



2018

# Semiannual Report to Congress

Office of Inspector General  
October 1, 2017 – March 31, 2018





## MESSAGE FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL



I am pleased to present this National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) Office of Inspector General (OIG) report summarizing our work for the reporting period ending 31 March 2018. OIG conducted audit and inspection oversight, produced recommendations for improvements in a wide variety of agency programs, and pursued allegations of fraud, waste, and abuse.

Working closely with the NGA directorates and offices, we closed 38 of 127 (30 percent) audit and inspection recommendations during this period. Under the Inspector General Empowerment Act of 2016, we will continue to expand our collection of metrics (see appendix A, page 22) resulting from our recommendations to the Agency.

The Audit Division examined the NGA's oversight of the acquisition of a consolidated production environment. The division identified \$46 million in questioned costs and \$104.5 million in funds put to better use. The auditors made recommendations to improve compliance with laws and regulations related to contract and program requirements, and to enhance controls over acquisition strategy, development of program requirements, and contract oversight. The government auditors provided oversight of the independent auditors' work on the NGA financial statement audits and the annual evaluation of the NGA Information Security Program.

The Inspections Division reviewed NGA's approach to capture, store, standardize, and serve GEOINT observations and determined that NGA did not adequately plan and establish sufficient governance for the program. The inspectors identified \$26.6 million in questioned costs and offered recommendations to improve program implementation, focusing on oversight requirements; agency plans, goals, and milestones; and customer requirements.

The Investigations Division closed 64 cases this period, substantiating 30 (47 percent) of its cases involving time and attendance fraud, computer misuse, security, and travel and recovered \$344,523. The division continues to work on several investigations of senior officials. The division's Forensic Analysis Support Team increasingly uses data analytics to pursue potential fraud in contracts, government purchase and travel cards, and to identify potential misconduct.

I appreciate the ongoing support from the Director, senior leadership, and NGA workforce.

Cardell K. Richardson, Sr.  
Inspector General

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# CONTENTS

<b>Overview</b>	<b>1</b>
Resources and Organization	1
Counsel to the Inspector General	2
Audit	3
Inspections	3
Investigations	3
<b>Summaries of Audits</b>	<b>5</b>
Completed	5
Ongoing	8
<b>Summaries of Inspections</b>	<b>11</b>
Completed	11
Ongoing	14
<b>Summaries of Investigations</b>	<b>16</b>
Judicial Actions and Prosecutions	16
Cases Involving Senior Government Officials (Substantiated)	16
Whistleblower	16
Time and Attendance Fraud	17
Contractor Labor Mischarging	18
Computer Misuse	18
Other Noteworthy Investigations	19
Criminal Investigations	20
Cases Involving Senior Government Officials (Unsubstantiated)	20



**Forensic Analysis Support Team 20**

Completed 20

Ongoing 21

**Appendix A. Status of Audit and Inspection  
Recommendations 22**

Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG  
Recommendations as of 31 March 2018 22

Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for  
Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period 29

Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective  
Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods  
Before 1 April 2018 40

Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports  
Issued During Reporting Period 45

Table A-5. Status of Recommendations  
That Questioned Costs 46

Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That  
Funds Be Put to Better Use 47

Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding  
OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before  
1 October 2017 47

Signification Management Decision 48  
OIG Disagreement with Significant

Management Decision 48



<b>Appendix B. Investigative Metrics</b>	<b>49</b>
Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting Period	49
Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period	49
Table B-3 Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Period	49
<b>Appendix C. Peer Reviews</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Appendix D. Abbreviations</b>	<b>51</b>

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## OVERVIEW

The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) is a Department of Defense combat-support agency and a member of the Intelligence Community (IC). The Agency receives guidance and oversight from DoD, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and Congress. NGA provides geospatial intelligence—GEOINT—that supports US national security and defense, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

The mission of the Office of Inspector General (OIG) is to conduct independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations to strengthen the efficiency, effectiveness, and integrity of NGA programs and operations.




Our assessments of NGA’s worldwide programs and operations are undertaken and performed in accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and in compliance with the standards of the Government Accountability Office and the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency.

The OIG also serves as the principal NGA agent responsible for investigating potential violations of law, rule, or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process. In addition, the OIG performs the NGA external liaison function for Federal, state, and local Inspectors General and congressional overseers on IG-related matters. The OIG is the liaison to external law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI.

## RESOURCES AND ORGANIZATION

The OIG is authorized 60 billets, and as of 31 March 2018, 55 employees were on board. The OIG staff is allocated among three core divisions—Audit, Inspections, and Investigations— and a support function—the Plans and Programs Division. A Counsel reports directly to the IG.

**Figure 1. OIG Organization Chart**



## **COUNSEL TO THE INSPECTOR GENERAL**

During the reporting period, Counsel directly supported the Inspector General (IG) and Deputy IG. Counsel also advised the Audit, Inspections, Investigations, and Plans and Programs Divisions by reviewing all plans and final reports for legal sufficiency. Counsel liaised with NGA Office of General Counsel, DoD and IC Counsels, federal and state prosecutors, and Congressional committee staffs. OIG's Counsel left NGA in February 2018 to accept another position. OIG has begun the hiring process for an attorney and plans to select the final candidate in April. A counsel at the NRO OIG is providing legal guidance until the final selection is made.

The Counsel provided legal guidance on requests for records under the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. Counsel also submitted legal opinions addressing evidentiary burdens associated with adverse actions in all investigations. During this reporting period, the Counsel reviewed all pertinent legislation including the FY2017 Intelligence Authorization Act (IAA), the National Defense Authorization Act, and other legislation that may affect the operations of the NGA OIG. The OIG ensured compliance with all requirements

of Section 309 of the FY 2017 IAA, and coordinated with elements of the IC and Congressional staff in furtherance of enhanced IC contractor whistleblower protections and transparency in reprisal investigations.

## AUDIT

The Audit Division is responsible for providing independent oversight and objective audits of NGA's programs and operations, and promoting the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of NGA programs and operations. Audits are conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Audit findings and recommendations seek to reduce costs; improve



overall performance; and eliminate fraud, waste, and abuse. The recommendations resulting from the projects offer insight for management, help improve internal controls, and ensure compliance with laws, regulation, and policy. This division identified \$46 million in questioned costs and \$104.5 million in funds put to better use this reporting period. The identified costs were the result of NGA not putting a new system into operation to replace legacy programs and systems still in use.

## INSPECTIONS

The Inspections Division has responsibility for the evaluation, review, and analysis of NGA's programs and activities, including authorities, policies, procedures, and controls. The division provides independent assessment of the reliability of information, compliance with regulations and policies, management of resources, and achievement of program results. Intelligence oversight inspections, conducted in accordance with executive orders, particularly Executive Order 12333, are also a responsibility. This division identified \$26.6 million in questioned costs this reporting period. The identified costs were the result of an undefined budget, redundant spending, and increasing costs because of insufficient planning related to a new technology for analyst to capture analytical observations.

## INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division conducts independent investigations of complaints and other information of possible violations of criminal and civil law. The division is the principal NGA agent for investigating potential violations of rule or regulation, as well as incidents of gross mismanagement, gross misconduct, abuse of authority, and denial of due process.

The division also incorporates the Forensic Analysis Support Team (FAST), which conducts an agency-wide fraud detection program using data mining and forensic analyses tools. FAST also identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Systemic findings are referred to the Inspections Division or Audit Division for further analysis and review. This division recovered \$344,523 for the first half of FY2018 and substantiated 46 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The funds recovered involve time and attendance fraud, contractor labor mischarging, and contractor self-disclosure cases.

The division is a member of the newly formed Intelligence Community Inspector General Forum Whistleblower Working Group. The group provides a venue for IC OIGs to identify and discuss whistleblower issues, share best practices, and develop solutions to better enable our respective whistleblower programs. The division participated in the initial meeting held in March 2018 where topics of discussion included issues concerning the new statutory IC contractor whistleblower protections; whistleblower outreach opportunities; and providing an open forum to discuss issues, trends, and best practices.

The division is also included in the *GAO Whistleblower in the IC* review which includes a review of the DIA, NRO, CIA, ICIG, NSA, and NGA processes and procedures in handling whistleblower complaints.

# SUMMARIES OF AUDITS

## COMPLETED

### **FY2017 Evaluation of the NGA Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 18-01, issued 7 November 2017**

*Overview.* The OIG Audit Division (OIGA) engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the FY2017 evaluation required by FISMA. The overall objectives of the evaluation were to determine whether NGA's overall information security program and practices were consistent with FISMA requirements, respond to the IG FISMA reporting metrics issued by the Department of Homeland Security and required by the Intelligence Community Inspector General, and determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the FY2016 assessment. The evaluation included a sample of five systems for testing to support the IG metrics.



*Findings.* KPMG issued 10 findings. The auditors found that NGA is making progress to strengthen its information security program; however, NGA does not consistently implement and enforce security policies and procedures in accordance with requirements, including Intelligence Community Directive 503. Until NGA consistently and effectively implements and enforces security requirements at the enterprise and system levels, the Agency will continue to risk the confidentiality, integrity, availability, nonrepudiation, and authentication of its data.

*Results.* KPMG issued 32 recommendations. This includes the recommendations that remained opened from the FY 2016 FISMA evaluation, as well as new recommendations. KPMG will follow up on the findings and evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions taken when it performs the FY 2018 evaluation.

### **Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, issued 9 November 2017**

*Overview.* OIGA engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA's FY2017 financial statements. The objective was to provide an opinion on whether NGA's financial statements were presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally accepted accounting principles. KPMG also considered NGA's internal control over financial reporting and performed tests to determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.

*Findings.* NGA was unable to provide sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support certain material account balances and disclosures. KPMG reported six material weaknesses in internal control related to the procurement process; property, plant, and equipment; manual journal entries; the fund balance with Treasury reconciliation process; unfilled customer orders and the deposit fund liability; and key financial and supporting systems, as well as a significant deficiency related to entity level controls weaknesses. KPMG also reported that NGA did not fully comply with the *Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act of 1982* and that NGA's financial management systems did not substantially comply with Federal financial management systems requirements, applicable Federal accounting standards, and the United States Government Standard General Ledger at the transaction level, as required under Section 803(a) of the *Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996*.



During the audit engagement, KPMG identified six internal control deficiencies that were not considered significant deficiencies or material weaknesses but were important enough to merit management's attention. These deficiencies were communicated to management in the *Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY2017 Financial Statement Audit Engagement* (Report No. OIGA 18-04, issued 21 December 2017).

*Results.* The audit engagement resulted in a disclaimer of opinion on NGA's FY2017 and FY2016 financial statements as KPMG was unable to obtain sufficient, appropriate audit evidence on which to base an opinion. KPMG issued 50 accompanying recommendations (42 with the auditor's report and eight with the management letter). KPMG will follow up on the findings and evaluate the adequacy of corrective actions taken when it performs the FY2018 financial statement audit.

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### **Audit of NGA's Management of the Acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment, Report No. OIGA 18-03, issued 30 November 2017**

*Overview.* The audit objective was to determine whether NGA effectively identified requirements and provided adequate contract and program oversight for the acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment (CFPE).

*Findings.* OIGA found that NGA awarded the CFPE contract to integrate NGA maritime, aeronautical, and topographic features into one system of content management. By implementing CFPE, NGA would improve efficiency, quality, and consistency of data, resulting in cost savings. However, personnel responsible for developing program requirements did not adequately capture mission needs, the program development methodology was not executed as written in the statement of work, contract requirements were inappropriately changed after



contract award, and personnel responsible for the acquisition of the CFPE did not develop an adequate acquisition strategy or address system integration issues. In addition, NGA contracting and program management office personnel did not provide sufficient contract oversight to ensure contractors performed in accordance with contract specifications. Consequently, the program did not deliver the promised results. NGA did not put the CFPE system into operation, costing the Agency \$46 million. Furthermore, NGA continues to sustain legacy programs and systems, which CFPE should have replaced, to meet the mission at an estimated cost of \$104.5 million for FY2017–2022. In addition, NGA is not effectively meeting Navy customer needs.

*Results.* We made six recommendations to improve compliance with laws and regulations related to contract and program requirements, and enhance controls over acquisition strategy, development of program requirements, and contract oversight.

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**Assessment of NGA’s Compliance with the Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act (IPERA) for Fiscal Year 2017, Memorandum U-010-18/OIG, issued 12 January 2018**

*Overview.* The objective of OIGA’s assessment was to determine whether NGA was in compliance with IPERA for FY2017.

*Findings.* OIGA concluded that NGA was in compliance with IPERA for FY2017 and that NGA reporting under IPERA was adequate.

*Results.* OIGA made no recommendations for corrective actions.

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**Closing of Investigation of Potential Antideficiency Act Violation Involving the Interim Transition Capability (ITC) Contract, Modification PZ0090, Memorandum U-033-18/OIG, issued 1 February 2018**

*Overview.* In response to a referral from the [REDACTED], OIGA conducted an investigation to determine whether NGA violated the Antideficiency Act by executing a modification to the ITC contract that included a scaled penalty for early termination and failure to exercise an option year.

*Results.* OIGA submitted a draft investigation report to the Deputy Chief Financial Officer, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) (OUSD(C)) and the DoD Office of General Counsel (OGC) requesting an advance violation decision. DoD OGC opined that NGA did not violate the Antideficiency Act. As a result, OIG and OUSD(C) closed the investigation.

## ONGOING

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### **Audit of NGA's Management of the Personnel Separation Process, Project No. 17-A07**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA management implemented policies and procedures designed to provide reasonable assurance that logical and physical access to government information is secure from personnel who separated from NGA. Specifically, OIGA will review the separation process for civilian and contractor personnel at NGA Campus East and NGA Campus West for the period of 1 May 2016 through 30 April 2017.

*Status.* The project was announced in March 2017. OIGA plans to issue a report in the third quarter of FY2018.

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### **Audit of NGA's Analysis Event Response for National Security and Natural Disasters, Project No. 17-A08**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether Analysis Directorate-related crisis and event response plans are in place and are executed and managed effectively. Specifically, the audit will determine whether the execution and management of those plans facilitate coordination among stakeholders, standardization of procedures where practical, and reduction in duplication of efforts, and whether the plans efficiently allocate available resources.

*Status.* The project was announced in May 2017. OIGA plans to issue a report in the fourth quarter of FY2018.

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### **Audit of NGA's Personnel Security Clearance Process, Project No. 17-A09**

*Overview.* The objectives of this audit are to determine whether: (1) NGA has a consistent and effective risk-based approach to onboarding NGA employees and contractors who require background investigations, including mitigating controls for onboarding prior to the full completion of background investigations; and (2) NGA has a backlog of background investigations, the reasons for the backlog, and the actions taken to reduce the backlog and improve the timeliness of background investigations.

*Status.* The project was announced in August 2017. OIGA plans to issue a report in the third quarter of FY2018.

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**Audit of NGA's Security Financial Disclosure Program, Project No. 17-A10**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether the NGA Security Financial Disclosure Program is effectively managed in accordance with applicable federal, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.

*Status.* The project was announced in August 2017. OIGA plans to issue a report in the third quarter of FY2018.

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**Audit of NGA's Support of US Strategic Command Mission Requirements, Project No. 17-A11**

*Overview.* NGA supports US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) by satisfying requirements, including providing reliable navigation and planning charts. The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is efficiently and effectively satisfying STRATCOM requirements.

*Status.* The project was announced in August 2017. OIGA plans to issue a report in the fourth quarter of FY2018.

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**FY2018 Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Evaluation of the NGA Information Security Program, Project No. 18-A02**

*Overview.* OIG engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the FY2018 evaluation required by FISMA. The overall objectives of the evaluation are to assess NGA's Information Security Program using guidance provided by the Intelligence Community Inspector General (ICIG) and determine whether NGA implemented recommendations from the FY2017 assessment. The evaluation will include a sample of seven systems for testing to support the IG metrics.

*Status.* The project was announced in January 2018. OIGA plans to issue the final external metrics report to the ICIG in September 2018, and the detailed internal report to NGA management in November 2018.

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**Audit of the NGA Financial Statements for FY2018, Project No. 18-A03**

*Overview.* OIGA engaged KPMG LLP, an independent public accounting firm, to audit NGA's FY2018 financial statements. The audit objective is to determine whether NGA's financial statements are presented fairly, in all material respects, in accordance with US generally accepted accounting principles. To meet requirements for federal financial statement audits, KPMG is also assessing internal control over financial reporting and performing tests to determine whether NGA complied with applicable provisions of laws, regulations, and contracts.

KPMG is following up on the status of management's corrective actions to address the findings and recommendations communicated in the *Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016* (Report No. OIGA 18-02), and the *Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY 2017 Financial Statement Audit*.

*Status.* The project was announced in January 2018. KPMG's report will be issued no later than 15 November 2018. If necessary, a management letter will be issued by 31 December 2018.

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#### **Audit of NGA's Corrective Action Implementation, Project No. 18-A04**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA is effectively and efficiently following up on recommendations to correct findings identified through external cyber security reviews. Specifically, this audit will focus on whether NGA is correcting deficiencies identified during the Defense Information Systems Agency Command Cyber Readiness Inspection and Cybersecurity Service Provider inspections. In addition, we will determine whether NGA is using these inspection results to correct enterprise-wide deficiencies and improve cyber security readiness throughout the Agency.

*Status.* The project was announced in February 2018. OIGA plans to issue a report in the first quarter of FY2019.

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#### **Audit of NGA's Management of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Program, Project No. 18-A05**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit aims to determine whether NGA is effectively and efficiently managing the DAWIA Program. Specifically, OIG will determine whether the NGA acquisition workforce was in compliance with the DAWIA core certification requirements for training, education, and experience for the period 1 January 2017 through 31 December 2017.

*Status.* The project was announced in March 2018. OIGA plans to issue a report in the first quarter of FY2019.

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#### **Audit of the Emergency Management Test, Training, and Exercise Program at NCE, Project No. 18-A06**

*Overview.* The objective of this audit is to determine whether NGA has developed and implemented an effective emergency management test, training, and exercise program at NCE in accordance with applicable DHS, DoD, and NGA policy and guidance.

*Status.* The project was announced in March 2018. OIGA plans to issue a report in the second quarter of FY2019.

# SUMMARIES OF INSPECTIONS

## COMPLETED

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### **External Review of the Defense Intelligence Agency, Office of the Inspector General, Inspections Division, Report No. (SP-17-03), issued 6 November 2017**

*Overview.* NGA OIG Inspections Division (OIGE) led this joint IC peer review of DIA's OIG Inspections Division. This peer review, the division's first, assessed the extent to which the division met the seven required Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) Blue Book standards—Quality Control, Planning, Data Collection and Analysis, Evidence, Records Maintenance, Reporting, and Follow-up. The review included an assessment of DIA OIG Inspections Division's internal policies and procedures and a review of its last four completed inspections/evaluations. The four inspections/evaluations were initiated and completed using the TeamMate automated tool that the division began using in February 2016.

*Findings and Results.* The DIA OIG Inspections Division's procedures met the CIGIE standards, and the four inspections/evaluations were completed in accordance with DIA OIG Inspections Division procedures and CIGIE Blue Book standards.

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### **Inspection of Structured Observation Management, Project No. II-17-01, issued 14 November 2017**



*Overview.* Structured Observation Management (SOM) is NGA's approach to capture, store, standardize, and serve GEOINT observations. This inspection focused on the planning and implementation of the SOM initiative from a holistic agency perspective and as an acquisition and an intelligence engine. The overall objective of this inspection aimed to assess implementation against oversight requirements, agency plans and goals, milestones, and customer requirements.

*Findings:* OIGE found that NGA did not adequately plan for SOM nor follow program management best practices resulting in \$26.6 million in questionable spending. SOM has yet to reach its potential for meeting customer needs. Although OIGE observed evidence of how SOM is improving NGA's analytic posture (e.g. Combatant Commands embracing the dynamic content of SOM, deeper analysis into difficult problem sets, and NGA's process for updating the National System for Geospatial Intelligence (NSG) Application Schema (NAS) ontology as a best practice), NGA's customers continue to rely on traditional NGA intelligence reporting rather

than SOM services. NGA did not establish sufficient governance for the SOM program throughout the execution areas of tradecraft, technology, data standards, training, nor the transition itself.

*Results.* OIG made seven recommendations to improve NGA's implementation of SOM. The recommendations include increasing financial management oversight of SOM expenditures, assigning a single program manager with requisite authorities for the SOM initiatives, improving customer engagement and outreach, establishing procedures to ensure tools are not put into operation prematurely, and making historical data discoverable. Additionally, OIG recommended NGA develop requirements for SOM tradecraft and tool training, while at the same time creating tradecraft standards for accuracy and quality control in accordance with Intelligence Community Directives (ICDs) 203 and 206.

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**Inspection of NGA's Office of Counterintelligence, Project No. 18-02, issued 29 November 2017**

*Overview.* The overall objective of this inspection aimed to determine whether NGA's Office of Counterintelligence (SIC) is effectively organized, staffed, trained, and equipped to fulfill the roles and responsibilities of its assigned mission. Counterintelligence (CI) activities are conducted to identify, deceive, exploit, disrupt, or protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or persons, or their agents, or international terrorist organizations or activities.

*Findings.* OIG identified several areas where SIC needs process and procedural improvements. SIC's roles and responsibilities regarding CI investigations are clearly documented, but in at least one case, procedures were not followed and may have resulted in a questionable intelligence activity. OIG Inspections referred this activity to OIG Investigations for action. While SIC does not have the authority to conduct CI investigations on NGA personnel, they are authorized to request investigative support from a Military Department CI Organization (MDCO), specifically, the Army's 902nd Military Intelligence (MI) Group. SIC's support to MDCO investigations lacked execution oversight, and because of this, NGA risks overstepping its CI authorities. This condition was caused by a procedural oversight omitting necessary written procedures. SIC performs TEMPEST assessments in support of the Office of Security (SIS) Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF) accreditation process, but SIC is not compliant with oversight requirements to have personnel with the necessary Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority (CTTA) credentials. This condition was caused by leadership's decision to reorganize without considering personnel resources and leaves NGA vulnerable to information-bearing emanation collection.



*Results.* OIGE made 10 recommendations designed to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the office's mission and functions. The recommendations evaluate SIC's investigative processes, TEMPEST support activities, adherence to records management requirements, establishment of a multifunctional team concept and methodology, and the need to improve referral and tasking mechanisms.

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### **Follow-up Inspection of NGA's Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program, OIGE-18-03, issued 11 February 2018**

*Overview.* The overall objective of this inspection assessed actions taken by management to correct deficiencies found during the 2016 inspection of the Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program (OIGE-16-06). OIGE assessed whether corrective actions were effective and complete; were producing desired results; and were economical, efficient, practical, and feasible.

*Findings.* NGA closed 10 of 13 recommendations identified in the 2016 OIG Safety of Navigation (SoN), Notice to Mariners (NtM) report, but three key recommendations remain open. The remaining open recommendations include Consolidated Feature Production Environment (CFPE) follow-on efforts, maintenance and funding needs secured for Digital Master Standard, and agency strategic and tactical-level plans to adequately address the SoN NtM backlog. NGA's priority based mitigation strategy to address the continuous growth of the NtM backlog is making progress and is currently acceptable to key customers; however, success is heavily dependent on a single technical solution that is at risk. Enterprise Engine, Notice to Mariners (E2-NtM), is the only technical solution specifically focused on the NtM backlog. E2's current funding profile is risky as current requirements are funded but unassociated with an established program. In addition, there is no out year funding for additional Foundation GEOINT Modernization (FG Mod)-related enhancements nor Operations and Maintenance. OIGE found that the root causes and risks identified in the 2016 NGA OIG report remain.

*Results.* OIGE's report contains no new recommendations; however, the findings and three remaining open recommendations from the OIGE-16-06 report are still valid.

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### **Intelligence Oversight Inspections**

*Overview.* OIGE is responsible for providing oversight of NGA's Intelligence Oversight Program. OIGE performs this function by conducting intelligence oversight (IO) inspections of NGA offices to determine whether the inspected organizations are in compliance with applicable policies and procedures. OIGE also assesses whether personnel are familiar with procedures for recognizing and reporting questionable intelligence activities (QIAs) and significant or highly sensitive (S/HS) matters.



OIGE did not complete any IO inspections during the reporting period. However, three inspections are pending completion.

## ONGOING

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### **Inspection of NGA's Insider Threat Program Case Management, Project No. II-17-02**

*Overview.* Executive Order 13587 directed structural reforms to improve the security of classified networks and the responsible sharing and safeguarding of classified information. In November 2012, the President issued the National Insider Threat Policy, which required agencies to implement an insider threat program within 180 days. OIGE published a report in February 2016 that assessed NGA's compliance with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The purpose of this inspection, announced in February 2017, is to evaluate NGA's protection of employees' civil liberties and the current status of progress in following minimum required standards. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess the processes and procedures that the NGA Insider Threat Program uses to manage cases and comply with statute and DoD and IC policy.

*Status.* This inspection was delayed in June 2017 due to the personnel resource demands of a Congressionally directed action and was resumed in January 2018. The final report is planned for June 2018.

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### **Inspection of NGA's Medical Services, Project No. II-17-03**

*Overview.* This inspection was initiated based on senior leaders' concern regarding medical and psychological issues experienced by returning deployers and the effectiveness of the deployer program. Between 2003 and 2015, NGA deployed more than 3,700 employees and contractors world-wide [REDACTED].

While deployment can be a great professional opportunity, the experience can also be life-changing and stressful. In response to increased demands and stresses experienced by the deploying workforce, NGA developed the Deployment Psychological Services Program in 2008 to provide consultation, screening, and support services to personnel as they readjust to life and duties at home. The current status and effectiveness of that program and the present-day deployer program are unknown. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, and compliance with oversight requirements of NGA's medical services, including the deployer program, during the period of 2014 to 2017.

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in May 2018.

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## **Inspection of GEOINT Services, Project No. II-18-01**

*Overview.* The GEOINT Services (GS) initiative is NGA’s delivery of geospatial content and analytics through a cloud-based architecture. GEOINT services are web-based tools and data that allow customers to discover, access, exploit, and contribute geospatial capabilities, datasets, and best practices. During her tenure as NGA Deputy Director, Sue Gordon stated “GEOINT Services isn’t an abstraction or an architecture, it’s about exposing what we know in a way that can be used by people who need it to do their job.” This inspection will focus on NGA’s planning and implementation of the GEOINT Services initiative from a holistic agency perspective and as an IC service of common concern. The overall objective of the inspection is to assess GEOINT Services implementation against customer requirements; agency goals, plans, and milestones; assigned responsibilities; and return on investment. The inspectors will review policies relating to oversight guidance regarding Geospatial Provider as a Service and the agencies implementing guidance. In addition, we will review the management of the effort, to include the requirements process, overlap with other portfolios and programs, and the budgetary efficiency and effectiveness of the program.

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in September 2018.

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## **Follow-up Inspection of NGA’s Privacy Program, Project No. FI-18-02**

*Overview.* Follow-up inspections assess actions taken by management to correct deficiencies found during prior inspections. They are designed to assess whether corrective actions are effective and complete; are producing desired results; are not causing new problems; and are economical, efficient, practical, and feasible. The overall objective of the review is to assess the status of open recommendations from the FY15 inspection of the agency’s Privacy Program. That inspection found the following: 1) the NGA Privacy Program had been hindered by long-term leadership and resource deficiencies; 2) the program needed to improve privacy training awareness, work force communication, and incident management; 3) the Agency did not adequately secure privacy information and; 4) NGA did not comply with major privacy legislation such as the Privacy Act and E-Government Act. OIGE’s report contained 22 recommendations designed to improve the NGA Privacy Program, three remain open (appendix A).

*Status.* The final report is planned for publication in July 2018.

## SUMMARIES OF INVESTIGATIONS

The Investigations Division (OIGI) opened 66 cases and closed 64 cases during the reporting period; 30 were substantiated, or 47 percent of its cases for the reporting period. The division has 94 ongoing investigations.



## JUDICIAL ACTIONS AND PROSECUTIONS

OIGI did not have any judicial actions during the reporting period. One case that was referred during the last reporting period for federal prosecution to the United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Missouri involving contractor labor mischarging is pending.

The Department of Justice declined to criminally charge a former NGA employee for unlawful activities that were reported to DoJ in a previous reporting period.

## CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (SUBSTANTIATED)

OIGI did not conduct any investigations of senior officials that resulted in substantiated allegations. OIGI has 10 pending investigations on senior officials.

## WHISTLEBLOWER

There are two closed whistleblower cases to report this period, which are summarized below.

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### **OIG Case No. 17-019, closed March 2018.**

OIGI investigated allegations that a Pay Band 5 supervisory program officer in the Security and Installations Directorate retaliated against a subordinate employee by including derogatory comments in the employee's performance evaluation after the employee reported inappropriate behavior by the program officer to management. OIGI substantiated these allegations and the supervisory program officer was removed from employment with NGA in March 2018 on charges of Reprisal and Revocation of Security Clearance.

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### **OIG Case No. 16-172, closed January 2018.**

OIG investigated an allegation that an NGA employee's management chain, including a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES) manager, retaliated against the employee for breaking the chain of command to address two personnel issues. The investigation found that the NGA employee did not make a protected disclosure, and thus, no evidence of reprisal. The investigation did find that the culture of the employee's organization

did not appear to support employees going outside the chain of command to raise issues, if necessary; a culture that could lead to whistleblower reprisal and/or unauthorized disclosures. This information was provided to the manager's supervisor for awareness.

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### **Whistleblower Complaint Concerning New Classified Development**

As part of a Congressionally-directed action to assess a new radar development, the NGA Office of Inspector General determined that a Whistleblower complaint about the project was unsubstantiated.

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## **TIME AND ATTENDANCE FRAUD**

The OIGI conducted fewer time and attendance fraud investigations during this period than in the previous six-month period, but the investigations accomplished were significant and resulted in the recovery of funds for time claimed but not worked. The division continued to send many of the less substantial issues to management for corrective action, which have also resulted in the recovery of funds. The following are summaries of two time and attendance fraud investigations that resulted in the termination of employment and the recovery of funds.

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### **OIG Case No. 16-092, closed October 2017.**

A proactive analysis of time and attendance and access control records identified that a Pay Band 5 analyst in the Source Operations and Management Directorate may have claimed over 600 hours on time sheets that the analyst did not work. The investigation substantiated that the analyst falsely claimed the hours, valued at \$49,545.84. After being credited for a portion of the hours for valid reasons, a debt collection was processed to recover the value of over 440 hours, \$34,898.25.

The analyst retired under a settlement agreement with the Agency.



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### **OIG Case No. 16-113, closed November 2017.**

A supervisor reported to OIGI that a Pay Band 4 contract specialist in the Office of Contract Services was not accurately accounting for the hours the specialist worked. An analysis of the specialist's time and attendance and the OIG investigation found that 266 hours were claimed on the specialist's time sheets, valued at \$18,901.02, that were not worked. The specialist's employment was terminated in November 2017 and NGA has initiated action to recover the value that was falsely reported.

## CONTRACTOR LABOR MISCHARGING

OIGI continued to address issues of contractor labor mischarging and has enhanced its outreach and contract fraud program with the development of a fraud survey that has been introduced to the NGA workforce. The survey asks questions that support the objective to identify contract fraud activities and vulnerabilities. OIGI closed significant contractor labor mischarging cases during this period, recovering a total of \$136,261; below is a summary of one. Another continues to be worked in coordination with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service (DCIS) and the US Attorney's Office in St. Louis, Missouri.

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### OIG Case No. 16-021, closed February 2018.

OIGI received allegations that a contractor database administrator in the Information Technology Services Directorate was involved in labor mischarging and possible misuse of NGA resources to conduct outside business. Coordination with NGA's Office of Contract Services and the administrator's employer disclosed billing discrepancies. The employer fired the administrator in February 2018 and agreed to refund the government \$44,206.75 for mischarged hours.

## COMPUTER MISUSE

OIGI investigated acts of computer misuse by contractor and government personnel at NGA. OIGI continues to see more computer misuse issues involving contractor employees. The following case summaries depict investigations on contractor personnel.



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### OIG Case No. 17-116, closed November 2017.

A computer network audit disclosed that a contractor employee in the Source Operations and Management Directorate repeatedly used NGA computer systems to conduct personal business using email and creating documents not related to NGA business on government time. The NGA Office of Contract Services reported this information to the employee's company, which agreed to reimburse the government \$7,623.88. The company also advised that it would use this incident in its employee training and compliance program to ensure proper use of government time and systems by its employees.

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### OIG Case No. 17-124, closed January 2018.

A computer network audit disclosed that a contractor employee in the Source Operations and Management Directorate repeatedly used NGA computer systems to conduct a personal business. The NGA Office of Contract Services reported this information to the



employee's company, which terminated employment effective 14 October 2017. The company also advised that it would use this incident to remind its employees about the proper use of government time and systems.

## **OTHER NOTEWORTHY INVESTIGATIONS**

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### **OIG Case No. 16-006, closed March 2018.**

OIGI received an allegation that a scientific, engineering, and technical advisor contractor misused government time and equipment for the purpose of furthering personal business interests. OIGI developed evidence that the advisor submitted invoices to his employer claiming that he worked from home, which was not authorized on the NGA contract. The advisor openly solicited for his personally owned business while at NGA and used NGA equipment. He also made false statements during his interview with OIGI investigators. OIGI forwarded investigative results to the NGA Office of Contract Services (OCS). OCS personnel worked with the advisor's company to reimburse the government \$1,000 for the time the advisor spent at NGA using NGA equipment on personal business.

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### **OIG Case No. 16-112, closed January 2018**

OIGI received a referral from the NGA Polygraph Office that a Pay Band 5 analyst discussed classified information with an unauthorized recipient, who is a former NGA employee. The investigation substantiated that the analyst willfully communicated classified information to an unauthorized person. OIGI provided the investigative results to the NGA Personnel Security Office. This office presented the analyst with a Security Clearance Eligibility Determination Warning memorandum, which was a formal warning regarding the analyst's security violations. Any subsequent violations by the analyst could result in the loss of access to classified information.

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### **OIG Case No. 17-134, closed March 2018**

OIGI received allegations that a Pay Band 3 analyst [REDACTED] assaulted a fellow analyst. The OIGI investigation found that the analyst displayed harassing behavior toward the fellow analyst and five other employees, and sexually harassed the fellow analyst. The Pay Band 3 analyst also physically assaulted the fellow analyst and physically intimidated other employees with aggressive and disrespectful behavior. The offending analyst resigned from NGA after receiving a Notice of Proposed Removal.

## CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

During this period, OIGI worked on eight investigations with the DCIS and other criminal investigative agencies. The issues included false claims, cost mischarging, conflict of interest, theft of government equipment, threats to Federal employees, and possible Buy America Act violations.

## CASES INVOLVING SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS (UNSUBSTANTIATED)

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### **OIG Case No. 16-172, closed January 2018.**

A senior government official retaliated against a subordinate employee; not substantiated.

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### **OIG Case No. 18-002, closed December 2017.**

A senior government official committed an unauthorized disclosure; not substantiated.

## FORENSIC ANALYSIS SUPPORT TEAM

FAST uses data forensics to uncover potential fraud in contracts, procurements, and financial transactions. The team also identifies policy violations and weaknesses in internal and management controls. Part of the Investigations Division, FAST comprises a forensic auditor and three forensic data analysts.

## COMPLETED

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### **Proactive NGA Telework Compliance, Project No. F17-001**

FAST reviewed NGA's Telework Program to ensure compliance with NGA telework policies, The Telework Act, and the Guide to Telework in the Federal Government. Telework was selected for review this year to test NGA's internal controls and for possible referrals to the Audit Division. The OIG Forensic Analysis Support Team (FAST) identified 659 NGA employees who teleworked outside of NGA policy guidelines resulting in 34,680.5 hours of improper telework. This project was completed on 17 October 2017.



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### **Proactive NGA Travel Compensation Compliance, Project No. F17-004**

FAST has selected to review travel compensatory time earned by NGA employees to ensure compliance with the DoD Joint Travel Regulation and NGA policies. Data needed for matching purposes was not accessible during this period, and FAST referred this project to the NGA OIG Audit Division for further development. This FAST project was completed on 8 December 2017.

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### **FY2016 Government Purchase Card Analytics, Project No. F17-008**

FAST conducted a forensic review of NGA's Government Purchase Card (GPC) transactions for FY2016. FAST did not uncover any fraudulent purchases. However, 713, or 8 percent, of the total, 8,880 transactions for FY2016 were questionable. FAST referred several internal control issues to the GPC Program manager. This project was completed on 5 February 2018.



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### **Sole Source Contract Analytics, Project No. F17-009**

One of the issues found during Proactive Contract Fraud Detection, Project No. F16-008, was the identification of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] No immediate red flags were identified. This project was completed on 8 December 2017.

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## **ONGOING**

FAST has no ongoing projects. The team continues to provide data analytics support to investigations.

## APPENDIX A. STATUS OF AUDIT AND INSPECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

This appendix includes seven tables that present the status of recommendations according to various parameters.

**Table A-1. Open and Closed OIG Recommendations as of 31 March 2018**

This table provides the number of NGA OIG and DoD OIG audit and inspection recommendations issued to NGA management that were closed or remained open at the end of the reporting period. Recommendations that closed prior to 30 September 2017 are not included.

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Review of NGA’s Management of Removable Media Devices and Data Transfer Activities, Report No. OIGA 14-05, August 2014</b>	0	5
Objectives: To assess whether NGA had adequate controls over the use of removable media devices and data transfer activities. Specifically, to determine whether NGA’s removable media and data transfer activities complied with the requirements in the Office of the Secretary of Defense memorandum, <i>Insider Threat Mitigation</i> , 12 July 2013, and the ODNI memorandum, <i>Oversight of Privileged Users with the Intelligence Community</i> , 25 July 2013.		
<b>Review of NGA’s Management of the Emergency and Extraordinary Expenses Funds, Report No. OIGA 15-04, January 2015</b>	0	1
Objectives: To assess whether NGA used the Official Representative Funds and Confidential Military Purpose funds for their intended purposes and to determine whether NGA management had adequate controls to manage the funds.		
<b>Audit of NGA’s Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 16-08, May 2016</b>	0	1
Objective: To determine whether NGA policies and procedures ensured the proper use of administrative leave.		

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Observations on NGA Purchases of Passenger Motor Vehicles, Report No. OIGA 16-11, September 2016</b>	0	1
Objectives: Observations identified during a formal investigation to determine whether NGA violated the Antideficiency Act (ADA) when it purchased two canine vehicles in FY2013 using the Operation and Maintenance appropriation. While NGA did not violate the ADA when it purchased the vehicles, certain matters were of sufficient importance to communicate to management.		
<b>Audit of Foreign Travel, Report No. OIGA 16-13, September 2016</b>	2	2
Objective: To determine whether management of foreign temporary duty (TDY) travel was effective and efficient. Specifically, the OIG determined whether NGA travelers and approving officials complied with applicable laws and regulations governing reimbursement for foreign TDY travel.		
<b>Audit of NGA's Disposal of Electronic Waste, Report No. OIGA17-06, March 2017</b>	2	4
Objective: To determine whether NGA sanitized and disposed of e-waste in accordance with IC, DoD, and NGA policies and procedures.		
<b>Audit of NGA's Information Assurance Certification Program, Report No. OIGA17-09, June 2017</b>	0	1
Objective: To determine whether the NGA workforce performing information assurance functions have met appropriate certification requirements in accordance with DoD and NGA policies and procedures.		
<b>Audit of NGA's Oversight of Contractor Performance and Contract Payments, Report No. OIGA17-11, September 2017</b>	7	10
Objective: To assess the effectiveness of oversight of contractor performance and payment, specifically, to determine, for contracts, whether (1) contractor officers' representatives (CORs) and technical monitors (TMs) were properly appointed in accordance with applicable policy; (2) an appropriate oversight plan was established; (3) CORs are reviewing contractor work on a timely basis and in accordance with the oversight plan; and (4) contract payments are adequately supported.		
<b>Audit of NGA's Management of the Acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment (CFPE), Report No. OIGA18-03, November 2017</b>	4	2
Objective: To determine whether NGA effectively identified requirements and provided adequate contract and program oversight for the acquisition of the CFPE.		

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the NGA Support Team to USPACOM, Report No. OIGE IO-14-04, July 2014</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA's overall IO Program and the organization's IO Program.		
<b>Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, November 2014</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>
Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of NGA's Privacy Program, processes, and procedures. Specifically, we assessed (1) whether the Privacy Program was effectively organized, staffed, and trained to fulfill its responsibilities; (2) the risk of a privacy breach and existing mitigation efforts; (3) key factors in promoting and hindering the effective exercise of privacy protections; and (4) the completeness of required agency privacy documentation.		
<b>Inspection of NGA's Identity and Access Management (IdAM) Program, Report No. OIGE 15-02, March 2015</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>
Objectives: To determine whether NGA has developed and implemented an effective IdAM Program. The subobjectives included determining whether the program is effective for managing user identities and access controls.		
<b>Inspection of NGA's Process for Managing Information Systems User Accounts, Report No. OIGE 15-03, March 2015</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>
Objective: To assess how agency information technology user accounts are created, activated, changed, suspended, terminated, or inactivated.		
<b>Review of NGA Police Force Internal Controls, Report No. OIGE 15-04, March 2015</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>0</b>
Objectives: To assess the effectiveness of the NGA Police Force internal control program in providing reasonable assurance that key processes and functional areas, such as weapons accountability, safety, and training, comply with Federal, DoD, and IC standards.		
<b>Inspection of the National System for Geospatial Intelligence Needs Process, Report No. OIGE 15-05, May 2015</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the NSG Needs Process. The subobjectives were to determine whether the NSG Needs Process is in compliance with governing policies, procedures, rules, and regulations, and to evaluate the performance of NGA's management, coordination, and monitoring activities of the NSG needs.		



Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Inspection of the NGA Personnel Accountability Program, Report No. OIGE 15-08, August 2015</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>0</b>
Objective: To determine the extent to which NGA personnel accountability processes comply with DoD Instruction 3001.02 and to determine whether NGA's implementation of the DoD Instruction is efficient and effective.		
<b>Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase I: Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 16-02, November 2015</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>
Objectives: To determine whether NGA developed and implemented the necessary governance structure, oversight, and review processes, as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) assessment guidelines, for entity-level reviews of the acquisition functions. The subobjectives were to (1) determine whether NGA's acquisition function is aligned with agency mission and needs; (2) evaluate the level of NGA leadership commitment; and (3) determine whether NGA's defense acquisition management review and oversight processes are sufficient.		
<b>Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human Capital, Report No. OIGE 16-03, November 2015</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>8</b>
Objectives: To review NGA's acquisition human capital policies and practices to evaluate whether NGA has developed and maintained a fully proficient acquisition workforce that is flexible and highly skilled across a range of management, technical, and business disciplines as outlined in OMB's assessment guide. The subobjectives were to determine (1) whether NGA is conducting effective strategic human capital planning and (2) whether NGA is effectively and efficiently acquiring, developing, and retaining acquisition talent.		
<b>Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04, February 2016</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
Objectives: To determine compliance with its statement of capabilities.		
<b>Review of the NGA Insider Threat Program, Report No. OIGE 16-05, February 2016</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>3</b>
Objectives: To determine whether NGA's Insider Threat Program complies with executive branch, DoD, and IC requirements. The subobjectives were aligned with the following six minimum standards established by the National Insider Threat Policy: (1) designation of senior official(s) and associated responsibilities; (2) information integration, analysis, and response; (3) insider-threat program personnel; (4) access the information; (5) monitoring user activity on networks; and (6) employee training and awareness.		

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Review of NGA Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners, Report No. OIGE 16-06, May 2016</b>	8	2

Objective: To assess the magnitude, primary causes, and impact of the backlog within NGA's Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners Program.

<b>Inspection of NGA's Office of Small Business Programs, Report No. OIGE 16-07, June 2016</b>	0	2
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Objective: To assess the effectiveness of the NGA Office of Small Business Programs, as well as compliance with IC, DoD, and Federal policies and directives.

<b>Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the Office of Customer Engagement and the Office of Design, Xperience Directorate, Report No. OIGE IO-16-03, July 2016</b>	0	2
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Objective: To determine whether the NGA organization is compliant with IO policies and procedures and to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of NGA's overall IO program and the organization's IO Program.

<b>Joint Inspectors General Inspection Report – Aerospace Data Facility Colorado (ADF-C), Report No. JT-16-0001, February 2017</b>	1	0
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Objective: To follow up on findings from the previous inspection and determine the level of effectiveness and efficiency of the ADF-C. Specifically, the inspection reviewed management effectiveness and resource management of the ADF-C.

<b>Inspection of NGA Imagery Analyst Tradecraft Training, Report No. OIGE 17-02, February 2017</b>	0	5
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Objectives: To determine the extent to which NGA is training its IAs to exploit imagery by taking advantage of the full spectrum of geospatial phenomenologies and making use of traditional and nontraditional sources. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>Inspection of InnoVision's Research and Development and Technology Transition Outcomes, Report No. OIGE 17-03, March 2017</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>

Objectives: To assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the processes by which InnoVision selects and transitions new products, processes, and services to the agency. Subobjectives of this inspection were to (1) identify the R&D programs/projects InnoVision has been pursuing over the last 5 years; (2) for each of the above programs/projects, identify its source and the reason it was chosen; and (3) for each program/project, determine the outcome. (Was the project transitioned, did it enhance the mission, what capabilities were delivered, etc.?)

<b>Inspection of NGA's Strategic Workforce Planning Function, Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 2017</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>
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Objective: To assess the effectiveness of NGA's strategic workforce planning function in meeting the requirement to have a future workforce that is capable of supporting DoD and IC missions. Consistent with Title 10, US Code, and DoD Instruction, the OIG used stages of the Office of Personnel Management's workforce planning model as the baseline for the assessment and issued five subobjectives: (1) assess strategic direction; (2) assess effectiveness of workforce and skills-gap analysis; (3) assess action plan(s); (4) assess implementation of action plan(s); and (5) assess the effectiveness of monitoring, evaluation, and revision.

<b>Inspection of Structured Observation Management (SOM), Report No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
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Objective: To assess SOM implementation against oversight requirements, agency plans and goals, milestones, and customer requirements. Sub-objectives of the inspection were: (1) determine the extent to which SOM has been implemented against the agency's established plan; (b) determine if SOM is meeting customer needs; and (c) assess the implementation of the program with respect to established standards.

<b>Inspection of NGA's Office of Counterintelligence, Report No. OIGE 18-02, November 2017</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
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Objective: To determine whether NGA's counterintelligence program complies with DoD and IC policies and standards. The inspection also assessed the effectiveness, efficiency, and execution of counterintelligence processes and activities. Sub-objectives of the inspection were to: (1) determine whether the Office of Counterintelligence programs and activities comply with DoD and IC policies and standards; (b) assess the Office of Counterintelligence program and organizational structure; and (c) assess the Office of Counterintelligence for effectiveness and efficiency.

Report Title, Number, Date	Recommendations	
	No. Closed	No. Open
<b>An Assessment of Contractor Personnel Security Clearance Processes in the Four Defense Intelligence Agencies, Report No. DODIG-2014-060, April 2014</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4</b>

Objectives: To assess (1) how, or if, substantiated investigations of misconduct were reported to Agency Clearance Adjudication Facilities and to the DoD Consolidated Adjudication Facility; (2) if the referred investigations had been adjudicated; and (3) the results of those security adjudications.

A **recommendation for corrective action** is issued in response to a finding that a Federal standard is not being met; it is intended to bring the agency into compliance with the standard.

**Table A-2. OIG Recommendations for Corrective Action, Current Reporting Period**

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Inspection of NGA's Office of Counterintelligence, Report No. OIGE 18-02, November 2017	1	Consistent with DoDI 5240.10, generate procedures (e.g. MOUs, or MOAs) addressing SIC's support to the Army 902nd MI Group.
	4	
	8	Update NGA policy defining SI's roles and responsibilities related to CI referrals. The policy should articulate ASO CI referral responsibilities and detail the referral process (including a referral acknowledgement response).
Inspection of Structured Observation Management, Report No. OIGE 18-01, November 2017	5	Develop and issue, across the NSG, SOM tradecraft standards that address: accuracy requirements with rules for capturing objects, observations, and judgements; a quality control process; and sourcing and data disclaimers consistent with ICDs 203 & 206.
FY2017 Evaluation of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017	01.01.	Develop and implement an organizational continuous monitoring strategy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	01.02.	Develop and implement a continuous monitoring policy and procedures in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY 2017 FISMA Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued)	01.03.	Develop and implement information system continuous monitoring plans in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	01.04.	Perform continuous monitoring over NGA IT security and performance metrics, and common and information system security controls in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	2.01	Develop policies and procedures for security awareness and role-based training in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	02.02.	Provide and track role-based training for information security personnel in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	03.01.	Develop notification, investigation, and reporting timelines for all defined incident categories.
	04.01.	Finalize cloud incident response procedures.
	04.02.	Finalize the development and implementation of cyber tools for all traffic routed into the agency, to include the cloud.
	05-01.	Develop and implement a process to ensure that system POA&Ms address all requirements in accordance with policy and procedures.
	06-01.	Develop an organizational risk management strategy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	06.02.	Develop risk assessment policy and procedures over mission and business processes in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance



Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2017 FISMA Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued)	06.03.	Perform risk assessments on NGA mission and business processes and NGA information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	06.04.	Define the required frequency for security control assessments in accordance with CNSS, and NIST guidance and implement security control assessments in accordance with policy.
	06.05.	Categorize and authorize all NGA information systems to operate in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance.
	06.06.	Ensure its information systems' security plans are updated and maintained to reflect the current environment, in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	07.01.	Ensure all systems in production have approved ITDRs.
	07.02.	Ensure system personnel take action to address the findings identified in ITDR exercises.
	07.03.	Document and implement procedures for assessing continued operations in a service continuity event for systems operating in the cloud environment.
	07.04.	Ensure information system management establish processes for ensuring backups are performed in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance.
	07.05.	Identify, track and oversee the implementation of system alternate processing sites in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance. Perform evaluations to determine whether management should implement alternate processes to enable the system to meet recovery objectives in the event of a disaster at the primary processing site, prior to the establishment of an alternate processing site.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2017 FISMA Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued)	08.01.	Document an entity level POA&M lien to identify and track the completion the requirements of OMB M-15-13 to ensure the agency allocates appropriate oversight for completion.
	08.02.	Develop and approve a process for the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS for all current and future public facing websites.
	08.03.	Implement the enforcement of HTTPS and HSTS on all public facing websites as required by policy.
	09.01.	Develop a formal identity and access management policy in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	09.02.	Implement an identity and access management program over information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	09.03.	Ensure information systems describe implementation of NIST Access Control family controls, such as account types, access authorization, segregation of duties, and access recertification in security documentation in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	10.01.	Ensure information systems develop and maintain configuration management procedures and plans in accordance with the ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.
	10.02.	Ensure information system owners maintain accurate listings of their hardware and software inventories in order to maintain an accurate configuration baseline.
	10.03.	Develop and implement processes to consistently authorize changes to information systems in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, and NIST guidance.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
FY2017 FISMA Internal Report, OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017 (continued)	10.04.	Perform vulnerability scans in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance.
	10.05.	Remediate vulnerabilities in accordance with ODNI, CNSS, NIST, and NGA guidance.
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017	1A.	FM and OCS should complete the design of and implement its tri-annual review, to include a reconciliation to the general ledger and measures to quantify the results of the review.
	1B.	FM and OCS should complete planned corrective actions to identify and de-obligate stale or invalid paid and unpaid UDOs.
	1C.	FM and OCS should identify reasonable methods of [REDACTED] and develop and implement procedures to [REDACTED] accordingly.
	1D.	FM and OCS should improve standard operating procedures (SOP) to include enhanced contract creation and execution controls (e.g., contract approval and three-way match between the obligation, the invoice, and the receiving report) and should establish monitoring controls to enforce such procedures.
	1E.	FM should work with OCS to complete an assessment to quantify the potential impact of expenditures on advance paid MIPRs incurred outside the period of performance. Additionally, FM should draft, finalize, and implement the SOP for advance paid MIPRs, to include consideration of the period of performance in its advance liquidation process.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued)	1F.	FM should formally and completely document its criteria and procedures for performing and reviewing the accounts payable accrual look-back analysis into an SOP, including allocation between federal and nonfederal attributes, determination of invoices to be included in or excluded from the analysis, and more detailed supervisor review requirements.
	1G.	FM should develop, document, and implement a process for identifying, quantifying, and recognizing accrued expenses related to activity with the [REDACTED] and should enhance procedures over [REDACTED] payroll reimbursements to include maintaining complete and readily available documentation.
	1H.	FM should develop, document, and implement controls over the completeness and presentation of TBOs reported to DFAS and determine if an additional UDA accrual is necessary.
	1I.	FM and the Security & Installations directorate (SI) should continue to remediate [REDACTED]
	1J.	FM should complete implementation of configuration changes to GEO-F posting logic to properly record refunds of prior year paid obligations.
	2A.	FM, SI, and the Chief Information Officer and IT Services directorate (CIO-T) should continue their efforts to remediate personal property deficiencies, including a review of personal property CIP and IUS in development costs. As part of its review, management should place completed assets into service. Going forward, FM and SI should develop and implement a process that allows for in-use assets to be placed in-service in a timely manner.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued)	2B.	SI should work with CIO-T and FM to assess the feasibility of implementing system configuration changes to capture personnel costs incurred for IUS in development. As an alternative, SI should work with CIO-T and FM to develop and implement a standard methodology to allocate capitalizable Government personnel costs incurred during system development to IUS in development at the asset level.
	2C.	FM, SI, and CIO-T should work to develop and implement a process for summarizing personal property CIP and IUS in development costs by asset to allow for tracking and data analysis and timely movement to in-service PP&E accounts.
	2D.	FM and SI should ensure that NGA's continued PP&E remediation efforts include a floor-to-book inventory of IUS, CAP, and GFP.
	2E.	SI, in coordination with FM, should develop and implement a policy for identifying completed CIP and IUS in development assets. The policy should define the point at which an asset is "complete" for financial reporting purposes to ensure timely asset and depreciation recognition.
	2F.	FM should enhance and implement its PP&E impairment monitoring policy to include all required components of SFFAS No. 10 and SFFAS No. 44 and document the impairment analyses performed.
	2G.	FM and SI should develop and implement corrective actions related to the identification of leased equipment, assessment of equipment leases as capital or operating leases, and inclusion of these leases in the lease note disclosure.
	3A.	FM should develop, implement, and document a monitoring control to ensure adherence to NGA's journal entry review and approval policy.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued)	3B.	FM should develop and implement system-enforced segregation of duties controls over journal entry preparation and approval. Such controls should include expanded use of the GEO-F journal entry approval role to enforce review thresholds.
	3C.	FM should configure GEO-F to restrict journal entry approvers from changing journal vouchers prior to approval, or to require that modified entries are routed through the preparer to re-submit.
	3D.	FM should ensure that adequate training and other resources, such as desktop guides, policies, or quick reference cards, are provided to personnel with journal entry preparation or approval responsibilities. Such training and resources should be provided timely upon the assumption of such responsibilities (i.e., prior to the month or quarter-end journal entry preparation timeline).
	3E.	FM should enhance policy to include
	3F.	FM should identify relevant information relied upon in its business processes and work with other key components, as appropriate, to design, document, and implement internal controls over the completeness and accuracy of such information.
	3G.	FM should develop and implement posting logic in GEO-F to record transactions in accordance with the USSGL at the transaction level.



Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued)	4A.	FM should continue to work with DFAS and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to establish a Plan of Action and Milestones for reliance on DFAS's FBWT reconciliation. As an alternative, FM management should develop appropriate analyses and processes to support the completeness and accuracy of NGA's FBWT without relying on the CMR report.
	4B.	FM should continue to work with DFAS to obtain appropriate documentation to support legacy transactions.
	5A.	We recommend that FM consistently follow recently implemented procedures to recognize all customer orders.
	6A.	Regarding access controls:
		1. Develop, document, implement, and enforce consistent [REDACTED].
		2. Enforce [REDACTED]
	6B.	Regarding segregation of duties controls:
		1. Develop, approve, and implement procedures to [REDACTED]
		[REDACTED], approved deviations from policy should be documented.
		2. Enforce [REDACTED]

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued)	6C.	Regarding [REDACTED]
	7A.	<p>To address the FM-related deficiencies noted above, FM, in coordination with the relevant Key Components, should:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Complete, document, and implement an [REDACTED]</li> <li>2. Develop or update, document, approve, and disseminate r [REDACTED]</li> <li>3. Update, approve, and disseminate a [REDACTED] in compliance with the relevant standards.</li> </ol>
	7B.	<p>To address the other information technology-related deficiencies noted above, CIO-T and the Office of Contract Services should:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Complete, approve, and disseminate [REDACTED] in compliance with applicable guidance.</li> </ol>
		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>2. Perform and document [REDACTED] in compliance with NIST SP 800-53.</li> <li>3. Update and disseminate [REDACTED] n compliance with NGA policy.</li> </ol>

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017 (continued)		4. Update and implement policies and procedures [REDACTED] in accordance with applicable guidance.
		5. Develop and implement procedures to monitor and enforce the
		Recommendations to address instances of noncompliance
		<p>1. We recommend that Financial Management and the Office of Strategic Operations revise NGA's FMFIA process to incorporate the ERM requirements of OMB Circular No. A-123. Additionally, FM should perform additional procedures to identify material weaknesses in NGA's ICOFR environment.</p> <p>2. We recommend that NGA implement the recommendations provided in Exhibits I and II and improve its processes to ensure compliance with the requirements of FFMIA section 803(a) in FY2018.</p>
Audit of NGA's Management of the Acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment, Report No. OIGA 18-03, issued 30 November 2017	3	Implement control activities emphasizing responsibility for unauthorized commitments, such as additional training and increased performance accountability, for personnel responsible for contract management.

**Table A-3. Recommendations for Corrective Action Not Yet Completed, Reporting Periods Before 1 October 2017**

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Audit of NGA's Information Assurance Certification Program, Report No. OIGA 17-09, 30 June 2017	1	Comply with DoD 8570.01-M. If management chooses to accept the risk of not complying with DoD 8570.01-M, perform a comprehensive risk assessment, signed by the Chief Information Officer, that justifies not complying with DoD 8570.01-M requirements. The risk assessment should address the risks to the protection, detection, and reaction capabilities of NGA's information systems and networks and any other information deemed necessary to support the assessment.
Audit of NGA's Disposal of Electronic Waste, Report No. OIGA 17-06, 30 March 2017	5	Complete a vulnerability assessment of e waste that includes the  and communicate how identified vulnerabilities will be addressed.
Review of NGA's Management of Removable Media Devices and Data Transfer Activities, Report No. OIGA 14-05, 30 August 2014	6	approved by the Designated Accrediting Authority.
	7	Clearly define the roles, responsibilities, and
	9	_____
	10	Implement Office of the Secretary of Defense requirements for  writable [REDACTED] media, or conduct and document risk assessments for alternate mitigations.
	12	Develop and implement a process to for approved [REDACTED] media devices (including Two-Person Integrity measures and designated media custodians) and regular compliance reviews.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Audit of NGA's Use of Administrative Leave, Report No. OIGA 16-08, 12 May 2016	1	Update NGA guidance relevant to administrative leave. Policies should: (1) Establish clear procedures for supervisors, managers, and key personnel to follow when taking actions that result in the placement of employees on administrative leave; (2) Establish oversight procedures for the approval of administrative leave, to assess the use of administrative leave, and to follow up when the improper use of administrative leave is identified; (3) Address appropriate time limits for administrative leave, and ensure that the references to related NGA policies and procedures are consistent and accurate; (4) Identify the responsible directorate for official tracking of administrative leave.
Inspection of NGA's Strategic Workforce Planning Function, Report No. OIGE 17-04, June 2017	1	In accordance with statute and policies, develop and issue a strategic workforce plan that looks at a total workforce mix with an emphasis on critical skills and competencies needed to perform the agency's evolving mission.
	3	Establish a resourced activity to update the NGA leader competency model to reflect requirements defined within ICD 610, ICS 610-3, ICS 610-4
	9	Update the career service implementing policy to account for the new organizational construct, and ICS 610-5.
Intelligence Oversight Inspection of the Office of Customer Engagement and the Office of Design, Xperience Directorate, Report No. IO-16-03, 13 July 2016	3	Develop procedures validating that users are authorized access to and exploitation of Map of the World.
	4	Develop procedures that allow for the verification of authorized use of the Map of the World.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Inspection of NGA's Office of Small Business Programs, Report No. OIGE 16-07, 22 June 16	6	Consistent with DoD Instruction 4205.01, ensure that appropriate senior acquisition professionals have, at a minimum, a performance objective regarding small business contracting goals in their performance plans.
Review of NGA Safety of Navigation, Notice to Mariners, Report No. OIGE 16-06, 9 May 2016	5	Identify an appropriate maintenance strategy and secure needed funding for Digital Master Standard code.
	11	Develop a strategic plan and a tactical working-level plan that are measurable, resourced, and repeatable to meet statutory mandates and reduce the SoN NtM backlog to levels agreed to by the Navy, Combatant Commands, and other users. The plans should establish goals, performance metrics, and reporting timelines and be tied to resources and individual performance and recognition.
Review of the NGA Insider Threat Program, Report No. OIGE 16-05, 22 February 2016	13	Per DoD CIO memo of 9 May 2008, develop IT system user agreements and ensure that all NGA employees sign them.
Inspection of the CURATOR Program, Report No. OIGE 16-04, 25 February 2016	3	Identify and review data.
Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human Capital, Report No. OIGE 16-03, 24 November 2015	1	Update all NGA acquisition workforce-related policies and instructions to reflect Component Acquisition Executive (CAE).
	2	Formalize and codify the management and oversight of Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund funding.



Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase II: Human Capital, Report No. OIGE 16-03, 24 November 2015 (continued)	3	Ensure that the CAE fulfills the responsibilities pursuant to DoD Directive 5000.52 in executing the Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L) Workforce Education, Training, and Career Development Program.
	7	Comply with the USD (AT&L) memo of November 2013 regarding key leadership position descriptions.
Inspection of NGA's Acquisition Function, Phase I: Organizational Alignment and Leadership, Report No. OIGE 16-02, 10 November 2015	2	Ensure that NGA policy and guidance effectively promote a strategic, integrated, and agency-wide approach to the acquisition function.
Final Inspection Report, Personnel Accountability Program, Report No. OIGE 15-08, 07 August 2015	7	Review and update NGAM 1000.1 for internal consistency and consistency with NI 1000.1.
Final Inspection Report, NGA's Process for Managing Information Systems User Accounts, Report No. OIGE 15-03, 16 March 2015	3	In accordance with ODNI guidelines, develop policy to periodically monitor elevated user-account privileges and report abuses within unique categories such as the super-user.
	4	Release a policy notice that mandates milestone compliance dates for DNI Memorandum E/S 00514 and OSD Memorandum dated 12 July 2013.
Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014	19	Establish a systematic process to ensure that all forms and other PII collection methods have accurate Privacy Act statements associated with them. Update and publish agency-level privacy policy with the statement procedures. Conduct periodic checks of the agency's forms and e-mails to evaluate the use of Privacy Act statements.

Report Title, Number, Date	Rec. Number	Recommendation for Corrective Action
Inspection of the NGA Privacy Program and Privacy Protection Management, Report No. OIGE 15-01, 5 November 2014 (continued)	21	In accordance with previous recommendations, after establishing a method to identify IT systems that contain PII, ensure that IT system owners (program managers) complete Privacy Impact Assessments and submit them to the Senior Component Official for Privacy. Publish completed Privacy Impact Assessments on NGA's webpages.

**Table A-4. Financial Results from Reports Issued During Reporting Period**

<b>Report Title, Number, Date Issued</b>	<b>Questioned Costs</b>	<b>Unsupported Costs</b>	<b>Funds To Be Put to Better Use</b>
FY2017 Evaluation of the National Geospatial- Intelligence Agency Pursuant to the Federal Information Security Modernization Act (FISMA) Internal Report, Report No. OIGA 18-01, 7 November 2017	\$0	0	\$0
Independent Auditors' Report on the NGA Financial Statements for FYs 2017 and 2016, Report No. OIGA 18-02, 9 November 2017	\$0	\$0	\$0
Audit of NGA's Management of the Acquisition of the Consolidated Foundation Production Environment, Report No. OIGA 18-03, issued 30 November 2017	\$46,000,000		\$104,500,000
Independent Auditors' Management Letter for the FY2017 Financial Statement Audit Engagement, Report No. OIGA 18- 04, issued 21 December 2017	\$0	\$0	\$0
Inspection of Structured Observation Management, Report No. OIGE 18- 01, November 2017	\$26,600,000		
<b>Total</b>	<b>\$72,600,000</b>	<b>\$0</b>	<b>\$104,500,000</b>

**Table A-5. Status of Recommendations That Questioned Costs**

<b>Recommendation Status</b>	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Number of Recommendations</b>	<b>Questioned Costs</b>
A. No management decision made by start of the reporting period	3	3	\$270,637,491
B. Issued during reporting period	2	7	\$72,600,000
Total A + B	5	10	\$343,237,491
C. Management decision made during reporting period	3	8	\$233,637,491
(i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to (disallowed costs)			
(ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to (allowed costs)	0	0	0
D. Total remaining for management decision at end of reporting period [(A + B) – C]	2	2	\$109,600,000

**Table A-6. Status of Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use**

<b>Recommendation Status</b>	<b>Number of Reports</b>	<b>Number of Recommendations</b>	<b>Funds To Be Put to Better Use</b>
A. No management decision made by start of the reporting period	2	2	\$7,700,000
B. Issued during reporting period	1	7	\$104,500,000
<b>Total A + B</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>\$112,200,000</b>
C. Management decision made during reporting period	0	0	\$0
(i) Dollar value of recommendations that were agreed to (disallowed costs)	3	9	\$112,200,000
(ii) Dollar value of recommendations that were not agreed to (allowed costs)	0	0	\$0
D. Total remaining for management decision at end of reporting period [(A + B) – C]	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>\$0</b>

**Table A-7. Management Decisions Regarding OIG Recommendations in Reports Issued Before 1 October 2017**

<b>Unresolved as of 31 March 2018</b>	<b>Reports with Unimplemented Recommendations</b>	<b>Number of Unimplemented Recommendations</b>	<b>Questioned Costs</b>	<b>Funds To Be Put to Better Use</b>
Audits	8	25	\$36,700,000	\$7,700,000
Inspections	18	46	\$83,000,000	
<b>Total</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>\$119,700,000</b>	<b>\$7,700,000</b>

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**Significant Revised Management Decisions**

- None to report.

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**OIG Disagreement with Significant Management Decisions**

- None to report.

## APPENDIX B. INVESTIGATIVE METRICS

**Table B-1. Number of Cases Referred for Criminal or Civil Prosecution, During Reporting Period**

Type of Case	Number of Cases		
	Referred	Accepted	Declined
Criminal	0	0	0
Civil	0	0	0

**Table B-2. Judicial Actions, During Reporting Period**

Action	Number
Indictments	0
Convictions	0
Years of incarceration	0
Years of supervised release	0
Years of probation	0

**Table B-3. Criminal Prosecutions and Referrals, During Reporting Period<sup>a</sup>**

No. investigative reports issued	14
No. individuals referred to DoJ for criminal prosecution	0
No. individuals referred to state and local prosecuting authorities for criminal prosecution	0
No. indictments and criminal informations resulting from any prior referral to prosecuting authorities	0

<sup>a</sup>. NGA OIG issued no criminal investigative reports, however NGA OIG did issue 14 administrative reports of investigation from 1 October 2017 to 31 March 2018.



## APPENDIX C. PEER REVIEWS

An external peer review of the NGA OIG Audit Division was performed by the National Security Agency OIG. In its report dated 23 February 2018, we received a rating of “pass” for our system of quality control in effect for the three-year period ending 30 September 2017. There are no outstanding recommendations from any peer reviews of the Audit Division.

NGA OIG completed a joint IC peer review of the Defense Intelligence Agency’s OIG Inspections Division in November 2017. The division met required CIGIE Blue Book standards and completed its last four inspections/evaluations in accordance with DIA OIG Inspections Division procedures and CIGIE Blue Book standards. There are no outstanding recommendations.

## APPENDIX D. ABBREVIATIONS

ADA	Antideficiency Act
CAE	Component Acquisition Executive
CDA	Congressionally directed action
CFPE	Consolidated Foundation Production Environment
CI	Counterintelligence
CIO-T	Chief Information Officer and IT Services Directorate
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
CIP	Construction-in-Progress
CNSS	Committee on National Security Systems
COR	contracting officer's representative
CTTA	Certified TEMPEST Technical Authority
DCIS	Defense Criminal Investigative Service
DFAS	Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DISES	Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service
DoD OGC	DoD Office of General Counsel
FAST	Forensic Analysis Support Team
FISMA	Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014
FM	Financial Management Directorate
GEO-F	GEOINT-Financials
GEOINT	geospatial intelligence
GPC	Government Purchase Card
GS	GEOINT Services
IC	Intelligence Community
IO	intelligence oversight
IPERA	Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act
IT	information technology
ITC	Interim Transition Capability
MDCO	Military Department CI Organization
MFT	Multifunctional Team
MI	Military Intelligence
MOA	Memorandum of Agreement
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAS	NSG Application Schema
NCE	NGA Campus East
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NRO	National Reconnaissance Office

NSG	National System for Geospatial Intelligence
NtM	Notice to Mariners
OCS	Office of Contract Services
ODNI	Office of the Director of National Intelligence
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OMB	Office of Management and Budget
OUSD(C)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
PII	Personally Identifiable Information
POA&M	plan of action and milestones
QIAs	questionable intelligence activities
S/HS	significant or highly sensitive matters
SCIF	Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility
SI	Security and Installations Directorate
SIC	Office of Counterintelligence
SIS	Office of Security
SOM	Structured Observation Management
SoN	Safety of Navigation
TM	technical monitor
US STRATCOM	US Strategic Command

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