



## **UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

### **Follow-up Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Dignitary Protection Division**

**Investigative Number 2019-I-0002**

**June 2019**

### ***Report Restriction Language***

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**UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE**  
**WASHINGTON, DC 20003**

**INSPECTOR GENERAL**

**PREFACE**

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) prepared this report pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. It is one of a series of audits, reviews, and investigative and special reports OIG prepares periodically as part of its oversight responsibility with respect to the United States Capitol Police (USCP) to identify and prevent fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement.

This report is the result of an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the office or function under review. Our work was based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observation, and a review of applicable documents.

We developed our recommendations based on the best knowledge available to OIG and discussed the draft findings with those responsible for implementation. It is my hope that the recommendations will result in more effective, efficient, and/or economical operations.

I express my appreciation to those contributing to the preparation of this report.

Michael A. Bolton  
Inspector General

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## Abbreviations and Acronyms

Be On The Lookout	BOLO
Calendar Year	CY
Capitol Police Board	Board
Containment Emergency Response Team	CERT
Dignitary Protection Division	DPD
Government Accountability Office	GAO
Office of General Counsel	OGC
Office of Inspector General	OIG
Office of Professional Responsibility	OPR
Operational Services Bureau	OSB
Protective Services Bureau	PSB
Standard Operating Procedure	SOP
Time and Attendance	T&A
Training Services Bureau	TSB
United States Capitol Police	USCP or the Department



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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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In a previous report—the *Evaluation of Dignitary Protection Division*, Report Number OIG-2013-07, dated September 2013—the Office of Inspector General (OIG) found the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) needed to strengthen internal controls and establish adequate criteria to measure compliance and performance for its Dignitary Protection Division (DPD). OIG made four recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. As of September 18, 2015, OIG had closed all four of the recommendations based on comments and documentation the Department provided.

In accordance with our annual plan, OIG conducted a follow-up analysis of the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number OIG-2013-07. Our objective was to confirm the Department took the corrective actions in implementing the recommendations. Our scope included existing controls related to implementation of recommendations as outlined in our previous report.

We conducted interviews, site visits, and reviewed relevant documentation to gain an understanding of the Department's implementation of recommendations. Our analysis identified three conditions related to recommendations in the previous report. The guidance for DPD agents to document and report their activities when assigned to protective detail assignments outside the Washington D.C., Metropolitan Area was outdated and did not reflect prevailing DPD procedures. In addition, guidance did not require that DPD supervisors document their review or approval of protective operations paperwork. Furthermore, USCP responses to a recommendation in Report Number OIG-2013-07 indicated the Department was in the process of implementing a DPD Reserve Corps Training Program. Implementation of the program, however, is still on hold pending a USCP Office of General Counsel (OGC) evaluation of the concept.

OIG issued new recommendations that the Department revise its guidance to reflect updated DPD procedures and require documentation of supervisory review and approval. To restart implementation of a DPD Reserve Corps, OIG issued a new recommendation that the Department obtain a legal opinion from OGC regarding the concept.

During follow-up work, opportunities for the Department to improve its protective operations came to the attention of OIG. Improvements included increased training, enhancements to protective advances, increased support from other USCP units, and a career development track for DPD. OIG, therefore, issued new recommendations that the Department consider implementing the improvements. See Appendix A for a complete list of recommendations.

On May 30, 2019, we provided a draft report to the Department for comment and attached the response in its entirety in Appendix B.


## **BACKGROUND**

The United States Capitol Police (USCP or Department) Protective Services Bureau (PSB) is one of the five operational bureaus reporting to the Chief of Operations. According to USCP PoliceNet,<sup>1</sup> the mission of PSB is to “provide safety and security to the Capitol, Members of Congress, Officers of Congress, and their immediate family.” PSB has three divisions and an administrative support unit. The divisions within PSB are the Dignitary Protection Division (DPD), Investigations Division, and the Intelligence Analysis Division. DPD is responsible for providing personal protection for leadership positions in the House of Representatives and Senate. DPD responsibilities also include:

- Protecting Members of the House of Representatives and Senate who have received significant direct threats
- Providing protective escorts within the Capitol Complex for Heads of State and other visiting dignitaries
- Planning and implementing security for both in-town and out-of-town congressional events such as retreats, funerals, and field hearings

As of April 23, 2019, [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] DPD has three sections, as shown in Exhibit I.

### **Exhibit 1 – DPD Organization Chart**



<sup>1</sup> PoliceNet is the Department's intranet.

In a previous report—the *Evaluation of Dignitary Protection Division*, Report Number OIG-2013-07, dated September 2013—the Office of Inspector General (OIG) found the United States Capitol Police (USCP or the Department) needed to strengthen internal controls and establish adequate criteria to measure compliance and performance for DPD. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) did not establish report formats or due dates. In addition, the methods that agents used for transmitting files—such as hotel computers—may not have been secure. Furthermore, no evidence existed to support that reports received a supervisory review.

Opportunities existed for the Department to use its resources in a more efficient and effective manner. For example, the Department used sworn officers rather than civilians to conduct administrative functions in DPD. In addition, DPD did not require periodic refresher training for its agents or have an adequate pool of reserve agents.

OIG made four recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. As of September 18, 2015, OIG closed all four of the recommendations based on comments and documentation provided by the Department.

### **OBJECTIVE, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY**

In accordance with our annual plan, OIG conducted a follow-up on the Department's implementation of recommendations contained in Report Number OIG-2013-07. Our objective was to confirm the Department took appropriate corrective actions in implementing the recommendations. Our scope included existing controls related to the implementation of recommendations as outlined in our previous report.

To accomplish our objective, we interviewed Department officials and stakeholders. We conducted site visits to the DPD Office. We reviewed Report Number OIG-2013-07 as well as correspondence between OIG and USCP related to closure of the recommendations in the report. Additionally, we reviewed relevant documentation as well as policies and procedures specific to DPD. Furthermore, we reviewed guidance from the Government Accountability Office (GAO).

OIG conducted this analysis in Washington, D.C., from December 2018 through April 2019. We did not conduct an audit, the objective of which would be the expression of an opinion on Department programs. Accordingly, we did not express such an opinion. Had we performed additional procedures, other issues might have come to our attention that we would have reported. ~~This report is intended solely for the information and use of the Department, the Capitol Police Board (Board), and the USCP Oversight Committees and should not be used by anyone other than the specified parties.~~

## RESULTS

Our follow-up analysis identified three conditions related to recommendations in the previous report. OIG also identified opportunities for the Department to improve its protective operations.


### Status of Previous Recommendations

In a previous report, Report Number OIG-2013-07, OIG found USCP needed to strengthen internal controls and establish adequate criteria to measure compliance and performance for DPD. OIG made four recommendations, which the Department agreed to implement. Prior to the start of our work, the Department provided OIG with the status of corrective actions for four recommendations, and OIG subsequently closed them. Our analysis identified three conditions related to recommendations in the previous report. See the prior recommendations along with their status below:

**Previous Recommendation 1:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police update its Standard Operating Procedures and internal controls to provide reasonable assurance that Dignitary Protection Division operations are effective and efficient with reliable reporting, and compliance with applicable guidance are achieved.

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number OIG-2013-07, as of September 17, 2015, USCP had updated and implemented all SOPs related to DPD.

We reviewed 32 SOPs specific to DPD that the Department listed on PoliceNet. We judgmentally selected criteria from six SOPs to analyze for compliance with guidance:



We conducted a site visit to the DPD office, interviewed Department officials, and reviewed relevant documentation to determine if DPD complied with the guidance. Our analysis revealed that SOP [REDACTED] does not reflect up-to-date procedures for DPD agents to document and report their activities when assigned to protective detail assignments outside the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area. SOP [REDACTED] requires that DPD agents account for activities during a tour of duty outside the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area using the DPD Daily Activity



Report form. SOP [REDACTED] then requires that DPD agents submit the form with their travel vouchers when they complete the tour of duty. However, DPD no longer uses the Daily Activity Report Form.

According to a Department official, agents now submit their work times by email along with an explanation of hours worked to DPD time and attendance (T&A) personnel and their supervisor. The supervisor approves the times, and the T&A personnel enter the hours into the Department's timekeeping system. The official stated DPD reviewed SOP [REDACTED] and submitted revisions reflecting the change in procedures up the chain of command for approval and comment. We reviewed a copy of the revisions as well as copies of emails demonstrating the process. Without an up-to-date SOP, confusion could exist about the appropriate process for DPD agents to account for activities during a tour of duty outside the Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Area. The Department should publish a revised SOP [REDACTED] to reflect the change in procedures. See new recommendation in Conclusion.

In Report Number OIG-2013-07, OIG reports a deficiency with DPD SOPs in that the SOPs did not require evidence of supervisory approval. Our analysis revealed SOP [REDACTED] contains that same deficiency. While it requires that supervisors review protective operations paperwork, SOP [REDACTED] does not require that supervisors document review or approval. OIG reviewed copies of protective operations paperwork as part of its analysis for compliance with guidance. Our review revealed that certain protective operations paperwork such as the standardized DPD [REDACTED] forms lack a designated space for supervisory approval. Furthermore, we did not find evidence of supervisory approval in any of the survey forms we reviewed.

A Department official stated that protective operations paperwork receives supervisory approval as part of the Plan of Action process for larger events [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GAO *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Control Activities*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, lists reviews by management at the functional or activity level as a common control activity and states that management should clearly document internal control and all transactions and other significant events in a manner that allows the documentation to be readily available for examination. The Department should revise SOP [REDACTED] to require documentation of supervisory review and approval for protective operations paperwork. See new recommendation in Conclusion.

**Previous Recommendation 2:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police consider providing Dignitary Protection Division adequate electronic equipment or establish other methods that will ensure data integrity and secure sensitive law enforcement information.



According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number OIG-2013-07, USCP considered providing each DPD agent with their own laptop but did not because of budget constraints.

During follow-up work, the Department brought to OIG attention that it now issues DPD agents [REDACTED] with which to travel and use so the agents can securely access the USCP network [REDACTED]. Department officials stated the devices were helpful and agents should no longer be using any non-USCP issued devices for official business.

**Previous Recommendation 3:** We recommend the United States Capitol Police consider realignment of sworn officers conducting Dignitary Protection Division administrative functions with civilians, which could result in a more efficient use of resources and result in approximately \$42,000 in annual saving.

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number OIG-2013-07, the Department hired and assigned a civilian to DPD for the sole purpose of T&A functions. That action eliminated DPD use of sworn personnel for those functions.

Department officials confirmed DPD still used a civilian employee to complete T&A functions and that DPD received additional administrative support from civilian employees at the bureau level for functions such as processing travel vouchers.

**Previous Recommendation 4:** The United States Capitol Police should consider (1) increasing the frequency per year in which Dignitary Protection Division required training is offered, increasing the number of officers available with Dignitary Protection Division, thus potentially reducing overtime costs, and (2) periodic refresher training for Dignitary Protection Division agents in the spirit of maintaining the highest caliber agent and enhancing team performance and overall security for Capitol Complex and the protectees, thereby ensuring the integrity, efficiency, and effectiveness of the Dignitary Protection Division Program.

According to Department responses to recommendations in Report Number OIG-2013-07, as of November 13, 2013, DPD had submitted a formal request for increasing the frequency of its basic and experienced agent training to the PSB Commander and USCP Training Services Bureau (TSB).<sup>2</sup> The responses also indicated the Department was in the process of implementing a DPD Reserve Corps Training Program but it had placed the program on hold because of funding constraints.

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<sup>2</sup>TSB is the USCP bureau responsible for planning, developing, and implementing Department-wide training programs.



OIG reviewed DPD training records for Calendar Year (CY) 2018 that TSB provided. The review revealed three classes completed the 5-week DPD basic agent training program during CY 2018. DPD training for experienced agents conducted in CY 2018 included Tactical Combat Casualty Care, Defensive Tactics, [REDACTED]. Department officials stated DPD was in the process of developing a formal 1-week training program for experienced agents as well as online training for experienced agents.

Department officials stated that a DPD Reserve Corps would be beneficial but indicated that implementation of the program was still on hold. Officials stated the USCP Office of General Counsel (OGC) is evaluating the concept because officers would have to temporarily leave the collective bargaining unit<sup>3</sup> while serving in DPD. According to officials, the reason officers would have to temporarily leave the collective bargaining unit is that certain collective bargaining agreement<sup>4</sup> requirements do not allow for the flexibility in working conditions that DPD needed for its agents. OIG agreed that a DPD Reserve Corps would be beneficial to the Department and would allow DPD to respond more rapidly to fluctuations in its protective operation requirements. To restart implementation of a DPD Reserve Corps, the Department should request a legal opinion from OGC regarding officers leaving the collective bargaining unit temporarily while serving in the program. See new recommendation in Conclusion.

## **Conclusion**

OIG follow-up analysis identified three conditions related to recommendations in the previous report. The guidance for DPD agents to document and report their activities when assigned to protective detail assignments outside the Washington D.C., Metropolitan Area was outdated and did not reflect prevailing DPD procedures. In addition, guidance did not require that DPD supervisors document their review or approval of protective operations paperwork. Furthermore, implementation of a DPD Reserve Corps Training Program is still on hold. As a result, OIG makes the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police revise Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] to reflect any changes in processes for the Dignitary Protection Division.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police revise Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] to require documentation of supervisory review and approval for protective operations paperwork.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police request a legal opinion from the Office of the General Counsel regarding officers temporarily

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<sup>3</sup> Fraternal Order of Police, District of Columbia Lodge No. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the FOP/U.S. Capitol Police Labor Committee and the United States Capitol Police Effective June 8, 2010.*



**leaving the collective bargaining unit while serving in a Dignitary Protection Division Reserve Corps.**

## **Opportunities for Improvement**

During follow-up work, opportunities for the Department to improve its protective operations came to our attention. The Department should consider enhancements to DPD training, protective advances, organizational support, and career development.

### **Training**

*GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Recruitment, Development, and Retention of Individuals*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, states:

Management recruits, develops, and retains competent personnel to achieve the entity's objectives. Management considers the following:

...Train - Enable individuals to develop competencies appropriate for key roles, reinforce standards of conduct, and tailor training based on the needs of the role...

Through interviews with Department officials, we learned operational demands often hinder opportunities for DPD training. We identified ways the Department could improve the frequency and quality of DPD training. For example, a Department official stated DPD could benefit from adding an additional team from which it could draw staffing to supplement its existing details. Having an additional shift or team from which DPD could draw staffing would free up agents for more consistent training opportunities.

Additionally, a Department official stated that DPD training instructors could benefit from periodically receiving external training to keep them up to date with tactics. The Department official provided a March 4, 2019, decision paper submitted up the chain of command. In the decision paper, the official recommended a program for the development of instructors in which DPD training instructors complete a minimum of two external training programs annually and present the material learned to fellow instructors. According to the decision paper, such a program would give DPD training instructors "the opportunity to learn from each other, validate new methodologies, and incorporate new strategies into existing training programs."

*GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Segregation of Duties*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, states:

Management considers segregation of duties in designing control activity responsibilities so that incompatible duties are segregated and, where such segregation is not practical, designs alternative control activities to address the risk.

DPD training lacked segregation of duties. DPD conducts its own training and has two sergeants serving as training supervisors. However, those sergeants are included in DPD operations and cannot focus on training full time. The Department could achieve better segregation of duties by having TSB take a greater role in DPD training. The Department could assign dedicated DPD instructors to TSB that could focus full-time on DPD basic and experienced agent training. An improved segregation of duties for training would allow DPD to focus more on protective operations and less on maintaining a full and stimulating training schedule.


USCP could improve the frequency and quality of DPD training. The Department should consider adding an additional DPD shift or team to supplement existing details, providing routine external training opportunities for DPD training instructors, and having TSB take a greater role in DPD training.

### **Protective Advances**

*GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Information and Communication, Principles*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, states:

13. Management should use quality information to achieve the entity's objectives.
14. Management should internally communicate the necessary quality information to achieve the entity's objectives...

OIG analysis revealed opportunities for DPD to improve the quality of its protective advance work. For example, DPD does not regularly complete final surveys after a trip or event. A Department official stated that although DPD personnel sometimes complete after-action reports for larger events, they do not always complete final surveys.



[REDACTED]

Opportunities for DPD to improve the quality of the information that it communicates to its agents ahead of a mission came to our attention [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

USCP could improve the quality of the information DPD collects and communicates in advance of its protective operations. The Department should implement certain enhancements to DPD's advance work and surveys such as [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] . The Department should also provide DPD agents with [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

#### **Support from Other USCP Units**

*GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Organizational Structure*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, state:

Management develops an organizational structure with an understanding of the overall responsibilities, and assigns these responsibilities to discrete units to enable the organization to operate in an efficient and effective manner, comply with applicable laws and regulations, and reliably report quality information. Based on the nature of the assigned responsibility, management chooses the type and number of discrete units, such as divisions, offices, and related subunits.



As part of establishing an organizational structure, management considers how units interact in order to fulfill their overall responsibilities. Management establishes reporting lines within an organizational structure so that units can communicate the quality information necessary for each unit to fulfill its overall responsibilities. Reporting lines are defined at all levels of the organization and provide methods of communication that can flow down, across, up, and around the structure. Management also considers the entity's overall responsibilities to external stakeholders and establishes reporting lines that allow the entity to both communicate and receive information from external stakeholders.

Management periodically evaluates the organizational structure so that it meets the entity's objectives and has adapted to any new objectives for the entity, such as a new law or regulation.

The OIG analysis revealed DPD could benefit from additional support from other USCP units. For example, not every DPD protective detail or advance team [REDACTED]

In a February 20, 2019, decision paper submitted up the chain of command, a Department official suggests that despite recent increases in training and firearms capabilities, DPD still lacked [REDACTED]. The official is requesting approval to develop a group of DPD agents with specialized training and equipment to augment existing details, support congressional delegations, and staff high-threat details. According to the official by way of the paper, DPD has tried to obtain this capability [REDACTED]

DPD could benefit from additional support from other USCP units. The Department should consider [REDACTED] to all DPD protective details and advance teams. Additionally, OIG continues to believe [REDACTED] would better support the USCP mission.

### **Career Development and Rotation**

*GAO Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government; Management of Human Capital*, GAO-14-704G, dated September 2014, state:

Effective management of an entity's workforce, its human capital, is essential to achieving results and an important part of internal control. Only when the right personnel for the job are on board and are provided the right training, tools, structure, incentives, and responsibilities is operational success possible. Management continually assesses the knowledge, skills, and ability needs of the entity so that the entity is able to obtain a workforce that has the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve organizational goals. Training is aimed at developing and retaining employee knowledge, skills, and abilities to meet changing organizational needs. Management provides qualified and continuous supervision so that internal control objectives are achieved. Management designs a performance evaluation and feedback system, supplemented by an effective rewards system, to help employees understand the connection between their performance and the entity's success. As part of its human capital planning, management also considers how best to retain valuable employees, plan for their eventual departure, and maintain a continuity of needed skills and abilities.

During the analysis, two documents<sup>11</sup> Board representatives prepared came to our attention. The documents focused on the concept of USCP implementing a career development track and rotational policy for DPD and possibly other units within the Department as well. The documents acknowledge that management has relinquished the chain of command as well as command and control in certain assignments within the Department. The documents note that a policy for a career development track is standard to all major Federal law enforcement, as well as the military, and ensures command and control and the adherence to chain of command.

The documents discuss a proposed program in which each selected sworn officer would receive a written professional development plan specifically describing objectives along with a timetable for advancement. The documents state that an important aspect of a career development track is a policy for rotations of duty throughout the Department. The documents discuss a potential rotational policy involving assignments within DPD both in the field on protection details and in support focused on management and oversight functions. The rotational policy would also include assignments outside DPD in other USCP specialty and/or uniformed units and could be instituted in those other specialty and uniformed units as well.

In previous reports, *Performance Audit of USCP Canine (K-9) Program*, Report Number OIG-2013-04, dated April 2013, and *Inspection of the United States Capitol Police Office of Professional Responsibility*, Report Number OIG-2016-06, dated April 2016, OIG states that the Department could benefit from instituting rotational policies. In Report Number OIG-2013-04, OIG reports that Canine technicians did not always comply with established requirements, which we believed indicated a level of complacency. In the report, OIG concluded that the Canine Unit<sup>12</sup> was a highly sought after assignment but with limited vacancies because the assignment did not have a time limit. The report states that establishing open competition or a rotational time requirement in the Canine Unit could boost Department-wide morale, increase cross-training, and offer more opportunities for other officers to join the Canine program.

In Report Number OIG-2016-06, OIG states that Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR)<sup>13</sup> assignments lasted too long, resulting in investigator fatigue and feelings that once the Department assigns an investigator to OPR they are forgotten. The report states that implementing a rotation policy for OPR could not only improve employee morale but also

<sup>12</sup> OSB Patrol Mobile Response Division Canine Unit Explosive Detection and Person-Borne Improvised Explosive Detection teams contribute to the Department's strategic goal of preventing, detecting, and deterring criminal and terrorist activity from reaching their intended target with improvised explosive devices.

<sup>13</sup> OPR oversees administrative investigations relating to the conduct of Department personnel and inspections of its organizational components.

provide more officers with investigative experience to assist with Division-level investigations<sup>14</sup> after rotating from OPR.

A career development track for DPD and other units would strengthen command and control within the Department and assist management in obtaining a workforce with the required knowledge, skills, and abilities to achieve organizational goals. OIG continues to believe the Department could benefit from instituting rotational policies. The Department should implement a career development track and consider a rotational policy for DPD.

### **Conclusion**

Increased training, enhancements to protective advances, increased support from other USCP units, and a career development track for DPD would improve the Department's protective operations. Therefore, OIG makes the following recommendations.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider adding an additional Dignitary Protection Division shift or team to supplement existing details, providing routine external training opportunities for Dignitary Protection Division training instructors, and having its Training Services Bureau take a greater role in Dignitary Protection Division training.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police implement enhancements to Dignitary Protection Division protective advance work

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police provide all Dignitary Protection Division agents

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider assigning

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police implement a career development track and consider a rotational policy for its Dignitary Protection Division.

<sup>14</sup> Division Commanders have the primary responsibility for investigating certain complaints such as allegations concerning inadequate police services, breaches of rules or regulations, and minor policy violations.

# APPENDICES



## *List of Recommendations*

**Recommendation 1:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police revise Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] to reflect any changes in processes for the Dignitary Protection Division.

**Recommendation 2:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police revise Standard Operating Procedure [REDACTED] to require documentation of supervisory review and approval for protective operations paperwork.

**Recommendation 3:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police request a legal opinion from the Office of the General Counsel regarding officers temporarily leaving the collective bargaining unit while serving in a Dignitary Protection Division Reserve Corps.

**Recommendation 4:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider adding an additional Dignitary Protection Division shift or team to supplement existing details, providing routine external training opportunities for Dignitary Protection Division training instructors, and having its Training Services Bureau take a greater role in Dignitary Protection Division training.

**Recommendation 5:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police implement enhancements to Dignitary Protection Division protective advance work [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Recommendation 6:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police provide all Dignitary Protection Division agents [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].

**Recommendation 7:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police consider assigning [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED].

**Recommendation 8:** We recommend that the United States Capitol Police implement a career development track and consider a rotational policy for its Dignitary Protection Division.



## DEPARTMENT COMMENTS



Form 214-5674

## UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF  
100 D STREET, NE  
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-7210

May 30, 2019

COP 190566

MEMORANDUM

**TO:** Mr. Michael A. Bolton  
Inspector General

**FROM:** Matthew R. Verderosa  
Chief of Police

**SUBJECT:** Response to Office of Inspector General draft report *Follow-up Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Dignitary Protection Division* (Investigative No. 2019-I-0002)

The purpose of this memorandum is to provide the United States Capitol Police response to the recommendations contained within the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) draft report *Follow-up Analysis of the United States Capitol Police Dignitary Protection Division* (Investigative No. 2019-I-0002)

The Department is committed to continuous improvement and grateful for the OIG's partnership in providing valuable and objective analysis of our operations. The current Dignitary Protection Division (DPD) protective models are flexible, adaptable, and tailored to the unique needs of our stakeholder protectees. The established protective models have served the Department and stakeholders well over time and in times of crisis. The Department recognizes that with additional staffing and funding resources, these well-established protective models could provide even greater levels of service to our protectees.

The OIG's recommendations as written in this draft will create a tremendous new staffing requirement for the Department to fulfill, easily above 100 new FTE and probably considerably more. These FTE's are not currently available anywhere else on the Department, and thus we would have to implement a long term strategy to grow the Protective Services Bureau and Training Services Bureau accordingly to accommodate these new mandates. As a result, this will take many years to close the majority of these recommendations and it will be dependent on our ability to acquire and train new specialized personnel at a rate considerably above attrition.

As requested once the final Investigative Report is published, we will provide specific explanations for each recommendation. Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the OIG's draft report.

DEPARTMENT COMMENTS

Your continued support of the women and men of the United States Capitol Police is appreciated.

Very respectfully,



Matthew R. Verderosa  
Chief of Police

cc: Steven A. Sund, Assistant Chief of Police  
Richard L. Braddock, Chief Administrative Officer  
[REDACTED] USCP Audit Liaison

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1-866-906-2446

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*119 D Street, NE*  
*Washington, DC 20510*



Or visit us – we are located at:  
*499 South Capitol Street, SW, Suite 345*  
*Washington, DC 20003*



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You can also contact us by email at: [OIG@USCP.GOV](mailto:OIG@USCP.GOV)

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