




Inspector General

DATE: January 16, 2025

TO: Thomas E. Austin, PE, CCM, PMP
Architect of the Capitol

FROM: Dr. Michael J. Rich, CIG, PMP, CFE, SHRM-SCP 
Deputy Inspector General performing the duties of the Inspector General

SUBJECT: White Paper on the Architect of the Capitol's Emergency Management
OIG-FLD-2025-02

The attached white paper presents the results of our follow-up work on open and closed recommendations pertaining to the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC's) emergency management. Specifically, we reviewed and summarized the AOC Office of Inspector General (OIG) report findings, the status of recommendations and the AOC's ongoing efforts to address open recommendations.

Our review was not an audit or evaluation. However, the work adheres to the professional standards of independence, due professional care, and quality assurance procedures to ensure accuracy of the information presented as prescribed by the *Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General*¹ and the AOC OIG's policies and procedures.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff during the project. Please direct questions to Brittany Banks, Assistant Inspector General for Follow-Up, at Brittany.Banks@aoc.gov or 202.436.1445.

Distribution List:

- Joseph Campbell, Deputy Architect of the Capitol
- Patrick Briggs, Chief of Staff
- Danna Planas Ocasio, Deputy Chief of Staff
- Angela Freeman, General Counsel
- Aaron Altwies, Chief Security Officer

¹ Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. 2012. *Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General*. <https://www.ignet.gov/sites/default/files/files/Silver%20Book%20Revision%20-%208-20-12r.pdf>.



White Paper on the Architect of the Capitol's Emergency Management

JANUARY 16, 2025

Purpose

The U.S. Capitol Building in Washington, D.C., is a globally recognized symbol of democracy and the epicenter of the nation's legislative process. In addition to its active use by Congress, the Capitol Building is a museum of art and history, visited by more than three million people annually. Because it is one of the most recognizable symbols of democracy, the Capitol Building is often the site of large public gatherings, such as the annual Fourth of July concert, as well as public demonstrations and marches. Its unique status as both a functional seat of government and a historic landmark places extraordinary demand on its emergency management protocols.

Events like those on January 6, 2021, the 9/11 terrorist attacks, severe weather incidents and the COVID-19 pandemic underscore the critical importance of a comprehensive and adaptive emergency management framework. These incidents highlight the need for enhanced coordination among federal, state and local emergency response entities. Furthermore, these incidents emphasized the importance of proactively addressing emerging risks, such as cybersecurity threats and climate-related disasters, which increasingly threaten both physical and digital infrastructure. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security expects the threat environment in the United States throughout 2025 to remain high due to a confluence of factors including violent extremist responses to domestic sociopolitical developments and the 2024 election cycle, the enduring intent of foreign terrorist organizations to conduct or inspire attacks on American soil along with the galvanizing effects of terrorist attacks abroad, and the impacts on a range of violent actors inspired by the ongoing conflict in the Middle East.² Given these complexities, the Architect of the Capitol (AOC) must integrate robust emergency management strategies and internal controls that address prevention, preparedness, response and recovery across diverse scenarios.

This white paper provides an overview of prior AOC Office of Inspector General (OIG) open and closed recommendations from reports pertaining to the AOC's emergency management programs and operations. It aims to inform stakeholders — including congressional oversight bodies, the public and the AOC leadership — on the status of emergency management efforts and areas for improvement. Additionally, it serves as a resource to support strategic decision-making, resource allocation and the implementation of policies that address vulnerabilities in the AOC's emergency management framework.

² Department of Homeland Security. 2024. *Homeland Threat Assessment 2025*.
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-10/24_0930_ia_24-320-ia-publication-2025-hta-final-30sep24-508.pdf

Background

On January 6, 2021, thousands of demonstrators surrounded the U.S. Capitol Building to prevent the U.S. Congress from counting Electoral College votes and formalizing President Biden's election. Subsequently, the Capitol complex was locked down while congressional members and their staff were evacuated or sheltered-in-place as demonstrators occupied and vandalized the Capitol building for several hours. Demonstrators attacked and injured law enforcement officers and breached the building. The attack resulted in assaults on approximately 140 police officers, including about 80 from the U.S. Capitol Police (USCP), and incurred over \$2.8 million in damages to facilities and infrastructure, according to the Department of Justice.³

The Senate Sergeant at Arms, the House Sergeant at Arms, and the AOC comprise the Capitol Police Board (the Board) that oversee the USCP, and each have a role in ensuring the physical security of the Capitol complex. As such, the AOC is one of three voting members on the Board. Their various security responsibilities include overseeing and assessing physical security risks and installing physical security countermeasures. A detailed description of roles and responsibilities can be found in Appendix B.

AOC OIG Reports Related to AOC Emergency Management

In the past five years, the AOC OIG issued four reports related to the AOC's emergency management. Three of the four reports were part of a Joint Oversight Project (JOP) examining the events that occurred at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.⁴ The reports highlighted the AOC's significant role in emergency management while identifying critical areas for improvement. The AOC has made progress in maintaining operational continuity and safeguarding the Capitol's infrastructure through frameworks like the Base Emergency Action Response Plan (EARP), which emphasizes an all-hazards approach. The AOC's response during the COVID-19 pandemic and the repair of Capitol windows after the January 6, 2021, breach showcase the organization's commitment to address emergencies efficiently.

However, gaps in multiagency collaboration and policy frameworks remain. The OIG's findings underscore that inconsistent participation in emergency exercises and delayed policy updates have left vulnerabilities that could hinder the AOC's response to large-scale events or emerging threats. To strengthen emergency management, the OIG collectively made 20 recommendations focused on interagency coordination, training programs and policy alignment. The AOC should continue efforts toward closing outstanding OIG recommendations to enhance both preparedness and resilience across the Capitol complex. Refer to Figure 1 and Table 1 for the list of OIG reports and the number of open and closed recommendations made for improvements to the AOC's emergency management program.

³ Department of Justice. 2024. *46 Months Since the Jan. 6 Attack on U.S. Capitol*. <https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/46-months-jan-6-attack-us-capitol>

⁴ The JOP included resources from the AOC OIG's Investigation, Audit and Inspection and Evaluation divisions. The objective of the JOP was to determine the effectiveness and integrity of the AOC's security and internal policies, procedures and practices and provide an independent evaluation of the same.

The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations:

- **Open Unresolved:** Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation (nonconcur) or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation. Recommendations remain open-unresolved until the AOC submits a corrective action plan that addresses the findings and the AOC OIG accepts the plan.
- **Open Resolved:** Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **Closed Resolved:** OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.
- **Closed Unresolved:** Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation (nonconcur) and has not proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation. OIG closed the recommendation because management is unlikely to implement the recommendation.

Figure 1: OIG Emergency Management Recommendations




Table 1: OIG Reports Related to Emergency Management

AOC OIG Report	Open	Closed
Evaluation of the AOC’s Emergency Preparedness Posture (2020-0002-IE-P)	0	8
Flash Report Series — AOC’s Emergency Preparedness Ahead of the January 6, 2021 U.S. Capitol Event (2021-0002-IE-P)	0	4
Flash Report Series — Independent Assessment of the AOC’s Role in Securing the Capitol Campus for Large Public Gatherings (OIG-AUD-2021-03)	5	1
Flash Report Series — U.S. Capitol Building Window Installation, Preservation and Repair: Before and After January 6, 2021 (2022-0003-IE-P)	0	2

OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

Flash Report Series — Independent Assessment of the AOC's Role in Securing the Capitol Campus for Large Public Gatherings

On May 5, 2021, the AOC OIG issued a flash report⁵ on its assessment of the AOC's role and responsibilities in the preparation and execution of operations to secure the Capitol campus and its structures, assets and artifacts during large public gatherings. The OIG found the AOC's role and responsibilities in securing the Capitol campus during large public gatherings is limited. Specifically, the AOC operates in a supporting capacity rather than a peer-level participant in communication, coordination and collaboration to secure the Capitol campus. Per Title 2 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) § 1964 and 1965, the AOC only approves alterations to a structural, mechanical or architectural feature of Capitol buildings and grounds required for a security system.⁶ AOC staff stated that this role creates limitations on the AOC's ability to support its mission to preserve America's Capitol.

The AOC OIG also found the following:

- The AOC Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) assists the USCP with installing, maintaining and removing physical security infrastructure, but there is no memorandum of understanding or service level agreement to support services or coordination.
- The AOC issued information and orders to secure work sites and equipment ahead of January 6, 2021, but poor communication with AOC staff across jurisdictions resulted in incomplete implementation of these orders.
- Many of the recommendations and concerns raised by the OCSO were dismissed by the USCP. Increased communication, coordination and collaboration between all members of the Board and its respective agencies is needed to secure the Capitol campus during large public gatherings.
- The AOC plays a limited role in developing perimeter security plans for large public gatherings and has no authority to contribute to their design or preparation unless explicitly directed by the Board. Additionally, security plans and concerns for such events are typically not shared with or approved by the Board, leaving the Architect uninformed about the safeguards in place. Collaborating with the AOC to leverage its knowledge of the Capitol's

⁵ AOC OIG. 2021. *Flash Report Series — Independent Assessment of the Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) Role in Securing the Capitol Campus for Large Public Gatherings*, Report No. OIG-AUD-2021-03. <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2021-05/OIG-Assessment-AOC-Role-Securing-Capitol-Campus-Large-Public-GatheringsPosted.pdf>.

⁶ Title 2 U.S.C. § 1964 and 1965. Security systems for Capitol buildings and grounds, (b) Transfer of responsibility to Capitol Police Board. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title2/pdf/USCODE-2022-title2-chap29-subchapII-sec1964.pdf>.

infrastructure and facilities would help ensure protection measures are effectively implemented. Additionally, involving the AOC in security plan development, sharing relevant information, and allowing feedback would enable the OCSO to brief AOC leadership on event expectations, issue timely orders, and address potential security risks.

A 2022 report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) echoed AOC OIG’s concerns about communication and emergency response coordination challenges impacting the Capitol’s security and potential security risks.⁷ The GAO found that as of January 6, 2021, neither the USCP nor the Board’s procedures required security surveys to be shared with the full Board, including the AOC, which is responsible for implementing security projects. The Board also lacked a formal process to review and document decisions on USCP security recommendations. Additionally, the USCP did not have clear procedures for requesting assistance from other agencies, which impacts how AOC deploys and allocates resources to address security plans and risks. The GAO issued four recommendations to the Board and USCP to improve and formalize these processes. To date, three of the four recommendations have been implemented.

The AOC OIG made six recommendations to enhance the AOC’s role and coordination in securing the Capitol campus. Five recommendations remain open and resolved. One recommendation is closed unresolved (refer to Appendix A). Refer to Table 2 for the list of open resolved recommendations from this report. A recommendation will remain open until the OIG verifies that the AOC implemented the agreed-upon corrective actions.

Table 2: Open and Resolved Recommendations Related to Emergency Management

Number	Recommendation	AOC Management Status Update
2	We recommend the AOC Office of the Chief Security Officer (OCSO) coordinate with USCP to draft a memorandum of agreement to support the roles and responsibilities and services required for preparation and execution of the perimeter security plans for large public events.	OCSO has weekly engagements with USCP, and other Legislative Branch Offices (LBO) in preparation and execution of security plans supporting multiple events. The plans are developed in the Security Working Groups (SWGs) and approved by the Board. The plans are memorialized for future planning initiatives. Additionally, security plans are briefed to AOC senior leadership during weekly meetings or ad hoc engagements when required.
3	We recommend the AOC OCSO establish well-defined policies and procedures with a preparation checklist for jurisdictions based on the severity of threat that provides clear guidance on execution of support activities related to coordination, mobilization, de-mobilization, asset protection and reporting of activities associated with special events across the Capitol campus.	OCSO routinely provides information to other jurisdictions based on severity of threat(s) with clear guidance (e.g., unplanned demonstrations occurring on or near Capitol campus). Information is disseminated in multiple ways by OCSO depending on the level of sensitivity (e.g., email, AOC Compass postings (online), video conference, phone, executive meetings, etc.). The Chief Security Officer (CSO) briefs the C-Suite weekly, as appropriate, about upcoming events that may have security concerns and share any concerns with the senior leaders. USCP sends alerts using their USCP Alerts distribution when there are unplanned demonstrations and when appropriate includes directions to staff. Additionally, a Web-based Emergency Operations Center (i.e., WEBEOC) interface is being developed to distribute information

⁷ GAO. 2022. *CAPITOL ATTACK: The Capitol Police Needs Clearer Emergency Procedures and a Comprehensive Security Risk Assessment Process*. <https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105001.pdf>

Number	Recommendation	AOC Management Status Update
		related to special events, record activity and/or events, and coordinate responses between jurisdictions.
4	We recommend the AOC coordinate with the USCP Board and legislative stakeholders to evaluate the overall focus on campus security, and reevaluate the responsibilities for design, installation and maintenance of the Capitol campus security systems and determine who should execute those responsibilities.	OCSO along with other LBOs participate in the SWGs. The SWG serves as an expert advisory panel to the Board and includes the best practices, emerging risks, and acceptable security compliance processes. Additionally, there are sub-working groups that focus on specific security topics that inform the SWG. The SWG serves as a final forum for discussion of physical security issues impacting the Capitol complex before decisions of the Board.
5	We recommend the AOC OCSO hold a security briefing with AOC senior leadership for each event, which highlights the security threats and risks identified during their monitoring and received from coordinating agencies along with AOC's approach to manage such risks and instructions for jurisdictions to execute the developed preparation checklist.	OCSO issues daily Spot Reports from the UCSP Command Center to highlight security threats for awareness purposes. AOC's EARP provides additional information for Jurisdictions/Offices Emergency Office Coordinator to implement. The CSO briefs the C-Suite weekly, as appropriate, about upcoming events that may have security concerns and shares any concerns with the senior leaders. Additionally, integration with WEBEOC is completed for accountability of all personnel, jurisdictional reporting during incidents, and coordinating response efforts to manage risk(s). Furthermore, prior to any National Special Security Event, OCSO develops an Operations Order and provides updates to other executive leaders within AOC. As an example, in preparation for the upcoming Elections Certification and Inauguration, the CSO will be participating in AOC-led Town Hall meetings with employees and will present general information about the security posture, so employees know what to expect.
6	We recommend the AOC inform the USCP of the deferred security maintenance work elements prior to large public gatherings and events on the Capital campus.	OCSO manages multiple security/emergency management related projects within the Capitol campus. OCSO routinely provides updates to the Board and other LBOs during weekly and monthly meetings (e.g., SWG), during committee hearings, and with AOC executive leadership. Currently, OCSO is completing a Barrier Replacement Program working with USCP and other LBOs on coordinating days/times of impacted areas within the Capitol campus. OCSO is also keeping the Board principals and deputies up to speed on other security projects and their impacts.

APPENDIX A

Closed Recommendations

This appendix summarizes four reports containing 15 recommendations that the AOC OIG designated as closed. Resolution occurs when the OIG and agency management agree on action to be taken on reported findings and recommendations or, in the event of disagreement, the point at which the OIG official determines the matter to be resolved. The OIG reports the status of recommendations and the management actions in its Semiannual Report to Congress (SAR).⁸

Evaluation of the AOC's Emergency Preparedness Posture

On February 5, 2021, the AOC OIG issued a report of its evaluation of the AOC's emergency preparedness posture.⁹ The OIG found that (1) the AOC's organizations' preparation and participation in multijurisdictional emergency management training was not always consistent, (2) the AOC lacked a standardized emergency management training evaluation process, (3) the AOC organizational EARPs were not consistently updated and aligned with the AOC Base EARP in policy structure and guidance and (4) the AOC's response efforts to the COVID-19 pandemic were proactive, efficient and sustained to support Congress, the U.S. Supreme Court and the AOC workforce.

The OIG made eight recommendations for improvements to the AOC's emergency management program. The OIG reviewed the AOC's actions to address the recommendations and reported the recommendations closed and resolved in fiscal years (FYs) 2021¹⁰ and 2022.¹¹

Flash Report Series — U.S. Capitol Building Window Installation, Preservation and Repair: Before and After January 6, 2021

On March 8, 2022, the AOC OIG issued a flash report on the installation, preservation, and repair to the U.S. Capitol windows before and after the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.¹² The

⁸ AOC OIG. n.d. "Semiannual Reports to Congress" [website]. <https://aocoig.oversight.gov/reports-reading-room/semiannual>.

⁹ AOC OIG. 2021. *Evaluation of the Architect of the Capitol's Emergency Preparedness Posture*, Report No. 2020-0002-IE-P. <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2023-05/Evaluation-AOC-Emergency-Preparedness-2020-0002-IE-PFinal.pdf>.

¹⁰ AOC OIG. 2021. *Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2021–September 30, 2021*, Report No. SAR 21-2. <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2021-12/SAR%2021-2.pdf>.

¹¹ AOC OIG. 2022. *Semiannual Report to Congress: October 1, 2021–March 31, 2022*, Report No. SAR 22-1. <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2022-06/SAR%2022-1.pdf>.

¹² AOC OIG. 2022. *Flash Report Series – U.S. Capitol Building Window Installation, Preservation and Repair: Before and After January 6, 2021*, Report No. 2022-0003-IE-P.

OIG found that, while all windows damaged on January 6, 2021, had been repaired, there were further security enhancements and repairs needed for U.S. Capitol windows. Additionally, the OIG found that the multiyear funds from the security supplemental to further address security enhancements at the U.S. Capitol had not been fully executed but were expected to be before they expired in September 2023.

The OIG made two recommendations for improvements to the U.S. Capitol windows and Capitol complex security planning. The OIG reviewed the AOC's actions to address the recommendations and reported the recommendations closed and resolved in FY 2022.¹³

Flash Report Series — AOC's Emergency Preparedness Ahead of the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol Event

On April 27, 2021, the AOC OIG issued a flash report on its independent assessment of the effectiveness and integrity of the AOC's emergency preparedness training, internal policies, procedures and practices prior to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.¹⁴ The OIG found that, prior to the events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021, the AOC's emergency preparedness posture had gaps in policy and training preparation. Specifically, the OIG found (1) the AOC lacked updated emergency management policies and procedures for active shooter, workplace violence, protestors and civil disturbances; (2) the AOC emergency management training activity and planned training was inadequate to address active shooters, workplace violence, protestors and civil disturbances; and (3) the AOC lacked consistent and integrated emergency preparedness training with all other legislative branch organizations serving inside the Capitol complex.

The OIG made four recommendations for improvements to the AOC's emergency management program. The OIG reviewed the AOC's actions to address the recommendations and reported the recommendations closed resolved in FYs 2021¹⁰ and 2022.¹¹

Flash Report Series — Independent Assessment of the AOC's Role in Securing the Capitol Campus for Large Public Gatherings

On May 5, 2021, the AOC OIG issued a flash report on its assessment of the AOC's role and responsibilities in the preparation and execution of operations to secure the Capitol campus and its structures, assets and artifacts during large public gatherings.⁵ The OIG found the AOC's role and responsibilities in securing the Capitol campus during large public gatherings is limited.

<https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2023-05/Flash-Report-SeriesUS-Capitol-Building-Windows2022-0003-IE-PRedacted.pdf>.

¹³ AOC OIG. 2022. *Semiannual Report to Congress: April 1, 2022–September 30, 2022*, Report No. SAR 22-2. <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2022-12/SAR%2022-2.pdf>.

¹⁴ AOC OIG. 2021. *Flash Report Series – Architect of the Capitol's (AOC) Emergency Preparedness Ahead of the January 6, 2021, U.S. Capitol Event*. Report No. 2021-0002-IE-P. <https://www.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/2023-05/Flash-Report-SeriesAOC-Emergency-Preparedness-2021-0002-IE-P.pdf>.

The OIG made six recommendations to enhance the AOC's role and coordination in securing the Capitol campus. Five recommendations remain open and one recommendation is closed unresolved. The OIG recommended the AOC coordinate with legislative stakeholders to draft legislation that would (1) add the OCSO to an advisory or consultative role to assist in the plans and execution of securing the Capitol campus for large public gatherings and (2) require communication, coordination and collaboration between the AOC, the Board, and USCP. The AOC did not concur, stating existing laws stipulate the AOC's role in advising, consulting, communicating and coordinating with USCP and the Board and that the OCSO currently serves in an advisory role to the Board. The AOC also noted that the authority to change permanent laws ultimately rests with Congress.

APPENDIX B

Roles and Responsibilities

USCP, the AOC and the Board each have a role in ensuring the physical security of the Capitol complex. Their various security responsibilities include overseeing and assessing physical security risks and installing physical security countermeasures.

United States Capitol Police

USCP is responsible for protecting the Capitol complex, including Members of Congress, staff, visitors and facilities, so that Congress can fulfill its constitutional and legislative responsibilities in a safe, secure and open environment. By statute, the Board oversees and supports USCP.¹⁵ The Board comprises the Senate and House Sergeants at Arms and the AOC, as well as the Chief of USCP as a nonvoting member.

The Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper

The Sergeant at Arms and Doorkeeper of the Senate (Senate Sergeant at Arms) serves as the chief law enforcement, protocol and executive officer for the Senate chamber. The Senate Sergeant at Arms is responsible for maintaining security in the Senate side of the Capitol and all Senate buildings, protecting Members of Congress, coordinating official events and visits and enforcing all rules of the Senate.

The Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives

The Sergeant at Arms of the House of Representatives (House Sergeant at Arms) serves as the chief law enforcement, protocol and executive officer for the House chamber. The House Sergeant at Arms has similar responsibilities to the Senate Sergeant at Arms, but their jurisdiction encompasses the House of Representatives.

The Architect of the Capitol

The AOC is responsible for the maintenance, operation, development and preservation of more than 18.4 million square feet of buildings and more than 570 acres of grounds. These buildings and grounds include the U.S. Capitol, House and Senate office buildings, the U.S. Capitol Visitor Center, the Library of Congress, the Supreme Court of the United States, the U.S. Botanic Garden, the Capitol Power Plant and other facilities. The AOC supports various ceremonies and events held on the Capitol campus, including the Presidential inaugural ceremony. This effort includes constructing the inaugural platform on the Capitol's West Front, coordinating the setup of seating and fencing and working closely with the Joint Congressional Committee on Inaugural Ceremonies to ensure all logistical and physical arrangements are seamlessly executed. A key official is the Chief Security

¹⁵ Title 2 U.S.C. § 1961(a). Policing of Capitol Buildings and Grounds. <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2015-title2/pdf/USCODE-2015-title2-chap29-subchapII-sec1961.pdf>.

Officer, who coordinates emergency preparedness across agencies and supports USCP in safeguarding both the congressional community and its visitors. Together, these efforts ensure that the Capitol complex remains secure, functional and ready for major events like the inauguration.

APPENDIX C

Notification Letter




Office of Inspector General
499 South Capitol Street, SW, Suite 518
Washington, DC 20515
202.593.1948
www.aoc.gov

United States Government

MEMORANDUM

DATE: October 31, 2024

TO: Thomas E. Austin, PE, CCM, PMP
Architect of the Capitol

FROM: Christopher P. Failla, CIG, CFE 
Inspector General

SUBJECT: Announcement Memorandum for Follow-up on the Architect of the Capitol's
(AOC) Emergency Management (Project No. 2025-0001-FLD-P)

This memorandum serves as notification that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) plans to initiate follow-up work on prior OIG reports and open and closed recommendations pertaining to the AOC's emergency management. To conduct our follow-up, we plan to collect background information and interview AOC staff.

We will contact the appropriate AOC offices in the upcoming weeks. If you have any questions, please contact Brittany Banks, Assistant Inspector General for Follow-Up, at 202.436.1445 or Brittany.Banks@ao.gov.

Distribution List:

Joseph Campbell, Deputy Architect of the Capitol
Patrick Briggs, Chief of Staff
Hajira Shariff, Acting Executive Officer
Angela Freeman, General Counsel
Aaron Altwies, Chief Security Officer
Chuck Iliff, Director of Safety and Code Compliance

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOC	Architect of the Capitol
CSO	Chief Security Officer
EARP	Emergency Action Response Plan
FY	fiscal year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
JOP	Joint Oversight Project
LBO	Legislative Branch Office
OCSO	Office of the Chief Security Officer
OIG	Office of Inspector General
SWG	Security Working Group
USCP	United States Capitol Police
WEBEOC	Web-Based Emergency Operations Center