



U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Office of Inspector General

DOE-OIG-25-24

June 25, 2025

Allegation Concerning the National Nuclear Security Administration's Mismanagement of Its \$90 Million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting System



INSPECTION REPORT



Department of Energy
Washington, DC 20585

June 25, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY

SUBJECT: Inspection Report: *Allegation Concerning the National Nuclear Security Administration's Mismanagement of Its \$90 Million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting System*

The attached report discusses our inspection of an allegation regarding productivity weaknesses and lack of deliverables by a contractor responsible for supporting the National Nuclear Security Administration's \$90 million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting (SAFER) system. In August 2023, the Office of Inspector General received an allegation that although SAFER was halfway through its 5-year contract period, the contractor had not provided any deliverables and had been "staggeringly unproductive given the money spent." We did not substantiate the allegation. However, we identified inadequate project planning and management of the SAFER system and concluded that the National Nuclear Security Administration could not demonstrate how the system improved oversight of its safety programs across the enterprise. This report contains three recommendations that, if fully implemented, should improve the management of the current SAFER contract and help inform future information technology projects. For instance, we made recommendations related to establishing performance measures and key performance indicators to monitor the success and outcomes of projects and ensuring that data management practices and project management requirements are followed. Management concurred with our recommendations.

We conducted this inspection from November 2023 through March 2025 in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency's *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* (December 2020). We appreciated the cooperation and assistance received during this inspection.

A handwritten signature in blue ink, reading "Sarah Nelson", is positioned above the typed name.

Sarah Nelson
Assistant Inspector General
for Management
Performing the Duties of the Inspector General
Office of Inspector General

cc: Chief of Staff
Acting Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration

DOE OIG HIGHLIGHTS

Allegation Concerning the National Nuclear Security Administration's Mismanagement of Its \$90 Million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting System

June 25, 2025

Why We Performed This Inspection

In August 2023, the Office of Inspector General received an allegation that a contractor had not provided any deliverables supporting the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) \$90 million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting (SAFER) system. The allegation claimed that the project was halfway through its 5-year contract period, but it had been “staggeringly unproductive given the money spent.”

We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding alleged productivity weaknesses and lack of deliverables from the contractor supporting NNSA's SAFER system.

What We Found

We did not substantiate the allegation that a contractor had productivity weaknesses and had not provided any deliverables on its project with NNSA. However, we identified inadequate project planning and management of the SAFER system by NNSA. For instance, key performance indicators were not developed to measure project success. In addition, user acceptance criteria was not established to measure the success of the development process and ensure that delivered functionality aligned with user requirements. Further, a required Contractor Performance Assessment Report was not completed for the base year of the contract but was completed in subsequent years.

Based on feedback provided by SAFER users and a lack of acceptance criteria to measure the success of the development process for the safety programs, we question whether SAFER is meeting user needs. Although not fully implemented, we were unable to obtain evidence that SAFER had produced widespread benefits and improved oversight across the NNSA enterprise.

As a result of the weaknesses identified, NNSA may be unable to determine the overall health of its safety programs and potential improvements needed to those programs. The lack of progress in completing actions outlined in the *Federal Data Strategy* may also have hindered effective data-driven decision making. Without improvements, NNSA may continue to encounter weaknesses related to managing the SAFER project, which could delay project progress.

What We Recommend

We made three recommendations related to establishing quantifiable metrics to measure the performance of NNSA's investments and ensuring that data management practices and project management requirements are followed. These recommendations should improve the management of the SAFER project and help inform future technology projects.

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Background and Objective

The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Office of Environment, Safety, and Health (NA-ESH) is responsible for providing corporate safety and health programs, responsive and efficient packaging and transportation, nuclear materials integration, enterprise waste management, and sustainable environmental stewardship. NA-ESH previously identified that its approach to safety oversight was not meeting expectations for efficiency or effectiveness to support the NNSA mission. To address this concern, NA-ESH chartered the Safety Oversight Pilot, which has evolved into the Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting (SAFER) project. The goal of SAFER was to integrate data from information systems across the enterprise and employ the use of data analytics to provide more effective information for decision makers to actively monitor and manage the health and risk of NNSA's safety programs. To accomplish this goal, project objectives were developed to determine the health of NNSA safety programs and the factors impacting those safety programs. Specifically, the SAFER platform needed to integrate health metrics and key performance indicators from safety programs; integrate information reporting on the effectiveness of safety programs; provide insights on resources, regulations, and external factors impacting the health of safety programs; and provide insights from trends and analysis for continuous monitoring and forecasting.

In April 2021, NNSA awarded a \$90 million firm-fixed-price contract¹ to provide configuration and user support services across the NNSA enterprise for 12 safety programs, such as fire protection, electrical safety, and radiation protection. NNSA awarded the contract with a 1-year base effort and four 1-year option periods. As of January 2025, over \$66 million has been spent on the system.

In August 2023, the Office of Inspector General received an allegation that a contractor had not provided any deliverables on the SAFER project with NNSA. The allegation claimed that the project was halfway through its 5-year contract period, but it has been "staggeringly unproductive given the money spent."

We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding alleged productivity weaknesses and lack of deliverables from the contractor supporting NNSA's SAFER system.

¹ According to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 16.202, a firm-fixed-price contract provides a firm price that is not subject to any adjustment based on the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract. This contract type places upon the contractor maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.

Results of Review


UNSUBSTANTIATED ALLEGATION BUT PROJECT MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES AND LACK OF IMPROVED OVERSIGHT IDENTIFIED

We did not substantiate the allegation that a contractor had productivity weaknesses and had not provided any deliverables on the \$90 million SAFER project with NNSA. Rather, the contractor provided NNSA with the necessary software, services, and cloud-computing hosting infrastructure to configure the SAFER platform.

Although we did not substantiate the allegation, we identified numerous issues related to NNSA's mismanagement of the SAFER project. Based on our analysis of user data, interviews with officials, and a review of documentation, we concluded that NNSA was unable to demonstrate how SAFER is meeting user needs or improving the oversight of safety programs across the NNSA enterprise.

Project Management Weaknesses

By the end of the contract period of performance (March 31, 2026), 12 safety programs are anticipated to be configured and implemented within SAFER related to areas such as fire protection, electrical safety, and radiation protection. After almost 4 years of work and over \$66 million spent on the project, 10 of 12 safety programs have been completed² (see Appendix 1).



² A completed safety program is defined by the current project manager to mean that user interfaces have been built at Headquarters and across the NNSA enterprise, the sites' data has been integrated to the maximum extent possible, and no additional changes are expected to the user interfaces. It does not mean that the safety programs are actively used to improve operations.

Throughout our review, we identified numerous instances of inadequate project planning and issues related to NNSA’s management of the SAFER project. For instance:

- The former project manager had not developed a thorough performance work statement to define detailed expectations related to the project schedule or deliverables. FAR³ states that performance work statements should describe the required results in clear, specific, and objective terms with measurable outcomes and enable the assessment of work performance against measurable performance standards. Although an NNSA official asserted that the performance work statement included a project schedule, our review of the schedule found that it lacked significant details. For example, while Year 1 showed that four safety programs should have been completed, it did not specify which safety programs or timeframes for completion (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Performance Work Statement Scope and Schedule

3.0 SCOPE & SCHEDULE

The Contractor will provide Configuration and User Support Services for twelve (12) safety programs over five years. These programs include but are not limited to the safety programs listed below. A schedule of safety programs to be configured on an annual basis is also shown below.

Beryllium	Contractor Assurance	Conduct of Operations
Criticality Safety	Electrical Safety	Emergency Management
Explosive Safety	Fire Protection	Packaging and Transportation
Quality Assurance	Radiation Protection	Safety Basis
Waste Management	Worker Safety and Health	

Year	1	2	3	4	5
Safety Programs(s) Completed	4	3	3	1	1

Image Source: U.S. Department of Energy National Nuclear Security Administration (DOE/NNSA) Office of Safety, Infrastructure, and Operations Performance Work Statement, Subset of Section 3.0 Scope & Schedule (March 18, 2021)

- NNSA had not developed a requirements document approved by the project manager and customer representatives that detailed functional, operational, and acceptance criteria for the 10 completed safety programs, as required by Department Order 415.1, *Information*

³ FAR 37.602.

*Technology Project Management.*⁴ The current project manager confirmed that formal user requirements and acceptance criteria were not developed for each safety program, and instead, each safety program was uniquely defined by a group of subject matter experts from across NNSA. Specifically, this group defined the keywords used to filter data, defined the data sources to be integrated into SAFER, defined the visualizations the contractor should build, and iterated on the safety programs with the contractor. However, acceptance criteria should have been developed as it is essential for projects to provide a clear and detailed set of conditions that must be met before a deliverable is considered complete. The criteria measures the success of the development process, ensuring that the delivered functionality aligns with user requirements.

- While the former project manager had developed a project plan, the plan did not clearly outline all aspects of the project from initiation to completion. Department Order 415.1 requires a project management plan that includes resources, key decision points, and a project schedule documenting the entire lifecycle of the project.
- During our review, NNSA could not provide evidence that it developed or used key performance indicators, an important aspect of project management to determine the success and outcomes of a project. An NNSA official also confirmed that key performance indicators had not been developed for the SAFER project. Key performance indicators are used to measure quantifiable progress toward an intended result, provide a focus for strategic and operational improvement, and create an analytical basis for decision making.
- The former project management team had not adequately planned for potential barriers that ultimately contributed to project delays such as establishing intermediary servers, determining data sources, and overcoming concerns with sharing data. Officials stated that sharing data between field offices and management and operating contractors had been an ongoing issue for years. In June 2019, the Office of Management and Budget issued Memorandum M-19-18, *Federal Data Strategy – A Framework for Consistency*, which established a *Federal Data Strategy*⁵ of operational principles and best practices aimed to improve the Federal Government’s approach to data stewardship. The Memorandum noted that when allocating resources, agencies should prioritize data that identifies problems, informs solutions, and provides transparency for results delivered. The Office of Management and Budget directed agencies to assess and proactively address the procedural, regulatory, and legal barriers to sharing data within and across Federal agencies, as well as with external partners. We also determined that neither the former nor current project managers requested a data management plan. Although not

⁴ The purpose of Department Order 415.1 is to provide the Department, including NNSA, with information technology (IT) project management guidance for the acquisition and management of IT projects and initiatives and applies to projects with a total project cost greater than or equal to \$25 million.

⁵ The *Federal Data Strategy* complements statutory requirements including the Paperwork Reduction Act, the E-Government Act of 2002, the Privacy Act of 1974, the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014, the Confidential Information Protection and Statistical Efficiency Act of 2002, the Freedom of Information Act, the Information Quality Act, the Federal Records Act, and the Foundations for Evidence-Based Policymaking Act of 2018, among others.

required to be submitted by the contractor, this document outlines how data will be collected, stored, and handled throughout the project lifecycle. More diligence during the planning phase to overcome these barriers before the contract was awarded may have alleviated some of the delays.


- The former project manager had not requested, and the contractor had not provided, formal monthly status reports or quarterly milestone schedule plans/status reports, as required by the contract. These types of reports can help ensure a project's success by providing a comprehensive overview of the status of the project, as well as information needed to make informed decisions related to future activities. These reports also could have informed NNSA officials on whether the contractor was meeting deliverable schedules. As a result of our inspection, the current project manager began requiring monthly status reports and quarterly milestone schedule plans/status reports from the contractor.
- Despite being required by FAR,⁶ contracting officials failed to complete a Contractor Performance Assessment Report for the base year of the contract to evaluate the contractor's performance and its ability to provide quality products and services. This report is required to be prepared at least annually. We noted that Contractor Performance Assessment Reports were completed in subsequent years. A Contractor Performance Assessment Report is used to hold a contractor accountable and provides a record, both positive and negative, on a contractor's performance during a specific time period. Past performance information is relevant for future source selection purposes, regarding a contractor's actions under previously awarded contracts or orders. It includes, for example, the contractor's record of adherence to schedules and reasonable and cooperative behavior and commitment to customer satisfaction.

To NNSA's credit, when the current project manager took over in February 2023, the project manager implemented a variety of mechanisms to better manage the contract. For example, the current project manager began developing quarterly project plans and utilizing project management tools such as agile sprints to help with scheduling, managing, and prioritizing specific tasks and resources for the SAFER project. The individual also improved the process for submitting tickets when problems within the system occur.

Safety Programs Within the Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting System

At the time of our review, we found that SAFER had data integrity issues and included redundant information from other existing systems. In addition, the lack of acceptance criteria did not allow for a determination on whether the system was meeting user needs. Further, we were unable to obtain sufficient evidence that implementation of existing SAFER safety programs had contributed to more effective or efficient oversight of those programs across the NNSA enterprise.

⁶ FAR 42.1501–42.1503.



Based on feedback provided by SAFER users and a lack of acceptance criteria to measure the success of the development process for the safety programs, we question whether SAFER is meeting user needs. In July 2024, we conducted a survey of 281 users at 9 sites across the NNSA enterprise and Headquarters to obtain user feedback on SAFER.⁷ Our survey results illustrated that 46 of 113 respondents (41 percent) had concerns with the integrity of the data in the SAFER system and questioned the completeness and accuracy of the data. User responses also noted that SAFER created some redundancy with other systems in use. Further, 88 (78 percent) respondents still relied on information from existing systems to perform their

responsibilities regardless of its availability in SAFER. Despite the estimated \$90 million expenditure on the SAFER system, NNSA indicated that the purpose of SAFER was not to replace existing systems or sources of information and was not concerned about the existence of redundant information.

Near the end of our review, NNSA noted that SAFER has saved safety professionals at Sandia National Laboratories hours of work by integrating multiple datasets and substantially reducing the time to gather and share information. While we commend NNSA for beginning to realize benefits, we found that implementation of the completed safety programs had resulted in limited improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of oversight of those programs across the NNSA enterprise. NNSA stated that SAFER provided decisionmakers with more visibility and insight to actively measure and monitor the health and risk of the enterprise's safety-related programs. However, we determined that SAFER, in its current state, was not providing this level of information. For example, NNSA could not demonstrate that SAFER had provided meaningful information on factors that are impacting the health and risk of its worker safety and health or packaging and transportation safety programs.

IMPACT

Based on the SAFER project planning and management weaknesses identified during our review, we determined that NNSA may be unable to determine the overall health of its safety programs and potential improvements needed to those programs. For instance, NNSA may be unable to determine whether health metrics and key performance indicators from safety programs have been adequately integrated or measure quantifiable progress towards continuous monitoring and forecasting based on trends and analysis. Failure to adequately meet project objectives would also put into question how much of the project's estimated \$90 million cost was wasted on unproductive efforts. Without improvements, NNSA may continue to encounter weaknesses related to managing the SAFER project, which could delay project progress. The issues identified during our review are not unlike those highlighted by the Government Accountability Office in its recent report, *National Nuclear Security Administration: Fully*

⁷ Since we conducted the survey, NNSA informed us that several more safety programs had been completed. As of January 2025, 10 of 12 safety programs had been completed.

Incorporating Leading Practices for Agency Reform Would Benefit Enhanced Mission Delivery Initiative (GAO-25-106675, February 2025), which indicated that NNSA should establish and document goals and associated outcomes for all implemented and ongoing reforms.

In addition, our report, *Fiscal Year 2024 Management Challenges at the Department of Energy*, identified that the Department is lagging on completion and integration of actions outlined in the *Federal Data Strategy* action plans, such as those related to establishing a framework for data management, data governance, establishing an enterprise data catalog, and assessing data management maturity. Incorporating certain aspects of the *Federal Data Strategy* throughout all phases of the project could have not only alleviated barriers encountered but could have also better positioned NNSA to improve the oversight of its safety programs by enhancing the use of data analytics to provide more effective data-driven decision making. NA-ESH agreed with this conclusion and further noted that the use of disparate systems across the NNSA enterprise makes it difficult for cross-complex analytics, forecasting, or evaluation reporting and often leads to inconsistent metadata tagging, which causes errors that hinder the reliability and usability of data.

Recommendations

To help determine the success of SAFER and identify any needed changes, we recommend that the Associate Administrator for Environment, Safety, and Health, NNSA:

1. Establish performance measures and key performance indicators to monitor the success and outcomes of the SAFER project; and
2. Develop user acceptance criteria for the safety programs, as required within Department Order 415.1.

To help ensure that future IT projects are effectively managed, we recommend that the Associate Administrator for Environment, Safety, and Health, NNSA, in coordination with the Associate Administrator for Information Management, NNSA:

3. Identify and use SAFER lessons learned to inform procedures to ensure that effective data management practices and project management requirements, such as those included in Department Order 415.1, are appropriately used in future IT projects.

Management Comments

Management concurred with our findings and recommendations and indicated that it is committed to following Government-wide guidance on data sharing, data management, software procurement, and software project management. Management also stated that it would propose a set of key performance indicators to monitor the success and outcomes of the SAFER platform, propose a set of acceptance criteria for SAFER safety management program modules, and document any lessons learned from the SAFER project to use in any future software procurements.

Management comments are included in Appendix 3.

Office of Inspector General Response

Management's comments and planned corrective actions were responsive to our recommendations.

Status of Safety Programs Within the Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting System

Safety Program	Function	Status
Maintenance	Track the health of real property assets in National Nuclear Security Administration facilities and investigate maintenance program trends.	Completed
Fire Protection	Track planned and unplanned impairments, reported fires, unwanted alarms, issues, deficiencies, and corrective actions.	Completed
Electrical Safety	View information related to electrical incidents and track the health of electrical assets.	Completed
Radiation Protection	View information related to worker dose.	Completed
Quality Assurance	View information related to quality assurance program compliance criteria.	Completed
Worker Safety and Health	View information related to worker injury, illness, and exposure; chemical safety; and vehicle safety.	Completed
Packaging and Transportation	Track shipments and investigate packaging and transportation issues, corrective actions, and assessments.	Completed
Safety Basis	Track and trend changes to safety basis and safety analyses and questions under review for existing facilities.	Completed
Contractor Assurance	View activities designed to identify, address, and prevent deficiencies; complete corrective actions; and share in lessons learned.	Completed
Emergency Preparedness	Report and track emergency readiness.	Completed
Criticality Safety	No functions have been established yet.	Not Completed
Explosive Safety	No functions have been established yet.	Not Completed

A completed safety program is defined by the current project manager to mean that user interfaces have been built at Headquarters and across the National Nuclear Security Administration enterprise, the sites' data has been integrated to the maximum extent possible, and no additional changes are expected to the user interfaces. It does not mean that the safety programs are actively used to improve operations.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Objective

We initiated this inspection to determine the facts and circumstances regarding alleged productivity weaknesses and lack of deliverables from the contractor supporting the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting (SAFER) system.

Scope

We primarily performed this inspection remotely from November 2023 through March 2025 at NNSA Headquarters located in Washington, DC. Additional information was also obtained from 14 NNSA locations, including: Livermore Field Office and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in Livermore, California; Nevada Field Office and Nevada National Security Site in Las Vegas, Nevada; Los Alamos Field Office and Los Alamos National Laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico; Sandia Field Office in Albuquerque, New Mexico; Sandia National Laboratories in Albuquerque, New Mexico, Livermore, California, Kauai, Hawaii, and Tonopah, Nevada; NNSA Production Office and Pantex Plant in Amarillo, Texas; NNSA Production Office and Y-12 National Security Complex in Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Kansas City Field Office and Kansas City National Security Campus in Kansas City, Missouri; and Savannah River Field Office and Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina. Our review covered over 4 years of NNSA's 5-year SAFER contract, which began incurring costs in April 2021. The inspection was conducted under Office of Inspector General project number S24TG001.

Methodology

To accomplish our audit objective, we:

- Reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and directives related to project and contract management.
- Held discussions with NNSA officials, including contractor staff associated with the SAFER project.
- Reviewed documentation pertaining to the SAFER project, including the initial project plan and performance work statement.
- Obtained a listing of SAFER users from NNSA in July 2024 of individuals who had logged into the system at least twice within 60 days. We surveyed the users to obtain user feedback on SAFER and included responses of those using the safety programs.

We conducted our inspection in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation* (December 2020) as put forth by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity

and Efficiency. We believe that the work performed provides a reasonable basis for our conclusions.

Management officials waived an exit conference on May 28, 2025.

Management Comments



Department of Energy
Under Secretary for Nuclear Security
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration
Washington, DC 20585



MEMORANDUM FOR THE SENIOR OFFICIAL PERFORMING THE DUTIES OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL

FROM:

TERESA M. ROBBINS
ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY
AND ADMINISTRATOR, NNSA

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Teresa M. Robbins".

SUBJECT:

Response to the Office of Inspector General (OIG) Draft Report,
*Allegation Concerning the National Nuclear Security Administration's
Mismanagement of Its \$90 Million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting,
Evaluation, and Reporting System (S24TG001)*

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the subject draft report. The National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting (SAFER) project integrates data for safety management programs across the Nuclear Security Enterprise and enables data sharing and utilization among NNSA's Office of Environment, Safety, and Health; NNSA field offices; and management and operating contractors for NNSA's laboratories, plants, and sites.

NNSA is committed to following government-wide guidance on data sharing, data management, software procurement, and software project management. The attached management decision provides detailed responses to the report's recommendations. If you have any questions regarding this response, please contact Mr. George Webb, Acting Director, Audits and Internal Affairs, at (240) 306-7709.

Attachment

Attachment

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION **Management Decision**

Allegation Concerning the National Nuclear Security Administration's Mismanagement of Its \$90 Million Safety, Analytics, Forecasting, Evaluation, and Reporting (SAFER) System (S24TG001)

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) recommends that the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) Associate Administrator for Environment, Safety, and Health (NA-ESH):

Recommendation 1: Establish performance measures and key performance indicators to monitor the success and outcomes of the SAFER project.

Management Response: Concur. The NA-ESH SAFER program manager will propose a set of key performance indicators to monitor the success and outcomes of the SAFER platform and circulate the set among the SAFER Steering Committee and stakeholders for their input before finalization. NA-ESH will draft the key performance indicators by May 31, 2025, and expects the indicators to be finalized by September 30, 2025.

Recommendation 2: Develop user acceptance criteria for the safety programs, as required within Department Order 415.1.

Management Response: Concur. The NA-ESH SAFER program manager will propose a set of acceptance criteria for SAFER safety management program modules and circulate the criteria among the SAFER Steering Committee and past and present working groups for their input before finalization. NA-ESH will draft the acceptance criteria by May 31, 2025, in alignment with Recommendation 1, and expects the acceptance criteria to be finalized by September 30, 2025.

OIG recommends that NA-ESH, in coordination with the NNSA Office of the Associate Administrator for Information Management and Chief Information Office (NA-IM):

Recommendation 3: Identify and use SAFER lessons learned to inform procedures to ensure that effective data management practices and project management requirements, such as those included in Department Order 415.1, are appropriately used in future IT projects.

Management Response: Concur. The NA-ESH SAFER program manager will coordinate with the NA-IM enterprise architect to document lessons learned from the SAFER project. The lessons learned document will then be provided to NA-IM for appropriate consideration and use in any future software procurements and the NNSA enterprise model for data sharing and analytics. The lessons learned document will be completed by December 31, 2025.

FEEDBACK

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