

Efficiency of Operations at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center, Cincinnati, OH

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 24-147-R25 | December 4, 2024



Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

December 4, 2024

MEMORANDUM FOR: WEBSTER G. TOTRESS II
SR. DIVISION DIRECTOR, PROCESSING OPERATIONS

PATRICK K. IBBETSON
LAKESHORES DIVISION DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS OPERATIONS

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sean Balduff", is centered below the memorandum header.

FROM: Sean Balduff
Director, Field Operations, Central & Southern

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Efficiency of Operations at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center, Cincinnati, OH (Report Number 24-147-R25)

This report presents the results of our audit of the Efficiency of Operations at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. Recommendations 1 through 7 should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed. We consider recommendation 8 closed with issuance of this report.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Jennifer Schneider, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Processing and Distribution Officer and Executive Vice President
Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer and Executive Vice President
Vice President, Processing and Maintenance Operations
Vice President, Logistics
Vice President, Eastern Regional Processing Operations
Central Regional Director, Logistics
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service needs effective and productive operations to fulfill its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and affordable mail service to the American public. It has a vast transportation network that moves mail and equipment among about 315 processing facilities and 31,200 post offices, stations, and branches. The Postal Service is transforming its processing and logistics networks to become more scalable, reliable, visible, efficient, automated, and digitally integrated. This includes modernizing operating plans and aligning the workforce; leveraging emerging technologies to provide world-class visibility and tracking of mail and packages in near real time; and optimizing the surface and air transportation network. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews the efficiency of mail processing operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback to further the Postal Service’s mission.

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of operations at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) and Network Distribution Center (NDC) in Cincinnati, OH (Project Number 24-147). We judgmentally selected the Cincinnati P&DC and NDC based on a review of several performance indicators during fiscal years (FYs) 2023-2024, including first and last mile failures;¹ workhours; scanning compliance;² and late, canceled,

and extra trips. The Cincinnati P&DC and NDC are in the Lakeshores Division. The P&DC processes letters and flats, and the NDC processes parcels. The Cincinnati P&DC and NDC service multiple 3-digit ZIP Codes in urban and rural communities³ (see Table 1).

As of August 9, 2024, the Cincinnati P&DC’s employee availability⁴ was 83.72 percent for processing and 94.33 percent for logistics. During the same period, the NDC’s employee availability was 84.48 percent for processing and 92.39 percent for logistics. The Postal Service’s Employee Availability goal for FY 2024 is 89 percent for processing and 92.90 percent for logistics.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate the efficiency of operations at the Cincinnati P&DC and NDC. To accomplish our objective, we focused on five audit areas: mail clearance times,⁵ delayed mail, late and extra outbound trips; dock scanning; and security of registry items. We reviewed Surface Visibility Web (SVWeb)⁶ data for late, canceled, and extra trips, as well as scan compliance for the period from August 1, 2023, to July 31, 2024. Further, we identified mail clearance time goals for the Cincinnati P&DC and NDC and compared them with operations shown in the Run Plan Generator report.⁷ During our site visit the week of September 9, 2024, we interviewed P&DC and NDC management and observed mail processing and dock operations.

Table 1. Population Demographics

3-Digit ZIP Codes	Urban Population	Rural Population	Total Population
410	375,057	146,517	521,574
450-455	2,415,392	488,514	2,903,906

Source: Postal Service National Distribution Labeling List and 2020 Census Bureau data.

1 First mile failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Last mile failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at a processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

2 Scans include load, depart, unload, close, assign, and arrive.

3 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.

4 Data that compares straight work hours to the work hours that would have been recorded if all employees reported to work as scheduled.

5 The latest time committed mail can clear an operation for proper dispatch or delivery.

6 A website dedicated to the Surface Visibility program, which provides real-time transportation updates and reports on the movement of trailers in the surface network. The data captured to identify early, on-time, late, or canceled trips is also used to evaluate and improve transportation schedules.

7 An application mail processing facilities use to plan machine utilization based on volume, clearance times, and other criteria.

During this time, the OIG also audited three delivery units⁸ serviced by the Cincinnati P&DC and NDC. We will provide the results of those audits to Ohio 2 District management in separate reports. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified deficiencies for four of the five areas we reviewed at the Cincinnati P&DC and NDC. We also identified issues related to safety and security at the NDC (see Table 2).

We analyzed mail processing schedules and data to verify the facilities were meeting the scheduled clearance times. During our visit, we also observed the timely processing of mail.

Table 2. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Cincinnati P&DC	Cincinnati NDC
Clearance Times		
Delayed Mail	X	X
Late, Canceled, and Extra Outbound Trips	X	X
Scan Compliance	X	
Security of Registry Items		X
Other Issues – Safety and Security		X

Source: Results of OIG data reviewed from FY 2023 and 2024 and fieldwork conducted from September 9 to September 12, 2024.

⁸ The three delivery units were Corryville Station, Cincinnati, OH (project number 24-148-1); Fairfield Branch, Fairfield, OH (project number 24-148-2); and Mid City Cincinnati Carrier Annex, Cincinnati, OH (project number 24-148-3).

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

During our observations at the P&DC on September 10 and 11, 2024, we identified delayed mail in the manual letter and flat operation units (see Figure 1). Some of the letters we observed in this area had been there since September 5, 2024. We also identified delayed letters on the workroom floor (see Figure 2). Management properly reported this mail in the Mail Condition Visualization (MCV)⁹ system. In total, 122,926 delayed letters and flats were reported in the MCV system during our visit (see Table 3).

Figure 1. Delayed Mail in the Manual Letters and Flats Areas at the Cincinnati P&DC



Source: OIG photos taken September 10, 2024.

Figure 2. Delayed Mail on the Workroom Floor at the Cincinnati P&DC



Source: OIG photo taken September 10, 2024.

During our observations at the NDC for the same time period, we identified 643 delayed packages (see Table 3). These consisted of packages that were recovered by maintenance personnel from the review of the machine belts, damaged packages that needed to be resealed, packages placed in the wrong staging area, and packages from the rejection bins. In addition, we found 134 potentially delayed packages around the machines on the floor after sorting operations were completed (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Packages on the Workroom Floor After Sorting Operations Were Completed at the Cincinnati NDC



Source: OIG photo taken September 10, 2024.

⁹ MCV provides near real-time visibility of a facility's on-hand volume, delayed processing volume, delayed dispatch volume, and oldest mail date by mail category and processing operation and stores historical trailer information.

Table 3. Delayed Letters, Flats, and Packages

Date	Delayed Letters Reported in MCV – P&DC	Delayed Flats Reported in MCV – P&DC	Delayed Packages Reported in MCV – NDC	Total Reported in MCV
September 10	59,085	7,425	238	66,748
September 11	53,176	3,240	405	56,821
Total	112,261	10,665	643	123,569

Source: MCV system.

Why Did it Occur

The delayed mail we identified at the P&DC was caused by a lack of management oversight. The plant manager stated there are many inexperienced supervisors at the facility, and they did not always follow proper mail flow procedures. This led to mail not being processed timely. In addition, while the facility has an employee responsible for monitoring the manual letter operation unit, the employee was on leave during our visit, and the supervisors did not monitor the unit to make sure the manual mail was being processed timely.

The delayed packages we identified at the NDC were primarily due to lack of management oversight, as well. Specifically, management did not conduct a thorough review of the workroom floor to collect and process any packages left behind from processing.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy¹⁰ states that management should continually gauge how well they are managing the flow of mail and have control over the workload, personnel, and equipment needed for a well-run operation. As part of Postal Service practice, a delayed mail count should be performed and accurately reported in the MCV system daily.¹¹

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

Recommendation #1

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify supervisors are trained on proper mail flow procedures in processing operations, properly allocate resources at the manual letter operation unit, and verify mail is sorted in time to meet dispatch daily at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center.

Recommendation #2

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations**, develop and implement a process to verify mail handlers conduct a review for mailpieces left behind on the workroom floor after operations are completed at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center, and that management reports all delayed mail in the Mail Condition Visualization system daily.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service generally agreed with this finding and the associated recommendations, and it stated it was unable to validate if the 134 packages found around the machines after sorting were delayed. Regarding recommendation 1, management stated it will provide training to non-bargaining personnel on proper mail flow procedures. In addition, management stated it has adequately staffed manual letter operations and will monitor to ensure compliance. Regarding recommendation 2, management stated it has incorporated reviews of the workroom floor into

¹⁰ Handbook PO-413, Platform Operations, Section 2-4.4, dated December 2013.

¹¹ Mail Condition Visualization Manual Line Item Entry Job Aid, updated October 26, 2020.

its daily checklist for packages left behind after operations are completed and will monitor for compliance. The target implementation date for both recommendations is January 31, 2025. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations.

Finding #2: Late, Canceled, and Extra Outbound Trips

What We Found

From August 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024, there was a total of 8,848 outbound late trips, 10,860 outbound canceled trips, and 2,747 outbound extra trips at the Cincinnati P&DC. These trips represented about 28.7 percent of all outbound trips at the facility (see Table 4).

Table 4. Outbound Transportation Metrics – P&DC

Transportation Metric	Number	Percent of Total Trips
Late Trips	8,848	11.3%
Canceled Trips	10,860	13.9%
Extra Trips	2,747	3.5%

Source: SVWeb.

From August 1, 2023, through July 31, 2024, there were a total of 13,987 outbound late trips, 13,373 outbound canceled trips, and 5,753 outbound extra trips at the Cincinnati NDC. These trips represented about 45.8 percent of all outbound trips at the facility (see Table 5).

Table 5. Outbound Transportation Metrics – NDC

Transportation Metric	Number	Percent of Total Trips
Late Trips	13,987	19.4%
Canceled Trips	13,373	18.5%
Extra Trips	5,753	8.0%

Source: SVWeb.

Why Did it Occur

Late and canceled outbound trips occurred primarily because management did not recently complete a full Postal Vehicle Service (PVS)¹² transportation schedule review at either the P&DC or the NDC. There

has not been a full PVS transportation schedule review at either facility since 2022.

For example, at the P&DC, the approved clearance time for letter processing was 6:15 a.m. The last trips going to the delivery units we reviewed (Corryville Station, Fairfield Branch, and Mid City Cincinnati Station) were either 6:10 a.m. or 6:15 a.m. Therefore, mail processing would have to always be completed early for the mail to make it to the dock for the last trip to leave on time.

Canceled trips at the P&DC were primarily due to combining trips and canceling trips that did not have sufficient volume. Management further stated that the extra trips were used for shuttling mail and packages between the NDC, P&DC, and another local processing facility.

According to management at the Cincinnati NDC, the Indianapolis STC closed in October 2023 and 65 percent of their trips were moved to the Cincinnati NDC. However, after receiving the new trips, the Cincinnati NDC did not properly adjust schedules, which led to most of the late trips. The large number of canceled trips at the NDC were due to transportation schedules not being aligned with the insourcing of Indianapolis STC trips and combining city trips.

Regarding extra trips at the NDC, management stated that all were intentional and related to an initiative to increase the transportation of mail volume from air to surface and reduce transportation costs.

What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,¹³ key elements to effective dispatch and routing include evaluating transportation performance to planned schedules and ensuring that planned dispatches are compatible with an effective mail arrival profile at the destination.

¹² A service Postal Service employees use to transport mail between mail processing facilities, post offices, post office branches, post office stations, detached mail units, various postal customers, and terminals.

¹³ Handbook M-22, *Dispatch and Routing Policies*, dated July 2013.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there are late, canceled, and extra trips, there is an increased risk the mail will not be delivered on time, which can adversely affect Postal Service customers, harm the brand, send mailers to competitors, increase operating costs, and cause the Postal Service to lose revenue.

Recommendation #3

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations**, complete a review of Postal Vehicle Service transportation schedules and verify related actions are implemented at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center.

Recommendation #4

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations**, properly schedule Surface Transfer Center operations to ensure effective dispatch of mail at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and the associated recommendations. Management stated it will complete a transportation schedule review at the P&DC and the NDC and will make any required adjustments to the schedules. The target implementation date for both recommendations is April 30, 2025.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations.

Finding #3: Scan Compliance

What We Found

The Cincinnati P&DC did not consistently meet the load scanning goal. From August 1, 2023, to July 31, 2024, the average compliance for load scans did not meet the Postal Service’s goals of 92 percent in FY 2023 and 93.25 percent in FY 2024 (see Table 6). These scans help the Postal Service track mail as it flows through the network. Load scans are performed when a container is loaded onto a trailer for dispatch.

Table 6. Scanning Compliance at the Cincinnati P&DC From August 2023 to July 2024

Month	Load Scan	Goal
July 2024	91.95	93.25%
June 2024	87.40	93.25%
May 2024	88.38	93.25%
April 2024	89.37	93.25%
March 2024	88.60	93.25%
February 2024	90.78	93.25%
January 2024	88.94	93.25%
December 2023	89.85	93.25%
November 2023	88.39	93.25%
October 2023	88.49	93.25%
September 2023	85.03	92.00%
August 2023	85.50	92.00%

Source: SVWeb

Why Did it Occur

The plant manager stated that load scans were not being performed consistently due to a lack of management oversight and enforcement. He explained that drivers sometimes consolidated mail into one container and did not transfer the placards, so they did not get scanned. In addition, the P&DC has two separate buildings, each with its own separate dock. According to the manager of distribution operations, it was difficult for her

to provide adequate oversight of load scan performance for both docks at the same time.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy¹⁴ states that employees are required to perform outbound and inbound scans of containers and trailers to ensure 100 percent mail visibility. In addition, Postal Service policy states that management should monitor Mail Transport Equipment to ensure it has a placard.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Low scanning compliance contributes to inaccurate utilization data, missent mail, and operational inefficiencies. Management uses scanning data to streamline outbound container operations, enhance dispatch quality, and increase efficiency in the use of transportation containers and trailers. When scans are not made, management may not have the information needed to make accurate operational decisions.

Recommendation #5

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations**, in coordination with the **Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations**, to develop and implement a plan to verify load scanning at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center is consistently completed in accordance with policy.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and the recommendation. Management stated it will provide training on load scans and physically monitor for compliance. The target implementation date is May 31, 2025.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management’s comments responsive to the recommendation.

14 Surface Visibility Program User booklet, updated July 1, 2024.

Finding #4: Security of Registry Items

What We Found


Logistics management did not follow proper procedures and controls to secure registry items at the NDC. During our observation on September 10 and 11, 2024, we observed a small empty cage without a log or registry clerk next to a storage room (see Figure 4). This cage did not maintain proper documentation for hand-to-hand exchange and cage entry, including Postal Service Form 3854, *Manifold Registry Dispatch Book*,¹⁵ or a signature log for those entering and leaving the cage. Further, employees were using a whiteboard attached outside of the cage, which listed the seal number and truck information for four registry items. During our review, we noted the list did not change (see Figure 5).

Figure 4. Registry Cage at the NDC



Source: OIG photo taken September 10, 2024.

Figure 5. Whiteboard Used for Logging Registry Items



Source: OIG photo taken September 10, 2024.

Why Did it Occur

Employees did not follow proper procedures for handling and securing registry items due to a lack of management oversight. Specifically, management did not monitor and ensure employees properly safeguarded registry items moving throughout the facility. An employee stated that he either handed registry items to a supervisor or left them near the supervisor staging area when a supervisor was not available. In addition, a supervisor stated that she was aware of the policy and had asked upper management about implementing proper procedures for accepting and transferring registry items. However, she stated she has not received any response from management.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy¹⁶ requires hand-to-hand exchanges during the transfer of registry items from one individual to another, and both parties must remain present until the transfer is completed. The policy requires that the receiving individual verify all registered information against the entries on the transfer form and legibly sign all copies during hand-to-hand exchanges. The policy also requires all employees and visitors to sign in and out of the registry room or cage where registry items are secured in the facility.

¹⁵ An inventory log for inbound/outbound registry items.

¹⁶ Handbook DM-901, *Registered Mail*, Sections 4-1.1, 6-1.3.3, and 7-1.3.1 dated January 2016.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Registered Mail provides added protection to the customer by providing evidence of secure mail and delivery for valuable and important items. When Registered Mail is not secured in accordance with proper procedures, there is an increased risk of loss or theft of items, insurance claims, and customer dissatisfaction with the Registered Mail service, potentially impacting the brand.

Recommendation #6:

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations**, in coordination with the **Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations**, implement a process to verify employees are following proper Registry Mail and registry cage procedures at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and the recommendation. Management stated it will train employees on proper handling of registry items at the NDC and will monitor to ensure relevant documentation is completed properly. The target implementation date is February 28, 2025.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendation.

Finding #5: Safety and Security

What We Found


During our site observations at the NDC, we observed safety and security issues. Specifically, we observed that employees used a laminated paper to prop open a dock entry and exit door (see Figure 6), and several fire extinguishers were missing an annual inspection (see Figure 7).

Figure 6. Laminated Paper to Prop Open Exit Door



Source: OIG photo taken September 11, 2024.

Figure 7. Fire Extinguishers Missing Annual Inspections



Source: OIG photos taken September 10, 2024.

Why Did it Occur

Regarding the annual fire extinguisher inspections, the maintenance manager was aware of the issue and had not scheduled an annual inspection. The plant manager was unaware of the exit door being propped open on the dock. He explained that the dock supervisor should have been monitoring the door.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy requires employers to provide a safe and healthy workplace free of recognized hazards.¹⁷

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When employees do not observe safe working practices and safety rules, there is an increased risk of employee accidents and injuries.

Recommendation #7

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations**, coordinate with the **Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations**, to communicate policy and verify facility doors are secured at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Recommendation #8

We recommend the **Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that annual fire extinguisher inspections are completed at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and the associated recommendations. Regarding recommendation 7, management stated it will communicate requirements to secure facility doors and monitor for compliance. The target implementation date is January 31, 2025. Regarding recommendation 8, management provided support showing that annual fire extinguisher inspections were completed at the NDC.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations. After reviewing the documentation management provided to support actions taken for recommendation 8, the OIG agreed to close this recommendation upon issuance of the report.

¹⁷ Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, dated July 2020.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from August through November 2024, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on November 13, 2024, and included their comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the mail processing operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we

determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of MCV and SVWeb data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



November 14, 2024

JOHN CIHOTA
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Efficiency of Operations at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center (24-147-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft audit report, *Efficiency of Operations at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center*.

Management generally agrees with the findings but was unable to validate if the 134 packages found around the machines after sorting were delayed as some packages were likely advanced mail.

Following are our comments on each of the eight recommendations.

Recommendation 1:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations, verify supervisors are trained on proper mail flow procedures in processing operations, properly allocate resources at the manual letter operation unit, and verify mail is sorted in time to meet dispatch daily at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Management will provide training to non-bargaining personnel on proper mail flow procedures. Adequate staffing is assigned to manual letter operations and management will monitor to ensure compliance.

Target Implementation Date: 01/31/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 2:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations, develop and implement a process to verify mail handlers conduct a review for mailpieces left behind on the workroom floor after operations are completed at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center, and that management reports all delayed mail in the Mail Condition Visualization system daily.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Management incorporated review of the workroom floor into their daily checklist review process to ensure mailpieces are not left behind after operations are completed. Management will also monitor to ensure compliance.

Target Implementation Date: 01/31/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 3:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations, complete a review of Postal Vehicle Service transportation schedules and verify related actions are implemented at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Management will conduct Zero-Based reviews for the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center and Network Distribution Center. Once reviews are completed, adjustments, if required, will be made.

Target Implementation Date: 04/30/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 4:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations, properly schedule Surface Transfer Center operations to ensure effective dispatch of mail at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Once Zero-based reviews are complete, management will make necessary adjustments to PVS schedule. Management is also in the process of evaluating HCR schedules.

Target Implementation Date: 04/30/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 5:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations, in coordination with the Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations, to develop and implement a plan to verify load scanning at the Cincinnati Processing and Distribution Center is consistently completed in accordance with policy.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Management will provide training on load scans and physically monitor for compliance.

Target Implementation Date: 05/31/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations,
Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 6:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations, in coordination with the Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations, implement a process to verify employees are following proper Registry Mail and registry cage procedures at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Management created Standard Work Instructions and will train employees on proper handling of registry items at the Cincinnati NDC. Management has secured the Registered Mail and will monitor to ensure proper documentation for transfer of registry items.

Target Implementation Date: 02/28/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations,
Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 7:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations, coordinate with the Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations, to communicate policy and verify facility doors are secured at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Management will communicate requirements to secure facility doors and monitor to ensure compliance.

Target Implementation Date: 01/31/2025

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations,
Lakeshores Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 8:

We recommend the Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations, verify that annual fire extinguisher inspections are completed at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Annual fire extinguisher inspections were completed at the Cincinnati Network Distribution Center. Management requests this recommendation be closed with issuance of the final report.

Target Implementation Date: 12/31/2024

Responsible Official:

Lakeshores Division Director, Processing Operations

E-SIGNED by WEBSTER G TOTTRISS II
on 2024-11-14 16:10:00 EST

Webster G. Tottress II
Sr. Division Director, Processing Operations

E-SIGNED by Patrick K Ibbetson
on 2024-11-19 09:27:32 EST

Patrick K. Ibbetson
Division Director, Logistics Operations

cc: Corporate Audit & Response Management

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