



Office of Inspector General United States Department of State

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Office of Inspections

April 2023

(U) Inspection of Embassy Juba, South Sudan

BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

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HIGHLIGHTS

Office of Inspector General
United States Department of State

ISP-I-23-12

(U) What OIG Inspected

(U) OIG inspected the operating environment, executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management operations of Embassy Juba.

(U) What OIG Recommends

(U) OIG made 20 recommendations: 17 to Embassy Juba and 3 to the Bureau of African Affairs. In its comments on the draft report, the Department concurred with all 20 recommendations. OIG considers all 20 recommendations resolved. The Department's response to each recommendation, and OIG's reply, can be found in the Recommendations section of this report. The Department's formal responses are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix B.

(U) April 2023

(U) OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

(U) BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS

(U) Inspection of Embassy Juba, South Sudan

(U) What OIG Found

- (U) Embassy Juba operated under difficult local conditions characterized by political conflict, communal violence, poor infrastructure, a dangerous security environment, and systemic corruption.
- (U) The embassy also faced significant internal challenges, including staffing limitations, inadequate facilities, and a complex, shared administrative services support platform.
- (U) The Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission led the embassy consistent with the Department of State's leadership and management principles.
- (U) Because of limited staffing and the annual turnover of U.S. direct-hire personnel, the embassy's Management Section struggled to address communication, coordination, and internal control deficiencies.
- (U) Embassy Juba ended its locally employed staff health insurance benefits contract, resulting in changes to medical coverage for locally employed staff that negatively affected their morale. Additionally, the embassy's local compensation plan did not comply with local labor laws.
- (U) Due to insufficient staffing, the embassy had numerous information management internal control deficiencies that required attention.

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(U) CONTEXT

(U) South Sudan, which gained independence from Sudan on July 9, 2011, is the world's newest country. Eleven years after attaining independence, despite political and financial backing from the United States and the international community, South Sudan has struggled to form a viable governing system and has been plagued by widespread and systemic corruption, political conflict, and communal violence. Transparency International ranked South Sudan worst in the world in perceived levels of public corruption in its 2021 Corruptions Perceptions Index report.¹ In addition, the Institute for Economics and Peace in its annual 2022 Global Peace Index report ranked South Sudan among the most dangerous countries in the world.² South Sudan is also one of the most dangerous places in the world for aid workers, with nearly 150 killed from 2013 through 2022.

(U) In 2013, 2 years after independence, the ruling Sudan People's Liberation Movement fractured as its members initiated a civil war. The conflict—which began primarily as a power struggle between President Salva Kiir Mayardit, who is a member of the Dinka ethnic group, and First Vice President Riek Machar Teny Dhurgon, who is a member of the Nuer ethnic group—expanded and became more complex as South Sudan's many tribes and political factions struggled for power and revenue from the country's petroleum industry.³ The competition for power and the mistrust between the President and First Vice President plunged South Sudan into a catastrophic 5-year internal conflict from 2013 through 2018. The war left over 400,000 dead and forced more than four million South Sudanese to flee their homes. It also led to abuses against civilians and exacerbated an already dire humanitarian crisis.

(U) Despite these events, the United States remained committed in its support for South Sudan and helped broker a power-sharing agreement in September 2018 called the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, the country's second peace agreement.⁴ However, South Sudan's Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity under President Kiir and First Vice President Machar has been implementing the revitalized peace agreement very slowly. Since 2020, implementation of the peace agreement has stalled as wrangling over power-sharing arrangements resulted in an uptick in communal violence and the country's worst food security crisis since independence. In 2022, an estimated

¹ (U) The 2021 Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index ranked South Sudan at 180 out of 180 countries, as the most corrupt country.

² (U) The Institute for Economics and Peace is an independent, nonpartisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress. Its Global Peace Index covers 163 countries using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators to measure the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal safety and security, the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarization. South Sudan ranked 159 out of 163 as the most dangerous.

³ (U) South Sudan's ethnic groups consist of Dinka (35–40 percent of the population), Nuer (15 percent), and other groups including the Suilluk, Azande, Bari, Kakwa, Kuku, Murle, Mandari, Didinga, and Ndogo.

⁴ (U) President Kiir and First Vice President Machar signed the first peace agreement in August 2015 that created the Transitional Government of National Unity in April 2016. However, in July 2016, renewed fighting broke out in Juba between Kiir's and Machar's forces, plunging the country back into conflict.

8.9 million of South Sudan's 12.4 million total population needed some type of humanitarian assistance, as discussed below. Core elements of the revitalized peace agreement, necessary for holding elections at the end of the transition period, have yet to be completed. On August 4, 2022, parties to the September 2018 peace deal agreed to extend it by 24 months starting in February 2023, when the original deal expires.

(U) Embassy Juba's top four strategic objectives, as outlined in its FY 2022 Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) are to support South Sudan in:

- (U) Addressing the drivers of subnational violence, leading to an improved security environment for all communities.
- (U) Implementing the peace agreement that will lead to the transition to a permanent government, and establishing basic institutions and reforms for improved governance.
- (U) Promoting inclusive economic growth, trade, and investment through sustained public financial management reform, combating corruption across federal and state institutions, and managing national resources transparently, equitably, and in accordance with international standards.
- (U) Improving its resilience to environmental, conflict-driven, and economic shocks while decreasing its dependence on humanitarian assistance.

(U) The United States has restricted most non-humanitarian assistance that directly supports the government of South Sudan.⁵ However, as the largest humanitarian aid donor to South Sudan, the United States has provided foreign assistance to the South Sudanese people for more than a decade in response to a series of hardships caused by conflict, displacement, and natural disasters. U.S. assistance from FY 2010 to FY 2022 totaled \$9 billion. This aid was delivered primarily in two ways: humanitarian assistance including food, health, nutrition, and protection assistance implemented through international organizations and nongovernmental organizations; and development assistance promoting democracy, education, economic growth, human rights, and peace implemented by civil society organizations. Both types of assistance are administered primarily by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Departments of State (Department), Health and Human Services, and Defense. The U.S. government also collaborates with United Nation agencies, other donors, and nongovernmental organizations to assist those affected by ongoing violence. In FY 2022, total U.S. government humanitarian foreign assistance was \$792 million to an estimated 8.9 million people in need.

(U) At the time of the inspection, Embassy Juba had 48 U.S. direct-hire staff members, 31 contractors, 13 Department of Defense military personnel, 2 third-country nationals, and 1 eligible family member employee. The embassy also had 396 locally employed (LE) staff members, which included 180 local guards and 148 USAID personnel. Of the 48 U.S. direct-hire

⁵ (U) The 2021 Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments says the United States will not provide non-humanitarian, non-trade-related assistance to the government of South Sudan for FY 2022 until the government complies with the minimum standards of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 or makes significant efforts to bring itself into compliance with the minimum standards.

employees, 28 worked for the Department, 18 for USAID, and 2 for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

(U) OIG evaluated the embassy's executive direction, policy and program implementation, resource management, and information management consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.⁶ A related classified inspection report discusses the embassy's security program, issues affecting the safety of personnel and facilities, and Sensitive But Unclassified findings related to the information management program.

(U) OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

(U) Challenging Local Environment

(U) Embassy Juba operated in a challenging environment that affected operations in different ways, as described throughout this report. South Sudan is one of the poorest and most fragile countries, with little infrastructure.⁷ As a result of this challenging environment, Embassy Juba is a 1-year unaccompanied assignment with two rest and recuperation breaks.⁸ It is also a special incentive post.⁹ U.S. direct-hire employees receive 35 percent danger pay¹⁰ and 30 percent hardship differential.¹¹

(SBU) (b) (7)(F) [REDACTED]

⁶ (U) See Appendix A.

⁷ (U) For example, South Sudan has 10,000 kilometers of roads, but only 2 percent are paved. In addition, only 2 percent of the population has access to electricity.

⁸ (U) The Department designates overseas posts in imminent danger areas or in areas with severe hardship as unaccompanied. An unaccompanied post is an overseas post at which no family members or members of household are authorized to reside. See 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 3771, "Subchapter Definitions," and 3 FAM 3772.2c, "Background."

⁹ (U) Special incentive posts encompass all overseas posts that have 1-year tours of duty. As of September 2022, these include Burma, Central African Republic, Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, and South Sudan. U.S. direct-hire employees serving in these locations receive additional compensation ranging from 20 to 35 percent.

¹⁰ (U) Danger pay is additional compensation above basic compensation for service at designated danger pay posts where civil insurrection, terrorism, or war conditions threaten physical harm or imminent danger to all U.S. government civilian employees.

¹¹ (U) Post hardship differential compensates employees for service in foreign areas where environmental conditions differ substantially from those in the continental United States and warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. The differential is paid as a percentage of basic compensation and can range from 5 to 35 percent.

(SBU) (b) (7)(F)



(U) Inadequate Embassy Facilities

(U) Embassy Juba began its history in the 1980s as a USAID field office supporting development in southern Sudan and became a consulate to Embassy Khartoum in 2006. Following South Sudan's independence from Sudan in 2011, the consulate transitioned into an embassy. The age and limitations of the existing compound, which was never intended to house a full-service embassy, have created a range of challenges for embassy operations. For example, the embassy lacked adequate working space and housing. Except for the Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM), all Department U.S. direct-hire employees and LE staff worked in a shared space with no individual offices. The Consular Section lacked appropriate space for its 2-person staff to hold private conversations with U.S. citizen and visa customers.

(U) To address these facilities issues, construction of a \$784 million new embassy compound is scheduled to begin in FY 2023 with a 54-month construction timeline. The new embassy compound will consolidate all functional and residential space in a modern, purpose-built facility to address the embassy's operational requirements. Facilities and space issues are discussed later in this report and security issues are discussed fully in the companion classified report.

(U) Embassy Staffing Challenges

(U) As noted above, Embassy Juba is a special incentive post with a 1-year unaccompanied assignment with two rest and recuperation breaks, offering U.S. direct-hire employees 35 percent danger pay and 30 percent hardship differential. According to Department and embassy staff, these incentives and allowances have been sufficient to attract a small number of bidders for most of the embassy's Foreign Service positions. However, some sections of the embassy, such as the Management, Consular, and Public Diplomacy Sections, had just one U.S. direct-hire Foreign Service generalist each. As a result, the Department had to send temporary duty personnel to fill in when any of these officers were absent from post or departing for another assignment. Additionally, other U.S. direct-hire positions at the embassy remained unfilled such as the Assistant Regional Security Officer, President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) Country Coordinator, and other agency positions. Staffing issues are discussed in more detail in the Public Diplomacy, Consular, Foreign Assistance, Resource Management, and Information Management sections of this report.

(U) Department and U.S. Agency for International Development Shared Administrative Services Platform

(U) Unlike most U.S. embassies, Embassy Juba had a shared administrative structure.¹² The Department and USAID each acted as administrative service providers through the International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS)¹³ mechanism to all U.S. government agencies represented at the embassy. The two providers, the Department ICASS service provider and the USAID alternate service provider (ASP), divided 41 administrative services between them. (See the breakout of administrative services between the two providers in Appendix C.) This legacy structure dated back to the years when USAID operated as a field office and Juba was designated a U.S. consulate under Embassy Khartoum. Department and embassy officials told OIG that this shared administrative structure will be terminated once the new embassy compound is completed in accordance with Department guidelines governing co-location of all agencies on a new embassy compound.

(U) Structurally, the USAID ASP was the larger of the two service providers with 2 U.S. direct-hire employees, 2 personal services contractors, and 89 LE staff. The USAID ASP also used a \$18.7 million life support contract to carry out part of its administrative support function. The USAID Executive Officer oversaw the ASP and reported to the USAID Director of Operations. At the time of the inspection, the ASP provided most of the general services and facilities management administrative services. It also served as the service provider for USAID's programmatic function. As the smaller of the two, the Department ICASS service provider comprised 3 U.S. direct-hire employees and 19 LE staff members. The Management Officer oversaw the Department ICASS service provider and reported to the DCM. The Department ICASS service provider provided security services and LE staff services to most of the embassy and other administrative services on a smaller scale.

(U) Given the shared administrative structure, the limited number of U.S. direct-hire staff involved in the structure, and the division of administrative services, Department and embassy staff told OIG that it was critical for the Department and USAID leadership teams to work cooperatively. However, Department, embassy, and USAID staff also told OIG that there had been an adversarial relationship between the embassy's Front Office and the USAID Front Office at post. For example, staff told OIG that, due to the poor relationship, Department-USAID discussions regarding the management of the embassy and residential compounds became strained. Coordination also faltered as interagency meetings were either poorly attended or did not take place at all. In addition, Department and embassy staff told OIG that the dispute with the provider for LE staff health insurance benefits exacerbated Department-USAID tensions.

¹² (U) Bureau of Comptroller and Global Financial Services officials told OIG that USAID served as an alternate service provider at five other embassies but to a lesser degree. At Embassies Lilongwe and Podgorica, USAID provides motor pool services. At Embassies Cairo, Pretoria, and Tegucigalpa, USAID provides facilities management support for its annex buildings.

¹³ (U) The ICASS system is the principal means that the U.S. government provides and shares the cost of common administrative support needed to embassy operations. The ICASS program provides a full range of administrative services such as motor pool operations and vehicle maintenance, travel services, human resources management, and other services.

The adversarial relationship improved considerably with the arrival of new leadership—the Ambassador for the Department and the Mission Director for USAID—in summer 2022. Both leaders told OIG that they were committed to improving communication and coordination between the two agencies. This issue is also discussed in the Resource Management section of this report.¹⁴

(U) EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

(U) OIG assessed Embassy Juba’s leadership based on interviews, staff questionnaires, reviews of documents, and OIG’s observations of meetings and activities during the inspection.

(U) Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct

(U) The Ambassador arrived at Embassy Juba in August 2022. He is a member of the Senior Foreign Service and previously served on the White House National Security Council staff as the Deputy Senior Director for South Asia and the Director for Afghanistan. The DCM arrived in February 2022. He is also a member of the Senior Foreign Service and previously served as the Director of the Office of Multilateral Affairs in the Department’s Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs. He was Chargé d’Affaires (Chargé) in Juba from June 2022 to August 2022.

(U) OIG determined that the Ambassador and the DCM acted consistent with the Department’s 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214 leadership and management principles.¹⁵ In accordance with 3 FAM 1214b(4) and (7), the Ambassador, on his arrival in August 2022, took steps to revitalize interagency communication and collaboration at the embassy. The Ambassador, the DCM, and the newly arrived USAID Mission Director emphasized the message of “One Team, One Mission” in their interactions with U.S. direct-hire and LE staff. Embassy staff told OIG that the three modeled this behavior. The Ambassador personally reached out to the embassy community via monthly town halls, biweekly meetings with LE staff, weekly Country Team meetings, daily meetings with section and agency heads, and one-on-one staff discussion sessions at the embassy and the residential compounds. In addition to his participation in these sessions, the DCM held weekly open chats in the embassy cafeteria with any employee who wished to bring a matter to his attention. The Front Office also facilitated meetings between a visiting high-level Department official and embassy staff to enhance communication among elements of the mission. Embassy employees told OIG that morale improved because of the Front Office’s internal initiatives to promote teamwork and improve communication, with LE staff citing as an example the Ambassador’s outreach to them on the embassy’s dispute with the health insurance provider. This issue is discussed in more detail in the Resource Management section of this report.

¹⁴ (U) The USAID OIG conducted a simultaneous inspection of the USAID ASP during the inspection period.

¹⁵ (U) The Department’s leadership and management principles outlined in 3 FAM 1214b include (1) model integrity, (2) plan strategically, (3) be decisive and take responsibility, (4) communicate, (5) learn and innovate constantly, (6) be self-aware, (7) collaborate, (8) value and develop people, (9) manage conflict, and (10) foster resilience.

(U) OIG found that the Front Office modeled integrity in accordance with 3 FAM 1214b(1). In their engagement with the embassy community, the Ambassador and DCM emphasized values such as mutual respect, professionalism, and collegiality. For example, in an initial communication to embassy staff, the Ambassador made clear that he held himself and his team to the highest standards of professionalism, ethics, and appropriate conduct.

(U) Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

(U) In accordance with 18 FAM 301.2-4d, the Front Office articulated Embassy Juba's goals and objectives in an August 1, 2022, ICS. The Front Office conducted the ICS review through an interactive process that included the entire Country Team, with a facilitator working with agencies and sections to produce a consensus document. Since June 2022, the embassy has held expanded Country Team meetings once a month, with both U.S. direct-hire and LE staff, to review progress on a specific ICS foreign policy goal or management objective.

(U) OIG found that the Ambassador, assisted by the DCM, fulfilled his responsibility under 2 FAM 113.1b to oversee the embassy's strategic activities. For example, the Ambassador met regularly with South Sudanese government officials, diplomats from other embassies resident in South Sudan, and civil society representatives to advance the ICS goal of a peaceful transition to a permanent government. Additionally, in accordance with its ICS goal to address drivers of subnational violence, the embassy issued public statements decrying violence against aid workers and journalists. Nonetheless, the embassy faced challenges in advancing ICS foreign policy goals due to continued struggles among South Sudan's many political factions and security threats that limited the embassy's engagement and physical mobility.

(U) Adherence to Internal Controls

(U) Embassy Juba did not submit its FY 2022 annual Statement of Assurance to the Department as required. The Department's Bureau of Comptroller and Global Financial Services required all embassies to submit their FY 2022 Statement of Assurance certifications by September 16, 2022. Embassy staff told OIG that they did not submit the FY 2022 certification in a timely manner because of misunderstandings within the mission, particularly as it related to USAID's role, if any, in assessing internal controls. According to 2 FAM 022.7, chiefs of mission are responsible for developing and maintaining appropriate systems of internal control for their organization and for reviewing them on an ongoing basis to determine whether they are adequate and functioning as prescribed. Furthermore, the Government Accountability Office's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requires documentation of management control assessments and corrective actions.¹⁶ Without a comprehensive, ongoing system of internal controls, Embassy Juba is at risk of failing to manage its activities and programs effectively, efficiently, economically, and with integrity.

¹⁶ (U) General Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, Principles 3.09–3.12, page 17 (GAO-14-704G, September 2014).

Recommendation 1: (U) Embassy Juba should submit its FY 2022 annual Statement of Assurance in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Security and Emergency Planning

(U) The Ambassador's leadership of the security and emergency preparedness programs satisfied Department's guidelines in 12 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH)-1 H-762a and 12 FAH-1 H-721. Since his arrival, the Ambassador signed 11 security directives. He had a formal weekly meeting with the Regional Security Officer to review the security program, but they also met daily either in a group setting or on an ad hoc basis. The embassy submitted its updated emergency action plan to the Department in September 2022 and posted links to security directives and notices on the embassy intranet site. In October 2022, the Ambassador and DCM participated in an Emergency Action Committee crisis management tabletop exercise. After that exercise, the Ambassador conducted an impromptu town hall with LE staff to discuss their specific security concerns. In addition, the Ambassador's after-action debrief with embassy security staff in the wake of his first trip outside the capital city of Juba resulted in a Regional Security Office-sponsored training session for all embassy officials. The companion classified inspection report contains additional discussion of the embassy's security program.

(U) Equal Employment Opportunity and Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility

(U) OIG found that the Front Office supported Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) principles and activities, in accordance with 3 FAM 1514c(2) and 21 STATE 60514.¹⁷ The Ambassador emphasized values such as collegiality and respect for others in his initial remarks to embassy staff upon his arrival in August 2022, and invited representatives from the Department's Office of Civil Rights to conduct training for embassy staff. The embassy currently does not have an EEO counselor and relies on the Department's Office of Civil Rights to provide this service. However, the Front Office and embassy staff told OIG that they were seeking to change this arrangement and have an incoming officer serve as EEO counselor. The embassy maintained two bulletin boards prominently displaying information regarding the process for filing an EEO claim, describing what constitutes harassment, and amplifying EEO messages from Washington to the wider embassy community.

(U) Embassy Juba had a Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Accessibility Council composed of U.S. direct-hire and LE staff. The Front Office met with the council, and the Ambassador expressed his support for its activities when he introduced the council chairs to embassy employees at an October 2022 town hall. In the past, the council advocated for LE staff with disabilities and mobility issues, and, at the time of the inspection, it was in the process of formulating its future agenda. While serving as Chargé, the DCM hosted a lunch with representatives of South Sudan's lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer, and intersex community to hear their views

¹⁷ (U) Cable 21 STATE 60514, "Policy Statements on Diversity and Inclusion and Equal Employment Opportunity and Harassment," June 11, 2021.

about how the embassy could support their efforts to promote understanding and acceptance within South Sudanese society.

(U) Developing and Mentoring Foreign Service Professionals

(U) OIG found that the Front Office oversaw the embassy's First- and Second-Tour (FAST) program, as required in 3 FAM 2242.4, for the two FAST employees assigned to Juba.¹⁸ The Ambassador and DCM both met with FAST employees regularly. In interviews with OIG, FAST and mid-level employees praised the Front Office's efforts to provide them with frequent career counseling and mentoring. Additionally, the Front Office held monthly meetings with mid-level U.S. direct-hire staff that enabled them to discuss U.S. foreign policy and professional development. On occasion, visiting temporary duty officials, including the Department's Director General of the Foreign Service, spoke to mid-level and FAST employees on professional and career development.

(U) POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

(U) OIG assessed Embassy Juba's policy and program implementation work performed by the Political-Economic, Public Diplomacy, and Consular Sections, and the embassy's coordination of foreign assistance programs. OIG found the embassy generally met Department requirements for policy and program implementation, except for the deficiencies in the Public Diplomacy and Consular Sections, as discussed below.

(U) Political-Economic Section

(U) OIG reviewed the Political-Economic Section's leadership and management, policy implementation, reporting and advocacy, and Leahy vetting¹⁹ and found the section generally complied with Department standards.

(U) OIG determined that the embassy's reporting and diplomatic engagement supported ICS and Department goals. Specifically, OIG reviewed a selection of 53 embassy cables sent from January 2022 through October 2022 and found reporting to be timely, relevant, and appropriately sourced. Washington consumers told OIG that the section's reporting was of good quality and quantity, especially given the difficulties of working in South Sudan. In addition to cable reporting, the section was responsible for compiling the embassy's end-of-day

¹⁸ (U) One of the two FAST employees departed Embassy Juba during the inspection.

¹⁹ (U) The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the United States from furnishing certain assistance to a unit of a foreign security force if the Department has credible information that the unit has committed a gross violation of human rights. Leahy vetting is the process of determining if the Department has credible information that units or individuals proposed to benefit from certain assistance have committed a gross violation of human rights. See 22 U.S.C. § 2378d and 9 FAM 303.8-5(B). The Department also helps implement a similar law applicable to "amounts made available to the Department of Defense" for assistance to foreign security forces. See 10 U.S.C. § 362.

notes.²⁰ Based on interviews with Washington stakeholders and interagency partners in Juba as well as inspector observations of interagency meetings, OIG also found that the section demonstrated good interagency cooperation.

(U) Staff reported that at times there was a lack of organization within the section and between the section and the Front Office, with short deadlines and some duplicated tasks. OIG determined that the Political-Economic Counselor attempted to address such problems by adding a section to the end-of-day notes for upcoming meetings and events and using a white board to share information. He told OIG that he planned to work with staff to introduce a formal task tracker that would also be shared with the Front Office.

(U) Public Diplomacy

(U) OIG reviewed the embassy's public diplomacy operations, including educational and cultural programs, grants administration, program implementation, media engagement, reporting, section leadership, and strategic planning. In interviews with OIG, Washington stakeholders commended the Public Diplomacy Section for its strong performance in a very challenging environment.

(U) The Public Diplomacy section was fully staffed at the time of the inspection with one U.S. direct-hire and three LE staff employees. One LE staff member was designated as a Grants Officer Representative, as was the Public Affairs Officer. Although the section was fully staffed, a long-term LE staff absence contributed to the section's increased workload as the remaining staff managed a wide range of public diplomacy programs during that extended absence. An announced upcoming LE staff resignation will further contribute to the section's staffing and workload challenges.

(U) OIG also found that ongoing political instability, the security environment, and the resulting restrictions on movement around the country made it difficult for the Public Diplomacy Section to conduct regular outreach and monitor grants both inside and outside of Juba. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic forced the only American Space in the country to close intermittently, which further constrained Public Diplomacy programming.

(U) Overall, despite these challenges, OIG determined public diplomacy operations and programs generally complied with Department standards and guidance and supported the embassy's ICS goals, except for grants management, as discussed below.

(U) Public Diplomacy Grant Files Did Not Meet Department Standards for Documentation

(U) OIG reviewed 20 out of 62 grants issued from October 1, 2020, to September 30, 2022, totaling \$377,135, and found that many grant files lacked some of the documentation required

²⁰ (U) End-of-day notes are very brief daily highlights, cleared through the Ambassador and emailed to key Department interlocutors. They include a list of that day's outgoing cables and upcoming meetings and events.

by the Federal Assistance Directive.²¹ Specifically, OIG found that 18 of 20 grant files lacked documentation. Of the 18 files, OIG found 7 files lacked documentation confirming the grant recipient was a verified entity or had proof of exemption, 5 lacked risk assessment and monitoring plans, 6 lacked a final written assessment of the program or if the grant activity was completed, and 7 lacked close-out documentation.²² The Department's Office of the Procurement Executive also reported to OIG that the Public Diplomacy Section had not closed out 17 grant files as required.²³ Public Diplomacy staff told OIG that staffing gaps due to a long-term LE staff absence, heavy workload, and limited staff who had received grants training prevented the section from completing grants documentation. Nonetheless, OIG found that the files contained payment documentation and determined the Public Diplomacy Section used grants funds as intended. Furthermore, the grants had clear objectives that directly supported the embassy's ICS goals. Effective grants management reduces the chances of loss or misuse of U.S. government funds and helps ensure the grants meet program objectives.

Recommendation 2: (U) Embassy Juba should bring its public diplomacy grant files into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Consular Operations

(U) OIG reviewed Embassy Juba's consular operations, including consular leadership, management controls, visa services, U.S. citizen services, crisis preparedness, and fraud prevention. OIG found the physical facilities allocated for consular services were inadequate, but, as discussed earlier, those issues will be corrected with the construction of a new embassy compound. Consular staff interacted with the public at the West Compound Access Control (CAC),²⁴ a small building 3 minutes by foot from the chancery. The building was not designed as a consular facility but was modified to allow contact with customers seeking consular services. Consular operations can be sustained in the present facilities only because of the artificially low volume of consular work as described below.

(U) At the time of the inspection, the Consular Section consisted of a consular officer and one LE staff member serving as a consular assistant; a second LE staff position had been authorized but not yet filled. In the year prior to the inspection, the section processed a limited number of

²¹ (U) The Federal Assistance Directive establishes internal guidance, policies, and procedures for all domestic and overseas grant-making bureaus, offices, and posts administering federal financial assistance. It is updated annually by the Department's Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive. Grants reviewed by OIG were subject to the Federal Assistance Directive, Version 4.0, effective October 1, 2019, through October 20, 2020; the Federal Assistance Directive, Version 5.0, effective October 21, 2020, through October 7, 2021; and Federal Assistance Directive, Version 6.0, which took effect on October 8, 2021.

²² (U) Office of the Procurement Executive, Federal Assistance Directive, October 2021. See Chapter 4, Section D, "Monitoring and Reporting;" Chapter 4, Section D.2., "Performance Progress Report;" and Chapter 5, Section C, "Grants Officer Responsibilities."

²³ (U) Federal Assistance Directive, October 2021, Chapter 5, Section A, "Closeout Timeline."

²⁴(U) A CAC is a system of gates, barriers, and guard booths, used to pre-screen personnel and vehicles entering a secure perimeter. The term CAC is most frequently used to describe a small building located on the perimeter of an official compound.

nonimmigrant visas, primarily for government officials. U.S. Embassy Nairobi processed Juba's immigrant visas. The section also provided services to a small number of American citizens. OIG concluded that, despite its inadequate facilities and limited personnel resources, Embassy Juba's consular programs generally complied with guidance contained in 7 FAM, 9 FAM, 7 FAH, applicable statutes, and other Department policies, except for the issues described below.

(U) Embassy's Public Entrance Lacked Required Signage

(U) OIG found that the embassy's public entrance for consular visitors did not have legible outside signs or notices with information about consular services, such as normal operating hours, telephone numbers for consular information and emergency after-hours services, and embassy internet addresses. Guidance in 7 FAH-1 H-263.8b states that consular sections should use outside signs to provide information about consular services to visitors. The Consular Officer was aware of this issue and, at the time of the inspection, had requested resources to address it. He told OIG he did not know why signage had not been installed when the West CAC was first used for public services. Without providing accurate information at the section's public entrance, those seeking emergency and other services may be delayed or misdirected.

Recommendation 3: (U) Embassy Juba should install signage at the Consular Section's public entrance with all information required by Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Consular Cashiering Operations Did Not Fully Comply With Department Standards

(U) OIG found that the embassy's consular cashiering operations did not fully comply with Department standards. Specifically, the consular cashier's²⁵ cash advance was not stored in a safe or cash lockbox to which only the cashier had access as required by 4 FAM 393.4-3d, and the alternate consular cashier did not have his own cash advance as required by 4 FAM 317.2-3 and 4 FAM 317.3-1. The Consular Officer knew of these deficiencies and, at the time of the inspection, requested resources to address them. However, having arrived in Juba only 2 months before the inspection, he did not know why these discrepancies had originally occurred. Failure to adhere to Department standards increases the risk of theft or misuse of funds.

Recommendation 4: (U) Embassy Juba should bring its consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Consular Section Lacked a Functional Privacy Booth

(U) OIG found that the interview booth in the West CAC did not provide sufficient privacy to deal with sensitive cases as required by 7 FAH-1 H-282(1)(k). Guards and members of the public waiting for services could easily overhear conversations from the booth. The Consular Officer was aware of this and, at the time of the inspection, had requested funds to upgrade the booth. Privacy was compromised because of the small size of the West CAC, its use by the local guard

²⁵ (U) The Consular Assistant served as the consular cashier.

force to admit embassy staff, and the ad hoc nature of consular modifications to facilitate consular services. An inadequate privacy booth makes it difficult to ensure privacy for interviews involving sensitive cases.

Recommendation 5: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should bring the privacy booth into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

(U) Consular Supervisor Lacked Full Oversight of Consular Cashiering Operations

(U) The Consular Officer lacked line-of-sight to the consular cashier's work area when the consular cashier deposited fees in the consular cash register. According to 7 FAH-1 H-281e, consular sections should be designed to allow consular officers to physically observe cashiering operations. The consular cashier collected consular fees at a window in the West CAC in the presence of the Consular Officer. However, because of limited space in the West CAC, the consular cash register was kept in the consular office in the chancery. This configuration meant that the consular cashier walked fees to the consular cash register in the chancery out of the view of the Consular Officer, who had to continue to interview applicants in the West CAC. The lack of line-of-sight monitoring increases the risk of malfeasance.

Recommendation 6: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should upgrade the booth in the West Compound Access Control to allow the consular cash register to be located there, bringing oversight of consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

(U) Consular Section Lacked an Adequate Developmental Training Program

(U) OIG found that the Consular Section's training program did not address the needs of its LE staff member. The Consular Officer had developed a detailed training plan for the consular assistant, and she completed a variety of online training courses. However, she had never worked with more experienced consular LE staff or been exposed to operations at a full-service consular section. Department standards in 7 FAH-1 H-645.2a state that LE staff must be adequately trained to carry out their responsibilities, while 3 FAH-2 H-135.2c notes the need for developmental training to develop employee potential and capabilities. Guidance in 3 FAH-2 H-135.4a details a variety of training methods that can be used to increase proficiency, including supervised practice. The Consular Officer and the LE Consular Assistant told OIG that a short temporary duty assignment to a neighboring embassy's Consular Section could be a critically important learning experience. The Consular Officer told OIG that the presence of only a single LE staff member in the section and constraints on funding for consular training during the COVID-19 pandemic had made arranging such developmental training difficult. Without adequate training, consular staff will have difficulty acquiring and maintaining proficiency, providing proper customer service, and preparing for more responsible positions.

Recommendation 7: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should bring its developmental training program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

(U) Foreign Assistance

(U) U.S. assistance to South Sudan, which totaled \$9 billion between FY 2010 to FY 2022, was delivered in two ways: humanitarian assistance including food, health, nutrition, and protection assistance was implemented through international organizations and nongovernmental organizations; and development assistance that promotes democracy, education, economic growth, human rights, and peace was implemented by civil society organizations. However, because all the Department's foreign assistance was administered in Washington and not by Embassy Juba, the embassy was only responsible for assistance coordination. OIG found that the embassy was effective in its coordination role, as described below.

(U) OIG also reviewed the PEPFAR program in South Sudan,²⁶ which was managed by the Department's Office of the U.S. Global Aids Coordinator and Health Diplomacy and staff from the CDC, the Department of Defense, and USAID in Juba, working in collaboration with the South Sudan Ministry of Health, the Global Fund,²⁷ and other stakeholders including civil society organizations to improve access to quality HIV prevention, care, and treatment. The U.S. government has invested more than \$250 million in the South Sudanese PEPFAR program since 2011, and at the time of the inspection, the embassy was in the process of recruiting, for the first-time, a dedicated PEPFAR Country Coordinator. Previously, the various agencies working on PEPFAR took turns having a staff member serve as acting Coordinator. OIG determined that the South Sudan PEPFAR program was at risk of not meeting its key performance goals, as discussed below.

(U) Embassy Demonstrated Sufficient Coordination on Foreign Assistance

(U) OIG found that the Front Office coordinated foreign assistance in accordance with 1 FAM 013.2k(6) and 2 FAM 113.1c(3) and (4). The Ambassador held frequent conversations with USAID regarding USAID's delivery of foreign assistance. Front Office leadership also coordinated with CDC, Department of Defense, and USAID representatives in weekly Country Team meetings and at critical decision points, including for PEPFAR quarterly coordination calls and during the negotiation of the PEPFAR Country Operational Plan. In addition, the Political-Economic Section kept embassy leadership informed about the equities of the Washington-managed assistance programs. Staff told OIG the Ambassador demonstrated interest in their foreign assistance programming and met with program implementers and civil society

²⁶ (U) OIG reviewed the South Sudan PEPFAR program as described in the *Inspectors General Coordinated PEPFAR Oversight Plan Fiscal Year 2023*, August 10, 2022.

²⁷ (U) The Global Fund is a worldwide movement to defeat HIV, tuberculosis, and malaria and ensure a healthier, safer, more equitable future for all. The fund raises and invests \$4 billion a year to fight the deadliest infectious diseases, challenge the injustice that fuels them and strengthen health systems in more than 100 countries.

organizations in country. Additionally, staff indicated that the close staff living quarters facilitated beneficial informal coordination on foreign assistance issues.

(U) President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief Program Was at Risk of Not Meeting Key Performance Goals

(U) OIG found that the PEPFAR program was at risk of not meeting its key performance goals.²⁸ Specifically, PEPFAR South Sudan was not on track to achieve the global targets set in the PEPFAR Strategy: Vision 2025.²⁹ Although South Sudan was a challenging environment in which to implement programming,³⁰ staff told OIG the PEPFAR program was not achieving its targets because it did not place adequate attention on education and awareness, which precede testing and treatment. As a result, only 35 percent of those living with HIV who knew their status and only 27 percent of the 170,000 people living with HIV were on antiretroviral therapy. Staff told OIG that having agency representatives rotate as the acting PEPFAR Coordinator has not served the program well because the agency representatives tended to focus on their agency’s priorities and not on the program as a whole. They told OIG that a dedicated Country Coordinator³¹ will be able to make an unbiased assessment of program needs that considers the priorities of all agencies involved in order to get PEPFAR South Sudan on track to meet performance goals. Because PEPFAR South Sudan was in the process of hiring a Country Coordinator as the inspection concluded, OIG did not make a recommendation to address this issue.

(U) RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

(U) OIG reviewed the Management Section’s operations and internal controls in general services, human resources management, financial management, the health unit, and the community liaison office. The Management Section faced several staffing challenges. Most notably, the sole Management Officer served concurrently as the Human Resources Officer, the Financial Management Officer, and the General Services Officer. Furthermore, the Management Officer was responsible for overseeing the solicitation and implementation of a new health insurance benefits contract for LE staff, completing the overdue IT inventory, submitting the overdue FY 2022 Statement of Assurance, and updating the local compensation plan to comply with local labor laws. Because of the Management Section’s limited staffing and the annual turnover of personnel, OIG is making recommendations to the Bureau of African Affairs for additional Department support to help resolve communication, coordination, and

²⁸ (U) These goals, known as the 95-95-95 targets, call for ensuring that 95 percent of people living with HIV know their status, 95 percent of those who test positive are on antiretroviral (ARV) drug treatment, and 95 percent of those on ARV drug treatment are virally suppressed. The combination of drugs used to treat HIV is known as ARV drug treatment.

²⁹ (U) Department of State, “VERSION 2.0 – Draft Overview PEPFAR Strategy: Vision 2025,” https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/DRAFT-Overview-PEPFAR-Strategy-Vision-2025_Version-2.0-2.pdf.

³⁰ (U) Staff cited high levels of interruption in treatment and told OIG this was due to the lack of education and awareness, as well as the country’s conflicts, natural disasters, and food insecurity.

³¹ (U) The Country Coordinator will be a Department of State employee.

internal control deficiencies as discussed below and in the Information Management section of this report.

(U) International Cooperative Administrative Support Services

(U) As discussed in the earlier Operating Environment section, both the Department and USAID provide administrative support services to embassy staff. The two providers, Department ICASS service provider and USAID ASP, divide 41 administrative services between them. The USAID ASP provides most of the general services and all facilities management services to all agencies. The Department provides security, local guard programs, cashiering, health services, LE staff human resources for some agencies, medical benefits, and other services to all agencies by subscription. In addition, both the Department ICASS service provider and the USAID ASP have identical services for most cost centers that fall under financial management, human resources, travel, and procurement to support each agency's programmatic responsibilities and guidelines. IT is also an area where the service providers split support services. Because OIG is responsible for inspecting Department operations, the scope of this inspection was limited to a review of the services provided by the Department ICASS service provider. See Appendix C for the breakout of administrative services between the two providers.

(U) Overall, embassy staff rated the two service providers as delivering good support. In 2022, the embassy's ICASS customer satisfaction survey scores equaled or exceeded 4 on a 1–5 scale, with 5 meaning "strongly agree," in 26 out of 31 services. Ratings for human resources for LE staff, procurement, pouching, reproduction, and non-travel vouchering were below 4. Although customer satisfaction with ICASS services was good overall, OIG found issues with internal controls and oversight, as described below.

(U) Management Section Lacked Adequate Communication and Coordination Both Internally and With the Alternate Service Provider

(U) Despite a small staff of 1 U.S. direct-hire Management Officer and 10 LE staff, OIG found a lack of communication and coordination within the section. For example, the Management Officer did not have weekly staff meetings or meetings with individual unit heads. Similarly, OIG found a lack of communication and coordination between the Department ICASS service provider and USAID ASP staffs. The Management Officer and USAID Executive Officer did not meet frequently, and when they did meet, they did not include LE staff from both agencies to coordinate operations. According to the Government Accountability Office's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,³² Principle 14.03, management should communicate quality information down and across reporting lines to enable staff to perform key roles in achieving objectives, addressing risks, and supporting the internal control system. The Management Officer told OIG that communication and coordination within the section was informal and less structured because the management staff worked in an open cubicle arrangement. Staff told OIG this lack of communication and coordination in the Management Section and with the USAID ASP created disunity and mistrust among staff. It also created

³² (U) GAO-14-704G, September 2014, page 60.

confusion about work responsibilities and delays in approving some administrative support services such as travel, customs and shipping, and other administrative services.

Recommendation 8: (U) Embassy Juba should develop and implement a plan for communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Recommendation 9: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute, should evaluate and provide resources to assist with improving communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider. (Action: AF, in coordination with FSI)

(U) Shared Service Providers Lacked Standard Operating Procedures for Administrative Support Services

(U) OIG found no standard operating procedures for key administrative processes carried out by the Department ICASS and USAID service providers. For example, the embassy had no standard operating procedures for financial management, human resources, general services, and other administrative services for the Department ICASS service provider. Additionally, Management staff told OIG that they did not have policies and procedures for an embassy with an alternate service provider. As stated in the Government Accountability Office's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,³³ Principle 3.11, management should document internal controls to meet operational needs. Documentation of internal controls, including changes to controls, is evidence that controls are identified, capable of being communicated to those responsible for their performance, and capable of being monitored and evaluated by the entity. Staff told OIG that the Management Section did not have the staffing resources to create standard operating procedures given higher priority tasks such as procuring a new LE staff medical contract, updating the local compensation plan, completing the IT inventory, and other tasks. The absence of standard operating procedures for key administrative processes reduced the staff's efficiency and created risk that critical responsibilities, assessments, and oversight of internal controls would not be carried out effectively.

Recommendation 10: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba should implement standard operating procedures for key administrative processes. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

³³ (U) Ibid., page 29.

(U) Human Resources

(U) Embassy Ended Locally Employed Staff Health Insurance Benefits Contract, Resulting in Changes to Medical Coverage That Negatively Affected Morale

(U) OIG found that in May 2022, Embassy Juba ended its LE staff health insurance benefits contract,³⁴ resulting in changes to medical coverage for LE staff that negatively affected their morale. Embassy Juba cited several reasons for not extending the contract. For example, the health insurance provider had misinterpreted terms around participant eligibility for coverage.³⁵ Additionally, the embassy had not included retention rates³⁶ in the contract as required by the Department's Office of the Procurement Executive. The dispute between the embassy and the provider led to unsuccessful renegotiations.³⁷ After ending the contract, the embassy returned to a direct reimbursement method for providing benefits, from May to September 2022.³⁸ The embassy then entered into a short-term health insurance benefits contract with another provider, starting in October 2022 for 6 months, and staff told OIG the embassy is expected to do a new solicitation for a longer-term contract. Although LE staff continued to have medical coverage throughout this process, the number of changes in that coverage, coming in quick succession, negatively impacted the LE staff's morale. Given the expected work associated with a new longer-term contract to stabilize medical coverage for LE staff, OIG informed embassy leadership of Department resources available for managing contracts, such as the Department's Regional Procurement Support Office.

(U) Embassy's Local Compensation Plan Did Not Comply With South Sudanese Labor Law

(U) Embassy Juba's local compensation plan for LE staff did not comply with South Sudanese labor laws as required by 3 FAM 7224.2-1a.³⁹ Specifically, the embassy did not update its local compensation plan to reflect the requirements introduced by the government of South Sudan in 2017 for normal working hours, overtime compensation, severance pay in case of death or physical incapacity, annual leave carryover, sick leave, and compassionate leave. Embassy staff told OIG they did not implement the adjustments because of a lack of awareness

³⁴ (U) The contract period of performance for the LE staff health insurance contract was from May 17, 2021, to May 16, 2026, with four option years. In May 2022, the embassy decided not to exercise the first year option to extend the contract.

³⁵ (U) For example, the provider believed that the annual reimbursement cap of \$15,400 applied to each family rather than to each employee and their eligible dependents individually. However, according to the contract, "the maximum annual reimbursement per covered individual per contract year is equivalent to \$15,400."

³⁶ (U) Retention rates are needed to identify all provider costs except the actual portion intended to fund claims paid to health care providers or claimants. The retention rate must include all other costs, including but not limited to overhead, administrative costs, profit, etc. See Bureau of Administration, Office of the Procurement Executive, "GMC Health and Life Insurance Services Overseas Model Uniform Contract Format."

³⁷ (U) The provider submitted a new quote of \$5.6 million, far higher than the \$1 million paid by the provider for medical costs during the base year of the contract. The provider eventually agreed to \$4.9 million but would not yield on the annual cap per eligible member as the embassy requested.

³⁸ (U) From May 2015 until May 2021, the embassy administered a direct reimbursement method for providing LE staff medical benefits.

³⁹ (U) According to 3 FAM 7224.2-1a, LE staff personnel programs should conform as closely as feasible with local law and prevailing practice but must be based on and administered in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations.

of local labor law, staffing gaps with temporary duty staff, and competing priorities for the sole Management Officer. Without an accurate local compensation plan, LE staff members may not receive all the benefits to which they are entitled.

Recommendation 11: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update the embassy's local compensation plan to comply with South Sudanese labor laws. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with GTM)

(U) Real Property

(U) Embassy Juba's Diplomatic Facilities Did Not Meet Department Security Standards and the Facilities Were Insufficient

(U) U.S. government-owned restricted⁴⁰ and leased diplomatic facilities, including the embassy compound and residential compound, did not meet Department security standards. The 2-acre embassy compound included the chancery, temporary structures, and auxiliary buildings. Located a quarter mile away from the embassy compound, the 7-acre residential compound also did not meet Department security standards. The compound included the chief of mission residence, DCM residence, USAID Mission Director's residence, Marine Security Guard Detachment residence, and 75 container housing units used as staff housing. Unique to Juba, the Department is a tenant agency operating from and living in USAID facilities. The companion classified inspection report contains additional information about the facilities not meeting Department security standards.

(U) During the inspection, OIG also observed insufficient office space on the embassy compound. For example, two U.S. direct-hire and two LE staff Information Resource Management staff occupied a cramped temporary structure along with their IT equipment. The motor pool drivers and two of the conference rooms were also located in temporary structures. Other Department U.S. direct-hire and LE staff shared offices including the Political-Economic, Public Diplomacy, Consular, Management, and IT sections. In 2022, the embassy staff requested space planning services from the Department's Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO) to address its space issues, and OBO sent a space planning team to the embassy in December 2022.

(U) In 2022, to improve these compounds, OBO completed a \$36.7 million compound security upgrade and a \$15.9 million Marine Security Guard residence expansion and renovation and a \$25.2 million project to update electrical systems. In addition, to meet the embassy's security requirements, OBO was moving forward with a \$784 million new embassy compound project. The project, awarded in 2022 with a completion date of 2027, will include a new office building, chief of mission residence, Marine Security Guard Detachment residence, community center and pool, and 167 staff apartment unit. OBO purchased a U.S. government-owned restricted 19-acre site for the compound.

⁴⁰ (U) The U.S. government has restricted ownership of the embassy and residential compounds. The land on which the embassy and residential properties sit is leased from the government of South Sudan.

(U) INFORMATION MANAGEMENT

(U) OIG reviewed Embassy Juba's information management operations, including classified, unclassified, and dedicated internet network (DIN)⁴¹ computer operations; physical protection of IT resources; classified communications security; emergency communications preparedness; and mail services. OIG found the Information Resource Management staff focused on day-to-day customer support and did not have time for routine maintenance of the classified, unclassified, and DIN systems, emergency communications, and classified communications security, including maintaining documentation and performing information security duties. These lapses occurred because the embassy Information Resource Management Unit was not staffed to adequately manage its operations. At the time of the inspection, an Information Management Officer, an Information Management Specialist, and three LE staff provided information management support to customers working in numerous buildings located on two compounds.⁴² Two of the LE staff were systems administrators, and the third one was a mailroom clerk. One of the systems administrators also served as the backup mailroom clerk and as a radio technician. Prior to August 2022, a sole Information Management Officer supported the embassy's information management operations with two LE staff for more than 6 months due to a staffing gap. The incumbent Information Management Officer and Information Management Specialist arrived at Juba in August and September 2022, respectively. To meet the demands of the workload and improve information management operations, the Information Management Officer had started to develop a plan to add three ICASS LE staff positions.

(U) OIG determined the embassy implemented most required information management and security controls in accordance with Department standards and applicable laws, except as described below.

(U) Information Systems Security Officers Did Not Perform All Required Duties

(U) Embassy Juba's information systems security officers (ISSO)⁴³ did not perform all required systems security duties. Although ISSOs briefed new classified and unclassified users on information security requirements, the ISSOs did not perform required monitoring and reviewing of ISSO tasks. For example, the ISSOs did not:

- (U) Review user access annually to verify if access was still needed or needs to be updated (12 FAH-10 H-112.1-3b and c).
- (U) Verify that data stored in shared folders did not contain information classified at a higher level than authorized on the system (12 FAH 10 H-112.8-3).

⁴¹ (U) A dedicated internet network is dedicated internet access from an internet service provider on a Department-owned and -operated discrete non-sensitive unclassified local area network that is not connected to any other Department system.

⁴² (U) Embassy and residential compounds.

⁴³ (U) ISSO responsibilities were assigned to the Information Management Specialist and Information Management Officer as a collateral duty.

- (U) Review and analyze audit logs (12 FAH-10 H-122.5-2).
- (U) Check mobile devices, including laptops, for compliance with Department standards (12 FAH-10 H-163.3(8) and 12 FAH-10 H-164.3(12)).

(U) OIG determined this issue occurred because the designated ISSOs did not have time for ISSO duties due to competing priorities. As noted earlier, the ISSOs focused on supporting a customer base working in multiple office buildings located in two compounds. OIG issued management assistance reports in May 2017 and December 2020⁴⁴ that highlighted widespread Department failures to perform ISSO duties. Failure to perform required ISSO responsibilities leaves Department networks vulnerable to potential unauthorized access and malicious activity.

Recommendation 12: (U) Embassy Juba should complete all information systems security officer responsibilities, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Embassy Lacked Documentation for Aspects of Computer Support and Operations

(U) Embassy Juba did not implement procedures to maintain documentation of all aspects of its computer support and operations, as required in 5 FAM 867. For example, the Information Resource Management staff did not have standard operating procedures for creating accounts, granting access to resources, managing passwords, maintaining systems, issuing mobile devices, and configuring laptops and non-enterprise mobile devices. As a result, OIG found nonstandard access request forms used for unclassified and classified computer operations, unencrypted laptops, systems passwords stored in computer files, and no records of systems maintenance tasks performed. Staff told OIG that they focused on customer support and had minimal time for standardization and documentation. Absence of documentation affects internal controls and diminishes the effectiveness of information management programs.

Recommendation 13: (U) Embassy Juba should implement procedures to maintain documentation for all aspects of its computer support and operations, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Embassy Operated Unauthorized and Unmonitored Wi-Fi Dedicated Internet Network

(U) Embassy Juba did not secure, monitor, or correctly register its DIN with the Bureau of Information Resource Management in accordance with 5 FAM 872.1, 5 FAM 872.3, and 12 FAH-10 H-152.1. OIG found the DIN operated with an unauthorized Wi-Fi network device. Additionally, Information Resource Management staff did not seek approval from the Department's Wi-Fi Governance Board to operate the Wi-Fi DIN as required in 12 FAH-10 H-152.1. A January 2018 Diplomatic Security Cybersecurity Assessment Report⁴⁵ identified

⁴⁴ (U) OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Non-Performance of Information Systems Security Officer Duties by Overseas Personnel* (ISP-17-24, May 2017); OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Continued Deficiencies in Performance of Information Systems Security Officer Responsibilities at Overseas Posts* (ISP-21-07, December 2020).

⁴⁵ (U) Bureau of Diplomatic Security, "Cybersecurity Assessment U.S. Embassy Juba ESC Pretoria 2018-015."

multiple issues with the embassy's DIN, but Information Resource Management staff did not take steps to address the issues due to other pressing day-to-day issues. At the time of the inspection, the Bureau of Information Resource Management notified Embassy Juba that it was approved for an enterprise Wi-Fi network to replace the current DIN. However, there was no timeline for the implementation of the new Wi-Fi network. Not securing and monitoring the DIN until the new Wi-Fi network is functional increases the vulnerability to cyber-attacks.

Recommendation 14: (U) Embassy Juba should configure, monitor, and register its dedicated internet network with the Bureau of Information Resource Management. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Information Technology Contingency Planning Did Not Meet Department Standards

(U) Embassy Juba did not complete and test either its unclassified or classified contingency plans, as required by 12 FAH-10 H-232.1-1(b) and 12 FAH-10 H-232.3-1. Department standards require management to develop and test IT contingency plans annually for effectiveness and to determine the mission's readiness to execute them during unplanned system outages or disruptions. This deficiency occurred because the information management staff focused on day-to-day operations. Inadequate contingency planning and testing prevents Information Resource Management staff from mitigating the risk of system and service disruptions in a timely manner.

Recommendation 15: (U) Embassy Juba should complete information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and classified networks and test the plans, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)


(U) Embassy Lacked Mobile Devices Management Procedures

(U) Embassy Juba did not implement standard operating procedures for managing mobile devices, such as cell phones, tablets, iPads, and laptops, as required in 12 FAH-10 H-163.1a(3) and 12 FAH-10 H-164.1a(8). The embassy also lacked a mobile device policy on the personal use of U.S. government issued devices, in accordance with 5 FAM 526.1c and d. OIG found the Information Resource Management staff used nonstandard property transfer forms to issue devices and did not keep track of returned devices. Additionally, staff was unable to tell OIG the number of mobile devices issued and in stock. This issue is part of a broader information technology inventory deficiency, which is discussed later in this report. At the time of the inspection, the Information Management Officer and the Information Management Specialist began to implement procedures for mobile devices but did not develop a standard operating procedure due to lack of time. Failure to document and implement proper mobile device management procedures and a policy on personal use could lead to mismanagement of the devices and incur unwarranted costs.

Recommendation 16: (U) Embassy Juba should implement standard operating procedures to manage its mobile devices and a policy on the personal use of mobile devices, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Unclassified Server Room Did Not Meet Department Access Control Standards

(U) The embassy's unclassified server room, which was in a trailer behind the chancery, did not meet the Department's access control and safety standards. Specifically, the room did not have a functioning spin-dial combination lock for after-hours access, as required in 12 FAH-10 H-272.2-1.1a (see figure 1). A January 2018 Bureau of Diplomatic Security Cybersecurity Assessment Report identified this deficiency, but the embassy did not address it. In addition, the server room floor had water damage that created safety issues (see figure 2). OIG also found that Information Resource Management staff did not have an up-to-date authorized access list, as required in 12 FAH-10 H-272.1-1, and a visitor access log, as required in 12 FAH-10 H-272.6-1. Operating servers and network devices in an unsecured server room with safety hazards leaves the equipment vulnerable to unauthorized access and jeopardizes employee safety.



(U) Figures 1 and 2: Unclassified server room entry and interior. (Source: OIG)

Recommendation 17: (U) Embassy Juba should bring the unclassified server room into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Lack of Standard Operating Procedures for Mail Screening Created Safety Risks

(U) Embassy Juba lacked standard operating procedures to ensure that all local mail was screened before entering the embassy buildings, as required in 14 FAH-4 H-121.1a. On occasion, local mail entered the chancery without screening because the local guards could not locate the mailroom clerk to conduct the screening. Additionally, the mail screening facility lacked personal protective equipment, such as gloves, masks, and goggles. The facility also was not connected to the telephone system. OIG determined that unit managers did not have the time to provide guidance to the mailroom staff and local guards on mail screening procedures. In the absence of documented mail screening procedures, embassy staff are at risk of being exposed to hazardous materials.

Recommendation 18: (U) Embassy Juba should develop mail screening standard operating procedures and disseminate it to local guard and mail room staff. (Action: Embassy Juba)

(U) Embassy Did Not Submit Annual Inventory and Reconciliation of Information Technology Assets for FY 2022

(U) Embassy Juba did not submit its required FY 2022 annual inventory reconciliation for its IT inventory of 1,121 assets valued at \$1.2 million. According to standards in 14 FAM 416.1b, an overseas post must submit its annual inventory to the Bureau of Administration's Property Management Division (A/PMP) by March 15 of each fiscal year to ensure financial integrity. Embassy staff told OIG they were unable to conduct the annual inventory and reconciliation for several reasons, discussed below.

(U) From FY 2011 to FY 2021, the USAID ASP inventoried most program and IT assets for the Department and USAID.⁴⁶ However, in FY 2022, after implementation of the Department's Annual Inventory Modernization⁴⁷ program in Juba, the embassy's Information Resource Management staff became responsible for the management and oversight of all Department IT assets. However, the USAID ASP retained responsibility for Department program assets and USAID's IT assets. Embassy staff told OIG that the transfer of the Department's IT inventory data from USAID to the Information Resource Management Unit was problematic due to the commingling of assets. Information Resource Management staff reported to OIG that during a visual scan of transferred IT inventory data, they found some assets appeared on both the Department's and USAID's IT inventories. Information Resource Management staff also told OIG that IT inventory data analytics indicated multiple discrepancies in the inventories.⁴⁸ Discrepancies included 70 unrecorded and 208 unscanned IT assets. Information Resource Management staff also reported that some IT items were entered with incorrect descriptions and asset categories, and some IT items were not received and entered in the IT inventory at all. Additionally, the transfer increased the workload for the unit, which was already overburdened with maintaining Department IT systems.

(U) OIG discussed potential solutions to the IT inventory issue with the embassy, USAID, and A/PMP staff. A/PMP staff proposed the following: (1) transfer Department IT assets, including oversight, back to USAID; (2) create another business unit to segregate assets; (3) convene a property management survey board and write off inventory discrepancies from the records; and (4) develop a memorandum of agreement between the embassy and USAID to manage personal property in Juba. However, by the conclusion of the inspection, embassy management staff had not implemented any of these proposed solutions. Management staff told OIG that the Information Resource Management Unit would require assistance from the Bureaus of

⁴⁶ (U) Annual Inventory Modernization (AIM) is an electronic system for conducting annual inventories at overseas posts.

⁴⁷ (U) Embassy Juba had oversight and management of classified assets including the annual inventory and reconciliation before and after implementation of the Annual Inventory Modernization program.

⁴⁸ (U) The Department's Bureau of Administration developed an overseas property management risk model that uses multiple metrics, including property management metrics, to measure an embassy's compliance with policies, procedures, and to identify weak internal controls.

African Affairs and Administration to finalize the FY 2022 Department IT inventory and to complete the FY 2023 Department IT inventory given staffing limitations. Failure to complete the annual inventory and reconciliation could result in undetected discrepancies, theft, or misuse of government resources.

Recommendation 19: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and Embassy Juba, should take appropriate action to assist the embassy with its annual inventory and reconciliation for fiscal years 2022 and 2023. (Action: AF, in coordination with A and Embassy Juba)

(U) Records Management Program Did Not Comply With Department Standards

(U) Embassy Juba's records management program did not comply with Department standards in 5 FAH-4 H-312.1b and 5 FAH-4 H-312.2 for records oversight and retirement. Specifically, OIG found the embassy did not retire records on schedule. For example, the embassy had never archived principal officer and program paper records, and only a limited number of electronic records were archived in 2022. In addition, the embassy did not archive diplomatic notes in accordance with the 5 FAH-1 Correspondence Handbook. OIG issued management assistance reports in September 2020 and June 2022⁴⁹ that highlighted deficiencies in records management, including records retirement, across the Department. Without a records management program that complies with Department standards, the mission is vulnerable to inefficient information retrieval and potential loss of critical documentation.

Recommendation 20: (U) Embassy Juba should implement a records management program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

⁴⁹ (U) OIG, *Management Assistance Report: Deficiencies in Overseas Records Management* (ISP-20-25, September 2020); and OIG, *Management Assistance Report: The Department of State's Records Retirement Process* (ISP-22-20, June 2022).

(U) RECOMMENDATIONS

(U) OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to Embassy Juba and the Bureau of African Affairs. The Department's complete responses can be found in Appendix B. The Department also provided technical comments that were incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

Recommendation 1: (U) Embassy Juba should submit its FY 2022 annual Statement of Assurance in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba submitted its FY 2022 annual Statement of Assurance in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 2: (U) Embassy Juba should bring its public diplomacy grant files into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation. The embassy noted an estimated completion date of May 2023.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba's public diplomacy grant files complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 3: (U) Embassy Juba should install signage at the Consular Section's public entrance with all information required by Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba installed signage at the Consular Section's public entrance with all information required by Department guidance.

Recommendation 4: (U) Embassy Juba should bring its consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba's consular cashiering operations complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 5: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should bring the privacy booth into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba's privacy booth complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 6: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should upgrade the booth in the West Compound Access Control to allow the consular cash register to be located there, bringing oversight of consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba upgraded the booth in the West Compound Access Control to allow the consular cash register to be located there, bringing oversight of consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards.

Recommendation 7: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should bring its developmental training program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba's developmental training program complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 8: (U) Embassy Juba should develop and implement a plan for communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba developed and implemented a plan for communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider.

Recommendation 9: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Foreign Service Institute, should evaluate and provide resources to assist with improving communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider. (Action: AF, in coordination with FSI)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response,¹ the Bureau of African Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the Bureau of African Affairs evaluated and provided resources to assist with improving communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider.

Recommendation 10: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba should implement standard operating procedures for key administrative processes. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, the Bureau of African Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the Bureau of African Affairs implemented standard operating procedures for key administrative processes.

Recommendation 11: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update the embassy's local compensation plan to comply with South Sudanese labor laws. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with GTM)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

¹ (U) In an email to OIG dated March 20, 2023, the Bureau of African Affairs noted that the embassy's official response document reflected the bureau's response.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba updated the embassy's local compensation plan to comply with South Sudanese labor laws.

Recommendation 12: (U) Embassy Juba should complete all information systems security officer responsibilities, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba completed all information systems security officer responsibilities, in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 13: (U) Embassy Juba should implement procedures to maintain documentation for all aspects of its computer support and operations, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba implemented procedures to maintain documentation for all aspects of its computer support and operations, in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 14: (U) Embassy Juba should configure, monitor, and register its dedicated internet network with the Bureau of Information Resource Management. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation. The embassy estimated completion by December 2023.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba configured, monitored, and registered its dedicated internet network with the Bureau of Information Resource Management.

Recommendation 15: (U) Embassy Juba should complete information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and classified networks and test the plans, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba completed information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and classified networks and tested the plans, in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 16: (U) Embassy Juba should implement standard operating procedures to manage its mobile devices and a policy on the personal use of mobile devices, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba implemented standard operating procedures to manage its mobile devices and a policy on the personal use of mobile devices, in accordance with Department standards.

Recommendation 17: (U) Embassy Juba should bring the unclassified server room into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba's unclassified server room complied with Department standards.

Recommendation 18: (U) Embassy Juba should develop mail screening standard operating procedures and disseminate it to local guard and mail room staff. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba developed mail screening standard operating procedures and disseminated it to local guard and mail room staff.

Recommendation 19: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and Embassy Juba, should take appropriate action to assist the embassy with its annual inventory and reconciliation for fiscal years 2022 and 2023. (Action: AF, in coordination with A and Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, the Bureau of African Affairs concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the Bureau of African Affairs took appropriate action to assist the embassy with its annual inventory and reconciliation for fiscal years 2022 and 2023.

Recommendation 20: (U) Embassy Juba should implement a records management program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

Management Response: (U) In its March 17, 2023, response, Embassy Juba concurred with this recommendation.

OIG Reply: (U) OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that Embassy Juba implemented a records management program that complies with Department standards.

(U) PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
Chiefs of Mission:		
Ambassador	Michael Adler	08/2022
Deputy Chief of Mission	William Flens	02/2022
Chiefs of Sections:		
Management	Griffin LeNoir	10/2021
Consular	Daniel Harper	09/2022
Political-Economic	Enrique Gallego	08/2021
Public Affairs	Moulik Berkana	08/2021
Regional Security	David Heddleston	08/2022
Other Agencies:		
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention	Sudhir Bunga	09/2017
Department of Defense	Michael Grater	03/2022
U.S. Agency for International Development	Katherine Crawford	09/2022

(U) Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by Embassy Juba.

(U) APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

(U) This inspection was conducted from August 29 to December 12, 2022, in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2020 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspections Handbook, as issued by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) for the Department and the U.S. Agency for Global Media (USAGM).

(U) Objectives and Scope

(U) The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chief Executive Officer of USAGM, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and USAGM. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **(U) Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved and U.S. interests are accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **(U) Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy; and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **(U) Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; and whether instances of fraud, waste, or abuse exist and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

(U) Methodology

(U) OIG used a risk-based approach to prepare for this inspection. OIG reviewed pertinent records; circulated surveys and compiled the results; conducted interviews with Department and on-site personnel; observed daily operations; and reviewed the substance of this report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, and organizations affected by the review. OIG used professional judgment and analyzed physical, documentary, and testimonial evidence to develop its findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

(U) APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

March 17, 2023

UNCLASSIFIED

THRU: Bureau of African Affairs Acting Assistant Secretary Massinga

TO: OIG – Arne Baker, Acting Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: Embassy Juba – Ambassador Michael Adler

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Embassy Juba, South Sudan

Embassy Juba has reviewed the draft OIG inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

OIG Recommendation 1: (U) Embassy Juba should submit its FY 2022 annual Statement of Assurance in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs and submitted the FY 2022 Statement of Assurance on January 6, 2023.

OIG Recommendation 2: (U) Embassy Juba should bring its public diplomacy grant files into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. The Public Diplomacy Section (PDS) will undertake a thorough review of current and past grants, ensuring compliance with Department standards, including adding to grants folders files documents that were missing. PDS

will coordinate with the grants office in AF/PDPA to cross-check and confirm completion of this recommendation by the end of May 2023.

OIG Recommendation 3: (U) Embassy Juba should install signage at the Consular Section's public entrance with all information required by Department guidance. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post has created temporary signage and is in the process of procuring a permanent sign.

OIG Recommendation 4: (U) Embassy Juba should bring its consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post has initiated the procurement process to purchase equipment necessary to bring consular cashiering practices into compliance.

OIG Recommendation 5: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should bring the privacy booth into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post has developed a project plan that is under consideration with OBO.

OIG Recommendation 6: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should upgrade the booth in the West Compound Access Control to allow the consular cash register to be located there, bringing oversight of consular cashiering operations into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post has developed a project plan and is actively working with OBO to initiate the construction process once funding is secured.

OIG Recommendation 7: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Consular Affairs, should bring its developmental training program into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with CA)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post has created a training plan for each employee.

OIG Recommendation 8: (U) Embassy Juba should develop and implement a plan for communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. The Acting Management Officer and LE Staff now meet weekly with the USAID EXO, and USAID HR staff. The Acting Management Officer, EXO, RSO, USAID Mission Director, DCM, and Ambassador meet weekly to discuss any ongoing or upcoming concerns related to Post management. The Acting Management Officer and USAID Mission Director also both attend the Ambassador's morning senior staff huddle. Informal meetings continue regularly within the Management Section, and between the Management Section, EXO, and Front Office.

OIG Recommendation 9: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management and the Foreign Service Institute, should evaluate and provide resources to assist with improving communication and coordination within the Management Section and with the U.S. Agency for International Development alternate service provider. (Action: AF, in coordination with GTM and FSI)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba and the Bureau of African Affairs concur with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 10: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with Embassy Juba should implement standard operating procedures for key administrative processes. (Action: AF, in coordination with Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba and the Bureau of African Affairs concur with the recommendation. Regional support personnel from the Executive Office of the Bureau of African Affairs will coordinate with Post management to review and, where appropriate, draw from its repository of best practices to implement standard operating procedures.

OIG Recommendation 11: (U) Embassy Juba, in coordination with the Bureau of Global Talent Management, should update the embassy's local compensation plan to comply with South Sudanese labor laws. (Action: Embassy Juba, in coordination with GTM)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. The Embassy notes that it had implemented several updates to the LCP in response to the 2017 labor law prior to the inspection, including changes to premium pay, annual leave, and annual leave carryover. Sick leave and compassionate or special leave were not changed since they already exceeded requirements in the 2017 law. Post will continue to adjust the LCP to conform with changes in the 2017 law as well as other relevant local regulations. Post continues to examine the implications of the 40-hour requirement for appropriate compensation for LE personnel required to work 12 hour shifts due to security conditions e.g., LGF, bodyguards, and drivers.

OIG Recommendation 12: (U) Embassy Juba should complete all information systems security officer responsibilities, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post's ISSO is reviewing user access and shared folder access on an ongoing basis, but not yet performing all ISSO tasks systematically using the ISSO checklist. Once inventories are complete and IRM section is more fully staffed the ISSO will be able to perform these tasks as required.

OIG Recommendation 13: (U) Embassy Juba should implement procedures to maintain documentation for all aspects of its computer support and operations, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post's IMO has contacted other posts via the IMO list for SOPs to start adapting them to post's needs.

OIG Recommendation 14: (U) Embassy Juba should configure, monitor, and register its dedicated internet network with the Bureau of Information Resource Management. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Securing the Wifi DIN with a Cisco ASA firewall and registering the DIN has already been completed. Post will request that the upcoming Wifi deployment team replace the access point with a GAP-WAP during an upcoming visit in April. This Wifi DIN will be replaced altogether with DOS Enterprise Wifi by the end of the year, which will be in full compliance with all department regulations.

OIG Recommendation 15: (U) Embassy Juba should complete information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and classified networks and test the plans, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Contingency plans for both systems have already been drafted.

OIG Recommendation 16: (U) Embassy Juba should implement standard operating procedures to manage its mobile devices and a policy on the personal use of mobile devices, in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. The IRM section has drafted a cell phone policy which is now in clearance. Post has also made significant progress in implementing ILMS Loanable Property and training staff in its usage to manage issuing of mobile devices. Post is drafting SOPs for mobile device management.

OIG Recommendation 17: (U) Embassy Juba should bring the unclassified server room into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post has completed the access list and visitor log for the server room. The IMO will also address the server room door/spin dial and server room floor issues with the Facilities Manager.

OIG Recommendation 18: (U) Embassy Juba should develop mail screening standard operating procedures and disseminate it to local guard and mail room staff. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation. Post is developing mail screening SOPs.

OIG Recommendation 19: (U) The Bureau of African Affairs, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration and Embassy Juba, should take appropriate action to assist the embassy with its annual inventory and reconciliation for fiscal years 2022 and 2023. (Action: AF, in coordination with A and Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba and the Bureau of African Affairs concur with the recommendation.

OIG Recommendation 20: (U) Embassy Juba should implement a records management program that complies with Department standards. (Action: Embassy Juba)

- **Management Response:** Embassy Juba concurs with the recommendation.

(U) APPENDIX C: ICASS SERVICE PROVIDERS AT EMBASSY JUBA

(U) Embassy Juba has two service providers for International Cooperative Administrative Support Services (ICASS): the Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which serves as the alternate service provider.

ICASS Services	Service Provider(s)
Mandatory^a	
Basic Package	State and USAID
Community Liaison Office	State
Health Services	State
Security Services	State
Building Operations	
Non-Residential Operations/Maintenance	USAID
Residential Operations/Building Maintenance	USAID
Financial Management	
Accounts and Records ^b	State
Budgets and Financial Plans ^b	State
Cashiering	State
Non-Travel Vouchering Services ^b	State
Payroll ^b	State
Travel Vouchering ^b	State
General Services	
Administrative Supply	USAID
Customs and Shipping	USAID
Fuel	USAID
Household, Furniture and Furnishings	USAID
Housing	USAID
Leasing	USAID
Motor Pool	USAID
Non-Expendable Property Management - Non-IT Assets	USAID
Procurement Services ^b	State and USAID
Travel Services ^b	State
Vehicle Maintenance	USAID
Human Resources	
LE Staff Human Resources Services ^b	State and USAID
LE Staff Human Resources Services - Medical Benefits	State
U.S. Citizen Human Resources Services ^b	State and USAID
Local Guard Programs	
Non-Residential Local Guard Program	State
Residential Local Guard Program	State
Information Management	
IT Support - Land lines	USAID

ICASS Services	Service Provider(s)
IT Support - Open Net and Class Net	State
IT Support – USAID Net	USAID
Mail and Messaging	State
Non-Expendable Property Management - Classified Assets ^c	State
Non-Expendable Property Management – State IT Assets ^{b, c}	State
Non-Expendable Property Management – USAID IT Assets	USAID
Pouching	State
Telecommunications - Circuits ^b	State and USAID
Telecommunications - Mobile Devices ^b	State and USAID
Telecommunications - Radios ^c	State
Telecommunications - TDY Radios Programming ^c	State
Telecommunications – TDY Radio Issuance	USAID

^a (U) Four services (also referred to as cost centers) are mandatory for every agency at post with personnel under Chief of Mission authority: basic package services, community liaison office services, health services, and security services. See 6 Foreign Affairs Handbook-5 H-341b, “Cost Center Description—ICASS Standard.”

^b (U) USAID ICASS service providers provide certain IT, general services, human resources, and financial management services for USAID. For example, USAID ICASS service providers manage the USAID network, USAID IT assets, and radio issuance for USAID employees on temporary duty in country.

^c (U) Not applicable for USAID.

(U) Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by Embassy Juba.

(U) ABBREVIATIONS

A/PMP	Bureau of Administration, Property Management Division
CAC	Compound Access Control
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
DCM	Deputy Chief of Mission
DIN	Dedicated Internet Network
EEO	Equal Employment Opportunity
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAST	First and Second Tour
ICASS	International Cooperative Administrative Support Services
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer
LE	Locally Employed
OBO	Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations
PEPFAR	President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development

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