



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Top Management Challenges Facing the United States Capitol Police Fiscal Year 2023

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>Page</u> |
|---|-------------|
| Introduction | 1 |
| Top Management Challenges for Fiscal Year 2023 | 2 |
| Protecting and Securing the Capitol Complex (Challenge 1) | 2 |
| Addressing Increasing Threats to Members and their Families (Challenge 2) | 3 |
| Strong, Integrated Internal Control Systems Still Needed (Challenge 3) | 5 |
| Improving Efficiency and Effectiveness of Department Training (Challenge 4) | 6 |
| Recruitment and Retention of a Qualified Work Force (Challenge 5) | 8 |

Introduction

Each year, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepares a summary of the most significant management challenges facing the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department). The challenges reflect continuing vulnerabilities OIG identified over the last several years as well as new and emerging issues the Department will face in the coming year. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) uses five criteria that reflect whether agencies met, partially met, or did not meet issues on its High-Risk Series—*Dedicated Leadership Needed to Address Limited Progress in Most High Risk Areas*, GAO-21-119SP, dated March 2021. The five criteria are:

- **Leadership Commitment** – Demonstrated strong commitment and top leadership support.
- **Capacity** – Agency with the capacity (that is, people and resources) to resolve risks.
- **Action Plan** – Corrective action plan defining the root cause and solutions as well as providing for substantially completing corrective measures, including steps necessary for implementing recommended solutions.
- **Monitoring** – Program instituted that would monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures.
- **Demonstrated Progress** – Ability to demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures and resolving the high-risk area.

In 2016, OIG began using the GAO criteria to measure the Department's progress. Since our last report, the Department has shown steady progress for the majority of its top management and performance challenges.

For Fiscal Year (FY) 2023, OIG identified five management challenges the Department faces. Overall, progress has been possible through the concerted actions of the Chief of Police (Chief), the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), and leadership and staff within the Department. This summary fulfills the OIG requirement under the *Reports Consolidation Act of 2000, Public Law 106-531*, to identify the management challenges, assess the Department's progress in addressing each challenge, and submit this statement each year to the Department.

Top Management Challenges for Fiscal Year 2023

Protecting and Securing the Capitol Complex (Challenge 1)




Source: Unknown.

Protecting and securing the Capitol Complex from various threats, such as terrorists (foreign and domestic), weapons of mass destruction, and violence in any form while at the same time protecting Congress and its staff and welcoming the public continues to be a major challenge. The social, political, economic, and psychological impact of the global pandemic, followed by the historic events of January 6, 2021, and its aftermath, has forever changed the Department. Against the backdrop of the heightened political discourse and divisiveness, protection and security of the Capitol Complex has never been more critical to the safeguarding of our democratic processes.


Pandemic restrictions established nationwide and in Washington, D.C., had a major impact on USCP operations. Public access to the complex was initially halted, and the Department altered its manpower deployment and implemented safety procedures and protocols while still providing a safe environment for congressional personnel to conduct legislative business.

As the pandemic peaked and began to subside, restrictions were gradually lifted. The Department has demonstrated flexibility in adjusting its security posture as well as adapting to an increased flow of congressional personnel, their staff, and the general public as access continues to gradually return to normal.

The tragic events of January 6, 2021, forced the Department to assess and evaluate its policies, procedures, operations, and philosophy. [REDACTED] OIG issued seven reports as part of its review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021. The reports included 103 recommendations.



Some recommendations involved the revision or updating of written policies and standard operating procedures (SOPs). Others involved training, additional resources, improved communication, and better coordination. OIG made recommendations regarding operational planning for events, command and control procedures, coordination of departmental and intra-agency assets, and the preparation, storage, and staging of protective equipment for major events, among others. The Department has closed approximately 70 of the January 6, 2021 recommendations and continues to make progress on overall improvements. While commendable, the Department must continue to evolve and find the appropriate balance between traditional policing and protection of the Members, their staff, the general public, and the Capitol Complex. Continued oversight and attention is also warranted given the issue's direct relevance to homeland security as well as the constant evolution of threats and changing technology. The Department must respond and deploy resources at a level of protection/security sufficient for scheduled or unanticipated events. Examples of such events are mass demonstrations, concerts, suspicious packages, land-based and airborne vehicles as well as changing and emerging threats within an open complex.




Addressing Increasing Threats to Members of Congress and their Families (Challenge 2)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

Threats against Members of Congress, although always a concern for USCP, have typically not led to violent acts. But things have changed. From anthrax-laced letters sent to Member offices in 2001, to the killing of 6 people and the wounding of 13 others including Representative Gabby Giffords in 2011, to the gunman opening fire at the congressional softball game practice wounding then-Majority Whip of the House Stephen Scalise in 2017, and the events of January 6, 2021, violence has become an increasing concern for the Department.

In a November 21, 2022,

 USCP Chief of Police J. Thomas Manger stated that threats against Members of Congress increased dramatically over the past several years. From 2016 to 2021, for example, threats increased from 1,929 to 9,625—a 400-percent jump. In his testimony before the Committee on Rules and Administration on December 19, 2022, Chief Manger stated that in 2022 there were more than 9,000 threats against Members of Congress. The recent

attack on the husband of Speaker Nancy Pelosi and Representative Lee Zeldin punctuated the need for the Department to re-evaluate its protective operations as it applied to Members and their families.

Previously, OIG made several recommendations designed to enhance security for Members of Congress. The Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) received multiple recommendations for improvement. Those recommendations included use of civilian personnel to perform administrative functions; developing a trained "reserve force" to supplement DPD as necessary; assigning other units to support the DPD mission, such as Protective Intelligence, Counter-Surveillance and Containment and Emergency Response, and enhanced training opportunities for agents assigned to DPD.

The Department has already taken steps to enhance security for the Members. The Department regularly conducts security awareness training for Members and staff. USCP conducts security surveys of the Washington, D.C., offices and residences as well as state and district offices and residences. Threat/risk assessments have been performed for the physical security of the Members of Congress and addressing protection-related needs directly with USCP resources or in conjunction with Federal, state, and local law enforcement partners.

The Department continues to enhance its security posture for Members, their families, and their staffs. [REDACTED]


The Department understands the critical role their law enforcement partners play in providing security for the Members and their families. [REDACTED] the expansion of the number of Memorandum of Understanding with local law enforcement agencies to enhance security for Members and their families outside of the Washington, D.C., area is one tool the Department plans to leverage its partnerships. [REDACTED] agents assigned to the two regional field offices in Tampa, Florida and San Francisco, California have proven invaluable in quickly responding to threats in the region, as well as assisting in law enforcement coordination and assisting DPD with advance work. Accordingly, the Department is considering expanding the number of regional field offices around the country to enhance those capabilities.

OIG will continue to monitor the Department's efforts for addressing this management challenge.

Strong, Integrated Internal Control Systems Still Needed (Challenge 3)

USCP has historically tended to resolve individual issues rather than strengthening the underlying systemically weak controls causing the issues. Managers are responsible for controlling the programs they oversee through internal control systems that bring about desired objectives, such as administering programs correctly and making payments accurately. Those internal controls consist of the policies, procedures, and organizational structures that collectively determine how a program is implemented and how requirements are met. In essence, internal controls are the tools managers use for ensuring that programs achieve intended results efficiently and effectively. They provide for program integrity and proper stewardship of resources. Because systemic control flaws can yield systemic program weaknesses—for example, unrealized objectives and improper payments—managers must continually assess and improve their internal control systems. Once a widespread deficiency is identified, managers must fix the problem before it undermines the program.

In recent years, however, USCP has incorporated several internal control enhancements that if fully developed could improve the internal control environment at USCP.



USCP's FY 2021 Financial Statement audit report was the first financial statement audit report in which USCP had no significant deficiencies or material weaknesses. The FY 2022 audit also yielded no significant deficiencies or material weaknesses; however, OIG identified several internal control weaknesses that although they did not rise to the level of a significant deficiency or material weakness, still warranted the attention of the Department's management. In numerous other recent reports, OIG noted non-compliance with Department policies and procedures, outdated policies and procedures, and other internal control weaknesses that if corrected could enhance the Department's internal control program.

Improving the Efficiency and Effectiveness of Department Training (Challenge 4)

[REDACTED] The USCP Department Strategic Plan 2021-2025, or DSP, details the forward-focused goals and objectives USCP will undertake over those 5 years to meet mission demands. According to the DSP, Objective 1.4, *Train and Develop Sworn and Civilian Personnel to Ensure a Ready, Able, and Professional USCP Workforce*, “enables the administration of robust training and employee development activities for the entire workforce to close competency gaps, ensure leadership excellence, prepare employees for professional growth, and meet mission demands now and into the future. Key to Objective 1.4 is ensuring the Department invests appropriately in identifying, delivering, and managing the training that will position the USCP to meet future strategic mission requirements, including building a strong cadre of Department leaders.” However, OIG has identified areas of improvement for Department training in several of its reports.


In Report Number 2022-I-0003, *Review of the United States Capitol Police Training Services Bureau*, dated April 2022, OIG reviewed the Department’s Training Services Bureau (TSB). The Bureau is responsible for planning, developing, and implementing Department-wide training programs. OIG found the Department’s decentralized training structure was the reason for many training deficiencies that hinder objectives stated in the DSP. The Department’s decentralized training structure created a lack of TSB oversight for in-service training and a lack of TSB involvement in training research and development. The Department also did not have a sufficient number of training instructors or adequate training space for effectively and efficiently completing entry-level and in-service classes at its training facility at Cheltenham, Maryland.

In Report Number 2022-I-0003, OIG also found USCP did not always adhere to training-related guidance and that its training policies and procedures were not consistent with the best practices of other Federal law enforcement agencies. USCP’s accreditation process did not comply with those of its partner agencies, and the Department did not adhere to guidance related to training records. Furthermore, we found TSB should have increased oversight of cybersecurity and online training for compliance with guidance.

As part of its review of the events surrounding the takeover of the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, OIG also identified areas of improvement for Department training [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



██████████ OIG made recommendations designed to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of Department training. Recommendations included areas such as increasing TSB oversight for all training-related activity, formalizing a training research and development process, increasing training staff and space, implementing additional training guidance, and increasing joint training between USCP elements as well as between USCP and its partner agencies. OIG is monitoring the Department's efforts for addressing this management challenge.

Recruitment and Retention of a Qualified Work Force (Challenge 5)



Source: Senate Photo Gallery.

An organization's success is dependent upon the skills and dedication of its people. They are its most important asset. USCP relies on the men and women of the force to fulfill its critical mission of providing a safe environment that will allow the democratic process to be executed.

Many law enforcement agencies at the Federal, state, and local levels, face the same challenges of recruiting and retaining qualified personnel. Recruitment efforts from all levels of the profession are targeting a decreasing pool of eligible candidates. With evolving attitudes about employment, the public perception about law enforcement, and the psychological and economic impact of the COVID 19 pandemic, recruitment and retention has become more difficult. Additionally, the officers hired during the post-9/11 surge have now reached the minimum retirement age.

During FY 2020, 119 employees separated from the Department. During this same period, the Department hired only 92 new employees. In FY 2021, 171 employees separated from the Department. During that same period, the Department hired only 137 new employees. Throughout FY 2022, 213 employees separated from USCP, but the Department was able to hire 328 new employees. While hiring drastically increased during FY 2022, an increase in attrition from 119 in FY 2020 to 213 in FY 2022 demonstrates a trend that could create continued staffing shortages in the years ahead.

During Calendar Year (CY) 2021, USCP offered employees a \$3,000 retention bonus, and in CY 2022 USCP offered employees an \$8,000 retention bonus. The retention bonuses included service periods that end on December 31, 2022, and December 31, 2023, respectively. The retention bonuses have undoubtedly helped reduce attrition among Department employees, and without future retention bonuses USCP could face increased attrition in the years ahead as other Federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies continue to offer signing bonuses and other benefits to entice lateral transfers.

With the dramatic increase in the number of threats against Members of Congress over several years, the need for manpower has never been greater. OIG has made several recommendations related to increasing manpower for DPD and other entities such as the Canine Unit, civilianizing certain positions in the Department held by sworn officers, hiring of additional analyst for Intelligence and Interagency Coordination Division (IICD), and increasing manpower for the Threat Assessment Section. The Department is looking increase staffing for the Protective Services Bureau with the expansion of counter-surveillance teams, protective intelligence teams, and counter-assault teams. According to the Security Recommendations Memo, the Department has requested 64 additional DPD agents in the FY 2023 budget.

The development of future leadership and the preparation of succession plans would help the Department continue to move forward into the future. As experienced employees retire throughout the Department, they leave behind critical gaps in leadership and institutional knowledge, which can adversely affect the Department's ability to carry out its diverse responsibilities and missions and effectively respond to urgent issues.

OIG has made several recommendations regarding a rotational policy and career development. In 2013, OIG recommended increasing the number of officers available to supplement DPD to provide more training opportunities, reduce overtime costs, and ease the transition of officers into DPD [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In 2019, OIG recommended a rotational policy, along with a career development track for DPD that would assist management in developing a workforce with the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve organizational goals [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In 2022, OIG made recommendations for a rotational policy for specialty units and to consider other areas of the Department that could benefit from such a policy to help develop well-rounded officers who could serve future leaders. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The same report also recommended a formal career progression policy for officers and officials at all levels.

According to [REDACTED], the Department is considering transitioning Protective Service Bureau agents to Job Series 1811, Criminal Investigator. Presently, the Department is inconsistent with Office of Personnel Management (OPM) standards and other law enforcement agencies in its classification of Special Agents as Job Series 083. Such a change in classification would allow the hiring of Job Series 1811s from other Federal agencies. It would also allow the rotation of special agents between protective and investigative assignments—a change that would help develop a well-rounded workforce and reduce the likelihood of burnout.

[REDACTED] also states the Department plans to expand its Regional Field Offices. There are two regional offices, one in Tampa and another in San Francisco. The Department will look to expand the regional field office concept with additional offices, which would provide better coverage nationwide for responding more quickly to threats in the region, assist with law enforcement coordination, and assist DPD with advance work.

The Department clearly recognizes the need to focus on recruitment, retention, and development of its workforce to effectively and efficiently accomplish its mission. OIG will continue to monitor the Department's progress toward meeting this management challenge.



