



Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2022 - September 30, 2022



A Message from the Inspector General



I am pleased to submit our Semiannual Report to the Congress summarizing the work and accomplishments of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General from April 1, 2022, through September 30, 2022. We have made tremendous improvements to DHS OIG since I came on board in July 2019. The OIG continued to demonstrate that progress in the quantity and quality of our work and the morale of our employees, which are at all-time highs. As we continue to transform our organization, we are grateful to the U.S. Government Accountability Office, the National Academy of Public Administration, and others, for their support in our continuing organizational transformation.

Our greatest resource continues to be our workforce and the relationships we have with Congress, the Department, and our external stakeholders. I am extremely proud of, and grateful for, our more than 750 professional, career employees and their integrity, dedication, and commitment to excellence.

In total, during this reporting period, we issued 45 reports containing 176 recommendations to improve DHS programs and operations. Our audit work identified almost \$3.9 billion in questioned costs and more than \$180 million in funds put to better use. We initiated 219 investigations, closed 283 investigations, and issued 249 investigative reports. Our investigative activities resulted in 62 arrests, 52 convictions, and almost \$8 million in recoveries, restitution, and fines.


One of our top priorities is detecting and deterring pandemic-related fraud. Since January 2020, DHS OIG has received more than 7,670 COVID-19 related complaints resulting in approximately 379 high impact investigations. To date, our COVID-19-related investigations have resulted in 48 indictments, 14 criminal informations, 29 convictions, and more than \$7.9 million in recoveries, restitution, and fines.

During this reporting period, we also reported on a wide range of other high-priority, high-risk areas, including:

- [Border Security](#)
- [Preparedness and Resilience](#)
- [Cybersecurity](#)
- [Counter Terrorism](#)

As the Department performs its tremendous mission, we will continue to provide rigorous, independent, and objective oversight, to promote excellence, integrity, and accountability across the Department. Thank you for your support of our work.


Sincerely,



Joseph V. Cuffari, Ph.D.
Inspector General

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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL AND DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY PROFILES

The [Homeland Security Act of 2002](#) officially established the Department of Homeland Security, as well as an OIG in the Department by amendment to the [Inspector General Act of 1978](#). By this action, Congress and the Administration ensured independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations of DHS' programs and operations.

The President appoints and the Senate confirms the Inspector General, who reports directly to the DHS Secretary and Congress. The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, ensures DHS OIG's independence. This independence is fundamental to our ability to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse as well as provide objective and credible reports to the Secretary and Congress about the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of DHS programs and operations. The DHS OIG is headquartered in Washington, DC, and operates from approximately 30 locations across the country.

OIG Offices

- Executive Office
- Office of Audits
- Office of Counsel
- Office of External Affairs
- Office of Innovation
- Office of Inspections and Evaluations
- Office of Integrity
- Office of Investigations
- Office of Management

DHS Components and Offices

- Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Office (CWMD)
- Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)
- Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
- Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC)
- Management Directorate (MGMT)
- Office of the Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman (CIS Ombudsman)
- Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL)
- Office of the Chief Financial Officer (OCFO)
- Office of the General Counsel (OGC)
- Office of Health Security (OHS)
- Office of the Immigration Detention Ombudsman (OIDO)
- Office of Inspector General (OIG)
- Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A)
- Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA)
- Office of Operations Coordination (OPS)
- Office of Partnership and Engagement (OPE)
- Office of Public Affairs (OPA)
- Office of Strategy, Policy, and Plans (PLCY)
- Privacy Office (PRIV)
- Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
- Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
- U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
- United States Coast Guard (Coast Guard)
- U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
- U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
- United States Secret Service (Secret Service)

SUMMARY OF OIG ACTIVITIES AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

During this reporting period, DHS OIG completed audits, inspections and evaluations, and investigations to promote economy, efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity in the Department's programs and operations.

Reports Issued to DHS

In this reporting period, we issued 45 audit and inspection reports (see Appendix 1), containing 176 recommendations, and 249 investigative reports.

Financial Impact

In this reporting period, our audits resulted in questioned costs of \$3,850,757,807. We issued two audit reports identifying \$180,111,248 in funds put to better use and the Department recovered or deobligated \$1,821,252 (see Appendix 1). We reported \$7,970,435 in recoveries, restitution, and fines from investigations.¹

| Type of Impact | Amount |
|--|-----------------|
| Questioned Costs | \$3,850,757,807 |
| Funds to be Put to Better Use | \$180,111,248 |
| Management Agreement that Funds be Recovered/Deobligated | \$6,684,427 |
| Funds Recovered/Deobligated | \$1,821,252 |
| Recoveries, Restitution, and Fines from Investigations | \$7,970,435 |

Investigations

We initiated 219 investigations and closed 283. Our investigations resulted in 62 arrests, 68 indictments, 52 convictions, and 10 personnel actions. In accordance with the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, we have included information regarding the number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities and indictments that resulted from prior referrals to prosecuting authorities.

¹ Investigative work often involves several law enforcement agencies working on the same case. OIGs may conduct cases with other OIGs, other Federal law enforcement agencies, and state or local law enforcement entities. Investigative Receivables and Recoveries reflect the results of criminal and civil cases that were ordered plus any voluntary repayments during the fiscal year. In criminal cases, the dollar value reflects the restitution, criminal fines, and special assessments resulting from successful criminal prosecutions. The dollar value in civil cases reflects the number of damages, penalties, settlements, and forfeitures resulting from successful civil actions. Voluntary repayments include the amount paid by the subject of an investigation or the value of government property recovered before prosecutorial action is taken. These totals do not reflect the dollar amounts associated with recovered items, such as original historical documents and cultural artifacts, whose value cannot be readily determined.

| Type of Investigation* | Number |
|---|--------|
| Open Investigations as of 09/30/2022 | 825 |
| Investigations Initiated | 219 |
| Investigations Closed | 283 |
| Investigative Reports Issued | 249 |
| Investigations (persons) Referred for Federal Prosecution | 48 |
| Investigations (persons) Accepted for Federal Prosecution | 98 |
| Investigations (persons) Declined for Federal Prosecution | 78 |
| Total number of persons referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution | 4 |
| Total number of indictments and criminal information during the reporting period that resulted from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities | 66 |

* All data was obtained from the Enforcement Data System, which is DHS OIG's investigations case management system.

Note: Investigations accepted or declined may have been received in a prior reporting period.

Complaints

The OIG Hotline is a resource for Federal employees and the public to report allegations of employee corruption, civil rights and civil liberties abuses, program fraud and financial crimes, and miscellaneous criminal and non-criminal activity associated with waste, fraud, or abuse affecting the Department's programs and operations.

| Complaint Activity Occurring April 1, 2022 to September 30, 2022 | Number |
|--|--------|
| Total Hotline Complaints Received | 10,217 |
| Complaints Referred (outside of DHS OIG) | 7,367 |
| Complaints Closed | 10,425 |

Note: Complaints referred and closed include complaints received in a prior period.

Whistleblower Protection Unit

The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Unit (WPU) reviews and investigates allegations of whistleblower retaliation made by DHS employees, as well as by employees of DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantees, and subgrantees. WPU primarily conducts non-discretionary investigations pursuant to the *Military Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1034; Protecting Whistleblowers with Access to Classified Information, Presidential Policy Directive 19; Security Clearances and Classified Information, 50 U.S.C. § 3341; and the Enhancement of Whistleblower Protection for Contractors and Grantees, 41 U.S.C. § 4712*. Additionally, in certain instances, WPU conducts whistleblower retaliation investigations under the authority of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and the Whistleblower Protection Act, 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)-(9)*.

WPU Activity During Current SAR Period

Complaint Intake

During this reporting period, WPU received 212 complaints, which it reviewed for allegations of whistleblower retaliation. Entering the period, WPU had 12 pending complaints to resolve. Therefore, combining the 212 received with the 12 pending from last period, WPU reviewed 224 complaints during the reporting period. Of those, WPU declined to open an investigation for 212 complaints during the intake process. The 224 complaints reviewed this period represents a 19 percent increase in complaints reviewed over the most recent SAR period ending on March 31, 2022. Investigations were opened on five complaints, leaving seven complaints currently pending.

| WPU Intake Complaints April 1, 2022 to September 30, 2022 | Number |
|---|------------|
| Pending Complaints Entering this Period | 12 |
| Complaints Received by WPU During Period | 212 |
| Total Complaints Reviewed by WPU during Period | 224 |
| Complaints Declined During Intake Process ² | 212 |
| Complaints Converted to Investigation | 5 |
| Total Complaints Pending at End of Period | 7 |

Investigations

WPU closed five whistleblower retaliation investigations with reports of investigation during the SAR period. WPU opened the same number of investigations that it closed, resulting in no increase in overall pending investigations.

² Complaints are most often declined during the intake process because they fail to allege a prima facie case of whistleblower retaliation, are the subject of an open inquiry being conducted by another office or agency, or alleged whistleblower retaliation generally handled by the U.S. Office of Special Counsel.

| Whistleblower Retaliation Investigations April 1, 2022 to September 30, 2022 | Number |
|---|---------------|
| Investigations Pending at Beginning of Period | 51 |
| Investigations Opened During Period | 5 |
| Investigations Closed During Period | 5 |
| Investigations Pending at End of Period | 51 |

Recent Substantiated Reports of Whistleblower Retaliation and Pending Corrective Action

None of the five investigations closed this SAR period found the complaints to be substantiated. Corrective actions from prior substantiated reports of whistleblower retaliation have been completed. Therefore, there are no pending corrective actions to address in this reporting period.

Whistleblower Protection Coordinator

Whistleblowers perform an important service by reporting what they reasonably believe to be evidence of waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement. DHS employees, contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, and personal services contractors are protected by law from retaliation for making a protected disclosure. In accordance with the Inspector General Act, as amended, the DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection Coordinator, who is in the OIG's Office of Counsel, provides the following services:

- Educates DHS employees, contractors, subcontractors, grantees, subgrantees, personal service contractors, and employees eligible for access to classified information, on reporting fraud, waste, and abuse within DHS without fear of reprisal.
- Educates all DHS employees on avenues to report allegations of whistleblower reprisal and on the roles that the OIG, the Office of Special Counsel, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and other relevant entities play in investigating reprisal allegations.
- Assists the Inspector General in promoting the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures and allegations of reprisal.
- Assists the Inspector General in facilitating communication and coordination with the Office of Special Counsel, the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, the Department, Congress, and other entities regarding the timely and appropriate handling and consideration of protected disclosures.

This reporting cycle, the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator focused on staff training, including presenting information about whistleblower rights and protections during biweekly DHS New Employee Orientation sessions and trainings specific to DHS components. Additionally, the Whistleblower Protection Coordinator helped develop and implement DHS OIG's Whistleblower Protection Alternative Dispute Resolution Program (ADR).

Whistleblower Protection Alternative Dispute Resolution Program

DHS OIG recently launched the ADR program. The program is designed to resolve whistleblower retaliation complaints filed by the following: 1) DHS contractors, subcontractors, grantee, subgrantees, and personal services contractors; 2) uniformed Coast Guard members; 3) individuals alleging retaliatory security clearance actions; and 4) other qualified complainants. Modeled after successful ADR programs in the federal government, the DHS OIG ADR program provides complainants with an alternative to the formal investigative process.

ADR is an efficient and effective method of resolving disputes. The DHS OIG Whistleblower Protection ADR program is voluntary and facilitated by a DHS OIG mediator, who assists the parties in reaching a mutually agreeable resolution to the complaint through a mediation or facilitated settlement negotiation. As an informal and confidential process, parties can customize both the ADR process and the resolution of the complaint, instead of an outside decision maker. The program has already received high praise from parties, the Department, and outside entities.



HIGHLIGHTS OF SIGNIFICANT OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES

During this reporting period, we issued 45 new reports and 176 recommendations to the Department and we closed 160 recommendations, issued in this and prior periods.

In this report, we highlight our pandemic response oversight activities and a number of audits, inspections, and evaluations we conducted. Our work is risk-based and aligns with the Department's strategic mission areas outlined in the [DHS Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2020-2024](#):

- Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats
- Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches
- Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure
- Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security
- Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience
- Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

We have also highlighted several investigations we conducted during the reporting period.

Pandemic Response

During this reporting period, DHS OIG completed and issued 11 reports related to the COVID-19 pandemic response:

- [ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19 Protocols and Detention Standards while Housing Migrant Families in Hotels, OIG-22-37](#)
- [Violations of ICE Detention Standards at South Texas ICE Processing Center, OIG-22-40](#)
- [Management Alert - FEMA's COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent with Previous Interpretation of Long-Standing Regulations for Eligible Funeral Expenses, OIG-22-36](#)
- [Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative, OIG-22-42](#)
- [ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights, OIG-22-44](#)
- [Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Folkston ICE Processing Center and Folkston Annex, OIG-22-47](#)
- [A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus Disease 2019 \(COVID-19\) Response and Relief, OIG-22-72](#)
- [FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \\$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program, OIG-22-69](#)
- [More than \\$2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees' Identities OIG-22-73](#)
- [FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19 Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations, OIG-22-74](#)
- [FEMA's Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement OIG-22-76](#)

We have focused on major pandemic fraud cases involving facilitators, such as corrupt employees working in state disbursing offices. For example, in the State of Arizona we partnered with the Department of Economic Security to identify state employees who improperly received unemployment insurance benefits. To date, four employees employed by the State of Arizona have been convicted with a total of \$94,829 recovered in restitution. In Michigan, we partnered with the Department of Labor's OIG to identify corrupt state employees who fraudulently approved unemployment insurance claims resulting in millions of dollars in losses. As noted earlier, in the State of Virginia, we exposed a major fraud ring running through the state prison system. This resulted in 27 criminal indictments, 21 convictions, and restitution of \$223,984.72.

DHS OIG is one of nine mandated IGs participating in the Pandemic Response Accountability Committee (PRAC), which was established as a committee of the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) by the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (CARES Act). The PRAC's mission is to promote transparency and ensure coordinated, comprehensive oversight of the Government's spending and COVID-19 pandemic response to prevent and detect fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. The PRAC is tracking more than \$5 trillion in payments to individual citizens, loans for businesses, and support for hospitals and other medical providers, as well as economic relief for impacted businesses, industries, and state, local, and tribal governments³. As a participating PRAC member, we conducted a review to determine the sources and intended purpose of Federal pandemic response funding initiatives provided to six geographic areas between January 1, 2020 and September 30, 2021. On September 16, 2022, we issued [A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus Disease 2019 \(COVID-19\) Response and Relief, OIG-22-72](#), which found that FEMA provided approximately \$49.3 million of COVID-19 pandemic relief funds to Springfield, MA; Coeur D'Alene, ID; Sheridan County, NE; Marion County, GA; White Earth Nation in Minnesota; and Jicarilla Apache Nation in New Mexico. Local entities and individuals in these locations received this assistance through the following funding initiatives and for the indicated amounts:

- Lost Wages Assistance (LWA) program (\$40.1 million)
- Public Assistance program (\$7.6 million)
- COVID-19 Funeral Assistance program (\$1.2 million)
- Assistance to Firefighters Grants (\$208,000)
- Emergency Food and Shelter Program (\$182,000)

Although FEMA provided information for each of its funding initiatives, in some instances, FEMA could not provide detailed data and/or supporting documentation in the time allotted. This was because FEMA's inconsistent data collection process and management practices presented FEMA with challenges when responding to our requests. For instance, FEMA does not always maintain data at the local level, some FEMA systems cannot provide program data as of a specific date, and FEMA did not follow a standardized process to obtain and generate program data. These weaknesses prevented us from effectively comparing program data across geographic locations and limited our ability to validate the accuracy of FEMA's systems during Phase 1 of the PRAC's study. Phase 2 of the PRAC's study is underway and as of September 30, four of the six were visited by the PRAC and participating OIGs. Additionally, during Phase 2, we plan to also review FEMA's oversight of recipient and subrecipient compliance with Federal reporting requirements.

³ The PRAC hosts a website — <http://www.pandemicoversight.gov> — with interactive data visualizations and maps to track pandemic funds.

Secure U.S. Borders and Approaches

"DHS helps maintain national security by managing the flow of people and goods into the United States. DHS' border security approach focuses on four goals: (1) securing and managing air, land, and maritime borders; (2) preventing and intercepting foreign threats so they do not reach U.S. soil; (3) enforcing immigration laws; and (4) properly administering immigration benefits."

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We continue to evaluate the Department's operations to secure our borders, safeguard and facilitate trade and travel, enforce immigration laws, and properly administer immigration benefits.

We issued 16 audit and inspection reports during this reporting period. Six of the issued reports described the results of unannounced inspections at CBP and ICE facilities.

[DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis \(REDACTED\), OIG-22-64](#)

After meeting with more than 130 individuals from DHS and gathering and analyzing data on Afghan evacuees arriving as part of Operation Allies Refuge (OAR)/Operation Allies Welcome (OAW), we determined that DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and inspect all the evacuees. Specifically, CBP did not always have critical data to properly screen, vet, or inspect the evacuees. We determined some information used to vet evacuees through U.S. Government databases (such as name, date of birth, identification number, and travel document data) was inaccurate, incomplete, or missing. We also determined CBP admitted or paroled evacuees who were not fully vetted into the United States.

We attributed DHS' challenges to not having: (1) a list of Afghan evacuees who lacked sufficient identification documents; (2) a contingency plan to support similar emergency situations; and (3) standardized policies. As a result, DHS may have admitted or paroled individuals into the United States who pose a risk to national security and the safety of local communities. We made two recommendations to improve the Department's screening and vetting of Afghan evacuees and coordination and planning efforts for future similar emergency situations. The Department did not concur with these recommendations.

[ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19 Protocols, and Detention Standards While Housing Migrant Families in Hotels, OIG-22-37](#)

The objective was to evaluate ICE plans to house migrant families in hotels and how ICE selected a contractor to implement these plans. We found that ICE did not adequately justify the need for the sole source contract, awarded to Endeavors, to house migrant families and spent approximately \$17 million for hotel space and services at six hotels that went largely unused between April and June 2021.

In addition, Endeavors did not meet new healthcare protocols or ensure proper COVID-19 testing for families. For example, families were not tested by ICE for COVID-19 prior to being transported to hotels and were not always tested by Endeavors staff upon arrival at or departure from hotels, putting migrant families and the outside population at risk of contracting COVID-19. Further, Endeavors did not follow required ICE standards to ensure the proper care for housing migrant families while such families were residing in its facilities. We made four recommendations to ICE to improve the contracting and oversight to address the issues identified and ensure hotel facility compliance with detention standards. ICE concurred with one recommendation and did not concur with three recommendations. One recommendation was resolved and closed, and three recommendations were administratively closed.

[*DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border, OIG-22-66*](#)

We determined that DHS' information technology (IT) systems did not effectively allow CBP and ICE personnel to track migrants from apprehension to release or transfer. Instead, DHS personnel and partner agencies at the southwest border implemented manual and ad hoc workarounds to process migrants apprehended illegally entering the United States. DHS personnel also faced challenges when data was not consistently documented in DHS' systems of record. For example, migrant apprehension times were not recorded in a consistent manner, and we identified missing migrant data that prevented DHS from determining family status. Also, CBP did not always document a migrant's intended U.S. address before releasing the individual into the United States using prosecutorial discretion to await immigration proceedings. We made eight recommendations to help prioritize funding needs and make integration improvements to DHS IT systems to promote timely and accurate information sharing within DHS and with external partners. The Department concurred with all eight recommendations.

[*DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome, OIG-22-54*](#)

The objective was to determine DHS' effectiveness in recruiting, deploying, and managing the DHS employees detailed to or volunteering at the safe havens. We found that, as the lead agency for OAW, DHS coordinated efforts across the Federal Government to resettle individuals evacuated from Afghanistan. DHS advertised detail opportunities to its employees but did not direct components to commit all necessary staff and did not initially receive funding. Therefore, DHS did not fill all the positions. DHS also recruited employee volunteers through the DHS Volunteer Force. However, DHS could not reimburse components for the costs of travel and overtime, making some components reluctant to fund the volunteer deployments and further limiting the number of DHS employees at safe havens. The DHS employee shortage affected the safe havens' ability to provide certain services to Afghan guests. Also, some DHS employee volunteers told us they did not feel adequately supported before and during deployments. Overall, we determined DHS did not have a structure to support volunteers for unfunded operations such as OAW. We recommended one action DHS can take to avoid potential staffing shortages in future operations and two actions to improve DHS' ability to deploy and support its employees during emergency operations. DHS concurred with all three recommendations.

[*ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights, OIG-22-44*](#)

The objective was to determine the extent to which ICE mitigates safety risks by testing migrants for COVID-19 before transport on domestic commercial flights and whether a process is in place for escorting noncitizen unaccompanied children (UC) during transport. We determined that ICE's

Enforcement and Removal Operations directorate (ERO) has a process for escorting UC to the Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Refugee Resettlement. However, ERO did not follow policies, guidance, or recommendations to ensure all migrants were tested for COVID 19 before transport on domestic commercial flights. This occurred because ERO's policies are unclear and ERO does not have controls in place to enforce them. Additionally, some of these policies do not apply to UC, who are not detained in ICE facilities. ERO also does not maintain complete records to oversee the transport of these migrants. We recommended that ERO coordinate with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the DHS Chief Medical Officer to determine and document whether existing policies for COVID-19 testing of migrants are appropriate and to establish controls to ensure staff and contractors follow those policies. We made four recommendations to ICE ERO to protect the health and safety of migrants, ERO staff, and the general public. ICE concurred with three recommendations and did not concur with one recommendation.

[CBP and CWMD Need to Improve Monitoring and Maintenance of Radiation Portal Monitor Systems, REDACTED, OIG-22-39](#)

We conducted this audit in response to a hotline complaint to determine the extent to which CBP monitors and maintains its radiation portal monitor (RPM) systems in accordance with DHS acquisition guidelines, policies, and procedures. We determined CBP and DHS' CWMD, as co-managers of the RPM program, do not monitor and maintain RPM systems to ensure they continue to meet needed capabilities. Although CBP monitors the operational availability of RPM systems, not all CBP ports of entry standard operating procedures include the requirement to conduct operational checks to confirm RPM systems are mission capable, as required by CBP policy. This occurred because CBP did not ensure ports of entry standard operating procedures included the requirement to conduct operational checks of RPM systems. We made two recommendations to improve the monitoring and maintenance of RPM systems. DHS concurred with both recommendations.

Other issued reports: [CBP Complied with Facial Recognition Policies to Identify International Travelers at Airports, OIG-22-48](#); [U.S. Border Patrol Faces Challenges Administering Outcomes Consistently Across Sectors, OIG-22-68](#); [ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations, OIG-22-70](#), [U.S. Border Patrol Screened Migrants at the Southwest Border but Could Strengthen Processes, OIG-22-71](#).

Unannounced Inspections


[Yuma Sector Border Patrol Struggled to Meet TEDS Standards for Single Adult Men but Generally Met TEDS Standards for Other Populations, OIG-22-38](#)

Our objective was to determine whether CBP complied with the National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search (TEDS). During our unannounced inspections of three CBP locations in the Yuma area of Arizona in September 2021, we observed that all three U.S. Border Patrol facilities we inspected generally met TEDS standards for noncitizen unaccompanied children, families, and single adult women at the time of our observation. CBP also met TEDS standards at the two Office of Field Operations ports of entry we visited. However, during our site visit, conditions for single adult men held at the Border Patrol's Yuma station did not always meet TEDS standards. Single adult men were held in crowded conditions, and those held in overflow military tents experienced temperatures in excess of 95 degrees. We found issues with data integrity during our site visit, not only regarding CBP staffing at stations, but also regarding migrants' locations and care. We did not make recommendations about TEDS compliance because there are relevant outstanding recommendations from a prior review. We made one recommendation to Yuma sector Border Patrol to monitor data integrity. CBP concurred with our recommendation.

[Violations of ICE Detention Standards at South Texas ICE Processing Center, OIG-22-40](#)

We conducted an unannounced inspection of South Texas ICE Processing Center to monitor compliance with select ICE detention standards. We also conducted a limited review of the facility's COVID-19 pandemic preparedness measures. We identified violations of ICE detention standards that compromised the health, safety, and rights of detainees. We found that South Texas did not meet standards for grievances, segregation, COVID-19 response, or communications with detainees. Specifically, the facility was late responding to grievances and did not document grievance resolutions. Grievances included complaints about mistreatment by staff, some of which the facility substantiated. Also, South Texas did not consistently provide required services for detainees in segregation, including access to legal materials and razors; nor were we able to confirm the facility consistently provided access to legal calls, mail, commissary, and linen exchange due to facility records missing documentation of these activities. In addressing COVID-19, South Texas did not consistently enforce precautions including use of masks and social distancing but did begin providing COVID-19 vaccinations to detainees through partnerships with local governments. Further, ICE did not consistently respond to detainee requests in a timely manner and did not provide detainees with visitation schedules indicating the times ICE officials would visit detainee housing units. Finally, we determined the diminished detainee population at South Texas resulted in ICE paying roughly \$18 million for unused bed space for a 1-year period under a guaranteed minimum contract. We made five recommendations to ICE's Executive Associate Director of Enforcement and Removal Operations to ensure the San Antonio ERO Field Office overseeing South Texas addresses identified issues and ensures facility compliance with relevant detention standards. ICE concurred with the recommendations.

Other issued reports describing results of unannounced inspections: [Del Rio Area Struggled with Prolonged Detention, Consistent Compliance with CBP's TEDS Standards, and Data Integrity, OIG-22-80](#); [Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Folkston ICE Processing Center and Folkston Annex, OIG-22-47](#); [El Paso Sector Border Patrol Struggled with Prolonged Detention and Consistent Compliance with TEDS Standards, OIG-22-57](#); [Violations of Detention Standards at Torrance County Detention Facility, OIG-22-75](#).



Strengthen Preparedness and Resilience

“The Federal Government must remain capable of responding to natural disasters, physical and cyber-attacks, weapons of mass destruction attacks, critical infrastructure disruptions, and search and rescue distress signals. Following disasters, the Federal Government must be prepared to support local communities with long-term recovery assistance. The United States can effectively manage emergencies and mitigate harm by thoroughly preparing local communities, rapidly responding during crises, and supporting recovery. The Department’s preparedness and resilience responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) build a national culture of preparedness; (2) respond during incidents; (3) support outcome-driven community recovery; and (4) train and exercise first responders.”

DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan

We conduct mandated, requested, and discretionary audits and evaluations to assess the Department’s disaster response and recovery programs and operations to identify deficiencies and make recommendations for improvement.

We issued 12 audit and inspection reports during this reporting period.

[Management Alert - FEMA’s COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent with Previous Interpretation of Long-Standing Regulations for Eligible Funeral Expenses, OIG-22-36](#)

The objective of our ongoing audit is to determine to what extent FEMA implemented internal controls to provide oversight of its COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Program. We determined it was necessary to issue this management alert because, under FEMA’s operating procedures, there is no assurance that: (1) funeral assistance funds are being used to reimburse necessary expenses and serious needs; (2) expenses are being checked line-by-line; (3) expenses specifically excluded from payment in other disasters are not being reimbursed in connection with COVID-19 without notice to the public; and (4) FEMA is complying with its own policies. FEMA did not concur with a recommendation to issue modified operating procedures that align with provisions on ineligible funeral assistance expenses.

[FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \\$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program, OIG-22-69](#)

The objective was to determine to what extent FEMA ensured that states and territories distributed supplemental LWA to eligible recipients. FEMA did not implement controls that may have prevented the 21 state workforce agencies (SWA) in our review from distributing more than \$3.7 billion in improper payments through its LWA program. These 21 SWAs distributed 80 percent of the \$36.5 billion distributed for LWA — \$30 billion in total — and later detected \$3.3 billion in potentially fraudulent payments. We also identified \$21.6 million in overpayments and \$403 million in payments made without obtaining claimants’ required self-certifications of eligibility for LWA. We made seven recommendations to improve FEMA’s management of its Federal assistance programs and recover the LWA improper payments. FEMA concurred with three recommendations and did not concur with four.

[*More than \\$2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees' Identities, OIG-22-73*](#)

The objective was to determine to what extent eligible DHS employees received FEMA's Disaster Relief Funds for supplemental state LWA. FEMA did not implement controls to prevent SWA from paying more than \$2.6 million in LWA in response to potentially fraudulent claims made by DHS employees, or claimants who fraudulently used the identities of DHS employees to obtain LWA benefits. In our dataset, we found 2,393 claims linked to DHS employees' identities, totaling \$3.3 million in LWA payments. Based on eligibility criteria, we determined that 1,809 DHS employees were ineligible or potentially ineligible for LWA benefits. The claims linked to these employees' identities totaled more than \$2.4 million in potentially fraudulent LWA payments. Additionally, 584 DHS employees were eligible to receive LWA benefits. However, 167 of the claims linked to these employees' identities (\$242,240) showed a high or medium risk of fraudulent activity, including identity theft, based on fraud risk indicators. We made seven recommendations to the Department and FEMA to mitigate the risks of LWA and unemployment insurance program fraud and strengthen future FEMA programs. DHS concurred with five recommendations and did not concur with two.

[*FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program, OIG-22-56*](#)

The objective was to determine to what extent FEMA's Oversight of the National Board's administration of Emergency Food and Shelter Program (EFSP), including CARES Act funding, ensured individuals experiencing emergency financial hardships received aid, in accordance with Federal requirements to meet program goals. We determined that about \$58 million in EFSP grant funds went unspent, of which \$45 million could have been put to better use more quickly to provide urgently needed services. In addition, FEMA's EFSP program office was unable to identify areas in which the program was achieving its goals or needed improvement. Also, the National Board and its fiscal agent did not have written policies and procedures or enforce established guidance. We recommended that FEMA and the EFSP National Board develop and document policies and procedures for improved oversight of EFSP. We made 10 recommendations to improve oversight of EFSP. FEMA concurred with seven recommendations and did not concur with three.

Other issued reports: [*Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative, OIG-22-42*](#); [*FEMA's Waiver Authority under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018, OIG-22-43*](#); [*FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions, OIG-22-46*](#); [*Assessment of FEMA's Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Program, OIG-22-51*](#); [*A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus \(COVID-19\) Response and Relief, OIG-22-72*](#); [*FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19 Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations, OIG-22-74*](#); [*FEMA's Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement, OIG-22-76*](#); and [*FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage Disaster Case Management Program Funds in Support of Hurricane Maria Recovery Services, OIG-22-77*](#).

Counter Terrorism and Homeland Security Threats

“DHS protects Americans from terrorism and other homeland security threats by preventing nation-states and their proxies, transnational criminal organizations, and groups or individuals from engaging in terrorist or criminal acts that threaten the Homeland. The Department’s counterterrorism responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) collect, analyze, and share actionable intelligence; (2) detect and disrupt threats; (3) protect designated leadership, events, and soft targets; and (4) counter weapons of mass destruction and emerging threats.”

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We continue to provide oversight of the Department’s counterterrorism programs and operations and make recommendations to improve capabilities and mitigate threats.

We issued four audit and inspection reports during this reporting period.

[DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism, OIG-22-49](#)

The objective was to determine the extent to which DHS is positioned to prevent and reduce domestic terrorism in the United States. We determined that DHS has taken steps to help the United States counter terrorism, but those efforts have not always been consistent. This occurred because the Department has not established a governance body with staff dedicated to long-term oversight and coordination of its efforts to combat domestic terrorism. DHS could also improve how it identifies domestic terrorism threats, tracks trends for future risk-based planning, and informs partners and the public about domestic terrorism. Specifically, the Department has limited access to the sources of information it needs to identify domestic terrorism threats. DHS could do more to compile, maintain and track domestic terrorism information for future planning. Finally, the advisories DHS issues to inform partners and the public may not be timely to help them take steps to protect themselves from threats. As the threat of domestic terrorism continues to evolve, it is imperative that the Department strengthens its ability to collect and disseminate critical information to proactively assist other Federal Government agencies, state and local governments, and the public to deter, prevent, preempt, and respond to the threat of domestic terrorism. DHS concurred with all six of our recommendations to improve DHS’ position on preventing and reducing domestic terrorism in the United States.

[DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures, OIG-22-41](#)

DHS did not adequately follow its internal processes and comply with applicable Intelligence Community policy standards and requirements when editing and disseminating an I&A intelligence product regarding Russian interference in the 2020 U.S. Presidential election. For example, I&A employees during the review and clearance process changed the product’s scope by making changes that appear to be based, in part, on political considerations, potentially impacting I&A’s compliance with Intelligence Community policy. Additionally, the Acting Secretary participated in the review process

multiple times despite lacking any formal role in reviewing the product, resulting in the delay of its dissemination on at least one occasion. The delays and deviation from I&A's standard process and requirements put I&A at risk of creating a perception of politicization. This conclusion is supported by I&A's own tradecraft assessment, which determined that the product might be viewed as politicized. I&A concurred with our one recommendation to work with relevant external offices as appropriate, identify and implement changes to the review and dissemination process for I&A's election-related intelligence products to ensure they are in accordance with applicable policies and guidelines.

[The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Needs to Improve Its Open Source Intelligence Reporting Process, OIG-22-50](#)

The objective was to determine the extent to which I&A has an effective process for collecting, managing, and protecting open-source intelligence (OSINT) for operational and intelligence purposes. We found that I&A is improving its process for collecting, managing, and protecting OSINT for operational and intelligence purposes. Issuing OSINT reports in a timely manner is a key challenge for I&A. Even after initial training, collectors we spoke with were not certain whether, in their day-to-day operations, they adhered to privacy protections and protected speech. Also, some collectors could not easily determine whether the information in their OSINT reports met the threshold for reportable intelligence. Lastly, the primary technology system used to report on OSINT was inefficient. We made four recommendations to improve the effectiveness of the process for collecting OSINT, timely OSINT report dissemination, and consistent training and functional IT systems within I&A. I&A concurred with all four recommendations.

We also issued *[Vulnerabilities Continue to Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening \(SECRET\), OIG-22-61](#)*.



Secure Cyberspace and Critical Infrastructure

"Cybersecurity threats to critical infrastructure are one of the most dynamic threats and significant strategic risks to the United States. The Department's cybersecurity and critical infrastructure security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) secure Federal civilian networks; (2) strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure; (3) assess and counter evolving cybersecurity risks; and (4) combat cybercrime."

[*DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan*](#)

We conduct mandated and discretionary audits to evaluate DHS' compliance with cybersecurity-related Federal laws and Executive Orders to safeguard the Department's information systems and the Nation's critical infrastructure.

We issued seven audit reports during this reporting period.

[*USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information, OIG-22-65*](#)

We determined that USCIS did not apply the IT access controls needed to restrict unnecessary access to its systems, networks, and information. Specifically, USCIS did not consistently manage access for personnel, service accounts, and privileged users. We attributed these deficiencies to insufficient internal controls and day-to-day oversight to ensure access controls are administered appropriately and effectively to prevent unauthorized access. Additionally, USCIS did not implement all the required security settings and updates for its IT systems and workstations to help reduce the risks that may result from an access control weakness. Although USCIS systems and workstations were generally compliant with required security standards, not all required settings and updates were implemented due to concerns that they might negatively impact system operations. Lastly, we determined that while USCIS appropriately relied on departmental guidance for access control policies and procedures, the guidance was outdated and did not include the latest Federal requirements. These deficiencies may limit the Department's ability to reduce the risk of unauthorized access to its network, which may disrupt mission operations. We made 10 recommendations to improve USCIS' access controls and system security and DHS' access control guidance. USCIS and DHS concurred with all 10 recommendations.

[*DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing Attacks, OIG-22-62*](#)

The objective was to determine whether DHS and its components implemented effective controls to protect sensitive data from malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks. To protect its sensitive information from potential exploitation, DHS implements multiple layers of defense against malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks. DHS also implemented specific tools and technologies to further detect and prevent security events on component systems and to help protect DHS' network communication and data. However, DHS could better protect its sensitive data from potential malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks by revising its policies and procedures to incorporate new controls from applicable Federal guidance and ensuring

ensuring its users received the required security awareness to mitigate the risk. Further, some components did not (1) ensure all users completed required cybersecurity awareness training; (2) consistently educate users about the risks of malware, ransomware, and phishing attacks; and (3) conduct the phishing exercises, as required, in fiscal years 2019 or 2020. DHS concurred with all 10 of our recommendations.

[*CISA and FEMA Can Improve Coordination Efforts to Ensure Energy Sector Resilience, OIG-22-63*](#)

The objective was to determine to what extent the CISA and FEMA's coordination efforts identify, monitor, and address Energy Sector concerns. We determined that CISA and FEMA could better ensure program efforts are mutually reinforcing. They did not have compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across component boundaries, and CISA did not regularly update and monitor written agreements with Energy Sector partners. Increased coordination between CISA and FEMA could improve the outcomes of their efforts. Further, without a comprehensive framework for Energy Sector activities, DHS risks losing important data that would strengthen Energy Sector relationships, programs, and outcomes. We made three recommendations to improve CISA's and FEMA's coordination efforts to ensure Energy Sector resilience. The Department concurred with all three recommendations.

Other reports issued:

[*Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2021, OIG-22-55*](#); [*DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns, OIG-22-58*](#); [*Additional Progress Needed to Improve Information Sharing Under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015, OIG-22-59*](#); and [*Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021 \(SECRET\), OIG-22-60*](#).

Preserve and Uphold the Nation's Prosperity and Economic Security

"The United States' prosperity and economic security are integral to DHS' homeland security operations, affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems. The Department's prosperity and economic security responsibilities focus on four goals: (1) enforce trade laws and facilitate lawful international trade and travel; (2) safeguard the transportation system; (3) maintain waterways and maritime resources; and (4) safeguard financial systems."

[*DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan*](#)

We continue to provide oversight of DHS' programs and operations affecting international trade, national transportation systems, maritime activities and resources, and financial systems.

We issued one audit report during this reporting period.

[*DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement, REDACTED, OIG-22-52*](#)

The objective was to determine the extent to which the DHS and CBP manage and enforce the priority trade issue related to intellectual property rights (IPR). We determined that DHS and CBP did not coordinate or manage IPR strategy, and CBP does not have accurate data to demonstrate the full extent or effectiveness of its IPR enforcement. DHS and CBP did not coordinate or monitor IPR strategy because DHS prioritized responding to ad hoc issues. CBP did not strategically manage IPR or develop an IPR risk assessment. Finally, CBP did not have accurate data to manage the IPR enforcement process. Despite CBP reporting more than 122,000 seizures from FY 2017 through FY 2020, DHS and CBP must address these strategic leadership gaps and data accuracy issues as CBP receives far more counterfeit shipments than it is capable of seizing and processing. We made seven recommendations to improve IPR management and enforcement. DHS and CBP concurred with six of the recommendations and did not concur with one.



Champion the DHS Workforce and Strengthen the Department

“Strengthening and integrating relationships between and among headquarters offices and operational components is critical to optimizing the Department’s efficiency and effectiveness. The Department seeks to increase integration, clarify roles and responsibilities, champion its workforce, advance risk-based decision-making, and promote transparency and accountability. The Department’s organizational responsibilities focus on three goals: (1) strengthen departmental governance and management; (2) develop and maintain a high performing workforce; and (3) optimize support to mission operations.”

[DHS FY 2020-2024 Strategic Plan](#)

We provide oversight of DHS’ acquisitions, financial and performance management, information systems, mission support, and workforce areas to ensure the Department’s activities and investments effectively support its mission.

We issued five audit and inspection reports during this reporting period.

[The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases, OIG-22-79](#)

The objective was to evaluate the DHS’ efforts to track Afghan evacuees departing U.S. military bases without assistance from resettlement agencies and how these departures affect Afghan evacuees’ immigration status. We determined that the Unified Coordination Group (UCG), led by DHS, struggled to track Afghan evacuees who independently departed U.S. military bases designated as “safe havens.” Specifically, UCG officials had difficulties documenting when independent departures actually occurred. Hummingbird, the case tracking system used by UCG officials, was not designed to track independent departures, and data quality issues included missing departure dates and contact information for evacuees. In some instances, officials noticed that Afghan evacuees recorded as present at safe havens had already left. Some Afghan evacuees independently departed safe havens without completing medical requirements. In addition, the UCG’s Independent Departure Task Force did not attempt to locate all Afghan evacuees who independently departed safe havens to verify their compliance with parole conditions. These evacuees could face challenges obtaining long-term immigration status due to their failure to comply with parole conditions or to submit immigration applications. We made one recommendation to ensure DHS contacts and counsels Afghan evacuees who independently departed and have not yet completed parole requirements. DHS concurred with the recommendation.

[The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority, OIG-22-78](#)

The objective was to review DHS leadership of OAW, including administration of the UCG, coordination of Federal agencies’ OAW activities, and general

oversight of the Afghan resettlement process. On August 29, 2021, the President designated DHS as the lead Federal agency for OAW, a Federal effort to resettle vulnerable Afghans who were evacuated from Afghanistan after the fall of the Afghan government in the summer of 2021 in the United States. The President further directed DHS to establish a UCG to coordinate the Federal resettlement effort.

For OAW, the UCG needed to quickly coordinate resettlement for tens of thousands of evacuated Afghans who began arriving in the United States prior to the UCG's formation. In accordance with the President's directive, the UCG coordinated the resettlement of approximately 74,190 vulnerable Afghans during the first operational phase of OAW. We found that the UCG faced two significant challenges leading OAW: (1) the absence of direct funding for most DHS OAW activities during the beginning of the operation and (2) the absence of clear and direct authority for UCG leadership. These challenges affected the UCG's coordination of the resettlement process. In particular, the UCG had trouble recruiting staff to support OAW and encountered problems procuring needed supplies and equipment. With respect to leading this effort, UCG officials and Federal partners were hindered by unclear lines of authority.

We recommended that DHS propose that Congress create a contingency fund for the establishment of future UCGs and develop DHS-specific guidance on lines of authority for DHS-led UCGs. DHS concurred with both recommendations.

[*DHS Has Controls to Safeguard Watchlist Data, OIG-22-53*](#)

We determined the Department has an approach to safeguard and share terrorist screening data. We confirmed that DHS' policies and procedures comply with Federal standards for safeguarding sensitive data, including terrorist watchlist records that are used, stored, and shared by the Department. We also determined that, on July 19, 2021, after learning of an alleged online exposure of more than 1.9 million Federal terrorist watchlist records, DHS responded appropriately by immediately notifying the Federal Bureau of Investigation's Terrorist Screening Center, the owner of terrorist watchlist records. We confirmed with DHS officials that the Department was not involved in the alleged incident. We made no recommendations as a result of our audit work.

Other issued reports:

[*Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments, OIG-22-45*](#) and [*DHS Component Collaboration on Law Enforcement Virtual Training Is Limited, OIG-22-67*](#).

Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information

Section 5(a)(21)(B) of the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, (IG Act) requires OIG to report “incidents where the establishment has resisted or objected to oversight activities of the Office or restricted or significantly delayed access to information, including the justification of the establishment for such action.”

Data Access Issues Directly Impacting DHS OIG Statutory Obligations

DHS Law Enforcement Preparation for and Response to the January 6, 2021 Events at the U.S. Capitol

During the previous two reporting periods, we included information about the Department’s significant delay of OIG’s access to Secret Service records, impeding the progress of our January 6, 2021, review. We offered to brief committees of jurisdiction, including the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (HSGAC), the House Committee on Homeland Security (CHS), and the House Committee on Oversight and Reform (COR). At their invitation, we also provided a briefing to the Select Committee on January 6 about the delays and denials of access to requested information related to our January 6, 2021, review. Some of the problems that we described to the Select Committee, specifically, failure to produce records of certain electronic communications and engaging in a lengthy review process before producing requested records, continued during this reporting period. The Department’s review process works to restrict, without legal justification, information requested by DHS OIG and is in direct conflict with section 6(a)(1)(A) of the IG Act and DHS OIG’s statutory responsibility to provide a transparent review of DHS programs and operations. Following our briefing of the Select Committee, HSGAC, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, CHS, and COR requested, and we briefed, committee staff about these same access issues.

Additionally, during this reporting period and as described in the chart below, DHS OIG requests for direct “read-only” access to databases were denied and data extracts were delayed. The Department components involved in these reportable issues are CBP, FEMA, and ICE. The Department components, as well as the Department’s Audit Liaison did not cite any legal authority consistent with section 6(a)(1)(B) of the IG Act to justify withholding or delaying DHS OIG’s access to information.

Summary of Issues Experienced during the Semiannual Reporting Period ending September 30, 2022

| Project Title | Description of Records, Documents, or Other Materials or Access to Data Requested | DHS Response to OIG Request | Timeframe |
|---|---|-----------------------------|---|
| CBP International Mail Enforcement (discretionary audit) | Read-only access to CBP Automated Targeting System - Cargo database | Denial | Audit delayed 101 days |
| | Extract from CBP Automated Targeting System – Cargo database | Delay | |
| CBP Firearms and Ammunition Accountability (discretionary audit) | Read-only access to Firearms, Armor & Credentials Tracking Systems database | Denial | Audit delayed 64 days |
| | Investigative or legal proceedings significant to CBP firearm and ammunition accountability | Delay | |
| | Results of Office of Professional Responsibility investigations surrounding misconduct related to firearms and ammunition accountability. | Delay | |
| CBP Outbound Searches (discretionary audit) | Two separate data extracts from The Enforcement Communication System (TECS) | Delay | Audit delayed 117 days. |
| CBP Encounters | Read-only access to the CBP TECS database | Delay | OIG forced to request data extracts for each project where encounter data is required resulting in delays to OIG projects and additional resource requirements for CBP. |
| FEMA's Workforce Management During Concurrent and Consecutive Events (discretionary audit) | Read-only access to FEMA Deployment Tracking System (DTS) database | Denial | Length of time impacted timeliness and resulted in suspension of audit. Audit delayed 68 days. |
| | Read-only access to FEMA Qualification System database | Denial | |
| FEMA's Presidential Residence Protection Assistance Grants for FYs 2019 and 2020 (mandated audit) | Read-only access to FEMA Non-Disaster Grants System database | Denial | Audit delayed 112 days. |
| | Read-only access to FEMA Payment & Reporting System database | Denial | |
| FEMA's Interim Non-Congregate Sheltering Policy for Disaster Survivors during the COVID-19 Pandemic (discretionary audit) | Extract of data from FEMA Enterprise Data Warehouse Public Assistance Datamart | Delay | Audit delayed 98 days. |

| | | | |
|--|--|--------|---|
| FEMA's use of Premium Pay during Disaster Response & Steady State Operations (audit) | Read-only access to FEMA DTS database | Delay | As of September 30, 2022, audit delayed 32 days and continuing. |
| | Read-only access to FEMA Payroll & Accounting Records | Delay | |
| ICE's Process for Detainee Surgical Procedures (discretionary) (audit) | Read-only access to ICE eClinicalWorks Electronic Health Records System database (eCW) | Denial | Audit delayed 108 days. |
| | Extract of data from ICE eCW | Delay | |
| ICE Access Controls (audit) | Read-only access to Integrated Security Management System | Denial | Audit delayed 33 days. |



INVESTIGATIONS

The Office of Investigations investigates allegations of criminal, civil, and administrative misconduct involving DHS employees, contractors, grantees, and programs. These investigations can result in criminal prosecutions, fines, civil monetary penalties, administrative sanctions, and personnel actions.

The narratives below are a select sample of our completed investigations.

Bribery

Jointly with CBP's Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), we conducted a corruption investigation on a Border Patrol Agent who was involved in alien smuggling while on duty. The BPA was indicted by a Federal grand jury in the Southern District of Texas, Laredo, TX, for violations of Title 8 U.S.C. § 1324 (a)(1)(A)(ii) and (v)(I) (Conspiracy to transport and attempt to transport undocumented aliens within the United States). The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted a guilty plea from the BPA and sentenced the BPA to 21 months of incarceration followed by 3 years of supervised release and a \$100 special assessment fee.

Jointly with ICE's OPR, we investigated an immigration attorney who paid bribes to Contract Security Officers in exchange for immigration detainee rosters. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted a guilty plea from the immigration attorney for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(1)(C) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Bribery of a Public Official) and Title 18 USC § 371 (Conspiracy) and sentenced the immigration attorney to 30 months of incarceration followed by 3 years of supervised release, a \$20,000 fine, and a \$200 special assessment.

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted guilty pleas from two of the Contract Security Officers for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 (b)(1)(C) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Bribery of a Public Official) and each were sentenced to 20 months of incarceration, 1 year of probation, and a \$100 special assessment fee. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted a guilty plea from a third Contract Security Officer for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 201 (c)(1)(B)(Bribery of a Public Official) and sentenced the Contract Security Officer to 1 year of probation and a \$100 special assessment fee. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas accepted a guilty plea from a second attorney, who worked with the immigration attorney, for violations of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (False statements) and sentenced the attorney to 1 year of probation.

Conspiracy to Commit Mail Fraud and Conspiracy to Commit Fraud in Connection with Major Disaster Benefits

We investigated civilians who conspired with an incarcerated individual to fraudulently receive over \$220,692 in Unemployment Insurance and Pandemic Unemployment Assistance benefits on behalf of incarcerated individuals in Virginia Department of Corrections facilities. These benefits were associated with the COVID-19 pandemic, which was declared a major disaster, and partially funded by FEMA. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia accepted a guilty plea from the incarcerated co-conspirator, for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Conspiracy to Commit Fraud in Connection with Major Disaster Benefits). The incarcerated individual was sentenced to 51 months of incarceration followed by 3 years of supervised release and was ordered to pay \$252,539.19 in restitution.

False Claims Act

Jointly with the General Services Administration OIG, we investigated a company that used a Service-Disabled Veteran-owned Small Business (SDVOSB) as a pass-through on a small business subcontract to renovate the Armed Forces Retirement Home in Washington, DC. The company used the SDVOSB to receive financial credit from the Government for awarding the subcontract to an eligible small business. The company entered a civil settlement with the U.S. Government and agreed to pay \$2,804,110 to resolve allegations that it improperly manipulated a Federal subcontract.

False Tax Returns

Jointly with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), we investigated a FEMA Management and Program Analyst for willfully aiding in the preparation and filing of Federal income tax returns for the tax years 2013 through 2015 that were false as to material matters. The U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland accepted a guilty plea from the former FEMA employee for violation of Title 26 U.S.C. § 7206(2) (Aiding and Abetting in the Preparation of a False Tax Return) and sentenced them to 6 months of incarceration followed by 1 year of supervised release and ordered them to pay \$98,965.90 in restitution to the IRS.

Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits

We investigated a civilian who filed a claim with FEMA and received \$35,212 for disaster assistance aid after claiming Hurricane Irma sunk his houseboat, which he claimed was his primary residence. The investigation revealed the claimant's houseboat had actually sunk prior to Hurricane Irma and was not damaged by the storm as he claimed in his application for disaster assistance benefits from FEMA. The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida accepted a guilty plea from the civilian claimant for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1040 (Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits) and sentenced the civilian to 6 months of incarceration followed by 5 years of supervised release and ordered him to pay \$35,212 in restitution to FEMA with an assessment fee of \$100.

Fraud in Connection with a Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits

We investigated a civilian who filed a claim with FEMA and received \$9,674.70 in disaster assistance aid after claiming the Camp Fire in Paradise, CA, destroyed her primary residence. As a result of the fraudulent disaster claim, she resided for 22 months in FEMA-owned Mobile Housing Units at a cost of \$67,575 to FEMA. The investigation revealed she reported damaged dwelling was not her primary address, because she was evicted from the dwelling 8 months prior to the fire, and she was in jail during the time of the disaster. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California accepted a guilty plea for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1040 (a) (2) (Fraud in Connection with Major Disaster or Emergency Benefits) and sentenced her to 12 months and 1 day of incarceration and ordered her to pay \$77,249 in restitution to FEMA.

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Identity Theft in Connection with a Major Disaster and Emergency Benefits

Jointly with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Labor OIG, and IRS-Criminal Investigations, we investigated a Nigerian citizen/state official for stealing the personal identifying information of more than 20,000 unwitting Americans. The Nigerian citizen used the stolen identities to defraud U.S. disaster programs, including aid for Hurricanes Harvey and Irma, and obtained benefits from other federally funded relief programs. In total, the Nigerian citizen submitted more than \$2 million in fraudulent relief claims for federally funded programs. The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington accepted a guilty plea from the Nigerian citizen for violation of Title 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (Aggravated Identity Theft) and Title 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (Wire Fraud) and sentenced him to 5 years of incarceration followed by 3 years of supervised release and ordered him to pay \$604,260 in restitution.



Investigations of Senior Government Employees

Consistent with the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*,⁴ OIG conducted the following investigations involving senior Government employees where allegations of misconduct were either substantiated, or unsubstantiated and not disclosed to the public.

| Senior Government Employee Investigations, Allegations Substantiated | Senior Government Employee Investigations, Allegations Unsubstantiated and not disclosed to the public |
|---|---|
| <p>A senior official (SES) for alleged violations of ethics and procurement laws. The investigation found that the former employee submitted, or caused others to submit, false invoices to DHS to conceal their involvement with the sole-source contract following departure from DHS. We referred the matter to the Department of Justice on June 15, 2018, and a False Claims Act settlement was finalized during this reporting period, on April 7, 2022.</p> <p>A senior official (SES) for unauthorized disclosure of Sensitive but Unclassified (SBU) Information. The investigation found evidence that the official sent emails containing SBU information to himself, his wife, family members, and friends. The official stated all the emails he sent to himself and his wife were for the purposes of printing the document from their home (personal) printer, a result of a technical challenge of working from home during the COVID-19 pandemic. The official further admitted he sent information to a friend who was a local police officer, which he believed would assist him in his job. We referred the matter to DHS for appropriate action.</p> | <p>A senior official (SES) for a conflict of interest. The senior official allegedly violated conflict of interest and ethics statutes when selecting his friend as the program manager on a Federal Government contract he oversaw. We found the allegations were unsubstantiated.</p> <p>A manager (GS-15) for possible criminal involvement with individuals known to another Federal agency as alleged narcotics traffickers. After interviews and review of relevant information we found no violation and closed the investigation.</p> <p>A supervisor (GS-15) for an alleged financial conflict of interest. The supervisor was responsible for evaluating tasks awarded to a large government contractor before DHS hired the supervisor. After interviews and review of relevant information we found no violation and closed the investigation.</p> <p>A supervisor (GS-15) for alleged solicitation of sex from a minor. A review of the interviews and relevant information revealed no evidence of criminal misconduct.</p> |

⁴Public Law 114-317 § 4(c)(1)(D)(19).

A **manager (SV-11)** for alleged false statements. The investigation revealed the manager made false statements using agency letterhead during the acquisition of 16 unauthorized personally owned firearms that were purchased using the DHS component agency's Federal Firearm License. The manager retired from employment with DHS during this investigation. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on April 5, 2022, and was declined on April 13, 2022.

A **manager (GS-15)** for alleged fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents. The manager allegedly approved the falsification of a Significant Public Benefit Parole request for a noncitizen. We conducted records reviews and multiple interviews, which substantiated the allegation. The manager retired from employment with DHS during this investigation. The investigation was presented for Federal prosecution on February 11, 2019, and was declined on August 2, 2021.



CONGRESSIONAL BRIEFINGS

DHS OIG has held more than 40 meetings and briefings with Members of Congress, Committees of Jurisdiction, and congressional staff during this reporting period. The Inspector General personally engaged with numerous Members of Congress including Members who sit on committees with jurisdiction over DHS regarding DHS OIG's complete portfolio of work. Of note, Inspector General Cuffari testified before the House Committee on Appropriations' Subcommittee on Homeland Security on [DHS OIG's FY 2023 Budget Request](#) on April 4, 2022. The Inspector General also briefed Members of the House Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the United States Capitol on July 15, 2022.

Legislative and Regulatory Reviews

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, directs the Inspector General to review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to DHS programs and operations and to make recommendations about the impact of such legislation and regulations on (1) the economy and efficiency of DHS programs and operations, and (2) the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in DHS programs and operations.

At the request of bipartisan staff members of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, we provided technical drafting assistance for H.R. 4349, *Department of Homeland Security Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Authorization Act*. Also upon request, DHS OIG reviewed and provided comments on H.R. 5641, *SPEED Recovery Act*.

Through participation with CIGIE, DHS OIG reviewed and provided comments regarding potential amendments to the DATA Act, the Social Security Act related to death data, and on amendments to H.R. 7900, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023*, pertaining to draft language to incorporate H.R. 2662, *IG Independence and Empowerment Act*.



OTHER OIG ACTIVITIES

Oversight of Single Audits

The *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, requires Inspectors General take appropriate steps to ensure that any work performed by non-Federal auditors complies with *Government Auditing Standards*, commonly referred to as generally accepted government auditing standards (GAGAS). The Office of Management and Budget requires entities such as state and local governments, universities, and nonprofit organizations that spend \$750,000 or more in Federal funds in a fiscal year to obtain an audit, referred to as a "Single Audit" (per the *Single Audit Act*, as amended by Public Law 104-156.) Non-Federal auditors perform these Single Audits. Our role is to take the appropriate steps to ensure that the non-Federal auditors perform their Single Audit work in compliance with GAGAS and that the audit results are properly reported.

During this reporting period, we completed 98 desk reviews of Single Audit reports issued by the non-Federal auditing firms (independent public accountant organizations). These 98 desk reviews encompass \$2,620,104,673 in Federal grant spending, of which \$2,317,176,418 were for direct DHS grants. We did not complete any quality control reviews.

Fifty percent of our reviews did not disclose any quality issues or disclosed only minor issues that did not require corrective actions. The remaining 50 percent contained errors needing correction in future filings, as identified below⁵.

| Problems with: | Number |
|--|--------|
| Schedule of Expenditures of Federal Awards | 21 |
| Corrective Action Plan | 14 |
| Prior Report | 10 |
| Findings | 8 |
| Standard Form accompanying Report | 7 |
| Audit Report | 5 |
| Incorrect risk assessment | 4 |
| Single Audit Report submitted late | 3 |
| Other | 2 |

⁵ Some of the Single Audit submissions had several errors, so arithmetically there are more errors noted than 50 percent of 98 letters would indicate.

APPENDIXES

Appendix 1: Reports

[Reports with Monetary Findings](#)

[Resolution of Reports and Recommendations](#)

[Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months](#)

[Reports with Open Recommendations Older Than 6 Months](#)

[Audit and Inspection Reports Issued](#)

[Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated](#)

Reports with Monetary Findings

Reports and Recommendations with Questioned or Unsupported Costs

| | # Reports | # Recommendations | Questioned Costs | Unsupported Costs |
|-----------|-----------|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|
| Carryover | 32 | 70 | \$8,058,731,047 | \$7,179,288,745 |
| Issued | 3 | 3 | \$3,850,757,807 | \$0 |

Reports and Recommendations with Questioned or Unsupported Costs

| | # Reports | # Recommendations | Funds Put to Better Use |
|-----------|-----------|-------------------|-------------------------|
| Carryover | 13 | 29 | \$2,971,409,106 |
| Issued | 2 | 2 | \$180,111,248 |

Resolution of Reports and Recommendations⁶

Reports & Recommendations Open Older Than 6 Months

| Period Ending | # Reports with Recommendations > 6 Months | # Recommendations Open and Unresolved > 6 Months |
|---------------|---|--|
| 3/31/2022 | 22 | 33 |
| 9/30/2022 | 23 | 32 |

Current Report Inventory

| | # Reports |
|--|-----------|
| Reports with open recommendations at the beginning of the period | 152 |
| Reports issued to DHS this period | 45 |
| Reports with recommendations closed this period | 37 |
| Reports with open recommendations at the end of the period | 160 |

Active Recommendations

| | # Recs |
|---|--------|
| Open recommendations at the beginning of the period | 514 |
| Recommendations issued this period | 176 |
| Recommendations closed this period | 160 |
| Open recommendations at the end of the period | 530 |

⁶ Since 2003, OIG has issued 11,376 recommendations. DHS has taken action to address all but 568 of them. This appendix excludes investigative reports.

Reports with Unresolved Recommendations Older Than 6 Months

| Date Issued | Report Number | Report Title | Rec No. | DHS Comp. | Reason Code* |
|-------------|---------------|---|---------|--|--------------|
| 5/4/2015 | OIG-15-85 | <i>DHS Missing Data Needed to Strengthen Its Immigration Enforcement Efforts</i> | 1 | SEC, Deputy Secretary, Chief of Staff | B |
| 10/24/2017 | OIG-18-04 | <i>FAMS' Contribution to Aviation Transportation Security Is Questionable</i> | 2, 3, 4 | TSA | B |
| 1/5/2018 | OIG-18-36 | <i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i> | 2 | ICE | B |
| 9/19/2018 | OIG-19-17 | <i>FAMS' Contribution to International Flight Security Is Questionable</i> | 1, 2 | TSA | C |
| 2/28/2019 | OIG-19-23 | <i>Border Patrol Needs a Staffing Model to Better Plan for Hiring More Agents</i> | 1 | CBP | B |
| 7/31/2019 | OIG-19-57 | <i>A Joint Review of Law Enforcement Cooperation on the Southwest Border between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and Homeland Security Investigations</i> | 5 | ICE | A |
| 9/30/2019 | OIG-19-66 | <i>FEMA Did Not Sufficiently Safeguard Use of Transportation Assistance Funds</i> | 1, 3 | FEMA | A |
| 4/6/2020 | OIG-20-23 | <i>FEMA Has Made More than \$3 Billion in Improper and Potentially Fraudulent Payments for Home Repair Assistance since 2003</i> | 1, 2 | FEMA | C |
| 7/14/2020 | OIG-20-52 | <i>CBP Has Not Demonstrated Acquisition Capabilities Needed to Secure the Southern Border</i> | 1 | CBP, MGMT | A |
| 7/28/2020 | OIG-20-55 | <i>CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities (REDACTED)</i> | 1,5 | CBP | C |
| 8/13/2020 | OIG-20-59 | <i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved (REDACTED)</i> | 4, 5 | ICE, MGMT, PLCY, TSA | A |
| 8/12/2020 | OIG-20-60 | <i>FEMA Has Paid Billions in Improper Payments for SBA Dependent Other Needs Assistance since 2003</i> | 1, 2, 3 | FEMA | C |
| 8/27/2020 | OIG-20-66 | <i>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA</i> | 1 | CBP, DHS, ICE, Coast Guard, Secret Service | A |
| 9/30/2020 | OIG-20-77 | <i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i> | 2 | MGMT | C |
| 10/27/2020 | OIG-21-02 | <i>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry</i> | 1 | CBP | B |

| Date Issued | Report Number | Report Title | Rec No. | DHS Comp. | Reason Code* |
|-------------|---------------|--|---------|-----------|--------------|
| 2/1/2021 | OIG-21-17 | <i>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019</i> | 1 | MGMT | C |
| 3/30/2021 | OIG-21-30 | <i>Violations of Detention Standards Amid COVID-19 Outbreak at La Palma Correctional Center in Eloy, AZ</i> | 1 | ICE | B |
| 7/6/2021 | OIG-21-43 | <i>FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges</i> | 1 | FEMA | B |
| 9/22/2021 | OIG-21-66 | <i>DHS Did Not Fully Comply with Requirements in the Transportation Security Card Program Assessment</i> | 1 | USCG, TSA | A |
| 11/4/2021 | OIG-22-04 | <i>DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain</i> | 3 | OCFO | C |
| 1/6/2022 | OIG-22-10 | <i>USCIS' U Visa Program Is Not Managed Effectively and Is Susceptible to Fraud (REDACTED)</i> | 1,3 | USCIS | A |
| 3/16/2022 | OIG-22-31 | <i>Management Alert - Immediate Removal of All Detainees from the Torrance County Detention Facility</i> | 1 | ICE | A |

| | | | |
|---------------|-------------------|--|----------------|
| Totals | 22 reports | | 32 recs |
|---------------|-------------------|--|----------------|

*Reason Code Key

A = DHS did not concur and has not changed its original position

B = DHS did not provide timely/sufficient corrective action plan and/or expected completion date

C = Disagreement on evidence and/or proposed corrective actions

Reports with Open Recommendations Older than 6 Months

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|---------------|---|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| OIG-15-10 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2014 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 20 | - | - | DHS, FEMA, ICE, MGMT, NPPD, Coast Guard |
| OIG-16-54 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on U.S. Customs and Border Protection's FY 2015 Consolidated Financial Statements</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-16-91 | <i>TSA Oversight of National Passenger Rail System Security</i> | 2 | - | - | OGC, TSA |
| OIG-17-12 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2016 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 28 | - | - | CBP, OCFO, FEMA, NPPD, Coast Guard, Secret Service |
| OIG-17-14 | <i>Summary Report on Audits of Security Controls for TSA Information Technology Systems at Airports</i> | 1 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-17-22 | <i>DHS Lacks Oversight of Component Use of Force (Redacted)</i> | 1 | - | - | Chief of Staff, Deputy Secretary, SEC |
| OIG-17-49 | <i>Review of Domestic Sharing of Counterterrorism Information</i> | 4 | - | - | CRCL, I&A, OGC, PRIV |
| OIG-17-51 | <i>ICE Deportation Operations</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-17-74-IQO | <i>Oversight Review of the U.S. Coast Guard Investigative Service</i> | 3 | - | - | Coast Guard |
| OIG-17-112 | <i>Covert Testing of TSA's Checkpoint Screening Effectiveness</i> | 3 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-18-16 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2017 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 42 | - | - | CBP, DHS, FEMA, Coast Guard, Secret Service |
| OIG-18-36 | <i>ICE Faces Challenges to Screen Aliens Who May Be Known or Suspected Terrorists (REDACTED)</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-18-70 | <i>FAMS Needs to Demonstrate How Ground-Based Assignments Contribute to TSA's Mission - Sensitive Security Information</i> | 2 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-18-71 | <i>FEMA Paid Employees Over the Annual Premium Pay Cap</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-18-73 | <i>DHS' Non-disclosure Forms and Settlement Agreements Do Not Always Include the Required Statement from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012</i> | 1 | - | - | Chief of Staff, Deputy Secretary, SEC |
| OIG-18-78 | <i>USCIS' Medical Admissibility Screening Process Needs Improvement</i> | 3 | - | - | USCIS |
| OIG-18-81 | <i>DHS Support Components Do Not Have Sufficient Processes and Procedures to Address Misconduct</i> | 1 | - | - | MGMT |

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|-----------|---|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|---|
| OIG-18-83 | <i>CBP's International Mail Inspection Processes Need Improvement at JFK International Airport</i> | 3 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-18-88 | <i>Review of Coast Guard's Oversight of the TWIC Program</i> | 2 | - | - | Coast Guard |
| OIG-19-04 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2018 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 28 | - | - | CBP, DHS, FEMA, NPPD, Coast Guard, Secret Service |
| OIG-19-10 | <i>CBP's Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-19-15 | <i>The Federal Protective Service Has Not Managed Overtime Effectively</i> | 1 | \$1,768,768 | - | CISA, MGMT |
| OIG-19-21 | <i>Covert Testing of Access Controls to Secure Airport Areas</i> | 1 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-19-28 | <i>ICE Faces Barriers in Timely Repatriation of Detained Aliens</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-19-35 | <i>TSA Needs to Improve Efforts to Retain, Hire, and Train Its Transportation Security Officers</i> | 1 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-19-42 | <i>DHS Needs to Address Oversight and Program Deficiencies before Expanding the Insider Threat Program</i> | 3 | - | - | DHS |
| OIG-19-48 | <i>DHS Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Misconduct and Discipline</i> | 3 | - | - | MGMT |
| OIG-19-52 | <i>FEMA's Cost Eligibility Determination of Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority's Contract with Cobra Acquisitions LLC</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-19-56 | <i>TSA's Data and Methods for Classifying Its Criminal Investigators as Law Enforcement Officers Need Improvement</i> | 1 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-20-03 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2019 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 5 | - | - | DHS |
| OIG-20-06 | <i>DHS Lacked Technology Needed to Successfully Account for Separated Migrant Families</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-20-13 | <i>U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Criminal Alien Program Faces Challenges</i> | 2 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-20-15 | <i>FEMA Purchased More Manufactured Housing Units Than It Needed in Texas After Hurricane Harvey</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-26 | <i>Capacity Audit of FEMA Grant Funds Awarded to the Puerto Rico Department of Education</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|-----------|---|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| OIG-20-28 | <i>TSA's Challenges with Passenger Screening Canine Teams - Sensitive Security Information</i> | 1 | - | \$77,000,000 | TSA |
| OIG-20-33 | <i>TSA Needs to Improve Monitoring of the Deployed Advanced Imaging Technology System</i> | 1 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-20-37 | <i>DHS Can Enhance Efforts to Protect Commercial Facilities from Terrorism and Physical Threats</i> | 2 | - | - | CISA |
| OIG-20-40 | <i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting SAVE Act Requirements But Challenges Remain for Fleet Management</i> | 1 | - | - | DHS |
| OIG-20-43 | <i>DHS Has Limited Capabilities to Counter Illicit Unmanned Aircraft Systems</i> | 3 | - | - | PLCY |
| OIG-20-48 | <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Lee County, Florida</i> | 7 | \$1,076,913 | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-50 | <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants to Polk County School Board, Florida</i> | 5 | \$62,763 | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-51 | <i>Early Warning Audit of FEMA Public Assistance Grants in Monroe County, Florida</i> | 7 | \$384,329 | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-55 | <i>CBP Needs a Comprehensive Process for Conducting Covert Testing and Resolving Vulnerabilities - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i> | 7 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-20-57 | <i>FEMA's Public Assistance Grant to PREPA and PREPA's Contracts with Whitefish and Cobra Did Not Fully Comply with Federal Laws and Program Guidelines</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-59 | <i>HSI Effectively Contributes to the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force, But Partnering Agreements Could Be Improved - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i> | 3 | - | - | ICE, PLCY, TSA |
| OIG-20-62 | <i>DHS Has Made Progress in Meeting DATA Act Requirements, But Challenges Remain</i> | 1 | - | - | OCFO |
| OIG-20-66 | <i>DHS Inconsistently Implemented Administrative Forfeiture Authorities Under CAFRA</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP, DHS, ICE, Coast Guard, Secret Service |
| OIG-20-68 | <i>FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage to Severe Repetitive Loss Properties</i> | 2 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-71 | <i>Review of CBP's Major Cybersecurity Incident During a 2019 Biometric Pilot</i> | 3 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-20-73 | <i>DHS Faces Challenges in Meeting the Responsibilities of the Geospatial Data Act of 2018</i> | 3 | - | - | DHS, MGMT |

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|-----------|--|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|-----------------|
| OIG-20-76 | <i>FEMA Mismanaged the Commodity Distribution Process in Response to Hurricanes Irma and Maria</i> | 2 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-20-77 | <i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2019</i> | 2 | - | - | CISA, DHS, MGMT |
| OIG-21-01 | <i>DHS Has Secured the Nation's Election Systems, but Work Remains to Protect the Infrastructure</i> | 3 | - | - | CISA |
| OIG-21-02 | <i>CBP Has Taken Steps to Limit Processing of Undocumented Aliens at Ports of Entry</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-06 | <i>DHS Privacy Office Needs to Improve Oversight of Department-wide Activities, Programs, and Initiatives</i> | 2 | - | - | PRIV |
| OIG-21-08 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2020 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 13 | - | - | OCFO, DHS |
| OIG-21-09 | <i>DHS Components Have Not Fully Complied with the Department's Guidelines for Implementing the Lautenberg Amendment</i> | 2 | - | - | ICE, PLCY |
| OIG-21-11 | <i>TSA Needs to Improve Management of the Quiet Skies Program - Sensitive Security Information</i> | 2 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-21-14 | <i>Ineffective Implementation of Corrective Actions Diminishes DHS' Oversight of Its Pandemic Planning</i> | 1 | - | - | MGMT |
| OIG-21-15 | <i>ICE Guidance Needs Improvement to Deter Illegal Employment</i> | 4 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-21-16 | <i>DHS Has Not Effectively Implemented the Prompt Asylum Pilot Programs</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP, DHS, USCIS |
| OIG-21-17 | <i>DHS Grants and Contracts Awarded through Other Than Full and Open Competition, FYs 2018 and 2019</i> | 1 | - | - | OCFO |
| OIG-21-19 | <i>CBP Needs to Improve the Oversight of Its Canine Program to Better Train and Reinforce Canine Performance - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i> | 3 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-21 | <i>CBP Has Improved Southwest Border Technology, but Significant Challenges Remain</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-22 | <i>Biological Threat Detection and Response Challenges Remain for BioWatch - For Official Use Only (REDACTED)</i> | 2 | - | - | CWMD |
| OIG-21-26 | <i>FEMA's Procurement and Cost Reimbursement Review Process Needs Improvement</i> | 3 | \$23,282,276 | - | FEMA |

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|-----------|---|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------------|
| OIG-21-27 | <i>CBP Faced Challenges in Its Inspection Processes and Physical Security at the JFK International Mail Facility - For Official Use Only (REDACTED)</i> | 8 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-28 | <i>FEMA Needs Revised Policies and Procedures to Better Manage Recovery of Disallowed Grant Funds</i> | 5 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-21-29 | <i>DHS' Fragmented Approach to Immigration Enforcement and Poor Planning Resulted in Extended Migrant Detention during the 2019 Surge</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-21-31 | <i>DHS Had Authority to Deploy Federal Law Enforcement Officers to Protect Federal Facilities in Portland, Oregon, but Should Ensure Better Planning and Execution in Future Cross-Component Activities</i> | 1 | - | - | SEC, Deputy Secretary, Chief of Staff |
| OIG-21-35 | <i>DHS Law Enforcement Components Did Not Consistently Collect DNA from Arrestees</i> | 3 | - | - | CBP, ICE, TSA, DHS, FPS |
| OIG-21-36 | <i>ICE Did Not Consistently Provide Separated Migrant Parents the Opportunity to Bring Their Children upon Removal</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-21-38 | <i>DHS Has Made Limited Progress Implementing the Continuous Diagnostics and Mitigation Program</i> | 2 | - | - | MGMT |
| OIG-21-40 | <i>ICE Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Assist Human Trafficking Victims</i> | 1 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-21-42 | <i>FEMA Initiated the Hurricane Harvey Direct Housing Assistance Agreement without Necessary Processes and Controls</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-21-43 | <i>FEMA Has Not Prioritized Compliance with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, Hindering Its Ability to Reduce Repetitive Damages to Roads and Bridges</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-21-48 | <i>CBP Needs to Strengthen Its Oversight and Policy to Better Care for Migrants Needing Medical Attention</i> | 2 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-52 | <i>TSA Did Not Assess Its EDCT Program for Surface Transportation Security</i> | 2 | - | - | TSA |
| OIG-21-53 | <i>U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Acquisition Management of Aviation Fleet Needs Improvement to Meet Operational Needs</i> | 2 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-54 | <i>FEMA Prematurely Obligated \$478 Million in Public Assistance Funds from FY 2017 through FY 2019</i> | 2 | - | - | FEMA |

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|-----------|--|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|--|
| OIG-21-55 | <i>Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2020 (SECRET)</i> | 1 | - | - | I&A |
| OIG-21-56 | <i>USCIS Needs to Improve Its Electronic Employment Eligibility Verification Process</i> | 8 | - | - | USCIS |
| OIG-21-57 | <i>ICE's Oversight of the Capgemini Contract Needs Improvement</i> | 3 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-21-58 | <i>ICE's Management of COVID-19 in Its Detention Facilities Provides Lessons Learned for Future Pandemic Responses</i> | 2 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-21-59 | <i>CISA Can Improve Efforts to Ensure Dam Security and Resilience</i> | 5 | - | - | CISA |
| OIG-21-60 | <i>DHS Needs to Enhance Its COVID-19 Response at the Southwest Border</i> | 2 | - | - | CBP, SEC, Deputy Secretary, Chief of Staff |
| OIG-21-62 | <i>CBP Targeted Americans Associated with the 2018–2019 Migrant Caravan</i> | 6 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-63 | <i>CBP Continues to Experience Challenges Managing Searches of Electronic Devices at Ports of Entry (REDACTED)</i> | 3 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-64 | <i>Lessons Learned from FEMA's Initial Response to COVID-19</i> | 3 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-21-65 | <i>Coast Guard Should Prioritize Upgrades to Rescue 21 Alaska and Expand its Public Notifications During Outages</i> | 2 | - | - | Coast Guard |
| OIG-21-70 | <i>CBP's FAST Program Exposes Borders to Security Risks (REDACTED)</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-21-71 | <i>FEMA Must Take Additional Steps to Better Address Employee Allegations of Sexual Harassment and Sexual Misconduct</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-21-72 | <i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for FY 2020</i> | 2 | - | - | FEMA, Secret Service |
| OIG-22-01 | <i>ICE Needs to Improve Its Oversight of Segregation Use in Detention Facilities</i> | 3 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-22-02 | <i>DHS Needs to Better Demonstrate Its Efforts to Combat Illegal Wildlife Trafficking</i> | 1 | - | - | DHS |
| OIG-22-03 | <i>Many Factors Hinder ICE's Ability to Maintain Adequate Medical Staffing at Detention Facilities</i> | 5 | - | - | ICE |
| OIG-22-04 | <i>DHS Continues to Make Progress Meeting DATA Act Requirements, but Challenges Remain</i> | 2 | - | - | OCFO |

| Report | Report Title | # of Recs | Questioned Costs | Funds to be Put to Better Use | DHS Comp. |
|-----------|---|-----------|------------------|-------------------------------|-----------|
| OIG-22-06 | <i>DHS Needs Additional Oversight and Documentation to Ensure Progress in Joint Cybersecurity Efforts</i> | 5 | - | - | CISA, DHS |
| OIG-22-08 | <i>Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting</i> | 4 | - | - | DHS |
| OIG-22-10 | <i>USCIS' U Visa Program Is Not Managed Effectively and Is Susceptible to Fraud (REDACTED)</i> | 1 | - | - | USCIS |
| OIG-22-11 | <i>FEMA Continues to Phase Out Its Use of Alternative Contracting Methods to Administer the National Flood Insurance Program</i> | 1 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-22-12 | <i>Continued Reliance on Manual Processing Slowed USCIS' Benefits Delivery during the COVID-19 Pandemic</i> | 1 | - | - | USCIS |
| OIG-22-13 | <i>Trusted Traveler Revocations for Americans Associated with the 2018-2019 Migrant Caravan (REDACTED)</i> | 1 | - | - | CBP |
| OIG-22-15 | <i>CISA Should Validate Priority Telecommunications Services Performance Data</i> | 1 | - | - | CISA |
| OIG-22-25 | <i>FEMA Should Apply Lessons Learned from the STEP Pilot Program Implementation in Puerto Rico to Future Programs</i> | 2 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-22-30 | <i>S&T Needs to Improve Its Management and Oversight of R&D Projects</i> | 4 | - | - | S&T |
| OIG-22-32 | <i>FEMA Followed Its Declaration Request Policies, but Could Improve Its Records Management</i> | 2 | - | - | FEMA |
| OIG-22-33 | <i>The Office for Bombing Prevention Needs to Improve its Management and Assessment of Capabilities to Counter Improvised Explosive Devices</i> | 3 | - | - | CISA |
| OIG-22-34 | <i>CBP Needs Improved Oversight for Its Centers of Excellence and Expertise</i> | 5 | - | - | CBP |

| | | | | |
|---------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Totals | 109 reports | 374 | \$26,575,049 | \$77,000,000 |
|---------------|--------------------|------------|---------------------|---------------------|

Report Number Abbreviations:

A report number ending with "MA" is a management alert. These reports identify conditions or issues that may pose a serious, imminent threat to safety, health, property, continuity of operations, or risk of fraud, waste, or abuse. A report number ending with "IQO" is a report issued by the Office of Integrity and Quality Oversight, which OIG dissolved in April 2021.

Audit and Inspection Reports Issued

| Date Issued | Report Number | Report Title | Total Questioned Costs ^(a) | Unsupported Costs ^(b) | Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c) |
|-------------|---------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 4/13/2022 | OIG-22-36 | Management Alert - FEMA's COVID-19 Funeral Assistance Operating Procedures Are Inconsistent with Previous Interpretation of Long-Standing Regulations for Eligible Funeral Expenses | - | - | - |
| 4/12/2022 | OIG-22-37 | ICE Spent Funds on Unused Beds, Missed COVID-19 Protocols, and Detention Standards While Housing Migrant Families in Hotels | - | - | - |
| 4/14/2022 | OIG-22-38 | Yuma Sector Border Patrol Struggled to Meet TEDS Standards for Single Adult Men but Generally Met TEDS Standards for Other Populations | - | - | - |
| 4/26/2022 | OIG-22-39 | CBP and CWMD Need to Improve Monitoring and Maintenance of Radiation Portal Monitor Systems (REDACTED) | - | - | - |
| 4/22/2022 | OIG-22-40 | Violations of ICE Detention Standards at South Texas ICE Processing Center | - | - | - |
| 4/26/2022 | OIG-22-41 | DHS Actions Related to an I&A Intelligence Product Deviated from Standard Procedures (REDACTED) | - | - | - |
| 5/10/2022 | OIG-22-42 | Lessons Learned from DHS' Employee COVID-19 Vaccination Initiative | - | - | - |
| 5/10/2022 | OIG-22-43 | FEMA's Waiver Authority under the Disaster Recovery Reform Act of 2018 | - | - | - |
| 5/18/2022 | OIG-22-44 | ICE Did Not Follow Policies, Guidance, or Recommendations to Ensure Migrants Were Tested for COVID-19 before Transport on Domestic Commercial Flights | - | - | - |
| 6/8/2022 | OIG-22-45 | Department of Homeland Security's FY 2021 Compliance with the Payment Integrity Information Act of 2019 and Executive Order 13520, Reducing Improper Payments | - | - | - |
| 6/22/2022 | OIG-22-46 | FEMA Needs to Improve Oversight and Management of Hazard Mitigation Grant Program Property Acquisitions | - | - | \$134,911,248 |
| 6/30/2022 | OIG-22-47 | Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Folkston ICE Processing Center and Folkston Annex | - | - | - |
| 7/5/2022 | OIG-22-48 | CBP Complied with Facial Recognition Policies to Identify International Travelers at Airports | - | - | - |
| 7/5/2022 | OIG-22-49 | DHS Could Do More to Address the Threats of Domestic Terrorism | - | - | - |
| 7/6/2022 | OIG-22-50 | The Office of Intelligence and Analysis Needs to Improve its Open-Source Intelligence Reporting Process | - | - | - |

| Date Issued | Report Number | Report Title | Total Questioned Costs ^(a) | Unsupported Costs ^(b) | Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c) |
|-------------|---------------|---|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 7/13/2022 | OIG-22-51 | <i>Assessment of FEMA's Public Assistance Alternative Procedures Program</i> | - | - | - |
| 7/18/2022 | OIG-22-52 | <i>DHS and CBP Should Improve Intellectual Property Rights Management and Enforcement - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i> | - | - | - |
| 7/25/2022 | OIG-22-53 | <i>DHS Has Controls to Safeguard Watchlist Data</i> | - | - | - |
| 7/27/2022 | OIG-22-54 | <i>DHS Did Not Adequately or Efficiently Deploy Its Employees to U.S. Military Installations in Support of Operation Allies Welcome</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/1/2022 | OIG-22-55 | <i>Evaluation of DHS' Information Security Program for Fiscal Year 2021</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/10/2022 | OIG-22-56 | <i>FEMA Needs to Improve Its Oversight of the Emergency Food and Shelter Program</i> | - | - | \$45,200,000 |
| 8/9/2022 | OIG-22-57 | <i>El Paso Sector Border Patrol Struggled with Prolonged Detention and Consistent Compliance with TEDS Standards</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/10/2022 | OIG-22-58 | <i>DHS Needs a Unified Strategy to Counter Disinformation Campaigns</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/16/2022 | OIG-22-59 | <i>Additional Progress Needed to Improve Information Sharing under the Cybersecurity Act of 2015</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/18/2022 | OIG-22-60 | <i>Evaluation of DHS' Compliance with Federal Information Security Modernization Act Requirements for Intelligence Systems for Fiscal Year 2021</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/18/2022 | OIG-22-61 | <i>Vulnerabilities Continue to Exist in TSA's Checked Baggage Screening</i> | - | - | - |
| 8/22/2022 | OIG-22-62 | <i>DHS Can Better Mitigate the Risks Associated with Malware, Ransomware, and Phishing Attacks</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/2/2022 | OIG-22-63 | <i>CISA and FEMA Can Improve Coordination Efforts to Ensure Energy Sector Resilience</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/6/2022 | OIG-22-64 | <i>DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis - Law Enforcement Sensitive</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/7/2022 | OIG-22-65 | <i>USCIS Should Improve Controls to Restrict Unauthorized Access to Its Systems and Information</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/9/2022 | OIG-22-66 | <i>DHS Technology Systems Do Not Effectively Support Migrant Tracking at the Southwest Border</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/15/2022 | OIG-22-67 | <i>DHS Component Collaboration on Law Enforcement Virtual Training Is Limited</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/13/2022 | OIG-22-68 | <i>U.S. Border Patrol Faces Challenges Administering Post-Apprehension Outcomes Consistently Across Sectors</i> | - | - | - |

| Date Issued | Report Number | Report Title | Total Questioned Costs ^(a) | Unsupported Costs ^(b) | Funds to be Put to Better Use ^(c) |
|---------------|-------------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|--|
| 9/16/2022 | OIG-22-69 | <i>FEMA Did Not Implement Controls to Prevent More than \$3.7 Billion in Improper Payments from the Lost Wages Assistance Program</i> | \$3,744,943,964 | - | - |
| 9/16/2022 | OIG-22-70 | <i>ICE and CBP Should Improve Visa Security Program Screening and Vetting Operations</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/16/2022 | OIG-22-71 | <i>U.S. Border Patrol Screened Migrants at the Southwest Border but Could Strengthen Processes</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/16/2022 | OIG-22-72 | <i>A Review of FEMA Funding for Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Response and Relief</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/27/2022 | OIG-22-73 | <i>More than \$2.6 Million in Potentially Fraudulent LWA Payments Were Linked to DHS Employees' Identities</i> | \$2,673,807 | - | - |
| 9/28/2022 | OIG-22-74 | <i>FEMA Made Efforts to Address Inequities in Disadvantaged Communities Related to COVID-19 Community Vaccination Center Locations and Also Plans to Address Inequity in Future Operations</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/28/2022 | OIG-22-75 | <i>Violations of ICE Detention Standards at Torrance County Detention Facility</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/29/2022 | OIG-22-76 | <i>FEMA's Management of Mission Assignments to Other Federal Agencies Needs Improvement</i> | \$103,140,036 | - | - |
| 9/29/2022 | OIG-22-77 | <i>FEMA Did Not Effectively Manage Disaster Case Management Program Funds in Support of Hurricane Maria Recovery Services</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/29/2022 | OIG-22-78 | <i>The DHS Unified Coordination Group for Operation Allies Welcome Coordinated Afghan Resettlement but Faced Challenges in Funding and Authority</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/29/2022 | OIG-22-79 | <i>The Unified Coordination Group Struggled to Track Afghan Evacuees Independently Departing U.S. Military Bases</i> | - | - | - |
| 9/29/2022 | OIG-22-80 | <i>Del Rio Area Struggled with Prolonged Detention, Consistent Compliance with CBP's TEDS Standards, and Data Integrity</i> | - | - | - |
| Totals | 45 reports | | \$3,850,757,807 | \$0 | \$180,111,248 |

Notes and Explanations:

(a) DHS OIG reports the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of costs it questions. The Total Questioned Costs column includes the Federal share of all ineligible and unsupported costs reported.

(b) The Unsupported Costs column is a subset of Total Questioned Costs and is shown separately as required by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

(c) The Funds to be Put to Better Use column only includes the Federal share, which ranged from 75 to 100 percent, of our cumulative reported findings or recommendations.

Schedule of Amounts Due and Recovered/Deobligated

| Date Issued | Report Number | Report Title | OIG Recommended Recovery (Federal Share) | Amount DHS Agreed to Recover (Disallow) | Amount DHS Will Not Recover (Allowed) | Amount DHS Recovered/ |
|--------------------|----------------------|---|---|--|--|------------------------------|
| 6/9/2016 | OIG-16-100 | <i>FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate Did Not Effectively Manage Assistance to Firefighters Grant Program - AFG</i> | \$7,124,893 | \$4,010,620 | \$3,114,273 | \$1,821,252 |
| 7/27/2021 | OIG-21-51 | <i>FY 2018 Audit of Science and Technology Bankcard Program Indicates Risks</i> | \$63,213 | \$0 | \$63,213 | \$0 |
| 9/27/2022 | OIG-22-73 | <i>FEMA Should Recover \$216.2 Million Awarded to the Recovery School District in Louisiana for Hurricane Katrina</i> | \$2,673,807 | \$2,673,807 | \$0 | \$0 |
| Totals | 3 reports | | \$9,861,913 | \$6,684,427 | \$3,177,486 | \$1,821,252 |

Appendix 2: Other OIG Activities

[Contract Audit Results](#)

[Previous Peer Reviews](#)

[Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public](#)

[Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996](#)

Contract Audit Results

The *National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008* requires that we list all contract audit reports issued during the reporting period containing significant audit findings; briefly describe the significant audit findings in the report; and specify the amounts of costs identified in the report as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed. This Act defines significant audit findings as unsupported, questioned, or disallowed costs in excess of \$10 million or other findings that the Inspector General determines to be significant. It defines contracts as a contract, an order placed under a task or delivery order contract, or a subcontract.

During this SAR period, we issued no contract audit reports.

Previous Peer Reviews of or by DHS OIG

Section 5(a) (14) – (16) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, requires OIGs to include in their semiannual reports certain information pertaining to peer reviews of, or conducted by, an OIG during and prior to the current reporting period.

OIG was not the subject of any external peer reviews during this reporting period. There are no outstanding recommendations from previous peer reviews conducted of or by DHS OIG.

The date of the last peer review of DHS OIG, which was conducted by the Department of Education OIG, was March 2021.

Peer Reviews Conducted by DHS OIG

In April 2022, DHS OIG completed a CIGIE External Peer Review of Department of Justice's OIG's Audit Division. DHS OIG made no formal recommendations.

In August 2022, a peer review team made up of three OIGs, including DHS OIG, completed a CIGIE External Peer Review of the Defense Intelligence Agency OIG's Inspection and Evaluation Division. The peer review team made no formal recommendations.

Closed Inspections, Evaluations, or Audits that Were Not Disclosed to the Public

There were no audits, evaluations, or inspections conducted that were closed and not publicly disclosed.

Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996

Requirement:

Reporting on Failure to Meet Deadlines in Remediation Plans. Section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA) requires that the Inspector General's semi-annual report to Congress required under section 5(a) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, include instances and reasons when an agency has not met the milestones established in the remediation plan. Specifically, the report shall include: (1) the facts pertaining to non-compliance with Section 803 (a), including the nature and extent of non-compliance, the primary reason or cause for the failure to comply, and any extenuating circumstances; (2) a statement of the remedial actions needed to comply; and (3) the entity or organization responsible for the noncompliance and if different, the entity or organization responsible for correcting the noncompliance.

Facts pertaining to non-compliance

As of September 30, 2021, DHS' financial management systems did not comply substantially with Federal financial management system requirements, as DHS continued to have a material weakness in IT Controls and Information Systems and Financial Reporting.⁷

Information Technology Controls and Information Systems

DHS continued to have deficiencies in its design and implementation of controls over IT Controls and Information Systems. Specifically, the independent auditors noted DHS had ineffective design, implementation, or operating effectiveness of IT general controls over IT operating systems, databases, and applications supporting financial reporting processes across DHS related to access control and segregation of duties, configuration management, and security management. Some of these deficiencies have persisted since DHS' inception.

Financial Reporting

DHS did not design control activities to achieve objectives and respond to risks as required by Green Book principle 10, Design Control Activities, or implement the entity's information systems and related control activities through policies as required by Green Book principles 11, Design Activities for Information Systems, and 12, Implement Control Activities. Specifically, the independent auditors noted DHS had ineffective design, implementation, or operating effectiveness of controls supporting financial reporting processes across DHS related to service organization control reports,

⁷ OIG-22-08, *Independent Auditors' Report on DHS' FY 2021 Financial Statements and Internal Control over Financial Reporting*, November 2021.

application controls and information derived from systems, and Application of Accounting Standards for New Programs. DHS did not remediate identified control deficiencies that have existed for multiple prior years on a timely basis.

Statement of the remedial actions needed to comply

To address this non-compliance, the Department has launched a multiyear financial systems modernization program and DHS CFO and components continue to design, document, and implement compensating controls to reduce the severity of legacy system application functionality limitations. The FY 2021 Agency Financial Report has a target of FY 2023 for FFMIA correction.



Appendix 3: Abbreviations

| | |
|-----------|--|
| ADR | Alternative Dispute Resolution |
| CARES Act | Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act |
| DATA Act | Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2014 |
| DOJ | Department of Justice |
| eCW | Electronic Health Records System |
| EFSP | Emergency Food and Shelter Program |
| ERO | Enforcement and Removal Operations |
| FBI | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| GAGAS | generally accepted government auditing standards |
| HSI | Homeland Security Investigations |
| IPR | intellectual property rights |
| IT | information technology |
| LWA | lost wages assistance |
| NPPD | National Protection and Programs Directorate |
| OAR | Operation Allies Refuge |
| OAW | Operation Allies Welcome |
| OPE | Office of Partnership and Engagement |
| OPS | Office of Operations Coordination |
| OSINT | open-source intelligence |
| PRAC | Pandemic Response Accountability Committee |
| RPM | radiation portal monitor |
| SBA | Small Business Administration |
| SES | Senior Executive Service |
| SWA | State Workforce Agencies |
| TEDS | National Standards on Transport, Escort, Detention, and Search |
| UC | Unaccompanied Children |
| U.S.C. | United States Code |
| WPU | Whistleblower Protection Unit |

Appendix 4: Index to Reporting Requirements

The specific reporting requirements described in the *Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended*, including Section 989C of the *Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act of 2010* and the *Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016*, are listed below, as well as where to find the information in this report.

| Section of the IG Act | Requirement | Report Section |
|-----------------------|---|--|
| 4(a)(2) | Legislative and regulatory reviews | Congressional Briefings |
| 5(a)(1) | Significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies | Nothing to report |
| 5(a)(2) | Recommendations with respect to significant problems, abuses, and deficiencies | Throughout report |
| 5(a)(3) | Significant recommendations on which corrective action has not been completed | Appendix 1 |
| 5(a)(4) | Matters referred to prosecutorial authorities and resulting prosecutions and convictions | Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments |
| 5(a)(5) | Summary of reports to head of establishment when information or assistance requested was unreasonably refused or not provided | Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information |
| 5(a)(6) | List of audit, inspection, and evaluation reports and where applicable total questioned costs and funds to be put to better use | Appendix 1 |
| 5(a)(7) | Summary of significant reports | Highlights of Significant OIG Activities |
| 5(a)(8) | Statistical table showing reports with questioned and unsupported costs | Appendix 1 |
| 5(a)(9) | Statistical table showing reports with recommendations that funds be put to better use | Appendix 1 |
| 5(a)(10) | Summary of prior reports with no management decisions | Appendix 1 |
| | Summary of prior reports with no establishment comment returned within 60 days | Nothing to report |
| | Summary of prior reports with outstanding unimplemented recommendations | Appendix 1 |
| 5(a)(11) | Significant revised management decisions | Nothing to report |
| 5(a)(12) | Significant management decisions with which DHS OIG disagrees | Appendix 1 |
| 5(a)(13) | Information required by § 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 | Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996 |
| 5(a)(14)-(16) | Results of any peer review of DHS OIG by another OIG or date of last peer review, list of outstanding recommendations from any peer review of DHS OIG that have not been fully implemented, and a list of peer reviews conducted by DHS OIG including any outstanding recommendations | Appendix 2 |

| Section of the IG Act | Requirement | Report Section |
|-----------------------|--|---|
| 5(a)(17) | Statistical tables showing investigative reports, referrals, and total number of indictments and criminal information resulting from any prior referrals | <i>Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments</i> |
| 5(a)(18) | Metrics used for investigative statistical tables | <i>Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments</i> |
| 5(a)(19) | Investigations involving a Senior Government Employee | <i>Investigations of Senior Government Employees</i> |
| 5(a)(20) | Instances of whistleblower retaliation | <i>Summary of OIG Activities and Accomplishments</i> |
| 5(a)(21) | Attempts to interfere with OIG independence | <i>Summary of Attempts to Restrict or Delay Access to Information</i> |
| 5(a)(22) | Inspections, evaluations, and audits that were closed and not disclosed to the public; and | <i>Appendix 2</i> |
| | Investigations involving a Senior Government Employee that were closed and not disclosed to the public | <i>Investigations of Senior Government Employees</i> |

U.S. Department of Homeland Security
Office of Inspector General

Semiannual Report to Congress

April 1, 2022 - September 30, 2022

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