AM&E issues into the feasibility reviews and the first time for their increased involvement with the process.

(U) We also found concerns in the guidance for FY 2025 SSCIs, in that it revised the feasibility review process to be required for only new SSCIs and continuing SSCIs with “execution challenges” in the previous fiscal year. When we asked for clarification of an execution challenge, DSCA officials defined it as a significant disruption to the normal process that may prevent the successful achievement of the SSCI, such as unexpected cost increases or a partner nation decision to change an agreement regarding delivery of training or equipment. Furthermore, DSCA officials stated that none of the four SSCIs selected for our review met the criteria for a FY 2025 feasibility review.

(U) Beyond feasibility reviews, the guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs explained that the ODASD(GP) and DSCA would provide continuous technical feedback to ensure that GCCs meet AM&E quality standards. However, when we discussed technical feedback with DoD officials in April 2024, an ODASD(GP) official described staffing issues that prevented individual technical feedback for the FY 2024 and FY 2025 SSCI submissions. Furthermore, DSCA officials identified that before 2023, biweekly meetings with USINDOPACOM SSCI stakeholders included slides with information on the status of AM&E products, but new DSCA leadership modified the slides to reduce information. In April 2024, DSCA officials described starting the process to re-create the original slides for the biweekly meetings.

(U) However, DSCA officials also emphasized that there is no process to force the production of AM&E products, and that SSCIs still get approved and funded in the resource allocation plan without the AM&E products. Furthermore, an ODASD(GP) official explained that despite feasibility review concerns, SSCIs may be approved due to congressional priority decisions. Therefore, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships (DASD[GP]), in coordination with the DSCA Director, should update the feasibility review and technical feedback process or develop a new oversight process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions, including tracking the corrective actions needed for concerns identified and documenting the reasons for approving SSCIs with outstanding concerns.

### ***(U) Data Management Issues and the Large Scope of DoD Security Cooperation Stakeholders Complicated AM&E Implementation***

(U) Furthermore, DoD officials attributed the lack of an effective AM&E program to data management issues, including the absence of an information technology system, the large scope of security cooperation stakeholders across a variety of entities, challenges staffing an AM&E workforce, and tailoring a program throughout all levels of the DoD. In addition, we determined that USINDOPACOM officials did not establish stakeholder roles and responsibilities for AM&E requirements, such as identifying who is responsible for data collection support from security cooperation organizations of U.S. embassies.

### ***(U) Data Management Issues Improved with Socium, but Important Functionality Is Still Under Development***

(U) An ODASD(GP) official explained that a challenge to their implementation of the AM&E program was the initial absence of an information technology system for AM&E. Furthermore, we found that even though the DSCA deployed the Socium system in FY 2020 and the guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs requires its use,

(U) key functionality was still under development during our review. According to DoDI 5132.14, the DSCA Director is responsible for developing and maintaining data management capabilities for AM&E, including collection, retention, and appropriate dissemination of products from all DoD Components.

(U) For our review of documents for FY 2022 through FY 2024 SSCIs, DSCA officials described inefficient methods to search for and obtain documentation. For example, these methods include searching a combination of files on multiple organizations' shared computer drives, SharePoint files, Intelink sites, and hard drives on individual laptop computers issued to government employees and contractors. DSCA officials acknowledged that the informal data management process would sometimes result in version control issues. We identified these issues with the documents in our review, including undated documents, documents marked "draft," and file names that did not match the internal data. Furthermore, we identified inconsistent naming conventions of the SSCIs and associated programs and activities from year to year of the initiative.

(U) The guidance for FY 2024 SSCIs was the first time that GCCs were required to put SSCI submissions and AM&E products into Socium. While GCCs used Socium software tools to build initiative design documents, also known as SSCI proposals, and objective trees, Socium functionality did not exist for PMPs and monitoring reports beyond uploading attachments. Furthermore, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials expressed concerns that Socium is a repository rather than a program management system and explained that staff find it overly burdensome to use. Specifically, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials noted difficulty revising SSCI objectives, finding prior information, and identifying what initiatives were funded.

(U) When we discussed these issues with ODASD(GP), DSCA, and USINDOPACOM officials, DSCA officials stated that Socium is the DoD-wide system of record for security cooperation and intended to collect documents from multiple organizations for security cooperation management. DSCA officials noted ongoing actions to update Socium functionality to collect additional metadata on files uploaded that would allow users to more easily filter through documents and more quickly conduct searches. Furthermore, ODASD(GP) officials explained that Socium should help standardize naming conventions and better track SSCIs. ODASD(GP) officials also explained that they are developing functionality for the PMP template as a Socium workflow to enable data entry and storage of collected data. In April 2024, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials explained that they were uploading all SSCI-related documents into Socium until data entry is available and engaging with the OUSD(P) to improve functionality from a GCC perspective. Therefore, the DSCA

(U) Director should further develop and implement data management capabilities within Socium for the clear identification of programs and activities associated with SSCIs, and for additional assessment and monitoring functions, including functionality for initial assessments, PMPs, and monitoring reports.

### ***(U) Large Scope of Stakeholders with Challenges Staffing an AM&E Workforce and Assigning Responsibilities***

(U) Additionally, ODASD(GP) and DSCA officials explained challenges to implementation of the AM&E program due to the distributed and disjointed nature of the DoD stakeholders, staffing an AM&E workforce, and assigning responsibilities with limited resources. ODASD(GP) officials described the challenge to tailor a program for stakeholders at all levels of the DoD. According to the report to Congress on the AM&E program for FY 2022, the AM&E community relies on staff across a variety of entities, with different objectives and missions for their use of AM&E.<sup>28</sup> The report explains that each entity plays a different role as well, including AM&E planning and data collection, AM&E contract management, and use of AM&E for decision making.

(U) When we asked about the phased-in approach for monitoring requirements, ODASD(GP) officials explained that this approach was necessary due to staffing concerns and the learning curve of all stakeholders. Specifically, DoD officials reported a lack of staffing required to perform SSCI and AM&E responsibilities at all levels, including security cooperation organizations of U.S. embassies, GCCs, the DSCA, and the ODASD(GP). According to DoDI 5132.14, the DSCA Director, in coordination with other appropriate DoD Components, is responsible for ensuring that resource allocations are sufficient to support a security cooperation workforce that is appropriately sized, properly assigned, and possesses the requisite skills and resources to implement the DoD's AM&E policy. Similarly, DoDI 5132.14 assigns geographic combatant commanders the responsibility to identify shortfalls in the size, preparation, training, and staffing of personnel assigned to the combatant command with AM&E responsibilities and to recommend mitigations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(U) An ODASD(GP) official explained that the OUSD(P) provides funding for AM&E contractors and the GCCs should direct the contractors on what support is needed. However, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials were not aware of contract performance requirements and did not use the contractor AM&E subject matter experts. For example, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials explained that initially they did not

<sup>28</sup> (U) "Report on Activities for FY 2022, AM&E Program in Support of the Security Cooperation Programs and Activities of the DoD," Report to Congress, Submitted pursuant to section 383, title 10, U.S.C.

(U) understand the contractor functions as enabling a USINDOPACOM process and instead understood them to support only DSCA processes. In addition, DoD officials explained that the previous USINDOPACOM, Cooperative Plans and Programs (J-552) Section Chief did not use the contractors or their products for SSCI planning and therefore moved them to a different section within the USINDOPACOM J-55. When we discussed the AM&E contractor performance requirements for USINDOPACOM with the DSCA contracting officer's representative, they explained that the performance work statement did not specify tasks and deliverables for any particular GCC and were based on a recommended labor category.<sup>29</sup>

(U) When we discussed these issues with DoD officials, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials explained that they were putting more effort into incorporating the AM&E contractors and syncing their products with what USINDOPACOM security cooperation planners need to make decisions. For example, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials described using the AM&E contractors to complete assessments for three planned FY 2025 SSCIs. In addition, DoD officials provided evidence that USINDOPACOM used the AM&E contractors to facilitate an initial assessment completed for an SSCI planned for FY 2026. Because these responses addressed the issues with USINDOPACOM J-55 officials' use of the contractor AM&E subject matter experts, we are not making a related recommendation.

(U) However, the lack of staffing required to perform AM&E responsibilities and unclear AM&E contract deliverables remains. Therefore, the Commander, USINDOPACOM, should require the Director, USINDOPACOM, Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), in coordination with the DSCA Director, to identify shortfalls in the staffing of personnel assigned to USINDOPACOM with security cooperation AM&E responsibilities, assess the feasibility of using contractor staff, and recommend mitigation in accordance with DoDI 5132.14. In addition, the Commander, USINDOPACOM, should require the Director, USINDOPACOM, Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), in coordination with the DSCA contracting officer's representative, to develop and document the AM&E contractor's deliverables for USINDOPACOM support.

~~(CUI)~~ In addition, we determined that USINDOPACOM officials did not establish security cooperation stakeholder roles and responsibilities for AM&E requirements, such as identifying who is responsible for data collection support. According to DoDI 5132.14, the geographic combatant commander is responsible for coordinating with subject matter experts and other appropriate participants,

<sup>29</sup> (U) In addition to supporting the GCCs, the AM&E contractor performance requirements include support services to the OUSD(P), DSCA, and other security cooperation stakeholders.

(~~CUI~~) and for directing the security cooperation organizations of U.S. embassies to support AM&E functions. Furthermore, DoDI 5132.14 assigns the geographic combatant commander the responsibility of ensuring that assessments and monitoring are undertaken for all SSCIs. However, USINDOPACOM did not develop a local implementing instruction to clearly assign roles and responsibilities. For example, the AMR for the FY 2022 [REDACTED] SSCI indicated the lack of assigned responsibilities resulted in limited involvement from stakeholders and data collection.

(U) Furthermore, in November 2023, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials held an SSCI session at the USINDOPACOM Capabilities Development Working Group with the goal of developing an informed process to incorporate into a USINDOPACOM instruction, including clear roles and responsibilities. As observed by the DoD OIG audit team at this SSCI session, USINDOPACOM security cooperation stakeholders expressed confusion over roles and responsibilities, including those for security cooperation organizations of U.S. embassies and participating military units. In April 2024, USINDOPACOM J-55 officials explained that they were still developing the USINDOPACOM instruction. Therefore, the Commander, USINDOPACOM, should require the Director, USINDOPACOM, Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5), to develop and implement instructions to establish the roles and responsibilities of USINDOPACOM security cooperation stakeholders for AM&E requirements, including security cooperation organization responsibilities.

## **(U) Without Assessments and Monitoring, the DoD Cannot Fully Evaluate Effectiveness of Building Partner Capacity**

(~~CUI~~) As a result of the failure to develop initial assessments, perform SSCI monitoring, and provide sufficient guidance or oversight, the DoD cannot fully evaluate the effectiveness of building partner capacity efforts within the USINDOPACOM AOR or identify lessons learned and best practices to inform future security cooperation efforts. Without monitoring quantitative and qualitative measures toward achieving stated objectives, the DoD cannot make evidence-based decisions to improve or eliminate ineffective security cooperation programs and activities. Consequently, the DoD risks not achieving U.S. global security objectives that rely on enhancing the capabilities and capacity of allies and partners. For example, an AMR for the FY 2022 [REDACTED] SSCI described instances where [REDACTED] Not having adequate monitoring data prohibits officials from determining whether performance indicators were met or from making effective decisions to improve future security cooperation efforts.

~~(U)~~ Documenting and monitoring the performance toward achieving the SSCI objectives can improve security cooperation efforts. For example, an AMR for the FY 2023 [REDACTED] SSCI analyzed the effect of [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

## **(U) Management Comments on the Finding and Our Response**

(U) The DASD(GP) provided the following comments on Finding A of the report. For the full text of all comments received, see the Management Comments section of the report.

### ***(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships Comments***

(U) The DASD(GP) disagreed with the Finding, stating that the ODASD(GP) worked closely with the combatant commands to support the implementation of SSCI PMPs in accordance with DoDI 5132.14. The DASD(GP) stated that the ODASD(GP) led an incremental approach to developing SSCI monitoring requirements, given their novelty and the ongoing development of AM&E technical capacity within the combatant commands. The DASD(GP) stated that the incremental approach comprised annual SSCI guidance, technical assistance from AM&E contractors, and AM&E resources, including guidebooks and a global AM&E working group.

(U) In addition, the DASD(GP) requested to provide factual clarifications and stated that the ODASD(GP) maintained records verifying completion of AM&E product submission since FY 2020. The DASD(GP) stated that combatant commands have been formally provided mandatory requirements, templates, and submission dates in the SSCI annual guidance since FY 2022. The DASD(GP) also stated that annual SSCI process updates led to the combatant commands absorbing AM&E, and review process updates resulted in the feasibility review, which is co-led by the ODASD(GP) and DSCA. The DASD(GP) stated that the feasibility reviews are scheduled with combatant commands, implementing agencies, and interagency counterparts to strengthen programs, validate rough order of magnitude estimates,

(U) review AM&E quality standards, and address other design concerns. The DASD(GP) also stated that the combatant commands are provided technical feedback for improving their AM&E products, and that despite outstanding concerns, some SSCIs are approved due to DoD priorities and congressional special interest items.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) We disagree with DASD(GP)'s comments that our report contains factual inaccuracies. We acknowledge the ODASD(GP)'s efforts toward developing AM&E guidance and oversight of SSCI requirements; however, in Finding A we explained how guidance and oversight could be more effective to improve assessments and monitoring. In addition, we acknowledge the incremental approach stated by the DASD(GP). However, in the Finding we explained that ODASD(GP) officials clarified that initial assessments were always required in accordance with DoDI 5132.14, published in 2017, but performance monitoring had a phased-in approach. We discussed the unclear phased-in monitoring requirements and USINDOPACOM changes to SSCIs selected for monitoring. In addition, we explained how the annual SSCI guidance did not mention any assessments required for SSCI submissions and did not contain an initial assessment template until the FY 2026 SSCI guidance. Regarding technical assistance, we stated that USINDOPACOM J-55 officials explained that they did not understand the contractor functions as enabling a USINDOPACOM process and did not use the AM&E contractors. Furthermore, we stated that we found inconsistencies with feasibility review results and determined that ODASD(GP) and DSCA officials did not ensure that USINDOPACOM corrected identified AM&E concerns. We also stated that an ODASD(GP) official described staffing issues that prevented technical feedback for the FY 2024 and FY 2025 SSCI submissions. Therefore, as noted in the Finding, although DoD officials implemented an incremental approach to SSCI monitoring, additional work is needed to improve AM&E product submissions.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### **(U) Recommendation A.1**

**(U) We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, update the feasibility review and technical feedback process or develop a new oversight process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions, including tracking the corrective actions needed for concerns identified and documenting the reasons for approving significant security cooperation initiatives with outstanding concerns.**

### ***(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships Comments***

(U) The DASD(GP) agreed with the recommendation, stating that to ensure oversight, the FY 2025 and FY 2026 SSCI annual guidance mandates strategic and feasibility reviews, allowing the opportunity for combatant commands' offices of primary responsibility to collaborate with the ODASD(GP), DSCA, OUSD(P) country desk office, USINDOPACOM J-5, and Department of State to better align SSCIs with U.S. strategy and address execution challenges. The DASD(GP) also stated that the ODASD(GP) implemented formal deadlines by which the DSCA's final feasibility determinations are provided, and GCCs have updated Socium based on strategic and feasibility review feedback. Additionally, the DASD(GP) stated that for the FY 2027 annual guidance, the DASD(GP) proposed that the OUSD(P) mandate that all required planning documents, including AM&E products, be submitted by the established deadline or the applicable SSCI will not be considered for approval or continuation. The DASD(GP) anticipates completion of this effort by November 2025.

### ***(U) Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Comments***

(U) The DSCA Director agreed with the recommendation, stating that during the FY 2025 and FY 2026 SSCI feasibility reviews, the DSCA and ODASD(GP) used a new feasibility review finding sheet to capture all feedback from the reviewers. These finding sheets were shared with stakeholders on the DSCA SharePoint site. Additionally, the DSCA has been working with USINDOPACOM J-5, offices of primary responsibility, and offices of coordinating responsibility during the FY 2027 SSCI

(U) planning cycle to add unit-level assessments to baseline partner nation capabilities before initiating programs. The DSCA is also implementing oversight processes using Socium to verify completion of all requirements and allowing reviewers the ability to address missing AM&E products. The DSCA anticipates completion of this effort by July 2025.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DASD(GP) and the DSCA Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the DASD(GP) provides support documenting the process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions, including tracking the corrective actions needed for concerns identified and documenting the reasons for approving SSCIs with outstanding concerns, such as the feasibility review finding sheet, described in the DSCA Director's comments.

### ***(U) Recommendation A.2***

**(U) We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency further develop and implement data management capabilities within Socium for the clear identification of programs and activities associated with significant security cooperation initiatives, and for additional assessment and monitoring functions, including functionality for initial assessments, performance monitoring plans, and monitoring reports.**

### ***(U) Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Comments***

(U) The DSCA Director agreed with the recommendation, stating that they are developing Socium with more data management capabilities to identify SSCI programs and activities. The Director stated that existing building partner capacity programs, which were activities, will be migrated and displayed in the program list, and the training and equipment list functionality will be associated only for programs in Socium. Additionally, the Director stated that the PMP will also be launched in Socium and combined with the objective tree tool, which will enable security cooperation stakeholders to effectively measure progress toward security cooperation program objectives. Subject to the availability of funding and prioritization with the OUSD(P), the DSCA anticipates completion of this release in Socium by June 2025.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DSCA Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the DSCA implemented data management capabilities within Socium to clearly identify programs and activities associated with SSCIs, and for additional assessment and monitoring functions, including functionality for initial assessments, PMPs, and monitoring reports within Socium.

### ***(U) Recommendation A.3***

**(U) We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, should require the Director, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5):**

- a. **(U) In coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, identify shortfalls in the staffing of personnel assigned to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command with security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation responsibilities, assess the feasibility of using contractor staff, and recommend mitigation in accordance with DoD Instruction 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise," January 13, 2017.**

### ***(U) Chief, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Security Cooperation Division (J-55) Comments***

(U) The Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55), responding for the USINDOPACOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, stating that while USINDOPACOM previously faced staffing challenges, the situation is now resolved, and the J-55 is well staffed and fully resourced.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55) addressed the specifics of the recommendation. In May 2025, J-55 officials provided an updated organizational chart and information supporting an increase in J-55 staffing through the use of contractors. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

- b. (U) In coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency contracting officer's representative, develop and document the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation contractor's deliverables for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command support.

***(U) Chief, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Security Cooperation Division (J-55) Comments***

(U) The Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55), responding for the USINDOPACOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, stating that USINDOPACOM's AM&E team developed and implemented a comprehensive tracking system for all required AM&E deliverables to the command based on the performance work statement.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55) addressed the specifics of the recommendation. In May 2025, J-55 officials provided the performance work statement and J-55 tracker document supporting the identification of contractor's deliverables for USINDOPACOM support. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

- c. (U) Develop and implement instructions to establish the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command security cooperation stakeholders for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirements, including security cooperation organization responsibilities.

***(U) Chief, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Security Cooperation Division (J-55) Comments***

(U) The Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55), responding for the USINDOPACOM Commander, agreed with the recommendation, stating that USINDOPACOM's J-55 is developing an instruction to streamline the SSCI process. The instruction will include guidance on AM&E and clarify roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders, including security cooperation organizations. USINDOPACOM anticipates completion of this effort by October 2025.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Chief, USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division (J-55) addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that USINDOPACOM implemented instructions establishing the AM&E roles and responsibilities, including security cooperation organization responsibilities.

## (U) Finding B

### (U) The DoD Generally Complied with Congressional Reporting Requirements for the USINDOPACOM AOR

(U) The DoD generally complied with requirements to notify Congress of building partner capacity efforts from FY 2022 through FY 2024 for the four SSCIs we reviewed. However, the DoD did not issue required annual congressional monitoring reports in a timely manner. Specifically, the DoD did not issue the:

- (U) FY 2023 § 332 annual report due on February 1, 2024, until July 25, 2024;
- (U) CY 2022 § 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI annual report due on March 1, 2023, until March 22, 2024; and
- (U) FY 2021 and FY 2022 § 386 annual reports due on January 31 of 2022 and 2023, respectively, until November 15, 2024.

(U) In addition, as of December 6, 2024, the DoD had not issued the CY 2023 § 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI annual report due on March 1, 2024, or the FY 2023 § 386 annual report due on March 31, 2024.

(U) The untimely reporting occurred because DoD officials did not have the information systems or processes in place to ensure compliance with reporting requirements. As a result, Congress may not have all the information it needs to make programmatic decisions. Without timely, relevant, and accurate information, Congress cannot fully evaluate the effectiveness of building partner capacity efforts within the USINDOPACOM AOR and make evidence-based decisions to improve or eliminate ineffective security cooperation.

### (U) The DoD Complied with Congressional Notification Requirements

(U) For the four SSCIs we reviewed for FY 2022 through FY 2024, the DoD complied with congressional notification requirements for building partner capacity. We found that the security cooperation programs and activities were included within the congressional notifications and that the notifications contained the required elements required by 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333, 383, and 386, such as a description of how the assignment serves the national security interests of the United States, the purpose of the capacity-building support, and the estimated cost.

(U) Title 10 of the U.S.C. contains multiple requirements for congressional notifications of security cooperation programs and activities. According to 10 U.S.C. § 332, the DoD is required to notify Congress before assigning an advisor to a regional security organization. These congressional notifications require detailed information, such as a description of how the advisor assignment serves the national security interests of the United States or the purpose of the capacity-building support with estimated cost. According to 10 U.S.C. § 333 and the Statutory Note for the Indo-Pacific MSI, the DoD is required to notify Congress before initiating capacity-building activities.

(~~CUI~~) Within the 4 SSCIs we reviewed from FY 2022 through FY 2024, there were ■ associated security cooperation programs and activities. As of July 2024, DSCA officials identified ■ security cooperation programs and activities that required congressional notification, with the remaining ■ pending congressional notification during the ongoing fiscal year.

(~~CUI~~) We reviewed the congressional notifications submitted by the DSCA for FY 2022 through FY 2024 and found that the ■ security cooperation programs and activities included in the SSCIs we selected were included in the notifications to Congress. The notifications for these programs and activities were submitted to Congress under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333 and the 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI, which each have various requirements for the congressional notifications made under the respective sections. Of the notifications submitted to Congress for the ■ security cooperation programs and activities:

- (~~CUI~~) ■ congressional notifications were submitted to Congress under 10 U.S.C. § 332;
- (~~CUI~~) ■ congressional notifications were submitted to Congress under 10 U.S.C. § 333; and
- (~~CUI~~) ■ congressional notifications were submitted to Congress under 10 U.S.C. § 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI.<sup>30</sup>

(~~CUI~~) Appendix B details the congressional notifications of the programs and activities included in the 4 SSCIs we reviewed for FY 2022 through FY 2024, including the ■ notifications already submitted to Congress and the ■ notifications that were pending submission. We found that the congressional notifications for the ■ security cooperation programs and activities contained the required elements in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333, and the 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI. For example, for programs we reviewed under

<sup>30</sup> (~~CUI~~) ■ was submitted to Congress under both 10 U.S.C. § 332 and 10 U.S.C. § 333.

~~(CUI)~~ 10 U.S.C. § 333, notification elements consisted of the specific unit, amount, type, purpose, capacity for absorption, implementation timeline, and arrangement for sustainment. Table 7 shows an example of our review of a congressional notification for the [REDACTED] program under 10 U.S.C. § 333.

*(U) Table 7. Congressional Notification Review Example*

<del>(CUI)</del> Required Notification Element	[REDACTED]
Specific Units	[REDACTED]
Amount (in millions)	[REDACTED]
Type	[REDACTED]
Purpose	[REDACTED]
Capacity for Absorption	[REDACTED]
Implementation Timeline	[REDACTED]
Arrangement for Sustainment	[REDACTED]

(CUI)

~~(CUI)~~ Source: DoD OIG analysis of congressional notifications of [REDACTED]

**(U) The DoD Did Not Always Issue Congressional Monitoring Reports in a Timely Manner**

(U) The DoD did not always issue the annual congressional monitoring reports required under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, the 333 Statutory Note - Indo-Pacific MSI, and 386 in a timely manner. Specifically, the DoD did not issue the:

- (U) FY 2023 § 332 annual report due on February 1, 2024, until July 25, 2024;
- (U) CY 2022 § 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI annual report due on March 1, 2023, until March 22, 2024; and
- (U) FY 2021 and FY 2022 § 386 annual reports due on January 31 of 2022 and 2023, respectively, until November 15, 2024.

(U) In addition, as of December 6, 2024, the DoD had not issued the CY 2023 § 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI annual report due on March 1, 2024, or the FY 2023 § 386 annual report due on March 31, 2024.

### ***(U) Sections 333 and 383, Title 10, U.S.C. Reports Met Content Requirements***

(U) Section 333, title 10, U.S.C., requires the DSCA to submit a report to Congress that includes information by recipient country showing delivery and execution status, timeliness of delivery, and the status of funds for each program.<sup>31</sup> We found that the quarterly congressional monitoring reports for FY 2022 and the semiannual congressional monitoring reports for FY 2023 met these requirements.<sup>32</sup>

(U) According to 10 U.S.C. § 383, the DoD is required to submit a report to Congress each year on the AM&E program during the previous year. Each report is required to include a description of the activities under the program and an evaluation of the lessons learned and best practices identified through activities under the program. We found that the annual congressional monitoring reports issued under 10 U.S.C. § 383 during our review period met these requirements.

### ***(U) Section 332, Title 10, U.S.C. Reports Were Not Always Timely***

(U) The DoD did not issue the FY 2023 annual congressional monitoring report under 10 U.S.C. § 332 that was due on February 1, 2024, until July 25, 2024. Section 332, title 10, U.S.C., requires the DoD to submit to Congress a report including a list of programs and activities under 10 U.S.C. § 332, the receiving organization, the number of trainers or advisors, the duration, a description of activities, the cost, and a comprehensive justification of the activities conducted.

(U) The requirements at 10 U.S.C. were updated during our review period. Before the updated 10 U.S.C. § 332 regulations effective January 5, 2023, which required an annual congressional monitoring report on section 332, the DoD was required to submit the report during each fiscal quarter for 10 U.S.C. § 332 activities conducted during the previous fiscal quarter. There was no specific due date for these quarterly reports. Effective January 5, 2023, the DoD is required to submit the report annually no later than February 1 of each year, for 10 U.S.C. § 332 activities conducted during the preceding fiscal year.

<sup>31</sup> (U) Section 333, title 10, U.S.C., specifies that the status of funds should include amounts of unobligated funds, unliquidated obligations, and disbursements.

<sup>32</sup> (U) Before the updated regulations effective January 5, 2023, for the DSCA to issue these reports semiannually, the DSCA was required to submit the section 333 report to Congress quarterly.

~~(CUI)~~ We reviewed the [REDACTED] quarterly congressional monitoring reports for 10 U.S.C. § 332 for FY 2022 and found that the reports met the requirements. However, the annual congressional monitoring report to Congress covering 10 U.S.C. § 332 activities conducted during FY 2023, due on February 1, 2024, was not submitted until July 25, 2024.

***(U) Section 333, Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI, Title 10, U.S.C. Reports Were Not Always Timely***

(U) As of December 6, 2024, the DoD had not issued the CY 2023 Indo-Pacific MSI annual congressional monitoring report due on March 1, 2024. Section 333, Statutory Note - Indo-Pacific MSI, title 10, U.S.C., requires the DoD to submit to Congress annually by March 1, a report including an assessment by recipient foreign country for the preceding calendar year, of the country's capabilities, the priorities' relationship to the overall theater strategy and country plan, and of how capabilities can be leveraged to improve MARSEC. We found that as of December 6, 2024, the DoD had not submitted the CY 2023 Indo-Pacific MSI annual congressional monitoring report due on March 1, 2024. In addition, the DoD did not issue the CY 2022 Indo-Pacific MSI annual congressional monitoring report in a timely manner. The report was due to Congress by March 1, 2023; however, the DoD did not issue the report until March 22, 2024. Therefore, the DASD(GP) should issue the CY 2023 Indo-Pacific MSI annual congressional monitoring report as required.

***(U) Section 386, Title 10, U.S.C. Reports Were Not Timely***

(U) The DoD did not issue the FY 2021 and FY 2022 annual 10 U.S.C. § 386 congressional monitoring reports due on January 31 of each year, until November 15, 2024. In addition, as of December 6, 2024, the DoD had not issued the FY 2023 § 386 annual report due on March 31, 2024. Before the updated regulations effective January 5, 2023, the DoD was required to submit to Congress by January 31 of each year beginning in 2018, a 10 U.S.C. § 386 report on a country-by-country basis, of activities conducted during the prior fiscal year. The 10 U.S.C. § 386 report was required to include a description of the purpose, duration, and type of assistance provided, the cost and expenditure of the assistance, a description of the metrics used for assessing the effectiveness of the assistance, a description of the participation by the foreign country, the number of members of the U.S. Armed Forces involved in providing the assistance, and a summary of the activities carried out under each authority.

(U) Effective January 5, 2023, the DoD is required to submit to Congress by March 31 of each year, a 10 U.S.C. § 386 report of an overview of security cooperation activities carried out by the DoD during the fiscal year in which the report is submitted. The updated requirements include specific requirements for the 10 U.S.C. § 386 report that vary depending on the type of assistance provided. However, in general, the 10 U.S.C. § 386 report is required to include:

- (U) a brief overview of the primary security cooperation objectives for the activities encompassed by the report, and
- (U) a description of how such activities advance the theater security cooperation strategy of the relevant GCC.

(U) The DoD did not timely issue any 10 U.S.C. § 386 annual congressional monitoring reports for the period included in our review. Specifically, the DoD did not issue the FY 2021 and FY 2022 annual 10 U.S.C. § 386 congressional monitoring reports due on January 31 of each year, until November 15, 2024. In addition, as of December 6, 2024, the DoD had not issued the FY 2023 § 386 annual report due on March 31, 2024, in accordance with the updated requirement. According to DoD officials, the DoD was building the 10 U.S.C. § 386 reports for FY 2020 through FY 2023 concurrently and was planning to issue the reports incrementally during CY 2024. While the DoD eventually issued the FY 2021 and FY 2022 reports on November 15, 2024, DoD officials stated that as of December 6, 2024, the FY 2023 report was estimated to be issued to Congress by March 31, 2025. Therefore, the DSCA should issue the FY 2023 10 U.S.C. § 386 annual congressional monitoring report as required.

## **(U) Systems and Processes Were Not in Place**

(U) The congressional monitoring reports were not submitted or submitted late because DoD officials did not have the systems or processes in place to ensure compliance with requirements. While the DoD's process varies by the type of report, the processes in place to complete the congressional monitoring reports involve manual processes, data availability inconsistent with reporting requirements, and reconciliation of data among multiple entities and systems.

## **(U) Reports Are Completed Using Manual Processes**

(U) The DSCA processes for compiling the 10 U.S.C. § 386 annual congressional monitoring reports include manual processes using different data sets from multiple entities. DoD officials explained that to compile the 10 U.S.C. § 386 report, which is more than 557 pages long for FY 2021 and 605 pages for FY 2022 reports, the DSCA must collect data from multiple entities. Depending on the entity, the submitted data could come from a system, or the data could be provided

(U) on a spreadsheet. For example, DoD officials explained that the regional center data may come from the Overseas Humanitarian Assistance Shared Information System while the Inter-American and Inter-European academies submit data using a DSCA-provided spreadsheet. The data from the various entities are compiled into the 10 U.S.C. § 386 report manually. DoD officials explained that the first report using this process took the longest, but each subsequent report has become faster to compile.

(U) DoD officials explained that no one system collects the required data for the 10 U.S.C. § 386 annual congressional monitoring report but noted that Socium could in the future be capable of capturing the required data to help automate the reporting processes. In addition to reducing the burden manually compiling the report, having a system capture data would also reduce the risk associated with manually entering data into spreadsheets or into the report itself.

(U) The requirement to produce the 10 U.S.C. § 386 congressional monitoring report started with the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act and included general requirements for all types of security assistance covered in the report. DoD officials explained that these general requirements resulted in a report that presented data only in broad terms, lacked meaningful data, and became increasing late over the years because it was not prioritized as a valuable product.

(U) DoD officials worked with the congressional armed services committees to propose a change to legislation to make the 10 U.S.C. § 386 requirements specific to each authority included in the report. This change was effective with the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act and the resulting updates to the regulations published in January 2023. The updated requirements are more detailed and include relevant data points for each authority included in the 10 U.S.C. § 386 report. DoD officials are working to produce the 10 U.S.C. § 386 reports from 2021 forward, in accordance with the updated requirements. Therefore, the DSCA Director should implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner if the DSCA is still unable to issue the report on time following the planned updates to Socium and recently implemented processes to collect and reconcile data.

(U) DoD officials also explained that the DSCA delayed the 10 U.S.C. § 332 annual congressional monitoring report to ensure that the stakeholders had enough time to complete thorough data collection and reconciliation and for the DSCA to complete a final review before submission. The DSCA officials noted that while the requirement for the 10 U.S.C. § 332 congressional monitoring report is now annual according to the 2023 requirements, they are gathering the reporting data for 10 U.S.C. § 332 quarterly. Once the DSCA team receives the data, team members

(U) verify the data, input the data into the report template, and then work with leadership to generate the associated narratives. Therefore, the DSCA Director should determine whether the processes put in place for data collection and reconciliation address the timeliness issues for future reports. If the DSCA is still unable to issue the report on time, the DSCA Director should implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner.

### ***(U) Available Data Were Not Consistent with the Requirements***

(U) The required reporting data were available by fiscal year, but the congressional report was required to cover calendar year data for the Indo-Pacific MSI annual congressional monitoring reports. Before the report for CY 2022, the DoD was issuing the Indo-Pacific MSI annual congressional report to cover fiscal year data; however, the DoD Office of General Counsel (International Affairs) interpreted the requirement that the reporting data needed to cover calendar year data. DoD officials from the ODASD(GP) explained that because their data reporting systems aggregate data by fiscal year, compiling the calendar year report required a substantial rework of the report after it was drafted and coordinated. The same DoD officials believed that because they have now worked through the process to compile the fiscal year data into calendar year data, this delay in reporting should be resolved for the 2024 annual congressional monitoring report. In addition, ODASD(GP) officials stated that they are pursuing a legislative proposal to change the requirement to cover fiscal year data instead of calendar year data. Therefore, the DASD(GP) should determine at the completion of the next annual congressional monitoring report for the Indo-Pacific MSI whether the recently implemented processes to reconcile the fiscal year data into a calendar year report are allowing the timely completion of the reports as expected. If the DASD(GP) is still unable to issue the report on time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary should develop and implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner.

### **(U) Untimely Information for Congressional Oversight**

(U) As a result of the late and unsubmitted congressional monitoring reports, Congress may not have all the information it needs to make programmatic decisions regarding building partner capacity activities. The lack of information systems or processes pose additional risk to the reliability and accuracy of information provided to Congress. Without timely, relevant, and accurate information, Congress cannot fully evaluate the effectiveness of building partner capacity efforts within the USINDOPACOM AOR and make evidence-based decisions to improve or eliminate ineffective security cooperation. The 10 U.S.C. §§ 332

(U) and 386 congressional monitoring reports include building partner capacity programs and activities globally; therefore, Congress' ability to evaluate building partner capacity activities beyond the USINDOPACOM AOR may be limited without timely reporting.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response**

### **(U) Recommendation B.1**

**(U) We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships:**

- a. **(U) Issue the CY 2023 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative annual congressional monitoring report as required.**

### ***(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships Comments***

(U) The DASD(GP) agreed with the recommendation, stating that they will submit the CY 2023 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative annual monitoring report. The DASD(GP) anticipated completion of this effort by May 30, 2025.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DASD(GP) addressed the specifics of the recommendation. In May 2025, ODASD(GP) officials issued the CY 2023 monitoring report. Therefore, the recommendation is closed.

- b. **(U) Determine at the completion of the next annual congressional monitoring report for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative whether the recently implemented processes to reconcile the fiscal year data into a calendar year report are allowing the timely completion of the report as expected. If the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships is still unable to issue the report on time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary should implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner.**

### ***(U) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships Comments***

(U) The DASD(GP) agreed with the recommendation, stating that the DoD acknowledges the process for the U.S. Pacific Fleet and DSCA to anticipatorily reconcile fiscal year data into calendar year data can expedite publication of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative annual monitoring report for Congress.

(U) The DASD(GP) also stated that the DoD intends to make its best effort at meeting future reporting deadlines while also seeking an administrative legislative proposal to change the reporting requirement from calendar year to fiscal year to align with data reporting systems and align with congressional intent. The DASD(GP) anticipates completion of this effort by January 15, 2026.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DASD(GP) addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but will remain open. As outlined in the report, ODASD(GP) officials took steps during the CY 2024 reporting cycle to reconcile fiscal year data to calendar year data to facilitate the timely completion of reports. In addition, the DASD(GP) stated they plan to seek an administrative legislative proposal to change the reporting requirement from calendar year to fiscal year and intentions to meet future reporting deadlines. As discussed in the recommendation B.1.a, the ODASD(GP) issued the CY 2023 monitoring report in May 2025. According to an ODASD(GP) official, ODASD(GP) then focused their efforts on the review and publication of the CY 2024 monitoring report. We will close this recommendation once we verify the ODASD(GP) issued the CY 2024 monitoring report, once approved, and issued the CY 2025 monitoring report in accordance with established timelines; or developed additional controls in the event of untimely reporting.

### ***(U) Recommendation B.2***

**(U) We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency:**

- a. **(U) Issue the FY 2023 section 386, title 10, United States Code annual congressional monitoring report as required.**

### ***(U) Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Comments***

(U) The DSCA Director agreed with the recommendation, stating that the DSCA anticipated beginning coordination on the FY 2023 10 U.S.C. § 386 annual congressional monitoring report by May 15, 2025. The DSCA anticipates completion of this effort by July 2025.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DSCA Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the DSCA issued the FY 2023 10 U.S.C. § 386 annual congressional monitoring report.

- b. **(U) Implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner if the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is still unable to issue the section 386, title 10, United States Code annual congressional monitoring report on time following the planned updates to Socium and recently implemented processes to collect and reconcile data.**

***(U) Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Comments***

(U) The DSCA Director agreed with the recommendation, stating that FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, section 1202, substantially revised data elements required in section 386 reports and authorized the DoD to submit any section 386 reports that were outstanding with the new format. The Director stated that since enactment of that legislation, the DSCA has implemented several process improvements, including collecting multiple years of data to simultaneously develop overdue reports; standardizing the data format to reduce the time needed for reconciliation and report generation; and developing a repeatable process for future fiscal years. The Director stated that the DSCA has significantly improved the process and anticipates on-time delivery for the FY 2025 report. The DSCA anticipates completion of this effort by July 2025.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DSCA Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the DSCA issued the FY 2024 annual congressional monitoring report in accordance with established timelines or implemented additional controls.

- c. **(U) Determine whether the processes put in place for data collection and reconciliation address the timeliness issues for future reports. If the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is still unable to issue the report on time, the Director should implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner.**

***(U) Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency Comments***

(U) The DSCA Director agreed with the recommendation, stating that the DSCA has developed and implemented several process improvements related to data collection and reconciliation. Additionally, the Director agreed to explore options if ongoing process improvements are not productive. The DSCA anticipates completion of this effort by July 2025.

***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the DSCA Director addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved but open. We will close the recommendation once we verify that the DSCA issued the FY 2024 annual congressional monitoring report in accordance with established timelines or implemented additional controls.

## (U) Appendix A

### (U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this performance audit from May 2023 through February 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

### (U) Audit Universe and SSCI Selection

~~(CUI)~~ We identified a universe of [REDACTED] for FY 2021 through FY 2024 within the USINDOPACOM AOR. Using the resource allocation plans for FY 2021 through FY 2024, we conducted steps to normalize the resource allocation plan data and combine the normalized data into a single data set. We then worked with DSCA officials to filter out continuing and duplicative SSCIs to determine our universe of [REDACTED] unique SSCIs.

~~(CUI)~~ To review the DoD's efforts to build partner capacity through SSCIs, we selected 4 SSCIs from a universe of [REDACTED]. We selected the four SSCIs to review based on the following criteria.

- ~~(CUI)~~ Highest dollar value based on the rough order of magnitude: [REDACTED]
- ~~(CUI)~~ Next highest dollar value based on the rough order of magnitude of a different activity: [REDACTED]
- ~~(CUI)~~ Highest FY 2024 priority within USINDOPACOM of a not previously selected activity type: [REDACTED]
- ~~(CUI)~~ Next highest FY 2024 priority within USINDOPACOM of a not previously selected activity type: [REDACTED]

~~(CUI)~~ While we based our selection of the SSCIs on FY 2021 through FY 2024 valuations and USINDOPACOM's FY 2024 prioritization, we limited our analysis of annual SSCI records to FY 2022 through FY 2024, which totaled 11 annual SSCI records. Table 8 provides a summary of the [REDACTED] SSCIs by countries or region and includes the total dollar value.

(U) Table 8. SSCI Summary by Country

(CUI) Country	Number of Initiatives	Total (in Millions)
		(CUI)

(U) Source: FY 2021 through FY 2024 resource allocation plans for USINDOPACOM SSCI.

### (U) Interviews and Documentation

(U) We interviewed or conducted data calls with officials from the Government Accountability Office (GAO); OUSD(P); DSCA, including the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies and the Institute for Security Governance; and USINDOPACOM, including the Security Cooperation Division and the Training and Exercise Divisions. We also observed a Capabilities Development Working Group hosted by the USINDOPACOM Security Cooperation Division.

(U) We found inconsistencies with the identification of programs and activities within the SSCI proposals. DSCA officials explained that these inconsistencies occurred because the SSCI process takes several years to move from proposal to congressional notification and execution. DSCA officials explained that during this time, names of programs can change to reflect new decisions. According to DSCA officials, they led a multi-organizational search of electronic records to create a list of the programs congressionally notified or planned for notification under each SSCI. Specifically, DoD officials searched a combination of files on multiple organizations' shared computer drives, SharePoint files, hard drives, and on Intelink, a U.S. Government information sharing website.

(U) We obtained the following documents to review objectives, assessments, and monitoring for building partner capacity within USINDOPACOM.

- (U) We reviewed SSCI proposals and Socium reports to determine whether annual SSCI records contained SMART objectives and addressed capability and capacity gaps, consistent with strategies. In addition, we also reviewed assessments to determine whether the assessments addressed partners' capabilities, risks, political will, stability, and absorptive capacity, to inform initiative planning.
- (U) Additionally, we reviewed objective trees, PMPs, 5-year plans, and monitoring reports outlining indicators, milestones, baselines, target goals, intervals, and data sources, to determine whether performance monitoring was documented.
- (U) We also reviewed contracts and performance work statements to determine contractor requirements for assessments and monitoring.

(U) We obtained the following documents to review congressional notifications and reporting requirements.

- (U) We reviewed congressional notifications for programs and activities in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333, and the 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI to determine whether Congress received notification of the programs and activities associated with the four SSCIs we reviewed and whether the notifications included the information required under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332 and 333, and the 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI.
- (U) In addition, we reviewed congressional monitoring reports prepared in accordance with 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333, 383, and 386, and the 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI to determine whether the reports were issued in a timely manner and whether the reports included the information required under 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333, 383, and 386, and the 333 Statutory Note – Indo-Pacific MSI.

### **(U) Criteria**

(U) We obtained and reviewed the following regulations and guidance.

- (U) Sections 301 – 386, title 10, U.S.C.
- (U) FY 2016, 2017, 2021, 2022, and 2023 National Defense Authorization Acts
- (U) DoDD 5132.03, "DoD Policy and Responsibilities Relating to Security Cooperation," December 29, 2016
- (U) DoDI 5132.14, "AM&E Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise," January 13, 2017

- (U) Joint Publication 3-20, “Security Cooperation,” September 9, 2022
- (U) “Policy Priorities for FY 2023 Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives,” May 6, 2021 (CUI Document)
- (U) “Policy Priorities for FY 2024 Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives,” August 9, 2022 (Classified Document)
- (U) “FY 2025-2029 Multi-Year Security Cooperation Guidance,” July 19, 2023 (Classified Document)
- (U) “DoD Assessment, Planning & Design, Monitoring, & Evaluation Overview for Security Cooperation,” summer 2020
- (U) “DoD Principles for Security Cooperation Assessment,” summer 2020
- (U) “Standards and Guidelines for Security Cooperation Planning and Design,” summer 2020
- (U) “Standards and Guidelines for Security Cooperation Performance Monitoring,” summer 2020
- (U) “Standards and Guidelines for Security Cooperation Performance Monitoring – Annex, How to Develop a Performance Monitoring Plan for Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives,” April 26, 2021
- (U) DSCA Policy Memorandum 22-38, “Revision of the Program Execution Requirements under 10 U.S.C. § 333 and § 1263 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2016,” September 30, 2022
- (U) “FY 2022 Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives Guidance,” March 25, 2020
- (U) “FY 2023 Guidance for Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives,” May 2021 (CUI Document)
- (U) “FY 2024 Guidance for Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives,” August 10, 2022 (CUI Document)
- (U) “FY 2025 Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives Process Guidance,” June 6, 2023
- (U) “FY 2026 Process Guidance: International Security Cooperation Program,” April 5, 2024 (CUI Document)

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Components failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

## (U) Internal Control Assessment and Compliance

(U) We assessed internal controls and compliance with Federal laws and regulations necessary to satisfy the audit objective. In particular, we assessed the control components and underlying principles related to the DoD's management of security cooperation efforts and AM&E. Specifically, we assessed the following control components.

- **(U) Control environment.** The control environment is the foundation for an internal control system. We evaluated whether the DoD met congressional reporting requirements and enabled Congress to exercise oversight of security cooperation efforts. Furthermore, we evaluated whether the DoD assigned roles and responsibilities to key stakeholders of security cooperation and AM&E processes.
- **(U) Control activities.** Control activities are the actions management establishes through policies and procedures to achieve objectives and respond to risks in the internal control system. We evaluated whether the DoD designed and implemented control activities through policies and guidance for SSCIs and AM&E.
- **(U) Information and communication.** Effective information and communication are vital for an entity to achieve its objectives. We evaluated whether the DoD used quality information for SSCI planning and AM&E.

(U) We identified internal control weaknesses in all areas reviewed, cited the deficiencies in our findings, and provided corresponding recommendations to correct the internal control deficiencies. However, because our review was limited to these internal control components and underlying principles, it may not have disclosed all internal control deficiencies that may have existed at the time of this audit.

## (U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We relied in part on computer-processed data during our review. Specifically, we used resource allocation plans to assist in our determination of the universe of SSCI during our review period. We used these plans for informational purposes only and not as the basis for our audit findings, conclusions, or recommendations. As a result, we did not perform additional testing to assess data reliability of the resource allocation plans.

(U) Socium provides a DoD-wide technology capability to facilitate and integrate planning, budgeting, collaboration, program design, assessment, monitoring, evaluation, and reporting in support of all U.S. security cooperation activities. Socium is the successor to the Global-Theater Security Cooperation Management Information System program. We reviewed the Socium initiative reports for each of the four SSCIs we selected for review. These reports contained information such as the SSCI objective, strategic context, and the partner nation assessment. We did not perform additional testing to assess the reliability of these data because the data served as the source data for the SSCI objective, strategic context, and the partner nation assessment, and there was no separate data to compare it with to determine completeness and accuracy.

### **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD OIG issued two reports related to AM&E. Specifically, DoD OIG issued one report on AM&E global health activities in USINDOPACOM and a management advisory, related to this audit, on not timely completing performance evaluations for AM&E contracts. Additionally, the GAO issued two reports discussing building partner capacity. Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html>. Unrestricted GAO reports can be accessed at <http://www.gao.gov>.

### **(U) DoD OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2025-080, “Management Advisory: Timeliness of Performance Evaluations for Contracts Supporting the DoD’s Building Partner Capacity Efforts,” March 28, 2025

(U) The DoD OIG found that performance evaluations were not completed for contractors supporting the security cooperation AM&E program in accordance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Specifically, the DoD OIG determined that contracting officers did not complete contractor performance evaluations within the 120-day reporting requirements for the contracts.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-037, “Evaluation of the Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation of Global Health Engagement Activities in USINDOPACOM, U.S. European Command, and U.S. Africa Command,” January 25, 2024

(U) The DoD OIG found that DoD instructions did not adequately establish criteria to determine which global health activities required AM&E and identify roles and responsibilities. Also, the geographic combatant commanders did not enforce the use of Socium to record global health engagement activities, and Socium lacked the functions needed to link the activities to campaign objectives and deconflict campaign plan activities.

**(U) GAO**

(U) Report No. GAO-23-105842, “Building Partner Capacity, DoD and State Should Strengthen Planning for Train and Equip Projects,” August 29, 2023

(U) The GAO found that the DoD had not addressed longstanding gaps in project planning related to its consideration of partner nations’ capacity to absorb and sustain DoD-provided training and equipment. Additionally, the GAO found that the DoD’s required congressional notifications provided limited information about its analysis of partner nations’ absorptive capacity and its plans for sustainment. The GAO also found that the Department of State had inconsistent involvement in 10 U.S.C. § 333 projects due to the lack of a joint DoD-State planning process and insufficient training.

(U) Report No. GAO-23-106275, “Building Partner Capacity, DoD Should Assess Delivery Delays in Train and Equip Projects and Improve Evaluations,” August 29, 2023

(U) The GAO found that 10 U.S.C. § 333 funding supported projects of equipment, training, services, and construction activities to the security forces of at least 90 partner nations. Also, the DoD delivered most project activities after the estimated dates, but did not monitor timeliness, and did not analyze the causes of delays. Furthermore, the GAO noted that the DoD’s evaluations of six 10 U.S.C. § 333 projects, completed in FY 2017 through FY 2022 showed mixed results, but these evaluations were not high quality.

# (U) Appendix B

## (U) Congressional Notifications of Programs and Activities in Our Selected Four SSCIs

(CUI) SSCI	Program and Activity Name	§ 332	§ 333	Indo-Pacific MSI	Pending Notification

(CUI) SSCI	Program and Activity Name	§ 332	§ 333	Indo-Pacific MSI	Pending Notification
					(CUI)

(U) Source: DoD OIG analysis of congressional notifications of programs and activities associated with our four selected SSCIs.

## (U) Management Comments

### (U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command



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UNITED STATES INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND  
BUILDING 700, 1 ELROD ROAD  
CAMP H M SMITH, HAWAII 96861-4028

April 29, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR  
GENERAL

SUBJECT: Response to the DoD OIG Draft Report, "Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility" (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0119.000)

1. This is the response of USINDOPACOM to the DoD OIG Draft Report, *Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility* (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0119.000).
2. USINDOPACOM will correct the issues identified in this report, and develop and implement corrective actions, as outlined in the recommendations below.
3. **Recommendation A.3:** "We recommend that the Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, should require the Director, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5):"
  - a. **Recommendation A.3.a:** "In coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, identify shortfalls in the staffing of personnel assigned to the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command with security cooperation assessment, monitoring, and evaluation responsibilities, assess the feasibility of using contractor staff, and recommend mitigation in accordance with DoD Instruction 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise," January 13, 2017."
  - b. INDOPACOM Comments to Recommendation A.3.a
    - a. **INDOPACOM Concurs.** USINDOPACOM previously faced challenges with security cooperation AM&E staffing; however, the situation is now resolved. The J-55 directorate is well-staffed with seven Global AM&E (GAME) contractors supporting J-552 Cooperative Plans and Programs, two dedicated AM&E contractors in J-551 Capabilities Development, and three more AM&E contractors currently onboarding to support both branches. While previously there was some ambiguity regarding AM&E roles and responsibilities between the two AM&E contracts, USINDOPACOM's security cooperation AM&E staffing is now well-defined and fully resourced.
    - b. Estimated completion date: May 2025.

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## (U) U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (cont'd)

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- c. Recommendation A.3.b: "In coordination with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency contracting officer's representative, develop and document the assessment, monitoring, and evaluation contractor's deliverables for U.S. Indo-Pacific Command support.
  - d. INDOPACOM Comments to Recommendation A.3.b
    - a. INDOPACOM Concurs. USINDOPACOM's AM&E team has developed and implemented a comprehensive tracking system for all required AM&E deliverables to the command. This tracker is already being utilized by USINDOPACOM's AM&E stakeholders to monitor AM&E product development. Additionally, USINDOPACOM is collaborating with the contracting officer's representative to ensure the command can provide input into the performance evaluations of AM&E contractors.
    - b. Completion date: February 2025
  - e. Recommendation A.3.c: "Develop and implement instructions to establish the roles and responsibilities of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command security cooperation stakeholders for assessment, monitoring, and evaluation requirements, including security cooperation organization responsibilities."
  - f. INDOPACOM Comments to Recommendation A.3.c
    - a. INDOPACOM Concurs. USINDOPACOM's J-55 directorate is developing an instruction to streamline the SSCI process. This instruction will include guidance on AM&E, clarifying roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders, including security cooperation organizations.
    - b. Estimated completion date: October 2025.
2. **USINDOPACOM Security Marking Review**: USINDOPACOM agrees with the portion markings currently contained in the Draft report and does not recommend any changes be made to those markings.
3. For additional information or assistance, please contact [REDACTED] at [REDACTED]

  
DAVID JENSEN  
Security Cooperation Chief (J55)  
United States Indo-Pacific Command

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## (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency

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MAY 07 2025



**DEFENSE SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY**  
2800 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-2800

MEMORANDUM FOR DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
(DODIG)

SUBJECT: Response to the draft DODIG Report "Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility" (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0119.000)

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject DODIG draft evaluation report titled "Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility" (Project No. D2023-D000RM-0119.000).

DSCA concurs with comments to OIG's recommendations (A.1, A.2, and B.2.). TAB A includes the consolidated DSCA response, which addresses:

- Updating the feasibility review and technical feedback process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions.
- Developing and implementing new data management capabilities within Socium.
- Implementation of additional controls to ensure timeliness of Section 386 reports.

Please direct any further questions or comments regarding this response to my primary action officers for this matter: [REDACTED] Acting Division Chief, Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation (AM&E) at [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] Audit Liaison Officer, at [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M.F. Miller", is positioned above the name and title.

Michael F. Miller  
Director

ATTACHMENT:

(U) TAB A: Consolidated DSCA Management Comments to OIG recommendations

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(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency (cont'd)

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The DSCA’s Response to DoDIG’s Draft Recommendation on Audit of the DoD’s Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility (D2023-D000RM-0119.000)

**DoDIG Instructions:** In your response, please state whether you agree or disagree with each of the recommendations. If you agree with our recommendations, describe what actions you have taken or plan to take to accomplish the recommendations and include the actual or planned completion dates of your actions. If you disagree that the recommendations can be implemented, please provide the reasons why you disagree and propose alternative corrective actions in your response for our consideration. DoD Instruction 7650.03 requires that recommendations be resolved promptly.

<b>Recommendation: A.1</b> We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships, in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, update the feasibility review and technical feedback process or develop a new oversight process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions, including tracking the corrective actions needed for concerns identified and documenting the reasons for approving significant security cooperation initiatives with outstanding concerns.	
<b>Office:</b> DSCA/SPP/RPPD	<b>Position:</b> Concur
<b>POC:</b> [REDACTED]	
<b>Estimated Completion Date:</b> 07/2025	
<b>Actions Taken or To Be Implemented for Recommendation:</b>	
<p>In the FY25 and FY26 SSCI Feasibility Reviews, DSCA and ODASD(GP) used a new Feasibility Review Finding Sheet to capture all feedback from the reviewers. The Finding Sheets were shared with all stakeholders made available on the DSCA SharePoint site.</p> <p>Additionally, DSCA has also been proactively working with the INDOPACOM J5 and offices of primary responsibility (OPRs) and offices of coordinating responsibility during the FY27 SSCI planning cycle to add unit-level assessments to baseline partner nation capabilities before initiating programs. This process will help to identify and mitigate AM&amp;E and other programmatic concerns prior to formal SSCI submission and SSCI feasibility review.</p> <p>Currently, DSCA is implementing additional oversight processes using Socium to verify completion of all requirements and allowing reviewers the ability to address missing AM&amp;E products. Furthermore, DSCA has since coordinated with ODASD(GP) regarding strategic and feasibility discussions with CCMD SSCI OPRs to technical feedback on identified issues requiring adjudication after an initial strategic and feasibility review period.</p>	
<b>Comments/ Reasoning:</b>	
<p>DSCA concurs with the need to update the feasibility review and technical feedback process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions. Understanding that SSCIs are multi-year initiatives and assessments, and monitoring are continually ongoing, some of the submitted products may no longer be relevant.</p>	

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## (U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency (cont'd)

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While ensuring requirements are met, DSCA has made progress by emphasizing the importance of unit snapshots that assess the targeted unit's current capabilities, capacity to absorb and sustain equipment and training, and ability to perform the desired defense role in support of the SSCI objectives. These unit snapshots are used to develop specific programs and activities supporting the SSCI and inform any adjustments to the SSCI's 5-year plans.

While some SSCIs with potential feasibility concerns were approved by ODASD(GP), these concerns and overall risks are mitigated by using assessment and monitoring products focused at the tactical and operational levels, such as unit snapshots and Performance Monitoring Plans, to inform the development and programmatic adjustments needed for building partner capacity programs to achieve the overall SSCI objectives.

**Recommendation: A.2** We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, further develop and implement data management capabilities within Socium for the clear identification of programs and activities associated with significant security cooperation initiatives, and for additional assessment and monitoring functions, including functionality for initial assessments, performance monitoring plans, and monitoring reports.

**Office:** DSCA/ADM/PIE/RADS

**Position:** Concur

**POC:** [REDACTED]

**Estimated Completion Date:** June 2025

**Actions Taken or To Be Implemented for Recommendation:** Development of further data management capabilities within Socium for identification of programs and activities associated with SSCI is on-going. The BPC Program hierarchy will be launched in Socium with release 8.0 slated for late May 2025. Existing BPC Programs, which were activities, will be migrated and will now display in the Program List. The Training and Equipment List functionality will now be associated only for Programs in Socium. The Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP) will also be launched in Socium with release 8.0 slated for late May. Conjoined with the Objective Tree tool in Socium, the PMP tool will enable SC practitioners effectively measure progress towards security cooperation program objectives.

**Comments/ Reasoning:** DSCA concurs with the need for additional functionality in Socium, while noting the planned update with release 8.0, and subject to the availability of funding and prioritization with OUSD/P.

**Recommendation: B.2** We recommend that the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency:

- a. Issue the FY 2023 section 386, title 10, United States Code annual congressional monitoring report as required.

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(U) Defense Security Cooperation Agency (cont'd)

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- b. Implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner if the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is still unable to issue the section 386, title 10 United States Code annual congressional monitoring report on time following the planned updates to Socium and recently implemented processes to collect and reconcile data.
- c. Determine whether the processes put in place for data collection and reconciliation address the timeliness issues for future reports. If the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is still unable to issue the report on time, the Director should implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner.

Office: IOPS/GEX	Position: Concur
POC: [REDACTED]	
Estimated Completion Date: 7/2025	
<b>Actions Taken or To Be Implemented for Recommendation:</b>	
DSCA anticipates entering the FY23 report into coordination NLT May 15, 2025.	
Section 1202 of the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act (Section 1202) substantially revised the Section 386 required data elements and authorized the Department to submit any Section 386 reports that were outstanding with the new format.	
Since enactment of that legislation, DSCA has implemented several process improvements including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>--Collected multiple years of data to simultaneously develop overdue reports. This has allowed DSCA to create and coordinate on multiple reports in parallel.</li><li>--Standardized Data Format for both consolidated and independent data submissions. This has streamlined our ability to manually disaggregate country level information, reducing the time needed for reconciliation and report generation.</li><li>--Developed a repeatable process that we can replicate across fiscal years.</li></ul>	
<b>Comments/ Reasoning:</b>	
DSCA concurs with the recommendation. While we have no direct oversight authority over the Section 386 data owners, we have significantly improved the process and anticipate on-time delivery for the FY 2025 report. DSCA agrees to explore options if ongoing process improvements are not productive.	

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## (U) Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships



OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
2200 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2200

MAY 20 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED] ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Draft Final Report – Project Number D2023-D000RM-0199.000 “Audit of the DoD’s Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility”

The following provides: Responses to the recommendations found in the Department of Defense (DoD) Office of Inspector General’s (IG) draft Final Report for Project Number D2023-D000RM-0199.000. ODASD(GP) also provides offers factual clarification to specific findings in the report at Tab A.

1. **Recommendation A.1:** “We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships [(DASD(GP))], in coordination with the Director, Defense Security Cooperation Agency [(DSCA)], update the feasibility review and technical feedback process to develop a new oversight process to verify completion of all assessment and monitoring product submissions, including tracking the corrective actions needed for concerns identified and documenting the reasons for approving significant security cooperation initiatives with outstanding concerns.”
  - a. **Response to A.1:** Concur with comments. DASD(GP) concurs with the report’s recommendation of ensuring oversight of corrective actions as part of the Significant Security Cooperation Initiative feasibility reviews. However, DASD(GP) would like to correct some factual inaccuracies in the report.
  - b. The Office of the DASD(GP) (ODASD(GP)) maintains records that verify completion of assessment, monitoring, & evaluation (AM&E) product submission, and has done so since FY 2020. Mandatory requirements, templates, and submission dates have been formally provided to the Combatant Commands (CCMDs) in the Significant Security Cooperation Initiative (SSCI) annual guidance since FY 2022. CCMDs receive guidance, templates, and technical support to meet AM&E requirements, such as Performance Monitoring Reports, Performance Monitoring Plans, Objective Trees, and Theories of Change.

Annual refinements to the SSCI process have led to the creation of CCMD adoption requirements and their absorption of AM&E. Iterations to the review process resulted in the addition of several milestones, including a feasibility review, which is co-led by

ODASD(GP) and DSCA. At the GS-15/O6-level, the feasibility reviews are scheduled with CCMD SSCI Offices of Primary Responsibility (OPRs), implementing agencies,

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and interagency counterparts, to collaboratively strengthen programs, validate rough order of magnitude estimates, review AM&E quality standards, and address other design concerns. The CCMDs have been provided technical feedback for improving their AM&E requirements and AM&E products. DASD(GP) recognizes that despite outstanding concerns, some SSCIs are approved due to DoD priorities and Congressional Special Interest Items.

- c. **Corrective Actions Concerning SSCI Feasibility Review improvement:** To reconstitute the level of oversight in the SSCI process, FY 2025 and FY 2026 SSCI annual guidance mandated strategic and feasibility reviews, which availed an opportunity for CCMD OPRs to collaborate with ODASD(GP), DSCA, OUSD(P) country desk officers, INDOPACOM J5, and the U.S. Department of State, to better align SSCIs with U.S. strategy and address challenges to execution. Furthermore, ODASD(GP) has instituted formal deadlines by which DSCA's final feasibility determinations are provided, and Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs) have updated Socium based on strategic and feasibility review feedback.

For the FY 2027 Annual Guidance, DASD(GP) proposed USD(P) mandate that all required planning documents, including AM&E products, be submitted by the established deadline or the relevant SSCI will not be considered for approval or continuation.

**Stakeholders:** ODASD(GP) and DSCA

**POC:** [REDACTED] Acting Director ODASD(GP) / OAME,

**Expected completion date:** November, 2025

2. **Recommendation B.1.a:** "We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships issue the CY 2023 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative annual congressional monitoring report as required."

- a. **Response to B.1.a:** Concur.
- b. DASD(GP) will submit the Calendar Year (CY) 2023 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative annual monitoring report by May 30, 2025.
- c. **Corrective actions:** Complete.

**Stakeholders:** ODASD(GP) and DSCA

**POC:** [REDACTED] Acting Director ODASD(GP) / S&R,

**Expected completion date:** April 30, 2025

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3. **Recommendation B.1.b:** “We recommend that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships [d]etermine at the completion of the next annual congressional monitoring report for the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative whether the recently implemented processes to reconcile the fiscal year data into a calendar year report are allowing the timely completion of the report as expected. If the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships is still unable to issue the report on time, the Deputy Assistant Secretary should implement additional controls to ensure that the report is issued in a timely manner.”

a. **Response to B.1.b:** Concur.

- b. The DoD acknowledges the process for The United States Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) and DSCA to anticipatorily reconcile FY data into CY data for the report can expedite the publication of the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative annual monitoring report for Congress. DoD intends to make its best effort at meeting future reporting deadlines.

- c. **Corrective actions:** Seek an administrative legislative proposal to change the reporting requirement from CY to FY to align with data reporting systems and align with congressional intent.

**Stakeholders:** ODASD(GP) and DSCA

**POC:** [REDACTED] Deputy Director ODASD(GP) / S&R,

**Expected completion date:** January 15, 2026 (upon issuance of 2026 NDAA)

We appreciate the opportunity to respond to your Audit and look forward to continuing working with the OIG to improve the security cooperation enterprise.

  
Christopher P. Mamack  
DASD Global Partnerships

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### Tab A

#### Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships Responses to Specific Findings

##### Audit of the DoD's Efforts to Build Partner Capacity in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Area of Responsibility

Although DASD(GP) concurs with comments on the above OIG recommendations, there are several findings within the report to which DASD(GP) would offer factual clarification below.

**1. Finding:** "USINDOPACOM officials did not assess or monitor initiatives because OUSD(P) officials did not provide complete implementing guidance with clear procedures and templates for assessing and monitoring security cooperation. Additionally, the OUSD(P) and DSCA did not provide adequate oversight of USINDOPACOM's submission of assessment and monitoring products. Furthermore, DoD officials attributed the lack of an effective AM&E program to data management issues, including the absence of an information technology system, the large scope of security cooperation stakeholders across a variety of entities, and challenges staffing an AM&E workforce."

a. **Response from DASD(GP):** DASD(GP) does not concur with the statement of this finding. DASD(GP) provided clarification to the OIG officials including the following information:

- ODASD(GP) worked closely with the CCMDs to support the design, development, implementation, and reporting on SSCI performance monitoring plans in accordance with DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5132.14, "Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation Policy for the Security Cooperation Enterprise." ODASD(GP) led an incremental approach to developing SSCI monitoring requirements, given their novelty and the ongoing development of AM&E technical capacity within the CCMDs. This incremental approach was composed of three areas: guidance, technical assistance (contracting of subject matter experts), and AM&E resources (guidebooks, the establishment of a global AM&E Working Group, and the execution of an annual AM&E symposium).
- Guidance. In FY 2020, ODASD(GP) began creating SSCI specific guidance that was included in the annual Guidance for Significant Security Cooperation Initiatives. This incremental approach was coordinated and socialized broadly within the SC enterprise.

Below is the detailed ODASD(GP) AM&E guidance that has occurred since FY 2022:

- **FY 2022 Submissions (June 2020)**

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- o 2 Pilot Performance Monitoring Plans (PMPs) for FY 2021/ 2022 funded SSCIs
- **FY 2023 Submissions (July 2021)**
  - o 2 Pilot PMPs (monitored)
  - o 2 annual monitoring reports for 2 FY 2021/2022 pilots
  - o 5 additional full PMPs for additional SSCIs
  - o Partial PMPs for continuation of FY 2022 SSCIs (the number varied per CCMD)
- **FY 2024 Submissions (June 2022)**
  - o Annual monitoring reports for approved/ funded FY 2021 and FY 2022 SSCIs with full PMPs
  - o For FY 2023 full PMPs for SSCIs based on criteria in consultation with CCMDs (# varied per CCMD)
  - o Partial PMPs (e.g., Objective Trees) for all SSCIs
  - o For FY 2024 submission, full PMPs were required for selected SSCIs based on criteria in consultation with CCMDs (# will vary per CCMD)
  - o Post-submission, full PMPs were required for all FY 2024 SSCIs above the Policy Resource Allocation Plan (RAP) cut line, submitted to ODASD (Security Cooperation) at the time Training and Equipment List (TEL) is submitted to DSCA)
- **FY 2025 Submissions (June 2023)**
  - o Annual Monitoring Reports for approved and funded FY 2022 and FY 2023 SSCIs that have full PMPs
  - o Full PMPs for all FY 2024 approved SSCIs
  - o Partial PMPs (Objective Trees) for all continuing and new start FY 2025 SSCIs
  - o Full PMPs for all FY 2025 SSCIs that were approved and funded in the final FY 2025 RAP
- **FY 2026 Submissions (June 2024)**
  - o For the FY 2026 submissions, OSD Policy and DSCA updated the PMP and Performance Monitoring Report (PMR) (formerly called the Annual Monitoring Report) templates (see Templates —PMP, and —PMR) and provided a new initial assessment template (Template —IA).
  - o Objective Trees for all continuing and new SSCIs.
  - o Initial Assessments: CCMDs needed to submit initial assessments for all FY 2026 new start SSCIs.
  - o Performance Monitoring Report: For FY 2026, the CCMDs were required to submit completed PMRs for continuing SSCIs for which they have previously submitted PMPs.
- Technical Assistance. As part of DoD's effort to establish the AM&E program and to minimize the impact of new reporting requirements on CCMDs, ODASD(GP) and DSCA

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developed an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contract mechanism to support CCMDs with AM&E subject matter experts. As a result of this effort, each GCC had 4-8 SSCI AM&E contractors hired under the IDIQ to assist with the development, maintenance, and submission of the AM&E products. This contract expired on February 12, 2025.

- AM&E Resources. ODASD(GP) issued 6 guidebooks on AM&E since 2019, highlighting best practices and adapting them to the specific needs of SC. In addition, ODASD(GP) and DSCA created a monthly AM&E Working Group with the intention to share information, integrate AM&E practitioners, and answer questions about AM&E implementation. In addition, ODASD(GP) and DSCA have provided three consecutive iterations of an Annual AM&E Symposium, which exists to integrate AM&E practices into SC and discuss AM&E priorities for global SC stakeholders.
- AO level follow up. The ODASD(GP) AM&E Directorate has AOs assigned to each CCMD. Their role is to liaison with each CCMD, provide technical feedback on AM&E products, and ensure AM&E guidance is distributed and understood.

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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(U) AM&E	Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation
(U) AMR	Annual Monitoring Report
(U) AOR	Area of Responsibility
(U) [REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
(U) DASD(GP)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships
(U) DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
(U) GCC	Geographic Combatant Command
(U) MARSEC	Maritime Security
(U) MSI	Maritime Security Initiative
(U) ODASD(GP)	Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Partnerships
(U) OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
(U) PMP	Performance Monitoring Plan
(U) SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attainable, Relevant, and Time-Bound
(U) SSCI	Significant Security Cooperation Initiative
(U) U.S.C.	United States Code
(U) USINDOPACOM	U.S. Indo-Pacific Command

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