



2025

# OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
1 OCTOBER 2024 — 31 MARCH 2025







# INSPECTOR GENERAL



I am pleased to provide our spring semiannual report from the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of Inspector General (OIG). This report covers 1 October 2024 through 31 March 2025, during which time there were no attempts by the Agency to interfere with our independence.

I have been impressed at the speed with which the OIG team has seamlessly adjusted to leadership change and continued to move forward to thoughtfully and strategically identify fraud, waste, and abuse and offer impactful recommendations to lessen vulnerabilities and enhance efficiency. We remain focused on providing independent and objective assessments promoting the effective operations of NGA.

We investigated 17 potential violations of law, rules, and regulations and published nine reports of investigation during this reporting period. Additionally, information our Data Analytics Team discovered and referred to the Department of Justice supported the investigation and conviction of an NGA employee for defrauding the Paycheck Protection Program. The Council of Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency also honored our Data Analytics Team this past fall with the "Excellence in Information Technology Award." The team's dedication to mission well represents the commitment of the entire OIG.

In this same period, we published seven audits and evaluations, including reviews of NGA's implementation of artificial intelligence, its Security Financial Disclosure Program, and the Agency's commercial GEOINT investments (specifically, its governance of commercial GEOINT analytic services). Our work on 12 other reviews is ongoing.

The Agency's focus on closing open recommendations during this timeframe was most impressive, as it closed 31 total audit and evaluation recommendations from reports involving topics such as medical services and clearances, funds reprogramming, contract writing, GEOINT standards, COVID-19 continuity of operations, NGA support team governance and support, software license management, zero trust architecture, small business contractor assessments, loaned equipment, removable media devices, DevCorps operations, and others. I appreciate the Agency's continued focus on implementing our remaining recommendations.

I look forward to continuing to deliver our important and independent responsibility to provide oversight for the Agency and appreciate the OIG team whose dedication and hard work makes this possible.

A stylized, handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Boehman', positioned above the printed name.

Michael P. Boehman  
INSPECTOR GENERAL







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# NGA OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL PROFILE OF PERFORMANCE

1 OCTOBER – 31 MARCH 2025

AUDIT, INSPECTION,  
& EVALUATION  
REPORTS ISSUED

7

NEW AUDIT, INSPECTION,  
& EVALUATION  
RECOMMENDATIONS

82

INVESTIGATIVE  
REPORTS  
ISSUED

9

31

AUDIT & INSPECTION  
RECOMMENDATIONS  
IMPLEMENTED BY NGA

16

TOTAL OIG REPORTS  
PUBLISHED


FUNDS  
RECOVERED

\$149,075

101

COMPLAINTS  
RECEIVED

# Office of Inspector General Organization



## Strategic Oversight of NGA

NGA’s geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) is critical to the ongoing work of keeping our nation safe. NGA has successfully adapted, and will continue to adapt, to shifting global threats and technology advancements to deliver timely, relevant, and accurate GEOINT to policymakers, warfighters, intelligence professionals, and first responders.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) provides broad oversight of NGA’s mission areas by performing independent, objective audits, inspections, evaluations, and investigations to promote effectiveness, efficiency, economy, and integrity throughout NGA. We also investigate fraud, waste, and abuse in NGA programs and operations.

In our report on the Top Management and Performance Challenges Facing NGA, published as part of the FY 2024 Agency Financial Report (AFR) on 15 November 2024, we articulated three broad challenge areas:



Several factors inform each area’s challenges and opportunities, including a strategic analysis of findings from previous oversight reporting, Agency progress in each area, and Agency actions to resolve open audit, inspection, and evaluation recommendations. We considered past NGA OIG reporting as well as relevant work from the Department of Defense (DoD) OIG, the Office of the Intelligence Community (IC) Inspector General (IG), and the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO). We also met with NGA’s senior leaders to capture and incorporate their insights, knowledge, experiences, and expertise.







# Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations Issued During Reporting Period and Recommendations for Corrective Action

## IG Act § 5(a)(1) and § 5(a)(5)(A)

During this reporting period, we issued seven reports that outlined potential program deficiencies at NGA and made 82 recommendations to the Agency, including recommendations from the financial statement audit (FSA) and the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) evaluation. Below is a list of the reports issued and accompanying recommendations for corrective action.

### FY 2024 Federal Information Security Modernization Act Evaluation Report No. OIGA-25-01, issued 1 October 2024

**Overview.** FISMA requires each agency IG to perform an annual, independent evaluation of its agency’s information security program and practices and report the results to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). We contracted with an independent public accounting firm to perform the FY 2024 evaluation of NGA’s information security program in accordance with FISMA and submitted the results to OMB.

**Results.** We found that NGA’s overall information security program was not effective.

**Recommendations.** The evaluation identified 17 findings and made the following 40 associated recommendations:

01.01	This recommendation is classified.
02.01	Chief Information Officer and IT Services Directorate (CIO-T) management should enforce compliance with Configuration Management (CM) inventory procedures by consistently implementing measures for assets identified as noncompliant in the Service+ Configuration Management Database (CMDB) as required within NGA policy.
02.02	Service Performance Office management should update knowledge base article KB0011519 to include all mandatory attributes as defined in the NGA Standard Process Guidance for Configuration Management of the Operational Baseline.
02.03	Remote Replication Service (Security Plan Identifier [SPID] #51098) management should populate the mandatory attributes for all assets in accordance with NGA requirements.
02.04	Maven (SPID #65154) management should populate the mandatory attributes for all assets in accordance with NGA requirements.
02.05	Red Team Tool (RTT) (SPID #51075) management should ensure the inventory of assets within the CMDB is complete and accurate and populate the mandatory attributes for all assets in accordance with NGA requirements.
03.01	Supply Chain Risk Management (SCRM) Program Management Office (PMO) should complete the review and update of NGA Instruction (NGAI) 5050.1 to include roles, responsibilities, and procedures for documenting and tracking supply chain-related risks and the tool(s) used to do so.
03.02	SCRM PMO should complete the review and update of NGAI 5050.1 to include component authenticity policies that, at a minimum, address procedures to detect and prevent counterfeit components from entering the system, maintain configuration control over system components that are awaiting repair and service or repaired components awaiting return to service, and requirements for reporting counterfeit system components.
04.01	Office of Security (SIS) management should coordinate with CIO-T to update existing processes for account creation for new users to ensure that individuals successfully complete a polygraph prior to receiving NGA system access, in accordance with NGA policy.



<b>04.02</b>	SIS management should update existing NGA procedures, or document new procedures, to specify processes for completing polygraphs for existing NGA personnel to include criteria for reexamination, such as prioritizations and timelines, as applicable.
<b>05.01</b>	CIO-T Risk Management Division (TESR) management should update the existing, or complete a new, security control assessment for RTT (SPID #51075) to include required fields and associated plan of action and milestones (POA&M) lines in accordance with NGA policies and procedures. Assess the risk posture of the system based on the updated assessment and determine if it impacts the authorization to operate decision for the system.
<b>05.02</b>	TESR management should update the existing, or complete a new, risk assessment for RTT (SPID #51075) to include required fields and associated POA&M liens in accordance with NGA policies and procedures. Assess the risk posture of the system based on the updated assessment and determine if it impacts the authorization to operate decision for the system.
<b>06.01</b>	This recommendation is classified.
<b>07.01</b>	Open IT Solutions Office (TEI) management should update current multifactor authentication (MFA) policies and procedures or establish additional policies and procedures to clearly define roles, responsibilities, and processes for approving, managing, and tracking users and machines with exemptions from MFA requirements and documenting the associated risk acceptance.
<b>07.02</b>	TEI management should update current MFA policies and procedures or establish additional policies and procedures to ensure all privileged and nonprivileged users utilize MFA to access Agency networks. If users cannot utilize MFA, TEI should document an exemption and risk acceptance in accordance with established policies and procedures.
<b>08.01</b>	Cybersecurity Office (TES) management should document procedures to define the required minimum frequency for the assessment of common controls.
<b>08.02</b>	TES management should review and update the mapping of common control providers (CCPs) in the NGA Information Assurance Requirements Catalog to be consistent with the named CCPs in XACTA360.
<b>08.03</b>	TES management should ensure that all CCPs operating in production have an approved and up-to-date security controls assessment.
<b>09.01</b>	TESR management should ensure that during NGA's authorization and re-authorization process, information system management perform a risk assessment to identify security-relevant software, firmware, and information that should be protected by integrity verification tools and maintain a record of the identified information within XACTA360.
<b>09.02</b>	This recommendation is classified.
<b>10.01</b>	TES should establish procedures to implement processes to block or remove unauthorized software deployed on NGA information systems.
<b>10.02</b>	TES should develop, administer, and monitor an inventory of software deemed critical as defined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
<b>11.01</b>	OCEAN TIDES (SPID #51772) management should update the program's system security plan and control implementation statements to be reflective and encompassing of the OCEAN TIDES server on the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communication System (JWICS). In completing the control implementation statements, management should also obtain a risk acceptance from NGA to allow for the exemption of control IA-2 for the OCEAN TIDES servers on JWICS.
<b>12.01</b>	CIO-T management should establish and document additional procedures or training to clearly define expected actions and results for reviewing privileged user audit logs.
<b>12.02</b>	CIO-T management should implement an oversight mechanism to monitor that systems are performing audit log reviews at the required frequency and documenting associated results.
<b>13.01</b>	TES management should document its assessment of compliance with NGA and DoD requirements when performing the quarterly cybersecurity certification review.
<b>13.02</b>	TES management should review cybersecurity training procedures annually in accordance with NGA requirements and document the review.
<b>14.01</b>	CIO-T management should establish new or update current procedures that clearly define requirements for authorizing privileged user access at the system level and associated documentation expectations.
<b>14.02</b>	CIO-T management should establish new or update current procedures that clearly define requirements for reviewing privileged user access at the system level and associated documentation expectations.
<b>14.03</b>	Vectra (SPID #51807) management should coordinate with TES to obtain a risk acceptance for use of the shared account as documented in the related POA&M.
<b>14.04</b>	Vormetric (SPID #68046/51808) management should implement processes to track and maintain a current list of system administrators with access to the shared account.



<b>14.05</b>	Vormetric (SPID #68046/51808) management should implement processes to uniquely identify privileged users with access to the system administrator shared account.
<b>14.06</b>	Vormetric (SPID #68046/51808) management should implement processes to control access to the system administrator shared account password.
<b>15.01</b>	CIO-T management should document procedures and/or provide training to clarify the expectation and requirements within control CM-5 (2) to review system changes to determine whether unauthorized changes have occurred.
<b>16.01</b>	TES management should update existing or document new procedures to track system vulnerabilities that the Agency cannot remediate within NGA and DoD timeframes to include documented action plans and timelines for remediation.
<b>16.02</b>	TES management should update existing or document new procedures to track instances of noncompliance with Security Technical Implementation Guide requirements to include documented action plans and timelines for remediation.
<b>16.03</b>	TES management should update existing or document new procedures to provide further guidance, leading practices, and expectations for system level procedures to facilitate the implementation of CM-6 and RA-5 for systems not utilizing the enterprise Assured Compliance Assessment Solution.
<b>16.04</b>	TES management should update existing or document new procedures to clarify roles and responsibilities for enforcing the escalation process to lock, disable, and terminate noncompliant assets from the network.
<b>17.01</b>	TES management should identify the party(ies) responsible for defining information security roles and associated role-based training requirements for control AT-3.
<b>17.02</b>	TES management should define information security roles, associated role-based training requirements, and procedures for tracking compliance for control AT-3.

## Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FY 2024, Report No. OIGA-25-02, issued 8 November 2024

**Overview.** We contracted with an independent public accounting firm (IPA) to audit NGA's financial statements and provide an opinion on whether NGA's financial statements were presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. The firm also considered NGA's internal control over financial reporting and performed tests to determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements.

**Results.** The audit resulted in a disclaimer of opinion on NGA's FY 2024 and FY 2023 financial statements because the IPA was unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate audit evidence on which to base an opinion. In addition, the IPA reported three material weaknesses and two significant deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting. The IPA also reported that NGA did not fully comply with the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982 and that NGA's financial management systems did not substantially comply with the requirements under Section 803(a) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) of 1996.

**Recommendations.** The IPA made the following recommendations to address the material weaknesses:

<b>1A.</b>	The Financial Management Directorate (FM) and Office of Contract Services (OCS) should allocate appropriate resources to the review of unliquidated obligations (ULOs) and reduce the balance of unvalidated obligations to an immaterial amount.
<b>1B.</b>	FM and OCS should revise procedures to address the financial reporting impact of ULOs with unresponsive suppliers.
<b>1C.</b>	FM and OCS should update the ULO database to include all information necessary for process owners to effectively document and complete their review of ULOs.
<b>1D.</b>	FM, in coordination with OCS, should continue to enforce its existing procedures to properly prepare and certify advanced liquidation receiving reports, including verifying the receipt of goods and services, the expense amount, and the receipt of appropriate information and/or documentation from the servicing agencies.
<b>1E.</b>	FM should enforce the existing process to support that FM records all expenses after the receiving report approving official approves the receipt of goods or services and signs the receiving report.
<b>1F.</b>	OCS, in coordination with FM, should enforce existing trainings and add program funding allocation guidance to existing procedures to support the proper allocation of invoice amounts on receiving reports to the proper program (Military Intelligence Program or National Intelligence Program) for contracts with multiple accounting classification record numbers under a contract line item or sub-line item number.



<b>2A.</b>	FM, the Security and Installations (SI) Directorate, and CIO-T should continue their efforts to review personal property costs. As part of the review, management should identify and move completed projects from the construction-in-progress (CIP) and software-in-development (SID) accounts to the respective in use accounts and remove noncapitalizable items from CIP and SID.
<b>2B.</b>	FM, SI, and CIO-T should complete implementation of planned corrective actions to ensure compliance with the federal accounting standards requirement of FFMIA Section 803(a).
<b>2C.</b>	FM and SI should develop and implement procedures to monitor in-service assets to ensure timely capitalization in the asset management system.
<b>2D.</b>	SI should enforce its procedures to effectively maintain relevant supporting documentation used to review potentially capitalizable assets it has not yet placed into service.
<b>2E.</b>	SI should update and communicate its annual inventory assessment procedures and its related monitoring control to incorporate specific completeness (floor-to-book) procedures and reviews of all inventory count results, respectively.
<b>2F.</b>	SI should enhance monitoring control procedures over incomplete disposal actions to facilitate the disposal of assets that are no longer in service in the property and accounting systems in a timely manner.
<b>2G.</b>	SI should develop and implement procedures over disposals to appropriately identify and assess them for impairment.
<b>2H.</b>	FM and SI should coordinate to implement a process to use the appropriate U.S. Standard General Ledger (USSGL) account for capital assets that are no longer in use but have not yet been disposed as of month-end.
<b>2I.</b>	SI and FM should collaborate with OCS and the Component Acquisition Executive (CAE) to fully document NGA's policies over personal property lease identification and classification and inclusion of personal property leases in the financial statements and disclosures as applicable.
<b>2J.</b>	FM and SI should collaborate with OCS and CAE to complete and document their analysis of Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 54 and update future financial statements and disclosures accordingly.
<b>2K.</b>	The Office of Corporate Communications should maintain supporting documentation for heritage asset inventory operations in accordance with NGA Manual 4160.1.
<b>3A.</b>	NGA should continue to leverage the Audit Committee as a resource for monitoring audit finding remediation with various stakeholders (i.e., leadership within FM and across other relevant components) and periodically communicating audit progress and challenges to the Director or Deputy Director.
<b>3B.</b>	NGA should configure posting logic in its financial system in alignment with the USSGL at the transaction level.
<b>3C.</b>	FM should complete planned corrective actions to fully implement Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) and internal control over reporting – financial reporting assessment procedures.
<b>3D.</b>	CIO-T should enhance internal control over reporting – financial systems risk assessment and test procedures.
<b>3E.</b>	FM should finalize implementation of procedures to monitor and enforce timely completion of FM certification and continuous education requirements in accordance with DoD Instruction 1300.26.
<b>3F.</b>	FM should enhance its service organization control report review control to include all relevant subservice organizations and documentation supporting either the effectiveness of complementary subservice organization controls (CSOCs) or the impact of any ineffective CSOCs on NGA's control environment.
<b>3G.</b>	The Office of Strategic Operations (OSO) should collaborate with CIO-T to further develop and enforce statement of assurance (SoA) compilation and reporting processes in accordance with applicable guidance.
<b>3H.</b>	OSO should coordinate with FM to accurately present the SoA and related discussion in the Management's Discussion and Analysis section of the AFR in the future.

**Recommendations.** The IPA made the following recommendations to address the significant deficiencies:

<b>1.</b>	CIO-T, in coordination with other relevant components, should develop, document, implement, and enforce consistent account management policies and procedures, including those related to account authorization, periodic access reviews, segregation of duties, and timely removal of access. Such procedures should include consideration of the entire system boundary, investigation of inappropriate access identified as a result of the user access reviews, and verification of the completeness and accuracy of listings used during access removal controls.
<b>2A.</b>	FM should coordinate with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service to design and implement procedures to evaluate the reliability of key Treasury Index 97 Cash Management Report data elements used to assess the impact of unknown transaction by others (TBOs) on the completeness of NGA's Fund Balance with Treasury (FBwT). Alternatively, assess potential unknown NGA TBOs using reliable internal NGA data to perform the completeness assessment.
<b>2B.</b>	FM should resolve all variances in the FBwT reconciliation within the required timeframe in accordance with the DoD Financial Management Regulation and NGA guidance.



# Management Letter for the FY 2024 Financial Statement Audit Engagement, Report No. OIGA-25-04, issued 18 December 2024

**Overview.** In connection with the audit of NGA's financial statements, the IPA issued a management letter to report deficiencies not included in the Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FY 2024.

**Recommendations.** The IPA issued the following recommendations in the management letter:

1.

FM should reinforce the precision required to review the quarterly financial statements compared to the underlying records to effectively identify and correct errors.
2.

FM should update its quarterly financial statement variance analysis procedures to include a review of the underlying formulas and information to support that it properly identifies and explains all variances requiring investigation.
3.

FM should enforce its reimbursable authority directive, Financial Management Directive (FMD) Budget to Execution SOP, specifically related to the timing of recording reimbursable authority in GEOINT-Financials.
4.

FM should continue to enforce its journal entry directive, FMD 014, Preparation of Journal Vouchers, and related journal entry desktop guides, specifically as it relates to appropriate application and review of underlying data.
5.

The Adopt and Deliver Group, Corporate Applications Office (TIB) should:

a.

Complete planned updates to the Audit Policy for Corporate Applications to designate the appropriate personnel to conduct and document the weekly audit log reviews.

b.

In a timely manner, document the completion of the weekly audit log review for the application, database, and operating system for PeopleSoft.
6.

The Cybersecurity Office and TIB should:

a.

Update password requirements in the Information Assurance Requirements Catalog as required by Memorandum for Record (MFR) 2023-0790, Strengthening Security Through Improved Authentication.

b.

Implement password requirements for Titanium, common operating environment, and PeopleSoft as required by MFR 2023-0790, Strengthening Security Through Improved Authentication.
7.

TIB should enforce the change management process for off-cycle migrations to ensure it completes, reviews, and approves required documentation prior to migrating changes to the production environment.





# Evaluation of NGA's Commercial GEOINT Investments, Phase 1: Governance of Commercial GEOINT Analytic Services, Report No. OIGE-25-01, issued 22 November 2024

**Overview.** NGA released an updated Commercial GEOINT Strategy in 2018 intended to “enable the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG) to better understand the world by leveraging commercial GEOINT capabilities.” The strategy emphasizes embracing new suppliers and services by working with federal and IC partners, combatant commands, and military services to employ the optimal combination of commercial and national sources, secure strategic competitive advantage, and outpace our adversaries. The 2020 Defense Space Strategy states, “The DoD has an opportunity to leverage innovation and cost-effective investments driven by the private sector.” And the NSG Enterprise Commercial GEOINT Strategy 2021 acknowledged that the NSG “collectively must harness the benefits of working with commercial providers or risk falling behind the accelerating global standard in GEOINT capabilities.” We evaluated the effectiveness of NGA’s policies and processes for identifying, prioritizing, and resourcing commercial GEOINT analytic services.

**Results.** We determined NGA needs a corporate policy that establishes the necessary authorities, roles, and responsibilities and a common definition for commercial GEOINT analytic services. We found that although NGA’s current commercial GEOINT analytic services governing documents establish strategic-level guidance, NGA needs a corporate policy to ensure organizational alignment and centralized authority within NGA.

**Recommendations.** We made three recommendations:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1 | The Associate Director for Operations should publish an NGA corporate policy establishing and outlining the authorities, roles, responsibilities, and organizational alignment of those processes and personnel needed for the identification, prioritization, and resourcing of commercial GEOINT analytic services. This corporate policy should include:<br><br>a. A definition of commercial GEOINT analytic services.<br><br>b. The requirement to publish an annual review, per fiscal year, no later than the end of the following fiscal year, consistent with the Commercial GEOINT Year in Review.<br><br>c. The delegation of centralized authority for commercial GEOINT analytic services investments to the Director of the Commercial Operations Group (SC). |
| 2 | SC, in collaboration with other components as needed, should finalize, approve, and sign the draft NSG Commercial GEOINT Requirements Process Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and institute a plan for the continued update of this CONOPS. We closed this recommendation on 4 March 2025.   |
| 3 | The GEOINT Functional Management Directorate (GFM), in collaboration with other components as needed, should coordinate and finalize an updated agreement that outlines the roles and responsibilities between NGA and NRO as outlined in the expired memorandum of understanding, NRO ID 2016-05309.   |

## Audit of NGA's Implementation of Artificial Intelligence, Report No. OIGA-25-03, issued 9 December 2024

**Overview.** The FY 2023 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA) required each IG with oversight responsibility for an element of the IC to conduct an audit of their agency’s efforts “to develop, acquire, adopt, and maintain artificial intelligence [AI] capabilities ... to improve intelligence collection.” We assessed the extent to which the Agency’s efforts align with ODNI policies and principles, the degree to which the Agency has implemented the applicable provisions of the IAA, and whether administrative or technical barriers impede the Agency’s accelerated adoption of AI.

**Results.** We determined that NGA has made efforts to develop, acquire, adopt, and maintain AI while adhering to ODNI policies and principles for its ethical use. However, NGA faces administrative and technical barriers to implementing AI as do other federal agencies. For example, NGA does not maintain a complete inventory of AI capabilities for intelligence collection and analysis, which may result in duplicate efforts, insufficient resource sharing, and difficulties effectively scaling AI capabilities. Additionally, NGA’s submission to ODNI’s FY 2025 Augmenting Intelligence Using Machines (AIM) data call was incomplete. Incomplete data on AI initiatives makes it difficult to respond to congressional requests, hinders ODNI’s and NGA’s ability to make informed decisions on allocating resources, and impedes NGA’s ability to assess the

effectiveness of existing initiatives, identify improvement areas, and prioritize future investments. Although such barriers are difficult to eliminate, NGA is working to mitigate them.

On 1 October 2024, the Director of NGA designated the Director of the Data and Digital Innovation Directorate (DDI) as the Agency’s Chief AI Officer. This crucial step provides leadership, oversight, and coordination as NGA develops and implements AI capabilities. Furthermore, NGA continues to implement the five FY 2023 IAA provisions applicable to NGA. NGA has fully implemented two and is awaiting DNI action and guidance before it can implement the other three. As the Agency incorporates AI into its GEOINT collection and analysis, NGA leaders should continue proactively addressing existing and future barriers.

**Recommendations.** We made two recommendations:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1 | The Chief AI Officer (CAIO) should establish and maintain a complete inventory of NGA AI capabilities to improve intelligence collection and analysis. To enhance the data-driven decisionmaking process and optimize the contract portfolio, NGA should consider collecting information on contracts and grants related to NGA's AI capabilities when compiling this inventory. We closed this recommendation on 24 March 2025.  |
| 2 | The CAIO should oversee NGA's response to the annual ODNI AIM data call to ensure the NGA data is accurate and complete and NGA understands its investments in AI technology. Examples of oversight include, but are not limited to, clarifying the AIM data call process, strengthening coordination between FM and DDI, developing a mechanism to verify the NGA data is accurate and adequately supported before submitting it to ODNI, and encouraging collaboration and information sharing among Agency components. |

## Evaluation of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program: Privacy Safeguards in Place, but Oversight and Internal Controls Were Needed, Report No. OIG E-25-02, issued 5 March 2025

**Overview.** We initiated an evaluation of NGA’s Security Financial Disclosure Program (SFDP) following a report from NGA’s Office of Mission Oversight and Compliance (MOC) that substantiated a claim that NGA’s SFDP analysts infringed on NGA employees’ privacy rights and civil liberties. We evaluated whether NGA’s SFDP policies and procedures comply with federal laws and IC and DoD policies and whether NGA employees complied with NGA policies and procedures safeguarding the privacy rights and civil liberties of all NGA employees.

**Results.** We found that the SFDP faces significant challenges in its policies, procedures, and oversight. Although the program’s written procedures comply with federal laws and IC and DoD policies, many SFDP analysts deviated from the official procedures. These deviations resulted from deficiencies in the design and implementation of internal controls, ineffective training, and inadequate oversight. We determined leadership must enhance oversight and complete the development of specific standards and repeatable measures to ensure the SFDP fulfills its mission while effectively protecting employees’ privacy rights.

**Recommendations.** We made two recommendations:

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| 1 | Update SFDP internal controls to include developing a comprehensive SFDP policy (examples include a SFDP standard operating procedure (SOP), handbook, or guide) that fully encompasses requirements, procedures, and oversight measures. |
| 2 | Coordinate with the MOC to develop annual, role-based privacy training, including specific SFDP privacy data handling, storage, and dissemination scenarios. We closed this recommendation on 27 March 2025.                              |

## Topic Brief for NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIG E-25-03, issued 3 March 2025

**Overview.** The evaluation of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program resulted in the release of a topic brief comparing NGA’s SFDP with seven other federal agencies to inform SI senior leadership decisionmaking.



# Ongoing Audits, Inspections, and Evaluations

We currently have 12 ongoing audits, inspections, and evaluations. Summaries of each appear below.

## Audit of FY 2025 Financial Statements (Mandatory)

The FY 2010 IAA requires NGA to undergo an independent, full-scope financial statement audit annually. In accordance with the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, as amended by the Government Management Reform Act of 1994, the Agency's IG or an independent external auditor determined by the IG is responsible for performing the audit. We contracted with an independent certified public accounting firm (IPA) to perform the FY 2025 financial statement audit. We are overseeing the audit's progress to ensure the IPA performs it in accordance with professional standards, OMB requirements, and the terms of the contract.

**Objective.** Provide an opinion on whether NGA's financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles. Based on federal financial statement audit requirements, the IPA will also assess NGA's internal control over financial reporting and determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, contracts, and grant agreements.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in January 2025, in November 2025.

## FY 2025 FISMA Evaluation (Mandatory)

FISMA directs federal agencies to report annually to the OMB Director, U.S. Comptroller General, and selected congressional committees on the effectiveness of agency information security policies and procedures. In addition, FISMA requires each agency's IG, or an independent external auditor determined by the IG, to perform an annual independent evaluation of the information security program and practices and to report the results to OMB. We will submit the FISMA external report to OMB by the 1 August 2025 deadline and distribute the internal report containing detailed findings and recommendations, to NGA management in September 2025.

**Objective.** Assess NGA's Information Security Program in accordance with the IG FISMA reporting metrics and determine whether NGA implemented prior year recommendations.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in October 2024, in September 2025.

## Payment Integrity Information Act Assessment for FY 2024 (Mandatory)

Congress enacted the Payment Integrity Information Act (PIIA) in March 2020 to improve efforts to identify and reduce improper payments. The PIIA requires agencies to review the programs and activities they administer to identify and report on those susceptible to significant improper payments. Each agency's IG will determine whether their agency complied with PIIA by reviewing improper payment reporting in their agency's annual AFR or performance and accountability report and accompanying materials.

**Objective.** Determine whether NGA complied with PIIA for FY 2024.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in January 2025, in April 2025.

## Audit of NGA's Oversight of the Next NGA West Program

In November 2019, NGA began construction on a new, government-owned facility in St. Louis to improve NGA's current and future mission productivity, flexibility, operational efficiency, and modernization. Contracts supporting this project involve the design and construction of multiple facilities, structures, and IT systems and the redeployment of NGA operations and workforce. The Agency's projects the Next NGA West (N2W) project to cost approximately \$1.7 billion.

**Objective.** Determine whether NGA provided effective oversight over contracts supporting the N2W Program.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in March 2024, in June 2025.

## Review of IT Vulnerability Tracking and Remediation

The ability to detect vulnerabilities helps the Agency identify possible information system and network weaknesses. Although several existing OIG FISMA findings and recommendations relate to this objective, our review expands the number of systems selected and focuses on systems managed by personnel outside of CIO-T.

**Objective.** Determine how NGA system personnel handle the vulnerability scanning, remediation, and POA&M processes.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in May 2024, in April 2025.

## Audit of NGA's Supply Chain Risk Management Program

NGA's reliance on suppliers and vendors may increase the vulnerability of NGA's systems and data to cyber-attacks. Supply chain risks can impede NGA's ability to provide critical GEOINT capabilities. Foreign adversaries can exploit supply chain weaknesses to disrupt critical networks, systems, and operations, impeding NGA's ability to provide critical GEOINT capabilities and accurate intelligence. SCRM enables the Agency to identify vulnerabilities and mitigate cybersecurity risks to NGA's IT data, products, materials, and services throughout their lifecycles.

**Objective.** Determine the effectiveness of the SCRM Program and whether NGA adequately protects information systems from cybersecurity threats.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in January 2025, in January 2026.



## Joint Evaluation with DoD IG of NGA's Integration of Maven

The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD[I&S]) established Maven in April 2017 to support algorithm-based technology initiatives to develop new methods for bringing AI and machine learning into programs of record, joint functions, and DoD mission areas. Maven's initial mission was fielding technology to augment or automate the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of full-motion video for intelligence support. Maven applies computer vision to independently detect, tag, and track objects or humans of interest from still images or videos captured by surveillance aircraft, satellites, and other means. NGA assumed operational control of Maven's GEOINT services and capabilities in December 2022, and the DoD's Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office took over the non-GEOINT portion of Maven. On 7 November 2023, Maven became an NGA program of record and was funded in the defense budget. Becoming a program of record also enabled NGA to apply its GEOINT expertise to improving AI and machine learning algorithms, scenario-based training, and development.

**Objective.** Assess how effectively NGA has integrated Maven into NGA's GEOINT operations and fielded Maven to support DoD missions.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in September 2024, in July 2025.

## Review of NGA's Research and Intellectual Property Security

NGA supports GEOINT research in areas of operational and strategic interest to both the DoD and the IC. Theft of this research can have grave consequences, and many foreign adversaries strategically target science and technology resources and products. In 2022, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) released a report examining counterintelligence threats not only to government entities but also private companies and universities, increasingly attractive targets for foreign entities trying to steal the latest technology. SSCI members felt an overhaul of counterintelligence was necessary, including efforts to protect academia from espionage. The Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs noted China seeks to exploit U.S. openness through its more than 200 recruitment plans, including the Thousand Talents Plan, which incentivizes individuals engaged in research and development in the United States to transmit their knowledge and research to China. The FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act emphasizes the importance of research security and of assessing whether to prohibit DoD from awarding federal research grants to institutions or persons from or located in countries of concern. GEOINT research remains vulnerable to theft, and this presents certain risks to intelligence missions and operations.

**Objective.** Assess how effectively NGA has implemented processes to protect federally funded research from foreign influence and other security threats.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in January 2025, in June 2025.

## Evaluation of NGA's Commercial GEOINT Investments, Phase 2: Acquisition and Management of Foundation GEOINT Data

This evaluation is one in a series covering NGA commercial GEOINT investments. Acquisition of foundation GEOINT data is a significant component of these investments and essential to achieving NGA's core mission. Over the years, there have been concerns over the quality assurance and quality control processes for foundation GEOINT data obtained through contracts.

**Objective.** Determine whether NGA has implemented effective quality assurance processes in the acquisition and management of foundation GEOINT data.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in July 2024, in June 2025.

## Evaluation of NGA's Anti-Harassment Program

In FY 2023, in response to allegations that an IC agency knowingly mishandled multiple internal employee harassment cases, the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence asked that agency's OIG to examine how that agency's Anti-Harassment Program (AHP) handled the complaints. This request prompted other IC OIGs, including ours, to open AHP reviews to evaluate their procedures for preventing and responding to harassment.

**Objective.** Determine whether NGA's AHP has the resources, policy guidance, and oversight measures in place to effectively serve NGA personnel.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in February 2024, in May 2025.

## NGA's Implementation of Executive Orders and Presidential Memoranda

Following the 2025 presidential inauguration, the White House issued multiple executive orders (EOs) and presidential memoranda (PMs). In response, the DoD, OMB, and the Office of Personal Management (OPM) issued supplemental guidance to federal agencies. As a part of our review, we identified the EOs, PMs, and related supplemental guidance applicable to NGA. The topical scope of this evaluation included EOs and PMs issued through 6 February 2025, the date of our notification memorandum, and Agency responses through 31 March 2025.

**Objective.** Assess NGA's implementation of the aforementioned EOs, PMs, and supplemental guidance.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project, announced in February 2024, in April 2025.

## Management Alert for Ensuring NGA's Implementation of Mandatory Time Limits for Administrative, Investigative, and Notice Leave

The FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act charged OPM with prescribing regulations for new leave categories. OPM issued its final rule for federal agencies on 17 December 2024 and supplemental guidance on 3 January 2025. Agencies must issue internal policies consistent with OPM's rule no later than 13 September 2025. We reviewed NGA employees' administrative leave usage against OPM's final rule and guidance to identify considerations for the Agency ahead of 13 September 2025.

**Objective.** Inform NGA senior leadership of our observations regarding employee use of administrative leave in relation to OPM's final rule and guidance.

**Status.** We expect to complete the project in May 2025.




# Open Recommendations Dated Before the Reporting Period

IG Act § 5(a)(2)

As of 31 March 2025, NGA had 22 total open recommendations, 18 of them made prior to this reporting period. These numbers do not include FSA and FISMA recommendations. There are no potential cost savings associated with these recommendations, and we did not identify any questioned costs or funds that could be put to better use.

## 22 TOTAL OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS



### Audit of NGA's Funds Reprogramming Activities Report No. OIGA-19-07 / September 2019

- Rec. No. 1 FM should revise its reprogramming policy to align with congressional oversight and ODNI's definitions of reprogramming.
- Rec. No. 4 FM should develop and implement Agency-wide policies that provide clear, actionable guidance on the inclusion of those executing the budget within the budget formulation process and require a standard lookback analysis at the project level to account for reprogramming trends.

### Quick Look Inspection Report of NGA's COVID-19 Response: GEOINT Continuity, Recovery, Reconstitution, and Impact Report No. OIGE-22-03 / 6 July 2022

- Rec. No. 2 As required by NGA 8940.1, Lessons Learned Program, the Mission Management Group should coordinate, draft, and prioritize Agency level lessons learned, including specific actions, associated offices of primary responsibility, and milestones, and develop enforcement and tracking mechanisms to track progress towards resolution as appropriate.

## Management Advisory Report on NGA Support Team Governance and Support

**Report No. MAR-22-01 / 12 August 2022**

Rec. No. 2 GFM, in collaboration with other components, should update the overall NGA Support Team (NST) Concept of Operations (CONOP).

## Audit of NGA's Software License Management

**Report No. OIGA-23-01 / 28 October 2022**

Rec. No. 3 TCS should assess software license inventories and usage to ensure that NGA is not paying for unused or underutilized software licenses.

## Evaluation of NGA's Zero Trust Architecture

**Report No. OIGA-23-06 / 13 January 2023**

Rec. No. 2 Recommendation is classified.

## Audit of NGA's Joint Duty Rotation Program

**Report No. OIGA-24-05 / 14 February 2024**

Rec No. 1 The Human Development (HD) Directorate, in coordination with the NGA Chief of Staff, should develop policies and procedures to define roles and responsibilities for key stakeholders involved in the Joint Duty Rotation (JDR) Program.

Rec No. 3 HD, in coordination with the Chief Information Officer and Information Technology Services Directorate (CIO-T) and FM, should perform an analysis to determine whether the program can track and account for the JDRs within and outside of the Joint Duty Application Tool in a centralized system that provides real-time updates on the status of employees. Based on the results of the analysis, develop a POA&M to implement the system.

Rec No. 4 HD, in coordination with FM and the NGA Chief of Staff, should develop policies and procedures to ensure that funding agreements are in place before the start of JDRs and that the program collects reimbursements on time. The policy should also establish actions to take when Gaining agencies do not reimburse NGA for employees on JDRs.

Rec No. 5 FM, in coordination with HD, should develop a POA&M to automate the reimbursement process that supports the JDR Program for FM to promptly bill for employee services, eliminate the heavy reliance on manual entries, and account for all reimbursable JDRs.

Rec No. 6 HD, in coordination with FM, should establish policies and procedures to accurately classify NGA employees on JDRs from other types of assignments and to update existing JDR records to reflect the policy.

## Inspection of NGA's DevCorp Operations

**Report No. OIGE-24-02 / 18 March 2024**

Rec No. 2 The Associate Director for Capabilities (ADC) should develop a DevCorps strategy implementation plan.

Rec No. 3 OCS should review and update quality control procedures where necessary to reinforce contracting officer responsibilities.

Rec No. 4 OCS, in collaboration with the CIO and in consultation with the General Counsel, should conduct a review of the aqua badge construct, identify risks of inadvertent improper administration of services contracts as personal services, and establish mitigation strategies that ensure proper administration of services contracts that use the aqua badge or similar construct.

Rec No. 5 OCS should develop or update and implement quality control procedures requiring contracting officers to ensure proper administration of services contracts that use the aqua badge or similar construct.



## Evaluation of NGA's Management of the Pay Setting Process

**Report No. OIGE-24-03 / 20 June 2024**

- Rec No. 1 HD should implement effective controls over the pay setting process to prevent errors in job offers.
- Rec No. 2 HD should implement policies establishing pay setting rules and the market compensation methodology. HD should also align NGA policy for the market compensation assessment methodology with the Defense Civilian Intelligence Personnel System Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics/Cyber Targeted Local Market Supplement.

## Review of Anti-Gag Provision in NGA Nondisclosure Policies and Agreements

**Report No. U-108-24 / 24 July 2024**

- Rec No. 1 NGA Chief of Staff should ensure components include the “anti-gag” statement in all current and future nondisclosure policies, forms, and agreements.



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# Management Decisions Made

IG Act § 5(a)(6)

During this reporting period, management made 28 decisions with respect to 16 audit, inspection, and evaluation reports issued during a previous reporting period.

## Inspection of NGA's Medical Services REPORT NO. OIGE-18-05 / 23 AUGUST 2018

**Decision:** NGA finalized negotiations with Fort Belvoir for interagency support for medical services that would be advantageous to the government. This action closed recommendation 3.

## Audit of NGA's Funds Reprogramming Activities REPORT NO. OIGA-19-07 / SEPTEMBER 2019

**Decision:** FM completed an analysis of FY 2017 through FY 2024 non-below threshold reprogramming fund movements between components to identify ways to decrease the number of movements to increase the efficiency of operations. This action closed recommendation 3.

## Inspection Report of NGA's Contract Writing System RREPORT NO. OIGE-21-05 / 22 APRIL 2021

**Decision:** OCS established a timeline, with specific milestones, to replace NGA's current iteration of the Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and Management with an up-to-date system and designated an office of primary responsibility for each milestone. The office also developed a plan to coordinate requirements across each NGA directorate involved. This action closed recommendation 1.

## Inspection of NGA's Telework Policy REPORT NO. OIGE-21-06 / 18 AUGUST 2021

**Decision 1:** OIG determined this recommendation was no longer actionable by the Agency following the release of Presidential Memorandum, Return to In-Person Work, 20 January 2025. We administratively closed recommendation 1.

**Decision 2:** NGA's HD updated telework training for supervisors and employees to address identified gaps in the application of telework and include telework best practices. This action closed recommendation 2.

## Inspection of NGA's GEOINT Standards Program REPORT NO. OIGE-21-07 / 3 SEPTEMBER 2021

**Decision 1:** GFM published the FY 2024 State of the Function report identifying GEOINT standards and interoperability goals, objectives, accomplishments, and impediments. This action closed recommendation 3.

**Decision 2:** NGA aligned the roles, responsibilities, grade, and organizational placement of the senior GEOINT authority (SGA) for GEOINT standards to make the position commensurate with other NGA SGAs. This action closed recommendation 5.

**Decision 3:** NGA developed a combined infrastructure of strengthened acquisition processes, policies, and decisionmaking bodies to ensure standards compliance and interoperability. This action closed recommendation 6.



## Audit of NGA's Laptop Inventory

REPORT NO. OIGA-21-10 / 29 SEPTEMBER 2021

**Decision:** NGA ensured it follows a single process for laptop acquisition as required by NGA Manual 4160.1, Accountability and Management of Property, Plant, Equipment, and Other Accountable Property. This action closed recommendation 2.

## Quick Look Inspection Report of NGA's COVID-19 Response: GEOINT Continuity, Recovery, Reconstitution, and Impact

REPORT NO. OIGE-22-03 / 6 JULY 2022

**Decision:** NGA established specific milestones to conduct annual testing, training, and exercises to validate the NGA Continuity of Operations Program; updated continuity and component specific plans; and developed a tracking mechanism for meeting these requirements. This action closed recommendation 1.

## Management Advisory Report on NGA Support Team Governance and Support

REPORT NO. MAR-22-01 / 12 AUGUST 2022

**Decision:** NGA completed an evaluation of its global presence and established and implemented NGA boards, working groups, and processes governing it. This action closed recommendation 1.

## Audit of NGA's Software License Management

REPORT NO. OIGA-23-01 / 28 OCTOBER 2022

**Decision 1:** TCS conducted an inventory of noncapitalized, accountable internal use software licenses. This action closed recommendation 1.

**Decision 2:** TCS established policy, procedures, and controls to ensure that NGA is not paying for unused or underutilized software licenses. This action closed recommendation 2.

## Evaluation of NGA's Zero Trust Architecture

REPORT NO. OIGA-23-06 / 13 JANUARY 2023

**Decision:** Management's actions closed recommendation 3, which is classified.

## Assessment of NGA's Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act for FY 2022

REPORT NO. U-066-23 / 31 MARCH 2023

**Decision 1:** FM contacted OMB and ODNI for written clarification regarding the PIIA reporting expectations for NGA, specifically the applicable payment integrity information NGA should publish to meet requirement 1a (i.e., publishing payment integrity information with the annual financial statement) and how the Agency should use the OMB data call guidance. Also, FM developed an SOP indicating that NGA would follow the instructions in the OMB data call to determine the PIIA information to disclose in the AFR. This action closed recommendation 1.

**Decision 2:** FM completed an SOP that describes NGA's annual PIIA reporting processes, including the procedures FM will perform to identify the applicable payment integrity information to report in the AFR each year. This action closed recommendation 2.

## Quick Look Inspection of NGA's Use of Small Business Contractors

REPORT NO. OIGE-24-01 / 8 NOVEMBER 2023

**Decision:** OCS completed a process assessment report (PAR) notification system and developed escalation procedures. This action closed recommendation 2.

## Audit of NGA's Loaned Equipment

### REPORT NO. OIGA-24-02 / 29 NOVEMBER 2023

**Decision 1:** The International Operations and Partnerships Directorate established and implemented a process to maintain and centralize loan agreements for equipment loaned to international partners as required by DoD and NGA policies. This action closed recommendation 1.

**Decision 2:** The Source Directorate (Source) developed and implemented a plan for obtaining signed and current support agreements for equipment loaned to partners. This action closed recommendation 5.

**Decision 3:** Source established and implemented a process to verify loans annually as required by NGA policy, maintained and centralized loan agreements and supporting documents, and obtained gravity data from partners as agreed to achieve intended program objectives. This action closed recommendation 6.

## Audit of NGA's Removable Media Devices

### REPORT NO. OIGA-24-06 / 8 MARCH 2024

**Decision 1:** The Chief Information Officer (CIO) appointed a Removable Media Control Program Manager to execute the responsibilities outlined in NGAI 8010.3, Removable Media Management and Protection. This action closed recommendation 1.

**Decision 2:** The CIO implemented controls to ensure NGA purchases only whitelisted removable media devices. This action closed recommendation 3.

**Decision 3:** Management's actions closed recommendation 4, which is classified.

**Decision 4:** The CIO reviewed the definitions of removable media in NGAI 8010.3 and related articles in the context of potential unauthorized use of disk burners and updated the policy and articles. This action closed recommendation 6.

**Decision 5:** Management's actions closed recommendation 7, which is classified.

## Inspection of NGA's DevCorp Operations

### REPORT NO. OIGE-24-02 / 18 MARCH 2024

**Decision:** The ADC assessed NGA's critical needs, identified gaps in the government software developer and software engineer cadre, and updated DevCorps' vision, mission statement, functions, long-term goals, and organizational placement to address critical needs and gaps. This action closed recommendation 1.

## Management Advisory Report on NGA's Medical Clearance Process

### REPORT NO. MAR-24-01 / 23 APRIL 2024

**Decision 1:** NGA updated corporate policies for expeditionary deployments, permanent change of station (PCS), and temporary duty (TDY) with designated authorities responsible for the medical clearance process; roles and responsibilities for Agency medical officials, supervisors, and employees; and requirements ensuring NGA employees follow applicable combatant command guidance prior to traveling OCONUS to perform official duties. This action closed recommendation 1.

**Decision 2:** NGA updated NGA Instruction 8920.1, Expeditionary Deployment Program, to assign the appropriate responsibilities to the Directors of SI and HD. This action closed recommendation 2.



## Closed Recommendations by KC


NGA Management closed 26 recommendations in FY 2023, 52 in FY 2024, and 31 in the first and second quarters of FY 2025.

KEY COMPONENT	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025 1 <sup>ST</sup> AND 2 <sup>ND</sup> QUARTERS
A	1	5	
ADC			5
ADO	1		
CIO-T	6	7	8
D	1	2	
DDI			1
DXC		4	
FM	1	5	3
G	3		2
HD	4	8	2
I			2
MOC	2		
N			1
OCS	4	6	1
S	1		2
SC			1
SI	2	15	3
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>31</b>

# Investigations Information, Statistics and Metrics

We received 120 complaints during this reporting period as shown on the following chart. During this reporting period, we opened 17 investigations, closed 28, and issued nine investigative reports.

Types of OIG Complaints Received  
1 October 2024 – 31 March 2025



## Summary of Significant Investigations Closed

### IG Act § 5(a)(3)

In 2022, the NGA OIG Data Analytics Team developed a proactive fraud model to analyze NGA employees for potential Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act fraud. The model produced several investigative leads, which the OIG Investigation Division examined further, discovering potential criminal conduct. The division referred a case to the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) St. Louis and continued to support DCIS and the Department of Justice (DoJ).

The investigation revealed that an NGA employee, who served as a program and business administration officer, falsely applied for and obtained \$20,614 in disbursements from the Paycheck Protection Program. The employee, who claimed she owned a fictitious human resource business, forged and submitted business and tax documents in furtherance of her scheme. Individual check disbursements from the funding institutions were transported across state lines, deposited into the employee's personal checking account, and converted to her personal use.

The employee entered a guilty plea in the United States District Court, Southern District of Illinois, on 5 February 2025. The employee was charged with one felony count of violating 18 U.S.C. § 2314 and is scheduled to be sentenced on 5 June 2025.



# Total Number of Convictions

## IG Act § 5(a)(4)

During the reporting period, we supported one criminal investigation that resulted in a conviction. The previous section describes this investigation in detail.

# Statistical Table of Investigation Information

## IG Act § 5(a)(11–12)

Although we did not refer any investigations to the DoJ or state or local authorities for prosecution during the reporting period, we proffered four complaints to DCIS for consideration. We obtained the data in this statistical table from our case management system.

9	0	0	0	4	\$149,075
Investigative Reports Issued	Referrals to the DoJ for Criminal Prosecution	Referrals to State and Local Authorities for Criminal Prosecution	Indictments Resulting from Prior Referrals	Cases Referred to Other Investigative Authorities for Possible Criminal Prosecution	Funds Recovered from Contractor Disclosures of Overpayment or Fraud

# Substantiated Allegations of Seniors

## IG Act § 5(a)(13)

We closed six investigations involving senior government officials and substantiated two of the allegations. We coordinated the completed reports of investigation with the DoD OIG Investigations of Senior Officials Directorate, which concurred with our conclusions.

# Whistleblower Retaliation

## IG Act § 5(a)(14)

We received six allegations of whistleblower retaliation during this reporting period. We closed five investigations and substantiated none of the allegations. We coordinated the complaint analyses and determinations with the DoD OIG Whistleblower Reprisal Investigations Directorate, which concurred with our conclusions.

Reprisal Cases Closed Semiannually		Reprisal Complaints Received Semiannually	
1 Oct 22 – 31 Mar 23	9	1 Oct 22 – 31 Mar 23	5
1 Apr 23 – 30 Sep 23	6	1 Apr 23 – 30 Sep 23	9
1 Oct 23 – 31 Mar 24	4	1 Oct 23 – 31 Mar 24	8
1 Apr 24 – 30 Sep 24	10	1 Apr 24 – 30 Sep 24	3
1 Oct 24 – 31 Mar 25	5	1 Oct 24 – 31 Mar 25	6

# Additional Reporting Requirements

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## Compliance with Federal Financial Management and Improvement Act of 1996

(IG Act § 5(a)(7))

NGA has developed and implemented remediation plans for financial management systems to address areas of noncompliance. We will assess NGA's progress during the FY 2025 financial statement audit.

## Peer Reviews

(IG Act § 5(a)(8–10))

### Peer Reviews of NGA OIG:

In November 2024, the National Security Agency (NSA) OIG completed a peer review of our Inspection and Evaluation Division. The review found the division had suitably designed and complied with its system of quality control for inspection and evaluation to provide reasonable assurance of complying with the CIGIE *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, December 2020.

In March 2024, NSA OIG completed a peer review of our Audit Division. The review found the division had suitably designed and complied with its system of quality control to provide reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity with applicable professional standards and legal and regulatory requirements in all material respects.

In January 2024, the Defense Intelligence Agency OIG completed a peer review of our Investigation Division. The review found the division complied with CIGIE quality standards and other applicable guidelines and statutes. The review highlighted two cases for “exemplary thoroughness and completeness of documentation.”

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer review of NGA OIG conducted by another OIG.

### Peer Reviews Conducted by NGA OIG:

In March 2025, our Investigation Division supported a peer review of NSA OIG led by CIA OIG.

In February 2025, our Inspection and Evaluation Division supported a peer review of the IC IG Inspection and Evaluation Division led by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) OIG.

In September 2024, our OIG Audit Division supported a peer review of NSA OIG led by NRO OIG.

There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer review we conducted of another OIG.



## **Attempts to Interfere with IG Independence**

(IG Act § 5(a)(15)(A))

We did not experience any attempts to interfere with the office's independence during this reporting period.

## **Information or Assistance Refused**

(IG Act § 5(a)(15)(B))

We were not refused any information or assistance during this reporting period.

## **Public Disclosure (Closed but Undisclosed Audits, Inspections, and Investigations)**

(IG Act § 5(a)(16))

We did not publicly disclose any audits, inspections, evaluations, or investigations during this reporting period. This report includes detailed descriptions of all nondisclosed reports.

## **Investigations of Unauthorized Public Disclosures of Classified Information**

(50 U.S.C. § 3235(b)(1))

There were no instances of unauthorized public disclosures of classified information during this reporting period.

CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS HAVE

# WHISTLE BLOWER PROTECTIONS

## WHISTLEBLOWERS ARE PROTECTED

NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES AND CONTRACTORS ARE PROTECTED BY PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 19, PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS WITH ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, 10 OCTOBER 2012, AND INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY DIRECTIVE 120, INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION, 20 MARCH 2014, AND 50 U.S.C. § 3234 AND § 3341 (J). MILITARY MEMBERS ARE PROTECTED UNDER 10 U.S.C. § 1034

WHERE TO REPORT

# HOTLINE

NATIONAL GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**

—SBU—

[WEB.INTRANET.NGA.MIL/ORG/OIG](http://WEB.INTRANET.NGA.MIL/ORG/OIG)  
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