

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

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# Semiannual Report to Congress

1 October 2024 to 31 March 2025





Pursuant to the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in accordance with NSA/CSS Policy 1-60, the NSA/CSS Office of the Inspector General conducts independent oversight that promotes the wise use of public resources, adherence to laws, rules, and regulations; and respect for Constitutional rights. Through audits, evaluations, inspections, and investigations, we detect and deter waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct, and promote the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of Agency operations.



# Message from the Acting Inspector General



I am pleased to submit the Semiannual Report (SAR) for the National Security Agency (NSA)/Central Security Service (CSS)—hereinafter referred to as NSA—Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for the period ending 31 March 2025.

The OIG continues to create positive change through impactful and independent oversight. Our team is committed to evaluating our processes and improving our agile oversight capabilities. Our goal is to effectively use taxpayers' dollars to help improve the Agency's programs and operations and detect and deter fraud, waste, and abuse. Our emphasis on oversight agility enables us to shift our focus towards emerging national security and defense priorities, such as cybersecurity, the southern border, adherence to analytical integrity standards for intelligence reporting, and civil liberties and privacy of the American people. We are a strong, efficient, and timely watchdog that demonstrates our core values of integrity and transparency in all of our work, as demonstrated in this public report.

The OIG's oversight divisions encompass multiple areas:

- The Audits and Evaluations Division provides an independent check on a wide breadth of programs and operations throughout NSA—authorities and mission-related activities, civil liberties and privacy, cybersecurity and technology, mission and mission support, financial audits, and procurement.
- The Inspections Division provides oversight across the NSA enterprise to address identified risk areas and the Agency's ability to promote effective, efficient, and economical management of an organization, site, or function. Inspections may recommend improvements and identify best practices across a broad range of topics.
- The Investigations Division operates our Hotline—ensuring whistleblowers have an independent means through which they can communicate with the OIG and raise concerns—and investigates criminal matters with our law enforcement partners as well as administrative matters involving employee misconduct, with an emphasis on allegations of whistleblower reprisal, procurement fraud, and intelligence misuse.

The OIG team did incredible work during this reporting period. Their work covered national security and defense priorities to include the Agency's Financial Statement Audit, and impactful reports on topics such as artificial intelligence and readiness and resiliency of operations across the NSA enterprise, in addition to the issuance of numerous agile quick reaction reports.

I am pleased to report that NSA fully supported our team and agreed to all of our recommendations to improve the Agency. NSA continued to work diligently on implementing both current and past recommendations.



Our investigative team is focused on detecting fraud and protecting the taxpayer's dollars. As an example of their outstanding work, the Procurement Collusion Strike Force of the Justice Department charged six individuals as part of an ongoing investigation into information technology manufacturers, distributors, and resellers who sell products and services to government purchasers, including to the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community. Four of those charged subsequently pled guilty and face substantial prison time. Other investigative work led to the debarment of two people from government contracts and to 18 Agency employees being held accountable for misconduct. We remain committed to enforcing laws, regulations, and policy; investigating criminal activity; holding individuals accountable; and protecting the integrity of federal contracting.

It is an honor to lead a talented and dedicated team of professionals whose impactful oversight work protects taxpayer dollars and helps improve the critical mission and operations of the National Security Agency.



Kevin B. Gerrity  
Acting Inspector General

# Highlights



## REPORTS



**3**

Audits

**4**

Evaluations

**6**

Inspections



**228**

Total Open  
Recommendations

## INVESTIGATIONS

**4**

Number of Convictions Resulting From Investigations

**5**

Investigations Involving Senior Employees

**6**

Investigations Involving Whistleblower Retaliation

**17,231**

Contacts Processed

**15**

New Investigations Opened

**57**

Investigations Closed



**18**

Disciplinary Actions



**149**

New Inquiries Opened

**18**

Inquiries Closed



**\$207,776**  
(Actual)

**\$228,593**  
(Proposed)

Monetary Recoveries

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# Information Related to Interference by NSA

The OIG experienced no attempts by NSA to interfere with our independence. The Agency fully cooperated with our work, did not refuse to provide or attempt to delay or restrict access to records or other information, and did not constrain our budget to limit the capabilities of the office.



# Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports Issued

For the following reports, the Agency agreed with the OIG's recommendations. These recommendations will assist the Agency to be more effective and efficient.

## Audit Reports

### **Audit of NSA/CSS Integration of Artificial Intelligence**

Pursuant to Section 6721 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023, Division F Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (the Act), the OIG conducted an audit of the Integration of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in order to evaluate the following:

- A. The efforts of NSA to develop, acquire, adopt, and maintain artificial intelligence capabilities for the purpose of improving intelligence collection and analysis in a timely manner; and the extent to which such efforts are consistent with the policies and principles described in section 6702(a)(2) of the Act;
- B. The degree to which NSA has implemented each of the provisions of Title 67 of the Act; and
- C. Any administrative or technical barriers to the accelerated adoption of AI by NSA.

Though NSA's AI governance structure is still evolving, the OIG found opportunities in the current control structure where NSA could strengthen governance and oversight of AI capabilities.

### **Audit of Controls Over a System for Software Development**

The audit objective was to determine if controls over a system for software development were sufficient to protect development data, address user needs to accomplish their mission, and prevent waste of government resources. The OIG assessed NSA's application of controls, conducted interviews, and evaluated relevant policies and other related documentation. We highlighted areas of improvement and identified \$67,000 in funds that could have been put to better use.

### **Audit of NSA's FY 2024 Financial Statements**

The objective of this audit was to provide an opinion on whether the Agency's financial statements are presented fairly in all material respects and in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

While NSA had made progress in a number of important respects, the external accounting firm that the OIG retained was unable to express an opinion on the financial statements because NSA could not provide sufficient, appropriate evidence to support certain material account balances. Further, the audit found that material weaknesses exist in the Agency's ability to provide documentation to support the financial statement assertions.





## Inspection Reports

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### **Joint Inspection of NSA Georgia**

The OIG performed a Joint Inspection of NSA Georgia. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

### **Quick Reaction Report Regarding Continuity of Operations Plan**

The OIG identified concerns related to the NSA Continuity of Operations (COOP) Plan. We found potential deficiencies in COOP preparations, logistics, and procedures that NSA should address to ensure personnel have sufficient resources at a COOP location.

### **Quick Reaction Report Regarding Ineffective Training Options Following Changes to Safety Training**

The OIG, during several recent inspections, identified concerns related to the effectiveness of NSA's safety training options, especially those related to climbing, fall protection, and electrical safety.

### **Quick Reaction Report Regarding Protection of Information**

The OIG identified instances of the Agency's verification and use of certain electronics equipment in a manner that is inconsistent with Agency information security procedures. We found several areas where the Agency could improve the effectiveness of their implementation and use of certain electronics equipment.

### **Quick Reaction Report Regarding NSA's Handling of Mission Data**

The OIG issued a report on NSA's handling of mission data. The OIG issued recommendations on how NSA may improve guidance and processes related to handling of mission data.

### **Joint Inspection of a Field Site**

The OIG performed a joint inspection of a field site. The overall objective of this inspection was to evaluate the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of a broad range of the site's activities and operations.

## Evaluation Reports

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### **Evaluation on COMSEC Equipment Inventory**

The OIG reviewed NSA's Central Office of Record (COR) Equipment Management procedures to determine if NSA COR COMSEC accounts are compliant with auditing requirements established by the Committee on National Security Systems. The OIG determined that not all NSA COR accounts are compliant with the auditing requirements.



**Evaluation on the Efficiency of the Promotion Process**

The OIG reviewed the efficiency of the Agency’s promotion process. We found that the Agency lacks sufficient data on process efficiency. For instance, NSA does not collect sufficient data on the time NSA personnel spend on the process and the correlating expense that time has on the individuals’ ability to accomplish their mission. As a result, the Agency may make decisions about the promotion process without enough data to assess effectiveness.

**Evaluation of Agency Processes**

The OIG reviewed Agency effectiveness and compliance with certain processes and practices. We found these NSA processes were effective. There were no recommendations.

**Evaluation of Cyber Intrusion Prevention Efforts**

The OIG performed this evaluation to assess the actions taken by NSA in advance of or in connection with a cyber-attack conducted against the U.S. Government and the private sector that occurred in previous years. While our review did not identify concerns related to NSA actions associated with the cyber-attack, this evaluation did find potential areas of improvement to NSA’s policies, procedures, and methods regarding cybersecurity information.

**Total Dollar Value of Questioned Costs and Funds Put to Better Use During the Reporting Period**

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Report Title	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs	Funds Put to Better Use	Management Decision Made by Reporting Period End
Audit of Controls Over Development eVolved	\$0	\$0	\$67,000	Yes

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# Information Regarding Management Decisions

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended (Title 5 U.S. Code [U.S.C.] Chapter 4) (IG Act), defines “management decision” as the evaluation by the management of an establishment of the findings and recommendations included in an audit report and the issuance of a final decision by management concerning its response to the findings and recommendations, including actions concluded to be necessary. For OIG audits and evaluations, management’s decision to agree or disagree with a recommendation, and submission of a corrective action plan, occur prior to issuance of the final report. For OIG inspections, management’s decision to agree or disagree with a recommendation occurs prior to issuance of the final report, and their submission of a corrective action plan occurs shortly after issuance of the final report.

There were no management decisions made during this reporting period with respect to reversing or changing the initial management decision for an audit, inspection, or evaluation issued during a previous reporting period.



# Compliance With Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA)

NSA reported in its Agency Financial Report for FY 2024 that it is not in substantial compliance with Section 803(a) of the FFMIA. Specifically, it is not in compliance with federal financial management systems requirements or applicable federal accounting standards. NSA's target for compliance is FY 2028.



# Investigations<sup>1</sup>

## Criminal Cases

### Six Charged in Ongoing Bid-Rigging, Fraud, and Bribery Investigation; Four Subsequently Pled Guilty

Six individuals were charged in the District of Maryland for their involvement in various schemes to rig bids, defraud the U.S. government, and pay bribes and kickbacks related to the sale of information technology (IT) products and services to the federal government. Four of the defendants subsequently pled guilty. Of the 4 who pled guilty, 2 face a maximum penalty of 15 years in prison, 1 faces a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison, and 1 faces a maximum penalty of 5 years in prison. A federal district court judge will determine sentences for the four after considering the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and other statutory factors.

The charges and pleas are part of an ongoing investigation by the Justice Department into corruption among IT manufacturers, distributors, and resellers who sell to the government, including the Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community.<sup>2</sup> The Justice Department's press releases can be found at:

- <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/six-charged-scheme-defraud-federal-government>
- <https://www.justice.gov/archives/opa/pr/four-defendants-plead-guilty-ongoing-bid-rigging-fraud-and-bribery-investigation-related-us>

## Suspensions and Debarments

The OIG previously reported that a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of a contract company was found guilty of 19 counts of submitting false claims to the Agency, totaling more than \$300,000 in fraudulent billings, and 1 count of making a false statement to an OIG investigator. The OIG also previously reported that the CEO was sentenced to 13 months in federal prison and ordered to pay \$176,913 in restitution. The CEO is debarred from government contracting activity through July 2025.

After an OIG investigation substantiated that a former non-senior employee violated numerous regulations and policies, misused his position as a contracting officer's representative for personal benefit and for the benefit of friends and family, failed to report evidence of fraud and damage to Agency property, failed to protect sensitive or proprietary information, misused Government information technology, and cheated on mandatory training tests, the former employee was debarred from government contracting activity through January 2028.

<sup>1</sup> For the purposes of this Semiannual Report, senior employees are General Grade (GG)-15 and higher.

<sup>2</sup> An indictment is merely an allegation. All defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law.



## Actions Taken by the Agency

During the reporting period, the Agency notified the OIG of disciplinary decisions for 18 employees based on OIG reports: 5 employees retired or resigned in lieu of removal, 4 employees received a suspension of 30 days or more, 6 employees received a suspension of fewer than 30 days, and 3 employees received written reprimands or counseling.

In addition, before any Agency action, three employees resigned as a result of the OIG's investigative activities.

## Investigative Statistical Tables

Category	Total <sup>a</sup>
Number of Investigative Reports	57
Number of Persons Referred to the Department of Justice for Criminal Prosecution	10
Number of Persons Referred to the State and Local Prosecuting Authorities for Criminal Prosecution	0
Number of Indictments and Criminal Informations That Resulted From Prior Referrals	6
Total Number of Convictions from Investigations	4

Note: <sup>a</sup> Statistical tables were developed by compiling data from the OIG's internal Investigations Division database.

## Summary of Closed Significant Investigations

### Investigations Involving Whistleblower Retaliation

The OIG closed six separate investigations into allegations of whistleblower retaliation:

- Four of the investigations determined that eight Agency supervisors, which included two Senior Executives, a General Grade 15 (GG-15) senior employee, and five non-senior employees, did not reprise against Agency employees for making protected disclosures.
- One of the investigations determined that a military officer did not reprise against a military affiliate, assigned to NSA, for making a protected disclosure.
- One of the investigations determined that an agency contractor did not reprise against another agency contractor for making a protected disclosure.

### False Statement and Labor Mischarging

- An OIG investigation determined that an Agency contractor knowingly falsified their NSA Security Forms causing the Agency to be billed on an Agency contract for work at a higher labor category rate than entitled based on their experience. The contract company's investigation provided to the OIG revealed that the labor category claimed by the contractor equated to an approximate loss of \$133,499 to the Government.



## Investigations Substantiating Misconduct Involving Senior Employees

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### **GG-15 Employee: Government Travel Credit Card (GTCC) Misuse**

The OIG determined that an Agency senior employee intentionally misused their GTCC approximately 31 times totaling \$9,433.69 in transactions not associated with official government travel.

### **GG-15 Employee: False and Inaccurate Timesheets**

The OIG determined that an Agency senior employee submitted false and inaccurate timesheets totaling 299.50 hours. This equates to an approximate loss to the Government of \$25,970.

See “[Summary of Closed Significant Investigations](#)” section above for other substantiated senior employee cases.

## Substantiated Investigations of Whistleblower Retaliation

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There were no instances of substantiated whistleblower retaliation during this period.

## Semiannual Reports on Investigations of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

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In December 2019, the President of the United States signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 (NDAA). Section 6718 of the NDAA amends Title XI of the National Security Act of 1947 by adding a new section: “Section 1105 – Semiannual Reports on Investigations of Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information.” This section requires the OIG to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report on investigations of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information, and to do so no less frequently than once every six months.

During the period from 1 October 2024 through 31 March 2025, the OIG did not open or complete any investigations of disclosures of information that have been determined to be classified.



# Audits, Inspections, Evaluations, and Investigations of Senior Government Employees Closed and Not Disclosed to the Public

This SAR discloses to the public all audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations involving senior government employees closed during the reporting period.





# Appendix A: Peer Review

## Peer Reviews Conducted by Other OIGs

No peer reviews were completed during this reporting period. The last peer review of the NSA OIG was of the audits division that covered the period from 1 April 2021 through 31 March 2024. The external peer review team issued a rating of pass.

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer review of the NSA OIG.

## Peer Reviews Conducted by NSA OIG

The NSA OIG led and completed the following peer review during the reporting period:

- NGA OIG inspections and evaluations peer review, 22 November 2024.

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer reviews performed by the NSA OIG.



## Appendix B: Recommendations Made Before the Reporting Period for Which Corrective Action Has Not Been Completed, and All Outstanding Recommendations in the Past 12 Months

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
3/31/2011	AU-11-0001	0001-1b
3/31/2011	AU-11-0001	0001-2
3/31/2011	AU-11-0001	0001-3
6/28/2013	AU-13-0004	0004-5
7/23/2015	JT-15-0002	1015
10/4/2016	IG-16-11869	CM-1
7/14/2017	AD-17-0001	0001-1
8/17/2017	ST-16-0003	0003-3
12/29/2017	AU-16-0018	0018-18
1/3/2018	AU-16-0004	0004-1
1/3/2018	AU-16-0004	0004-6
8/1/2018	JT-18-0001	2314
9/21/2018	ST-17-0003	0003-19
9/28/2018	ST-17-0001	0001-7
9/28/2018	ST-17-0001	0001-8
9/28/2018	ST-17-0001	0001-14
3/11/2019	JT-18-0002	2501
7/11/2019	IN-19-0002A	2902
8/28/2019	JT-18-0003	2501
8/28/2019	JT-18-0003	1509
9/30/2019	AU-18-0013	0013-18
10/2/2019	AU-18-0002	0002-1
10/2/2019	AU-18-0002	0002-4
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-3
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-4
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-5
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-6
12/18/2019	ST-18-0002	0002-7
6/16/2020	ST-18-0004	0004-1
6/16/2020	ST-18-0004	0004-4
6/16/2020	ST-18-0004	0004-6
6/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-18

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
6/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-23
6/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-25
6/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-8
6/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-9
6/18/2020	ST-18-0006	0006-12
7/1/2020	ST-18-0009	0009-1
7/1/2020	ST-18-0009	0009-8
7/1/2020	ST-18-0009	0009-5
7/14/2020	JT-19-0001	1608
7/14/2020	JT-19-0001	2506
7/14/2020	JT-19-0001	2601
9/21/2020	AU-19-0001	0001-3
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-2
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-3
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-8
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-9
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-12
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-4
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-1
9/30/2020	ST-19-0002	0002-5
12/17/2020	AU-18-0012	0012-5
3/31/2021	ST-19-0003	0003-16
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-9
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-3
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-6
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-2
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-12
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-1
8/30/2021	EV-19-0002	0002-15
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	1311
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2304
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2109



Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2301
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2413
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2414
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	2437
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	1502
9/28/2021	JT-20-0001	1503
9/29/2021	EV-21-0002	0002-11
9/30/2021	AU-20-0007	0007-7
9/30/2021	AU-20-0007	0007-15
1/21/2022	IN-21-0001	2301
2/9/2022	EV-20-0005	0005-2
2/9/2022	EV-20-0005	0005-3
2/9/2022	EV-20-0005	0005-10
6/30/2022	AD-21-0006	0006-4
9/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-5
9/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-21
9/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-22
9/14/2022	EV-21-0005	0005-20
9/19/2022	JT-21-0002	2302
9/19/2022	JT-21-0002	2404
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-10
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-4
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-6
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-9
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-1
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-2
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-5
9/27/2022	EV-22-0003	0003-7
11/17/2022	AD-23-0002	0002-04
5/2/2023	AU-22-0001	0001-3
5/2/2023	AU-22-0001	0001-4
5/2/2023	AU-22-0001	0001-11
5/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-24
5/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-3
5/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-23
5/26/2023	EV-20-0009	0009-25
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	1607
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2101
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	1003
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2601
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2201
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2001

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
10/23/2023	JT-22-0002	2301
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-1
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-6
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-8
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-9
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-19
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-14
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-10
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-11
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-12
2/12/2024	AU-22-0009	0009-13
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-6
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-7
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-3
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-10
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-5
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-12
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-4
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-9
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-8
2/16/2024	EV-23-0012	0012-11
<b>Outstanding Recommendations in the Past 12 Months</b>		
4/10/2024	AU-22-0004	0004-11
4/10/2024	AU-22-0004	0004-13
4/10/2024	AU-22-0004	0004-8
4/10/2024	AU-22-0004	0004-20
5/3/2024	AU-24-0003	0003-1
5/29/2024	EV-23-0016A	0016A-1
5/29/2024	EV-23-0016A	0016A-2
6/18/2024	JT-21-0001	2402
6/18/2024	JT-21-0001	1519-S
6/18/2024	JT-21-0001	1520-S
6/18/2024	JT-21-0001	1522-S
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-7
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-2
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-3
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-5
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-6
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-4
7/9/2024	EV-24-0004	0004-8
9/10/2024	JT-24-0001A	0001A-QRR-1



Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
9/10/2024	JT-24-0001A	0001A-QRR-2
9/27/2024	IN-22-0002	2404
9/30/2024	IN-23-0004A	0004A-1
9/30/2024	IN-23-0004A	0004A-2
10/4/2024	EV-24-0007	0007-1
10/4/2024	EV-24-0007	0007-2
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-2
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-3
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-4
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-1
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-5
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-6
10/4/2024	IN-24-0002A	0002A-7
10/16/2024	IN-23-0003B	2903
10/16/2024	IN-23-0003B	2905
11/7/2024	IN-23-0003C	0003C-QRR-2a
11/7/2024	IN-23-0003C	0003C-QRR-2b
11/7/2024	IN-23-0003C	0003C-QRR-2c
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1104-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1203-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1518-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2402
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2105
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2101
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2106
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2104
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2202
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1102-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1103-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1204-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1308-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1309-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2407
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	2403
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1505 -S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1517-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1519-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1520-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1608-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1610-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1611-S

Report Date	Report Number	Recommendation Number
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1704-S
11/12/2024	JT-22-0003	1705-S
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-3
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-2
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-1
11/15/2024	EV-24-0009	0009-4
11/26/2024	EV-23-0015B	0015B-1
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-1
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-2
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-3
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-4
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-5
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-8
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-9
12/3/2024	AU-22-0011	0011-10
12/19/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-3
12/19/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-1
12/19/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-4
12/19/2024	AU-24-0002	0002-2
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1505
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1513
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2402
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1101
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2101
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2105
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2119
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1301
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1501
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1508
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1520
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1521
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	1604
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2201
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2405
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2406
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2407
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2408
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2409
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2403
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2601
3/21/2025	JT-23-0001	2603



## Appendix C: Abbreviations List

AI	artificial intelligence
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
COOP	continuity of operations
COR	Central Office of Record
CSS	Central Security Service
DoD	Department of Defense
FFMIA	Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996
FY	fiscal year
GG	General Grade
GTCC	government travel credit card
IC	Intelligence Community
IG	Inspector General
IG ACT	Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended
IT	information technology
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020
NSA	National Security Agency
OIG	Office of the Inspector General
SAR	Semiannual Report
U.S.C.	United States Code



## Appendix D: Index of Reporting Requirements

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\$405(b)(3)	Summary of significant investigations closed during the reporting period	8
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\$405(b)(5)(A)	Listing of each audit, inspection, or evaluation	2-4
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\$405(b)(8)	(A) Results of any peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General during the reporting period; or (B) A statement identifying the date of the last peer review conducted by another Office of Inspector General	11
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\$405(b)(12)	Description of metrics used for statistical tables of investigations	8
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\$405(b)(14)	Detailed description of any instance of whistleblower retaliation	9
\$405(b)(15)(A)	Information related to interference by the establishment including with budget constraints to try to limit oversight	1
\$405(b)(15)(B)	Information related to interference by the establishment, including attempts to resist or object to oversight activities, or resisted or significantly delayed access to information	1
\$405(b)(16)(A)	Detailed descriptions of each inspection, evaluation, and audit conducted that is closed and was not disclosed to the public; and	9
\$405(b)(16)(B)	Detailed descriptions of each investigation involving a senior Government employee that is closed and was not disclosed to the public	10
\$405(b)(note)	Public Law 110-181 §845, Final, completed contract audit reports	NA

Note: <sup>a</sup> Citations are to the IG Act of 1978, as amended (Title 5 U.S.C. Chapter 4).

<sup>b</sup> Requirement covered by §405(b)(5)(A).



# OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

## INSPECTIONS

The Inspections Division performs organizational inspections and functional evaluations to assess adherence to regulations and policies and to promote the effective, efficient, and economical management of an organization, site, or function. OIG inspection reports recommend improvements and identify best practices across a broad range of topics. The Inspections Division also partners with Inspectors General of the Service Cryptologic Elements and other IC entities to jointly inspect consolidated cryptologic facilities. Inspections and evaluations are conducted in accordance with the CIGIE *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*.

## AUDITS AND EVALUATIONS

The Audits and Evaluations Division performs audits and evaluations that examine the economy, the efficiency, and the effectiveness of NSA programs and operations; assess Agency compliance with laws, policies, and regulations; review the operation of internal information technology and controls; determine whether the Agency's financial statements and other fiscal reports are fairly and accurately presented; and examine whether NSA intelligence programs and activities are effective, efficient, appropriately protect civil liberties and individual privacy, and comply with federal law, executive orders and directives, and IC, DoD, and NSA policies. Audits are conducted in accordance with auditing standards established by the Comptroller General of the United States. Evaluations are conducted in accordance with the CIGIE *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*.

## INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division examines allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, and misconduct by NSA affiliates or involving NSA programs or operations. Investigations are based on submissions made through the classified and unclassified OIG Hotlines; information uncovered during OIG audits, inspections, and evaluations; and referrals from other internal and external entities. Investigations are conducted in accordance with the CIGIE *Quality Standards for Investigations*.





## How to Reach Us

9800 Savage Road, Suite 6247  
Fort George G. Meade, Maryland 20755

### HOTLINE

PHONE: 301.688.6327

FAX: 443.479.0099

<https://oig.nsa.gov>

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