



U.S. Department of Justice | Office of the Inspector General



# SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS

April 1, 2024–September 30, 2024

## Online Report Availability

The audits, evaluations, inspections, special review reports, investigations press releases, and ongoing work of the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) are available on the [OIG website](#).

Announcements of the latest reports, multimedia, and news from the OIG are also available on the OIG's X, formerly known as Twitter, account [@JusticeOIG](#). Videos featuring the Inspector General and OIG staff discussing their work, career opportunities, and other information are available on the OIG's [YouTube account](#). Information about job opportunities and workplace culture are available on the OIG's [LinkedIn page](#).

Information about the federal Inspector General community is available through the [Inspectors General Network](#).

Public reports from all federal Inspectors General who are members of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency are available at [Oversight.gov](#).

## Automatic Email Updates

The OIG offers a free email subscription service that provides automatic notifications by email when new reports or other information is posted to the OIG website.

To receive email notifications of additions to the OIG website, sign up on [GovDelivery](#). You will be asked to provide the email address where you want the notifications to be sent. You may elect to receive notifications for all reports and documents when they are added to the OIG website, or you can elect to receive notifications for only certain types of OIG reports and documents. At any time, you can change your email address, modify your password, add or delete subscriptions, or remove your email address from this service.

# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<b>1</b>	Highlights of OIG Activities
<b>9</b>	OIG Profile
<b>12</b>	Pandemic Response Oversight
<b>14</b>	Multicomponent
<b>19</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>23</b>	Federal Bureau of Prisons
<b>27</b>	U.S. Marshals Service
<b>30</b>	Drug Enforcement Administration
<b>33</b>	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
<b>34</b>	Office of Justice Programs
<b>38</b>	Crime Victims Fund
<b>42</b>	Other DOJ Components
<b>45</b>	Top Management and Performance Challenges
<b>47</b>	Testimony/Legislation and Regulations
<b>48</b>	Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Program
<b>49</b>	Open Recommendations
<b>51</b>	Statistics
<b>54</b>	Appendices

## MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



It is my pleasure to submit this Semiannual Report to Congress on the operations of the U.S. Department of Justice (the Department or DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which covers the period from March 31, 2024, to September 30, 2024.

Within the past 6 months, the OIG has completed and released many noteworthy reports. For example, the OIG released an audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) handling of tips of hands-on sex offenses against children, which reviewed the FBI's compliance with policies and laws governing its handling of allegations of hands-on sex offenses against children with a particular focus on corrective measures made since our 2021 Nassar report. The OIG also released its report on the unannounced, on-site inspection of Federal

Correctional Institution Lewisburg, where the OIG observed several serious issues relating to staffing, inmate healthcare quality, infrastructure, single-celling of inmates in restrictive housing, suicide prevention practices, and employee professionalism.

The OIG also released a report on the Department's response to protest activity and civil unrest in Washington, D.C., in late May and early June 2020, which described our concerns regarding the Department leadership's decision making that required DOJ law enforcement agents and elite tactical units to perform missions for which they lacked the proper equipment and training.

Additionally, the OIG has officially retired the monthly open recommendations report in favor of a new [Recommendations page](#) that allows users to easily browse, search, and filter open recommendations associated with our reports.

The OIG also issued several investigative summaries during this reporting period, including a report detailing the investigation into a then FBI senior official for numerous comments to a subordinate in violation of the Department's zero tolerance policy on harassment and FBI policies. Also, during this reporting period, an OIG investigation resulted in a retired Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent being convicted of one count of obstruction of justice and one count of false statements. Further, the OIG's Investigation's Division closed 116 criminal or administrative misconduct cases, and its work resulted in 31 convictions or pleas and 62 terminations, administrative disciplinary actions, and resignations. The quality of the investigations described in this report demonstrates the importance of effective, fair, and independent investigative oversight conducted by our office.

The OIG remains committed to its mission for promoting the rule of law through objective, independent oversight of DOJ—as is exemplified in our work over the past 6 months. As usual, the Semiannual Report to Congress reflects the exceptional work of OIG personnel.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Michael E. Horowitz". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a large, stylized "H" at the end.

Michael E. Horowitz  
Inspector General  
October 31, 2024

# HIGHLIGHTS

## Statistical Highlights

The following summaries highlight some of the Office of the Inspector General's (OIG) audits, evaluations, inspections, special reviews, and investigations, which are discussed further in this report. As the highlights illustrate, the OIG continues to conduct wide-ranging oversight of U.S. Department of Justice (the Department or DOJ) programs and operations.

### OIG-wide



**44**

Total Number of OIG Reports Issued<sup>1</sup>



**190**

Total Number of Recommendations in OIG Reports  
(including dollar-related recommendations)<sup>2</sup>

### Audit Division



**36**

Reports Issued

**\$2,388,369**

Questioned Costs

<sup>1</sup> This figure includes OIG audits, reports, evaluations, inspections, special reviews, surveys, issue alerts, and Management Advisory Memoranda (MAM) issued during the reporting period. This figure does not include Single Audit Act reports, which are identified below, or Reports of Investigation.

<sup>2</sup> This figure includes all recommendations, including those for management improvements and dollar-related recommendations, which are recommendations for components to remedy questioned costs and funds to be put to better use.

**168**

Recommendations for Management Improvements



**45**

Single Audit Act Transmittal Reports Issued

**\$462,836**

Questioned Costs

**80**

Recommendations for Management Improvements

## Evaluation and Inspections Division

---

**3**

Reports Issued



**5**

Recommendations for Management Improvements



## Investigations Division

---



**9,079**

Allegations Received by the Investigations Division<sup>3</sup>



**129**

Investigations Opened



**116**

Investigations Closed



**42**

Arrests



**39**

Indictments & Informations



**31**

Convictions & Pleas



**62**

Administrative Actions<sup>4</sup>



**\$26,959,675.47**

Monetary Recoveries<sup>5</sup>

<sup>3</sup> These figures represent allegations entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. They do not include the approximate 7,725 additional hotline, email, and phone contacts that were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government.

<sup>4</sup> See the Glossary for a definition of "Administrative Actions."

<sup>5</sup> "Monetary Recoveries" include civil, criminal and nonjudicial fines, restitutions, recoveries, assessments, penalties, and forfeitures.



## Audits, Evaluations, Inspections, and Special Reviews Highlights

Examples of OIG audits, evaluations, inspections, and special reviews completed during this semiannual reporting period are:

### [Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's \(FBI\) Handling of Tips of Hands-on Sex Offenses Against Children](#)

Following up on the OIG's Nassar investigation, the OIG found the FBI needs to build on changes it made to its crimes against children and human trafficking program to ensure it appropriately addresses child sexual abuse allegations. During the OIG's review of case files, various issues of significant non-compliance with FBI policies were identified. The FBI agreed with the 11 recommendations made to improve the FBI's handling of allegations involving hands-on sex offenses against children.

### [A Review of DOJ's Response to Protest Activity and Civil Unrest in Washington, D.C., in Late May and Early June 2020](#)

The OIG found that DOJ's command and control of its personnel was chaotic during its response to civil unrest in Washington, D.C., during May and June 2020. The OIG had concerns about DOJ leadership ordering agents to perform missions for which they lacked proper training and equipment. The OIG also found that then Attorney General Barr did not order the clearing of protesters from Lafayette Park on June 1 to begin or affect the timing of that operation.

### [A Report of Investigation Into the Department's Release of Public Statements Concerning a Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, Election Fraud Investigation in September 2020](#)

The OIG found that then Middle District of Pennsylvania U.S. Attorney David Freed released a statement about an investigation and a letter containing investigative details. The OIG concluded that the statement did not comply with applicable DOJ policy; however, the OIG did not find that either then Attorney General William Barr or Freed committed misconduct relating to the statement. The OIG found that Freed violated DOJ policy when he publicly released the letter and failed to consult with the Public Integrity Section and an affected component. Finally, the OIG concluded that Barr's decision to provide information to President Trump did not violate applicable DOJ policy. The OIG made five recommendations.


### [Evaluation of DOJ's Efforts to Coordinate Information Sharing About Foreign Malign Influence Threats to U.S. Elections](#)

The DOJ components that counter foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections effectively share information with each other. However, neither DOJ nor the FBI had specific policy or guidance applicable to information sharing with social media companies until February 2024. The OIG also found that DOJ does not have a comprehensive strategy for engaging with social media on foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections. The Department agreed with both of the OIG's recommendations.

## Investigative Highlights


As shown in the statistics at the beginning of this section and in the charts below, the OIG investigates many allegations of misconduct involving DOJ employees or contractors and grantees who receive DOJ funds.

**All Cases Opened by Offense Category**  
**April 1, 2024–September 30, 2024**



**Source:** Investigations Data Management System

**All Cases Referred and Convictions/Pleas  
April 1, 2024-September 30, 2024**



**Note:** The convictions/pleas reported in this chart do not necessarily arise from the matters referred for prosecution during this reporting period.

**Source:** Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of such investigations:

### [Executive at a Nonprofit Receiving DOJ Funding Sentenced for Conspiracy](#)

On April 29, 2024, the former Chief Operating Officer (COO) at a nonprofit receiving DOJ funding was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a \$250,000 fine and a \$100 special assessment for one count of conspiracy. The former COO was also ordered to pay \$4,350,000 in restitution jointly with her husband, who was the Chief Financial Officer. The former COO was sentenced in the Western District of Missouri. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about 2013 through in or about 2015, the former COO paid bribes to members of the Arkansas legislature in exchange for those members using their official positions to perform official action that would benefit the nonprofit.

### [Former Financial Director of Counseling Center Receiving DOJ Funds Sentenced for Bank Fraud and Tax Evasion](#)

On July 24, 2024, the former Financial Director of the Family Crisis and Counseling Center (FCCC) in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day of confinement, followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay \$374,879 in restitution and a \$200 special assessment for one count of bank fraud and one count of tax evasion. The former Financial Director, who was terminated from his position from the FCCC, was sentenced in the Northern District of Oklahoma. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about 2014 through in or about 2018, the former Financial Director issued unauthorized checks from FCCC's bank accounts to herself with no legitimate business purpose. The amounts of the payments allegedly totaled approximately \$278,257. During the same period, the former Financial Director willfully attempted to evade and defeat substantial income tax by not reporting her income to the IRS.

### [Former FBI Special Agent Sentenced to Life in Prison for Sodomy and Sexual Abuse of a Child](#)

On August 1, 2024, a former FBI Special Agent (SA) previously assigned to the FBI New Orleans Field Office in Louisiana was sentenced to life in prison for one count of sodomy, plus 20 additional years in prison for one count of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years of age. Christopher Bauer, who was terminated from his position from the FBI in connection with an unrelated administrative investigation, was sentenced in the Circuit Court of Montgomery, Alabama. According to the evidence presented at trial, Bauer sexually abused his minor daughter over a period of years, which included his tenure with the FBI.

### [Findings of Misconduct by a then Supervisory Criminal Assistant United States Attorney \(AUSA\) for Misuse of Position, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Government](#)

On August 21, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by a then Supervisory Criminal AUSA. The OIG initiated an investigation upon the receipt of information from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys alleging that a then Supervisory Criminal AUSA had misused the AUSA's position in connection with local law enforcement's investigation into the AUSA's involvement in a hit-and-run car crash causing property damage while the AUSA was under the influence of alcohol. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation that the then Supervisory Criminal AUSA had engaged in misuse of position when the AUSA, unsolicited, provided local law enforcement officers with the AUSA's DOJ credentials and business card during their investigation into the AUSA's conduct, in violation of federal ethics regulations. The OIG investigation also found that the AUSA engaged in conduct prejudicial to the government when the AUSA drove the AUSA's personally owned vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, hit another vehicle, and then left the scene of the crash before law enforcement arrived, in violation of federal ethics regulations.\*<sup>6</sup>

### [Former Arkansas State Representative Sentenced for Conspiracy](#)

On August 26, 2024, a former Arkansas State Representative was sentenced to 3 years of probation and ordered to pay forfeiture in the amount of \$450,501 for one count of conspiracy. The former Arkansas State Representative was sentenced in the Western District of Missouri. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about October 2009 through in or about February 2017, the former Arkansas State Representative conspired with the executives of a healthcare nonprofit that received DOJ funding, to use its money for unlawful political contributions and lobbying, as well as to enrich themselves.

<sup>6</sup> An asterisk ("\*") indicates that the investigative summary is responsive to the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(13).

### [Findings of Misconduct by an FBI Assistant Special Agent in Charge \(ASAC\) for Sexual Harassment, Making Racially Insensitive Remarks, Making Misrepresentations to Supervisors, Bullying Subordinates, Threatening Subordinates with Retaliation, and Lack of Candor](#)

On September 11, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by an FBI ASAC. The OIG initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information from the FBI alleging that an FBI ASAC sexually harassed an FBI SA, made racially insensitive remarks to an FBI Investigative Analyst (IA), made misrepresentations to supervisors about a subordinate's willingness to volunteer for a temporary assignment, and bullied subordinates by using intimidating language and tactics with them. During the investigation, the OIG found indications that the ASAC threatened subordinates with retaliation if they made complaints about management during an office inspection, and that the ASAC lacked candor under oath in an OIG interview. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations that the ASAC sexually harassed the SA, made racially insensitive remarks to the IA, made misrepresentations to supervisors, bullied subordinates, threatened subordinates with retaliation if they made complaints about management, and lacked candor under oath in an OIG interview, all in violation of FBI and DOJ policy. The ASAC retired while the OIG's investigation was ongoing.\*

### [Former Federal Bureau of Prisons \(BOP\) Correctional Officer \(CO\) Sentenced for Sexual Abuse of an Inmate](#)

On May 23, 2024, a former BOP CO previously assigned to the Federal Correctional Institution (FCI) Aliceville in Alabama, was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration and 15 years of supervised release for one count of sexual abuse of a ward. Robert Smith, who resigned from his position during the OIG investigation, was sentenced in the Northern District of Alabama. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, in or about February 2019, Smith engaged in a sexual act with a female inmate at FCI Aliceville. Further, between on or about July 6, 2018, and on or about November 15, 2018, Smith knowingly engaged in a sexual act with a different female inmate at FCI Aliceville.

## OIG PROFILE

The OIG is a statutorily created independent entity whose mission is to promote the rule of law through objective, independent oversight of DOJ. The OIG investigates alleged violations of criminal and civil laws, regulations, and ethical standards arising from the conduct of DOJ employees in their numerous and diverse activities. The OIG also audits and inspects DOJ programs and assists management in promoting integrity, economy, efficiency, and effectiveness. The OIG has jurisdiction to review the programs and personnel of the FBI; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); BOP; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); U.S. Attorney's Offices (USAO), U.S. Marshals Service (USMS), and all other organizations within DOJ, as well as DOJ's contractors and grant recipients.

The OIG consists of the following divisions and offices:

- **Immediate Office of the Inspector General** is the leadership office of the OIG. It is comprised of the Inspector General, the Deputy Inspector General, and staff who contribute to the leadership and policy direction of the OIG, congressional relations, media relations and internal communications, diversity and inclusion, special projects, sensitive investigations, administrative duties, and other responsibilities. The Immediate Office engages with the Department's leadership, members of Congress and their staffs, and other stakeholders. It also coordinates awareness of whistleblower rights and protections; and publication of the OIG's mission reports, including the Top Management and Performance Challenges Report and the Semiannual Report to Congress.
- **Audit Division** is responsible for independent audits of DOJ programs, computer systems, and financial statements. The Audit Division has regional offices in the Atlanta; Chicago; Denver; Philadelphia; San Francisco; and Washington, D.C., areas. Its Financial Statement Audit Office and Computer Security and Information Technology Audit Office are located in Washington, D.C., along with Audit headquarters. Audit headquarters consists of the Immediate Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of Operations, Office of Policy and Planning, Office of Quality Assurance, and Office of Data Analytics.
- **Investigations Division** investigates alleged violations of fraud, abuse, and misconduct by DOJ employees, contractors, grantees, and other outside parties. The division's SAs develop cases for criminal or civil prosecution, or administrative action. The Investigations Division has seven regions with offices in Arlington, Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Dallas, Denver, Detroit, El Paso, Houston, Los Angeles, Miami, New York, San Francisco, Trenton, and Tucson. Its Fraud Detection Office and Cyber Investigations Office are co-located in Arlington, Virginia, with personnel in offices nationwide. Investigations headquarters in Washington, D.C., consists of the Immediate Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations and the following branches: Operations I, Operations II, Investigative Support, Administrative Support, and Hotline Operations.

The following map shows the locations for the Audit and Investigations Divisions:

**Audit and Investigations Division Locations**



Source: OIG

- **Evaluation and Inspections Division** conducts program evaluations and on-site inspections that serve as an adaptable and agile format for OIG oversight of DOJ programs and activities and yield recommendations for improvement in DOJ operations.
- **Oversight and Review Division** blends the skills of Attorneys, Investigators, Program Analysts, and Paralegals to conduct special reviews and investigations of sensitive allegations involving DOJ employees and operations.
- **Management and Planning Division** Division provides the Inspector General with advice on administrative and fiscal policy and assists OIG components by providing services in the areas of planning, budget, finance, quality assurance, human resources, training, procurement, facilities, asset management, telecommunications, security, records management, and general mission support.
- **Information Technology Division** executes the OIG's information technology strategic vision and goals by directing technology and business process integration, network administration, implementation of computer hardware and software, cybersecurity, applications development, programming services, policy formulation, and other mission support activities.



- **Office of General Counsel** provides legal advice to OIG management and staff. It also drafts memoranda on issues of law; prepares administrative subpoenas; represents the OIG in personnel, contractual, and legal matters; and responds to Freedom of Information Act requests.

The OIG has a nationwide workforce of more than 500 SAs, Auditors, Inspectors, Attorneys, and administrative professionals. For fiscal year (FY) 2024, the OIG's direct appropriation was \$139 million; the OIG also received a transfer-in of \$10 million and an additional \$16.9 million in reimbursements.

As required by Section 5 of the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 405, this Semiannual Report to Congress is reviewing the accomplishments of the OIG for the 6-month period of April 1, 2024–September 30, 2024.

Additional information about the OIG and full-text versions of many of its reports are available on the [OIG website](#).

## PANDEMIC RESPONSE OVERSIGHT

Beginning in early March 2020, the OIG promptly shifted a significant portion of its oversight efforts toward assessing DOJ's readiness to respond to the emerging COVID-19 pandemic. Through its initial assessment, and the subsequent passage of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act on March 27, 2020, the OIG determined that the most immediate challenges to DOJ operations involved preventing the spread of the virus among federal inmates and detainees; safely operating immigration courts; and ensuring robust oversight of \$850 million in pandemic-related grant funding being disbursed by DOJ to state, local, and tribal organizations. Since that time, these efforts have been expanded to include areas such as the impact of COVID-19 on DOJ law enforcement and other day-to-day operations.

The OIG's completed pandemic-related work for this reporting period is listed below, along with the OIG's ongoing work. More information about the OIG's pandemic oversight activities is available on the [OIG website](#).

### Investigations

In January 2021, the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC) stood up a Fraud Task Force to serve as a resource for the Inspector General community by surging investigative resources into those areas where the need is the greatest, which is currently pandemic loan fraud. Agents from OIGs across the government are detailed to work on task force cases. These agents have partnered with prosecutors at the Department's Fraud Section and USAOs across the country.

The Investigations Division has nine agents who are assigned to the PRAC Fraud Task Force on a part-time basis. The PRAC has extended its authority to investigate pandemic-related fraud to the DOJ OIG through a memorandum of understanding. The agents are assigned Paycheck Protection Program (PPP) cases while continuing to work their existing OIG caseloads. This initiative allows the OIG to make a broader contribution to the Inspector General community by assisting with investigations that might otherwise remain understaffed.

The idea behind the PRAC Fraud Task Force is to harness the expertise of the oversight community and attack this problem with every available tool. The PRAC Fraud Task Force works closely with other initiatives to combat pandemic fraud such as the Department's COVID-19 Fraud Enforcement Task Force.

The following is an example of an investigation that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

#### [Non-DOJ Individual Pleaded Guilty to Pandemic-Related Fraud Charges](#)

On April 11, 2024, a non-DOJ individual pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud. The individual pleaded guilty in the Middle District of Georgia. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about March 2020 through in or about April 2021, the individual, in connection with other co-

defendants, submitted numerous false PPP, Economic Injury Disaster Loan, and Unemployment Insurance Benefit applications containing materially false representations and certifications. As part of the plea agreement, the individual agreed to forfeit \$57,458.

## Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the Office on Violence Against Women's (OVW) Grant Administration During the COVID-19 Pandemic

---

Review Examining the BOP's Use of Home Confinement as a Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic

---

## MULTICOMPONENT

While many of the OIG's activities are specific to a particular component of DOJ, other work covers more than one component and, in some instances, extends to DOJ contractors and grant recipients. The following describes OIG audits, evaluations, inspections, reviews, and investigations that involve more than one DOJ component.

### Reports Issued

#### [A Review of DOJ's Response to Protest Activity and Civil Unrest in Washington, D.C., in Late May and Early June 2020](#)

The OIG found that DOJ's command and control over its personnel was at times chaotic and disorganized. The OIG report agreed with the serious concerns expressed to the OIG by law enforcement personnel about DOJ leadership's decision to put DOJ law enforcement agents in close proximity to the public and have them perform missions for which they lacked the proper equipment and training, which created safety and security risks for the agents and the public. Regarding the operation to clear protesters from Lafayette Park and the surrounding area on June 1, 2020, the OIG found that the U.S. Park Police and the U.S. Secret Service were in overall operational command at Lafayette Park on June 1; that the U.S. Park Police and the U.S. Secret Service unified command had already decided to initiate the operation to clear the park and had begun preparations to do so prior to then Attorney General William Barr's arrival in the park; and that Barr did not order the clearing operation to begin or affect the timing of the operation.

#### [A Report of Investigation Into the Department's Release of Public Statements Concerning a Luzerne County, Pennsylvania, Election Fraud Investigation in September 2020](#)

The OIG found that then Middle District of Pennsylvania U.S. Attorney David Freed released a statement about an investigation and a letter containing investigative details. The OIG concluded that the statement did not comply with applicable DOJ policy; however, the OIG did not find that either then Attorney General William Barr or Freed committed misconduct relating to the statement. The OIG found that Freed violated DOJ policy when he publicly released the letter and failed to consult with the Public Integrity Section and an affected component. Finally, the OIG concluded that Barr's decision to provide information to President Trump did not violate applicable DOJ policy. The OIG made five recommendations.

#### [Evaluation of DOJ's Efforts to Coordinate Information Sharing About Foreign Malign Influence Threats to U.S. Elections](#)

The OIG found that the DOJ components that counter foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections effectively share information with each other. The FBI, which interacts with outside entities on behalf of DOJ, shares information about this threat with social media companies. However, the OIG found that neither DOJ nor the FBI had a specific policy or guidance applicable to information sharing with social media companies until February 2024, and the sensitivity markings on that document render it not suitable for public release. As social media companies provide a forum for speech, this guidance seeks to minimize the

risk of First Amendment violations when the government interacts with them. The OIG also found that DOJ does not have a comprehensive strategy guiding its approach to engagement with social media companies on foreign malign influence directed at U.S. elections. The OIG made two recommendations, and the Department agreed with both of them.

### [An Investigation of Allegations Concerning DOJ's Handling of the Government's Sentencing Recommendation in United States v. Roger Stone](#)

The OIG did not identify documentary or testimonial evidence that the actions and decisions of those involved in the preparation and filing of the government's first and second sentencing memoranda were affected by improper political considerations or influence. The OIG concluded that failures in leadership by then Interim U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia prompted the events leading up to the filing of the second sentencing memorandum. The OIG also concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that one of the prosecutors on the government's trial team provided false testimony to the House Judiciary Committee when he alleged that improper political pressure had been placed on the trial team before the filing of the first and second sentencing memoranda.

### [Audit of DOJ's FY 2023 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019](#)

The OIG issued an audit report of DOJ's FY 2023 compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019, in accordance with the reporting requirements of the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) Circular A-123, Management's Responsibility for Internal Control, Appendix C, Requirements for Payment Integrity Improvement; OMB Circular A 136, Financial Reporting Requirements; and OMB Payment Integrity Annual Data Call Instructions. The OIG found that the Department complied with the requirements of the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 for FY ended September 30, 2023. In addition, the OIG determined the Department's efforts to prevent and reduce improper and unknown payments were effective.

### [Audit of DOJ's Implementation of its Policy to Electronically Record Statements of Arrestees in Custody](#)

The OIG released a report on DOJ's implementation of its policy to electronically record statements of arrestees in custody (e-Recording Policy), which established the presumption that DOJ's law enforcement components will electronically record individuals' statements made under certain circumstances. The OIG found that the components: (1) generally integrated the e-Recording Policy into their internal policies, procedures, and operations; and (2) made efforts to provide their offices suitable recording equipment. One component still needs to ensure that places of detention within the United States have sufficient recording equipment. The OIG found that: (1) all components generally trained their personnel on the e-Recording Policy, although some have not trained their Task Force Officers; and (2) none of the components provide their personnel with subsequent refresher training on the e-Recording Policy. The OIG made four recommendations to improve implementation of the e-Recording Policy. ATF, DEA, FBI, and USMS agreed with all four.

### [Audit of DOJ's Strategy to Combat and Respond to Ransomware Threats and Attacks](#)

The OIG released a report assessing the DOJ's strategy to combat ransomware threats, including its coordination and response to ransomware attacks. The OIG found that the FBI and the DOJ Criminal Division's Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section have led DOJ's response and prioritized their efforts to maximize ransomware attack prevention. However, the OIG found the Department lacked

impactful metrics for measuring success against ransomware and that it could improve compliance with its deconfliction policy for cyber investigations to ensure consistent implementation and compliance by federal prosecutors. The OIG also found that the FBI-led National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force did not produce meaningful outcomes in combatting ransomware and that its role in this area has been undefined since Congress created the Joint Ransomware Task Force in 2022. DOJ, through the FBI and Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), concurred with all three of the report's recommendations.

### [Audit of DOJ's Compliance with the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 for FYs 2023 and 2024](#)

The OIG released a report examining DOJ's compliance with the Geospatial Data Act of 2018 (GDA). The OIG found that DOJ has established a comprehensive DOJ-wide strategy for ensuring that it meets GDA requirements, but additional actions are needed. DOJ previously met 8 of the 13 GDA requirements related to its geospatial data strategy, data integration, recordkeeping, resource allocation, industry coordination, use of geospatial data, personal privacy, and lead agency coordination. The OIG found that DOJ met three of the remaining five requirements, which relate to National Spatial Data Infrastructure contributions, the use of existing geospatial data, and geospatial data quality. DOJ made progress toward meeting the remaining 2 of the 13 GDA requirements. However, DOJ still needs to develop a process to regularly monitor data assets submitted by components. The OIG made one recommendation to improve DOJ's effort to comply with the GDA, and DOJ agreed with it.

### [Audit of DOJ's Contract Actions Reported by Contracting Officers into the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation](#)

The OIG released a report auditing certain DOJ contract transactions into the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation, which feeds into USAspending.gov. USAspending.gov is the official open data source for unclassified spending information of the U.S. government. Accurate and timely reporting to USAspending.gov is important to show the American public how much the federal government spends every year and how the money is spent. The OIG tested a statistical sample of DOJ's contract action transactions reported in USAspending.gov during FY 2023. The OIG's statistical analysis showed that over 96 percent of the data entries were accurate and that approximately 80 percent of the data entries were timely. The OIG provided the Department's Justice Management Division one recommendation to improve the accuracy and timeliness of the contract actions reported into the Federal Procurement Data System–Next Generation by Contracting Officers, and the Justice Management Division concurred with it.

### **Single Audit Act Reports**

The Single Audit Act of 1984, as amended, promotes sound financial management of federal financial assistance provided to state, local, and tribal governments, colleges, universities, and nonprofit organizations. Under 2 C.F.R. § 200, Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, such entities that expend \$750,000 or more in federal funds in 1 year must have a "single audit" performed annually covering all federal funds expended that year. These audits are conducted by nonfederal auditors. The OIG performs quality reviews of these audit reports when they pertain to DOJ funds and to determine whether they contain audit findings related to DOJ funds. The OIG's oversight of nonfederal audit activity informs federal managers about the soundness of the management of federal programs and identifies any significant areas of internal control weakness, non-compliance, and questioned costs for resolution or follow-up. The OIG transmitted to the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 45 single audit reports covering expenditures totaling more than \$455 million in 335 grants and other agreements. To address these deficiencies, the auditors recommended 80 management improvements and identified questioned costs totaling more than \$462,800. The OIG monitors these audits through the resolution and closure process.

## [Civil Rights and Civil Liberties](#)

Section 1001 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act directs the OIG to receive and review complaints of civil rights and civil liberties violations by DOJ employees, to publicize how people can contact the OIG to file a complaint, and to send a Semiannual Report to Congress discussing the OIG's implementation of these responsibilities. In September 2024, the OIG released its most recent report, which summarized the OIG's Section 1001 activities from January 1, 2024, through June 30, 2024. The report described the number of complaints the OIG received under this section, the status of investigations conducted by the OIG and DOJ components in response to those complaints, and an estimate of the OIG's expenses for conducting these activities.

## Management Advisory Memorandum

### [Notification of Concerns Regarding DOJ's Compliance with Whistleblower Protections for Employees with a Security Clearance](#)

The OIG released this Management Advisory Memorandum (MAM) regarding DOJ's compliance with whistleblower protections for employees with a security clearance. The OIG identified these concerns in connection with the OIG's assessment of complaints the OIG received from employees alleging that their security clearances were suspended in retaliation for protected whistleblowing activity. The OIG identified several issues with DOJ's policy for employees whose security clearances have been suspended, revoked, or denied. This included DOJ's failure to provide a process for employees with a suspended clearance to file a retaliation complaint with the OIG if their clearance remained suspended for over 1 year. The OIG made four recommendations to DOJ to address the concerns the OIG identified, and DOJ concurred with all of them, and has since made changes to its policies to ensure the Department is compliant with whistleblower protections for employees with a security clearance.

## Investigations

The following are examples of investigations the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

### [Former Boston Police Sergeant Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Theft from a Program Receiving Federal Funds and Embezzlement from an Agency Receiving Federal Funds](#)

On August 1, 2024, a former Boston Police Sergeant previously assigned to the Evidence Control Unit was sentenced to 1 day of incarceration, followed by 2 years of supervised release with 6 months of home confinement, a \$5,000 fine, \$25,930 in restitution, and a \$200 special assessment for conspiracy to commit theft from a program receiving federal funds and the underlying theft from a program receiving federal funds. Gerard O'Brien was sentenced in the District of Massachusetts. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about December 2016 through in or about February 2019, O'Brien submitted false and fraudulent overtime slips for overtime hours that he did not work and knowingly endorsed the fraudulent overtime slips of his subordinates.

### [Former DOJ Contractor Ordered to Pay Restitution Pursuant to an Amended Judgment for Wire Fraud](#)

On May 31, 2024, a former DOJ contractor who was sentenced for wire fraud on March 19, 2024, was ordered to pay \$2,672,038.88 in restitution. The former DOJ contractor, who operated BulletProof-IT, LLC, that sold ballistic equipment to numerous state, local, and federal agencies was sentenced in the District



of Oregon. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about 2016 through in or about 2021, the former DOJ contractor, using interstate and foreign wires, devised a scheme to defraud purchasers of body armor by advertising and selling body armor while making materially false statements about the origin and testing of the products. According to the factual statement, the former DOJ contractor made numerous false statements about the nature of his products, including representing that they were made in the United States when many of his products were purchased from companies in China.

## Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the DEA's and FBI's Integration of Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Technology within the U.S. Intelligence Community

---

Audits of DOJ and Select Components Annual Financial Statements FY 2024

---

Audit of the FY 2024 Information Technology Security Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act

---

Review of Racial Equity in DOJ's Law Enforcement Components

---

Review Examining the Role and Activity of DOJ and its Components in Preparing for and Responding to the Events at the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021

---

Review of DOJ's Use of Subpoenas and Other Legal Authorities to Obtain Communication Records of Members of Congress and Affiliated Persons, and the News Media

---

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

## Reports Issued

### [Audit of the FBI's Violent Criminal Apprehension Program](#)

The OIG released a report examining the FBI's Violent Criminal Apprehension Program (ViCAP), which is a program that conducts crime analysis of certain types of violent crimes to facilitate investigative coordination among law enforcement to identify and apprehend violent, serial offenders. The OIG found that ViCAP experienced challenges effectively meeting its mission based on recently enacted state legislation and DOJ grants requiring ViCAP usage that caused case submissions to increase almost 3,000 percent since FY 2018, while ViCAP's technology processes, funding, and staffing remained essentially unchanged. As a result, ViCAP's workload has significantly increased, yet the OIG found that the FBI does not have a comprehensive strategy to address the increased workload and associated challenges. Consequently, the OIG does not believe ViCAP is currently positioned for long-term success. The OIG made three recommendations to the FBI to address the challenges, and the FBI concurred with all of them.

### [Audit of the FBI's Handling of Tips of Hands-on Sex Offenses Against Children](#)

The OIG released a report on the FBI's handling of tips of hands-on sex offenses against children. Following up on the OIG's Nassar investigation, the OIG found the FBI needs to build on changes it made to its crimes against children and human trafficking program to ensure it appropriately addressed child sexual abuse allegations. The OIG flagged 42 incidents for FBI headquarters review because the OIG believed they may require immediate attention. The OIG found no evidence that FBI employees complied with mandatory reporting requirements to state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement or to social services agencies in almost half of incidents the OIG reviewed. Lastly, the OIG found that a substantial amount of the active child sexual abuse allegations the OIG reviewed lacked evidence that the allegations were responded to within 24 hours and transferred to an appropriate field office in compliance with FBI policy. The OIG made 11 recommendations to improve the FBI's handling of allegations involving hands-on sex offenses against children, and the FBI concurred with all of them. Prior to the release of the report, the FBI took corrective action on two of the OIG's recommendations and the OIG has closed those recommendations.

The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

### [Audit of the FBI's Contract for Ballistics Research Assistant Services](#)

The OIG released a report examining the FBI's awarding of a 2021 sole-source contract for ballistic research assistant services. The OIG determined that the FBI has awarded sole-source contracts for such services to the same individual for the last 18 years. The OIG found that the FBI's methods for awarding the 2021 contract to this individual improperly impeded competition, potentially circumvented civil service laws, and placed the contractor in a personal services role contrary to federal requirements, FBI guidance, and the contract's terms. Further, while the OIG did not find any problems with the services provided by the contractor, the OIG did find significant weaknesses in the FBI's management of the contract, which created

an environment that increased the risk for ineffective and inappropriate contracting practices. The OIG made five recommendations to the FBI to remedy the identified contract deficiencies, and the FBI concurred with all of them.

## Management Advisory Memoranda

### [Recommendation Concerning Potential Conflict Between FBI Post-Shooting Evidence Handling and Crime Scene Maintenance Procedures and FBI Hostage Rescue Team Practice of Identifying and Removing Sensitive Items](#)

On July 9, 2024, the OIG released a MAM regarding a potential conflict between FBI post-shooting evidence handling and crime scene maintenance procedures and the FBI Hostage Rescue Team's (HRT) practice of identifying and removing sensitive items, such as night vision goggles, weapons, or flash bang grenades, from a crime scene. The OIG identified these concerns in connection with its review of the FBI HRT's role in a law enforcement-involved shooting in January 2016. The OIG identified areas in which HRT's practice of identifying and removing sensitive items are not squarely addressed by or potentially conflict with the FBI's procedures for evidence handling, crime scene management, and agent-involved shooting incident investigations, particularly where state or local law enforcement conducts the shooting investigation. The OIG made four recommendations to the FBI to address the concerns the OIG identified, and the FBI agreed with all of them.

### [Notification of Concerns Identified in the FBI's Inventory Management and Disposition Procedures of Electronic Storage Media](#)


The OIG released a MAM to the Director of the FBI identifying concerns with the FBI's inventory management and disposition procedures for its electronic storage media containing sensitive but unclassified information, such as law enforcement sensitive information, as well as classified national security information, and the physical security over these items at an FBI-secure controlled facility. The OIG found several areas for improvement in the FBI's media accountability and disposition efforts, including: (1) electronic storage media containing sensitive but unclassified information or classified national security information is not always accounted for, (2) electronic storage media extracted from large components are not marked with appropriate classification, and (3) electronic storage media slated for disposal are not physically secured. The OIG made three recommendations to improve the FBI's management of its inventory and disposition for its electronic storage media, and the FBI agreed with all of them.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 892 complaints involving the FBI. The most common allegations made against FBI employees were Official Misconduct and Fraud. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the FBI for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 10 investigations and referred 51 allegations to the FBI's Inspection Division for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 58 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to FBI employees. The investigations included Official Misconduct and Off-Duty Violations.

**FBI Cases Opened by Offense Category  
April 1, 2024–September 30, 2024**



**Source:** Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the FBI that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

#### [Former FBI Section Chief Sentenced for Theft of Government Property](#)

On June 12, 2024, a former FBI Senior Executive Service Section Chief previously assigned to the FBI Laboratory in Quantico, Virginia, was sentenced to 2 years of supervised release with the first 6 months to be served on home confinement, and ordered to pay \$69,352.94 in restitution, \$12,300 to the Federal Public Defender Fund, and a \$100 assessment for theft of government property. John Behun, who was terminated from his position with the FBI during the OIG investigation, was sentenced in the District of Maryland. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from on or about January 5, 2015, through on or about November 21, 2018, while leading the section that supports human resources, finance, compliance/health, and safety programs, and managing over 100 individuals, Behun regularly submitted to the FBI false and fraudulent time and attendance certifications falsely representing that he had worked regular hours.

#### [Former FBI SA Sentenced to Life in Prison for Sodomy and Sexual Abuse of a Child](#)

On August 1, 2024, a former FBI SA previously assigned to the FBI New Orleans Field Office in Louisiana was sentenced to life in prison for one count of sodomy, plus 20 additional years in prison for one count of sexual abuse of a child less than 12 years of age. Christopher Bauer, who was terminated from his position from the FBI in connection with an unrelated administrative investigation, was sentenced in the Circuit Court of Montgomery, Alabama. According to the evidence presented at trial, Bauer sexually abused his minor daughter over a period of years, which included his tenure with the FBI.

#### [Findings of Misconduct by an FBI ASAC for Sexual Harassment, Making Racially Insensitive Remarks, Making Misrepresentations to Supervisors, Bullying Subordinates, Threatening Subordinates with Retaliation, and Lack of Candor](#)

On September 11, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by an FBI ASAC. The OIG initiated this investigation upon the receipt of information from the FBI alleging that an FBI ASAC sexually harassed an FBI SA, made racially insensitive remarks to an FBI IA, made misrepresentations

to supervisors about a subordinate's willingness to volunteer for a temporary assignment, and bullied subordinates by using intimidating language and tactics with them. During the investigation, the OIG found indications that the ASAC threatened subordinates with retaliation if they made complaints about management during an office inspection, and that the ASAC lacked candor under oath in an OIG interview. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations that the ASAC sexually harassed the SA, made racially insensitive remarks to the IA, made misrepresentations to supervisors, bullied subordinates, threatened subordinates with retaliation if they made complaints about management, and lacked candor under oath in an OIG interview, all in violation of FBI and DOJ policy. The ASAC retired while the OIG's investigation was ongoing.\*

## Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the FBI's Contract Awarded to Clark Construction Group, LLC for the Innovation Center

---

Audit of the FBI's Efforts to Respond to Changing Operational Technologies

---

Audit of the FBI's Participation in Operation Allies Refuge and Operation Allies Welcome

---

Audit of the FBI's Media Destruction Services Contract Awarded to Articus Solutions, LLC

---

Audit of the FBI's Use of Special Deputations

---

# FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS

## Reports Issued

### [Inspection of the BOP's FCI Sheridan](#)

The OIG identified serious operational deficiencies, including staffing shortages among healthcare workers and COs, substantially impacting the health, welfare, and safety of employees and inmates. Healthcare worker shortages affect daily functions such as drawing blood, triaging patients, and ensuring that medical equipment and supplies are ready for routine care and medical emergencies. Especially alarming was a backlog of 725 laboratory orders and 274 pending x-ray orders. Institution management was not always able to fill all inmate-monitoring posts to safely supervise inmates. As a result, inmates must routinely be confined to their cells and are often unable to participate in programs and recreational activities. Additionally, the OIG found serious staffing shortages among the employees who facilitate the BOP's Residential Drug Abuse Program, and this program was suspended at one of the institution's sub-facilities, (the camp) due to persistent hiring challenges. The OIG made no new recommendations to the BOP.

The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

### [Audit of the BOP's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program](#)

The OIG released a report on the BOP's Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (IFRP). Since 1987, the BOP has administered the IFRP to encourage inmates to pay court ordered financial obligations. As of November 2023, 35 percent of the BOP's total inmate population had outstanding balances ranging from 1 cent to as much as \$2.4 billion. Currently, IFRP participation is voluntary and federal regulations create ambiguity regarding the use of certain inmate funds. The OIG concluded that the BOP has limited ability to mandate payments from inmates commensurate with available inmate resources. Making necessary changes to existing regulations could help bring clarity to the BOP's efforts to implement the program. Additionally, the OIG found that the BOP's process for documenting the rationale for IFRP payment plans could be improved. The OIG made two recommendations to assist the BOP's efforts to administer the IFRP, and the BOP concurred with both of them.

### [Audit of the BOP's Management of the National Gang Unit](#)

The OIG released a report on the BOP's management of the National Gang Unit (NGU). The OIG found that the NGU relies on inadequate and outdated policies and quality control measures, which significantly impacted its ability to effectively carry out its gang oversight mission. The OIG's findings include the following: (1) the BOP should routinely assess its security threat group designations; (2) the BOP needs to develop a strategy to better utilize its resources; (3) the NGU should make details about its disassociation program more accessible to inmates; and (4) the BOP should strengthen its quality controls for security threat group validations, disassociations, and investigative work. The OIG made 13 recommendations to the BOP to improve the operations of the NGU and its management and oversight of the BOP's gang-affiliated population, and the BOP concurred with all of them.

## Inspection of the BOP's FCI Lewisburg

The OIG identified serious operational deficiencies related to staffing, inmate healthcare, infrastructure, restrictive housing, suicide prevention, and employee professionalism. The most concerning findings include appropriate staffing levels for Correctional Services, Correctional Systems, and Health Services: a BOP-hired contractor's projections were significantly lower than current levels and FCI Lewisburg's needs estimates. Inadequate staffing may limit the BOP's ability to reliably and effectively accomplish its missions and impair the safety and efficacy of FCI Lewisburg's recently expanded operations. Also, the OIG found that clinicians abruptly discontinued medications for 15 inmates with mental health conditions, contrary to BOP clinical guidance for management of major depressive disorder. The OIG also found single-celling of inmates in restrictive housing despite BOP policy discouraging it, prevalent employee violations of BOP guidance directly compromising FCI Lewisburg's ability to effectively and timely respond to suicide attempts, and multiple examples of obscene and sexually abusive graffiti degrading certain employees.


The OIG released a [video message](#) to accompany this report.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 7,131 complaints involving the BOP. The most common allegations made against BOP employees were Official Misconduct and Force, Abuse, Rights Violations. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the BOP for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 82 investigations and referred 274 allegations to the BOP's Office of Internal Affairs for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 302 open cases of alleged misconduct related to BOP employees. The investigations included Official Misconduct and Force, Abuse, Rights Violations.

**BOP Cases Opened by Offense Category**  
April 1, 2024–September 30, 2024



**Source:** Investigations Data Management System



The following are examples of investigations involving the BOP that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

### [Former BOP Pharmacy Technician Sentenced for Sexual Abuse of a Ward](#)

On April 9, 2024, a former BOP Pharmacy Technician at the FCI Petersburg in Hopewell, Virginia, was sentenced to 5 years of supervised release and ordered to pay a \$100 special assessment for sexual abuse of a ward. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about November 2021 through in or about June 2022, Adrienne Del Valle engaged in a sexual relationship with an inmate at FCI Petersburg. During that time, Del Valle and the inmate engaged in multiple sexual acts while in the medical unit of FCI Petersburg, where Del Valle worked as a Pharmacy Technician and the inmate worked as a medical unit orderly. These acts often took place on Saturdays when Del Valle worked voluntary overtime hours and was alone in the medical unit with the inmate.

### [Former BOP CO Sentenced for Sexual Abuse of an Inmate](#)

On May 23, 2024, a former BOP CO previously assigned to the FCI Aliceville in Alabama, was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration and 15 years of supervised release for one count of sexual abuse of a ward. Robert Smith, who resigned from his position during the OIG investigation, was sentenced in the Northern District of Alabama. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, in or about February 2019, Smith engaged in a sexual act with a female inmate at FCI Aliceville. Further, between on or about July 6, 2018, and on or about November 15, 2018, Smith knowingly engaged in a sexual act with a different female inmate at FCI Aliceville.

### [El Paso Contractor Sentenced to Prison for Defrauding Bureau of Prisons](#)

On July 3, 2024, a former DOJ contractor was sentenced to 24 months of imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay \$11,397,374 in restitution, a \$5,000 fine and \$100 special assessment fee for one count of wire fraud. The former DOJ contractor was sentenced in the Western District of Texas. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about December 2010 through in or about July 2021, the former DOJ contractor overbilled the BOP \$23,064,985, of which \$11,397,374 was within the relevant statute of limitations period, for the sale of natural gas to United States Prison Canaan in Waymart, Pennsylvania, and FCI Aliceville in Alabama, by overstating the amount of natural gas the BOP used.

### [Former BOP CO Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit Bribery](#)

On July 18, 2024, a former BOP CO previously assigned to the Federal Correctional Complex Petersburg in Hopewell, Virginia, was sentenced to 24 months of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and a \$100 assessment fee for one count of conspiracy to commit bribery. Daniel Thomas, who was terminated from his position with the BOP after pleading guilty, was sentenced in the Eastern District of Virginia. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from on or about October 4, 2022, through on or about December 16, 2022, Thomas conspired with a BOP inmate and a non-DOJ individual to receive bribes in exchange for providing prohibited objects, including tobacco and anabolic steroids, to the inmate, who further distributed the prohibited objects to other inmates at the Federal Correctional Complex Petersburg.

### [Former BOP CO Sentenced for Bribery of a Public Official](#)

On July 30, 2024, a former BOP CO previously assigned to the Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn in New York, was sentenced to 30 months in prison followed by 3 years of supervised release and ordered to forfeit \$10,000 for one count of bribery of a public official. Quandelle Joseph, who resigned from the BOP in August 2023, was sentenced in the Eastern District of New York. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about December 2020 through in or about November 2021, Joseph smuggled narcotics, cigarettes, and cell phones in exchange for monetary payments to inmates at the Metropolitan Detention Center Brooklyn.

### **Ongoing Work**

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the BOP's Use of Restraints

---

Audit of the BOP's Residential Reentry Center Contracts Awarded to The Kintock Group, Inc.

---

Audit of the BOP's Acquisition and Life-Cycle Management of Major Equipment Supporting Food Services

---

Audit of the BOP's National Menu

---

Inspection of Six BOP Facilities: Food Service Operations

---

Evaluation of the BOP's Colorectal Cancer Screening Practices for Inmates and Its Clinical Follow-up on Screenings

---

Inspection of Federal Medical Center Devens

---

# U.S. MARSHALS SERVICE

## Reports Issued

### [Audit of the USMS's Special Deputation Authority](#)

The OIG released a report examining the USMS's special deputation authority. The USMS exercises the authority (delegated by the Attorney General) to deputize individuals with the power to execute Title 18 federal law enforcement powers. The OIG identified significant deficiencies in the USMS's administration and oversight of its special deputation authority that increase the risk of: (1) providing Title 18 law enforcement authorities to local, state, or other federal officials when there is not a justified need; (2) heightening opportunities for misuse and abuse of Title 18 law enforcement authority; and (3) creating legal and operational liabilities for the USMS and DOJ. The OIG made 11 recommendations (10 to the USMS and 1 to ODAG) to improve the USMS's administration and oversight of special deputation authority, including the USMS's use of this authority for task force officers and court security officers. The USMS and ODAG concurred with their respective recommendations.

### [Audit of the USMS's Home Intrusion Detection System Program](#)


The OIG released a report examining USMS's Home Intrusion Detection System (HIDS) program. The OIG found that the USMS has seen a 13 percent increase in HIDS enrollment under the restructured program. However, about 28 percent of federal judges still do not participate. The OIG found that, contrary to an OIG recommendation in 2021, the USMS had not solicited input directly from judges when considering how to restructure the HIDS program, and that the USMS was unaware of the reasons why judges were not participating in the HIDS program and only recently attempted to obtain that data. Additionally, the OIG identified enhancements to the USMS residential judicial security programs and practices that the OIG believe will help ensure the safety of protected persons and improve the program. The OIG made nine recommendations to improve the USMS's management of the HIDS program, and the USMS concurred with all of them.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 261 complaints involving the USMS. The most common allegations made against USMS employees were Official Misconduct and Force, Abuse, Rights Violations. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the USMS's Office of Internal Affairs for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 7 investigations and referred 27 allegations to the USMS's Office of Internal Affairs for its review. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 38 open cases of alleged misconduct related to USMS employees. The most common allegation was Official Misconduct.

**USMS Cases Opened by Offense Category  
April 1, 2024-September 30, 2024**



**Source:** Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the USMS that the OIG conducted during this reporting period.

#### [Former USMS Task Force Officer Pleaded Guilty to Deprivation of Rights](#)

On May 15, 2024, a former Mississippi Bureau of Investigations officer previously assigned to the USMS Gulf Coast Regional Fugitive Task Force pleaded guilty to one count of deprivation of rights under color of law. The former state officer pleaded guilty in the Southern District of Mississippi. According to court documents and evidence presented in court, on or about September 16, 2021, the former state officer, while acting under color of law as a USMS Task Force Officer, struck an arrestee in the face while the arrestee was handcuffed and being safely escorted by another task force member, thereby willfully depriving the arrestee of their Constitutional right to be free from objectively unreasonable force. The offense resulted in bodily injury to the arrestee.

#### [Former USMS Contract CO Pleaded Guilty to Bribery Charges](#)

On July 1, 2024, a former USMS Contract CO previously assigned to the Limestone County Detention Center (LCDC) pleaded guilty to one count of bribery of a public official. The former Contract CO, who resigned from her position at LCDC following her OIG interview, pleaded guilty in the Western District of Texas. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, on or about June 1, 2022, she received approximately \$200 in payment for smuggling contraband cigarettes into LCDC.

## Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the USMS's Contract Awarded to Heritage Health Solutions, Inc.

---

Audit of the USMS's Contract Awarded to Mayvin, Incorporated for Executive, Administrative, and Professional Support Services

---

Audit of the USMS's and Criminal Division Office of Enforcement Operations' Witness Security Program Procurements

---

# DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION

## Report Issued

### [Audit of the DEA's Use of Polygraphs in the Pre-employment and Foreign Vetting Processes](#)

The OIG issued a report examining the DEA's policies and procedures for conducting polygraph examinations for pre-employment screening and the vetting of foreign partners. The OIG found that the DEA did not properly utilize the results of pre-employment and other polygraph exams to help identify and mitigate potential insider threat and security risks to the organization, both domestically and abroad. The OIG identified DEA employees, Task Force Officers, contractors, and foreign partners who had not successfully completed a DEA-conducted polygraph exam who were nonetheless hired or allowed to operate on DEA-led task forces and foreign vetted units, in violation of DEA policies. The OIG made 12 recommendations to improve the DEA's use of polygraph results to help mitigate insider threats and law enforcement partner risks, and the DEA agreed with all of them.

## Management Advisory Memorandum

### [Notification of Concerns Relating to the DEA's Untimely Reporting of Potential Human Rights Violations by Foreign Law Enforcement](#)


The OIG released a MAM identifying concerns related to the DEA's untimely reporting of potential human rights violations to the U.S. Department of State. The Leahy Law refers to statutory provisions that prohibit the U.S. government from providing assistance to a unit of a foreign security force where there is credible information that such unit has committed a gross violation of human rights (GVHR). The OIG identified five instances where the DEA did not notify, within a reasonable period of time, the proper authorities at the U.S. Department of State and respective U.S. Embassies of evidence of potential GVHR admitted to by foreign law enforcement officials. The OIG found that the DEA waited between 51 and 266 days to report these incidents. The OIG made three recommendations to improve the DEA's reporting of GVHR, and the DEA concurred with all of them.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 248 complaints involving the DEA. The most common allegations made against DEA employees were Official Misconduct and Waste, Mismanagement. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to the DEA for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 13 investigations and referred 30 allegations to the DEA's Office of Professional Responsibility for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 49 open cases of alleged misconduct related to DEA employees. The most common allegations were Official Misconduct and Off-Duty Violations.

**DEA Cases Opened by Offense Category**  
**April 1, 2024-September 30, 2024**



**Source:** Investigations Data Management System

The following are examples of investigations involving the DEA that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

#### [Retired DEA SA Found Guilty of One Count of Obstruction of Justice and One Count of False Statements](#)

On April 12, 2024, a retired DEA SA previously assigned to the DEA's New York Division in Buffalo, New York, was found guilty of one count of obstruction of justice and one count of false statements. The former SA, who retired from the DEA while under investigation by the OIG, was convicted in the Western District of New York. According to the evidence presented at trial, from on or about February 1, 2019, through on or about June 6, 2019, the former SA did knowingly conceal and cover up records, documents, and tangible objects of the DEA with intent to impede, obstruct, and influence the investigation and proper administration regarding the nature of the relationship between the former SA and individuals involved in drug trafficking activities by unlawfully taking, removing, concealing, and storing a DEA working case file at his residence.

#### [Former DEA ASAC Sentenced for Conspiracy to Bribe a Public Official, Bribery, and Conspiracy to Commit Wire Fraud](#)

On May 14, 2024, a former DEA ASAC previously assigned to the Miami Field Office was sentenced to 3 years of incarceration, 3 years of supervised release, and a \$400 assessment for one count of conspiracy to bribe a public official, one count of bribery of a public official, and two counts of wire fraud. The former DEA ASAC was sentenced in the Southern District of New York. According to the evidence presented at trial, from in or about October 2018 through in or about November 2019, the former DEA ASAC and a former DEA SA, together and with others, engaged in a bribery scheme in which the former DEA ASAC and others



provided the DEA SA with various benefits, including more than \$70,000 in payments, in exchange for the DEA SA using his official position to benefit the former DEA ASAC and others, including by providing them information about forthcoming sealed indictments and non-public investigations.

#### [Findings of Misconduct by a DEA Executive Assistant for Misuse of Position, Prohibited Association with a Former DEA Confidential Source, and Soliciting and Accepting Gifts from a Former DEA Confidential Source](#)

On August 1, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by a DEA Executive Assistant. The OIG initiated an investigation after receiving information from the DEA alleging that a DEA Executive Assistant had developed and maintained a friendship with a former DEA confidential source and used that relationship to obtain access to expensive sporting events. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation that the DEA Executive Assistant had developed a prohibited relationship with a former DEA confidential source in violation of DEA policy. The OIG investigation also found that the DEA Executive Assistant had used their position to cultivate the friendship, and then used the friendship to seek and obtain tickets to expensive sporting events, in violation of DEA policy and federal ethics regulations.\*

### **Ongoing Work**

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the DEA's Contract Awarded to Ocean Bay Information and Systems Management, LLC

---

Evaluation of the DEA's Transportation Interdiction Activities

---

Audit of DEA's Registration Process for Medical Practitioners

---

# BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS AND EXPLOSIVES

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 238 complaints involving ATF. The most common allegations made against ATF employees were Waste, Mismanagement and Official Misconduct. Most of the complaints were considered management issues and were provided to ATF for its review and appropriate action.

The OIG opened 3 investigations and referred 20 allegations to ATF's Office of Professional Responsibility for action or investigation. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 12 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to ATF employees. The investigations included Off-Duty Violations and Fraud.

## Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of ATF's Management of Gun Trace Requests at Its National Tracing Center

---

Use of Government-Owned Vehicles for Home to Work Transportation by ATF Headquarters Officials

---

# OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS

## Reports Issued

### Audits of Grants to State and Local Entities

During this reporting period, the OIG audited external OJP grant recipients, six of which are described in the following examples:

[Audit of OJP Services and Transitional Housing for Trafficking Victims Grants Awarded to the Healing Action Network, Inc. \(Healing Action\), St. Louis, Missouri](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$1,041,706 awarded to Healing Action to provide services and transitional housing for human trafficking victims. The OIG found that Healing Action demonstrated adequate progress towards achieving the grants' stated goals and objectives but did not adhere to all grant requirements. Specifically, the OIG identified areas of improvement related to its financial policies and procedures, grant expenditures, drawdowns, and Federal Financial Reports. The OIG also identified \$6,473 in net questioned costs, \$2,548 of which were unsupported costs. The OIG made five recommendations to OJP to assist in its management and oversight of Healing Action's grant program activities, and both OJP and Healing Action agreed with all of them.

[Audit of OJP Drug and Mental Health Treatment Grants Awarded to My Health My Resources \(MHMR\) of Tarrant County, Fort Worth, Texas](#)

The OIG released a report on four grants totaling \$3,003,755 awarded to MHMR of Tarrant County for the purpose of enhancing drug and mental health treatment services. The OIG found that MHMR demonstrated adequate progress towards achieving the grants' stated goals and objectives. However, the OIG found that MHMR did not comply with essential grant conditions related to performance reports, the use of grant funds, indirect costs, matching costs, and Federal Financial Reports. The OIG also identified \$247,326 in net questioned costs, of which \$93,278 were unsupported costs. The DOJ OIG made seven recommendations to OJP to address these deficiencies, and OJP concurred with all of them. MHMR concurred with five and partially concurred with two of the OIG's recommendations.

[Audit of the OVW and OJP Grants Awarded to the Mi'kmaq Nation, Presque Isle, Maine](#)

The OIG released a report on five grants totaling \$4,359,339 awarded to the Mi'kmaq Nation for the Tribal Governments Program, Tribal Victim Services Set-Aside Program, and Tribal Delinquency Prevention Program. As of February 2024, the Mi'kmaq Nation drew down \$2,928,548 of the total grants. The OIG identified areas for improvement with progress reporting, completing all required background checks, property management, consultant procurement, and documenting personnel and fringe benefit costs. Additionally, the OIG identified \$33,322 in questioned costs associated with issues related to budget management, indirect costs, and excess cash-on-hand, which included \$22,166 in unsupported costs. The OIG made 14 recommendations to OJP and OVW to improve the Mi'kmaq Nation's management of award performance; and OJP, OVW, and the Mi'kmaq Nation agreed with all of them.

[Audit of OJP Coronavirus Emergency Supplemental Funding \(CESF\) Grant Awarded to the City of Tucson, Tucson, Arizona](#)

The OIG released a report on one grant totaling \$949,721 awarded to the City of Tucson under the CESF program. The OIG found that the City of Tucson adequately achieved the CESF program goal and objectives. However, the OIG identified \$7,114 in unallowable costs related to personnel and fringe benefit expenditures. The OIG discussed this issue with City of Tucson officials in May 2024. By June 2024, the City of Tucson had coordinated with OJP to remedy the unallowable costs. As a result, the OIG does not offer a recommendation.

[Audit of OJP and OVW Grants Awarded to HOPE Works, Inc., Burlington, Vermont](#)

The OIG released a report on four grants totaling \$2,012,715 to support and provide services to victims of domestic violence, sexual assault, and human trafficking. As of December 2023, HOPE drew down \$1,649,120 of the total grant funds. The OIG found that HOPE did not comply with essential grant conditions related to subrecipient monitoring requirements and did not maintain adequate documentation to support direct assistance costs. The OIG identified a total of \$3,800 in questioned costs associated with unsupported direct assistance costs. The OIG made one recommendation to the OVW and three recommendations to OJP to improve HOPE's management of grant funds, and the OVW concurred with the recommendation. OJP and HOPE agreed with all three recommendations.

[Audit of OJP Grants Awarded to the Center for Family Services, Inc. \(CFS\), Camden, New Jersey](#)

The OIG released a report on three grants totaling \$2.2 million to the CFS for the Enhancing Community Responses and the STOP School Violence Grant programs. The OIG did not identify significant concerns regarding CFS's management of its grant budgets and grant expenditures. However, the OIG found that CFS did not have written policies and procedures to ensure accurate reporting of program progress. Additionally, the OIG found that CFS did not have any written policies and procedures in place to ensure compliance with federal requirements related to drawdowns and financial reporting. The OIG made four recommendations to OJP to improve CFS's management of grant funds, and OJP agreed with all of them. CFS agreed with the report overall, but neither agreed nor disagreed with the individual recommendations.

## Investigations

During this reporting period, the OIG received 32 complaints involving OJP. The most common allegation made against OJP employees, contractors, or grantees was Fraud.

The OIG opened three investigations and referred zero allegations. At the close of the reporting period, the OIG had 19 open criminal or administrative investigations of alleged misconduct related to OJP employees, contractors, or grantees. The most common allegation was Fraud.

The following are examples of investigations involving OJP that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

#### [Executive at a Nonprofit Receiving DOJ Funding Sentenced for Conspiracy](#)

On April 29, 2024, the former COO at a nonprofit receiving DOJ funding was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment, 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay a \$250,000 fine and a \$100 special assessment for one count of conspiracy. The former COO was also ordered to pay \$4,350,000 in restitution jointly with her husband, who was the Chief Financial Officer. The former COO was sentenced in the Western District of Missouri. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about 2013 through in or about 2015, the former COO paid bribes to members of the Arkansas legislature in exchange for those members using their official positions to perform official action that would benefit the nonprofit.

#### [Former Budget Analyst at Agency Receiving DOJ Funds Sentenced for Federal Program Theft and Mail Fraud](#)

On May 8, 2024, a former Budget Analyst for the Albany County Sheriff's Office (ACSO) in Albany, New York, was sentenced to 2 years of probation, including 180 days of home confinement, and ordered to pay \$122,251.25 in restitution, a \$5,5000 fine, and a \$200 assessment for one count of federal program theft and one count of mail fraud. The former Budget Analyst, who resigned from his position after the onset of the OIG investigation, was sentenced in the Northern District of New York. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about January 2021 through in or about February 2023, the former Budget Analyst abused his position at the ACSO by writing 14 checks totaling \$113,301.25 from three accounts maintained by the ACSO that were paid to him directly or used to pay a line of credit extended to him by a bank.

#### [Former Financial Director of Counseling Center Receiving DOJ Funds Sentenced for Bank Fraud and Tax Evasion](#)

On July 24, 2024, the former Financial Director of the FCCC in Bartlesville, Oklahoma, was sentenced to 12 months and 1 day of confinement, followed by 3 years of supervised release, and ordered to pay \$374,879 in restitution and a \$200 special assessment for one count of bank fraud and one count of tax evasion. The former Financial Director, who was terminated from her position from the FCCC, was sentenced in the Northern District of Oklahoma. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about 2014 through in or about 2018, the former Financial Director issued unauthorized checks from FCCC's bank accounts to herself with no legitimate business purpose. The amounts of the payments allegedly totaled approximately \$278,257. During the same period, the former Financial Director willfully attempted to evade and defeat substantial income tax by not reporting her income to the IRS.

#### [Former Arkansas State Representative Sentenced for Conspiracy](#)

On August 26, 2024, a former Arkansas State Representative was sentenced to 3 years of probation and ordered to pay forfeiture in the amount of \$450,501 for one count of conspiracy. The former Arkansas State Representative was sentenced in the Western District of Missouri. According to the factual statement in support of the guilty plea, from in or about October 2009 through in or about February 2017, the former Arkansas State Representative conspired with the executives of a healthcare nonprofit that received DOJ funding, to use its money for unlawful political contributions and lobbying, as well as to enrich themselves.

## Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of OJP's Administration and Oversight of the 2024 Presidential Nominating Convention Security Grants

---

# CRIME VICTIMS FUND

The Crime Victims Fund (CVF) was established by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA) and serves as a major funding source for victim services throughout the country. The fund includes deposits from criminal fines, forfeited bail bonds, penalty fees, and special assessments collected by USAOs, U.S. Courts, and the BOP. OJP's Office for Victims of Crime administers the CVF by sending states and territories funding directly through the VOCA victim assistance and compensation formula grants and awarding discretionary grants to state and local public and private entities to support national-scope projects, training, and technical assistance that enhances the professional expertise of victim service providers. From FY 2015 through 2024, DOJ distributed more than \$26,274 million in funding for CVF programs.

The OIG's audits of victims of crime programs have resulted in hundreds of recommendations to improve recipients' administration of CVF-funded grants, enhance program performance, improve monitoring of thousands of subrecipients, and help ensure accountability for billions of CVF dollars. During this semiannual reporting period, the Audit Division issued 12 audits of state VOCA and subaward CVF grant recipients and at the end of the period had 15 ongoing audits of state VOCA and subaward CVF grant recipients. The OIG's subaward CVF grant audits issued this period are described below.

## Reports Issued

### Audits of CVF Grants

During this reporting period, the OIG released 12 audits of state VOCA and subawards for CVF-funded grant programs, as described below:

#### [Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency \(Pennsylvania\) to the Victim Services Center of Montgomery County, Inc. \(VSC\), Norristown, Pennsylvania](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$2,199,215 subawarded by Pennsylvania to the VSC, to provide advocacy, counseling, and education to those affected by sexual violence and other crimes. As of June 2024, Pennsylvania had reimbursed VSC for a cumulative amount of \$1,940,223 for the subawards the OIG reviewed. The OIG found that VSC should formalize its performance data collection and reporting procedures. The OIG also identified significant deficiencies with VSC's financial management, including a lack of grant financial management policies and procedures, insufficient tracking of actual VOCA expenditures within its accounting system, and inadequate documentation and fiscal reporting practices. As a result, the OIG questioned \$1,940,223 as unsupported costs. The OIG made five recommendations to OJP to improve Pennsylvania's and VSC's management of award performance; and OJP, Pennsylvania, and VSC agreed with all of them.

#### [Audit of OJP Victim Compensation Grants Awarded to the Illinois Court of Claims, Springfield, Illinois](#)

The OIG released a report on three of grants totaling \$5,710,000 awarded to the Illinois Court of Claims for compensating victims and survivors of criminal violence throughout the state of Illinois. The OIG found that the Illinois Court of Claims should adopt various changes to bring its program into compliance with federal

grant requirements and the VOCA Guidelines to include enhancing its policies and procedures relating to identifying and handling potential conflicts of interest, compiling information for state certification forms and performance reporting, records retention, and drawdowns. The OIG also found that claims were processed in an untimely manner. The OIG identified \$125,165 in questioned costs relating to victim compensation claims, of which \$123,965 was unsupported and the remainder unallowable. The OIG made 11 recommendations to OJP to improve the Illinois Court of Claims' management of grant performance; and OJP agreed with all of them, while the Illinois Court of Claims concurred with all of them.

*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the District of Columbia's Office of Victim Services and Justice Grants (OVSJG) to the Network for Victim Recovery of DC (NVRDC), Washington, D.C.*

The OIG released a report on a grant totaling \$1,168,066 awarded by the OVSJG to the NVRDC to support victim assistance programs in Washington, D.C. The OIG found that NVRDC could improve aspects of its grant financial management policies and procedures. The OIG also found that the OVSJG needs to distinguish and track the source of subaward expenses between federal and local funds. The OIG identified \$8,662 in questioned costs related to unallowable indirect cost reimbursements. The OIG made four recommendations to OJP to work with the OVSJG to address these deficiencies; and OJP agreed with all of them, OVSJG generally agreed with the recommendations, and NVRDC concurred with all of them.

*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Colorado Division of Criminal Justice (CDCJ) to Ralston House, Arvada, Colorado*

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$2,515,460 awarded by the CDCJ to Ralston House. The OIG found that Ralston House provided child advocacy services including forensic interviews and medical examinations to victims of crimes against children. However, the OIG found that Ralston House could improve certain areas of its subaward management, including enhancing its financial management and developing and implementing financial procedures. Specifically, the OIG found that Ralston House did not evaluate whether allocations for personnel costs were aligned with the actual time that personnel spent on subaward activities. The OIG also identified deficiencies within Ralston House's accounting system used to manage its subaward expenditures. The OIG made two recommendations to OJP to work with CDCJ to improve Ralston House's management of grant performance; and OJP, CDCJ, and Ralston House agreed with all of them.

*Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by New Jersey Department of Law and Public Safety (New Jersey DLPS) to Manavi, Inc. (Manavi), New Brunswick, New Jersey*

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$550,000 subawarded by the New Jersey DLPS to Manavi, to provide culturally appropriate and linguistically accessible victim support services to the South Asian and underrepresented communities within New Jersey. The OIG found that Manavi could improve certain areas of its subaward management, to include developing programmatic and fiscal policies and procedures, reporting accurate performance data in the Office for Victims of Crime Performance Measurement Tool, and protecting victims' personally identifiable information. The OIG made four recommendations to OJP to improve New Jersey DLPS and Manavi's management of grant funds, and OJP agreed with all of them. New Jersey DLPS agreed with one recommendation and neither agreed nor disagreed with three recommendations. Manavi concurred with all the recommendations.



[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Grants Awarded to the Oklahoma District Attorneys Council \(Oklahoma DAC\), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$29,845,338 awarded to the Oklahoma DAC to provide funds to eligible crime victims services operating in public and nonprofit organizations throughout Oklahoma. The OIG found that the Oklahoma DAC's subrecipient monitoring practices were inadequate. Specifically, the OIG identified deficiencies in Oklahoma DAC's risk assessment process and found that the Oklahoma DAC did not perform on-site monitoring of subrecipients as required. In addition, the OIG found that the Oklahoma DAC does not take proper action to ensure subrecipients have required annual audits completed and does not ensure corrective action is taken on audit findings. Finally, the OIG found that the Oklahoma DAC does not validate or test subrecipient-reported performance data for accuracy. The OIG made five recommendations to OJP to improve the Oklahoma DAC's grant management and administration, and OJP and the Oklahoma DAC concurred with all of them.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Grants Awarded to the Montana Board of Crime Control \(Montana BCC\), Helena, Montana](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$9,575,562 awarded to the Montana BCC to provide financial support from the CVF to enhance crime victim services in Montana. The OIG found that Montana BCC utilized and managed its funding to support its victim assistance program. However, the OIG determined that Montana BCC should enhance its subrecipient monitoring policies and procedures and its review of subrecipient expenditures and performance reporting to improve its oversight of VOCA funding and ensure that subrecipient costs are allowable and supported. The OIG made six recommendations to improve Montana BCC's management of grant performance, and OJP and Montana BCC concurred with all of them.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Florida Department of Legal Affairs \(FDLA\) to Speak Up for Kids of Palm Beach County, Inc. \(Speak Up for Kids\), West Palm Beach, Florida](#)

The OIG released a report on two subawards totaling \$2,155,552 made by the FDLA to Speak Up for Kids. The purpose of the FDLA's subawards was to provide child advocacy services to child victims of crime. The OIG found that Speak Up for Kids assisted victims of crime by providing the services, including accompanying children to emergency medical care and guiding children through the criminal justice process. However, the OIG determined that Speak Up for Kids should strengthen its policies and procedures to ensure that its Board of Directors performs adequate oversight and to enhance the accuracy of its financial reporting. The OIG made two recommendations for OJP to work with the FDLA to assist Speak Up for Kids in improving its subaward management and administration. OJP agreed with the recommendations, and the FDLA and Speak Up for Kids concurred with the recommendations.

[Audit of OJP Victim Compensation Grants Awarded to the Florida Department of Legal Affairs \(Florida DLA\), Tallahassee, Florida](#)

The OIG released a report on three grants totaling \$20,408,000 awarded to the Florida DLA to provide financial support through the payment of compensation benefits to crime victims throughout Florida. The OIG found that the Florida DLA compensated victims and survivors of criminal violence but needs to improve controls to administer the program more effectively. Specifically, the OIG found Florida DLA lacked a procedure to track the recovery of funds owed to the Florida DLA such as when a claim is later rescinded. The OIG also identified \$13,950 in questioned costs, \$11,250 of which were unsupported costs and \$2,700 were unallowable costs. The OIG made three recommendations to improve the Florida DLA's grant management, and OJP and the Florida DLA concurred with all of them.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Nevada Division of Child and Family Services \(Nevada DCFS\) to Community Chest, Inc. \(CCI\), Virginia City, Nevada](#)

The OIG released a report on two grants totaling \$515,155 subawarded to the CCI. Due to a lack of controls over its victim files, the CCI could not provide support for its reported FY 2023 subaward performance metrics, and the FY 2024 metrics were inaccurate. The OIG found that the CCI may not be on track to reach its goal of providing 300 new victims of crime access to mental health and other resources. The OIG identified issues with segregation of duties, maintaining adequate supporting documentation for expenditures charged to grants, ensuring appropriate approval of expenditures, and proper allocation of expenditures. The OIG questioned \$9,448 in unsupported costs and made five recommendations to OJP to assist the Nevada DCFS and the CCI in improving their award management and administration. OJP agreed with and Nevada DCFS concurred with all five recommendations. The CCI concurred with three recommendations that pertained to its operations.

[Audit of OJP Victim Assistance Funds Subawarded by the Iowa Department of Justice \(Iowa DOJ\) to Crisis Intervention Services \(CIS\), Oskaloosa, Iowa](#)

The OIG released a report on six grants totaling \$1,019,582 awarded by the Iowa DOJ to CIS in Oskaloosa, Iowa, to provide comprehensive services and shelter to victims of sexual assault, homicide, and other violent crimes. The OIG found that while CIS used the grant funds to provide services and shelter to victims of sexual assault, homicide, and other violent crimes in Iowa, CIS could also improve certain areas of its grant management, particularly performance reporting procedures and financial procedures related to accounting for federal subaward reimbursements and determining personnel allocation percentages. The DOJ OIG made three recommendations to OJP and the Iowa DOJ to improve CIS' grant management and administration, and OJP agreed with all of them. The Iowa DOJ concurred, and CIS agreed with all of them.

[Audit of OJP Victim Compensation Grants Awarded to the Arizona Criminal Justice Commission \(Arizona CJC\), Phoenix, Arizona](#)

The OIG released a report on three grants totaling \$5.16 million awarded to the Arizona CJC to provide financial support through the payment of benefits to crime victims throughout Arizona. The OIG identified discrepancies with annual state certification forms, performance reporting, monitoring of subrecipients, and federal financial reporting. Further, Arizona CJC could not demonstrate it had implemented adequate controls to monitor subrecipients including verification of data submitted for performance reports, verification of financial information for subrecipient reimbursement, and the retention of documentation for monitoring activities. The OIG made five recommendations to OJP to improve Arizona CJC's management of award performance; and OJP agreed with all five recommendations, and Arizona CJC concurred with the recommendations.

## OTHER DOJ COMPONENTS

### Antitrust Division

#### Report Issued

#### [Preliminary Review of Allegations Concerning the Antitrust Division's \(ATR\) Handling of the Automakers Investigation](#)

The OIG released a report summarizing its preliminary review of the ATR's handling of a preliminary investigation into four automakers that entered into an agreement with the State of California. Circumstantial evidence, including a series of tweets by then President Donald Trump the day before senior ATR officials opened the preliminary investigation, suggested that they may have acted for political reasons. The OIG did not identify evidence of improper political influence sufficient to warrant further review, or evidence that ATR officials sought to misuse the enforcement process based on political considerations. The OIG also found that the investigative steps taken by ATR were limited and quickly resolved.

### Criminal Division

#### Reports Issued

#### Audit of Equitable Sharing Program Activities

The DOJ Equitable Sharing Program allows state or local law enforcement agencies that directly participate in an investigation or prosecution resulting in a federal forfeiture to claim a portion of federally forfeited cash, property, and proceeds. During this reporting period, the OIG released two audits of Equitable Sharing Program participants, as described below:

#### [Audit of the Lincoln County Sheriff's Office's \(LCSO\) Equitable Sharing Program Activities, Troy, Missouri](#)

The OIG released a report on the use of DOJ equitable sharing funds by LCSO. During the period of January 1, 2022, through August 31, 2023, LCSO received \$64,919 and spent \$1,247,940 in DOJ equitable sharing funds, primarily on law enforcement equipment and training. The OIG found that LCSO accounted for and used its DOJ equitable sharing funds for law enforcement purposes. However, the OIG found deficiencies in LCSO's internal controls for property management. The OIG made one recommendation to the DOJ Criminal Division; and the Criminal Division concurred with the recommendation, and LCSO agreed with the recommendation.

#### [Audit of the Fort Lauderdale Police Department's \(Fort Lauderdale PD\) Equitable Sharing Program Activities, Fort Lauderdale, Florida](#)

The OIG released a report on the use of equitable sharing funds by the Fort Lauderdale PD. During the period of October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2023, the Fort Lauderdale PD received \$1,814,083

and spent \$2,144,195 in DOJ equitable sharing funds, primarily on equipment. The OIG found that the Fort Lauderdale PD properly spent and accounted for its equitable sharing funds. However, the OIG found the Fort Lauderdale PD did not have documented local procedures for completing and submitting Equitable Sharing Agreement and Certification reports. The OIG made one recommendation to ensure that the Fort Lauderdale PD continues to properly administer its equitable sharing program; and the DOJ Criminal Division concurred with the recommendation, and the Fort Lauderdale PD agreed with the recommendation.

## Investigation

The following is an example of an investigation that the OIG conducted during this reporting period:

### [Findings of Misconduct by a then Supervisory Criminal AUSA for Misuse of Position, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Government](#)

On August 21, 2024, the OIG released an investigative summary of findings of misconduct by a then Supervisory Criminal AUSA. The OIG initiated an investigation upon the receipt of information from the Executive Office for United States Attorneys alleging that a then Supervisory Criminal AUSA had misused the AUSA's position in connection with local law enforcement's investigation into the AUSA's involvement in a hit-and-run car crash causing property damage while the AUSA was under the influence of alcohol. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation that the then Supervisory Criminal AUSA had engaged in misuse of position when the AUSA, unsolicited, provided local law enforcement officers with the AUSA's DOJ credentials and business card during their investigation into the AUSA's conduct, in violation of federal ethics regulations. The OIG investigation also found that the AUSA engaged in conduct prejudicial to the government when the AUSA drove the AUSA's personally owned vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, hit another vehicle, and then left the scene of the crash before law enforcement arrived, in violation of federal ethics regulations.\*

## Environment and Natural Resources Division

### Report Issued

#### [Audit of the Superfund Activities in the Environment and Natural Resources Division \(ENRD\) for FYs 2021 and 2022](#)

The OIG released a report examining the ENRD's Superfund Activities for FYs 2021 and 2022. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 established a trust fund, known as the Superfund, to clean up the nation's worst hazardous waste sites. The OIG is required by statute to audit uses of (including costs charged to) the fund in the prior FY. The OIG concluded that the ENRD reasonably accounted for the activities that it charged to FY 2021 and 2022 Superfund cases. Therefore, the OIG made no recommendations.

## Office of Community Oriented Policing Services

### Ongoing Work

The OIG's ongoing work is available on the [OIG website](#).

---

Audit of the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services COPS Hiring Program

---

# TOP MANAGEMENT AND PERFORMANCE CHALLENGES

Since 1998, the OIG has published an annual report on the top management and performance challenges facing DOJ. The report is based on the OIG's oversight work, research, and judgment. By statute, this report is required to be included in DOJ's annual Agency Financial Report.

This year's report identifies seven challenges that the OIG believes represent the most pressing concerns for DOJ:

1. The Ongoing Crisis Facing the Federal Corrections System,
2. Strengthening Public Trust in DOJ,
3. Promoting and Safeguarding National Security,
4. Cybersecurity and Emerging Technology,
5. Pursuing DOJ's Law Enforcement Mission While Protecting Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
6. Strengthening the Administration and Oversight of Contracts and Grants, and
7. Managing Human Capital.

While these challenges are not rank ordered, the OIG believes that it is critical that the Department address the escalating strategic management and operational challenges facing the federal correction system, which is beset by deteriorating facilities, staffing challenges, and concerns over institutional safety and security and healthcare. The serious issues identified during recent OIG unannounced inspections of BOP facilities, including significant facility issues affecting the conditions of inmate confinement and operational deficiencies in core inmate management and security functions, have heightened concern about the Department's ability to fulfill basic mission requirements. Strengthening the public's trust also remains vitally important for the Department, as confidence in the Department as an institution and its employees is essential to fulfilling the Department's mission to uphold the rule of law, keep our country safe, and protect civil rights.

Additionally, the Department must continue to promote and safeguard national security as it works to counter acts of terrorism and violent extremism, hold international criminal networks accountable

for crimes, and ensure the nation's elections are secure and free from foreign influence. Increasingly sophisticated cyber criminals and the rapid advancement of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, will require the Department to enhance its cybersecurity strategy and better safeguard sensitive data and information systems. The Department will also need to continue carefully balancing its responsibility to keep the American people safe against its responsibility to protect civil rights and civil liberties. And, as the Department strives to protect communities against violent crime, opioids and other narcotics, and child exploitation, it must also ensure that adequate oversight and accountability measures over law enforcement are robust and effective.

To maximize taxpayer dollars, the Department must continue to ensure that the management of DOJ contracts and grants comply with federal law and requirements. Lastly, the Department's ability to hire and retain top talent next year and beyond will depend, in part, on (1) addressing pay disparities between the federal workforce and the private sector, (2) managing workplace flexibilities to maintain operational readiness while being responsive to work-life balance needs, (3) implementing succession planning to address the shifting generational make-up of the federal workforce and retain institutional knowledge, and (4) quickly and appropriately addressing allegations of sexual harassment and discrimination.

Detailed information about DOJ's management and performance challenges is available on the [OIG website](#).

# TESTIMONY/LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS

## Congressional Testimony

During this reporting period, the Inspector General testified on one occasion:

- [“Oversight of the Department of Justice’s Handling of Security Clearances for Whistleblowers,”](#) before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government on September 25, 2024.

## Legislation and Regulations

The IG Act directs the OIG to review proposed legislation and regulations relating to the programs and operations of DOJ. Although the DOJ’s Office of Legislative Affairs reviews all proposed or enacted legislation that could affect DOJ’s activities, the OIG independently reviews proposed legislation that could affect its operations and legislation that relate to waste, fraud, or abuse in DOJ’s programs and operations. For example, during this period, the OIG reviewed the Federal Prison Oversight Act, which directs the OIG to conduct risk-based evaluations and both announced and unannounced inspections of BOP facilities. The bill also provides for the establishment of a DOJ Ombudsman.



# WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION COORDINATOR PROGRAM

Whistleblowers perform a critical role when they bring forward evidence of wrongdoing, and they should never suffer reprisal for doing so. The OIG [Whistleblower Protection Coordinator Program](#) works to ensure that whistleblowers are fully informed of their rights and protections from reprisal.

During this reporting period, Inspector General Horowitz testified before a House Judiciary subcommittee at a hearing to discuss whistleblower protections for employees with a security clearance. Inspector General Horowitz’ testimony highlighted concerns the OIG had identified with the Department’s lack of compliance with whistleblower protections for employees with a clearance, and specifically, that the Department’s policies did not allow employees to file a retaliation complaint with the OIG if their clearance was suspended for longer than 1 year, as required by federal law. The OIG identified these concerns in connection with its assessment of complaints from FBI employees, including former FBI employee Marcus Allen, who also testified at the hearing. The hearing also provided an opportunity for Congress to consider whether whistleblower protections for employees with a security clearance should be further strengthened.

**April 1, 2024–September 30, 2024**

Employee complaints received <sup>7</sup>	348
Employee complaints opened for investigation by the OIG	65
Employee complaints that were referred by the OIG to the components for investigation	174
Employee complaint cases closed by the OIG <sup>8</sup>	63

<sup>7</sup> “Employee complaints” are defined as allegations received from whistleblowers, defined broadly as complaints received from employees and applicants with the Department, or its contractors, subcontractors, or grantees, either received directly from the complainant by the OIG Hotline, the field offices, or others in the OIG, or from a DOJ component if the complaint otherwise qualifies and is opened as an investigation.


<sup>8</sup> This number reflects cases closed during the reporting period regardless of when they were opened.

# OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS

As part of the OIG's mission to promote accountability and transparency in DOJ, the OIG periodically publishes a list of its open recommendations to DOJ, i.e., the OIG recommendations that DOJ has not fully implemented as of the reporting date. A listing of recommendations not closed by the OIG as of September 30, 2024, is available on the [OIG website](https://oig.justice.gov) and on [Oversight.gov](https://oversight.gov).

As of September 30, 2024, DOJ had 620 open OIG recommendations, which the OIG associated with the following statuses at that time: (1) resolved (532 recommendations), (2) on hold/pending with OIG (78 recommendations), and (3) response not yet due (6 recommendations). The recommendations in this report are associated with approximately \$47,622,665 in questioned costs and over \$191,690 in funds that the OIG recommends could be used more efficiently if repurposed by the agency.<sup>9</sup>

**Number of OIG Open Recommendations by FY  
(As of Close of FY 2024)**



Source: OIG

<sup>9</sup> This information omits recommendations that DOJ determined to be classified or sensitive, and therefore unsuitable for public release. Definitions of each status category are available in "Appendix 2, Glossary of Terms."

The OIG also identifies its three highest priority open recommendations on [Oversight.gov](https://www.oversight.gov). These priority recommendations are those the OIG believes, when implemented, will have the most benefit or impact to DOJ's mission, operations, programs, or funds. Factors the OIG considers when identifying priority recommendations include monetary impact; reduction of waste, fraud, abuse, or misconduct; impact on program efficiency and effectiveness; impact on health, safety, national security, or the economy; current value to policy makers; and the recommendation's relationship to high-profile areas such as OIG top management challenges, agency strategic priorities, Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency top challenges, and congressional interest. At the close of this reporting period, the OIG had identified on Oversight.gov the priority open recommendations outlined in the table below:

Report Number and Date	Report Title	Rec. No.	Recommendation
22-001 (October 2021)	<a href="#">MAM: Notifications of Needed Upgrades to the BOP's Security Camera System</a>	1	The OIG recommended that the BOP develop a comprehensive strategic plan for transitioning to a fully digital security camera system that, among other things: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. identifies enhancements needed to address camera functionality and coverage deficiencies,</li> <li>b. provides cost projections and the BOP appropriations account to fund the upgrades, and</li> <li>c. includes estimated timeline for completion of the work.</li> </ul>
16-05 (June 2016)	<a href="#">Review of the BOP's Contraband Interdiction Efforts</a>	3	Develop uniform guidelines and criteria for conducting random staff pat searches across all institutions that require a minimum frequency and duration for search events to ensure that appropriate numbers of staff on each shift are searched with appropriate frequency.
21-093 (July 2021)	<a href="#">Investigation and Review of the FBI's Handling of Allegations of Sexual Abuse by Former USA Gymnastics Physician Lawrence Gerard Nassar</a>	1a	The OIG recommended that the FBI more precisely describe for FBI employees when they are required to promptly contact and coordinate with applicable state and local law enforcement and social service agencies after receiving allegations of crimes against children that potentially fall under state jurisdiction, even when the allegations also potentially fall within the FBI's jurisdiction.

## STATISTICS

### Evaluation and Inspections Workload and Accomplishments

The following table summarizes the workload and accomplishments of the Evaluation and Inspections Division during the 6-month reporting period ending September 30, 2024:

Workload and Accomplishments	Number of Reviews
Reviews Active at Beginning of Period	5
Reviews Cancelled	0
Reviews Initiated	4
Final Reports Issued	3
Reviews Active at End of Reporting Period	6

### Investigations Statistics

The following table summarizes the workload and accomplishments of the Investigations Division during the 6-month period ending September 30, 2024:

Source of Allegations <sup>10</sup>	
Hotline (Telephone, Mail, and Email)	3,415
Other Sources	5,664
Total Allegations Received	9,079

<sup>10</sup> These figures represent allegations entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. They do not include the approximate 7,725 additional hotline, email, and phone contacts that were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and/or outside the purview of the federal government.

Investigative Caseload	
Investigations Opened This Period	129
Investigations Declined for Prosecution	79
Investigations Closed and Reports of Investigation Issued This Period <sup>11</sup>	116
Investigations in Progress as of September 30, 2024	549
Prosecutive Actions	
Criminal Indictments/Informations <sup>12</sup>	39
Arrests	42
Convictions/Pleas	31
Prosecutions Referred to DOJ <sup>13</sup>	163
Prosecutions Referred to State and Local Prosecutors <sup>14</sup>	18
Administrative Actions	
Terminations	18
Resignations	25
Disciplinary Action	19
Monetary Results	
Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries/Assessments/Forfeitures	\$26,526,575.45
Civil Fines/Restitutions/Recoveries/Penalties/Damages/Forfeitures	0
Non-judicial Restitutions/Recoveries/Forfeitures/Revocations/Seizures	\$433,100.02

<sup>11</sup> At the conclusion of an investigation, one or more types of report are prepared. The prepared report may be an abbreviated report of investigation or a full report of investigation. In addition, an investigative summary for public posting on the OIG website may be prepared for an investigation involving a senior government employee. The number of reports issued represents one report for each investigation.

<sup>12</sup> The number of indictments reported include both sealed and not sealed.

<sup>13</sup> This number includes all criminal and civil referrals to DOJ for a prosecutorial decision, whether they were ultimately accepted or declined with the caveat that, if an investigation was referred to more than one DOJ office for a prosecutorial decision, the referral to DOJ was counted only once. The number reported as referred represents referrals for both individuals and or other legal entities.

<sup>14</sup> The number reported as referred represents referrals for both individuals and/or other legal entities.

## Investigations Division Briefing Programs

OIG investigators conducted 212 Integrity Awareness Briefings for Department employees and other stakeholders throughout the country. These briefings are designed to educate employees and other stakeholders about the misuse of a public official's position for personal gain and to deter employees from committing such offenses. The briefings reached more than 3,305 employees.

## OIG Hotline


During FY 2024, the OIG received most of its [hotline](#) complaints through its electronic complaint form.

In addition, DOJ employees and citizens can file complaints by telephone, fax, email, and postal mail. The online access, email, fax, and postal mail all provide the ability to file a complaint in writing to the OIG.

From all hotline sources during the second half of FY 2024, 3,415 new complaints related to DOJ operations or other federal agencies were entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system. Of the new complaints, 2,879 were forwarded to various DOJ components for their review and appropriate action; 184 were filed for information; 87 were forwarded to other federal agencies; and 6 were opened by the OIG for investigation.

Approximately 7,725 additional hotline, email, and phone contacts were processed and deemed non-jurisdictional and outside the purview of the federal government and therefore were not entered into the OIG's complaint tracking system.

**Complaint Sources**  
**April 1, 2024-September 30, 2024**



**Source:** Investigations Data Management System

# APPENDICES

## 1 | Acronyms and Abbreviations

<b>ASAC</b>	Assistant Special Agent in Charge
<b>ATF</b>	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
<b>ATR</b>	Antitrust Division
<b>AUSA</b>	Assistant United States Attorney
<b>BOP</b>	Federal Bureau of Prisons
<b>CO</b>	Correctional Officer
<b>COO</b>	Chief Operating Officer
<b>COVID-19</b>	Coronavirus Disease 2019
<b>CVF</b>	Crime Victims Fund
<b>DEA</b>	Drug Enforcement Administration
<b>DOJ or Department</b>	U.S. Department of Justice
<b>FBI</b>	Federal Bureau of Investigation
<b>FCCC</b>	Family Crisis and Counseling Center
<b>FCI</b>	Federal Correctional Institution
<b>FY</b>	Fiscal Year
<b>HIDS</b>	Home Intrusion Detection System
<b>IA</b>	Investigative Analyst
<b>IG Act</b>	Inspector General Act of 1978
<b>MAM</b>	Management Advisory Memorandum
<b>ODAG</b>	Office of the Deputy Attorney General
<b>OIG</b>	Office of the Inspector General
<b>OJP</b>	Office of Justice Programs
<b>OMB</b>	Office of Management and Budget

<b>OVW</b>	Office on Violence Against Women
<b>PPP</b>	Paycheck Protection Program
<b>PRAC</b>	Pandemic Response Accountability Committee
<b>SA</b>	Special Agent
<b>USAO</b>	United States Attorney's Office
<b>USMS</b>	U.S. Marshals Service
<b>VOCA</b>	Victims of Crime Act of 1984



## 2 | Glossary of Terms

The following are definitions of specific terms as they are used in this report:

**Administrative Actions:** Term that encompasses actions taken against an employee, contractor, or grant recipient, including disciplinary action, termination, debarment, and loss of funding, and can also include an employee's or contractor's resignation or retirement.

**Cooperative Agreement:** Term used to describe when the awarding agency expects to be substantially involved with the award's activities, often used interchangeably with "grant."

**Contraband:** 28 C.F.R. § 500.1(h) defines contraband as "material prohibited by law, regulation, or policy that can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the safety, security, or good order of the facility or protection of the public." Contraband includes weapons, explosives, drugs, intoxicants, currency, cameras, recording equipment, telephones, radios, pagers, electronic devices, and any other objects that violate criminal laws or are prohibited by federal regulations or BOP policies.

**Disallowed Cost:** The IG Act defines "disallowed cost" as a "questioned cost that management, in a management decision, has sustained or agreed should not be charged to the Government."

**Equitable Sharing Program:** This program allows state or local law enforcement agencies that directly participate in an investigation or prosecution resulting in a federal forfeiture to claim a portion of federally forfeited cash, property, and proceeds.

**Funds Recommended to Be Put to Better Use:** Recommendation by the OIG that funds could be used more efficiently if management of an entity took actions to start and complete the recommendation, including: (1) reductions in outlays; (2) deobligation of funds from programs or operations; (3) withdrawal of interest subsidy costs on loans or loan guarantees, insurance, or bonds; (4) costs not incurred by implementing recommended improvements related to the operations of the entity, a contractor, or grantee; (5) avoidance of unnecessary expenditures noted in pre-award reviews of contract or grant agreements; or (6) any other savings that specifically are identified.

**Management Decision:** The IG Act defines "management decision" as the "evaluation by the management of an establishment of the findings and recommendations included in an audit report and the issuance of a final decision by management concerning its response to such findings and recommendations, including actions concluded to be necessary."

**Questioned Cost:** A cost that is questioned by the OIG because of: (1) an alleged violation of a provision of a law, regulation, contract, grant, cooperative agreement, or other agreement or document governing the expenditure of funds; (2) a finding that, at the time of the audit, such cost is not supported by adequate documentation; or (3) a finding that the expenditure of funds for the intended purpose is unnecessary or unreasonable.

**Supervised Release:** Court-monitored supervision upon release from incarceration.

**Unsupported Cost:** A cost that is questioned by the OIG because the OIG found that, at the time of the audit, the cost was not supported by adequate documentation.

## 3 | Peer Reviews

### Peer Reviews Conducted by Another OIG

#### Audit Division

The most recent peer review of the Audit Division was performed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security OIG in September 2021. There are no outstanding recommendations.

#### Evaluation and Inspections Division

A peer review of the Evaluation and Inspections Division was performed by a team from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation OIG. In the report issued on September 24, 2024, the team determined that the Evaluation and Inspections Division generally met all seven of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (2020) and generally complied with its own internal policies and procedures.

#### Investigations Division

The most recent peer review of the Investigations Division was conducted by the U.S. Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration in March 2021. There are no outstanding recommendations.

### Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG

#### Audit Division

The Audit Division conducted a peer review of the U.S. Postal Service OIG. There are no outstanding recommendations.

#### Evaluation and Inspections Division

The Evaluation and Inspections Division did not conduct any peer reviews during this reporting period.

#### Investigations Division

The Investigations Division did not conduct any peer reviews during this reporting period.

## 4 | Reporting Requirements

The IG Act specifies reporting requirements for semiannual reports. The requirements are listed below and indexed to the applicable pages:

IG Act References	Reporting Requirements	Page
5 U.S.C. § 404(a)(2)	Review of Legislation and Regulations	47
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1)	Description of Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies and Recommendations for Corrective Actions	12–44
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2)	Identification of Recommendations for Which Corrective Actions Have Not Been Completed	49–50
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(3)	Significant Investigations Closed	12–43
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(4)	Total Number of Convictions Resulting From Investigations	3, 52
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(5)	Listing of Audit, Inspection, and Evaluation Reports	12–44
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(6)	Information Regarding Management Decisions Made During the Reporting Period with Respect to Audits, Inspections, or Evaluations Issued During a Previous Reporting Period	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(7)	Information Described in Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 Section 804(b)	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(8)	Peer Reviews Conducted by Another OIG	58
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(9)	Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews of the OIG	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(10)	Outstanding Recommendations from Peer Reviews Conducted by the OIG	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(11)	Statistical Table Pertaining to OIG Investigations	51–52
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(12)	Description of Metrics for OIG Investigative Table	51–52
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(13)	Reports Involving Substantiated Allegations Against Senior Government Employees or Senior Officials	7, 8, 22, 32, 43
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(14)	Instance of Whistleblower Retaliation	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(15)	Attempts to Interfere with OIG Independence and Summary of Reports of Refusal to Provide Information or Assistance	Nothing to Report
5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(16)	Inspections, Evaluations, Audits, and Investigations of Senior Government Employees Undisclosed to the Public	Nothing to Report <sup>15</sup>

<sup>15</sup> This information is provided pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(16)(B). The OIG does not have any information to report pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 405(b)(16)(A) for this reporting period.

# Report Waste, Fraud, Abuse, Misconduct, or Whistleblower Retaliation

To report allegations of waste, fraud, abuse, misconduct, or whistleblower retaliation regarding DOJ programs, employees, contractors, or grants, please go to the [OIG Hotline](#) to submit a complaint.

The OIG website has complaint forms that allow you to report the following to the OIG:

- COVID-19 related issues, including suspected waste, fraud, abuse, misconduct, or whistleblower retaliation relating to a DOJ employee, program, contract, or grant;
- allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or misconduct in DOJ contracts, subcontracts, and grants;
- allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, or misconduct in DOJ programs or by DOJ employees;
- violations of civil rights or civil liberties by DOJ employees; and
- whistleblower retaliation against DOJ employees or employees of DOJ grantees, subgrantees, contractors, or subcontractors.

To give information by mail or fax, please send to:

U.S. Department of Justice  
Office of the Inspector General  
Investigations Division  
ATTN: OIG Hotline  
950 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.  
Washington, D.C., 20530  
Fax: (202) 616-9881

For further information on how to report a complaint to the OIG, please call (800) 869-4499.

