



UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Pre-screener Program

Investigative Number 2019-I-0007

December 2019

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**UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
WASHINGTON, DC 20003**

INSPECTOR GENERAL

PREFACE

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepared this report pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. It is one of a series of audits, reviews, and investigative and special reports OIG prepares periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to the United States Capitol Police (USCP) to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office or function under review. Our work was based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

We developed our recommendations based on the best knowledge available to OIG and discussed the draft findings with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that the recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to those contributing to the preparation of this report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "M. A. Bolton".

Michael A. Bolton
Inspector General

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

Government Accountability Office	GAO
Office of Inspector General	OIG
Standard Operating Procedure	SOP
Training Services Bureau	TSB
Uniformed Services Bureau	USB
United States Capitol Police	USCP or Department

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

According to United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) Directive [REDACTED] [REDACTED] October 16, 2018, exterior pre-screeners are the first stage of the typical security screening process. The Directive states:

[REDACTED]

In accordance with our annual plan, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed the USCP Pre-screener Program to determine whether (1) the organizational structure and training for the program was the most efficient and effective, and (2) the Department complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. Our scope included the Pre-screener Program organizational structure, training, and compliance with policies and procedures.

While it had an adequate organizational structure for its program, we believe the Department could increase its efficiency and effectiveness if it implemented additional training. The Department did not provide its pre-screeners with any specialized training. In addition, the Department's entry-level training only briefly reviewed pre-screening techniques and the Department did not provide any in-service training on the subject. Additional training would have provided personnel with the opportunity to increase competencies and reinforce standards of conduct within the Pre-screener Program.

The Department lacked policies and procedures for its Pre-screener Program, and existing guidance did not consider the role pre-screeners [REDACTED] [REDACTED] In addition, pre-screener positioning and readiness was frequently inconsistent with Department guidance. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] On several occasions and while on post, pre-screeners often appeared to be distracted by their mobile phones. The Department could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its Pre-screener Program if it implemented detailed pre-screening guidance. See Appendix A for a complete list of recommendations.

On November 21, 2019, we provided a draft report to the Department for comment and attached the response in its entirety in Appendix B.

BACKGROUND

United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) Directive [REDACTED], October 16, 2018, identifies exterior pre-screeners as the first stage of the typical security screening process. The Directive states:

[REDACTED]

According to correspondence between USCP and its stakeholders, the Department increased use of pre-screening at various building access points in response to the rise in terrorist events and the tactics displayed by homegrown violent extremists and international terrorists.

The Department's Uniformed Services Bureau (USB) is one of the three operational bureaus reporting to the Assistant Chief of Police for Uniformed Operations. USB has a Capitol Division, Senate Division, House Division, and Library Division. USB responsibilities include providing police services and security for the Capitol Building and grounds, Senate Office Buildings, House Office Buildings, and the Library of Congress.

The USCP Training Services Bureau (TSB) is responsible for planning, developing, and implementing Department-wide training programs. TSB is also responsible for the Department's entry-level training program.

OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

In accordance with our annual plan, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) assessed the USCP Pre-screener Program to determine whether (1) the organizational structure and training for the Program was the most efficient and effective, and (2) the Department complied with applicable policies and procedures as well as applicable laws, regulations, and best practices. Our scope included the Pre-screener Program organizational structure, training, and compliance with policies and procedures.

To accomplish our objectives, we interviewed Department officials. We conducted site visits to observe all USCP pre-screener posts. We reviewed correspondence between USCP and its stakeholders related to implementation of the Pre-screener Program. We also reviewed policies and procedures related to the Pre-screener Program including those in draft form. Furthermore, we reviewed Government Accountability Office (GAO) guidance.

OIG conducted this assessment in Washington, D.C., from August through October 2019. We did not conduct an audit, the objective of which would be the expression of an opinion on Department programs. Accordingly, we did not express such an opinion. Had we performed additional procedures, other issues might have come to our attention that we would have reported. ~~This report is intended solely for the information and use of the Department, the Capitol Police Board (Board), and the USCP Oversight Committees and should not be used by anyone other than the specified parties.~~

RESULTS

While the Department had an adequate organizational structure for its Pre-screener Program, it could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of the Program if it implemented additional pre-screening training and guidance. During site visits, we often observed that pre-screener positioning and readiness was inconsistent with Department guidance.

Organizational Structure

The Department had an adequate organizational structure for its Pre-screener Program. According to a Department official, the Pre-screener Program is part of building security, which is USB's primary responsibility. Therefore, USB divisions staff pre-screener posts located at the access points for which they are responsible. The official stated that [REDACTED]

As of September 11, 2019, the Department had [REDACTED]

Conclusions

The Department had an adequate organizational structure for its Pre-screener Program. USB divisions staff pre-screener posts located at the access points for which they are responsible.

Training

GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Recruitment, Development, and Retention of Individuals, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, state:

Management recruits, develops, and retains competent personnel to achieve the entity's objectives. Management considers the following:

... Train – Enable individuals to develop competencies appropriate for key roles, reinforce standards of conduct, and tailor training based on the needs of the role ...

The Department did not provide its pre-screeners with any specialized training about pre-screening. According to a Department official, any USCP officer can staff a pre-screener post.

In entry-level training at USCP, recruits view a [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In response to the assessment, a Department official stated that they had directed that TSB update its entry-level and in-service security screening classes to include more discussion about pre-screening. Additional training would give USCP personnel the opportunity to increase competencies and reinforce standards of conduct within its Pre-screener Program.

Conclusions

USCP did not provide its pre-screeners with any specialized pre-screening training. The Department could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its Pre-screener Program if it implemented additional pre-screening training. Thus, OIG makes the following recommendation.

Recommendation 1: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop and implement additional entry-level and in-service pre-screening training.

Policies and Procedures

GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Documentation of Responsibilities through Policies, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, state:

Management documents in policies the internal control responsibilities of the organization.

Management documents in policies for each unit its responsibility for an operational process's objectives and related risks . . .

The Department lacked policies and procedures for its Pre-screener Program. USCP Directive [REDACTED] includes one paragraph that discusses pre-screeners, which is the only formal Department guidance specific to the topic. A Department official provided OIG with a copy of a draft Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) titled [REDACTED]. The draft SOP identifies its purpose as establishing "the duties and responsibilities of employees assigned as Pre-Screeners at the House Office Building Entrances." The draft SOP provides more detailed pre-screener guidance than USCP Directive [REDACTED]. Department correspondence related to the approval of the draft SOP indicates that as of July 23, 2019, USCP officials were contemplating whether to incorporate the language from the draft SOP into USCP Directive [REDACTED] or revise it to apply to all USB divisions. Implementing formal, detailed pre-screening guidance would more effectively identify and document responsibilities and objectives of the Department's Pre-screener Program.

Review of USCP Directive [REDACTED] and the draft SOP revealed that neither document provides sufficient information about the role pre-screeners [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Because the posts are outdoors and require visual monitoring of surroundings, pre-screener are in an advantageous position for identifying suspicious activity and providing counter-surveillance. Providing guidance that considers such additional responsibilities for pre-screener could increase the efficiency of the Department's Pre-screener Program.

[REDACTED]

On several occasions, pre-screener did not engage with individuals as they approached access points or monitor their area of responsibility. For example, multiple pre-screener were typing on and/or staring at their mobile phone screens while on post. At times, individuals approached and entered access points while the pre-screener never looked up from the mobile phone. Such inconsistencies in pre-screener positioning and readiness could decrease the effectiveness of the Department's Pre-screener Program.

Conclusions

The Department lacked policies and procedures for its Pre-screener Program, and existing guidance did not appear to consider the role pre-screener [REDACTED]. During site visits, inconsistencies existed in the positioning and readiness of pre-screener. The Department could increase the efficiency and effectiveness of its Pre-screener Program if it implemented detailed pre-screening guidance. Thus, OIG makes the following recommendations.

Recommendation 2: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop and implement detailed pre-screener policies and procedures that document the responsibilities and objectives of the program.

Recommendation 3: We recommend the United States Capitol Police consider developing and implementing guidance that defines the Pre-screener Program's responsibilities [REDACTED].

APPENDICES

Listing of Recommendations

Recommendation 1: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop and implement additional entry-level and in-service pre-screening training.

Recommendation 2: We recommend the United States Capitol Police develop and implement detailed pre-screener policies and procedures that document the responsibilities and objectives of the program.

Recommendation 3: We recommend the United States Capitol Police consider developing and implementing guidance that defines the Pre-screener Program's responsibilities for [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS



Form 305-254 1004

UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF

119 D STREET, NE

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-7218

December 6, 2019

COP 191037

MEMORANDUM

TO: Michael A. Bolton
Inspector General

FROM: Steven A. Sund
Chief of Police

SUBJECT: Response to Office of Inspector General draft report *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Pre-screener Program* (Investigative No. 2019-I-0007)

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the United States Capitol Police response to the recommendations contained within the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) draft report *Assessment of the United States Capitol Police Pre-screener Program* (Investigative No. 2019-I-0007).

The Department generally agrees with all of the recommendations and appreciates the opportunity to work with the OIG to further improve upon the policies and procedures in place for the Pre-screener Program. The Department will assign Action Plans to appropriate personnel regarding each recommendation in effect in order to achieve long term resolution of these matters.

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the OIG's draft report. Your continued support of the women and men of the United States Capitol Police is appreciated.

Very respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S. Sund".

Steven A. Sund
Chief of Police

cc: Assistant Chief Chad B. Thomas, Uniformed Operations
Assistant Chief Yogananda D. Pittman, Protective and Intelligence Operations
Richard L. Braddock, Chief Administrative Officer
[REDACTED] JSCP Audit Liaison

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1-866-906-2446

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United States Capitol Police
Attn: Office of Inspector General, Investigations
119 D Street, NE
Washington, DC 20510



Or visit us – we are located at:
499 South Capitol Street, SW, Suite 345
Washington, DC 20003



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