SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR 19-55 Inspection Report

Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project: Construction of the Road and Bridge Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Deficiencies Have Created Safety Hazards for Users

AUGUST

2019

August 28, 2019

The Honorable Dr. Mark T. Esper
Secretary of Defense

General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr.
Commander, U.S. Central Command

General Austin Scott Miller
Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and
Commander, Resolute Support

Lieutenant General Todd T. Semonite
Commanding General and Chief of Engineers,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

This report discusses the results of SIGAR's inspection of the Ghulam Khan Road project. In September 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded a $4.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to Batoor Design and Construction Incorporated (BDCI), an Afghan company, to design and construct a 4.3-mile paved asphalt road from the Gurbuz district to Khost City in Khost Province. The contract also required BDCI to construct 21 culverts under the roadway, a 13.1-foot-wide, one-lane bridge, and a 4.9-foot-wide sidewalk on both sides of the bridge. The project was completed in July 2017, and the construction warranty expired in July 2018.

During our July and November 2018 site visits, we found that BDCI generally built the Ghulam Khan road and bridge according to contract requirements and technical specifications. For example, BDCI constructed an asphalt road to the required 4.3 miles in length and about 4 inches in depth. However, we identified five construction deficiencies, four of which involved the bridge spanning the Kaitu River. Specifically, the bridge's concrete support beams had honeycombing, and BDCI did not build the bridge's stone foundation barriers, retaining walls, and protective railings to required heights. Three of these deficiencies could impact the bridge's structural integrity. For example, if the support beams are not repaired, moisture will enter the concrete and cause the reinforcing steel rods to rust and the concrete to disintegrate. This damage could cause the concrete beam to fail.

In addition, BDCI did not construct protective walls around 2 of the 21 road culverts. All five deficiencies create safety hazards for motorists, pedestrians, and cyclists using the road and bridge. The deficiencies resulted from BDCI's noncompliance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and USACE's inadequate oversight during the construction and the final and warranty inspections.

We found that motorists were using the Ghulam Khan Road and bridge, and that pedestrians and bicyclists were using the sidewalks along the bridge. However, 5 of the road's 21 culverts were not being maintained. Poor maintenance of these culverts may lead to their deterioration over time, which could shorten the road's useful life and create a safety hazard.

We are making one recommendation in this report. We recommend that the Commander of U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) notify the Afghan Ministry of Public Works of the deficiencies and maintenance issues with the road and bridge—specifically, support beams with honeycombing; shorter than required stone barriers, protective retaining walls, and protective railings; missing protective walls around culverts; and broken stone masonry and uncleared debris around culverts—so the ministry can take action to correct them.

We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Defense for review and comment. USFOR-A and USACE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. USFOR-A did not concur with our recommendation, stating that it is not responsible for inspecting or repairing infrastructure projects, or reporting on their condition after the projects are turned over to the Afghan government. We acknowledge that USFOR-A is no longer responsible for the Ghulam Khan road project because it was turned over to the Afghan government and the warranty period has expired. However, we found that the deficiencies in the road and bridge occurred due to BDCI's poor workmanship and noncompliance with the contract requirements, and that there are safety hazards associated with their continued use. Therefore, we maintain that USFOR-A should notify the Ministry of Public Works of these hazards. As a result, the recommendation remains open.

USACE agreed with our conclusion that BDCI generally complied with the contract requirements, but did not agree with our assessment that BDCI exhibited poor workmanship on the project and that there are safety issues affecting the structural integrity of the bridge. However, USACE did not give us any documentation showing that the construction deficiencies we identified have been corrected. Additionally, USACE did not give us any evidence showing that these deficiencies were identified before USACE accepted BDCI's work, or other evidence that would lead us to change our assessment. Therefore, we maintain that BDCI's poor workmanship and contract noncompliance caused the deficiencies, and that they have created safety risks that could affect the bridge's structural integrity.

USACE also provided us with technical comments, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate.

We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended; and in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction

TABLE OF CONTENTS

FIGURES

PHOTOS

ABBREVIATIONS

BDCI	Batoor Design and Construction Incorporated
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces–Afghanistan

In September 2015, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) awarded a $4.5 million firm-fixed-price contract to Batoor Design and Construction Incorporated (BDCI), an Afghan company, to design and construct a 4.3-mile paved asphalt road from the Gurbuz district to Khost City in Khost province.[1] The contract also required BDCI to construct 21 culverts under the roadway, a 13.1-foot-wide, one-lane bridge spanning the Kaitu River at the town of Kotay, and a 4.9-foot-wide sidewalk on each side of the bridge with protective railings.[2] The Ghulam Khan Road project was completed in July 2017, and the construction warranty expired in July 2018. U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) accepted the project from USACE in September 2017and turned it over to the Ministry of Public Works in the same month.

Figure 1 - Map of the Ghulam Khan Road Project

Source: SIGAR analysis of contract documents.

The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether the Ghulam Khan Road and new bridge (1) were constructed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) are being used and maintained.

We conducted our work in Kabul and at locations along the Ghulam Khan Road in Afghanistan from April 2018 through August 2019, in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Our professional engineers conducted the engineering assessment in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. Appendix I contains a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology.

[1] The contract number is W5J9JE-15-C-0023.

[2] A culvert is a structure, such as a pipe or reinforced concrete, that allows water to flow under a road from one side to the other.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE ROAD AND BRIDGE GENERALLY MET CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS, BUT FIVE DEFICIENCIES CREATE SAFETY HAZARDS

During our July and November 2018 site visits, we found that BDCI generally built the Ghulam Khan road according to contract requirements and technical specifications. For example, BDCI constructed an asphalt road to the required 4.3 miles in length and about 4 inches in depth. However, we identified five construction deficiencies, four of which involved the Ghulam Khan bridge. Specifically, the bridge's concrete support beams had honeycombing, and BDCI did not build the bridge's stone foundation barriers, retaining walls, and protective railings to required heights. Three of these deficiencies could impact the bridge's structural integrity. In addition, BDCI did not construct protective walls around 2 of the 21 road culverts. All five deficiencies create safety hazards for motorists, pedestrians, and cyclists using the road and bridge. These deficiencies resulted from BDCI's noncompliance with contract requirements and technical specifications.

In addition, USACE's oversight during the construction and the final and warranty inspections was inadequate because it did not discover the deficiencies and direct BDCI to correct them. We have previously identified problems with USACE's oversight and implementation of its three-phase inspection process. In response, USACE officials acknowledged that documentation of quality controls functions was incomplete in most cases and that it had zero visibility on construction site conditions, and in January 2019, USACE issued a memorandum to add requirements to its local national quality assurance personnel contract by reassigning personnel to help USACE execute its mission better. USACE plans to reassign high-performing local national civil, electrical, and mechanical engineers to three quality assurance teams managed by its Contract Administration Branch at Bagram Air Field. These teams will provide on-site support during key phases of construction to ensure that contractors comply with the quality control management process and perform inspections where USACE personnel cannot access construction sites. The teams will also participate in the final, follow-up, and warranty inspections. USACE stated these efforts will help address the oversight problems we found during this and other inspections. Because the construction warranty has expired, it is unlikely that USACE can require BDCI to make the repairs or recoup any funds paid for these nonconforming items.

The Bridge's Support Beams Contain Honeycombing, Which Could Affect the Bridge's Structural Integrity

During our July and November 2018 site visits, we found that the bridge's support beams contain honeycombing as a result of BDCI's poor workmanship (see photos 1 and 2).[3] The bridge is supported by five concrete columns. The bases of these columns are submerged below ground and extend vertically to the bridge's road surface. The support beams, which consist of concrete and steel reinforcing rods, extend the length of the bridge and sit on top of the columns. The columns and beams provide structural integrity to the rest of the bridge.

The contract required BDCI to ensure that all of the bridge's concrete work was free of defects. If any faulty work existed, for example honeycombed concrete, BDCI was to repair the concrete to ensure that it had a smooth finish that matched the surrounding concrete. Honeycombed concrete is porous; if it is not repaired, moisture will enter the concrete and cause the reinforcing steel rods to rust and the concrete to disintegrate. This situation could cause the concrete beams to fail, which would affect the bridge's structural integrity and could cause it to collapse.

[3] Honeycombing refers to rough or pitted surfaces in concrete resulting from incomplete concrete filling against the formwork, or to voids in the concrete resulting from incomplete filling of the spaces between particles of course aggregate material.

Photo 1 - Bridge Support Beam with Honeycombed Concrete

Source: SIGAR, July 17, 2018

Photo 2 - Bridge Support Beam with Honeycombed Concrete

Source: SIGAR, July 17, 2018

BDCI Built the Stone Barriers Protecting the Bridge's Column Foundations More Than 1 Foot Below the Required Height

The contract required BDCI to build a 4.1-foot-tall stone filling around each of the bridge's foundations. This stone filling helps prevent soil erosion around the column foundations, which stabilize the bridge. However, during our July and November 2018 site visits, we found that BDCI only loosely stacked the stones and to about 3 feet high (see photo 3). As a result, some of the stones have washed away from the column foundations and the soil has eroded. In particular, we found that soil erosion around the east end of the bridge has placed abnormal pressure on the abutment foundation, which could affect the bridge's stability (see photo 4).[4]

Photo 3 - Stones Stacked Around Bridge Foundations

Source: SIGAR, July 17, 2018

[4] An abutment is a structure built to support the ends of a bridge.

Photo 4 - Bridge Abutment with Exposed Foundation Due to Soil Erosion

Source: SIGAR, July 17, 2018

BDCI Built Part of the Bridge's Retaining Walls 1.6 Feet Below the Required Height

The contract required BDCI to construct retaining walls at each end of the Ghulam Khan bridge. The walls were to be 13.1 feet tall on the ends closest to the bridge and decrease to 6.6 feet on the ends farthest from the bridge. During our July 2018 site visits, we found that BDCI constructed the four retaining walls and that the walls were the required 13.1 feet on the ends closest to the bridge. However, BDCI constructed the farthest ends of the walls to about 5.1 feet tall, about 1.6 feet lower than required (see photo 5). Retaining walls are designed to hold back any material, usuallys earth, and prevent that material from sliding or eroding. Because the end of the bridge's retaining walls are shorter than required, the bridge's foundations could be exposed to erosion, which would weaken the bridge's stability.

Photo 5 - 5.1 Feet Bridge Retaining Wall

Source: SIGAR, July 17, 2018

BDCI Built the Bridge's Protective Railings 13 to 25 Inches Below the Required Heights

During our July 2018 site visits, we found that BDCI constructed the bridge's pedestrian and cyclist railings, which are bolted on the sidewalk's concrete surface, about 30 inches tall (see photo 6). However, the contract required BDCI to follow the American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials' standards for bridge design. The standards require pedestrian railings along bridges to be at least 42 inches tall and bicycle railings to be at least 54 inches tall. Although BDCI built the sidewalks on each side of the bridge to accommodate pedestrians and cyclists as required, the low railings create a safety hazard by increasing the risks that they might fall from the bridge.

Photo 6 - 30-Inch High Bridge Railing



Source: SIGAR, July 17, 2018

BDCI Did Not Construct Protective Walls for Two Road Culverts

The contract required BDCI to construct 21 culverts under the roadway. Each culverts was to have 2.3-feet-high protective walls known as parapets, which are designed to ensure that vehicles and pedestrians do not fall into the culverts, thereby enhancing safety.[5] However, during our July 2018 site visits, we found that BDCI did not construct protective walls around two road culverts: culvert 1 and culvert 16 (see photos 7 and 8, respectively). Without these walls, vehicles and pedestrians are more at risk of falling into the culverts, which could damage vehicles and injure drivers and pedestrians.

Photo 7 - Culvert 1 Missing Required Protective Walls

Source: SIGAR, July 18, 2018

Photo 8 - Culvert 16 Missing Required Protective Walls

Source: SIGAR, July 18, 2018

[5] A parapet is a low wall or railing to protect the edge of a platform, roof, or bridge.

THE GHULAM KHAN ROAD AND BRIDGE ARE BEING USED, BUT SOME CULVERTS ARE NOT BEING MAINTAINED

During our July and November 2018 site visits, we found that motorists were using the Ghulam Khan road and bridge, and that pedestrians and cyclists were using the sidewalks along the bridge. However, we also found that 5 of the 21 culverts (culverts 2, 4, 5, 7 and 9) were not being maintained. For example, the stone masonry around culvert 9 was broken, which could reduce the culvert's structural integrity. Elsewhere, we found that the area around culvert 2 had uncleared debris that was causing water to pool alongside the culvert. The pooling water could damage the road around the culvert. Poor maintenance of these culverts may lead to their deterioration over time, which could shorten the road's useful life and create a safety hazard.

CONCLUSION

BDCI generally complied with contract requirements when completing the Ghulam Khan Road project. However, five deficiencies exist due to contract noncompliance and USACE's poor oversight. The honeycombed support beams and improper construction of both the concrete barriers around the bridge foundations and the retaining walls could affect the bridge's structural integrity. In addition, the low safety railings are a safety risk for pedestrians and cyclists using the bridge's sidewalk, while the culverts without protective walls are a safety hazard for motorists and pedestrians using the road. USACE did not discover these instances of BDCI's poor workmanship and noncompliance, and therefore did not make BDCI correct them during the construction or the final or warranty inspections. Because the construction warranty has expired, it is unlikely that USACE can require BDCI to repair the deficiencies or recoup any funds paid for these nonconforming items, leaving it to the Afghan government, once notified, to decide whether it wants to pay to correct them.

The Ghulam Khan Road and bridge are being used but five culverts crossing underneath the roadway were not being maintained and either had broken stone masonry or were surrounded by debris. If these are not corrected, the culverts could deteriorate, which could shorten the road's useful life and create a safety hazard.

RECOMMENDATION

To ensure that the Ghulam Khan road and bridge are structurally sound and safe for users, we recommend that the USFOR-A Commander:

1. **Notify the Ministry of Public Works of the deficiencies and maintenance issues with the road and bridge—specifically, bridge support beams with honeycombing; shorter than required bridge stone barriers, protective retaining walls, and protective railings; missing protective walls around culverts; and broken stone masonry and uncleared debris around culverts—so the ministry can take action to correct them.**

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Department of Defense for review and comment. USFOR-A and USACE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendices II and III, respectively. USFOR-A did not concur with our recommendation. USACE agreed with our conclusion that BDCI generally complied with the contract requirements, but disagreed with our assessments of the poor workmanship and safety issues. USACE also provided technical comments, which we incorporated into the report, as appropriate.

USFOR-A did not concur with our recommendation to notify the Afghan Ministry of Public Works to correct the reported deficiencies and maintenance issues we identified. USFOR-A said USACE and the ministry completed

the final inspection on July 29, 2017, all punchlist items were corrected, and the ministry found the construction "acceptable."[6] USFOR-A also said it transferred the project to the Ministry of Public Works on September 10, 2017, at which time the Afghan government took responsibility for the project's security, operation, and maintenance. According to USFOR-A, the transfer relieved it of all future liability and responsibility beyond the warranty period. USFOR-A added that it is not responsible for inspecting or repairing Afghan government-owned infrastructure, or reporting on its condition because "deterioration, damage, and modifications to completed projects typically occur rapidly after project completion outside the control of USFOR-A in contested areas." While we acknowledge that USFOR-A is no longer responsible for the Ghulam Khan road project because it has been transferred to the Afghan government, as noted in our report, the deficiencies we identified in the road and bridge were due to BDCI's poor workmanship and noncompliance with the contract requirements, and there are safety hazards associated with continued use. Therefore, we maintain that USFOR-A should directly notify the Ministry of Public Works of these safety issues. As a result, the recommendation remains open.

In its comments, USACE agreed with our conclusion that BDCI generally complied with the contract requirements for the Ghulam Khan road project. However, USACE disagreed with our assessment that BDCI exhibited poor workmanship on the project. In its technical comments, USACE stated that the honeycombing in the bridge support beams was the result of concrete sticking to molds when BDCI removed them, and that it had been corrected. However, although USACE stated that the honeycombing was corrected, it did not give us any documentation showing the corrections have been made or other evidence that would lead us to change our assessment. USACE also said such honeycombing is not unusual and was not the result of BDCI's poor workmanship. As we stated in the report, the contract required BDCI to ensure that all of the bridge's concrete was free of defects or repair any defects so that all concrete had a smooth finish.

USACE disagreed with our finding that there are safety issues affecting the structural integrity of the bridge, and stated that the five deficiencies cited in this report did not create safety hazards for motorists, pedestrians, and cyclists using the road and bridge. In its technical comments, USACE said each of the deficiencies was either corrected, not considered a safety concern, or was within the approved design requirements. However, we found that the bridge's concrete support beams, the heights of the bridge's foundation stone barriers, retaining wall ends, and protective railings did not comply with the contract requirements. In addition, BDCI did not build protective walls around two of the road culverts. As a result, we continue to maintain that these deficiencies and omissions place cyclists, pedestrians, and motorists at risk.

[6] A punch list is a document prepared near the end of a construction project listing work not conforming to contract specifications that the general contractor must complete prior to final payment.

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report provides the results of SIGAR's inspection of the Ghulam Khan Road project. The objectives of this inspection were to determine whether the road and new bridge (1) were constructed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable construction standards, and (2) are being used and maintained. Specifically, we:

- reviewed contract documents, drawings, design submittals, and other relevant project documentation;
- interviewed U.S. and Afghan government officials concerning the project's construction, use, and maintenance; and
- conducted site visits on July 17 and 18, 2018, and a follow-up inspection on November 8, 2018.

We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this inspection. However, we considered the impact of compliance with laws and fraud risk.

In December 2014, SIGAR entered into a cooperative agreement with Afghan civil society partners. Under this agreement, our Afghan partners conduct specific inspections, evaluations, and other analyses. In this regard, Afghan engineers inspected the Ghulam Khan Road and new bridge on July 17 and July 18, 2018 and a follow-up inspection on November 8, 2018. We developed a standardized engineering evaluation checklist covering items required by the contract and design and specification documents. The checklist required our partners to analyze the contract documents, scope of work, technical specifications, and design drawings.

We compared the information our Afghan civil society partners provided to accepted engineering practices, relevant standards, regulations, laws, and codes for quality and accuracy. In addition, as part of our monitoring and quality control process, we

- met with our Afghan partner engineers to ensure that the approach and planning for the inspection were consistent with the objectives of our inspection and the terms of our cooperative agreement;
- attended periodic meetings with our partners, and conducted our normal entrance and exit conferences with agency officials;
- discussed significant inspection issues with our partners;
- referred any potential fraud or illegal acts to SIGAR's Investigations Directorate, as appropriate;
- monitored our partners' progress in meeting milestones and revised contract delivery dates, as needed; and
- conducted oversight of our partners in accordance with SIGAR's policies and procedures to ensure that their work resulted in impartial, credible, and reliable information.

We conducted our inspection work in Kabul and at locations along the Ghulam Khan Road in Afghanistan from April 2018 through August 2019. This work was conducted in accordance with the *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Our professional engineers conducted the engineering assessment in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our inspection objectives. We conducted this inspection under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

UNCLASSIFIED
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

DCOM-USNSE-A

12 July 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR USCENTCOM Inspector General (CCIG), MacDill Air Force Base, FL 33621

SUBJECT: United States Forces-Afghanistan, Response to SIGAR Draft Report I-053 Recommendation, *"Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project*

1. USFOR-A was responsible for providing a response to Recommendation 1 from the SIGAR Draft Report I-053, *"Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project: Construction of the Road and Bridge Generally Met Contract Requirements, but Deficiencies Have Created Safety Hazards for Users"*. Recommendation 1 is italicized and copied verbatim from the original tasker and the response is detailed in the following discussion.

2. Recommendation 1:

To ensure that the Ghulam Khan Road and bridge are structurally sound and safe for users, we recommend that the Commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan:

1. Notify the Ministry of Public Works of the deficiencies and maintenance issues with the road and bridge—the honeycombed bridge support beams; the bridge stone barriers, protective retaining walls, and protective railings built shorter than required; missing protective walls around culverts; and broken stone masonry and debris around culverts—so the ministry can take action to correct them.

(U) USFOR-A RESPONSE:

USFOR-A **non-concurs** with this recommendation. On 24 July 2017 USACE, and MoPW completed a joint pre-final inspection of the bridge and road segments. All punch list items were corrected and the final inspection was completed on July 29, 2017. The MoPW inspected the work completed by BDCI and found it acceptable. Beneficial use was granted on July 30, 2017, which started a 1yr warranty period. The official transfer of the project from USFOR-A to MoPW was agreed as September 10, 2017. Upon official transfer, GIRoA assumed full responsibility for all security, operations and maintenance of the property.

The official transfer relieved USFOR-A of all future liability and responsibility beyond the warranty period. The construction project was deemed complete and usable at the time of transfer. Deterioration, damage and modifications to completed projects typically occur rapidly after project completion outside the control of USFOR-A in contested areas. USFOR-A is not responsible for inspecting, repairing or reporting condition status on GIRoA owned infrastructure and to do so creates further expectations and obligations on past projects.

UNCLASSIFIED

DCOM-USNSE-A
United States Forces-Afghanistan, Response to SIGAR Draft Report I-053 Recommendation, *"Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project*

Reliance on Local National Quality Assurance representatives (LNQAs) and Local National construction companies continues to be a systematic challenge and will remain so as long as construction projects are executed in an active combat zone without direct project site supervision and inspection by U.S personnel.

3. Point of contact for this memorandum is Maj Joseph Birkhold, Chief of Programs, USFOR-A JENG, joseph.o.birkhold.mil@mail.mil, DSN 318-481-3429 and LTC Edward B. Schoenheit, USFOR-A Joint Engineering Director; edward.b.schoenheit.mil@mail.mil; DSN: 318-431-1845.

BRIAN N. WOLFORD
Brigadier General, United States Marine Corps
Deputy Commander
U.S. National Support Element-Afghanistan

Enclosures:
Final Inspection and Handover
Property transfer Memo
Warranty Commencement Memo

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION
201 PRINCE FREDERICK DRIVE
WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA 22602-4373

19 July 2019

SUBJECT: Response to Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Draft Report, I-053 Afghanistan's Ghulam Khan Road Project

Mr. John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
1550 Crystal Drive, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Sopko:

The purpose of this letter is to provide the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) response to the subject report.

The USACE agrees with SIGAR's conclusion that the contractor, Batoor Design and Construction Incorporated (BDCI) generally complied with the contract requirements, however we do not agree with the assessment that BDCI provided poor workmanship on this project. Nor does USACE agree that there are any safety issues or dangers to the structural integrity of the bridge. Additional details are provided in the enclosure.

My point of contact for this response is Ms. Erin K. Connolly, TAD Internal Review Auditor (Interim). She may be reached by e-mail at erin.k.connolly@usace.army.mil or by telephone at 540-665-5348.

Sincerely,

CHRISTOPHER G. BECK
COL, EN
Commanding

Enclosure

APPENDIX IV - ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Steven Haughton, Senior Inspection Manager

Robert Rivas, Inspector-in-Charge

Farid Akrami, Program Analyst

Ahmad Javed Khairandish, Civil Engineer

Yogin Rawal, Professional Engineer

This inspection was conducted
under project code SIGAR-I-053.

SIGAR's Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

- improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;
- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
- improve contracting and contract management processes;
- prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to SIGAR's Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all publicly released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Afghanistan Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and reprisal, contact SIGAR's hotline:

- Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud
- Email: sigar.pentagon.inv.mbx.hotline@mail.mil
- Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300
- Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
- Phone International: +1-866-329-8893
- Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378
- U.S. fax: +1-703-601-4065

Public Affairs

Public Affairs Officer

- Phone: 703-545-5974
- Email: sigar.pentagon.ccr.mbx.public-affairs@mail.mil
- Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs
  2530 Crystal Drive
  Arlington, VA 22202