


CUI

# INSPECTOR GENERAL

*U.S. Department of Defense*

JULY 31, 2023



## (U) Evaluation of Controls over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command

Controlled by: DoD OIG  
Controlled by: Evaluations  
CUI Category: ~~PRIVILEGE; OPSEC~~  
LDC: None  
POC: SIEO PM, [REDACTED]

INTEGRITY ★ INDEPENDENCE ★ EXCELLENCE

CUI





# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Evaluation of Controls over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command*

July 31, 2023

### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the Service intelligence centers and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) trained and operationalized Intelligence Community Directive 203 (ICD 203).<sup>1</sup> In addition, we determined whether ICD 203 processes changed because of the coronavirus disease–2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Our scope included the Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), the Navy’s Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and USCYBERCOM. We did not evaluate the Air Force’s Service intelligence center.

### (U) Background

(U) The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) establishes analytic tradecraft standards across the Intelligence Community. ICD 203 is an ODNI directive that establishes standards for the Intelligence Community that govern the production and evaluation of finished all-source intelligence products and standards for excellence and integrity in those products.

### (U) Findings

(U) NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM each had programs to operationalize ICD 203; however, each of the commands modified portions of their analytic standards and tradecraft programs because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

<sup>1</sup> (U) ICD 203, “Analytic Standards,” January 2, 2015.

### (U) Findings (cont’d)

(U) NGIC, MCIA, and ONI personnel conducted tradecraft evaluation boards as required by ICD 203. Although USCYBERCOM is not required to conduct tradecraft evaluation boards, and did so voluntarily, USCYBERCOM personnel had not conducted a tradecraft evaluation board since March 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. USCYBERCOM officials told us that COVID-19 protocols required reduced staffing and operational adjustments.

(U) There was no formal DoD requirement for combatant commands such as USCYBERCOM to conduct tradecraft evaluation boards; however, USCYBERCOM planned to reestablish a tradecraft evaluation board in FY 2023. As a result, USCYBERCOM did not have an internal program of review and evaluation of analytic intelligence products that sought to improve materials and programs for education and training.

(U) In addition, during the COVID-19 pandemic, newly hired analysts and military analysts at NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM were not trained on ICD 203 analytic tradecraft standards, for a variety of reasons.

(U) As a result of the lack of initial ICD 203 training for new analysts, some all-source intelligence analysts may be unfamiliar with analytic tradecraft standards. As stated by the respondents to a Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council survey, gaps in analytic tradecraft training were the top analytic tradecraft challenge, and created the potential for inconsistent application of analytic tradecraft standards. This increases the risk of inconsistent approaches to objectivity, bias, politicization, or other challenges in analytic products across the DoD.

### (U) Recommendations

(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]), through the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, provide



# (U) Results in Brief

## *(U) Evaluation of Controls over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command*

### **(U) Recommendations (cont'd)**

(U) guidance for the combatant commands and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise on the requirement for a tradecraft evaluation program.

(U) We recommend that the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Director, through the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, conduct an assistance visit to USCYBERCOM to provide mentorship, advice, training, and best practices as USCYBERCOM seeks to restart its tradecraft evaluation program.

(U) Additionally, we recommend that the USD(I&S) issue policy guidance to ensure that the Service intelligence centers and combatant command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers provide ICD 203 training to their respective command's senior analysts and staff members responsible for analytical and editorial review of junior analysts' production items.

(U) Also, we observed that current ICD 203 training initiatives may not be currently sufficiently resourced, and would benefit from resourcing review in order to ensure their success.

### **(U) Management Comments and Our Response**

(U) OUSD(I&S) and DIA officials agreed with the recommendations and plan to take actions that will fully address the recommendations. Therefore, the recommendations are resolved, but will remain open until we verify that the actions were taken. The Deputy USD(I&S), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed and stated that the OUSD(I&S) is consolidating eight DoD instructions on defense intelligence and security training into a single instruction with an estimated publication date in early FY 2024. The Deputy USD(I&S) anticipated that this instruction would state that the DIA, as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, would be responsible for training the Defense Intelligence Enterprise all-source analytic workforce.

(U) Please see the Recommendations Table on the next page for the status of recommendations.

**(U) Recommendations Table**

| (U) Management   | Recommendations Unresolved | Recommendations Resolved | Recommendations Closed |
|--|----------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------|
| Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security | None                       | 1, 3                     | None                   |
| Director, Defense Intelligence Agency                    | None                       | 2                        | None (U)               |

(U) Please provide Management Comments by September 1, 2023

**(U) Note:** The following categories are used to describe agency management’s comments to individual recommendations.

- **(U) Unresolved** – Management has not agreed to implement the recommendation or has not proposed actions that will address the recommendation.
- **(U) Resolved** – Management agreed to implement the recommendation or has proposed actions that will address the underlying finding that generated the recommendation.
- **(U) Closed** – DoD OIG verified that the agreed upon corrective actions were implemented.





**OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL**  
**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
 4800 MARK CENTER DRIVE  
 ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22350-1500

July 31, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE  
 AND SECURITY  
 DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

**SUBJECT:** (U) Evaluation of Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards  
 by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command  
 (Report No. DODIG-2023-XXX)

(U) This final report provides the results of the DoD Office of Inspector General's evaluation. We previously provided copies of the draft report and requested written comments on the recommendations. We considered the OUSD(I&S), DIA, and ONI management's formal comments on the draft report when preparing the final report. These comments are included in the report.

(U) The Deputy USD(I&S), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S) agreed to address Recommendations 1 and 3; therefore, we consider Recommendations 1 and 3 resolved and open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, we will close the recommendations when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendations are completed.

(U) The Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, responding on behalf of the DIA Director, agreed to address Recommendation 2; therefore, we consider the recommendation resolved and open. As described in the Recommendations, Management Comments, and Our Response section of this report, we will close the recommendation when you provide us documentation showing that all agreed-upon actions to implement the recommendation are completed.

(U) Therefore, within 90 days please provide us your response concerning specific actions in process or completed on the recommendations. Send your response to either [REDACTED] if classified SECRET.

(U) We appreciate the cooperation and assistance received during the evaluation. If you have any questions, please contact [REDACTED]

FOR THE INSPECTOR GENERAL:

Randolph R. Stone  
 Assistant Inspector General for Evaluations  
 Space, Intelligence, Engineering and Oversight

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## (U) Introduction

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### (U) Objective

(U) The objective of this evaluation was to determine the extent to which the Service intelligence centers and U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) trained and operationalized Intelligence Community Directive 203 (ICD 203).<sup>2</sup> Specifically, we examined how the Army's National Ground Intelligence Center (NGIC), the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), the Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), and USCYBERCOM:

- (U) trained their personnel on ICD 203;
- (U) reinforced the importance of protecting analytic integrity and objectivity with intelligence analysts in accordance with ICD 203;
- (U) promoted the role of the analytic ombudsman to intelligence analysts through training and awareness;
- (U) conducted tradecraft evaluation boards in accordance with ICD 203; and
- (U) ensured understanding of analytic tradecraft standards, including refresher training for managers and analysts and executive-level training.

(U) In addition, we determined whether the aforementioned ICD 203 processes changed because of the coronavirus disease-2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.

### (U) Background

(U) The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 established the Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and required it to establish analytic tradecraft standards across the Intelligence Community (IC).<sup>3</sup> The ODNI established analytical standards in ICD 203, which governs the production and evaluation of finished all-source intelligence products and “articulates the responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices.”

(U) ICD 203 establishes the IC's core principles for intelligence analysis and defines a set of tradecraft standards for intelligence production. The ICD 203 analytic standards and tradecraft standards are listed in Appendix B.

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<sup>2</sup> (U) ICD 203, “Analytic Standards,” January 2, 2015, as amended December 21, 2022. We selected commands located in Virginia and Maryland. We did not evaluate the Air Force Service intelligence center, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, which is located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio.

<sup>3</sup> (U) Public Law 108-458, “Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004,” sections 102 and 103, December 17, 2004.

(U) ICD 203 also requires the heads of the IC elements to:

- (U) ensure that analytic intelligence products produced and disseminated by their element properly apply the IC analytic standards;
- (U) designate an individual or office responsible for responding to concerns raised by the element’s analysts about adherence to analytic standards (including tradecraft standards) in analytic products;
- (U) conduct internal programs of review and evaluation of finished all-source intelligence products using the IC analytic standards as the core criteria, and provide annual status reporting to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration; and
- (U) ensure that the element’s education and training programs properly address the IC analytic standards.

(U) The IC elements include Army Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, and Navy Intelligence. The Service intelligence centers make up the largest all-source analytic components for each of the Services, but do not encompass the totality of each Service’s intelligence capability. Unlike the Services, USCYBERCOM and the other combatant commands are not members of the IC. However, DoD Instruction (DoDI) 3115.17 and Joint Publication (JP) 2-0 state that all-source intelligence analysis should comply with ICD 203, thereby extending the analytic standards and analytic tradecraft standards to the combatant commands.<sup>4</sup> Additionally, the USD(I&S) required that defense intelligence components adopt other portions of ICD 203, specifically the analytic ombudsman, as discussed below.

***(U) DoD Requirement That Defense Intelligence Components Have an Analytic Ombudsmen***

(~~CUI~~) ICD 203 defines the role of the ODNI analytic ombudsman, who “addresses concerns regarding lack of objectivity, bias, politicization, or other issues in standards application in analytic products.” [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

<sup>4</sup> (U) DoD Instruction 3115.17, “Management and Oversight of DoD All-Source Analysis,” November 16, 2016 (Incorporating Change 1, Effective September 21, 2020); and Joint Publication 2-0, “Joint Intelligence,” May 26, 2022. The Analytic Standards and Analytic Tradecraft Standards are listed in Appendix B.

<sup>5</sup> (U) The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2020 (Public Law 116–92), December 20, 2019, re-designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence as the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (USD[I&S]), which we use throughout this report for consistency.

### ***(U) ICD 203 Requirement That IC Components Have Tradecraft and Product Evaluation Boards***

(U) ICD 203 requires each IC element, which includes the Service intelligence centers, to maintain a program that evaluates intelligence products using the IC analytic standards as the criteria. The intent of the Tradecraft and Product Evaluation Board is for the IC elements to use the results of product evaluations to improve education and training in analytic knowledge, skills, abilities, and tradecraft.

(U) As discussed above, unlike the Services, USCYBERCOM and the other combatant commands are not members of the IC. Although USCYBERCOM conducted tradecraft evaluation boards in the past, there is no formal DoD requirement for USCYBERCOM to conduct tradecraft evaluation boards. DoDI 3115.17 and JP 2-0 state that all-source intelligence analysis should comply with ICD 203, thereby extending the analytic standards and analytic tradecraft standards to the combatant commands. However, there is no guidance from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD[I&S]) on tradecraft evaluation boards for the combatant commands. The DIA provided written guidance for evaluating tradecraft standards in October 2019, and during our evaluation, the DIA was drafting a memorandum on evaluating analytic tradecraft, which was issued in January 2023. The DIA's tradecraft notes are mandatory for DIA analysts but optional for other commands, including the combatant commands.

### ***(U) ICD 203 Requirement That IC Components Have Intelligence Training***

(U) ICD 203 requires each IC element to ensure that its education and training programs properly address the IC analytic standards. DoD Components are responsible for planning, programming, and budgeting for their intelligence training, using OUSD(I&S) and DIA guidance.

(U) DoDI 3305.02 is the current DoD policy for general intelligence training and certification, which includes all-source analysis and other major non-source-specific intelligence. DoDI 3305.02 states that the DIA Director establishes and maintains general intelligence training standards and certifications in coordination with the DoD Components.<sup>6</sup> An FY 2019 DoD OIG report made a recommendation to the USD(I&S) to issue training and certification policy for all-source intelligence analysts.<sup>7</sup> Specifically, the 2019 DoD OIG report recommended that the USD(I&S)

<sup>6</sup> (U) DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training and Certification," August 12, 2015, (Incorporating Change 2, Effective September 28, 2020).

<sup>7</sup> (U) DoD OIG Report No. DODIG-2019-032, "Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communications Processes," December 4, 2018.

(U) examine DoD intelligence training and education policies and mandate a common body of knowledge, including ICD 203, for entry-level intelligence professionals. In response to the recommendation in the report, the OUSD(I&S)'s Director for Geographic Combatant Command Intelligence Support encouraged the combatant commands to continue to assign entry-level and mid-grade military personnel in analyst billets to the DIA's Professional Analyst Career Education (PACE) Essentials Course.<sup>8</sup> The OUSD(I&S) response to the report stated that the OUSD(I&S) was drafting a DoD manual that would establish an All-Source Analysis Certification Program Governance Council and Certification Program. The draft DoD manual would also direct the combatant commands to incorporate the all-source analysis certification into the coding criteria of billets and submit requirements to the Joint Staff for the military all-source analysis certification program. However, subsequent to the 2019 DoD OIG report, and during our evaluation, the OUSD(I&S) was in the process of consolidating all DoD instructions and manuals relating to intelligence training and certification into one instruction and one manual, each of which would include a section on all-source intelligence analysis. According to OUSD(I&S) officials, that instruction and manual were still in draft form.

### ***(U) FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act Requirement for Annual ICD 203 Training for the IC Components***

(U) The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act requires the ODNI to require IC elements, which include the Service intelligence centers as part of the Services' overall intelligence capabilities, to create an annual training program on ICD 203 standards.<sup>9</sup> The law requires the heads of analysis at the IC elements to submit to the congressional intelligence committees a certification as to whether all of the analysts of that element have completed the training required and, if not, an explanation of why the training has not been completed. The law also requires the heads of analysis at the IC elements to report to Congress how compliance with ICD 203 is considered in performance evaluations, merit pay, bonuses, promotion, and any other personnel actions.

### ***(U) Roles and Responsibilities of DoD Components for Analytic Standards***

(U) The USD(I&S), the DIA, the Service intelligence centers, and the combatant commands each have specific roles and responsibilities for implementing analytic standards.

<sup>8</sup> (U) PACE Essentials is a 10-day course for members of the DIA's Analysis Career Field and DIA personnel assigned to Analysis Career Field billets.

<sup>9</sup> (U) Public Law 117-263, "James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023," section 6312, "Annual Training Requirement and Report Regarding Analytic Standards," December 23, 2022.

### ***(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security***

(U) The USD(I&S) is the Principal Staff Assistant and adviser on intelligence to the Secretary of Defense and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The USD(I&S) ensures that defense intelligence analysis is aligned with IC and DoD analytical concepts, methodologies, and tradecraft efforts. For human capital and manpower management, the USD(I&S) develops policy and provides oversight of training, including joint intelligence training, certification, education, and professional development of personnel in defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and security components. The USD(I&S) also ensures integration of defense intelligence standards into other training within the DoD and the IC, as appropriate.

### ***(U) Defense Intelligence Agency***

(U) The DIA is an intelligence combat support agency that provides support for operating forces planning for, or conducting, military operations, including support during conflict or in the conduct of other military activities related to countering threats to U.S. national security. The DIA Director provides personnel and resources to support combatant command intelligence directorates and Joint Intelligence Operations Centers. Additionally, the DIA Director serves as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager–Analysis or designates another senior DoD official to serve in that role. The DIA Director designated the head of the DIA’s Directorate for Analysis as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager–Analysis.<sup>10</sup>

(U) The DIA, through its Joint Military Intelligence Training Center, offers the PACE courses, which are required for DIA analysts. The PACE Essentials Course is one of those courses. The DIA’s Analyst Career Field manager has designated PACE as the core analytic training program for its analysis career field.

(U) The DIA’s course catalogue states that PACE Essentials orients analysts to core analytic tradecraft concepts and processes and gives analysts the opportunity to practice essential analytic skills. The course is a simulated on-the-job experience, reinforcing analysts’ understanding of key concepts and their ability to apply the knowledge and skills associated with competencies for all-source analysts. The course catalogue states that upon completion of PACE Essentials, analysts should be able to construct a solid argument for an analytic conclusion that answers a defense intelligence question. All-source analysts should be able to incorporate the ODNI Analytic Tradecraft Standards into a presentation that communicates this finding effectively through both oral and written means to a specific defense intelligence client.

<sup>10</sup> (U) In December 2021, the USD(I&S) directed the usage of the title Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager–Analysis to replace the title DoD Functional Manager for All-Source Analysis. We use the term Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager–Analysis throughout this report for consistency.

**(CUI)** [Redacted]

**(CUI)** [Redacted]

(U) The Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council assists the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager–Analysis and the Board of Governors in directing the defense intelligence all-source analytic effort. The Council recommends actions, initiatives, or programs related to analytic quality, standards, tradecraft, and professional development.

***(U) Service Intelligence Center and Combatant Command Responsibilities for Analytic Standards***

(U) Members of the IC include Army Intelligence, Marine Corps Intelligence, and Navy Intelligence. The Service intelligence centers represent each branch of Service: NGIC (Army), the MCIA (Marine Corps), the ONI (Navy), and National Air and Space Intelligence Center (Air Force and Space Force), and make up the largest all-source analytic components for each of the Services, but are not the totality of each Service’s intelligence capability. Service intelligence centers serve two primary roles: direct intelligence support to their Service and production of foundational intelligence on foreign military service capabilities and operational art. The combatant command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) provide intelligence production and support for their respective commands and components.

***(U) National Ground Intelligence Center***

(U) NGIC is the Army’s Service intelligence center and is headquartered in Charlottesville, Virginia. The NGIC commander is an Army colonel.

### ***(U) Marine Corps Intelligence Activity***

(U) The MCIA is the Marine Corps' Service intelligence center and is headquartered at Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. The MCIA commander is a Marine Corps colonel.

### ***(U) Office of Naval Intelligence***

(U) The ONI is the Navy's Service intelligence center and is headquartered in Suitland, Maryland. The ONI is co-located with its five centers of excellence. Each center is a distinct command. The ONI commander is a Navy rear admiral. The five centers of excellence are each commanded by Navy captains.

### ***(U) U.S. Cyber Command***

(U) USCYBERCOM is a unified combatant command and is headquartered at Fort Meade, Maryland. Its mission is to direct, synchronize, and coordinate cyberspace planning and operations to defend and advance national interests in collaboration with domestic and international partners. USCYBERCOM defends the DoD information systems, supports joint force commanders with cyberspace operations, and defends the Nation from significant cyberattacks. The USCYBERCOM Commander is an Army general and the Director of Intelligence is an Air Force brigadier general.

## (U) Finding

### (U) The Service Intelligence Centers and USCYBERCOM Had Programs to Operationalize Analytic Standards, but Faced Tradecraft Evaluation and Training Challenges

(U) NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM each had programs to operationalize ICD 203, but each of the commands modified portions of their analytic standards and tradecraft programs during the COVID-19 pandemic.

- (U) NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM promoted the role of the analytic ombudsman through training and awareness in accordance with ICD 203. The analytic ombudsman at each organization served in the role as a collateral duty.
- (U) NGIC, MCIA, and ONI personnel conducted tradecraft evaluation boards.

(U) However, we determined that USCYBERCOM had not conducted a tradecraft evaluation board to improve materials and programs for education and training in analytic knowledge, skills, abilities, and tradecraft since March 2020. USCYBERCOM officials told us that this occurred because of COVID-19 protocols that required reduced staffing and operational adjustments. In addition, there is no formal DoD requirement for combatant commands to conduct tradecraft evaluation boards.<sup>11</sup> The USCYBERCOM Analysis and Production Group Chief told us that USCYBERCOM planned to reestablish a tradecraft evaluation board at USCYBERCOM in FY 2023. As a result, from March 2020 through March 2023, USCYBERCOM did not have an internal program of review and evaluation of its finished all-source analysis products in order to improve materials and programs for education and training.

(U) Furthermore, during the COVID-19 pandemic, newly hired civilian and military analysts at NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and military all-source analysts at USCYBERCOM were not trained on ICD 203 analytic tradecraft standards, for a variety of reasons.

- (U) NGIC, the MCIA, and the ONI stopped or reduced all-source intelligence analyst training programs because of COVID-19 pandemic protocols.

<sup>11</sup> (U) DoDI 3115.17 and JP 2-0 state that all-source intelligence analysis should be consistent with ICD 203 analytic standards and analytic tradecraft standards, thereby extending the analytic standards and analytic tradecraft standards to the combatant commands. The analytic standards and analytic tradecraft standards are listed in Appendix B. Additionally, the USD(I&S) mandated that defense intelligence components adopt other portions of ICD 203, such as the analytic ombudsman, however, there is no specific DoD policy for tradecraft evaluation boards.

- (U) The OUSD(I&S) did not have requirements for all-source analyst training and certification.
- (U) Initial intelligence analyst training for Service members did not focus on strategic-level intelligence analysis or ICD 203 standards.
- (U) The Service intelligence centers had limited space in their internally developed all-source intelligence analyst training programs.
- (U) The Service intelligence centers had limited access to DIA training programs, because the DIA focused its all-source analyst training on DIA civilian employees and did not have the capacity to expand its own all-source analysis training to the larger Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise.

(U) As a result of the lack of initial ICD 203 training for new analysts reporting to the intelligence commands, some all-source intelligence analysts may be unfamiliar with analytic tradecraft and standards. As stated by the respondents to a Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council survey, gaps in analytic tradecraft training were the top analytic tradecraft challenge and created the potential for inconsistent application of analytic tradecraft standards. This increases the risk of inconsistent approaches to objectivity, bias, politicization, or other challenges in analytic products across the DoD.

### **(U) The Service Intelligence Centers and USCYBERCOM Had Programs to Operationalize Analytic Standards, but Encountered Tradecraft Evaluation and Training Challenges**

(U) NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM each had programs to operationalize ICD 203, and each of the commands modified portions of their analytic standards and tradecraft programs to apply ICD 203 analytic standards. NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM all promoted the role of the analytic ombudsman through training and awareness in accordance with ICD 203. In addition, NGIC, MCIA, and ONI personnel conducted tradecraft evaluation boards.

### ***(U) Analytic Ombudsman Activities Continued Through the COVID-19 Pandemic***

(U) NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM each promoted the analytic ombudsman role through training and awareness in accordance with ICD 203. The position of analytic ombudsman was established at NGIC in 2016, the MCIA in 2018, the ONI in 2015, and USCYBERCOM in 2021. The incumbents at the three Service intelligence centers and USCYBERCOM served in the role as a collateral duty.

(U) ICD 203 requires the heads of the IC elements to designate an individual or office responsible for responding to concerns raised by the element’s analysts about adherence to analytic standards, including analytic tradecraft standards, in analytic intelligence products. We observed that NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM had homepages on their command intranet with the analytic ombudsman’s contact information, the roles of the analytic ombudsman, links to analytic tradecraft and guidance, and other policies and procedures related to the implementation of ICD 203.

**(U) Service Intelligence Center Tradecraft Evaluation Boards Continued in a Reduced Role**

(U) NGIC, the MCIA, and the ONI each held tradecraft evaluation boards that continued at a reduced level through the COVID-19 pandemic. As discussed, ICD 203 requires the heads of the IC elements to conduct internal programs of review and evaluation of analytic intelligence products using the IC Analytic Standards as the core criteria, and provide annual status reporting to the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Intelligence Integration. These tradecraft evaluation boards vary in size and scope, depending on the organizational size and available personnel. As stated by the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council, at each of these commands, the COVID-19 pandemic degraded the capacity to conduct evaluations, prompting modified processes.

(U) Table 1 summarizes FY 2020 and FY 2021 product reviews at NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM.

(U) Table 1. FY 2020 and FY 2021 Product Reviews

| (CUI)      |            |            |
|------------|------------|------------|
| [Redacted] | [Redacted] | [Redacted] |

**(U) Legend**

- (U) NGIC                    National Ground Intelligence Center
- (U) MCIA                   Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
- (U) ONI                    Office of Naval Intelligence
- (U) USCYBERCOM       U.S. Cyber Command

(U) Source: Annual reports to the ODNI. There is not a required minimum number or percentage for product reviews.

***(U) NGIC Tradecraft Evaluation Board Process***

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

***(U) MCIA Tradecraft Evaluation Board Process***

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]  
[Redacted]

<sup>12</sup> (CUI) [Redacted]  
[Redacted]

***(U) ONI Tradecraft Evaluation Board Process***

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

***(U) USCYBERCOM Suspended Its Tradecraft Evaluation Board***

(U) We determined that USCYBERCOM had not conducted a tradecraft evaluation board to improve materials and programs for education and training in analytic knowledge, skills, abilities, and tradecraft since March 2020.<sup>15</sup> Specifically, multiple USCYBERCOM personnel told us that no tradecraft evaluation boards had occurred since March 2020, and USCYBERCOM did not provide any reports or documentation that tradecraft evaluations had occurred since that time. USCYBERCOM officials told us that tradecraft review boards did not occur because of COVID-19 protocols that required reduced staffing and operations adjustments to other USCYBERCOM priorities. In addition, personnel from the OUSD(I&S), the DIA, and USCYBERCOM told us that there is no formal DoD requirement for combatant commands to conduct tradecraft evaluation boards. The USCYBERCOM Analysis and Production Group Chief told us that USCYBERCOM will recruit and train personnel in order to reestablish a tradecraft evaluation board in FY 2023.

<sup>13</sup> (CUI) [Redacted]

<sup>14</sup> (CUI) [Redacted]

<sup>15</sup> (U) USCYBERCOM is not a member of the Intelligence Community.

***(U) All-Source Intelligence Training Challenges Are an Enduring Issue***

(U) We determined that during the COVID-19 pandemic, newly hired civilian and military analysts at NGIC, the MCIA, and the ONI, and military analysts at USCYBERCOM were not trained on ICD 203 analytic tradecraft standards, for a variety of reasons.

- (U) NGIC, the MCIA, and the ONI stopped or reduced in-person all-source intelligence analyst training programs because of COVID-19 pandemic protocols.
- (U) The OUSD(I&S) did not have requirements for all-source analyst training and certification.
- (U) Newly hired analysts and military analysts arriving at the intelligence centers were not provided in-person training on strategic-level intelligence analysis or ICD 203 standards.

***(U) NGIC Tailored Its Training to Comply with COVID-19 Protocols***

(~~CUI~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(~~CUI~~) [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

(U) Several NGIC personnel told us that many military personnel assigned to NGIC have tactical intelligence analyst experience but lack exposure to strategic intelligence and the training that DIA civilian analysts receive in DIA-provided PACE courses. Several NGIC supervisors told us that this was because most Army military all-source analysts are assigned to the Army corps echelon level or lower, where there is not a requirement to be trained on ICD 203.

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

***(U) The MCIA Lacked a Dedicated All-Source Intelligence Training Program***

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(CUI) [Redacted]

(U) In March and April 2022, the MCIA held a pilot course for its newly developed Analysis Essentials Course focused on civilian and Marine Corps analysts who had not completed IC-provided analytic training. However, the course after action

<sup>16</sup> (CUI) [Redacted]

(U) report concluded that the MCIA’s tradecraft team lacked “the organic resources to administer, sustain, and professionalize an analytic training program that fully meets the professional development needs of analysts” across the MCIA.

***(U) The ONI Suspended Its New Analyst Training Because of the COVID-19 Pandemic***

(~~CUI~~) [Redacted]

(U) Several ONI personnel told us that new naval intelligence personnel understand foundational military analysis, but are not taught ICD 203 tradecraft standards before reporting to the ONI. The ONI personnel additionally told us that the ONI does not normally have access to the DIA’s PACE courses. PACE training has a limited number of seats available, and the ONI is not allocated a certain number of seats.

***(U) USCYBERCOM Civilian All-Source Analysts Had Access to DIA Analytic Tradecraft Training Throughout the COVID-19 Pandemic***

(~~CUI~~) Civilian all-source analysts at USCYBERCOM are DIA employees, and DIA analyst career field personnel are required to complete the DIA’s PACE training. [Redacted]

<sup>17</sup> (~~CUI~~) [Redacted]

### ***(U) Several Proposed Initiatives Seek to Improve All-Source Analyst Training***

(U) The DIA and several Service intelligence centers were developing their own all-source intelligence analyst training solutions, but told us that they were constrained by their training budgets. The DIA proposed expanding its PACE Essentials training in a 5-year surge to include class seats for military members at the combatant commands and military and civilian employees of the Service intelligence centers. According to DIA training and policy personnel, this initiative was not intended to be a long-term solution, and relied on an assumption that the Services would increase their own future all-source analyst training programs. However, as of November 2022, the Service intelligence centers had not developed a plan to transition PACE-type training to the Service intelligence centers following the 5-year DIA PACE surge, if implemented.<sup>18</sup>

(CUI) [REDACTED]

### ***(U) The OUSD(I&S) Was Developing DoD Instructions for Intelligence Training and Certification***

(U) As of March 2023, the OUSD(I&S) did not require the Services to incorporate training in analytic tradecraft standards for Service intelligence analysts. The OUSD(I&S) is consolidating its intelligence training and intelligence certification instructions. We reviewed drafts of those instructions that stated the DIA should set aside a percentage of training seats for non-DIA employees, and that the DoD Component heads should “direct full implementation, integration, and utilization” of the intelligence certification programs.

<sup>18</sup> (U) The FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act requires the ODNI to require IC elements, which include the Service intelligence centers, to create an annual training program on ICD 203 standards.

### ***(U) Current Training Initiatives Were Focused On New All-Source Intelligence Analysts***

(U) As discussed above, we observed that training initiatives were focused on new all-source intelligence analysts. A separate January 2021 report, from the IC Analytic Ombudsman's review of politicization of intelligence, recommended that the IC increase training efforts on analytic objectivity and tradecraft standards for three customer categories: new analyst training, refresher training for managers and analysts, and executive-level training. The IC Analytic Ombudsman also recommended providing in-service training on analytic standards for senior analysts and managers of analysts. Based on our observations, we agree with those recommendations.

### **(U) Pandemic Restrictions, Policy Gaps, and Resource Constraints Limited How the Service Intelligence Centers and USCYBERCOM Applied Controls over Analytic Standards**

(U) NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM each had programs to operationalize ICD 203, and each of these commands modified portions of their analytic standards and tradecraft programs because of the COVID-19 pandemic to apply ICD 203 analytic standards. These modifications included reductions in new analyst training at each of the commands we reviewed; reductions in the frequency of tradecraft evaluation boards at NGIC, the MCIA, and the ONI; and suspension of the tradecraft evaluation board at USCYBERCOM.

(U) The combined effect of these modifications is that new analysts reporting to the intelligence commands did not receive initial ICD 203 training, resulting in a population of all-source intelligence analysts who may be unfamiliar with analytic tradecraft and standards. As stated by the respondents to a Defense Analytic Tradecraft Counsel survey, gaps in analytic tradecraft training were the top analytic tradecraft challenge, and created the potential for inconsistent application of analytic tradecraft standards. This increases the risk of inconsistent approaches to objectivity, bias, politicization, or other issues in analytic products across the DoD. Also, we observed that the current ICD 203 training initiatives may benefit from a review of resource considerations in order to ensure their success.

## **(U) Recommendations, Management Comments and Our Response**

### ***(U) Recommendation 1***

**(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security, through the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, provide guidance to the combatant commands and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise on the requirement for a tradecraft evaluation program in order to comply with Intelligence Community Directive 203, “Analytic Standards.”**

### ***(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments to the Draft Report***

(U) The Deputy USD(I&S), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed and stated that the OUSD(I&S) will ensure that updated instructions adequately address the DIA’s role as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, and are synchronized to support guidance on the requirement for an ICD 203 compliant tradecraft evaluation program across the defense intelligence all-source analysis enterprise.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) The planned actions satisfy the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open until the OUSD(I&S) provides documentation showing that they implemented the pending oversight actions.

### ***(U) Recommendation 2***

**(U) We recommend that the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, through the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, conduct an assistance visit to the U.S. Cyber Command to provide mentorship, advice, and best practices as it seeks to restart its tradecraft evaluation program.**

### ***(U) Defense Intelligence Agency Director Comments***

(U) The Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, responding on behalf of the DIA Director, agreed with the recommendation for assistance to USCYBERCOM as it works to restart its tradecraft evaluation program. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis stated that the DIA has begun consultations with USCYBERCOM and will continue partnering with USCYBERCOM on analytic tradecraft and product evaluation.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) Comments from the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis addressed the specifics of the recommendation; therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open. We will close the recommendation once USCYBERCOM provides documentation showing that it restarted its tradecraft evaluation program.

### ***(U) Recommendation 3***

**(U) We recommend that the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security issue policy guidance to ensure that the Service intelligence centers and combatant command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers provide ICD 203 training to their respective command's senior analysts and staff members responsible for analytical and editorial review of junior analysts' production items.**

### ***(U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security Comments***

(U) The Deputy USD(I&S), responding on behalf of the USD(I&S), agreed and stated that the OUSD(I&S) is consolidating eight DoD instructions on defense intelligence and security enterprise training into a single instruction with an estimated publication date in early FY 2024. The Deputy USD(I&S) anticipated that this instruction would designate the DIA, as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, responsible for training the Defense Intelligence Enterprise all-source analytic workforce. Additionally, the OUSD(I&S) will work with the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council and the Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise Board of Governors to determine the best approach to establish controls for analytic and editorial review of junior analysts' products. The OUSD(I&S) will also use these forums for oversight of DoD production of all-source analysis and tradecraft evaluation boards.

### ***(U) Our Response***

(U) The planned actions satisfy the intent of the recommendation. Therefore, the recommendation is resolved, but will remain open pending the published, updated training instruction. We updated the reference to DoDI 3305.02 and general intelligence training in this report based on the Deputy USD(I&S)'s comments. We will close the recommendation once we receive the published instruction.

***(U) Office of Naval Intelligence Comments***

(U) Although not required to comment, the Deputy Commander of the ONI stated that the ONI concurred with the report's findings, but noted that our recommendations tied to delivering additional policy or guidance offer no oversight for, or synchronization of, approaches to resourcing and delivering consistent training across the Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise. The Deputy Commander further concurred with the comment in this report that current ICD 203 training initiatives may need additional resourcing review.

## **(U) Appendix A**

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### **(U) Scope and Methodology**

(U) We conducted this evaluation from April 2022 through April 2023 in accordance with the “Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation,” published in December 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Those standards require that we adequately plan the evaluation to ensure that objectives are met and that we perform the evaluation to obtain sufficient, competent, and relevant evidence to support the findings, conclusions, and recommendations. We believe that the evidence obtained was sufficient, competent, and relevant to lead a reasonable person to sustain the findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

(U) We non-statistically selected commands that are located in Virginia and Maryland. We did not evaluate the Air Force’s Service intelligence center, the National Air and Space Intelligence Center, which is located at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. We interviewed officials from the OUSD(I&S), Army, Navy, Marine Corps, USCYBERCOM, and the DIA and requested information to determine whether and how NGIC, the MCIA, the ONI, and USCYBERCOM trained and operationalized ICD 203. We reviewed OUSD(I&S), DIA, and command policies and guidance; annual reports to the ODNI; and meeting notes and presentations from the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Council. We interviewed the analytic ombudsman and training personnel at each of the commands, and we reviewed classified budget estimates for proposed training programs.

(U) This report was reviewed by the DoD Components associated with this oversight project to identify whether any of their reported information, including legacy FOUO information, should be safeguarded and marked in accordance with the DoD CUI Program. In preparing and marking this report, we considered any comments submitted by the DoD Components about the CUI treatment of their information. If the DoD Components failed to provide any or sufficient comments about the CUI treatment of their information, we marked the report based on our assessment of the available information.

### **(U) Use of Computer-Processed Data**

(U) We did not use computer-processed data to perform this evaluation.

## **(U) Prior Coverage**

(U) During the last 5 years, the DoD Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG), the Intelligence Community Inspector General, the Defense Intelligence Agency Inspector General, and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General issued six reports discussing analytic tradecraft and standards.

(U) Unrestricted DoD OIG reports can be accessed at <http://www.dodig.mil/reports.html/>.

### **(U) DoD OIG**

(U) Report No. DODIG-2019-032, "Evaluation of Combatant Command Intelligence Directorate Internal Communication Processes," December 24, 2018

(U) This report focused on implementation of recommendations and best practices taken from DODIG-2017-049 and recommended expanding DIA-led ICD 203 training to military personnel assigned to the combatant commands, establishing analytic integrity policies, and advertising of the role of the analytic ombudsman.

(U) Report No. DODIG-2017-049, "Report of Investigation on Allegations Relating to USCENTCOM Intelligence Products," January 31, 2017

(U) The DoD OIG initiated this investigation to address allegations that senior intelligence officials at the U.S. Central Command had falsified, distorted, suppressed, or delayed intelligence products to present a more optimistic portrayal of the success of USCENTCOM's efforts to degrade and destroy the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. This report contained 29 recommendations, mostly focused on communication with analysts and analyst training at USCENTCOM.

### **(U) Intelligence Community Office of Inspector General**

(U) Report No. NS-2021-004, "Review of the Intelligence Community Analytic Ombudspersons' Complaint Processes," December 9, 2021

(U) This report made one recommendation to improve the IC Analytic Ombudsperson's structure and governance while increasing the effectiveness of the complaint process. The report recommended that the Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Mission Integration expand the IC Analytic Ombudsperson's roles and responsibilities to have authority over the IC community of practice. Under this framework, the IC Analytic Ombudsperson

(U) would have the authority to establish requirements for tracking and categorizing complaints. The IC Analytic Ombudsperson could also identify performance measures to assess program effectiveness on behalf of the community of practice. These measures would supersede ICD-203’s directive that the IC Analytic Ombudsperson informally lead but not directly govern the community of practice.

(U) In response to this IC IG report, the ODNI issued a technical amendment to ICD 203 on December 21, 2022, that designated the IC analytic ombuds as head of the IC analytic ombuds community of practice. Amendments to this Directive include designating the Office of the Director of National Intelligence Analytic Ombuds as the head of the Intelligence Community Analytic Ombuds Community of Practice and establishing the position as an independent entity reporting directly to the Deputy Director for Integration.

**(U) Defense Intelligence Agency Office of Inspector General**

(U) Report No. DIA IG 2022-2005, “Evaluation of Analytic Tradecraft Standards,” March 31, 2023

(~~CUI~~) [Redacted text block]

(U) Report No. DIA IG 2020-2004, “Evaluation of DIA’s Management of the DoD All-Source Analysis Professional Certification Program,” March 31, 2021

(U) This report evaluated the DIA’s management of the DoD All-Source Analysis Professional Certification Program. Recommendations included establishing strategic performance indicators for the certification program and developing a scalable resourcing strategy.

***(U) Department of Homeland Security Office of  
Inspector General***

(U) Report No. DHS OIG-22-41, "DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures," April 26, 2022

(U) This report assessed an instance of potential politicization of a specific DHS Intelligence and Analysis intelligence product regarding Russian interference in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election. The report found that DHS may have created a perception of politicization by failing to follow its standard process and analytic standards required by ICD 203.

## (U) Appendix B

### (U) ICD 203 Analytic Standards and Analytic Tradecraft Standards

| (U) ICD 203 Analytic Standards                             |  |
|--|--|
| Objective  | Analysts must perform their functions with objectivity and with awareness of their own assumptions and reasoning. They must employ reasoning techniques and practical mechanisms that reveal and mitigate bias. Analysts should be alert to influence by existing analytic positions or judgments and must consider alternative perspectives and contrary information. Analysis should not be unduly constrained by previous judgments when new developments indicate a modification is necessary. |
| Independent of political consideration                     | Analytic assessments must not be distorted by, nor shaped for, advocacy of a particular audience, agenda, or policy viewpoint. Analytic judgments must not be influenced by the force of preference for a particular policy.   |
| Timely   | Analysis must be disseminated in time for it to be actionable by customers. Analytic elements have the responsibility to be continually aware of events of intelligence interest, of customer activities and schedules, and of intelligence requirements and priorities, in order to provide useful analysis at the right time.  |
| Based on all available sources of intelligence information | Analysis should be informed by all relevant information available. All-source intelligence elements should identify and address critical information gaps and work with collection activities and data providers to develop access and collection strategies.  |
| ICD 203 Analytic Tradecraft Standards                      |  |
| Sourcing   | Properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources, data, and methodologies.   |
| Uncertainty  | Properly expresses and explains uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments.  |
| Distinctions   | Properly distinguishes between underlying intelligence information and analysts' assumptions and judgments.  |
| Alternatives   | Incorporates analysis of alternatives.   |
| Relevance  | Demonstrates customer relevance and addresses implications.  |
| Argumentation  | Uses clear and logical argumentation.  |
| Analytic line  | Explains change to or consistency of analytic judgments.   |
| Accuracy   | Expresses judgments as clearly and precisely as possible, reducing ambiguity by addressing the likelihood, timing, and nature of the outcome or development.   |
| Visualization  | Incorporates effective visual information.   |

(U)

(U) Source: ICD 203, "Analytic Standards," January 2, 2015.

## (U) Management Comments

### (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security

CUI

**DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**  
5000 DEFENSE PENTAGON  
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-5000



**INTELLIGENCE  
AND SECURITY**

JUL 10 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR OFFICE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUBJECT: Response to the draft DoD Inspector General Report, "Evaluation of Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command"

My office has reviewed the final draft DoDIG report, "Evaluation of Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command." We concur with recommendations A.1 and A.3. With regards to the draft itself, we have points of clarification that are contained in the attached Annex A. Annex A provides detailed updates of key documents still underway and actions that are being taken to address issues you identified in the proposed report. Annex A highlights are:

- DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training and Certification," is the current DoD policy that addresses training and certification programs for all-source analysis within the Department. Annex A clarifies a statement in your draft, page 4: "The DoD does not have a policy addressing education and training programs for all source analysis." The Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence and Security) (OUSDI&S) is consolidating eight current DoD Instructions on Defense Intelligence and Security enterprise training into one DoDI. The current draft of the new DoDI 3305.XX is ready for informal review. The estimated publication date is in early Fiscal Year 2024.
- DoDI 5105.21 Defense Intelligence Agency, and the December 2021 USD(I&S) Memorandum, indicate that DIA is assigned as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for all-source analysis (DIEM-A), and is responsible for training DoD's all source analytic workforce. The new DoDI 3305.XX draft maintains that DIA, as the DIEM-A, is responsible for training the DIE all-source analytic workforce.
- OUSDI&S is also consolidating five current DoD manuals regarding defense intelligence and security certification and credentialing. This additional effort DoDI 3305.XX DoD Intelligence and Security Certification and Credentialing Programs will supplement the new training focused instruction.

Additionally, DIA made an investment in the Fiscal Year 2024 President's Budget (PB24) request for the expansion of analytic tradecraft training to analysts at DIA, Service Intelligence Centers, and the CCMDs to enhance common training standards, including Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203.

Recommendation A.1. states, "OUSDI&S, through the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis, provide guidance to the combatant commands and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise on the requirement for a tradecraft evaluation program in order to comply with ICD 203."

Controlled by: OUSDI&S  
CUI Categories: PRIVILEGE-OPSEC  
Distribution/Dissemination Controls: None  
FOUO: ██████████

CUI

## (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont'd)

CUI

OUSD(I&S) concurs and will coordinate DoDI 3305.XX with DIA to ensure it adequately addresses DIA's role as DIEM-A. We will ensure the additional instruction, DoDI 3305.##, is synchronized with the instruction on training to update and support guidance on the requirement for an ICD 203 compliant tradecraft evaluation program across the defense intelligence all-source analysis enterprise.

Recommendation A.3. states, "OUSD(I&S) issue policy guidance to ensure that the Service intelligence centers and Combatant Command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers provide ICD 203 training to their respective commands' senior analysts and staff members responsible for analytical and editorial review of junior analysts' products." OUSD(I&S) concurs and will engage DIA, as the DIEM-A, to determine if a companion policy document is the suitable mechanism to direct the Service Intelligence Centers and CCMD JIOCs to follow DIA direction and enable an adequate level of education, training and resources across the Defense Intelligence All-source Analytic Enterprise (DIAAE) on ICD 203 analytic tradecraft standards.

OUSD(I&S) will also use existing forums—the Defense Analytic Tradecraft Counsel (DATC) and the DIAAE Board of Governors (BOG) to determine the best approach to establish controls to ensure training on ICD 203 analytic tradecraft standards for the Service Intelligence Centers and Commands' senior analysts responsible for analytic and editorial review of junior analysts' products. OUSD(I&S) will use these forums to ensure that DoD producers of all-source analysis conduct regular tradecraft evaluation boards and provide product evaluation reports to the DIEM-A to inform the OUSD(I&S) oversight mission.

OUSD(I&S) has no objections to a redacted public release of this report.

Please feel free to reach out to my staff if you have additional questions. The point of contact is

[Redacted]

  
Milancy D. Harris

Attachment:  
ANNEX A – (U) Updates on Key Documents and Actions In Progress

CUI

## (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont'd)

ANNEX A: (U) Updates on Key Documents and Actions In Progress

(U) Page 4, first paragraph, "Introduction"

(U) DoDI 3305.02, "DoD General Intelligence Training and Certification", is the current DoD policy that addresses training and certification programs for all-source analysts within the Department.

(U) Although the above policy is still in effect, the following are current efforts underway within OUSD(I&S) regarding Defense Intelligence Enterprise (DIE) and Defense Security Enterprise (DSE) training and certification:

- (U) DoD Intelligence Training:
  - (U) In April 2020, OUSD(I&S) began the effort of consolidating eight current DoD instructions regarding defense intelligence and security training into one DoDI.
  - (U) In August 2020, the first draft of the new DoDI 3305.XX, DoD Intelligence and Security Training, was released to the DIE and DSE components for review and input for developing and shaping a preliminary draft policy.
  - (U) After much review and input by the components, the current draft is ready to be released by the OUSD(I&S) Policy Office for Informal review and coordination with the DIE and DSE, including the military services, the OUSD(I&S) staff, and OGC-I.
  - (U) Estimated publication date: FY2024
- (U) DoD Intelligence Certification:
  - (U) In 2019, OUSD(I&S) began the effort of consolidating five current DoD manuals regarding defense intelligence and security certification and credentialing programs into one DoDI.
  - (U) In 2020, the first draft of the new DoDI 3305.##, DoD Intelligence and Security Certification and Credentialing Programs, was released to the DIE and DSE components for review and input for developing and shaping a preliminary draft policy.
  - (U) Since then, the draft instruction was released for Informal review and coordination with the DIE and DSE, including the military services, the OUSD(I&S) staff, and OGC-I.
  - (U) In 2023, the OUSD(I&S) HCOM director made changes to the draft, that now requires the OUSD(I&S) Policy Office to re-send for Informal review and coordination.
  - (U) Estimated publication date: FY2024
- (U) Regarding all-source analysis certification, in 2016, DIA developed the Certified Defense All-Source Analysis (CDASA) certification program. In 2017, it was nationally accredited through the National Commission for Certifying Agencies (NCCA) and is available to all military and civilians assigned to all-source positions within the DoD and US Coast Guard.

## (U) Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security (cont'd)

(U) Top of Page 9, first bullet, comment:

(U) In accordance with DoDI 5105.21 Defense Intelligence Agency, Section 2, paragraph b.(1)(a)4., and the December 13, 2021 USD(I&S) Memorandum, as the Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager (DIEM) for all-source analysis, DIA is responsible for training DoD's all-source analytic workforce. Through their General Intelligence Training Council, DIA also establishes training requirements and standards for the DIE.

(U) Regarding all-source analysis certification, CDASA is not a requirement for DoD and USCG military and civilian personnel; however, OUSD(I&S) goal for individuals assigned to all-source analyst positions is to obtain CDASA certification. DIA's All-Source Analysis Governance Council establishes the rules and regulations for CDASA and ensures the alignment of program to the standards required for independent accreditation by NCCA.

(U) Page 13, first paragraph, second bullet:

(U) Same comment as above

(U) Page 16, third paragraph, "The OUSD(I&S) Was Developing DoD Instructions for Intelligence Training and Certification"

(U) The draft instruction (DoDI 3305.XX) also states in paragraph 2.2.b., that DIA, as the DIEM for all-source analysis, is responsible for training the DIE/DSE workforce, to include Military Service personnel, in their designated functional area for which an EA has not been established.

(U) Top of Page 17, first paragraph:

(U) As the DIEM for all-source analysis and because the GITC sets the training standards for all-source analysis, recommend changing verbiage to DIA should issue policy guidance to ensure that the Service Intelligence Centers and combatant command Joint Intelligence Operations Centers (JIOCs) provide ICD 203 training to their respective command's senior analysts and staff members responsible for analytical and editorial review of junior analysts' production items.

(U) Page 18, Recommendation A.3:

(U) As stated in first comment, the draft DoDI 3305.XX, DoD Intelligence and Security Training, provides the policy for DIA, as the DIEM for all-source analysis, to ensure the Service Intelligence Centers and combatant command JIOCs provide ICD 203 training to their respective command's senior analysts and staff members responsible for analytical and editorial review of junior analysts' production items. Estimated publication date is 1 October 2023.

# (U) Defense Intelligence Agency Director



DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340-5100



JUN 05 2023

U-23-0241/DI

To: Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General

Subject: Response to Draft Evaluation Report on Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command

Reference: Evaluation of Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command, May 2, 2023, (Document is CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION)

1. The Defense Intelligence Enterprise Manager for Analysis acknowledges the Department of Defense Office of the Inspector General recommendation for an assistance visit to United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to provide mentorship, advice, training and best practices as USCYBERCOM seeks to restart its tradecraft evaluation program.

a. The Directorate for Analysis (DI) Office of the Research Director (RD) has already engaged with USCYBERCOM counterparts at multiple levels, including the Office of the Deputy Director for Intelligence, on this recommendation. The RD has provided published analytic guidance, best practices, and advice as the USCYBERCOM Directorate for Intelligence restarts its tradecraft evaluation program. Consultations are going well and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) looks forward to continuing to partner with USCYBERCOM on analytic tradecraft and product evaluation.

b. DIA has no objections to a redacted public release of this report.

2. My point of contact for this letter is [REDACTED]

Trent Maul  
 Defense Intelligence Enterprise  
 Manager for All-Source Analysis

# (U) Office of Naval Intelligence



CUI  
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY  
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE  
4251 SUTLAND ROAD  
WASHINGTON DC 20395-5720

IN REPLY REFER TO  
5216  
Ser N01/013  
30 May 23

MEMORANDUM

From: Deputy Commander, Office of Naval Intelligence  
To: Assistant Inspector General for Space, Intelligence, Engineering and Oversight  
U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Subj: (U) REVIEW AND COMMENT ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL DRAFT REPORT

Ref: (a) Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD IG) Draft Report: Evaluation of Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command (Project No. D2022-DEV0SI-0129.000)

1. (U) Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the DoD IG Draft Report: Evaluation of Controls Over the Application of Analytic Standards by the Service Intelligence Centers and U.S. Cyber Command (Project No. D2022-DEV0SI-0129.000). With respect to recommendations A.1 and A.3, Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) would like to provide the following response for inclusion in the final report:

2. (U) ONI concurs with the report's findings, but notes critical comments underpinning recommendations. Specifically, listed recommendations tied to delivering additional policy or guidance offer no oversight for or synchronization of approaches to resourcing and delivering consistent training across the Defense Intelligence All-Source Analysis Enterprise. We find that further exploration of the observation that "current Intelligence Community Directive 203 training initiatives may not be currently resourced, and would benefit from considering their resourcing in order to ensure their success" is warranted. Such review of resources must be tied to implementation of current or delivery of expanded policy guidance or new requirements.

3. (U) Questions concerning this matter may be directed to [REDACTED]

ANDREW G. RICHARDSON  
Deputy Commander

Controlled by: ONI  
CUI Category: PRIVILEGE; OPSEC  
Distribution/Dissemination Controls: None  
POC: [REDACTED]

CUI

## (U) Acronyms and Abbreviations

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|                      |  |
|----------------------|--|
| <b>COVID-19</b>      | Coronavirus Disease–2019   |
| <b>DIA</b>           | Defense Intelligence Agency  |
| <b>DoDI</b>          | DoD Instruction  |
| <b>IC</b>            | Intelligence Community   |
| <b>ICD</b>           | Intelligence Community Directive                                       |
| <b>MCIA</b>          | Marine Corps Intelligence Activity                                     |
| <b>NGIC</b>          | National Ground Intelligence Center                                    |
| <b>ODNI</b>          | Office of the Director of National Intelligence                        |
| <b>ONI</b>           | Office of Naval Intelligence   |
| <b>OUSD(I&amp;S)</b> | Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security |
| <b>PACE</b>          | Professional Analyst Career Education                                  |
| <b>USCYBERCOM</b>    | U.S. Cyber Command   |
| <b>USD(I&amp;S)</b>  | Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and Security               |

## **Whistleblower Protection**

### **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

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