Report No. DODIG-2025-075

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INSPECTOR GENERAL

U.S. Department of Defense

MARCH 10, 2025

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces

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INSPECTOR GENERAL
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EFFICIENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces

March 10, 2025

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of DoD Component accounting of repair parts provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and the process for verifying the need for new repair parts requested by the UAF to maintain military equipment provided by the DoD.

(U) Background

(U) The mission of the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center–Ukraine (RDC-U) is to sustain readiness of DoD equipment provided to Ukraine. The RDC-U is composed of maintenance and supply personnel from the Army Materiel Command's subordinate life-cycle management commands, associated contract support, and original equipment manufacturers. The RDC-U established a two-level validation process for all UAF repair part requests. The process consists of a first review by field service representatives (FSRs) and a second-level review by the RDC-U maintenance officer and technician (U.S. Army Soldiers), during which they approve or deny each part request.

(U) Findings

(U) Although we did not find applicable DoD policy to assess the effectiveness of the validation process, we observed that RDC-U officials made a substantial effort to validate and respond to UAF requests for repair parts. However, the DoD can improve both

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(U) its accountability for repair parts provided to the UAF and the process for validating the need for new repair parts requested by the UAF. Specifically:

- (U) for major assembly and controlled parts provided to the UAF, DoD officials were not consistently aware of the location and installation status of parts in Ukraine for weapons platforms for which the parts were requested and
- (U) the RDC-U's validation of repair part requests was not consistent.

(U) The DoD's inconsistent accounting of repair parts provided to Ukraine and validation of new repair parts requested by the UAF occurred for the following reasons.

- (U) The Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U) did not standardize FSR responsibilities across various contracts and weapon system teams. Each FSR weapon system team and each contract vendor providing FSRs had different requirements and procedures for tracking and accounting for repair parts.
- (U) SAG-U did not provide RDC-U officials with business rules for validating UAF repair part requests.
- (U) The DoD did not have an agreement with the UAF requiring the UAF to readily assist with accountability of received parts, including a requirement to routinely provide updates to the U.S. Government on the status of U.S.-provided parts the UAF maintains as on-hand stock.

(U) In addition, the UAF returned only a small portion of recoverable parts that are repairable, including major assemblies and controlled parts. This occurred because DoD officials did not have an agreement with the UAF to return recoverable parts and did not adequately press the UAF to return unserviceable, recoverable parts.

(U) The lack of formal validation procedures or business rules may result in RDC-U officials approving or disapproving repair part requests in a way that is inconsistent with the intent of SAG-U and DoD interests. In addition, failing to return

(U) Results in Brief

(U) Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces

(U) Findings (cont'd)

(U) recoverable parts results in the loss of significant value to the U.S. Government for unserviceable parts that could be repaired and returned to the UAF for a fraction of the cost of providing the UAF with new repair parts.

(U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the SAG-U Commander:

- (U) Update contract work orders, in coordination with contracting officers, to standardize the information tracked by FSRs for all weapons systems provided to the UAF.
- (U) Revise the RDC-U standard operating procedures or develop separate business rules that provide detailed validation guidance for repair part requests with specific criteria and rationale for disapproving requests.
- (U) Establish a formal agreement with the UAF Logistics Command to provide routine updates on the inventory of U.S.- provided parts in UAF Logistics Command depots and warehouses.
- (U) Develop a plan to assist the UAF in fully integrating an electronic, automated supply management system that enables the UAF to provide the DoD with the status of U.S. repair part stock on hand.
- (U) Establish a formal agreement with the UAF to return recoverable parts and implement validation procedures that will cause the rejection of requests for these same parts if the UAF has an excessive quantity (as defined by SAG-U) that it has not sent back for turn-in credit or repair.

(U) Management Comments and Our Response

(U) SAG-U agreed with all of the recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are resolved and open. We will close the recommendations when we verify that management has implemented actions to address the recommendations.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

(U) Recommendations Table

(U) Management	Recommendations Unresolved	Recommendations Resolved	Recommendations Closed
Commander, Security Assistance Group–Ukraine	None	1.a, 1.b, 1.c, 1.d, 1.e	None **(U)**

(U) Please provide Management Comments by June 10, 2025.

(U) Note: The following categories are used to describe agency management's comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – The DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.


INSPECTOR GENERAL
INTEGRITY
EFFICIENCY
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

March 10, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, SECURITY ASSISTANCE GROUP–UKRAINE

SUBJECT: (U) Evaluation of the DoD's Validation of Repair Parts Requested by the Ukrainian Armed Forces (Report No. DODIG-2025-075)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of the Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered management's comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) SAG-U agreed to address all of the recommendations presented in the report; therefore, the recommendations are resolved and open. We will close the recommendations when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-on actions to implement the recommendations are complete. Therefore, please provide us within 90 days your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [redacted] if unclassified or [redacted] if classified SECRET.

(U) If you have any questions, please contact me at [redacted]

Bryan Clark

Bryan T. Clark
Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations
Programs, Combatant Commands, and Operations

(U) Contents

(U) Introduction

(U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of DoD Component accounting of repair parts provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and the process for verifying the need for new repair parts requested by the UAF to maintain military equipment provided by the DoD.[1]

(U) Background

(U) DoD Organizations That Support Ukraine's Repair Part Needs

(U) Multiple DoD organizations provide repair parts to Ukraine, including the Defense Logistics Agency, Military Services, and U.S. Special Operations Command. The focus of this evaluation is on the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (SAG-U) and the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center–Ukraine (RDC-U), where officials have a dedicated mission to validate and respond to UAF requests for repair parts.

(U) Security Assistance Group–Ukraine

(U) On November 4, 2022, the DoD announced the establishment of SAG-U, a dedicated Joint Military headquarters element in Wiesbaden, Germany, that was established to provide long term coordination and oversee the full range of U.S. security assistance activities to the UAF. According to a U.S. Army Europe and Africa official, SAG-U's mission is to support security assistance activities, coordinate training efforts, oversee efforts to supply and equip the UAF, and enhance Ukraine's situational awareness. SAG-U has overall responsibility and accountability for validating UAF repair part requests.

(U) Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center–Ukraine

(U) The RDC-U, established in Poland, is responsible for sustaining the readiness of DoD equipment provided for Ukraine operations. The RDC-U is composed of maintenance and supply personnel from the Army Materiel Command's subordinate life-cycle management commands, associated contract support, and original equipment manufacturers. The RDC-U integrates capabilities to assess, diagnose, repair, and enable forward repair of equipment in Ukraine using remote

[1] (U) This report contains information that has been redacted because it was identified by the DoD as Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI) that is not releasable to the public. CUI is Government-created or owned unclassified information that allows for or requires safeguarding and dissemination controls in accordance with laws, regulations, or Government-wide policies.

(U) maintenance; provide multi-class supply support and distribution management to generate and sustain UAF equipment readiness; provide professional development to UAF personnel; and conduct retrograde maintenance repair to rapidly return capability to the UAF.

(U) Request and Approval Process for Repair Parts

(U) The Commander of the International Donor Coordination Centre and the SAG-U Deputy Commanding General for Support signed a memorandum on May 24, 2023, addressed to the Commander of the UAF Logistics Command (LOGCOM), to request UAF endorsement of a standardized process for repairing donated equipment and combat platforms.[2] The memorandum recommended adopting a single process for all contributing nations that requires LOGCOM to consolidate and prioritize all UAF requests for repair parts. The standardized process requires that repair parts the UAF requests for major weapons systems include the serial number of the platform for which the part is intended.

(U) According to RDC-U officials, SAG-U delegated day-to-day responsibility to the RDC-U to validate that UAF requests for repair parts are needed for specific weapon platforms. After the memorandum established this repair process, LOGCOM then required UAF units and depots to send their repair part requirements to LOGCOM for validation. LOGCOM consolidates and prioritizes the part requests and sends them on separate spreadsheets for each different weapon system to the RDC-U's contract International Team for processing. According to RDC-U officials, the International Team inputs the part request into the SkyBlue system and is responsible for moving the request package through the validation and UAF notification processes and, if approved, to the ordering process.[3] The RDC-U established a two-level validation process for all UAF repair part requests that consists of a first review by field service representatives (FSRs) and a second-level review by the RDC-U maintenance officer and technician (U.S. Army Soldiers), during which they approve or deny each repair part request.[4] See Figure 1 for an example of a UAF repair part request spreadsheet with final validation decisions.

(U) According to RDC-U officials, they return the part request spreadsheets with their validation decision to the International Team. For approved part requests, the RDC-U Production Control team creates work orders for the parts in the Global Combat Support System–Army.

[2] (U) The International Donor Coordination Centre is a United Kingdom-led, multinational organization co-located with SAG-U, where personnel from 21 different countries accept and coordinate donations for Ukraine from more than 50 donating nations.

[3] ~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

[4] (U) FSRs are contract subject matter expert maintainers for individual weapon systems.

(U) Figure 1. Example UAF Repair Part Request Spreadsheet with Final Validation



(U) Source: The RDC-U.

(U) RDC-U procedures require the Production Control team to first look for parts that are on hand in the local Poland RDC-U warehouse, which allows for the rapid transfer and delivery of parts to Ukraine. The warehouse consists of two distinct sections: the shop stock listings (SSLs) and a local supply support activity (SSA).[5] RDC-U officials first look for availability in the SSL, which includes parts that were purchased for the UAF using 1-year Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative-appropriated funds for this purpose. The SSL includes over 4,400 different line items with a total quantity of over 869,000 parts. If not in the SSL, officials look in the SSA, which includes an authorized stockage list of U.S. Government (USG)-owned parts that are forward positioned for quick access in anticipation of UAF weapon system needs. The SSA includes over 5,800 different line items with a total quantity of approximately 4 million parts. See Figure 2 for pictures of the RDC-U repair part warehouse.



(U) Figure 2. The RDC-U Warehouse of Repair Parts
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

[5] (U) SSAs are activities assigned a DoD activity address code and have a supply support mission. An SSL is a list of organization maintenance repair parts that are demand supported, non-demand supported, and specified initial stockage repair parts for newly introduced end items. Shop stock includes repair parts and consumable supplies stocked within a support-level maintenance activity for internal use during accomplishment of maintenance requests. It is similar in purpose to repair parts kept by a unit in support of organizational maintenance in that it is for internal use only and has been issued from an authorized stockage list at an SSA.

(U) If the part is not on hand at the RDC-U warehouse, RDC-U personnel send a work order through the Global Combat Support System–Army to other supply activities to fulfill the order. SAG-U must approve funding for any part that is not in the SSL and is purchased from the local SSA or ordered through the supply system using a dedicated fund site for UAF repair parts.

~~(CUI)~~ According to RDC-U procedures, once the RDC-U receives ordered parts, the Production Control team sorts, palletizes, and packages the parts for delivery to designated UAF depots or units. [redacted] The UAF liaison officers at the RDC-U prioritize items that will ship on any given day based on available truck capacity and current needs. The liaison officers verify and sign a copy of the items that are shipped, which is called the Ukrainian Consolidated Items List (UCIL). The Ukrainian liaison officers at the RDC-U sign the UCIL when the items are transferred and shipped. This serves as a release document to confirm that title or ownership passes to Ukraine, and the UAF then employs their own accountability controls for the repair parts. RDC-U officials email the UCIL to UAF LOGCOM and a distribution list of donor nations. The weapon system FSRs also notify the UAF unit liaisons of part orders and shipment status on a commercial encrypted messaging system.[6] Throughout the process, RDC-U officials update SkyBlue with the validation, ordering, receipt, and shipment status of UAF repair part requests for visibility.

(U) Repair Part Types

(U) According to Department of the Army Pamphlet 708-2, "Cataloging and Supply Management Data Procedures for the Army Enterprise Material Master," defense articles have 10 materiel codes for various supply categories (Classes I through X).[7] Repair parts are categorized under Class IX, which includes components of kits, assemblies, and subassemblies required for maintenance support of all equipment. Class IX parts are generally used to repair Class VII major end items provided to Ukraine, such as launchers, tanks, air defense systems, and combat vehicles. Class IX repair parts may be further differentiated by one or more categories, including consumable, expendable, major assembly, controlled, and recoverable parts.

[6] (U) RDC-U officials use this open-source, encrypted messaging service for instant messages, voice calls, and video calls for unclassified, sensitive communications with Ukrainian officials. Communication may be one-to-one between users or involve group messaging.

[7] (U) Department of the Army Pamphlet 708-2, "Cataloging and Supply Management Data Procedures for the Army Enterprise Material Master," March 26, 2020.

(U) Consumable and Expendable Parts

(U) The DoD identifies many repair parts provided to Ukraine as consumable or expendable items. Consumable supplies are items consumed in use, such as ammunition, fuel, cleaning and preserving materials, surgical dressings, and drugs or supplies that lose their separate identity in use, such as repair parts and building materials. Expendable items include consumables and items not consumed in use with an organization cost of less than $500, and a classification item code identifies them as unclassified.[8] According to Army Regulation 735-5, "Property Accountability: Relief of Responsibility and Accountability," consumable and expendable items require no formal accountability after issue.[9] According to RDC-U officials, they may authorize the transfer of bulk consumable or expendable items to Ukraine for routine maintenance without assigning every part to a specific weapon platform by serial number as required for other repair parts.

(U) Major Assemblies and Controlled Parts

(U) Some repair parts provided to the UAF may be identified as major assemblies or controlled items. A major item or assembly is a final combination of component parts or materials that is ready for its intended use, including installation in an equipment end item. These parts are important enough to be subject to centralized management, regardless of whether they are issued to and employed by U.S. forces or requested for the UAF. According to the program managers (PMs) for weapons systems at the RDC-U, major assemblies include high-value items such as engines, transmissions, and suspension components. Item managers who control one or more major assemblies for the U.S. Army supply system may restrict the release of these items because of their high value and often limited stock.[10] See Figure 3 for an example of major power assemblies for a Stryker, which includes the engine and transmission, a major repair part of high value.

[8] (U) Defense Logistics Agency, "Federal Logistics Information System Cataloging Data and Transaction Standards," Volume 10, October 27, 2022.

(U) A classification item code indicates which level of control or protection the materiel may require in the interest of national security and in accordance with provisions of DoD Manual 5200.1, "DoD Information Security Program."

[9] (U) Army Regulation 735-5, "Property Accountability: Relief of Responsibility and Accountability," April 10, 2024.

[10] (U) An item manager is an individual in the organization of an inventory control point or other such organization assigned management responsibility for one or more specific materiel items.



(U) Figure 3. Example Major Assembly: Stryker Full-up Power Pack at the RDC-U
(U) Source: The DoD OIG.

(U) Controlled items are property with characteristics that may require them to be identified, accounted for, secured, segregated, or handled in a special manner to ensure their safekeeping and integrity. These include classified, sensitive, and pilferable items. Controlled repair parts provided to Ukraine require a high degree of protection for a variety of reasons, including because they have a high value or are highly technical or of a hazardous nature.[11]

(U) Recoverable Parts

(U) Many of the repair parts provided to the UAF are categorized as recoverable. Recoverable parts include: (1) repairable parts that can be restored to perform all of their required functions by corrective maintenance and (2) parts that include materials that have useful physical or chemical properties after serving their original purposes and can be reused or recycled. The latter parts, such as batteries, need special disposal or handling and are treated as recoverable items but not necessarily as repairable items.[12]

[11] (U) The accountability and control requirements for these items is distinct from the end-use monitoring requirements for tracking and accountability of defense articles provided to foreign partners, as directed under the Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5101.38, "Security Assistance Management Manual."

[12] (U) According to Army regulations, requests for recoverable parts are normally submitted on a one-for-one basis and, when possible, at the same time the unserviceable item is turned in. Recoverable parts are identified with a recoverable code; a code of "D," "F," "H," or "L" indicates the recoverable part is repairable.

(U) The Army supply system typically provides a credit to a unit's account when it returns unserviceable but repairable parts to the RDC-U SSA. Recoverable repair parts that RDC-U officials must order through the Global Combat Support System–Army generate a "due-back" status in the system; those recoverable parts are tracked by the local RDC-U SSA in their Overage Recovery List. Many recoverable parts have significant value and can be repaired and reused for less cost than purchasing new parts. Some recoverable, high-value parts, known as line replaceable units (LRUs), can be repaired at the RDC-U and returned to the UAF to repair weapons platforms; therefore, these parts may not be turned in to the RDC-U SSA.[13] Other recoverable parts returned by the UAF are turned in to the SSA for repair elsewhere in Europe or the United States. After these recoverable parts are repaired, they may be purchased again by the dedicated UAF Class IX repair parts fund site before provision back to the UAF.

(U) Other Methods of Procuring Repair Parts for the UAF

(U) In addition to the UAF request process, repair parts may be provided to the UAF through other methods, such as provision of bulk sustainment parts by weapon system PMs or by Presidential Drawdown Authority execute orders. These push packages are funded separately from the dedicated UAF Class IX repair parts fund site. PM-provided parts are typically included on the UCIL with other parts that are routinely transferred to the UAF from the RDC-U. Presidential Drawdown Authority-provided parts are not included in the UCIL but rather provided to the UAF through one of the logistics hubs in Poland. Neither of these sources of repair parts is tracked by the RDC-U SSA warehouse as a due-back, recoverable part in the Global Combat Support System–Army.

[13] (U) LRUs are electronics parts that provide a variety of functions on Army combat systems, such as vehicle power distribution, forward-looking infrared cameras, data management, optics and sighting, ballistic solutions, and global positioning systems. In the military, electronic LRUs are typically designed to interface according to data bus standards, such as MIL-STD-1553, to ensure that they can be interchangeable, especially if they are from different manufacturers. Usually, a class of LRUs has coordinated environmental specifications, such as temperature and condensation limits. Each LRU also has detailed specifications describing its function, tray size, tray connectors, attachment points, and weight ranges.

(U) Finding

(U) DoD Officials Made Substantial Efforts to Validate and Respond to UAF Requests for Repair Parts; However, the DoD Can Improve Its Accountability and Validation of Repair Parts for the UAF

(U) Although we did not find applicable DoD policy to assess the effectiveness of the validation process, we observed that RDC-U officials made a substantial effort to validate UAF requests for repair parts. For example, RDC-U officials conducted a validation review of 381 UAF repair part requests for 28 different weapon platforms in the first 6 months of 2024. Each UAF request included a few to several dozen different types of repair parts in different quantities. Additionally, RDC-U officials responded to UAF requests by quickly addressing requests, taking extra measures to identify and service the most urgent needs, and saving $13 million by repairing parts at the RDC-U. However, the DoD can improve both its accountability of repair parts provided to the UAF and the process for validating the need for new repair parts requested by the UAF for the following reasons.

- (U) DoD officials were not consistently aware of the location and installation status of major assembly and controlled parts provided to the UAF into the weapons platforms for which they were requested. For example, the DoD weapon system teams for four different weapons systems, including the Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target (PATRIOT) systems, only knew about the receipt and location of 32 of 120 (27 percent) major assemblies sent to the UAF in response to their critical requests.
- (U) The RDC-U inconsistently validated repair part requests. For example, DoD officials denied requests for M1A1 Abrams major assemblies, instructing the UAF to use on-hand stock first before ordering more parts. However, RDC-U officials did not do the same for other weapons platforms, such as the Stryker and Bradley, because the officials were not aware of the inventory of UAF stock on hand.

(U) This inconsistent accounting and validation occurred for the following reasons.

- (U) SAG-U did not standardize FSR responsibilities across various contracts and weapon system teams. Each FSR weapon system team and each contract vendor providing FSRs had different requirements and procedures for tracking and accounting for repair parts. For example,

(U) the Stryker FSRs were required to confirm the UAF's receipt of repair parts and obtain the fully mission capable (FMC) or not mission capable (NMC) status of every Stryker provided to Ukraine.[14] However, Bradley FSRs stated that they were not required to confirm receipt of repair parts or track the FMC or NMC status of Bradleys, although they attempted to do so.

- (U) The RDC-U published standard operating procedures for the facility; however, the procedures did not include business rules for RDC-U officials to execute the required validation of UAF repair part requests. RDC-U officials developed their own general criteria for approving or disapproving requests, but the officials were not certain about what authorities they had to approve bulk orders for various repair parts.
- (U) The DoD did not have an agreement with the UAF requiring the UAF to assist with accountability of received parts. For example, the UAF did not complete its portion of the SkyBlue spreadsheet for part request status to verify the receipt of parts. In addition, the DoD and UAF did not have an agreement for the UAF to provide updates to the USG on the status of U.S.-provided parts the UAF maintains as on-hand stock. As such, the UAF did not routinely provide these status updates to the USG.

~~(CUI)~~ In addition, the UAF returned only a small portion of recoverable and repairable parts, including major assemblies and controlled parts, as requested by the International Donor Coordination Centre and SAG-U memorandums. Specifically, as of July 27, 2024, the RDC-U was tracking over 19,000 recoverable parts that were provided to the UAF and that were not returned, some of which are major assemblies that are low in stock in the U.S. supply system, [redacted][15] This occurred in part because DoD officials did not have an agreement with the UAF to return unserviceable, recoverable parts using the validation process. For example, RDC-U officials validated most UAF requests for new recoverable major assemblies even though the UAF did not return a significant number of the same broken or damaged items.

[14] (U) FMC is a materiel condition indicating that systems and equipment are safe and have all mission-essential subsystems installed and operating as designed. The terms ready, available, and FMC refer to the same status: equipment is on hand and able to perform its combat missions. NMC is a materiel condition indicating that equipment cannot perform any one of its combat missions.

[15] (U) This amount only accounts for recoverable parts that the SSA Overage Recovery List is tracking as due back for return in the Global Combat Support System–Army. This amount does not include any recoverable parts provided to the UAF by the PMs, parts pulled from on-hand stock in the shop stock listing, or parts provided by Presidential Drawdown execute orders.

(U) Although an RDC-U standard operating procedure addresses some RDC-U operations, the lack of formal validation procedures or business rules may result in RDC-U officials approving or disapproving repair part requests that do not meet the intent of SAG-U or DoD interests, particularly because of the frequent changeover of personnel making these decisions. SAG-U's inconsistent accounting for the disposition of major assemblies and controlled parts in Ukraine, or lack of a formal agreement with the UAF to return them, makes these high-value or sensitive parts vulnerable to pilfering, loss, or theft. In addition, failing to return recoverable parts results in the loss of significant value to the USG for unserviceable parts that could be repaired and returned to the UAF for a fraction of the cost of providing the UAF with new repair parts.

(U) DoD Officials Made Substantial Efforts to Validate and Respond to UAF Requests for Repair Parts

(U) Although we did not find applicable DoD policy to assess the effectiveness of the validation process, we observed that RDC-U officials made substantial efforts to validate and respond to UAF requests for repair parts. For example, RDC-U officials developed a two-stage process through which they validated and responded to UAF requests for repair parts. The RDC-U International Team received request spreadsheets from LOGCOM and provided them to the applicable weapon system FSR teams for their initial review of the UAF repair part requests. The International Team then provided the FSR-reviewed spreadsheets to the RDC-U's military maintenance officer and technician for a final validation decision. RDC-U officials conducted a validation review of 381 separate spreadsheets for UAF repair part requests for 28 different weapons platforms in the first 6 months of 2024. We determined that the RDC-U generally responded to the UAF with a decision to approve or disapprove repair parts requests within a few days.

(U) We reviewed a non-statistical sample of 89 of 381 spreadsheets. The spreadsheets we reviewed included a few to several dozen different types of parts in multiple quantities. For example, for the M1A1 Abrams alone, RDC-U officials reviewed 630 requests for 5,904 parts of different types. In addition, we determined that from January through mid-July 2024, RDC-U officials received and repaired 721 LRUs for M1A1 Abrams and M2A2 Bradleys that the UAF returned, saving $13 million compared to the cost of providing new LRUs. We also analyzed the UCIL for the first 6 months of 2024 and determined that DoD officials transported and transferred to the UAF approximately 470,000 parts for U.S. weapons systems in the first 6 months of 2024. We observed RDC-U officials conduct daily meetings with UAF LOGCOM officials to focus on the maintenance

(U) status and issues for specific weapon systems. RDC-U and UAF officials prioritized the most critical parts needed to enable the UAF to repair and bring the maximum number of weapons systems back to FMC status. RDC-U officials then diligently searched the U.S. supply system to locate the SSAs that had these critical parts and could most quickly provide them to satisfy the requirement.

(U) DoD Officials Were Not Consistently Aware of the Location and Status of Major Assembly and Controlled Parts Provided to the UAF

(U) DoD officials were not consistently aware of the location and installation status of major assembly and controlled parts provided to the UAF and whether those parts were installed in the weapons platforms for which they were requested. The DoD does not have a requirement to track inventories of repair parts provided to the UAF, nor does the UAF have a requirement to provide this information back to the USG. However, to make informed validation decisions regarding future UAF requests for parts, DoD officials need to have a sound understanding of the status of repair parts that the UAF has in its possession.

(U) DoD Weapon System Teams Did Not Know the Location of Most Major Assemblies or Controlled Items

(U) It would be impractical for DoD officials to be cognizant of the status of every repair part provided to the UAF, particularly consumable parts. However, DoD weapon system teams that conduct direct liaison with UAF LOGCOM, depots, and units did not know the location of most major assemblies or controlled items. These include parts that are high value, vulnerable to pilfering, or contain sensitive technology. Major assemblies may also include items that are low in stock and are metered by item managers to ensure U.S. force readiness.[16]

(U) We selected a non-statistical sample of the major assemblies most frequently requested, approved, and provided for four different weapons systems, including the Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and PATRIOT systems, for the first 6 months of 2024. Collectively, the weapon system teams could only confirm the receipt and location of 32 of 120 (27 percent) major assemblies sent to the UAF in response to UAF critical requests.

[16] (U) Metering is the act of supplying in a measured or regulated amount. Item managers may regulate the release of major assemblies as a risk reduction measure to ensure that an adequate supply of parts is available for U.S. military requirements.

(U) The DoD Provided Numerous Sustainment Push Packages of Repair Parts to the UAF

~~(CUI)~~ In addition to repair parts sent to the UAF in response to approved requests, the DoD provided the UAF with numerous sustainment packages, or push packages, in presidential determination (PD) execute orders or funded as a Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative case. [redacted][17]

~~(CUI)~~ Those FSR weapon system teams who received regular updates from the UAF were able to make informed decisions on UAF needs. For example, according to an Abrams PM representative from the U.S. Army Tank and Automotive Command at the RDC-U, the Abrams PM bought and prepared four push packages for M1A1 sustainment parts in 2023. [redacted] Unlike other weapon system teams, the Abrams PM and FSRs not only knew what was in the push packages but also tracked the status of UAF on-hand stock of major assemblies. The Abrams team asked for and received regular updates from LOGCOM on Abrams major assemblies that the UAF had in their stock. As a result, DoD officials making validation decisions were equipped with the information needed to decide whether further UAF part requests were a legitimate need or an attempt to acquire extra stock. This is particularly important for parts that are in short supply or have a zero balance, [redacted]

~~(CUI)~~ Conversely, some FSR weapon system teams did not always know where major assemblies included in push packages were after they were provided to the UAF. The DoD provided push packages with Class IX repair parts to support [redacted] Strykers provided as part of PD [redacted] According to data provided by the team lead for Stryker Vehicle Operations and Sustainment Programs, the PD execute orders were composed of two push packages with 32,300 total parts. Approximately 260 (less than 1 percent) of these parts included costly or sensitive major assemblies, such as transmissions, diesel engines, suspension and drive components, and thermal imaging systems. Although these few major assemblies accounted for $22.8 million, or 65 percent

[17] (U) DoD Office of Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2024-056, "Evaluation of Sustainment Strategies for the PATRIOT Air Defense Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces," February 20, 2024, and DoD Office of Inspector General Report No. DODIG-2024-057, "Evaluation of the DoD's Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems," February 20, 2024, separately evaluated the extent to which the DoD developed and implemented sustainment strategies in support of PATRIOT air defense and Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems transferred to the UAF.

~~(CUI)~~ of the total cost of the push package parts, DoD officials did not maintain accountability for these items after they were transferred to Ukraine. According to the Stryker team lead, the team never received official confirmation that any of these items were delivered to their destination in Ukraine. The team lead stated that they have seen unusual part orders and questioned if Ukraine received and used the push package items first before ordering more of the same parts from the supply system. However, according to one Stryker PM, the team does not currently track what the UAF has on hand for the Stryker. The Stryker team does not know whether these major assemblies are located at a warehouse or if they were pulled and delivered to a Stryker unit for installation to repair broken or damaged platforms.

~~(CUI)~~ Numerous other platform teams know which parts were provided in push packages to the UAF but may not know UAF quantities of on-hand stock. [redacted] According to a Bradley PM, the Bradley team knows exactly which repair parts were provided to the UAF in the 2023 PD push package for UAF on-hand stock, including major assemblies, but the team is currently not aware of the UAF's true on-hand stock.

(U) The RDC-U Inconsistently Validated Repair Part Requests

(U) RDC-U officials' validation of repair part requests was not consistent across the different weapons platforms for which the parts were requested. This inconsistency could result in the RDC-U approving or disapproving repair part requests that may be contrary to the intent of SAG-U and DoD interests. RDC-U could approve the transfer of parts to the UAF that may be short in the U.S. supply system and put sustainment of U.S. equipment at risk. RDC-U could also deny bulk part requests that higher-level DoD officials determined the UAF should have as on-hand safety stock to facilitate rapid repairs of broken or damaged equipment.

~~(CUI)~~ For example, based on our review of UAF part request spreadsheets for January through June 2024, we determined that RDC-U officials denied 64 separate part requests for the M1A1 Abrams, instructing the UAF to use the parts on hand in their warehouse stock first before ordering more parts. During the same period, RDC-U officials did not deny UAF requests for parts for other weapons systems, such as the Stryker and Bradley, despite the UAF having stock on hand that was previously provided to the UAF as part of [redacted] part push packages. In another

(CUI) example, RDC-U officials denied requests for Bradley weapon system parts listed as having zero inventory in the supply system, such as target acquisition subsystems, and directed the UAF to return the damaged or broken parts for which they requested replacement to the RDC-U for repair. However, according to an RDC-U validation official, the officials approved requests for [redacted] even though they were aware that the Army item manager would not release more transmissions because the Army supply system is short on supply and may need them for U.S. Army readiness.

(U) SAG-U Did Not Have Standardized FSR Responsibilities Across Various Contracts and Weapon System Teams

(U) SAG-U did not standardize FSR responsibilities across the various contractor and weapon system teams. Each FSR weapon system team and each contract vendor providing FSRs has different requirements and procedures for tracking and accounting for repair parts, even within the same contractor. FSR requirements varied for several tracking and validation procedures, such as confirmation methods for parts received by units that requested them, installation of parts into designated platforms, and confirmation of FMC or NMC status of all platforms. For example, the Stryker FSRs stated that they were tasked with confirming, to the extent possible and through the Stryker chat coordination rooms, the receipt of repair parts by the UAF units that requested them. The FSRs also stated that they were tasked to follow up with the units to obtain the FMC or NMC status of every Stryker provided to Ukraine. The Bradley FSRs stated that they were not required to confirm receipt of repair parts; they were also not required to track the FMC or NMC status of all Bradleys provided to Ukraine, although they usually attempted to do so. See the Table for a comparison of the FSRs' stated procedures for various weapons systems.

(U) The FSRs are the primary means of providing coordination with UAF units employing the various weapons systems provided by the United States. The lack of consistency in FSR accounting processes for major assemblies and controlled parts makes these parts vulnerable to pilfering, loss, or theft and prevents DoD officials from having all of the information they need to validate future UAF requests for more parts. Therefore, to standardize FSR procedures, SAG-U should coordinate with contracting officers to provide additional guidance and updated contract work orders, as required, to standardize the information tracked by FSRs for all weapons systems provided to the UAF.

(U) Table. Comparison of FSR Weapon System Team Procedures

(U) Procedures	Abrams	Bradley	PATRIOT	Stryker	M777
Track UAF major assembly on-hand stock	**YES**	**NO**	**NO**	**NO**	**N/A**[1]
Verify arrival of parts sent	**YES**	**NO**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**
Track FMC and NMC status	**YES**	**NO**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**
Chat room communication	one for all units	organized by platform	one with each unit	one with each unit	one with each unit
Part request validation	FSRs recommend the USG deny UAF requests for:				
Wrong part, inappropriate quantity (hoarding), battle loss item, item not with UAF possession	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**	**YES**
UAF unit fails to notify FSR of broken platform in chat room	**YES**	**NO**	**NO**[2]	**YES**	**NO**
UAF already has stock on hand in warehouse or depot	**YES**	**NO**	**NO**[2]	**NO**	**N/A**[1]
UAF fails to return recoverable parts due back to RDC-U	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**[2]	**NO**	**NO** (U)

(U) Source: The DoD OIG, derived from analysis based on information from FSR interviews and DoD OIG analyst direct observation.

[1] (U) The M777 team maintains UAF repair part stock on hand at the shop stock listing, not in Ukraine.

[2] (U) The PATRIOT team requires a one-for-one replacement of non-consumable parts.

(U) SAG-U Did Not Establish Formal Guidance for RDC-U Officials to Validate UAF Repair Part Requests

(U) Although SAG-U directed the RDC-U to complete validation of repair parts for Ukraine, SAG-U did not establish formal guidance or business rules in its standard operating procedures for RDC-U officials to execute validation of UAF repair part requests. According to RDC-U officials, they were not certain what the criteria were and what delegated authority they had for approving UAF bulk repair part and other requests. Therefore, the officials used their own judgement to develop general criteria for approving or disapproving requests, which may not always align with SAG-U goals or DoD interests. According to SAG-U officials, they are in the process of developing business rules that will provide guidance

(U) to maintenance officials responsible for validating UAF repair part requests, but they did not specify when these rules will be complete. Therefore, SAG-U should develop business rules that provide detailed guidance for repair part request validation with specific criteria and rationale for disapproving requests.

(U) The DoD Did Not Have an Agreement with the UAF to Provide Accountability of Received Parts, and the UAF Was Not Obligated to and Did Not Regularly Provide the DoD with Accountability Information or Return Major Assemblies and Controlled Items

(U) The DoD does not have an agreement with the UAF to provide accountability of received parts, and the UAF did not consistently provide accountability information for those parts. For example, the UAF made no formal commitment to complete its portion of the SkyBlue part request spreadsheet. The UAF did not complete the majority of its assigned tasks in SkyBlue, including documenting the receipt of parts, the date the part was received, and the name of the official making the confirmation in the SkyBlue spreadsheet.

~~(CUI)~~ Based on our sample from the SkyBlue spreadsheet, the USG approved and provided to the UAF [redacted] repair parts as part of [redacted] separate line-item requests. The UAF completed their receipt confirmation for only [redacted] (1.3 percent) of those line items. In addition, the UAF confirmation entries were only added during the months of March and April 2023. Even if the UAF properly completed their portion of the SkyBlue spreadsheet, the spreadsheet does not include a field to track the depot or unit that received the part or the weapon platform on which the part was installed. According to RDC-U officials, the UAF units stated that they do not provide this information because they do not have time to put this data into SkyBlue.

(U) The UAF Was Not Obligated to and Did Not Regularly Provide Status Updates for U.S.-Provided Parts on Hand in Ukraine

(U) In addition, the UAF was not obligated to and did not regularly provide updates to DoD officials on the status of U.S.-provided parts on hand in Ukrainian depots and warehouses. According to SAG-U officials, the UAF performs most repair part tracking and management manually on paper, and they have difficulty maintaining accountability for parts, especially in a wartime environment. The SAG-U officials stated that they do not receive updates from the UAF for on-hand stock; therefore, SAG-U officials do not have knowledge of the UAF's on-hand inventory.

(U) Based on our analysis of information provided by the RDC-U and interviews with RDC-U personnel, we determined that several of the weapon system teams at the RDC-U, except for the Abrams team, were not aware of which parts the UAF had on hand in their depots or warehouses from previous push packages. SAG-U officials stated that they have an ongoing effort to help the UAF implement a modern, electronic, supply management system. The electronic supply system will improve the UAF's ability to track and manage their inventory. Specifically, the system will allow the brigade commander at the UAF unit to order parts. In the new system, the request will be sent to the UAF LOGCOM to check the other Ukrainian depots, and if the part is not available, the request will go to the RDC-U. However, without an agreement with the USG, the UAF does not routinely provide to the DoD either manual or electronic updates of their on-hand repair parts. Therefore, SAG-U should establish an agreement with the UAF LOGCOM to provide routine updates on the inventory of the major assembly and controlled parts provided to them by the United States that they have as stock on-hand in their depots and warehouses. In addition, SAG-U should develop a plan with actions and milestones to assist the UAF in fully integrating an electronic, automated, supply management system that provides the UAF with the capability to efficiently and routinely provide the DoD with an updated status of on-hand U.S. repair parts.

(U) The UAF Returned Only a Small Portion of Recoverable Parts

(U) The UAF returned a small portion of recoverable and often repairable parts, including major assemblies and controlled parts. Between July 2023 and June 2024, the UAF turned in 5,229 unserviceable, recoverable parts worth $9.98 million. However, this is a small portion of the items that could be returned. According to the RDC-U Overage Recovery List, the UAF currently has over 19,000 recoverable parts that could potentially be returned to the United States when they become unserviceable, some of which are major assemblies that are low in stock in the U.S. supply system.

~~(CUI)~~ For example, according to the [redacted] FSR, the Army is running low on stock for some weapon system parts, so returning these recoverable parts for repair is important. However, the UAF has not returned any [redacted] recoverable parts. RDC-U officials stated that the UAF [redacted] units consistently fail to return unserviceable parts; their commanders do not allow the broken parts to be returned because they are concerned about their accountability for the items. The [redacted] PMs also stated that [redacted] for these systems are in short supply across the Army supply system, which is why the PMs want the UAF to return the parts for repair.

(U) According to SAG-U officials, getting parts back from the UAF is difficult because the UAF accountable officers are fearful of returning broken parts for repair because of corruption and severe consequences for not maintaining control of the parts. UAF accountable officers are still responsible for parts, even if the parts are broken.

(U) The DoD Did Not Have a Formal Mechanism to Encourage the UAF to Return Recoverable Parts

(U) The DoD did not have a formal mechanism to encourage the UAF to provide recoverable parts, including major assemblies and controlled items. The UAF did not return many recoverable parts in part because DoD officials did not have an agreement with the UAF to return them. In addition, DoD officials did not use the validation process to press the UAF to return the parts. DoD personnel validated most UAF requests for new, recoverable major assemblies despite the fact that the UAF failed to return a significant number of the same broken or damaged items. Some weapon system teams, such as the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System launcher, PATRIOT, and Sentinel radar teams, required a one-for-one exchange of all major assemblies the UAF requested. However, DoD officials did not require the return of many broken or damaged parts for other weapons systems, such as the Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and M777 howitzer, based on a rationale that the UAF has a backlog of recoverable parts for these systems.

~~(CUI)~~ SAG-U personnel did not deny UAF part requests when the UAF had broken or damaged recoverable parts that could be provided back to the DoD. We reviewed the reason SAG-U denied UAF part requests in a non-statistical sample of 1,995 line items of Abrams, Bradley, High Mobility Artillery Rocket System chassis, and Stryker weapon system parts that the UAF requested in 2024. The USG denied requests for a total of 459 (23 percent) line-item parts in our sample. Most requests were denied because they were duplicate requests for items already sent to the UAF or previously approved and on back-order in the U.S. supply system. Other requests were denied because the wrong part was ordered, the platform for which the part was ordered was reported as FMC or a battle loss, or the platform was not in the UAF's possession. All 64 Abrams weapon system part requests in our sample were denied because the USG officials knew the parts were on hand in the UAF warehouse. Finally, 38 Bradley part requests in our sample were denied because the RDC-U officials stated that the parts could be repaired much faster than they could be replaced. [redacted] However, no requested parts were documented as denied because of a backlog of broken or damaged recoverable parts that the UAF owes back to the USG. SAG-U officials confirmed that they

(CUI) do not deny requests for parts because of a backlog of recoverable parts that are repairable. Therefore, SAG-U should establish an agreement with the UAF to return a designated list of recoverable parts. SAG-U should also incorporate validation procedures that reject requests for these same parts if the UAF has an excessive quantity (as defined by SAG-U) that it has not sent back for turn in, credit, or repair.

(U) SAG-U's Lack of Validation Business Rules or Agreement with the UAF for Repair Parts May Negatively Impact DoD Strategic Objectives for Support to Ukraine

(U) SAG-U's lack of business rules for repair part validation or a formal agreement with the UAF for accountability of major assemblies and controlled items and return of recoverable parts may negatively impact DoD strategic objectives to adequately support Ukraine while maintaining DoD readiness. Without formal validation procedures or business rules, RDC-U officials may approve or disapprove repair part requests that do not meet the intent of SAG-U or DoD interests, particularly because of the frequent change-over of personnel making these decisions. RDC-U could approve the transfer of parts to the UAF that may be short in the U.S. supply system and put sustainment of U.S. equipment at risk. RDC-U could also deny bulk part requests that higher-level DoD officials determined the UAF should have as on-hand safety stock to facilitate rapid repairs of broken or damaged equipment. SAG-U's inability to consistently account for major assemblies and controlled parts or to get the UAF to report their on-hand stock makes these parts vulnerable to pilfering, loss, or theft and prevents DoD officials from having the information they need to validate future UAF requests for parts. In addition, the UAF's not returning recoverable parts may result in the expenditure of additional U.S. funding for new parts that would not otherwise be required. Specifically, the estimated value of all unserviceable but recoverable parts that the UAF could provide back to the U.S. totals over $20 million. In addition, some of these repairable major assemblies are short in stock in the U.S. supply system; the continued provision of these items to Ukraine reduces safety stock on hand for U.S. Army platforms.

(U) Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response

(U) Recommendation 1

(U) We recommend that the Commander of the Security Assistance Group–Ukraine:

a. **(U) Update contract work orders in coordination with contracting officers to standardize the information tracked by field service representatives for all weapons systems provided to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.**

b. **(U) Revise the Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center–Ukraine standard operating procedures or develop separate business rules that provide detailed validation guidance for repair part requests with specific criteria and rationale for disapproving requests.**

c. **(U) Establish a formal agreement with the Ukrainian Armed Forces Logistics Command to provide routine updates on the inventory of the major assembly and controlled parts provided to them by the United States that they have as on-hand stock in their depots and warehouses.**

d. **(U) Develop and implement a plan with actions and milestones to assist the Ukrainian Armed Forces in fully integrating an electronic, automated, supply management system that provides the Ukrainian Armed Forces with the capability to efficiently and routinely provide the DoD with the status of on-hand, U.S., repair part stock.**

e. **(U) Establish a formal agreement with the Ukrainian Armed Forces to return a designated list of recoverable parts, including timely U.S. Government provision of return receipts, and implement validation procedures that would cause the rejection of requests for these same parts if the Ukrainian Armed Forces has an excessive quantity (as defined by Security Assistance Group–Ukraine) that it has not sent back for turn-in credit or repair.**

(U) Security Assistance Group–Ukraine Comments

(U) The SAG-U Chief of Staff, responding on behalf of the Commander, agreed and stated that SAG-U will work with the FSRs by the end of March 2025 to standardize the FSR reports. He also agreed that SAG-U needs business rules that provide detailed guidance for the repair part request validation process. He added that SAG-U will establish an agreement with the UAF to establish a specific shop stock listing (SSL) of repair parts to be provided by the USG and maintained by the UAF in Ukraine, and SAG-U will continue to assist the UAF to integrate an electronic logistics management system that will inform the USG on the status of the repair

(U) parts in the Ukraine SSL. Finally, the Chief of Staff stated that SAG-U is developing an agreement with the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense that creates a list of recoverable parts that the UAF will provide back to the USG, along with turn-in procedures, and a process for the UAF to manage the relief of their property.

(U) Our Response

(U) Comments from the Chief of Staff addressed the specifics of the recommendations; therefore, the recommendations are resolved but will remain open. We will close the recommendations when we verify that SAG-U has implemented actions to fully address the recommendations.

(U) Appendix

(U) Scope and Methodology

(U) We conducted this evaluation from June 2024 through December 2024 in accordance with the "Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation," published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We identified and reviewed the following criteria for this evaluation.

- (U) Army Regulation 710-1, "Centralized Inventory Management of the Army Supply System," November 28, 2016
- (U) Army Regulation 700-82, Secretary of the Navy Instruction 4410.23A, and Air Force Manual 21-106, "Joint Regulation Governing the Use and Application of Uniform Source, Maintenance, and Recoverability Codes," August 29, 2020
- (U) Army Regulation 710-4, "Inventory Management Property Accountability," January 26, 2024
- (U) Army Regulation 750-1, "Army Materiel Maintenance Policy," March 2, 2023
- (U) RDC-U Maintenance Standard Operating Procedures, July 22, 2023

(U) During the evaluation, we obtained and referenced the following supporting documentation.

- (U) The RDC-U's Consolidated Repair Part Request spreadsheets from January through July 10, 2024
- (U) SAG-U's SkyBlue request tracker from inception in approximately December 2022 through July 27, 2024
- (U) The RDC-U's Ukrainian Consolidated Items List (UCIL) from January through July 10, 2024
- (U) The RDC-U's Overage Recovery List from its initiation in approximately November 2022 through July 10, 2024
- (U) The RDC-U's tracking of all turned-in, recoverable parts and credited funds applied from July 2023 through June 2024

- (U) The Stryker PM's list of repair parts provided to Ukraine in two push packages
- (U) Direct Support Electronics System Team tracking spreadsheets of line replaceable units returned and repaired at the RDC-U and the cost savings to the USG from February through July 23, 2024
- (U) Army Contracting Command–Detroit Arsenal for Amentum Services, Inc. Contract Order Agreement No. W56HZV-22-D-ER04, December 5, 2022 (Incorporating Modifications P00001 through P00019)
- (U) RDC-U Distinguished Visitor Briefing, May 12, 2024, and Daily Closeout briefings, July 1, 2024, and July 18, 2024 (CUI)
- (U) Contract International Team, "SSSI Flow Chart," July 6, 2024
- (U) Memorandum from Commander, International Donor Coordination Centre to Commander, UAF LOGCOM, "Optimizing Maintenance Support," May 24, 2023

(U) To determine the processes and procedures for validating and tracking the repair parts requested, approved, and provided to the UAF, we interviewed the following officials.

- (U) SAG-U J4 (Logistics) and J8 (Requirements and Resources)
- (U) RDC-U Commander, Maintenance Control Officer, Maintenance Control Technician, and Accountable Property Officer
- (U) RDC-U Supply Support Activity (SSA) and SSL officials and International Coordination Team
- (U) RDC-U Defense Logistics Agency liaisons and PM liaisons
- (U) Contract Officer Representatives from the Defense Contract Management Agency that provide oversight of the Amentum contract
- (U) Contractor PM and Deputy PM (senior leadership)
- (U) Contractor FSRs

(U) We analyzed a non-statistical sample of 89 of 381 UAF part request spreadsheets for four U.S.-provided end items, including the Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and High Mobility Artillery Rocket System weapons systems, to review the DoD's validation process and identify trends for the various rationales for denying part requests. We randomly selected a few part request spreadsheets for several different months in 2024. We chose these 4 weapon platforms because they had the largest total number of part request spreadsheets.

(U) We reviewed FSR procedures for repair part validation and tracking across several weapons systems and reviewed a contract performance work statement to determine if contract FSRs have any required actions. We selected a non-statistical sample of 120 major assembly repair parts provided in the UCIL for January to June 2024 for four weapons systems, consisting of the Abrams, Bradley, Stryker, and PATRIOT. We selected these 120 repair parts because the FSRs identified them as the top three most requested major assemblies for their weapons systems. We then asked the FSRs to identify each of the 120 major assemblies for which they had previously verified delivery to the unit for which it was requested (or another unit) and, if available, the platform on which the part was installed. We reviewed the 120 sample items to determine whether the weapon system teams were aware of the status of high-value parts in Ukraine.

(U) We also reviewed Overage Recovery List and recoverable part turn-in spreadsheets to determine the number of parts that the RDC-U's SSA is tracking as due back, parts turned in to the SSA over a 1-year period from July 2023 to June 2024, and the value of these unserviceable parts to the USG.

(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

(U) Prior Coverage

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) issued four reports discussing the DoD's validation of Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance, development and implementation of sustainment plans for air defense and weapons systems provided to Ukraine, and compliance with Federal and DoD policies for awarding contracts for maintenance of equipment at the RDC-U.

(U) Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/.

(U) DoD OIG

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-082, "Audit of DoD's Controls for Validating and Responding to Ukraine's Requests for Military Equipment and Assistance," May 17, 2024

~~(CUI)~~ [redacted]

(U) The audit found that USEUCOM, SAG-U, and Service Component commands had controls in place, and they continued to update controls to validate Ukraine's requests for military equipment and assistance required to fill capability gaps. However, USEUCOM, SAG-U, and the Service Component commands did not document the roles, responsibilities, processes, or procedures for validating Ukraine requests.

(U) The audit recommended that the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with SAG-U and its Service Component commands, document roles, responsibilities, processes, and procedures for validating Ukraine requests for military equipment and assistance. The audit also recommended that the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with the SAG-U Commander, identify and implement courses of action to mitigate coordination challenges with partner nations regarding the classification level of information.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-056, "Evaluation of Sustainment Strategies for the PATRIOT Air Defense Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces," February 15, 2024

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD developed and implemented sustainment strategies in support of PATRIOT air defense systems transferred to the UAF. The evaluation found that the DoD did not develop a sustainment strategy for the PATRIOT air defense systems transferred to the UAF.

(U) The evaluation recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, develop and implement a sustainment strategy for PATRIOT air defense systems transferred to the UAF. The evaluation also recommended that the USEUCOM Commander, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, identify requirements and facilities to provide life-cycle support to sustain PATRIOT air defense systems or components transferred to the UAF.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-057, "Evaluation of the DoD's Sustainment Plan for Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams Armored Weapon Systems Transferred to the Ukrainian Armed Forces," February 15, 2024

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the DoD developed and implemented sustainment plans to support Bradley, Stryker, and Abrams armored weapon systems transferred to the UAF. The evaluation found that the DoD did not develop or implement a plan for sustaining the Bradleys, Strykers, and Abrams provided to the UAF.

(U) The evaluation recommended that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in coordination with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, provide recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with DoD Directive 5100.01, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," to identify the policy goals, priorities, and objectives of U.S. sustainment support for weapon systems provided to the UAF.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2024-041, "Management Advisory: Audit of Remote Maintenance and Distribution Cell–Ukraine Restructuring Contract Award," January 5, 2024

(U) The audit found that Army Contracting Command contracting personnel properly awarded the task order for the maintenance of equipment at the RDC-U in accordance with Federal and DoD policies. Contracting personnel complied with the applicable procedures designed to ensure selection of the most qualified contractor of the businesses that submitted offers to repair and return critical equipment to the UAF as they defend against the Russian full-scale invasion. This management advisory contained no recommendations.

(U) Management Comments

(U) Security Assistance Group–Ukraine

~~CUI~~

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY EUROPE & AFRICA
HEADQUARTERS, SECURITY ASSISTANCE GROUP - UKRAINE
BOX 97 UNIT 29623
APO, AE 09096

AEAG-COS 14 Feb 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: DoD IG Validation of Repair Parts

1. (U) Update contract work orders, in coordination with contracting officers, to standardize the information tracked by FSRs for all weapons systems provided to the UAF.
Response: SAG-U agrees/concurs to work with FSRs by end of Q2 to standardize these reports.

2. (U) Revise the RDC-U standard operating procedures or develop separate business rules that provide detailed guidance for repair part request validation with specific criteria and rationale for disapproving requests.
Response: SAG-U agrees/concurs the RDC-U standard operating procedures need to be revised or work to develop separate business rules that provide detailed guidance for repair part request validation with specific criteria and rationale for disapproving requests.

3. (U) Establish a formal agreement with the UAF Logistics Command to provide routine updates on the inventory of U.S.- provided parts in UAF Logistics Command depots and warehouses.
Response: SAG-U agrees/concurs with the established and agreed upon SSL, between USG and AFU, that is managed with their logistics information system (SAP). The SSL can be socialized through SAP platforms.

4. (U) Develop a plan to assist the UAF in fully integrating an electronic, automated supply management system that enables the UAF to provide the DoD with the status of U.S. repair part stock on hand.
Response: SAG-U agrees/concurs. Currently ongoing with M777, M119, and M113 platforms being built int SAP. No estimated completion date currently.

5. (U) Establish a formal agreement with the UAF to return recoverable parts and implement validation procedures that would cause the rejection of requests for these same parts if the UAF has an excessive quantity (as defined by SAG-U) that it has not sent back for turn-in credit or repair.
Response: SAG-U agrees/concurs the MOU is under construct based on CONOP provided to MOD that outlines the recoverable turn in procedures, and an accurate list of only recoverable parts is being reviewed by LOGCOM, SOK LOG, and SAG-U, and

~~CUI~~

(U) Security Assistance Group–Ukraine (cont'd)

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AEAG-CS
[redacted]

will be subsequently implemented. This will provide a process for the AFU to manage the relief of their property.

6. (U) The document is classified as CUI and should be labelled as such.
Controlled by: DOD US-ARMY
Controlled by: SAG-U
CUI Category: Critical Infrastructure security information; Privileged Safety Information
Limited Dissemination: Should come from sources likely FEDCON
Name and Phone: POC for report

PADILLA.STEVEN.MARTIN.[redacted]
STEVEN M. PADILLA
Colonel, U.S. Army
Deputy Chief of Staff

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~~CUI~~

UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

(U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

FMC	Fully Mission Capable
FSR	Field Service Representative
LOGCOM	Logistics Command
LRU	Line Replaceable Unit
NMC	Not Mission Capable
PATRIOT	Phased Array Tracking Radar to Intercept on Target
PD	Presidential Determination
PM	Program Manager
RDC-U	Remote Maintenance and Distribution Center–Ukraine
SAG-U	Security Assistance Group–Ukraine
SSA	Supply Support Activity
SSL	Shop Stock Listing
UAF	Ukrainian Armed Forces
UCIL	Ukrainian Consolidated Items List
USEUCOM	U.S. European Command
USG	U.S. Government

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Legislative Affairs Division
703.604.8324

Public Affairs Division
public.affairs@dodig.mil; 703.604.8324

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

4800 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, Virginia 22350-1500
www.dodig.mil
DoD Hotline 1.800.424.9098