

Approved for public release by the Capitol Police Board on November 26, 2024

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Top Management Challenges Facing the United States Capitol Police Fiscal Year 2024

OIG-2024-02

November 2023



TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Introduction	1
Top Management Challenges for Fiscal Year 2024	2
Protecting and Securing the Capitol Complex (Challenge 1)	2
Addressing Increasing Threats to Members and their Families (Challenge 2)	3
Strong, Integrated Internal Control Systems Still Needed (Challenge 3)	4
Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness of Department Training (Challenge 4)	5
Recruitment and Retention of a Qualified Work Force (Challenge 5)	7

Introduction

Each year, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepares a summary of the most significant management challenges facing the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department). The challenges reflect continuing vulnerabilities OIG identified over the last several years as well as new and emerging issues the Department will face in the coming year. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) uses five criteria that reflect whether agencies met, partially met, or did not meet issues on its High-Risk Series—*Efforts Made to Achieve Progress Need to Be Maintained and Expanded to Fully Address All Areas*, GAO-23-106203, dated April 2023. The five criteria are:

- **Leadership Commitment** – Demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support.
- **Agency Capacity** – Agency has the capacity (i.e., people and resources) to resolve the risks.
- **Action Plan** – Corrective action plan defining the root cause and solutions and provides an approach for substantially completing corrective measures, including steps necessary to implement solutions.
- **Monitoring Efforts** – Program instituted to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures.
- **Demonstrated Progress** – Ability to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures and resolving the high-risk area.

In 2016, OIG began using the GAO criteria to measure the Department's progress. Since our last report, the Department has shown steady progress for many of its top management and performance challenges.

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2024, OIG identified five management challenges the Department faces. Overall, progress has been possible through the concerted actions of the Chief of Police (Chief), the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), and leadership and staff within the Department. This summary fulfills the OIG requirement under the *Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-531*, to identify the management challenges, assess the Department's progress in addressing each challenge, and submit this statement each year to the Department.

Top Management Challenges for Fiscal Year 2024

Protecting and Securing the Capitol Complex (Challenge 1)



Source: Senate.

Protecting and securing the Capitol Complex from various threats, such as terrorists (foreign and domestic), weapons of mass destruction, and violence in any form while at the same time protecting Congress and its staff and welcoming the public continues to be a major challenge. The events of January 6, 2021, and its aftermath, has forever changed the Department. Against this backdrop protection and security of the Capitol

Complex has never been more critical to the safeguarding of our democratic processes.

The events of January 6, 2021, forced the Department to assess and evaluate its policies, procedures, operations, and philosophy. As shown in Table 1, OIG issued seven reports as part of its review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The reports included 103 recommendations.

Table 1 – January 6, 2021, Reports and Recommendations

Report Number	Total Recommendations
2021-I-0003-A	8
2021-I-0003-B	26
2021-I-0003-C	10
2021-I-0003-D	21
2021-I-0003-E	12
2021-I-0003-F	15
2021-I-0003-G	11
Total	103

Source: OIG Generated.

Some recommendations involved the revision or updating of written policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Others involved training, additional resources, improved communication, and better coordination. OIG made recommendations regarding operational planning for events, command and control procedures, coordination of departmental and intra-agency assets, and the preparation, storage, and staging of protective equipment for major events, among others. The Department has closed 92 of the January 6, 2021, recommendations and continues to make progress on overall improvements. While commendable, the Department must continue to evolve and find the appropriate balance between traditional policing and protection of the Members, their

staff, the general public, and the Capitol Complex. Continued oversight and attention are also warranted given the issue's direct relevance to homeland security as well as the constant evolution of threats and changing technology. The Department must respond and deploy resources at a level of protection/security sufficient for scheduled or unanticipated events. Examples of such events are mass demonstrations, concerts, suspicious packages, land-based and airborne vehicles as well as changing and emerging threats within an open complex.



Addressing Increasing Threats to Members of Congress and their Families (Challenge 2)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

Threats against Members of Congress, although always a concern for USCP, have typically not led to violent acts. But things have changed. From anthrax-laced letters sent to Member offices in 2001, to the killing of 6 people and the wounding of 13 others including Representative Gabby Giffords in 2011, to the gunman opening fire in 2017 at the congressional softball game practice wounding then-Majority Whip of the House Stephen

Scalise to the events of January 6, 2021, and the 2022 attacks on Representative Lee Zeldin and the husband of then Speaker Nancy Pelosi, violence has become an increasing concern for the Department.

During FY 2023, additional attacks were made against Members of Congress and their staff. On February 10, 2023, Representative Angie Craig was assaulted in the elevator of her Washington, D.C., apartment building. On May 15, 2023, a man injured two members of Representative Connolly's district office staff with a baseball bat. On October 3, 2023, Representative Henry Cuellar was carjacked in Washington, D.C.

On July 26, 2023, USCP Chief of Police J. Thomas Manger testified before a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and the Committee on House Administration and stated that over the past seven years, threats against Members of Congress had increased by approximately 300 percent. The Chief further noted, "One

of the Department's greatest challenges is the retention of our Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) and Investigations Division Agents. Prior to January 6, 2021, DPD was staffed with 218 agents and 15 Supervisory Special Agents. Currently, DPD has 174 fully trained agents, 38 USB reserve officers, and 12 Supervisory Special Agents."

Previously, OIG made several recommendations designed to enhance security for Members of Congress. DPD received multiple recommendations for improvement. Those recommendations included use of civilian personnel to perform administrative functions; developing a trained "reserve force" to supplement DPD as necessary; assigning other units to support the DPD mission, such as Protective Intelligence, Counter-Surveillance and Containment and Emergency Response, and enhanced training opportunities for agents assigned to DPD.

The Department has already taken steps to enhance security for the Members. The Department regularly conducts security awareness training for Members and their staff. USCP conducts security surveys of the Washington, D.C., offices and residences as well as state and district offices and residences. Threat/risk assessments have been performed for the physical security of the Members of Congress and addressing protection-related needs directly with USCP resources or in conjunction with Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.

OIG will continue to monitor the Department's efforts for addressing this management challenge.

Strong, Integrated Internal Control Systems Still Needed (Challenge 3)

USCP has historically tended to resolve individual issues rather than strengthening the underlying systemically weak controls causing the issues. Managers are responsible for controlling the programs they oversee through internal control systems that bring about desired objectives, such as administering programs correctly and making payments accurately. Those internal controls consist of the policies, procedures, and organizational structures that collectively determine how a program is implemented and how requirements are met. In essence, internal controls are the tools managers use for ensuring that programs achieve intended results efficiently and effectively. They provide for program integrity and proper stewardship of resources. Because systemic control flaws can yield systemic program weaknesses—for example, unrealized objectives and improper payments—managers must continually assess and improve their internal control systems. Once a widespread deficiency is identified, managers must fix the problem before it undermines the program.

As a result of on-going work, and at the request of Congress, OIG conducted an inquiry into the contract for USCP pre-employment psychological evaluations. This work revealed numerous internal control failures that resulted in evaluations being conducted by personnel who did not meet the qualifications called for by best practices.

In recent years, however, USCP has incorporated several internal control enhancements that if fully developed could improve the internal control environment at USCP. For example, USCP published Directive [REDACTED], dated October 21, 2022, outlining the roles and responsibilities of the Internal Controls and Risk Management Coordination Team (ICRMCT). The Directive states that “the Department will establish, implement, and maintain the Internal Controls and Risk Management Program (ICRMP) to verify compliance with policies, procedures, rules, regulations, and applicable Federal laws.”

USCP’s FY 2021 Financial Statement audit report was the first financial statement audit report in which USCP had no significant deficiencies or material weaknesses. The FY 2022 audit also yielded no significant deficiencies or material weaknesses; however, OIG identified several internal control weaknesses that although they did not rise to the level of a significant deficiency or material weakness, still warranted the attention of the Department’s management. In numerous other recent reports, OIG noted non-compliance with Department policies and procedures, outdated policies and procedures, and other internal control weaknesses that if corrected could enhance the Department’s internal control program.

Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Department Training (Challenge 4)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

The USCP Department Strategic Plan 2021-2025, or DSP, details the forward-focused goals and objectives USCP will undertake over those 5 years to meet mission demands. According to the DSP, Objective 1.4, *Train and Develop Sworn and Civilian Personnel to Ensure a Ready, Able, and Professional USCP Workforce*, “enables the administration of robust training and employee development activities for

the entire workforce to close competency gaps, ensure leadership excellence, prepare employees for professional growth, and meet mission demands now and into the future. Key to Objective 1.4 is ensuring the Department invests appropriately in identifying, delivering, and managing the training that will position the USCP to meet future strategic mission requirements, including building a strong cadre of Department leaders.” However, OIG has identified areas of improvement for Department training in several of its reports.

In Report Number 2022-I-0003, *Review of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*, dated April 2022, OIG reviewed the Department's Training Services Bureau (TSB). The Bureau is responsible for planning, developing, and implementing Department-wide training programs. OIG found the Department's decentralized training structure was the reason for many training deficiencies that hinder objectives stated in the DSP. The Department's decentralized training structure created a lack of TSB oversight for in-service training and a lack of TSB involvement in training research and development. The Department also did not have a sufficient number of training instructors or adequate training space for effectively and efficiently completing entry-level and in-service classes at its training facility at Cheltenham, Maryland.

In Report Number 2022-I-0003, OIG also found USCP did not always adhere to training-related guidance and that its training policies and procedures were not consistent with the best practices of other Federal law enforcement agencies. USCP's accreditation process did not comply with those of its partner agencies, and the Department did not adhere to guidance related to training records. Furthermore, we found TSB should have increased oversight of cybersecurity and online training for compliance with guidance.

As part of its review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, OIG also identified areas of improvement for Department training in each of the following reports issued:

- Report Number 2021-I-0003-A, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Operational Planning and Intelligence*, dated February 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-B, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Civil Disturbance Unit and Intelligence*, dated March 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-C, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Counter-Surveillance and Threat Assessment*, dated April 2021
- Report Number OIG-2021-07, *Management Advisory Report: Containment Emergency Response Team Contractor*, dated May 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-D, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Containment Emergency Response Team and First Responders Unit*, dated June 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-E, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Command and Coordination Bureau*, dated July 2021

- Report Number 2021-I-0003-F, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Hazardous Incident Response Division and Canine (K-9) Unit*, dated August 2021
- Report Number 2021-I-0003-G, *Review of the Events Surrounding the January 6, 2021, Takeover of the U.S. Capitol, Flash Report: Dignitary Protection Division and Human Capital*, dated October 2021

In each of those reports, OIG made recommendations designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Department training. Recommendations included areas such as increasing TSB oversight for all training-related activity, formalizing a training research and development process, increasing training staff and space, implementing additional training guidance, and increasing joint training between USCP elements as well as between USCP and its partner agencies. OIG is monitoring the Department's efforts for addressing this management challenge.

Recruitment and Retention of a Qualified Work Force (Challenge 5)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

An organization's success is dependent upon the skills and dedication of its people. They are its most important asset. USCP relies on the men and women of the force to fulfill its critical mission of providing a safe environment that will allow the democratic process to be executed.

Many law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels, face the same challenges of recruiting and retaining qualified personnel.

Recruitment efforts from all levels of the profession are targeting a decreasing pool of eligible candidates. With evolving attitudes about employment, the public perception about law enforcement, and the psychological and economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, recruitment and retention has become more difficult. Additionally, the officers hired during the post-9/11 surge have now reached the minimum retirement age.

During FY 2020, 119 employees separated from the Department. During this same period, the Department hired only 92 new employees. In FY 2021, 171 employees separated from the Department. During that same period, the Department hired only 137 new employees. Throughout FY 2022, 213 employees separated from USCP, but the Department was able to hire 328 new employees. During FY 2023, 190 employees separated from the Department. During that same period, the Department hired 282 new employees. While hiring drastically increased during FYs 2022 and 2023, an increase in attrition from 119 in FY 2020 to 190 in FY 2023 demonstrates a trend that could create continued staffing shortages in the years ahead.

During Calendar Year (CY) 2021, USCP offered employees a \$3,000 retention bonus, and in CYs 2022 and 2023 USCP offered employees an \$8,000 retention bonus. The two most recent retention bonuses included service periods that end on December 31, 2023, and December 31, 2024, respectively. The retention bonuses have undoubtedly helped reduce attrition among Department employees, and without future retention bonuses USCP could face increased attrition in the years ahead as other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies continue to offer signing bonuses and other benefits to entice lateral transfers.

With the dramatic increase in the number of threats against Members of Congress over several years, the need for manpower has never been greater. As noted above, on July 26, 2023, USCP Chief of Police J. Thomas Manger testified before a joint hearing of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration and the Committee on House Administration and stated, "One of the Department's greatest challenges is the retention of our Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) and Investigations Division Agents. Prior to January 6, 2021, DPD was staffed with 218 agents and 15 Supervisory Special Agents. Currently, DPD has 174 fully trained agents, 38 USB reserve officers, and 12 Supervisory Special Agents."

The Department clearly recognizes the need to focus on recruitment, retention, and development of its workforce to effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission. OIG will continue to monitor the Department's progress toward meeting this management challenge.



