



2019

# Semiannual Report to Congress

Office of Inspector General  
October 1, 2018 – March 31, 2019

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## MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to present this National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) report for the period ending 31 March 2019. OIG conducted audit and inspection oversight, produced recommendations for improvements in agency programs, and pursued allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Working closely with the NGA elements, we closed 16 of 101 (16 percent) audit and inspection recommendations during this period. Under the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, we continue to expand our metrics resulting from our recommendations to the Agency.

The Audit Division examined the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act program and provided oversight of the independent contract auditors' work on NGA's financial statement audits and evaluation of adherence to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). Recommendations from these projects focused on improving policies, procedures, and requirements compliance; internal controls; and process effectiveness and efficiency. We continue to examine NGA's crisis and event response to national security and natural disasters, support of US Strategic Command mission requirements, corrective action implementation, and compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010.

The Inspections Division examined NGA's insider threat case management and the Geospatial-Intelligence (GEOINT) Services programs and conducted two intelligence oversight inspections. The division identified \$72.7 million in waste and questioned another \$8.5 million in spending with respect to GEOINT Services. The team continues to evaluate NGA's acquisition procedures. It announced new inspections of NGA's Outposts and GEOINT Standards. The IG no longer conducts intelligence oversight (IO) inspections, and realigned OIG resources to more compelling requirements. OIG continues to investigate reported questionable intelligence activities and may conduct periodic IO inspections as deemed necessary.

The Investigations Division closed 75 cases this period, substantiating 19 (25 percent) of its cases involving time and attendance fraud, computer misuse, security, and travel, and recovered \$160,172. The division continues to work on several investigations of senior officials. The Fraud Analytics Support Team used data analytics to pursue potential fraud in contracts, government purchase and travel cards and to identify potential misconduct.

I appreciate the ongoing support from the Director, senior leadership, and NGA workforce.

Cardell K. Richardson, Sr.  
Inspector General

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## OVERVIEW

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense combat-support agency and a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Agency receives guidance and oversight from DoD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Congress. NGA provides geospatial intelligence—GEOINT—that supports US national security and defense, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.



The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is to conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations to strengthen the effectiveness, efficiency, and integrity of NGA programs and operations.

We undertake and perform our assessments of NGA’s worldwide programs and operations in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in compliance with the standards of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

The OIG also serves as the principal NGA agent responsible for investigating potential violations of law, rule, or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process. In addition, the OIG performs the NGA external liaison function for federal, state, and local Inspectors General and Congressional overseers on IG-related matters. The OIG is the liaison to external law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI.

## RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION


The OIG is authorized 60 billets, and as of 31 March 2019, 52 employees were on board. The OIG staff is allocated among three core divisions—Audit, Inspections, and Investigations—and a support function—the Plans and Programs Division. A Counsel reports directly to the IG.

The Inspector General addressed independence concerns about NGA’s career service personnel management system by developing the NGA Human Capital Management Framework signed by the Director and the Inspector General in September 2017. The IG Career Service (IGCS), established 1 October 2017, achieved initial operating capability in April 2018 with the assignment of a dedicated IGCS Manager and achieved full operating capability in

November 2018 with the employment of one additional staff member. The IGCS manager led implementation of the NGA Human Capital Management Framework, thus satisfying concerns about IG independence.

The IGCS completed the inaugural IG Career Resource Guide to manage internal talent management processes, such as hiring, career development, assignments, and promotions, thereby helping to ensure OIG independence regarding human capital management. Additionally, the IGCS conducted an extensive analysis of career development programs and practices across IC IGs (NGA, DIA, NSA, and NRO). The objective: to leverage best practices used at other IC OIGs to improve career development opportunities for personnel assigned to the NGA OIG.

**Figure. OIG Organization Chart**



(Figure is UNCLASSIFIED)

## COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

The Counsel to the Inspector General is an in-house legal asset. Counsel provides legal advice directly to the IG, and provides legal assistance to all OIG elements. Counsel also represents the OIG in litigation arising out of or affecting OIG operations, manages the OIG legislative and regulatory review, and reviews all plans, investigations, and final reports

for legal sufficiency. On behalf of the IG and OIG, the Counsel liaises with, among others, DoD and IC counsels, DoD IG, federal and state prosecutors, NGA's Office of General Counsel, and other NGA components.

## AUDIT

The Audit Division is responsible for providing independent oversight and objective audits of NGA's programs and operations, and promoting the effectiveness, efficiency, and accountability of NGA programs and operations. Audits are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Audit findings and recommendations seek to reduce costs; improve overall performance; and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. The recommendations resulting from the projects offer insight for management, help improve internal controls, and ensure compliance with laws, regulation, and policy.



## INSPECTIONS

The Inspections Division has responsibility for the evaluation, review, and analysis of NGA's programs and activities, including authorities, policies, procedures, and controls. The division provides independent assessment of the reliability of information, compliance with regulations and policies, management of resources, and achievement of program results. This division identified \$8.5 million in questioned costs and \$72.7 million in waste during this reporting period. The identified costs were the result of ineffective leadership and oversight, NGA making investments without customer requirements, and inadequate program oversight.

In October 2018, NGA established the [REDACTED], which as a part of its mission, subsumed [REDACTED]. With the stand-up of the [REDACTED], the Agency now has a mechanism to perform routine intelligence oversight (IO) inspections. The DoD mandated that NGA OIG Inspections Division conduct IO inspections from 2007 to 2010. On 7 October 2010, the NGA OIG became statutory, and IO inspections became discretionary. OIG continued to perform IO inspections although we were no longer required to, since the IO inspection program yielded tangible benefits to the Agency, and no other entity existed to ensure mission oversight and compliance. Since the standup of the [REDACTED], the IG decided to divest of conducting IO inspections and align these OIG resources to other requirements to increase value to the Agency and taxpayers. The NGA OIG will continue to investigate reported questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and the IG may conduct periodic IO inspections as deemed necessary.

## INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division conducts independent administrative and criminal investigations of complaints and other information of possible violations of criminal and civil law. The division is the principal NGA agent for investigating potential violations of rule or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process.

The division also incorporates the Fraud Analytics Support Team (FAST), which conducts an agency-wide fraud detection program using data mining and forensic analyses tools. FAST also identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Systemic findings are referred to the Inspections Division or Audit Division for further analysis and review. This division recovered \$160,172 for the first half of FY2019 and substantiated 25 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The funds recovered involve time and attendance fraud, contractor labor mischarging, and contractor self-disclosure cases.

The division is included in the *GAO Whistleblower in the IC* review, which includes a review of the DIA, NRO, CIA, IC IG, NSA, and NGA processes and procedures in handling whistleblower complaints. The GAO review is ongoing.

# SUMMARIES OF AUDITS

## COMPLETED

### **FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act, Report Nos. OIGA 19-01 (External Report) and 19-02 (Internal Report), issued 25 October 2018**

*Overview.* OIGA contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the FY2018 evaluation required by FISMA. The overall objectives of the evaluation were to determine whether NGA's overall information security program and practices were consistent with FISMA requirements, responded to the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the Department of Homeland Security and required by the Intelligence Community Inspector General (IC IG), and to determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the FY2017 assessment. The evaluation included a sample of seven systems for testing to support the IG metrics. Two reports were issued in relation to the evaluation. KPMG issued the external report to the IC IG and provided the results of the reporting metrics, and issued the internal report to NGA management that included the detailed findings and recommendations.

*Findings.* KPMG issued 13 findings. The auditors found that NGA is making progress to strengthen its information security program; however, NGA does not consistently implement and enforce security policies and procedures in accordance with current requirements. Until NGA consistently and effectively implements and enforces security requirements at the enterprise and system level, the Agency will continue to risk the confidentiality, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, and authentication of its data.

*Results.* KPMG issued 39 recommendations. KPMG will follow up on the findings and evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions taken when it performs the FY2019 evaluation.

### **Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018**

*Overview.* OIGA contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA's FY2018 financial statements. The objective was to provide an opinion on whether NGA's financial statements were presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally accepted accounting principles. KPMG also considered NGA's internal control over financial reporting and performed tests to determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.



*Findings.* For certain material account balances and disclosures, NGA was unable to provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence for, or make representations to the facts and circumstances that support them. In addition, KPMG reported seven material weaknesses in internal control related to the procurement process; property, plant, and equipment; manual journal entries; the fund balance with Treasury reconciliation process; advances from others and revenue; entity-level controls; and key financial and supporting systems, as well as a significant deficiency related to insufficient documentation for certain payroll transactions. KPMG also reported that NGA did not fully comply with the *Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982*, and that NGA's financial management systems did not substantially comply with federal financial management systems requirements, applicable federal accounting standards, and the United States Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level, as required under Section 803(a) of the *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996*.

During the audit engagement, KPMG also identified nine internal control deficiencies that were not considered significant deficiencies or material weaknesses but were important enough to merit management's attention. These deficiencies were communicated to management in the *Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY2018 Financial Statement Audit Engagement* (Report No. OIGA 19-04, issued 21 December 2018).

*Results.* The audit engagement resulted in a disclaimer of opinion on NGA's FY2018 and FY2017 financial statements, as KPMG was unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate audit evidence on which to base an opinion. KPMG issued 52 accompanying recommendations (43 with the auditors' report and nine with the management letter). KPMG will follow up on the findings and evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions taken when it performs the FY2019 financial statement audit.

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### **Audit of NGA's Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Program, Report No. OIGA 19-05, issued 1 March 2019**

*Overview.* The audit objective was to determine whether NGA effectively and efficiently managed the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) program. Specifically, we were to determine whether the NGA acquisition workforce (AWF) complied with the DAWIA core certification requirements for training, education, and experience.

*Findings.* NGA was not fully compliant with DAWIA requirements and had uncertified personnel performing acquisition duties. We also found NGA management did not [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Noncompliance with DAWIA requirements increases the risk that NGA will not be able to provide and sustain an expert AWF to meet its acquisition needs to fulfill its mission. In addition, AWF training, education, experience, and certification reporting to DoD and Congress may not be accurate. Since NGA's Defense Acquisition Workforce

Development Fund (DAWDF) is dependent on the accuracy of the DAWIA data reported to DoD, NGA's future DAWDF could be at risk.

*Results.* The report contains three recommendations to improve the management of the DAWIA program. The recommendations focus on improving procedures to enforce compliance with DAWIA laws and regulations, developing introductory training for AWF members, and developing an automated process to efficiently and effectively track DAWIA training and certification requirements.

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### **Audit of NGA's Geodesy Products, Memorandum S-061-19/OIG, issued 4 March 2019**

*Overview.* The audit objective was to evaluate the Office of Geomatics's (SFN) ability to achieve current and future mission requirements.

*Findings.* OIGA observed that SFN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED].

*Results.* OIGA worked with SFN to develop a set of program metrics for each SFN division. However, since a system was not in place to collect metric data, SFN was unable to develop and provide information required for the project in a timely manner. Without the necessary SFN program management information to analyze, OIGA was unable to obtain sufficient and competent evidence required by Government Auditing Standards to perform the audit. As such, OIGA issued a memorandum that communicated our observations and terminated the audit.

## **ONGOING**

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### **Audit of NGA's Analysis Event Response for National Security and Natural Disasters, Project No. 17-A08**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether Analysis component-related crisis and event response plans are in place and are executed and managed effectively. Specifically, the audit will determine whether the execution and management of those plans facilitate coordination among stakeholders, standardization of procedures where practical, and reduction in duplication of efforts, and determine whether the plans efficiently allocate available resources.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in May 2017, and plans to issue a report in May 2019.

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**Audit of NGA's Support of US Strategic Command Mission Requirements, Project No. 17-A11**

*Overview.* NGA supports US Strategic Command (US STRATCOM) by satisfying requirements, including providing reliable navigation and planning charts. The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is satisfying US STRATCOM requirements effectively and efficiently.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in August 2017, and plans to issue a report in May 2019.

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**Audit of NGA's Corrective Action Implementation, Project No. 18-A04**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is following up on recommendations effectively and efficiently to correct findings identified through external cyber security reviews. Specifically, this audit will focus on whether NGA is correcting deficiencies identified during the Defense Information Systems Agency Command Cyber Readiness Inspection and Cybersecurity Service Provider inspections. In addition, we will determine whether NGA is using these inspection results to correct enterprise-wide deficiencies and improve cyber security readiness throughout the Agency.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in February 2018 and plans to issue a report in May 2019.

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**Assessment of NGA Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Project No. 19-A02**

*Overview.* The objective of our assessment is to determine whether NGA is complying with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 for FY2018.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in December 2018 and issued its report on 23 April 2019. The report concluded that NGA was compliant with IPERA for FY2018.

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**Audit of NGA's Permanent Duty Travel, Project No. 19-A03**

*U) Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of NGA's permanent duty travel program. Specifically, the audit will determine whether NGA complied with applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement for permanent duty travel.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in March 2019 and plans to issue a report in January 2020.

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## **FY2019 Federal Information Security Modernization Act Evaluation of the NGA Information Security Program, Project No. 19-A04**

*Overview.* OIG contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the FY2019 evaluation required by the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA). The overall objectives of the evaluation are to assess NGA's information security program in accordance with the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the Department of Homeland Security and to determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the FY2018 assessment. The evaluation will include a sample of seven systems for testing to support the IG metrics.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in February 2019 and plans to issue the final external metrics results to OMB in October 2019 and the detailed internal report to NGA management in November 2019.

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## **Audit of the NGA Financial Statements for FY2019, Project No. 19-A05**

*Overview.* OIG contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA's FY2019 financial statements. The audit objective is to determine whether NGA's financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally accepted accounting principles. To meet requirements for federal financial statement audits, KPMG is also assessing internal control over financial reporting and performing tests to determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.

KPMG is following up on the status of management's corrective actions to address the findings and recommendations communicated in the *Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017* (Report No. OIGA 19-03), and the *Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY2018 Financial Statement Audit* (Report No. OIGA 19-04).

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in February 2019. KPMG's report will be issued no later than 15 November 2019. If necessary, a management letter will be issued by 31 December 2019.

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## **Audit of NGA's Funds Reprogramming Activity, Project No. 19-A07**

*Overview.* OIG contracted KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA's funds reprogramming activity in conjunction with KPMG's audit of NGA's FY2019 financial statements. The audit objectives are to (1) assess NGA's funds reprogramming activity for gaps in compliance with applicable laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and (2) provide information on the root cause of reprogramming activity.

*Status.* OIGA announced the project in February 2019. KPMG's report is expected to be issued in September 2019.

# SUMMARIES OF INSPECTIONS

## COMPLETED

### **Inspection of NGA's Insider Threat Program Case Management, Report No. OIGE-19-01, issued February 2019**

*Overview.* Executive Order 13587 directed structural reforms to improve the security of classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information. In November 2012, the President issued the National Insider Threat Policy, which required agencies to implement an insider threat program within 180 days. OIG published a report in February 2016 that assessed NGA's compliance with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The purpose of this inspection, announced in February 2017, was to evaluate NGA's protection of employees' civil liberties and the status of progress in following minimum required standards. The overall objective of the inspection was to assess the processes and procedures that the NGA Insider Threat Program uses to manage cases and comply with statute and DoD and IC policy.

*Findings.* Three findings detailed that (1) the Agency's insider threat policies and procedures are not sufficient to ensure effective case management; (2) the insider threat program needs to improve heightened monitoring processes, coordination with privacy and civil liberties officials, and documentation of legal advice and concurrence on policies and operations to ensure privacy and civil liberties protections; and (3) the program does not comply with established policies and procedures in the oversight of audit logs and account management. We found that NGA's insider threat policies and investigative operations are not aligned and their case management operations lack consistency. Process improvements are needed to minimize the risk of privacy and civil liberties violations against employees and ensure compliance with applicable laws. Specifically, NGA employees remain in heightened collection status beyond the approved date of termination. Furthermore, the Insider Threat Office does not coordinate with the privacy and civil liberties program office regarding developing and implementing insider threat processes and procedures, and coordination with the Office of General Counsel is largely informal.

*Results.* We made 10 recommendations designed to improve the NGA Insider Threat Program with respect to case management. The recommended improvements focused on consistent operations in executing data triage, analysis and follow-on actions, privacy and civil liberties protections, and more effective management oversight mechanisms.

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## **Inspection of GEOINT Services Initiative, Report No. OIG-19-02, issued February 2019**

*Overview.* The GEOINT Services initiative is NGA’s delivery of geospatial content and analytics through a cloud-based architecture. GEOINT services are web-based tools and data that allow customers to discover, access, exploit, and contribute geospatial capabilities, datasets, and best practices. During her tenure as NGA Deputy Director, The Honorable Sue Gordon stated, “GEOINT Services isn’t an abstraction or an architecture, it’s about exposing what we know in a way that can be used by people who need it to do their job.” This inspection focused on NGA’s planning and implementation of the GEOINT Services initiative from a holistic agency perspective and as an IC service of common concern. The overall objective of the inspection was to assess GEOINT Services implementation against customer requirements; agency goals, plans, and milestones; assigned responsibilities; and return on investment. The inspectors reviewed policies relating to oversight guidance regarding Geospatial Platform as a Service (GPaaS) and the agency’s implementing guidance. In addition, we reviewed the management of the effort, including the requirements process, overlap with other portfolios and programs, and the budgetary effectiveness and efficiency of the program.

*Findings.* We found \$72.7 million in waste and questioned another \$8.5 million in spending. Four findings detailed the following: (1) GEOINT Services lacked effective leadership oversight and business management, resulting in \$41 million in waste. NGA instilled a culture that valued continued research over fielding an operational deliverable and managed the initiative without enforcing rigor and standards. (2) NGA made investments without customer requirements and without adequate program oversight, resulting in \$31.7 million in waste and \$8.5 million in questioned costs. (3) GEOINT Services demonstrated both time and cost savings by enabling the development and deployment of capabilities on the PaaS. GEOINT Services demonstrated efficiencies and time savings in the development of the initiative’s PaaS. Also, the PaaS has enabled the modernization of antiquated processes, and (4) NGA fulfilled the intent of the 2014 DNI GPaaS memorandum, but failed to finalize a memorandum of understanding with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) and did not incorporate past efforts that could have made GEOINT Services more efficient.

*Results.* We made 10 recommendations to improve NGA’s implementation of GEOINT Services. The recommendations focus on addressing found waste and questioned costs by aligning the initiative with NGA’s requirements process, instituting additional contract oversight, and establishing a customer metrics solution to measure return on investment. We also recommend that the initiative comply with records management programs, DNI instructions, and DoD policies as detailed in the report.

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## Intelligence Oversight Inspections

*Overview.* OIG provided oversight of NGA’s Intelligence Oversight Program. OIG conducted intelligence oversight (IO) inspections of NGA offices to determine compliance with applicable policies and procedures. OIG also assessed whether personnel were familiar with procedures for recognizing and reporting questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and significant or highly sensitive (S/HS) matters.



During the reporting period, we completed two IO inspections involving the following components:

- NGA Operations Center, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-01, issued December 2018
- NGA Support Team to US Indo-Pacific Command, Report No. OIGE-IO-18-02, issued March 2019.

*Findings and Results.* We found no deficiencies rising to the level of a QIA or S/HSM and, in most cases, found employee knowledge, training, and program execution to be compliant with Agency and DoD guidance. In report OIGE-IO-19-02, we had one finding and made two recommendations to assess whether NGA’s Intelligence Oversight training requirement was duplicative and properly enumerated in DoD policy.

The IG divested the OIG of the responsibility to conduct IO inspections and aligned these OIG resources to other requirements to increase value to the Agency and taxpayers. The OIG will continue to investigate reported QIAs and the IG may conduct periodic IO inspections as deemed necessary.

## ONGOING

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### Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Processes and Procedures (Phase III), Project No. II-18-02

*Overview.* This inspection is the third, and final, in a series of acquisition-function inspections. Since the NGA acquisition function is large and complex, a single comprehensive inspection would have taken too long. Some of the information could become outdated before the end of the inspection. Therefore, to provide the most relevant and timely assistance to NGA senior management, the inspection was divided into three phases, generally based on a

framework established by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The overall objective of the inspection is to assess NGA's acquisition policies and processes to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of the Agency's acquisition program management and compliance with oversight requirements.

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in September 2019.

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### **Inspection of Aeronautical Safety of Navigation, Project No. QL-18-02**

*Overview.* NGA's Source component supports DoD and civilian air safety of navigation worldwide with regularly updated paper and digital charts of the world's airways and oceans, and publications of its runways. Through the science of geomatics, NGA can precisely georeference where things are on the earth. This inspection continues our evaluations of NGA's safety of navigation missions but focuses on aeronautical vs. maritime as previous reports did. The overall objective of this inspection is to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NGA Aeronautical Navigation mission.

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in May 2019.

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### **Inspection of NGA's Outposts, Project No. QL-19-01**

*Overview.* The NGA Office of Ventures and Innovation has the strategic planning responsibility over the acquisition of systems and technology that advances a national leadership role in the imagery, imagery analysis, and geospatial information community. As part of the Office of Ventures and Innovation, NGA's Outposts create a presence at the point of origin for new technology to innovate and develop new solutions for NGA's current and future challenges. The Outposts (Silicon Valley, California, and Austin, Texas) state that they elicit, compile, and assess NGA technology requirements to enable cooperation and collaboration, and to develop a shared strategic vision with partners in industry and academia. They also assess commercial technologies against identified problem sets, for potential NGA investment. The Outposts team has also focused on fostering relationships with the academic community. The overall objective of the inspection is to evaluate the effectiveness of the NGA Outposts with respect to return on investment.

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in July 2019

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### **Inspection of GEOINT Standards, Project No. II-19-01**

*Overview.* NGA Director, as Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Functional Manager (GFM), established the NSG GFM Standards Assessment program, which defines and implements NSG methods and processes to assess and assert information technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS) conformance with GEOINT data and service standards within the DoD and the IC. During our 2019 annual planning process, we learned of potential negative impact resulting from NGA Career Services manpower initiatives and constrained contract funding for the GEOINT Standards program. Management raised concerns that the Career Services' initiatives

created a critical shortfall in qualified cadre to carry out its mission. In addition, we learned of concerns that possible reductions to the GEOINT standards-related contract funding may have negatively affected the mission. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess whether the GEOINT Standards program is organized, staffed, and resourced to fulfill its GFM responsibilities effectively.

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in October 2019

## SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division (OIGI) closed 75 cases during the reporting period; 19 were substantiated, or 25 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The division opened 72 cases and has 75 ongoing investigations.



## JUDICIAL ACTIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

OIGI did not have any judicial actions during the reporting period. One case that has been reported in previous periods for federal prosecution to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Missouri involving contractor labor mischarging is pending.

## CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (SUBSTANTIATED)

OIGI conducted six investigations of senior officials that resulted in substantiated allegations, which are summarized below. OIGI has 11 pending investigations on senior officials.

We provided the DoD OIG the required notification of these allegations and cases.

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### **OIG Cases No. 17-071 and 17-084, closed January 2019**

In two related cases, the OIGI investigated allegations that two senior managers retaliated against two employees: one for reporting sexual harassment and simple assault and one for reporting harassment. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegations that both senior officials retaliated against the employees. The senior officials were charged with "Failure to Follow Agency Policies and Procedures." One senior official received a Letter of Reprimand; the other received a Letter of Caution.

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### **OIG Case No. 18-043, closed October 2018**

The OIGI obtained information that an NGA Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service manager misused NGA computer systems by searching for, viewing, and storing inappropriate and sexually oriented material. The OIG investigation substantiated the allegation. The manager received a Letter of Reprimand from the former NGA director.

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**OIG Case No. 18-124, closed December 2018**

The OIGI received a complaint that a senior manager treated employees disrespectfully and created a hostile work environment. The details of the complaint were referred to management for review and action. A management inquiry substantiated that the manager had created a hostile work environment. The senior manager was counseled regarding the manager's communication style.

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**OIG Case No. 18-125, closed January 2019**

The OIGI received a complaint that an NGA component director created a hostile work environment and treated employees disrespectfully. A management inquiry was conducted to address the allegations. The inquiry substantiated the allegations that the director had created a hostile work environment and treated employees disrespectfully. The director received a Letter of Reprimand and a Letter of Requirements that mandated remedial training.

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**OIG Case No. 19-004, closed December 2018**

The OIGI investigated allegations that a senior military officer at NGA created a hostile work environment and displayed a toxic leadership style. OIGI referred this matter to the officer's management, who counseled the officer regarding the officer's leadership style. OIGI also addressed the complainant's reprisal allegation about the officer, which was not substantiated.

## **CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (UNSUBSTANTIATED)**

OIGI conducted eight investigations of senior officials in which allegations were not substantiated. The cases are summarized below.

We provided the DoD OIG required notification of these allegations and cases.

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**OIG Case No. 17-087, closed February 2019**

A senior government official retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

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**OIG Case No. 18-032, closed January 2019**

A senior government official misused position and wasted government funds; not substantiated.

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**OIG Case No. 18-078, closed January 2019**

A senior government official denied due process; not substantiated.

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**OIG Case No. 18-079, closed January 2019**

A senior government official denied due process; not substantiated.

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**OIG Case No. 18-094, closed November 2018**

A senior government official committed acts that violated the Procurement Integrity Act; not substantiated.

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**OIG Case No. 19-012, closed March 2019**

Senior government officials retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

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**OIG Case No. 19-053, closed February 2019**

A senior government official misused position and showed favoritism to a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

## WHISTLEBLOWER RETALIATION

In addition to the whistleblower retaliation cases cited in cases involving senior officials, the OIG closed three whistleblower retaliation cases, which are summarized below.

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**OIG Case No. 18-103, closed February 2019**

OIGI investigated allegations that NGA management retaliated against an employee, who no longer worked at NGA, for reporting fraud and waste in a leadership-training program while attending leadership training. The OIGI concluded that NGA management did not retaliate against the employee for making a protected communication. These findings were reported to the employee in writing.

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**OIG Case No. 18-113, closed March 2019**

OIGI investigated an allegation of retaliation against a Pay Band 4 analyst by a supervisor for reporting management issues to the NGA Ombudsman. The analyst received a Letter of Reprimand (LoR) for discourtesy, disrespectful conduct, and creating a disturbance. OIGI obtained documents that supported issuance of the LoR and, based on the timeline of events that OIGI produced, determined that a prima facie reprisal case did not exist. These findings were reported to the analyst.

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### **OIG Case No. 18-131, closed February 2019**

OIGI investigated allegations that Pay Band 5 supervisors retaliated against a subordinate employee for filing an EEO complaint by changing the employee's position and duties. OIGI determined that the employee filed a complaint with NGA Office of Diversity, Inclusion, and Equal Employment Opportunity (ODE) that included the employee's reprisal allegations. OIGI personnel advised the complainant that OIGI would not conduct an investigation of the same reprisal allegations that were being addressed in the EEO complaint, and that the complainant could return to the OIGI after the EEO complaint process concluded if there were still issues that should be addressed by OIGI.

### **TIME AND ATTENDANCE FRAUD**

The OIGI conducted fewer time and attendance fraud investigations during this period than in the previous six-month period; however, the investigations accomplished were significant and resulted in the recovery of funds totaling \$160,172 for time claimed for work not performed. The division continued to send many of the less substantial issues to management for corrective action, which also resulted in the recovery of \$3,655. The following are summaries of three time and attendance fraud investigations that resulted in the terminations of employment, a suspension, and the recovery of funds totaling \$156,517.

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### **OIG Case No. 16-095, closed March 2019**

An OIGI proactive analysis of time and attendance reporting disclosed that a Pay Band 4 systems engineer misused NGA computer systems and committed time and attendance fraud. The investigation found that the systems engineer used NGA computer systems to conduct extensive personal business during work hours, falsely claimed 1,941 hours, valued at \$134,468, that the employee did not work, falsified various official government forms, and made false statements. The employee resigned from NGA, effective 31 January 2019. Actions were taken to revoke the employee's security clearance and to recover the value of the falsely claimed hours. The appropriate criminal referrals were made.



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### **OIG Case No. 17-083, closed October 2018**

OIGI received an allegation that a Pay Band 3 analyst was not accurately accounting for the hours worked. The analysis of time and attendance data showed that the analyst claimed 147 hours, valued at \$7,263, that were not worked. The analyst received a 14-day suspension without pay. NGA initiated action to recover \$6,225, the value of the hours that were determined to be falsely reported, after the analyst was able to account for some additional hours worked.

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### **OIG Case No. 18-023, closed January 2019**

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 4 staff officer committed time and attendance fraud when the staff officer used military leave on civilian timesheets and claimed reserve duty training credit by submitting Department of Army (DA) Form 1380, Record of Individual Performance of Reserve Duty Training, for duty that the staff officer did not perform. The investigation substantiated the allegations and developed evidence that the officer submitted false claims by knowingly and willfully submitting 17 claims for duty that the officer did not perform. The officer accrued 248 points that counted toward US Army Reserve retirement benefits. To perpetrate the fraud, the officer also used 258 hours of leave, valued at \$15,824, from the military leave bank. The officer conspired with another NGA employee, who is also a retired Army Reserve officer, to fraudulently sign the DA Form 1380 and numerous Officer Evaluation Reports to facilitate the fraud. The staff officer was terminated from NGA and required to reimburse the government for the hours that the officer recorded and received compensation but was absent from work. The co-conspirator received a letter of reprimand. The NGA OIG report of investigation was forwarded to the Department of Army Inspector General for any action it deemed appropriate.

### **CONTRACTOR LABOR MISCHARGING**

OIGI continued to address issues of contractor labor mischarging through outreach efforts with industry and a fraud survey provided to the NGA workforce. After evaluating the survey results, OIGI made improvements to the survey. OIGI continues to work one labor mischarging case in coordination with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the Department of Justice (DOJ). OIGI has also received some contractor self-disclosure letters from NGA contractors. Recovery of funds on these disclosures is in process.

### **COMPUTER MISUSE**

OIGI investigated acts of computer misuse by contractor and government personnel at NGA. The following are case summaries of two investigations of contractor employees using NGA computer systems excessively for personal use. Additional computer misuse cases are pending actions that will address the misuse.



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### **OIG Case No. 18-059, closed December 2018**

OIGI investigated an allegation that a contractor employee was operating a personal business on government time and using NGA computer systems. After reporting evidence of this activity to the NGA Office of Contract Services and the contracting officer, OIGI was advised that the employee was terminated by his employer and that OCS reminded the NGA contracting company that NGA systems and time must be used for NGA business.

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## **OIG Case No. 18-088, closed October 2018**

OIGI investigated an allegation that a deployed contractor employee repeatedly used NGA computer systems to support personal activities, not related to the employee's NGA duties. The employee received counseling and was required to complete refresher training on cybersecurity and NGA's IT Acceptable Use Policy.

## **OTHER NOTEWORTHY INVESTIGATIONS**

OIGI has no noteworthy investigations to report for this reporting period.

## **CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS**

During this period, OIGI worked on 10 investigations with the DCIS, other criminal investigative agencies, and DoJ attorneys. The issues included false claims, cost mischarging, conflict of interest, theft of government equipment, threats to Federal employees, and tax fraud.

## **FRAUD ANALYTICS SUPPORT TEAM**

The NGA OIG Fraud Analytics Support Team (FAST) performs two missions: (1) detect fraud, waste, and abuse through data analytics and (2) provide forensic analysis support to the Audits, Inspections, and Investigations divisions. FAST provides the basis for restitution and recovery of dollars lost due to fraud, waste, and abuse so that corrective actions can be taken to improve efficiency and cost effectiveness of NGA's programs and operations. FAST is outsmarting fraud, waste, and abuse through data science.

## **COMPLETED**

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### **Government Travel Charge Card Analytics, Project No. F18-004**

FAST reviewed ██████ transactions and found that ██████ NGA employees used travel cards to make \$█████ in purchases and obtain \$█████ in cash advances. FAST determined that 99.9% of NGA's Government Travel Charge Card holders used their cards in accordance with NGA regulations and guidance.

The FAST review identified three NGA employees who misused their GTCCs, with costs of misuse ranging from \$3,212 to more than \$7,388. FAST referred these three misuse cases to management for action and to NGA's Government Travel Charge Card Team for remedial action. OIG regularly reviews questionable GTCC transactions.

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### **Proactive Military Time and Attendance Analysis, Project No. F19-001**

NGA's Office of the Director requested assistance with a manpower study of all military personnel at NGA. FAST used the Proactive Time and Attendance and Labor Mischarge (PTALM) model and matched the names of the military members from PeopleSoft to identify potential abusers. The primary objective of the PTALM project is to detect false claims, and its secondary objective is to deter future false claims against the government. The analysis identified three military members with a significant shortfall for the previous 12-month period, and OIG referred them to management. Management chose not to pursue further because of the military members' job duties and responsibilities requiring fieldwork outside of NGA facilities. The project was completed in January 2019.

## **ONGOING**

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### **Proactive Payroll Fraud Detection Model, Project No. F18-002**

FAST reviewed NGA Payroll and developed a model that uses algorithms to detect NGA employees that are considered to be high risk for payroll fraud. The model resulted in the independent detection of an instance of potential nepotism and a potential conflict of interest. Additionally, the OIG model identified one instance of a deceased employee who passed in May 2018 whose pay status was still active in August 2018. No fraud was found because DFAS and NGA Financial Management were settling the leave balance owed. No true instances of payroll fraud were found, and the model validated that the separation of duties and controls in place are sufficient to mitigate payroll fraud, such as ghost employees, at NGA.

## **NEW**

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### **Resume Scoring Model, Project No. F19-002**

NGA OIG developed a tool to automatically parse unstructured data from NGA resumes and promotion packages and rank them based on a customizable list of keywords through text analytics, natural language processing, and statistical analysis. This tool reduced the initial resume review process from 20 man-hours to approximately 30 minutes.

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### **Automated Document Highlighter, Project No. F19-003**

NGA OIG developed an automated highlighting tool that aided in the review of a large number of resumes and promotion packages against a list of key words establishing the criteria for promotion. The script successfully ran through a customizable list of 114 key words in over 900 pages of promotion packet materials in a matter of a few minutes. This reduced the manual review by 95 percent, allowing the reviewer to focus on context and content.

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### **Government Purchase Card Analytics, Project No. F19-004**

The US Government uses purchase cards as a financial management tool to purchase goods and services, reduce transaction costs, and provide an auditable electronic history of transactions to identify areas to further improve efficiencies and reduce waste, fraud, or abuse. The NGA OIG is conducting a forensic review of NGA's Government Purchase Card (GPC) transactions for FY2018. We are analyzing ████████ transactions for instances of fraud, waste, or abuse. In previous reviews, FAST determined that the GPC program could strengthen internal controls to reduce the number of Split Payments (known requirements split solely to keep them under the micro-purchase threshold).

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### **OIG Contract Fraud Survey, Project No. F19-005**

The NGA OIG has developed an online survey tool that allows NGA employees to report potential contract fraud anonymously. The goal of this project is to detect fraudulent activities with the aid of NGA employee input and enable OIG to take necessary action to neutralize or mitigate fraud schemes once detected. Additionally, the OIG Contract Fraud Survey aims to increase fraud awareness among NGA personnel and leadership, improve the prosecution referral rate for cases involving criminal activity, and enhance NGA OIG proficiency and knowledge in procurement fraud investigations. The OIG Contract Fraud Survey is conducted semiannually. OIG received 61 survey replies for the period 1 October 2018 to 31 March 2019.

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### **Proactive Contract Fraud Detection Model, Project No. F19-006**

Contracts pose one of the highest risks for fraud at NGA. In response, FAST initiated a review of NGA contracts. The objective of this project is to identify high-risk contracts based on risk rankings derived from available data and outlier detection methods. Given that a majority of the contract data should not be fraudulent, the goal is to find the outliers in the data and identify contracts with potential fraud, waste, and abuse. High-risk contracts identified in the project will be referred to investigations or the audit division for further review. Completion of the Proactive Contract Fraud Detection Model is projected for October 2019.

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### **Proactive Time and Attendance and Labor Mischarge Model, Project No. F19-007**

The NGA OIG determined that a large number of investigative cases involve employee time and attendance or contractor labor mischarges. The primary objective of the Proactive Time and Attendance and Labor Mischarge (PTALM) project is to detect false claims, and its secondary objective is to deter future false claims against the government. The model's overall objective is to detect and deter time and attendance and contractor labor mischarges. Completion of the PTALM project is projected for October 2019.

## APPENDIX A. STATUS OF AUDIT AND INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

This appendix includes seven tables that present the status of recommendations according to various parameters.

**Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG Recommendations as of 31 March 2019**

This table provides the number of NGA OIG and DoD OIG audit and inspection recommendations issued to NGA management that were closed or remained open at the end of the reporting period. This table does not include recommendations from the Financial Statement Audit (52 open) and FISMA evaluation (39 open). Recommendations that closed prior to 1 October 2018 are not included.

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Audit of NGA’s Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 16-08, May 2016</b>	0	1
Objective: To determine whether NGA policies and procedures ensured the proper use of administrative leave.		
<b>Observations on NGA Purchases of Passenger Motor Vehicles, Report No. OIGA 16-11, September 2016</b>	0	1
Objectives: Observations identified during a formal investigation to determine whether NGA violated the Antideficiency Act (ADA) when it purchased two canine vehicles in FY2013 using the Operation and Maintenance appropriation. While NGA did not violate the ADA when it purchased the vehicles, certain matters were of sufficient importance to communicate to management.		
<b>Audit of Foreign Travel, Report No. OIGA 16-13, September 2016</b>	0	1
Objective: To determine whether management of foreign temporary duty (TDY) travel was effective and efficient. Specifically, the OIG determined whether NGA travelers and approving officials complied with applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement for foreign TDY travel.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Disposal of Electronic Waste, Report No. OIGA17-06, March 2017</b>	0	4
Objective: To determine whether NGA sanitized and disposed of e-waste in accordance with IC, DoD, and NGA policies and procedures.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Information Assurance Certification Program, Report No. OIGA17-09, June 2017</b>	0	1

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
Objective: To determine whether the NGA workforce performing information assurance functions have met appropriate certification requirements in accordance with DoD and NGA policies and procedures.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Oversight of Contractor Performance and Contract Payments, Report No. OIGA17-11, September 2017</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>
Objective: To assess the effectiveness of oversight of contractor performance and payment, specifically, to determine, for contracts, whether (1) contractor officers’ representatives (CORs) and technical monitors were properly appointed in accordance with applicable policy; (2) an appropriate oversight plan was established; (3) CORs are reviewing contractor work on a timely basis and in accordance with the oversight plan; and (4) contract payments are adequately supported.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Management of the Acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment (CFPE), Report No. OIGA18-03, November 2017</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively identified requirements and provided adequate contract and program oversight for the acquisition of the CFPE.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, April 2018</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
Objective: To determine whether NGA management implemented policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government information was secure from personnel who separated from NGA.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, July 2018</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>
Objective: To determine whether the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program is effectively managed in accordance with applicable federal, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Personnel Security Clearance Process, Report No. OIGA18-07, August 2018</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>11</b>
Objective: Part 1: To determine whether NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based approach to onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background investigations, including controls for mitigating risk associated with onboarding prior to the full completion of background investigations. Part 2: To determine whether NGA has a backlog of background investigations, the reasons for the backlog, and the actions taken to reduce the backlog and improve the timeliness of background investigations.		

<b>Audit of NGA’s Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Program, Report No. OIGA19-05, March 2019</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
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Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively and efficiently managed the DAWIA Program.

<b>Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, November 2014</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NGA’s Privacy Program, processes, and procedures. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether the Privacy Program was effectively organized, staffed, and trained to fulfill its responsibilities; (2) the risk of a privacy breach and existing mitigation efforts; (3) key factors in promoting and hindering the effective exercise of privacy protections; and (4) the completeness of required agency privacy documentation.

<b>Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Function, Phase I: Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 16-02, November 2015</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
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Objectives: To determine whether NGA developed and implemented the necessary governance structure, oversight, and review processes, as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assessment guidelines, for entity-level reviews of the acquisition functions. The sub-objectives were to (1) determine whether NGA’s acquisition function is aligned with agency mission and needs; (2) evaluate the level of NGA leadership commitment; and (3) determine whether NGA’s defense acquisition management review and oversight processes are sufficient.

<b>Inspection of NGA’s Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human Capital, Report No. OIGE 16-03, November 2015</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
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Objectives: To review NGA’s acquisition human capital policies and practices to evaluate whether NGA has developed and maintained a fully proficient acquisition workforce that is flexible and highly skilled across a range of management, technical, and business disciplines as outlined in OMB’s assessment guide. The sub-objectives were to determine (1) whether NGA is conducting effective strategic human capital planning and (2) whether NGA is effectively and efficiently acquiring, developing, and retaining acquisition talent.

<b>Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04, February 2016</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
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Objectives: To determine compliance with its statement of capabilities.

<b>Review of the NGA Insider Threat Program, Report No. OIG 16-05, February 2016</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
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Objectives: To determine whether NGA’s Insider Threat Program complies with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The sub-objectives were aligned with the following six minimum standards established by the National Insider Threat Policy: (1) designation of senior official(s) and associated responsibilities; (2) information integration, analysis, and response; (3) insider-threat program personnel; (4) access the information; (5) monitoring user activity on networks; and (6) employee training and awareness.

<b>Review of NGA Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners, Report No. OIG 16-06, May 2016</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
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Objective: To assess the magnitude, primary causes, and impact of the backlog within NGA’s Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program.

<b>Inspection of NGA’s Office of Small Business Programs, Report No. OIG 16-07, June 2016</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
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Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the NGA Office of Small Business Programs, as well as compliance with IC, DoD, and federal policies and directives.

<b>Inspection of NGA Imagery Analyst Tradecraft Training, Report No. OIG 17-02, February 2017</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
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Objectives: To determine the extent to which NGA is training its IAs to exploit imagery by taking advantage of the full spectrum of geospatial phenomenologies and making use of traditional and nontraditional sources. Subobjectives were to (1) determine the extent to which IAs have been trained to exploit full-spectrum GEOINT; (2) determine the extent to which IAs are trained to the same tradecraft standards; and (3) assess the mechanisms by which new IA tradecraft content, regardless of origin, is integrated into NGA College learning solutions and curricula.

<b>Inspection of InnoVision’s Research and Development and Technology Transition Outcomes, Report No. OIG 17-03, March 2017</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes by which InnoVision selects and transitions new products, processes, and services to the agency. Subobjectives of this inspection were to (1) identify the R&D programs/projects InnoVision has been pursuing over the last 5 years; (2) for each of the above programs/projects, identify its source and the reason it was chosen; and (3) for each program/project, determine the outcome. (Was the project transitioned, did it enhance the mission, what capabilities were delivered, etc.?)

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<b>Inspection of NGA’s Strategic Workforce Planning Function, Report No. OIG 17-04, June 2017</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
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Objective: To assess the effectiveness of NGA’s strategic workforce planning function in meeting the requirement to have a future workforce that is capable of supporting DoD and IC missions. Consistent with Title 10, US Code, and DoD Instruction, the OIG used stages of the Office of Personnel Management’s workforce planning model as the baseline for the assessment and issued five sub-objectives: (1) assess strategic direction; (2) assess effectiveness of workforce and skills-gap analysis; (3) assess action plan(s); (4) assess implementation of action plan(s); and (5) assess the effectiveness of monitoring, evaluation, and revision.

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<b>Inspection of Structured Observation Management (SOM), Report No. OIG 18-01, November 2017</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
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Objective: To assess SOM implementation against oversight requirements, agency plans and goals, milestones, and customer requirements. Sub-objectives of the inspection were: (1) determine the extent to which SOM has been implemented against the agency’s established plan; (b) determine if SOM is meeting customer needs; and (c) assess the implementation of the program with respect to established standards.

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<b>Inspection of NGA’s Office of Counterintelligence, Report No. OIG 18-02, November 2017</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
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Objective: To determine whether NGA’s counterintelligence program complies with DoD and IC policies and standards. The inspection also assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, and execution of counterintelligence processes and activities. Sub-objectives of the inspection were to: (1) determine whether the Office of Counterintelligence programs and activities comply with DoD and IC policies and standards; (b) assess the Office of Counterintelligence program and organizational structure; and (c) assess the Office of Counterintelligence for effectiveness and efficiency.

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<b>Inspection of NGA’s Medical Services, Report No. OIG 18-05, August 2018</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>11</b>
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Objective: To assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with oversight requirements of NGA’s medical services, including the deployer program, during the period of 2014 to 2017.

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<b>Inspection of NGA’s Insider Threat Program Case Management, Report No. OIG 19-01, February 2019</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>
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Objective: To assess the NGA Insider Threat Program's processes and procedures used for managing cases and complying with applicable laws, DoD, and IC policies.

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<b>Inspection of NGA’s GEOINT Services Initiative, Report No. OIGE 19-02, February 2019</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>
Objective: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the implementation of GEOINT Services against IC requirements; agency objectives, plans, and milestones; and assigned responsibilities. Specific sub-objectives of the inspection were to determine the extent to which GEOINT Services: (1) has been implemented effectively and efficiently and (2) has fulfilled NGA’s designated responsibilities of GPaaS effectively and efficiently.		
<b>Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the NGA Support Team to US Indo-Pacific Command, Report No. OIGE IO-19-02, March 2019</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>2</b>
Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA’s overall IO Program and the organization’s IO Program.		
<b>An Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence Agencies, Report No. DODIG-2014-060, April 2014</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>
Objectives: To assess (1) how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were reported to Agency Clearance Adjudication Facilities and to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility; (2) if the referred investigations had been adjudicated; and (3) the results of those security adjudications.		
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>85</b>

A **recommendation for corrective action** is issued in response to a finding that a Federal standard is not being met; it is intended to bring the agency into compliance with the standard.

**Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period**

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 October 2018	01.01.	Document an entity level POA&M lien to identify and track the completion of the requirements from M-15-13 and M-17-06 to determine the agency allocates appropriate oversight for completion.
	01.02.	Develop and approve a process for the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS for all current and future public facing websites.
	01.03.	Implement the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS on all public facing websites as required by policy.
	02.01.	Consistently implement the ICD 503 process for monitoring the internal control environment of external service providers, which may include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Obtaining and inspecting documentation that provides the BoE on the implementation and operating effectiveness of internal controls in place at external service providers;</li> <li>• Performing analysis over any identified control deficiencies to evaluate risks; and</li> <li>• Designing and implementing appropriate compensating controls to mitigate against identified risks.</li> </ul>
	03.01.	Finalize and approve the NGA Privacy Program Directive and related Instructions to define the monitoring and reporting of potential PII incidents and privacy role-based training requirements.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 October 2018 (continued)	03.02.	<p>Enforce the Privacy Program Directive and related Instruction to ensure</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Individuals with privacy responsibilities take required role-based privacy training;</li> <li>b. PTAs and PIAs are completed and approved within the risk management information system’s body of evidence for monitoring the risk to the environment.</li> <li>c. All potential privacy incidents are consistently monitored and reported to appropriate individuals and parties.</li> </ul>
	04.01.	Develop policies and procedures for security awareness and role-based training to identify the required trainings for persons with specialized responsibilities in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	04.02.	Provide and track role-based training for information security personnel in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	05.01.	Develop and implement an organizational continuous monitoring strategy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	05.02.	Develop and implement a continuous monitoring policy and procedures in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	05.03.	Develop and implement information system continuous monitoring plans in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	05.04.	Perform continuous monitoring over NGA IT security and performance metrics, and common and information system security controls in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	06.01.	Establish notification, investigation, and reporting timelines for all defined incident categories and analyst groups.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 October 2018 (continued)	06.02.	Establish a training program for incident handlers to be trained within 30 working days of assuming an incident response role, when required by system changes or responsibility and annually thereafter.
	07.01.	Finalize cloud incident response procedures.
	07.02.	Finalize the implementation of cyber tools for all traffic routed into the agency, to include the cloud.
	08.01.	Establish SBUNet remote session timeout configuration settings in accordance with NIST guidance and NGA requirements.
	09.01.	Ensure information systems develop and maintain configuration management procedures and plans in accordance with the ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	09.02.	Ensure information system owners maintain accurate listings of their hardware and software inventories in order to maintain an accurate configuration baseline.
	09.03.	Develop and implement processes to consistently authorize changes to information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	09.04.	Review the compliance baseline scans to ensure that the results [REDACTED] are complete and accurate in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	09.05.	Remediate [REDACTED] in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	10.01.	Document [REDACTED] to address weaknesses identified at a program level in accordance with NGA policy.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 October 2018 (continued)	10.02.	Develop and implement a process to ensure that [REDACTED] address all requirements in accordance with policy and procedures.
	11.01.	Ensure all systems in production have Information System Contingency Plans (ISCPs) approved by all required parties.
	11.02.	Ensure information system personnel with contingency planning responsibilities participate in ISCP exercises and document after-actions reports and lessons learned per Security Plan Identification Number.
	11.03.	Ensure information system management establishes processes for all ISCP phases in accordance with NIST and Federal Continuity Directive (FCD) guidance, to include systems in the cloud. Additionally, establish processes for ensuring [REDACTED] are performed in accordance with CNSS, NIST, NGA, and system guidance.
	11.04.	Identify, track, and oversee the implementation of system alternate processing sites in accordance with CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. Perform evaluations to determine whether management should implement alternate processes to enable the system to meet recovery objectives in the event of a disaster at the primary processing site, prior to the establishment of an alternate processing site.
	11.05.	Complete an agency-level business impact analysis in accordance with FCD requirements.
	12.01.	Develop risk assessment policy and procedures over mission and business processes in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	12.02.	Ensure security control assessments are completed for information systems in accordance with NGA policy.
	12.03.	Perform risk assessments on NGA information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to FISMA Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-02, issued 25 October 2018 (continued)	12.04.	Categorize and authorize all NGA information systems to operate in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance.
	12.05.	Ensure its information systems' security plans are updated and maintained to reflect the current environment, in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	12.06.	Ensure systems define the responsible entity for all required security controls and enhancements within security documentation.
	13.1.	Ensure information systems implement and document the [REDACTED] in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	13.2.	Establish and implement a strategy for identity, credential, and access management.
	POA&M 03.01.	Continue to implement milestones needed to remediate the weakness identified within the [REDACTED].
	RTS-L POA&M CM-6.1.01	Continue to implement milestones needed to remediate the weakness identified to implement an automated change control solution. [REDACTED]
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018	1A.	FM should enhance its standard operating procedures related to the dormant obligations review, and FM and OCS should continue to implement the dormant account review in accordance with NGA's policy and the DoD Financial Management Regulation.
	1B.	FM and OCS should prioritize and allocate sufficient resources to completely and timely perform the dormant obligation review control and de-obligate invalid obligations.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	1C.	As part of its dormant obligation review activities, FM and OCS should develop and implement a methodology for adjusting the year-end financial statements for dormant obligations that have been identified as invalid but have not been de-obligated.
	1D.	FM should work with OCS to complete an assessment to quantify the potential impact of expenditures on advance paid Military Interdepartmental Purchase Requests (MIPRs) incurred outside the period of performance. Considering the results of this assessment, FM should draft, finalize, and implement standard procedures for advance paid MIPRs, including consideration of the period of performance in its advance liquidation process.
	1E.	FM should develop, document, and implement controls over the completeness of transactions by other reported to DFAS and determine if an additional undistributed adjustment accrual is necessary.
	1F.	FM and the Security and Installations component (SI) should continue to remediate capitalization issues identified in Material Weakness No. 2, while taking into consideration the effects on gross costs.
	1G.	FM and SI should enforce existing procedures in the Property, Plant, and Equipment (PP&E) Work Activity General Ledger Account Code (WAG) Review User Guide and should complete their retrospective application of the Cost Capitalization Decision Matrix to pre-FY2015 contracts.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	1H.	FM, OCS, and the Component Acquisition Executive should clarify procedures related to contract creation and execution and invoice approval to address cost allocation between major programs and documentation of non-severability and to revisit NGA contract language requiring the use of the oldest funding first.
	2A.	FM, SI, and NGA's Chief Information Officer and IT Services component (CIO-T) should continue their efforts to remediate personal property deficiencies, including a review of software-in-development and construction-in-progress (CIP). As part of the review, management should reclassify completed projects from the software-in-development account to software and from CIP to the relevant in-service personal property account. Going forward, FM, SI, and CIO-T should develop and implement a process that allows completed assets to be placed in-service in the financial system in a timely manner.
	2B.	As part of the remediation efforts described in recommendation 2A., FM, SI, and CIO-T should develop and implement a process for summarizing software-in-development and personal property CIP by project to allow for better tracking and data analysis and more timely movement from in-development to in-service.
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	2C.	SI should work with CIO-T and FM to assess the feasibility of implementing system configuration changes to capture personnel costs incurred for software-in-development. As an alternative, SI should work with CIO-T and FM to develop and implement a standard methodology to allocate capitalizable Government personnel costs incurred during system development to software-in-development at the asset level.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
	2D.	SI should continue to develop, document, and implement policies and procedures for accounting for personal property, including property held at off-site locations, as part of its corrective action plan. Such policies and procedures should include a floor-to-book inventory of capital assets, including personal property.
	2E.	SI, in coordination with FM, should develop, document, implement, and communicate a policy for identifying completed real property assets. The policy should include necessary approvals and requirements for completed assets to be placed in-service in the financial system in a timely manner.
	2F.	SI should enforce existing procedures in the Accountability Manual to timely review and dispose of assets that are no longer in-service.
	2G.	FM should enhance and implement its PP&E impairment monitoring policy to include all required components of Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards No. 10 and No. 44 and document the impairment analyses performed.
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	2H.	FM and SI should develop and implement corrective actions related to the identification of leased equipment and enhance its lease classification determination procedures to address data availability issues, unique assumptions made related to certain leases, and compliance with budgetary funding requirements.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
	3A.	FM should perform an analysis of incorrectly prepared journal entries during FY2018 and identify the reasons for incorrect preparation and ineffective review. Using the results of this assessment, FM should develop and provide sufficient training to the preparers and reviewers of journal entries. Such training should be delivered periodically, including when new reviewers need to temporarily or permanently fill vacancies.
	3B.	FM should enhance FMD 014 to include clear definition of (1) approval documentation requirements, (2) segregation of duties requirements, and (3) the process to enter and approve entries in GEO-F.
	3C.	FM should consistently implement controls over the completeness and accuracy of information relied upon to record manual journal entries.
	3D.	FM should work with NRO to enable workflow configuration in GEO-F to enforce segregation of duties and maintain transaction histories, including preparer and reviewer history.
	3E.	FM should develop and implement posting logic in GEO-F to record transactions in accordance with the United States Standard General Ledger at the transaction level.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	4A.	FM should continue to work with DFAS to correct reconciling differences between the Cash Management Report (CMR) and the Department of the Treasury's Government-Wide Accounting system to allow NGA management to rely on the CMR for the completeness and accuracy of NGA's Fund Balance with Treasury (FBwT). As an alternative, FM should develop appropriate analyses and processes to support the completeness of NGA's FBwT balance without relying on the DFAS CMR.
	4B.	FM should develop, implement, and document procedures for reconciling payroll disbursements to DFAS' Cash Disbursement System or directly to Treasury each payroll cycle.
	5A.	FM should work with the necessary parties throughout the government to establish a no-year reimbursable fund such that the funding availability in NGA's execution fund matches the funding availability associated with customer orders.
	5B.	FM should continue to accrue unbilled revenue as of year-end.
	6A.	Use the Audit Committee as a tool for monitoring audit finding remediation with various stakeholders (i.e., leadership within FM and across other relevant components), enforcing accountability for corrective action plans and timelines, and periodically communicating audit progress and challenges to the Director or Deputy Director.
	6B.	Update contingency plans and succession plans for roles key to maintaining effective internal controls.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action	
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	6C.	Complete, document, and implement an internal control framework to address the GAO's Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government requirements, including the development of an internal risk assessment.	
	6D.	Develop or update, document, approve, and disseminate remaining end-to-end business processes and related financial management policies and procedures.	
	6E.	Enforce requirements in the DoD Instruction 1300.26 to complete DoD FM training requirements timely, and develop, document, and implement procedures for ensuring that compliance is monitored using complete and accurate reports.	
	6F.	Update, approve, and disseminate formal security authorization documentation in compliance with NIST SP 800-53 guidance, as required by ICD 503.	
	6G.	Perform and document annual reviews of security authorization documentation in compliance with NIST SP 800-53, as required by ICD 503.	
	6H.	Update and disseminate formal POA&Ms in compliance with NGA policy.	
	6I.	Update and implement policies and procedures for security awareness training in accordance with applicable guidance.	
	6J.	Implement procedures to monitor and enforce the training compliance for system administrators.	
	Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)	7A.	Regarding access controls, develop, document, implement, and enforce consistent [REDACTED] policies and procedures, including those related to [REDACTED].

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
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7B. Regarding segregation of duties controls:

1. Develop, approve, and implement procedures to [REDACTED], approved deviations from policy should be documented.
2. Enforce [REDACTED], including [REDACTED].
3. Develop, approve, and implement procedures that address the [REDACTED].

7C. Regarding configuration management controls, [REDACTED], or document approved deviations from policy.

8A. To address the deficiencies noted above, we recommend that HD develops, documents, and implements procedures to maintain and make readily available supporting documentation for allowances and other pay types. The procedures should be available for new personnel with responsibility for maintaining and accessing such documentation.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
<p>Independent Auditors’ Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, issued 9 November 2018 (continued)</p>		<p>Recommendations to address instances of noncompliance:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. We recommend that Financial Management (FM) and the Office of Strategic Operations, and Chief Information Officer – Information Technology Services Directorate revise NGA’s Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 1982 process to fully incorporate the Enterprise Risk Management requirements of OMB Circular No. A-123. FM should also perform additional procedures to identify material weaknesses in NGA’s ICOFR environment.</li> <li>2. We recommend that NGA implement the recommendations provided in Exhibit I and improve its processes to achieve compliance with the requirements of FFMIA section 803(a).</li> </ol>

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
<p>Audit of NGA’s Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Program, Report No. OIGA 19-05, issued March 1, 2019</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>The NGA Component Acquisition Executive, in coordination with the Director of Human Development, and the component organizations with acquisition positions, develop additional procedures to monitor and enforce compliance with DAWIA requirements to ensure only qualified and credentialed personnel occupy AWF positions. The additional procedures should address, but not be limited to, the enforcement of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusion of DAWIA requirements in AWF vacancy announcements.</li> <li>• Inclusion of the DAWIA requirements in AWF annual performance plans.</li> <li>• Coordination between the DAWIA Program Management Office and Career Services Heads to ensure that when updates or changes are made to Career Services standard operating procedures, the procedures align with the established DAWIA procedures.</li> <li>• Accountability for not complying with the requirements of the DAWIA.</li> </ul>
<p>Inspection of NGA’s Insider Threat Case Management, Report No. OIGE-19-01, February 2019</p>	<p>1 4 9</p>	<p>1. Update and publish NGAI 5200.1 and NGAI 5240.2 to ensure an authoritative basis for all SII activities.</p> <p>Clarify and prominently post reporting requirements for personnel with access to classified information in accordance with Security Executive Agent Directive 3 and NGAM 5200.2.</p> <p>In accordance with NIST 800.53A, establish and enforce procedures to review audit logs and report the disposition of those results to SII leadership.</p>

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Inspection of NGA's GEOINT Services, Report No. OIG-19-02, February 2019	2	Comply with DoDI 8410.01 by transitioning GEOINT Services' unclassified environment to the .mil environment or by obtaining authorization/waiver from the NGA CIO.
	3	For the geo-capability mission tools identified as wasteful or questioned costs (finding 2), determine whether NGA should continue investing in or cease these programs.
	5	Comply with the NGA Records Management program for the GEOINT Services Office (TD).
	8	For the geo-capability mission tools identified as wasteful (finding 3), determine whether NGA should continue investing in or cease these programs.

**Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods Before 1 October 2018.**

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
<p>Audit of NGA’s Information Assurance Certification Program, Report No. OIGA 17-09, 30 June 2017</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>Comply with DoD 8570.01-M. If management chooses to accept the risk of not complying with DoD 8570.01-M, perform a comprehensive risk assessment, signed by the Chief Information Officer, that justifies not complying with DoD 8570.01-M requirements. The risk assessment should address the risks to the protection, detection, and reaction capabilities of NGA’s information systems and networks and any other information deemed necessary to support the assessment.</p>
<p>Audit of NGA’s Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 16-08, 12 May 2016</p>	<p>1</p>	<p>Update NGA guidance relevant to administrative leave. Policies should:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(1) Establish clear procedures for supervisors, managers, and key personnel to follow when taking actions that result in the placement of employees on administrative leave.</li> <li>(2) Establish oversight procedures for the approval of administrative leave, to assess the use of administrative leave, and to follow up when the improper use of administrative leave is identified.</li> <li>(3) Address appropriate time limits for administrative leave, and ensure that the references to related NGA policies and procedures are consistent and accurate.</li> <li>(4) Identify the responsible component for official tracking of administrative leave.</li> </ul>

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Audit of NGA’s Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Report No. OIGA18-05, issued 18 April 2018	2	<p>OIG recommends that the directorate designated in recommendation 1 identify an office of primary responsibility to develop agency-wide personnel separation policy and procedures that define roles and responsibilities, including, but not limited to, procedures for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Creating and maintaining documentation showing timely removal of logical and physical access.</li> <li>• Monitoring the personnel separation process.</li> <li>• Training personnel on the documentation of the separation process.</li> </ul>
Audit of NGA’s Security Financial Disclosure Program, Report No. OIGA18-06, issued 12 July 2018	2	<p>OIG recommends the Director, Security and Installations, [REDACTED]. In developing the Security Financial Disclosure Program [REDACTED].</p>
Inspection of NGA’s Medical Services, Report No. OIGE 18-05, August 2018	3	<p>Consistent with the Economy Act, reassess whether inter-Agency support is available for medical services that would be advantageous to the government. For all such support, (1) ensure documentation in an ISSA (DD Form 1144) and (2) ensure the support is explained in relevant internal SOPs.</p>

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Inspection of NGA’s Medical Services, Report No. OIG 18-05, August 2018 (continued)	5	Implement a secure electronic transfer of NGA pre- and post-deployment health activity requirements to Defense Medical Surveillance System.
	6	Ensure Human Development Component’s respective Primary Information Officer (PIO) and Information Officer (IO) responsible for all medical program records perform Records and Information Lifecycle Management requirements including updating the office file plan with the proper file series.
Inspection of Structured Observation Management, Report No. OIG 18-01, November 2017	5	Develop and issue, across the NSG, SOM tradecraft standards that address: accuracy requirements with rules for capturing objects, observations, and judgements; a quality control process; and sourcing and data disclaimers consistent with ICDs 203 & 206.
Inspection of NGA’s Strategic Workforce Planning Function, Report No. OIG 17-04, June 2017	1	In accordance with statute and policies, develop and issue a strategic workforce plan that looks at a total workforce mix with an emphasis on critical skills and competencies needed to perform the agency’s evolving mission.
Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIG 16-04, 25 February 2016	3	Identify and review data.
Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIG 15-01, 5 November 2014	19	Establish a systematic process to ensure that all forms and other PII collection methods have accurate Privacy Act statements associated with them. Update and publish agency-level privacy policy with the statement procedures. Conduct periodic checks of the agency’s forms and e-mails to evaluate the use of Privacy Act statements.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
	21	In accordance with previous recommendations, after establishing a method to identify IT systems that contain PII, ensure that IT system owners (program managers) complete Privacy Impact Assessments and submit them to the Senior Component Official for Privacy. Publish completed Privacy Impact Assessments on NGA's webpages.

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**Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports Issued During Reporting Period**

Report Title, Number, Date Issued	Questioned Costs	Unsupported Costs	Funds To Be Put to Better Use
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act External Report, Report No. OIGA 19-01, October 2018	\$0	\$0	\$0
FY2018 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 19-02, October 2018	\$0	\$0	\$0
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2018 and 2017, Report No. OIGA 19-03, November 2018	\$0	\$0	\$0
Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY2018 Financial Statement Audit Engagement, Report No. OIGA 19-04, December 2018	\$0	\$0	\$0
Audit of NGA's Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act Program, Report No. OIGA 19-05, March 2019	\$0	\$0	\$0
Inspection of NGA's Insider Threat Program Case Management, Report No. OIGE-19-01, February 2019	\$0	\$0	\$0
Inspection of NGA's GEOINT Services, Report No. OIGE-19-02, February 2019	\$8,500,000	\$0	\$72,700,000
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$8,500,000</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$72,700,000</b>

**Table A-5. Status of Recommendations That Questioned Costs**

<b>Recommendation Status</b>	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Number of Recommendations</b>	<b>Questioned Costs</b>
A. No management decision made by start of the reporting period	0	0	\$0
B. Issued during reporting period	1	1	\$8,500,000
Total A + B	1	1	\$8,500,000
C. Management decision made during reporting period			
(i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to (disallowed costs)	1	1	\$8,500,000
(ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to (allowed costs)	0	0	\$0
D. Total remaining for management decision at end of reporting period [(A + B) – C]	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>

**Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use**

<b>Recommendation Status</b>	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Number of Recommendations</b>	<b>Funds To Be Put to Better Use</b>
A. No management decision made by start of the reporting period	0	0	\$0
B. Issued during reporting period	1	5	\$72,700,000
<b>Total A + B</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>\$72,700,000</b>
C. Management decision made during reporting period			
(i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to (disallowed costs)	1	5	\$72,700,000
(ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to (allowed costs)	0	0	\$0
D. Total remaining for management decision at end of reporting period [(A + B) – C]	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>

**Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before 1 October 2018**

<b>Unresolved as of 30 September 2018</b>	<b>Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations</b>	<b>Number of Unimplemented Recommendations</b>	<b>Questioned Costs</b>	<b>Funds To Be Put to Better Use</b>
Audits	8	28	\$0	\$0
Inspections	11	32	\$0	\$0
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$0</b>

## STATUTORY REPORTING

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### **Information or Assistance Refused by NGA**

Section 5(a)(5) of the Inspector General (IG) Act of 1978 requires IGs to promptly report to the head of the establishment if information requested is unreasonably refused or not provided. No such reports were needed or made during this reporting period.

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### **Significant Revised Management Decisions**

Section 5(a)(11) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to describe and explain the reasons for any significant revised management decisions made during the reporting period. We are not aware of revisions to any significant management decisions during this reporting period.

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### **OIG Disagreement with Significant Management Decisions**

Section 5(a)(12) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information concerning any significant management decisions with which they disagree. During this reporting period, the IG had no instances of disagreement with significant management decisions.

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### **Compliance with Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996**

Section 5(a)(13) of the IG Act of 1978 requires IGs to provide information described under section 804(b) of the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996. This information involves the instances and reasons when an agency has not met target dates within its remediation plan to bring financial management systems into compliance with the law. NGA has developed and implemented remediation plans to address areas causing noncompliance for financial management systems. NGA has met the intermediated target dates in the plans.

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### **Attempts to Interfere with the IG's Independence**

Section 5(a)(21) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to provide detailed descriptions of any attempts by their establishments to interfere with their independence. We did not experience any attempts to interfere with our office's independence during this reporting period.

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## **Public Disclosure (Closed But Undisclosed Audits, Inspection, Investigations)**

Section 5(a)(22) of the IG Act of 1978, as amended by the IG Empowerment Act, requires IGs to provide detailed descriptions of inspections, evaluations, audits, and investigations involving senior government employees that were closed during the reporting period without being publicly disclosed. Summaries of all such work are included in the appropriate sections of this report.

- Audits closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 5.
- Inspections closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 11.
- Investigations closed during this reporting period are described beginning on page 16.

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## **Peer Reviews**

Section 5(a)(14-16) of the IG Act requires IGs to report information about peer reviews that their offices have conducted or been subject to. No peer review of NGA OIG was conducted by another OIG during this reporting period.

The most recent external peer review of the NGA OIG Audit Division was performed by the National Security Agency's OIG. In its report of 23 February 2018, we received a rating of "pass" for our system of quality control in effect for the three-year period ending 30 September 2017. There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer reviews of the Audit Division.

The most recent peer review of the NGA OIG Inspections Division was completed by Central Intelligence Agency's OIG on 19 September 2017. There were no findings or recommendations identified in the 2017 peer review.

NGA OIG conducted the onsite portion of a peer review of National Security Agency/Central Security Service's OIG Inspections Division from 25 February to 6 March 2019. The report writing and review process is ongoing and was not completed during this reporting period.

## APPENDIX B. INVESTIGATIVE METRICS

**Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting Period**

Type of Case	Number of Cases		
	Referred	Accepted	Declined
Criminal	0	0	0
Civil	0	0	0

**Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period**

Action	Number
Indictments	0
Convictions	0
Years of incarceration	0
Years of supervised release	0
Years of probation	0

**Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Period**

No. investigative reports issued	0
No. individuals referred to DoJ for criminal prosecution	0
No. individuals referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	0
No. indictments and criminal informations resulting from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	0

## APPENDIX C. INDEX OF REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

Semiannual Reporting Requirement		Page
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## APPENDIX D. ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Antideficiency Act
CFPE	Consolidated Foundation Production Environment
CIO-T	Chief Information Officer and IT Services Component
CIP	Construction-in-Progress
CNSS	Committee on National Security Systems
COR	contracting officer's representative
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
FAST	Fraud Analytics Support Team
FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
FM	Financial Management Component
GEO-F	GEOINT-Financials
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GPC	Government Purchase Card
IC	Intelligence Community
IO	intelligence oversight
IPERA	Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act
IT	information technology
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office
NSG	National System for Geospatial Intelligence
OCS	Office of Contract Services
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
POA&M	plan of action and milestones
QIAs	questionable intelligence activities
S/HS	significant or highly sensitive matters
SI	Security and Installations component
SOM	Structured Observation Management
US STRATCOM	US Strategic Command

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