



**OIG**

**Office of Inspector General**

U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors

---

ISP-I-17-18

Office of Inspections

June 2017

---

# Inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem

BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

---



# OIG HIGHLIGHTS

ISP-I-17-18

UNCLASSIFIED

June 2017

OFFICE OF INSPECTIONS

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs

## Inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem

### What OIG Found

- The Chief of Mission and Deputy Principal Officer promoted constructive engagement with the Palestinian public and the Palestinian Authority.
- Consulate General Jerusalem's annex facility did not meet operational standards for use as a warehouse.
- The consulate general's radio network coverage for the West Bank did not meet Department standards.
- The consulate general did not update and test its information technology contingency plans.
- The Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs did not enforce Department of State standards in the provision of services and benefits to the staff of the U.S. Security Coordinator office.
- Spotlight on Success: Consulate General Jerusalem instituted a program for First- and Second-Tour American staff to mentor Marine Security Guards and established a mission code of conduct that promotes teamwork and respect.

### What OIG Inspected

OIG inspected Consulate General Jerusalem from November 1 to 18, 2016.

### What OIG Recommended

This report includes a total of 25 recommendations. OIG made 24 recommendations to improve Consulate General Jerusalem's operations and procedures. The report addresses the implementation of Department of State-managed security assistance programs, the consulate general's management of employee security and safety programs, and the need to improve information management operations. OIG made one recommendation to the Bureau of Information Resource Management to upgrade the radio network coverage for the West Bank.

In its comments on the draft report, the Department concurred with all 25 recommendations. The Department's response to each recommendation, and OIG's reply, can be found in the Recommendations Section of this report. OIG considers the recommendations resolved. The Department's formal written responses are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix B.

\_\_\_\_ Office of Inspector General \_\_\_\_  
U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors

UNCLASSIFIED

# CONTENTS

---

CONTEXT .....	1
EXECUTIVE DIRECTION .....	2
Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct.....	2
Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives.....	4
Security of the Mission.....	5
Adherence to Internal Controls.....	5
Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leadership.....	6
POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION.....	6
Foreign Assistance .....	6
Advocacy and Analysis .....	8
Public Diplomacy .....	8
Consular Affairs.....	10
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT .....	11
Management Operations .....	11
General Services.....	13
Facility Management.....	15
Financial Management.....	16
Human Resources.....	17
Information Management and Information Security.....	18
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	22
PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS.....	29
APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY.....	30
APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES.....	31
APPENDIX C: FY 2016 STAFFING AND FUNDING BY AGENCY .....	38
ABBREVIATIONS .....	39
OIG INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS .....	40

## CONTEXT

---

Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza together have a population of more than 5.7 million, including close to 600,000 Israeli settlers in West Bank and East Jerusalem. The Palestinian Territories consist of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The West Bank is the larger of the two areas and is governed by the Fatah-dominated Palestinian Authority. The security environment is marked by periodic violence and unrest. In 2007, Hamas, which is designated by the U.S. Government as a terrorist group, took control of the Gaza Strip, which resulted in frequent violent flare-ups with Israel, including a 51-day conflict in summer 2014. Sporadic Israeli-Palestinian violence also takes place in the West Bank and Jerusalem.

The United States is the leading provider of direct development assistance to Palestinians, having provided more than \$5 billion since 1994. The United States is also the largest donor to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East. U.S. foreign assistance to the West Bank and Gaza of \$416 million in FY 2016 focused on improving the Palestinian Authority's capacity to provide security and services in the West Bank and thereby build confidence in public administration. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) manages assistance programs aimed at improving the quality of life for Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza through broad-based economic growth; improving water, sanitation, health delivery and road networks; and promoting equitable access to quality education. U.S. security assistance to the Palestinian Authority is led by the U.S. Security Coordinator (USSC), an international military staff located in the consulate general and headed by a U.S. Army Lieutenant General. USSC closely coordinates with and is funded by the Department's Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The bureau also funds and manages criminal justice system programs that complement initiatives to develop the Palestinian security service.

Consulate General Jerusalem is an independent diplomatic mission rather than a constituent post of U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv, and its Chief of Mission is the Consul General. It is responsible for U.S. relations with the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, and other parties and movements, such as Fatah, that have not been designated by the U.S. Government as terrorist groups. Its area of responsibility includes Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. In contrast, Embassy Tel Aviv has little or no involvement with the Palestinians, the Palestinian Authority, and associated entities. The consulate general's work is central to the U.S. Government's Middle East peace process efforts.

Consulate General Jerusalem's FY 2015-2017 Integrated Country Strategy (ICS) includes three main goals:

- Advancing Middle East peace through a negotiated solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
- Providing development and humanitarian assistance in the West Bank and Gaza that meets basic human needs.
- Having the Palestinian Authority build and sustain institutions and the security capacity of a future Palestinian State.

At the time of the inspection, Consulate General Jerusalem had 582 U.S. and locally employed (LE) staff members working in 10 locations in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. The total FY 2016 budget was \$106 million. The Social Security Administration, the Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security were represented at the consulate general. The mission was working with the Department on facility upgrades and consolidation to address the risks of Jerusalem's security environment and accommodate the needs of increasing staff and programs.

OIG evaluated the consulate general's policy implementation, resource management, and management controls consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act.<sup>1</sup> OIG also assessed security, which is covered in a classified report that contains a comprehensive discussion of the conduct of the security program and issues affecting the safety of mission personnel and facilities.

## EXECUTIVE DIRECTION

---

Jerusalem's complex history and politics creates a challenging environment in which to advance U.S. foreign policy goals. Other governments in the region, advocacy organizations, and the regional and U.S. media scrutinize the consulate general's work. The situation is equally complex within the mission itself, where the LE staff reflect the religious and ethnic diversity of the consulate general's area of responsibility.

### **Tone at the Top and Standards of Conduct**

OIG assessed Consulate General Jerusalem's leadership on the basis of 61 on-site interviews and 16 interviews in Washington that addressed questions about the Chief of Mission's (COM) and Deputy Principal Officer's (DPO) performance; 290 questionnaires completed by U.S. and LE staff members; and OIG's review of documentation and observation of consulate general meetings and activities during the on-site inspection.

The COM arrived in July 2015 with previous experience at U.S. missions in the Near East and South Asia. The DPO, who arrived in August 2014, most recently served in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration. In OIG interviews, Consulate General Jerusalem staff consistently described the COM and the DPO as knowledgeable, collaborative, inclusive, and concerned about mission staff. These qualities are all consistent with the leadership principles in 3 Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) 1214. Consulate general staff told OIG they viewed the COM and the DPO as setting a good example for ethical behavior, consistent with 3 FAM 1216. The COM and the DPO met with newly arrived American staff to explain the complexities of Jerusalem's work environment and the importance of the consulate general's mission. They also discussed the consulate general's "Mission Code of Conduct," described in more detail below, which promoted cohesion in the consulate general's diverse work force. American and LE staff

---

<sup>1</sup> See Appendix A.

members told OIG they appreciated the importance the COM and DPO attached to promoting a respectful workplace environment.

### **Spotlight on Success: Mission Code of Conduct Promoted Teamwork and Respect**

In 2015, several former consulate general employees made negative comments to local media concerning the consulate general's allegedly unequal treatment of its staff. The resulting press coverage created tensions among the consulate general staff and, among other things, undermined morale. With the help of facilitators from the Department's Foreign Service Institute, the consulate general developed a "Mission Code of Conduct," which noted the political sensitivities of the region and set the expectation that all employees would treat each other professionally. It also directed that personal political views should not disrupt the workplace and that managers should foster a collective respect for diversity. The Code of Conduct was posted in all consulate general facilities, and the COM and the DPO discussed it with all newly arrived American staff to ensure they understood the complexities of the Jerusalem working environment. OIG found American and LE staff members valued the Code of Conduct and believed it promoted teamwork and respect across the mission.

### ***Dispersed Facilities Presented Challenges to Staff Cohesion***

Consulate general staff worked in multiple facilities widely dispersed around Jerusalem, which presented a challenge for mission cohesion. Mission leadership attempted to address this issue. The DPO held weekly meetings in the consular section and with Department of Homeland Security staff located at the Arnona complex, the facility farthest from the consulate general's main office; the COM met with staff there less frequently. The COM and the DPO visited the General Services Office Annex/Warehouse facility three times each in 2016. In addition, the consulate general held all-hands and town hall meetings at its main office compound in 2016. Despite these efforts, staff at the more distant facilities told OIG they felt separate from the rest of the mission. OIG advised the COM and the DPO of this perception and suggested they address it by scheduling more meetings with staff at satellite facilities.

### ***Consulate General Coordination with Embassy Tel Aviv***

OIG observations and interviews indicated the COM promoted a constructive approach to working with U.S. Embassy Tel Aviv on issues of mutual interest. The chiefs of mission of these independent diplomatic missions met periodically, usually in Jerusalem, and the DPO and the embassy's Deputy Chief of Mission regularly attended each other's country team meetings. During the inspection, the two missions reviewed and updated a document on principles for cooperation that was first prepared in 2011 in response to an OIG recommendation from the 2011 inspections of both missions.<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Tel Aviv, Israel* (ISP-I-11-31A, March 2011); OIG, *Inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem* (ISP-I-11-34A, March 2011).

## Execution of Foreign Policy Goals and Objectives

Washington officials reported they valued the COM's views on developments in his area of responsibility, which were informed by his engagement with Palestinians in the West Bank. They also noted he was part of a small group working in Washington on Middle East peace process issues, which kept them in regular contact. OIG's review of the COM's schedule confirmed his engagement with a variety of contacts and events outside the mission. The COM and the DPO were an integral part of the consulate general's public diplomacy program. For example, from June through early November 2016, the COM participated in 28 public diplomacy events, and the DPO participated in 12.

The COM and the DPO promoted constructive engagement with the Palestinian public and the Palestinian Authority, consistent with the mission's ICS. These efforts included their public diplomacy outreach activities. In addition, the COM and DPO played leading roles in organizing issue-focused meetings, such as the resumption of the U.S.-Palestinian Economic Dialogue in May 2016, the U.S.-Palestinian Educational Dialogue held in Washington in October 2016, and the U.S.-Palestinian Political Dialogue held in Washington in December 2016.

### *Mission Collaboration*

Consulate general staff consistently reported that the COM and the DPO worked as a team and promoted collaboration among all sections and agencies in the mission. The COM and the DPO provided updates on their activities and priority issues at country team and all-hands meetings, which staff reported they found useful. They also had a regular schedule of smaller group meetings focused on specific topics, such as security assistance and economic issues. OIG observations confirmed that these meetings were inclusive and produced detailed substantive engagement among the Front Office and section and agency representatives.

### *Dual-Mission Coordination of Permit Requests*

OIG found that Consulate General Jerusalem and Embassy Tel Aviv did not effectively coordinate their engagement with Israeli Government officials responsible for issuing transit permits. Palestinian participants in U.S. Government exchange programs and Department-sponsored activities, as well as U.S. Government employees who work in Gaza, require these permits to travel among the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem. Ensuring participants and employees have the necessary permits is critical to the success of U.S. Government humanitarian assistance and rehabilitation efforts in the West Bank and Gaza. These efforts are objectives in the Integrated Country Strategies of both Embassy Tel Aviv and Consulate General Jerusalem. OIG recommended in the concurrent 2017 OIG Inspection Report of Embassy Tel Aviv that the two missions adopt a joint standard operating procedure to coordinate the tracking of pending transit permits.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup> OIG, *Inspection of Embassy Tel Aviv, Israel* (ISP-I-17-20, April 2017).

### ***Strategic Planning and Program Oversight***

OIG's review of Consulate General Jerusalem's strategic goals and objectives found that all sections and agencies were involved in preparing its FY 2015-2017 ICS. The FY 2018 Mission Resource Request was linked to ICS goals and objectives. Existing section reporting plans, the Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan, and the economic and security assistance funds expended in the West Bank reflected ICS priorities.

However, the consulate general did not regularly review the ICS to assess progress toward achieving its strategic objectives, as required by 18 FAM 101.4-3 and Department cable 16 State 122756.<sup>4</sup> During the inspection, the COM and the DPO launched a process to conduct this review. The consulate general also lacked mission-wide reporting and representational plans aligned to ICS goals. OIG advised the COM and the DPO to require that section heads prepare these plans to ensure representation and reporting resources support ICS priorities. The COM and the DPO began this process during the inspection.

### **Security of the Mission**

Security is a constant concern in Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. From January through mid-November 2016, the mission issued 17 staff notices based on security incidents in the greater Jerusalem area. In October 2016, Jerusalem experienced a series of stabbing and firearm attacks. Security considerations limited the consulate general staff's access to and work in the West Bank, prevented American staff from visiting Gaza, and limited the use of some consulate general facilities.

Consulate general staff told OIG the COM and the DPO emphasized the importance of mission security in their initial meetings with new staff and in country team and smaller group meetings. They also followed up with staff who failed to participate in periodic tests of the consulate general's radio system to ensure full participation in future tests. The consulate general's Emergency Action Committee was chaired by the DPO; the COM participated depending on the issue under consideration.

### **Adherence to Internal Controls**

The 2016 Chief of Mission Annual Management Control Statement of Assurance found no material weaknesses but identified three deficiencies, all of which the consulate general was addressing at the time of the inspection. The DPO attested in an annex to the Statement of Assurance that the consulate general was compliant with IT contingency planning. However, OIG found internal control deficiencies in the Management and Information Management Sections, as detailed later in this report. To ensure all consulate general sections recognize and act on their internal control responsibilities, OIG advised the COM and the Management Officer to

---

<sup>4</sup> Department Cable 2016 STATE 122756, "Implementation of Strategic Progress Reviews, New Managing for Results Website, and Program Design and Performance Management Toolkit," November 15, 2016.



engage all section heads—rather than only the DPO and the Management Officer—at the beginning and the conclusion of the next Statement of Assurance process.

## Developing and Mentoring Future Foreign Service Leadership

The Front Office, particularly the DPO, played an active role in developing and mentoring First- and Second-Tour (FAST) and mid-level officers and specialists at the consulate general, as required by Department cable 2014 State 19636.<sup>5</sup> The consulate general's FAST program had 14 participants and held 23 events from January through November 2016. Staff members told OIG that the DPO was the catalyst in forming a similar group of 30 mid-level officers and specialists in 2015 that organized career-focused activities. OIG advised the DPO and the FAST and mid-level officer groups to work together to develop a written outline for the goals and activities of the groups in order to sustain their success in the future.

### Spotlight on Success: FAST Staff Mentor Marine Security Guards

In 2015, with the support of the DPO and the Marine Detachment Commander, FAST employees began a mentoring program for the consulate general's Marine Security Guards. Six of the eight Marine Security Guards participated in the program, which included topics such as Department functions and careers and other career and educational options. The program afforded FAST employees the opportunity to gain experience as mentors, while the Marine Security Guards learned about Department operations and the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The Detachment Commander told OIG the mentoring program will continue.

## POLICY AND PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

---

### Foreign Assistance

Foreign assistance for the West Bank and Gaza totaled \$416 million in FY 2016, with \$261 million for economic development administered by USAID, \$56 million for security assistance administered by the Department, and \$99 million for humanitarian assistance provided by the Department through international organizations. Consulate General Jerusalem's International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL-J) Section managed \$55 million of the \$56 million of security assistance. OIG reviewed mission-wide program implementation of Department-funded security assistance and found that, while planning was well coordinated, implementation suffered from a lack of clear roles and responsibilities, and coordination between INL and USSC. OIG also reviewed security assistance end-use monitoring, compliance with Leahy Amendment vetting,<sup>6</sup> and grants oversight, which are described below.

<sup>5</sup> Department Cable 2014 State 19636, "Mentoring the Next Generation – Taking Charge!," February 21, 2014.

<sup>6</sup> The Leahy Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibits the Department of State from furnishing assistance to foreign security forces if the Department receives credible information that such forces have committed gross violations of human rights. See 22 USC 2378d.

### ***Security Assistance Planning Well Coordinated***

The COM and the DPO established a process for vetting proposed security assistance projects in the West Bank; this process included an interagency Security Working Group chaired by the DPO. Consulate general staff told OIG the process promoted collaboration among offices and raised the quality of projects. The COM and the DPO also provided policy oversight of USAID programs through meetings with senior USAID staff from Embassy Tel Aviv and by including USAID staff in the consulate general's functional working groups that involved assistance issues.

### ***Roles and Responsibilities for Program Implementation Not Clearly Defined***

INL-J and USSC did not specify the roles and responsibilities for security assistance program implementation among INL-J section staff and contractors and the USSC staff. INL-J contractors administered security assistance for the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The USSC also worked with the Palestinian Authority to reform and professionalize Palestinian security institutions. The lack of clear roles and responsibilities among INL-J and USSC staff led USSC staff to make conflicting requests to INL-J contractors. Guidance in 18 FAM 005.1-7 (F) and (G) charges chiefs of mission with ensuring strategic integration and coordination of assistance, promoting interagency problem solving, and managing programs effectively. The Government Accountability Office *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*<sup>7</sup> states that a principle of a sound organizational structure is one where management assigns responsibility to discrete units to operate in an efficient and effective manner.

**Recommendation 1:** Consulate General Jerusalem should identify and assign the roles and responsibilities for implementation of security assistance programs to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Section and the U. S. Security Coordinator. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Lack of Coordination Led to Delays in Procurement***

Consulate general staff told OIG that inadequate coordination between INL-J and USSC led to delays in procuring items, such as vehicles, provided to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces under the security assistance program. INL-J issued a standard operating procedure for procurement, but consulate general staff cited instances where USSC staff did not adequately follow the INL-J procurement procedures. In addition, INL-J cited procurement delays caused when USSC staff did not consult with INL-J staff on how to satisfy Israeli Government requirements for approving items that are procured for provision to the Palestinian Authority Security Forces. OIG suggested that the consulate general embed an INL procurement specialist with USSC to provide expertise in federal acquisition procedures and knowledge of Israeli Government requirements.

---

<sup>7</sup> Government Accountability Office, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government* (GAO-14-704G, September 2014), Principle 3.

### ***End-Use Monitoring Exceeded Requirements***

The INL-J Section developed an end-use monitoring plan for equipment furnished to the Palestinian Authority that exceeded the INL bureau's requirements. Under the plan, the INL-J Section monitored expendable equipment that was below the required dollar value threshold set forth in INL's overall requirements. Bureau staff in Washington told OIG that this approach set a positive example for other missions. Consistent with the Department's performance management principles, the mission used end-use monitoring data to adjust the assistance that it provided. For example, when end-use monitoring data showed low mileage for donated vehicles, the mission reduced the number of vehicles it planned to donate in the future.

### ***Leahy Vetting Conducted in Accordance with Department Guidance***

In the 10-month period up to September 10, 2016, Consulate General Jerusalem vetted 4,441 individuals and security units for potential gross human right abuses in accordance with applicable laws and Department requirements. The Political-Military Officer oversaw the consulate general's Leahy vetting process, conducted spot checks, kept the standard operating procedures up-to-date, and acted as a resource and interface with the Department. The two largest nominators of individuals and security units—USSC and INL-J—each had designated trained Leahy vetting coordinators who conducted vetting for their respective nominees.

## **Advocacy and Analysis**

### ***Diplomatic Engagement and Reporting Supported Mission Goals***

OIG reviewed the consulate general's reporting for the 6-month period prior to the inspection and found it was relevant to ICS goals and informed by a range of contacts in Palestinian society. The mission's diplomatic engagement supported U.S. Government efforts to reduce tensions in Jerusalem and sustain security cooperation between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Washington consumers in the Department and other agencies consistently expressed to OIG positive views of the mission's political and economic reporting and engagement with Palestinian interlocutors.

Although Israeli settlements are in the consulate general's area of responsibility, the consulate general and Embassy Tel Aviv each had responsibilities for covering different aspects of the issue. OIG suggested that the consulate general convene responsible staff from both missions to identify key questions and gaps in coverage of interest to Washington and to share their plans for contacts and reporting on this issue.

## **Public Diplomacy**

OIG reviewed the full range of the Public Affairs Section's operations, including media outreach, alumni engagement, exchanges, English language programs, and social media platforms. In collaboration with other consulate general sections and agencies, the section used these tools to promote a better public understanding of U.S. policy. OIG found the section supported ICS goals with an emphasis on youth empowerment, interfaith dialogue, conflict resolution, and

progress toward the resumption of final status talks. The section had a current Public Diplomacy Implementation Plan and Public Diplomacy Country Context, in accordance with Department guidance. During the inspection, the section finalized strategic plans for American spaces,<sup>8</sup> alumni engagement, education initiatives, media outreach, and cultural programs. It also organized multiple activities in support of Global Entrepreneurship Week and International Education Week and was implementing the first-ever U.S.-Palestinian Education Dialogue. OIG identified areas for improvement in the Public Affairs Section's management of American spaces and grants, as described in more detail below.

### ***Grant Files Lacked Risk Assessments and Monitoring Plans***

OIG reviewed all 21 of the Public Affairs Section's grants of \$24,000 or more awarded in FY 2015 and FY 2016 (totaling \$2,809,205) and found that 13 lacked risk assessments. Section 2.03-A of the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive requires a risk assessment worksheet for all grants and cooperative agreements, whether competed or not. The warranted Grants Officers did not verify that all grant files included risk assessments, the lack of which increases the risk that Federal funds will be lost or misused. OIG noted, however, that the section consistently had used risk assessments since April 2016 and that the deficiencies were in older grants.

None of the 21 files reviewed by OIG had monitoring plans, although in two instances the grantee had provided an internal monitoring plan during the award's period of performance. OIG also noted a lack of documentation showing whether monitoring activities had taken place. Section 3.01-A of the Department's Federal Assistance Policy Directive requires such monitoring plans, which should include a risk mitigation strategy, a reporting schedule, and types of monitoring mechanisms to be employed. The Grants Officers are responsible for verifying that all grant files included monitoring plans. Implementing such plans ensures that intended activities and objectives are accomplished.

**Recommendation 2:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement monitoring plans for all active grants and ensure the use of both risk assessments and monitoring for all Federal assistance awards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Middle East Partnership Initiative Grants Contributed to Public Diplomacy Objectives***

OIG found that Consulate General Jerusalem's Middle East Partnership Initiative grants contributed to ICS public diplomacy objectives by engaging and supporting priority audiences. The Public Affairs Section's staff included one officer and one LE staff member responsible for administering grants under the auspices of the Middle East Partnership Initiative Regional Office, which funds partnerships with civil society organizations to promote participatory governance, economic reform, and educational advancement. Guidance from the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs in Department cable 2015 State 22048<sup>9</sup> directed that Public Affairs

<sup>8</sup> American Spaces are Department-operated or -supported public diplomacy facilities that host programs and use digital tools to engage foreign audiences in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

<sup>9</sup> Department Cable 2015 State 22048, "Message from Under Secretary Stengel Regarding New Grants Policies for Public Diplomacy Officers," March 3, 2015.

Section staff only should administer grants with an intrinsic public diplomacy function in support of mission-level strategic goals and objectives. OIG reviewed the scope of all 15 Middle East Partnership Initiative grants awarded in FY 2015-2016 and FY 2016-2017 (totaling \$1,723,796) in the Palestinian Territories and found these projects contributed to the consulate general's ICS public diplomacy goals.

### ***American Spaces Network***

The Public Affairs Section administered a network of six American Spaces in the Palestinian Territories.<sup>10</sup> OIG visited the America Houses in Jerusalem and Ramallah and the American Corner in Nablus. OIG found all three locations met the Bureau of International Information Programs' Standards for American Spaces, engaged priority audiences, and conducted policy-relevant activities that advanced ICS goals.<sup>11</sup>

### **Consular Affairs**

OIG reviewed the full range of Consulate General Jerusalem's consular operations, including immigrant and nonimmigrant visas, passports and nationality adjudication, American citizen services, fee collection, crisis management preparation, and other consular administrative duties. OIG found that procedures complied with 7 FAM, 7 Foreign Affairs Handbook (FAH), and 9 FAM guidance. The Consular Section provided nonimmigrant visa and American citizen services to a consular district that comprises Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. It also provided immigrant visa services to these areas in addition to all of Israel. Consular section employees travelled to Ramallah in the West Bank 2 days a month to serve U.S. citizens in the West Bank and Gaza who could not obtain travel permits to enter Jerusalem. The section experienced an almost 40 percent growth in nonimmigrant visa applications from FY 2013 to FY 2015. U.S. citizen applications for passports increased almost 10 percent during the same period.

While the consular fraud prevention program complied with FAM and FAH procedures, a significant issue related to the section's use of the Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator (ARSO-I) is discussed below. OIG also identified minor discrepancies in the designation of consular system user roles, referral program data entry, and consular fee collection deposits and advised consular management to take corrective action.

### ***ARSO-I Division of Responsibilities Not in Line with Memorandum of Understanding***

OIG found that the ARSO-I worked 60 percent of the time in the Consular Section, rather than the 80 percent required in the December 18, 2012, memorandum of understanding between the

---

<sup>10</sup> The specific locations were America House Jerusalem, America House Ramallah, and American Corners in Gaza, Jericho, Nablus, and Salfeet. In September 2016, the Department's regional bureaus, in consultation with the Bureau of International Information Programs, completed a biennial review of American Spaces. As a result of the review, America Houses in Jerusalem and Ramallah were listed as two of nine "Priority Spaces" by the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs.

<sup>11</sup> The Bureau of International Information Programs' five "pillars" for American Spaces programs and services are English language learning, alumni engagement, educational advising, information about the United States, and community outreach.

Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security governing the ARSO-I program. The ARSO-I, a Diplomatic Security Special Agent detailed to the Consular Section, is primarily responsible for protecting border security and the integrity of the passport and visa systems by pursuing criminal investigations related to passport and visa fraud.

OIG found that the ARSO-I spent 40 percent of his time on RSO duties, such as managing all RSO security programs in the Consulate Section facility and serving in the standard RSO duty rotation and the COM's personal security duty rotation. OIG determined these last two activities alone comprised almost 20 percent of his time. The Consular Section is located in the Arnona area of Jerusalem, approximately three miles from the main consulate general facility. During peak traffic, the ARSO-I can spend more than an hour traveling between the two facilities, which further diminishes his ability to perform Consular Section duties. The success of the ARSO-I program and Consular Section security depend on regular, personal, interaction between the ARSO-I and the consular staff. The ARSO-I's absence, especially during the Consular Section's visa and passport applicant interviews, risks impeding the agent's ability to initiate timely visa and passport criminal investigations, which optimally begin during the initial interviews.

**Recommendation 3:** Consulate General Jerusalem should realign the Assistant Regional Security Officer–Investigator duties and ensure compliance with the 80-20 percent time split called for in the governing memorandum of understanding between the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

## RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

---

### Management Operations

OIG reviewed all major functions of Consulate General Jerusalem's Management Section, including the general services, human resources, facility management, and financial management functions, and found them in compliance with Department standards and guidance, with the exceptions discussed below.

#### *Warehouse Operations Did Not Meet Standards*

OIG found the General Services Office Annex/Warehouse was vulnerable to operational and internal control risks as it did not meet the storage operation standards in 14 FAH-1 H-313. The warehouse lacked high bay storage space, a loading dock at truck-bed level, a protected receiving area, a secured drivers waiting area, a property disposal area, an internal climate control system, and a controlled access system. These deficiencies were discussed in OIG's 2011 inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem.<sup>12</sup> The consulate general did not address these deficiencies because it was waiting for the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations to relocate the warehouse to new facilities planned for land adjacent to the Arnona Consular Section facility. That relocation has not occurred in the six years since OIG's previous inspection. This ongoing failure to meet storage operation standards leaves the General Services Office

---

<sup>12</sup> ISP I-11-34A, March 2011.



Annex/Warehouse vulnerable to operational risks and creates a poor internal control environment.

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem, should bring the General Services Annex/Warehouse into compliance with Department standards. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***USSC Support Services, Benefits Did Not Meet Department Guidelines***

Consulate General Jerusalem provided support services and benefits to USSC employees that conflicted with Department guidelines. The Under Secretary of Management in a June 2010 memorandum<sup>13</sup> outlined several changes in the support and funding for USSC in Jerusalem. The Department purchased, rather than continued to lease, vehicles for USSC. The consulate general also moved most USSC staff out of hotels and into government-leased housing. Both of these initiatives saved considerable money. However, OIG found three issues which conflicted with Department guidelines, as outlined below.

### ***USSC Motor Vehicle Use Did Not Adhere to Department Standards***

USSC staff used Department-funded official vehicles for personal use, such as for shopping. Guidance in 14 FAM 433.1 (2) and 14 FAM 433.3-4 (3) permit the use of such vehicles to transport U.S. government employees if that transportation is directly related to the conduct of U.S. government business; these provisions also permit home-to-office transportation for employees at post on temporary duty assignment but do not permit personal use of official vehicles. USSC staff told OIG that Department of Defense Joint Travel Regulations applicable to uniformed military members, however, permit the use of U.S. Government vehicles for "life support use," which they interpret to include personal use. OIG found no evidence that the consulate general had contacted the Department regarding this matter. Because there was no clear guidance from the Department confirming that its policies govern USSC temporary duty staff, the consulate general did not enforce Department standards as to those staff members under Chief of Mission authority. Failure to adhere to Department standards increases the risk of mismanagement and misuse of government property.

**Recommendation 5:** Consulate General Jerusalem should enforce Department motor vehicle standards for all personnel under Chief of Mission authority (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Incorrect Meals and Incidental Expenses Payments Made to USSC Staff***

The consulate general paid long-term USSC temporary duty staff the full Jerusalem meals and incidental expenses rate of approximately \$138 per day for their entire one-year assignment, despite their living in U.S. Government-leased housing. This approach is inconsistent with the

---

<sup>13</sup> "Changes in support and funding for the U.S. Security Coordinator in Jerusalem (USSC)," June 2, 2010.

Department's own guidance. First, 14 FAM 572.3-1 states that the lodgings-plus per diem system is inappropriate for certain travel assignments, such as when quarters, meals, or both are provided at no cost or at nominal cost by the U.S. Government. Federal Travel Regulation section 301-11.200 gives agencies authority to reduce meals and incidental expenses rates under such conditions. Finally, the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs' policy is to reduce these payments so as to cover only lunch and incidentals for temporary duty staff in Jerusalem after day 10 of their assignment. OIG found no evidence that the consulate general had contacted the Department regarding this matter. Again, because there was no clear guidance from the Department confirming that its policies govern USSC temporary duty staff, the consulate general did not enforce the bureau's own policy. Providing full reimbursement for meals and incidental expenses to USSC temporary duty staff incurs unnecessary costs to the U. S. Government.

**Recommendation 6:** Consulate General Jerusalem should reduce the meals and incidental expenses rate of U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff to conform to Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs policy. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem, in coordination with NEA).

### ***USSC Travel Vouchers Processed Incorrectly***

The consulate general, rather than the Department's Post Support Unit, processed USSC temporary duty staff's travel vouchers in response to USSC management's request to do so in order to allow this staff to be paid more quickly. However, Department cable 2014 State 27921<sup>14</sup> mandates centralized processing of all overseas temporary duty travel vouchers through the Post Support Unit. OIG found no evidence that the consulate general had contacted the Department regarding this matter. Because there was no clear guidance from the Department confirming that its policies govern USSC temporary duty staff, the consulate general did not enforce Department standards. Failure to use the Post Support Unit to process these vouchers creates additional work for the consulate general.

**Recommendation 7:** Consulate General Jerusalem should process all U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff's travel vouchers through the Department's Post Support Unit. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### **General Services**

OIG reviewed the consulate general's purchasing operations, housing, property management, and motor pool. OIG found that the sections overseeing those operations had in place or were developing overall processes and procedures, adequately used Department systems, used internal controls to mitigate risks, and provided sufficient oversight and supervision, with the exceptions described below.

---

<sup>14</sup> Department Cable 2014 State 27921, "Centralization of Overseas TDY Travel Vouchers through the PSU," May 9, 2014.



### ***Purchase Card Program Lacked Adequate Management Oversight***

The General Services Office did not establish adequate management oversight of the consulate general's purchase card program. The office had not designated a program coordinator, nor were the several supervisors who oversaw purchase card holders designated as approving officials, as required by the Department's Worldwide Purchase Card Program Manual. The lack of adequate oversight to ensure enforcement of internal controls risks loss and misuse of Department funds.

**Recommendation 8:** Consulate General Jerusalem should designate the purchase card program coordinator and approving officials in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

### ***Regional Security Office Did Not Document Security Upgrades of Residential Housing***

OIG found that the Regional Security Office failed to document security work performed to bring consulate general residences up to security standards as required in 12 FAM 473.2-1 a(1)-(3). Without such documentation, consulate general staff members do not know whether the required security measures have been completed prior to occupancy and cannot properly assess safety vulnerability of residences, which increases the security risk for occupants.

**Recommendation 9:** Consulate General Jerusalem should document that security upgrades were performed on all residences in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

### ***Consulate General Had a High Level of Preventable Motor Vehicle Accidents***

Consulate General Jerusalem had a high number of motor vehicle accidents, a significant proportion of which it recorded as preventable. OIG found that between 2006 and 2016, the consulate general recorded 86 motor vehicle accidents, the nineteenth highest for all Department posts worldwide during this time period. Moreover, from October 2015 to July 2016, the consulate general reported 36 motor vehicle mishaps, 81percent of which it determined to be preventable. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations reported that between 2010 and 2016, 48 percent of the consulate general drivers' lost work days came from injuries caused by motor vehicle accidents. Nonetheless, the consulate general did not review motor vehicle mishaps or take corrective action to prevent recurrences as required by the Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program for Overseas Posts. Failure to take corrective action increases the risk to employee life and safety and damage to Government property.

**Recommendation 10:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement a policy to review all motor vehicle mishaps and a corrective action plan to mitigate the number of motor vehicle mishaps. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Motor Pool Drivers Worked Shifts of Over 10 Hours***

The consulate general's 19 motor pool drivers regularly exceeded limits on duty working hours. The Department's Motor Vehicle Safety Management Program and the Mission Motor Pool Operations Policy both require that drivers not perform more than 10 hours of duty each day. Motor pool managers neither planned nor staffed trips to avoid exceeding this limit. Failure to do so increased the risk of motor vehicle mishaps.

**Recommendation 11:** Consulate General Jerusalem should comply with Department standards for motor pool driver duty limits. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### **Facility Management**

OIG reviewed the Facility Management Section and found that it operated in accordance with Department standards, with the exceptions noted below. The consulate general submitted the 2015 Annual Inspection Summary on time and resolved all major issues in the 2015 Fire Inspection Report. The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations closed all recommendations from its January 2013 Safety, Health and Environmental Management Technical Support Visit.

### ***Consulate General Did Not Comply with Department Fire Safety Standards***

The consulate general had not evaluated all of its leased offices and residential properties to determine compliance with Department fire safety standards, as required in 15 FAM 812.5<sup>15</sup> and the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations' Fire Protection Guide—Residential Fire Safety. The consulate general was aware of the requirements but the Facility Management Section did not consistently perform and document the required assessments. Failure to adhere to Department fire safety standards and minimum equivalencies risks employee life and safety.

**Recommendation 12:** Consulate General Jerusalem should bring all high-rise residential properties into compliance with Department fire safety standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Consulate General Did Not Conduct Annual Occupational Safety and Health Inspections***

The Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer did not perform the required annual inspection of all office work areas and semi-annual inspections of "increased-risk" work areas<sup>16</sup> and operations as required by 15 FAM 962. In addition, the mission did not document and correct issues identified in the inspections as required by 15 FAM 963. The Post Occupational Safety and Health Officer is responsible for day-to-day safety, occupational health, and environmental

<sup>15</sup> 15 FAM 812.5, Acquiring High Rise Property (June 7, 2016), incorporates the guidance provided in two earlier cables: Department Cable 2013 STATE 110614, "Guidance on Acquiring High Rise Property," July 29, 2013, and Department Cable 2014 STATE 97942, "Restatement of Guidance on Acquiring High Rise Property," August 12, 2014.

<sup>16</sup> An increased risk work area is a workplace or environment with a high potential for mishaps or occupational illnesses, including activities involving machines, electrical or electronic functions, construction, maintenance and repair. 15 FAM 962e.

program management and implementation. Guidance in 15 FAM 961 requires that each overseas post implement a comprehensive safety and occupational health and environmental loss control program to protect personnel and capital assets and to meet environmental requirements. Failure to follow these requirements risks harm to personnel and failure to meet environmental requirements.

**Recommendation 13:** Consulate General Jerusalem should conduct and document Post Occupational Safety and Health inspections in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***No Safety, Health and Environmental Management Committee Meetings Held Since 2015***

OIG found that Consulate General Jerusalem had not convened a safety, health, and environmental management committee meeting since October 2015 due to repeated turnover in the Facilities Management Section. Guidance in 15 FAM, however, requires missions to establish a committee to assist in coordinating the safety, health and environmental management program, while 15 FAM 933.2 requires the committee to hold semi-annual meetings. The committee facilitates communication and a team approach to dealing with safety, occupational health, and environmental issues and helps to establish post program goals and objectives. Failure to hold formal periodic meetings can result in vulnerabilities in program management, poor monitoring of safety programs, and inadequate review of annual mishap statistics.

**Recommendation 14:** Consulate General Jerusalem should schedule semiannual safety, health and environmental management committee meetings and maintain all related meeting minutes. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

## **Financial Management**

OIG's review of the full range of the Financial Management Office's operations found it conducted accounting, vouchering, payroll, and cashiering operations in accordance with Department standards, with one exception described below. OIG assisted the embassy in improving its operations in three areas, as described below.

### ***Cashier Inappropriately Disbursed Shuttle Bus Coupons and Gas Cards***

The consulate general's principal Class B Cashier safeguarded and disbursed embassy shuttle bus coupons and gasoline cards in violation of Department standards. Guidance in 4 FAH-3 H-393.4-3e prohibits cashiers from safeguarding or disbursing any money, checks, or documents that are not a part of their advance. Although consulate general management decided to give the cashier responsibility for shuttle bus coupons and gas cards as an internal control measure, doing so detracts from primary cashiering responsibilities and increases the risk of inadequate oversight.

**Recommendation 15:** Consulate General Jerusalem should transfer the responsibility for safeguarding and disbursing shuttle bus coupons and gas cards from the Class B cashier to another section. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Suspense Deposit Account Had Balance from 2015***

The consulate general's Suspense Deposit Abroad account had a remaining balance of \$2,605 from a 2015 deposit by a shipping company. During the inspection, the consulate general closed the account by depositing the funds with the U.S. Treasury.

### ***Financial Management Officer Did Not Review Vouchers***

The Financial Management Officer did not conduct periodic reviews of LE staff certifying activity or document the outcome of the non-cash payment voucher reviews, as required by 4 FAH-3 H-065.2-2 d. During the inspection, the Financial Management Officer reviewed 56 non-cash payment vouchers certified by the Alternate Certifying Officer for July through September 2016 and began to document his reviews.

### ***No Review of Unliquidated Obligations***

The consulate general did not review and validate unliquidated obligation balances for prior year obligations. These included unliquidated obligations of \$28,000 in the FY 2011 through FY 2013 diplomatic and consular program allotments for procurement of personal computer equipment and accessories. The Financial Management Officer did not have the necessary documentation to determine whether these obligations were still valid. In accordance with 4 FAM 225, periodic reviews are required to verify that unliquidated obligation balances and disbursements remain valid. During the inspection, the Financial Management Officer de-obligated all invalid prior year obligations from FY 2011 through FY 2013.

## **Human Resources**

OIG reviewed the Human Resources Section's hiring practices, employee performance evaluations, work requirements, position descriptions, and delivery of services, and found them in accordance with Department standards, with the exception noted below.

### ***Overtime Not Consistently Approved in Advance***

Time and attendance records showed that 8 of the consulate general's 25 supervisors failed to approve overtime in advance, as required by 4 FAH-3-H-523.2. OIG determined that the consulate general paid a total of \$907,012 in overtime for local staff in FY 2016. While there is no evidence to suggest that the overtime was not actually worked, roughly half the overtime lacked supervisor approval or a justifiable reason for the extra work. The consulate general issued a new overtime policy, and, during the inspection, the COM emphasized to the country team the need for supervisors to approve overtime in advance.

## Information Management and Information Security

OIG reviewed the effectiveness of Consulate General Jerusalem's information management (IM) operations, policies, and procedures in the following areas: classified and unclassified networks; Dedicated Internet Networks (DINs); Information Systems Security Officer (ISSO) duties; emergency communications preparedness; communication security; and mail, pouch, radio, and telephone operations. OIG identified technical, physical, and administrative controls deficiencies in several areas, as described below. OIG also advised the IM Section staff to correct minor noncompliance issues with 12 FAH information systems security controls and procedures and 5 FAH communications security record keeping requirements. The related classified report addresses the sensitive but unclassified network port security.

### *Information Systems Security Officers Did Not Perform All Duties*

Consulate General Jerusalem's unclassified and classified ISSOs did not perform all information systems security duties prescribed in 12 FAM 613.4, nor did they use the Bureau of Information Resource Management's ISSO checklist. As a result, OIG found multiple access control issues in the unclassified systems operations, such as unnecessary groups and user accounts, personal email addresses added as contacts to the Department's global address list, and unmanaged dedicated internet networks (DINs). The Information Management Officer's lack of oversight of the ISSOs led to non-performance of key information systems security duties, which puts Department computer systems at risk of intrusion.

**Recommendation 16:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for Information Systems Security Officers duties. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### *Inadequate Information Technology Contingency Planning*

IM Section managers did not update and test the classified and unclassified IT contingency plans annually as required by 12 FAH-10 H-232.3-1b. IM Section managers told OIG they were unaware of what constitutes proper contingency plan testing. Inadequate IT contingency planning and testing prevents IM Section managers from mitigating the risk of system and service disruptions.

**Recommendation 17:** Consulate General Jerusalem should update and test the information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and the classified networks and develop a process for periodically updating the plans as systems environments and resources change. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### *Lack of Information Technology Contingency Plan Training*

IM Section managers did not provide IT contingency training to personnel because they lacked updated IT contingency plans. According to 12 FAH-10 H-232.2-1, consulate general management must ensure that initial and annual refresher contingency training is provided to personnel based on their contingency planning roles and responsibilities defined in the

completed IT contingency plans. A lack of contingency plan training prevents IM personnel from knowing their roles and effectively responding to systems outages.

**Recommendation 18:** Consulate General Jerusalem should conduct initial and annual refresher contingency training for personnel based on their classified and unclassified information technology contingency planning roles and responsibilities. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Physical Controls in Information Systems Center Allowed Access by Unauthorized Individuals***

The Information Systems Center supporting the consulate general's unclassified network did not have adequate physical controls to limit access by unauthorized individuals. IM Section managers allowed customers to enter its workspaces because the Information Systems Center did not have a separate customer service area. These customers often had access to unattended information systems and network equipment, which created a risk of interruption of service. This is inconsistent with Department guidance in 12 FAH-10 H-272.16-2, under which system administrators must position information systems and components (e.g., workstations, routers, hubs) to prevent accidental or malicious interruption of service and unauthorized access.

**Recommendation 19:** Consulate General Jerusalem should reconfigure the Information Systems Center to limit access to the workspace to authorized personnel. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Helpdesk Service Requests Were Not Tracked Consistently***

The Information Systems Center staff lacked standard operating procedures for receiving and tracking helpdesk requests for the unclassified network and DINs. The Information Systems Center staff did not require customers to open service requests for assistance and did not always document the performance of services after the fact. According to the Government Accountability Office *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*,<sup>17</sup> however, documentation is required for effective design, implementation, and operation of an entity's internal control system. Without documented and tracked helpdesk requests, IM managers could not monitor and evaluate the operation's effectiveness. OIG also advised the Information Management Officer to use the Department's enterprise service management application, called eServices, to manage helpdesk service requests.

**Recommendation 20:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for recording and tracking helpdesk requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

---

<sup>17</sup> GAO-14-704G, September 2014, Section 4.

### ***Ineffective Internal Control of Mobile Devices***

The IM Section staff did not implement effective internal controls for the management and inventory of mobile devices, such as cell phones, iPads, and laptops, as required in 12 FAH-10 H-163.1a (3) and 12 FAH-10 H-164.1a (8). At the time of the inspection, the IM Section staff was using multiple spreadsheets to track issuance and returns of mobile devices. The IMO started to consolidate the inventory lists and was considering the use of the Integrated Logistics Management System for loanable property. Using separate tracking systems limits the effectiveness of inventory control, enables potential duplicative purchases, and can lead to an excess number of mobile devices.

**Recommendation 21:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for managing mobile devices that include authorization, issuance, tracking and inventory. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Unmonitored Dedicated Internet Networks Created Security Vulnerabilities***

Consulate General Jerusalem did not have standard operating procedures to manage and track its DINS. Additionally, not all DINs were registered with the Bureau of Information Resource Management. According to 5 FAM 872.1(a), the Management Officer must ensure that DINs are established only for purposes that cannot be accomplished on the unclassified system and that they register, support, and maintain the DINs in accordance with applicable Department policies and standards. The IM Section's ineffective monitoring and securing of the DINs exposed those networks to possible security vulnerabilities.

**Recommendation 22:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures to manage, track, and register its dedicated internet networks. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Inadequate West Bank Radio Network***

The radio network supporting mission-essential programs in the West Bank did not meet 5 FAH-2 H-713.1 standards for enhancing security, disseminating information during emergency situations, and supporting the emergency action plan. The West Bank radio network was designed 10 years ago without a maintenance and support plan and relied on obsolete technology and infrastructure. The West Bank radio network did not allow personnel in different coverage areas, such as Nablus, Ramallah, and Hebron, to communicate with each other directly. In addition, because the network shared frequencies with the Emergency Action Committee Radio network, communication over the two networks during an emergency could be difficult. In April 2016, the Bureau of Information Resource Management's Radio Program Branch conducted a study and developed corrective action plans to upgrade and implement a mission-wide radio program covering Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Tel Aviv, but the consulate general did not implement the action plans.



**Recommendation 23:** The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Consulate General Jerusalem, should upgrade the radio network coverage for the West Bank to meet Department standards. (Action: IRM, in coordination with DS and Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Improper Location of Telecommunications Demarcation Point***

The demarcation point interconnecting the consulate general's telecommunications systems and the public telecommunication network was located in the main telephone frame room of the Post One facility. This configuration is contrary to 12 FAH-6 H-651.5.2 standards. Locating the public telecommunication equipment in a controlled access telephone distribution frame room created security vulnerabilities every time access was granted to non-cleared internet service provider employees. The lack of space and a non-standard office building resulted in the current condition. This issue was identified in the 2011 OIG inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem,<sup>18</sup> but a formal recommendation was not made to address the issue.

**Recommendation 24:** Consulate General Jerusalem should relocate the telecommunication demarcation point outside the controlled access telephone frame room in the Post One facility. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

### ***Lack of Mail Sorting Workspace Caused Security and Employee Safety Issues***

Consulate General Jerusalem did not have sufficient workspace for the mailroom staff to sort incoming diplomatic mail and pouches. Staff sorted mail and pouch contents in the parking lot outside of the Post One facility. The lack of a proper mail sorting space compromised the safety of mailroom personnel and prevented them from safeguarding mail and pouch items as required in 14 FAH-4 H-255.1a and 14 FAH-5 H-611.1a. At the time of the inspection, the Information Management Officer initiated a project to create a safe workspace for mail sorting, but consulate general management had not determined how to fund the project.

**Recommendation 25:** Consulate General Jerusalem should establish safe and secure diplomatic mail and pouch sorting spaces. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

---

<sup>18</sup> ISP-I-11-34A, March 2011.



## RECOMMENDATIONS

---

OIG provided a draft of this report to Department stakeholders for their review and comment on the findings and recommendations. OIG issued the following recommendations to Consulate General Jerusalem, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, and the Bureau of Information Resource Management. The Department's complete responses can be found in Appendix B. The Department also provided technical comments that OIG incorporated, as appropriate into this report.

**Recommendation 1:** Consulate General Jerusalem should identify and assign the roles and responsibilities for implementation of security assistance programs to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Section and the U. S. Security Coordinator. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it will identify and assign the roles and responsibilities.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of assigned roles and responsibilities for the security assistance programs.

**Recommendation 2:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement monitoring plans for all active grants and ensure the use of both risk assessments and monitoring for all Federal assistance awards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the monitoring plans for all active grants and Federal assistance awards.

**Recommendation 3:** Consulate General Jerusalem should realign the Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator duties and ensure compliance with the 80-20 percent time split called for in the governing memorandum of understanding between the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it will take the required action to realign the Assistant Regional Security Officer-Investigator duties.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of consulate general adhering to the governing memorandum of understanding.

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem, should bring the General Services Annex/Warehouse into compliance with Department standards. (Action: OBO, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its June 2, 2017, response, the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations concurred with this recommendation. The bureau noted that it, in coordination with the Bureau of Administration Office of Logistics Management, was assisting the consulate general identify a warehouse solution that was in compliance with Department standards until a new purpose built warehouse was constructed on the recently purchased Arnona compound.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. Based on Department comments, OIG transferred action to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of a warehouse that meets Department standards.

**Recommendation 5:** Consulate General Jerusalem should enforce Department motor vehicle standards for all personnel under Chief of Mission authority (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it had already taken action on the recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the enforced Department motor vehicle standards.

**Recommendation 6:** Consulate General Jerusalem should reduce the meals and incidental expenses rate of U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff to conform to Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs policy. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem, in coordination with NEA)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it had already taken action on the recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff conforming to bureau policy for meals and incidental expenses.

**Recommendation 7:** Consulate General Jerusalem should process all U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff's travel vouchers through the Department's Post Support Unit. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff vouchers processed through the Department's Post Support Unit.

**Recommendation 8:** Consulate General Jerusalem should designate the purchase card program coordinator and approving officials in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it had taken substantial action implementing the recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the designated purchase card program coordinator and approving officials.

**Recommendation 9:** Consulate General Jerusalem should document that security upgrades were performed on all residences in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the security upgrades on all residences.

**Recommendation 10:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement a policy to review all motor vehicle mishaps and a corrective action plan to mitigate the number of motor vehicle mishaps. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it had policies in place to address motor vehicle mishaps.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the policy.

**Recommendation 11:** Consulate General Jerusalem should comply with Department standards for motor pool driver duty limits. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it had already altered driver schedules.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the motor pool driver duty limits.

**Recommendation 12:** Consulate General Jerusalem should bring all high-rise residential properties into compliance with Department fire safety standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the high-rise residential properties' compliance with Department fire safety standards.

**Recommendation 13:** Consulate General Jerusalem should conduct and document Post Occupational Safety and Health inspections in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the Post Occupational Safety and Health inspections.

**Recommendation 14:** Consulate General Jerusalem should schedule semiannual safety, health and environmental management committee meetings and maintain all related meeting minutes. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of scheduled semiannual committee meetings.

**Recommendation 15:** Consulate General Jerusalem should transfer the responsibility for safeguarding and disbursing shuttle bus coupons and gas cards from the Class B cashier to another section. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that responsibility for shuttle bus and gas card responsibility was transferred from the Class B cashier.

**Recommendation 16:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for Information Systems Security Officers duties. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the standard operating procedures for Information Systems Security Officers duties.

**Recommendation 17:** Consulate General Jerusalem should update and test the information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and the classified networks, and develop a process for periodically updating the plans as systems environments and resources change. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the updated and tested information technology contingency plan.

**Recommendation 18:** Consulate General Jerusalem should conduct initial and annual refresher contingency training for personnel based on their classified and unclassified information technology contingency planning roles and responsibilities. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the contingency training.

**Recommendation 19:** Consulate General Jerusalem should reconfigure the Information Systems Center to limit access to the workspace to authorized personnel. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the reconfigured Information Systems Center.

**Recommendation 20:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for recording and tracking helpdesk requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted substantial action on this recommendation had occurred.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the standard operating procedures for helpdesk requests.

**Recommendation 21:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for managing mobile devices that include authorization, issuance, tracking and inventory. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted substantial action on this recommendation had occurred.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the standard operating procedures for managing mobile devices.

**Recommendation 22:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures to manage, track, and register its dedicated internet networks. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the dedicated internet networks standard operating procedures.

**Recommendation 23:** The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Consulate General Jerusalem, should upgrade the radio network coverage for the West Bank to meet Department standards. (Action: IRM, in coordination with DS and Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 22, 2017, response, the Bureau of Information Resource Management concurred with this recommendation. The bureau anticipates project completion by September 2017.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the upgraded radio network coverage for the West Bank.

**Recommendation 24:** Consulate General Jerusalem should relocate the telecommunication demarcation point outside the controlled access telephone frame room in the Post One facility. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation. The consulate general noted it had already taken action on the recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the relocated telecommunication demarcation point outside the controlled access telephone frame room.

**Recommendation 25:** Consulate General Jerusalem should establish safe and secure diplomatic mail and pouch sorting spaces. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** In its May 26, 2017, response, Consulate General Jerusalem concurred with this recommendation.

**OIG Reply:** OIG considers the recommendation resolved. The recommendation can be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation of the safe and secure diplomatic mail and pouch sorting spaces.

## PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS

Title	Name	Arrival Date
<b>Chiefs of Mission:</b>		
Consul General	Donald Blome	07/15
Deputy Principal Officer	Dorothy Shea	08/14
<b>Chiefs of Sections:</b>		
Consular	Aaron Hellman	08/14
Economic	James Turner	08/16
Management	Andrea Baker	08/16
Political	David Berns	08/15
Public Affairs	Chris Hodges	07/16
Regional Security	Paul Fiffick	09/16
INL	Margaret Nardi	08/16
<b>Other Agencies:</b>		
Department of Defense	LTG Frederick Rudesheim	07/15
Department of Homeland Security	Ed Moore	07/14
Legal Attaché	Chung Chang	08/16
Open Source Enterprise	Corbin Cowley	07/15
USAID	Jonathan Kamin	08/13

**Source:** Consulate General Jerusalem



## APPENDIX A: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

---

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation, as issued in 2012 by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and the Inspector's Handbook, as issued by OIG for the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors

### Objectives and Scope

The Office of Inspections provides the Secretary of State, the Chairman of the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Congress with systematic and independent evaluations of the operations of the Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors. Inspections cover three broad areas, consistent with Section 209 of the Foreign Service Act of 1980:

- **Policy Implementation:** whether policy goals and objectives are being effectively achieved; whether U.S. interests are being accurately and effectively represented; and whether all elements of an office or mission are being adequately coordinated.
- **Resource Management:** whether resources are being used and managed with maximum efficiency, effectiveness, and economy and whether financial transactions and accounts are properly conducted, maintained, and reported.
- **Management Controls:** whether the administration of activities and operations meets the requirements of applicable laws and regulations; whether internal management controls have been instituted to ensure quality of performance and reduce the likelihood of mismanagement; whether instance of fraud, waste, or abuse exist; and whether adequate steps for detection, correction, and prevention have been taken.

### Methodology

In conducting inspections, OIG uses a risk-based approach to prepare for each inspection; reviews pertinent records; reviews, circulates, and compiles the results of survey instruments, as appropriate; conducts interviews; and reviews the substance of the report and its findings and recommendations with offices, individuals, organizations, and activities affected by the review.

For this inspection, OIG conducted 245 documented interviews. OIG also reviewed 842 documents and responses to 88 personal questionnaires. OIG used professional judgment, along with physical, documentary, testimonial, and analytical evidence collected or generated, to develop findings, conclusions, and actionable recommendations.

## APPENDIX B: MANAGEMENT RESPONSES

---



**American Consulate General**

***Jerusalem***

May 26, 2017

UNCLASSIFIED

THRU: Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs – Stuart Jones, Acting Assistant Secretary

TO: OIG– Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: Donald Blome, Consul General

SUBJECT: Response to Draft OIG Report – Inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem

Consulate General has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

**On Page 1 under “Context” first paragraph:**

We would recommend inserting “periodic” in front of “violence and unrest.” We do not live under a constant state of violence/unrest, so this better captures how violence and unrest ebbs and flows.

**On Page 3 under “Dispersed Facilities Presented Challenges to Staff Cohesion”:**

According to their respective Outlook calendars, the COM and DPO visited the GSO Office Annex/Warehouse facility three times each in calendar year 2016. As written, it says we both visited “once or twice a year.”

**In the section on Reporting on page 9, we would propose rewording as follows:**

Washington consumers told OIG, however, that they would welcome more front channel Consulate General reporting on Israeli settlements, in addition to the considerable email reporting the ConGen has done on the issue. Although the settlements are in the Consulate General’s area of responsibility, the Consulate General and Embassy Tel Aviv each had responsibilities for covering different aspects of the issue. OIG suggested that the Consulate General convene responsible staff from both missions to identify key questions and gaps in coverage of interest to Washington and to share their plans for contacts and reporting on this issue.

**On page 10 under “Consular Affairs” we would propose rewording as follows:**

The Consular Section provided nonimmigrant visa and American citizen services to a consular district that comprises Jerusalem, the West Bank, and Gaza. It also provided immigrant visa services to these areas in addition to all of Israel. (The way it was drafted could be read to mean only Israel, or that we consider the West Bank, Gaza, and Jerusalem to be part of Israel.)

**On page 16:**

The date of ConGen Jerusalem's most recent SHEM meeting was incorrect. The report says February 2015, but according to the DPO's Outlook calendar it was actually October 29, 2015.

**On page 25:**

On the Section Chiefs list, the name of the POL section chief is misspelled without an "s" at the end. Correct Spelling – Davis Berns

**OIG Recommendation 1:** Consulate General Jerusalem should identify and assign the roles and responsibilities for implementation of security assistance programs to the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Section and the U. S. Security Coordinator. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

**Management Response:** Post agrees and will identify and assign the roles and responsibilities.

**OIG Recommendation 2:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement monitoring plans for all active grants and ensure the use of both risk assessments and monitoring for all Federal assistance awards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 3:** Consulate General Jerusalem should realign the Assistant Regional Security Officer–Investigator duties and ensure the 80-20 percent time split called for in the governing memorandum of understanding between the Bureaus of Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees and will take required action.

**OIG Recommendation 4:** Consulate General Jerusalem should bring its warehouse into compliance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees, but believes that the action office should be changed. The action office is listed as Consulate General Jerusalem. ConGen has been actively trying to move from this sub-standard facility, but we have been stymied multiple times by OBO. We would argue that action should be with OBO. We recently received 17 STATE 41778, which states: OBO and DS, however, do not support moving the existing warehouse to the Caprize (Note: It is actually the Caprice Diamond Center. End Note) building due to the cost and the inability to achieve a critical physical security requirement (the perimeter fence). In addition, given current budgetary constraints and global priorities, the cost and effort cannot be justified since this site will be available for fewer than three years due to the impending development of the Arnona facility in 2020. OBO is committed to moving all personnel out of the current warehouse building into commercial space and is actively reviewing, with Post and DS potential office space to lease in the Caduri building.

**OIG Recommendation 5:** Consulate General Jerusalem should enforce Department motor vehicle standards for all personnel under Chief of Mission authority (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Consulate General Jerusalem agrees and has already taken action. A full report will be sent in response when the OIG report is published.

**OIG Recommendation 6:** Consulate General Jerusalem should reduce the meals and incidental expenses rate of U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff to conform to Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs policy. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem, in coordination with NEA).

**Management Response:** Consulate General Jerusalem agrees and has taken action. A full report will be provided when the OIG report is published.

**OIG Recommendation 7:** Consulate General Jerusalem should process all U.S. Security Coordinator temporary duty staff's travel vouchers through the Department's Post Support Unit. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 8:** Consulate General Jerusalem should designate the purchase card program coordinator and approving officials in accordance with Department guidance. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

**Management Response:** In recognition of the importance of this recommendation, Post has taken action to substantial completion. Additional information will be provided in next response to the published report.

**OIG Recommendation 9:** Consulate General Jerusalem should document that security upgrades were performed on all residences in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem).

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 10:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement a policy to review all motor vehicle mishaps and a corrective action plan to mitigate the number of motor vehicle mishaps. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Consulate General Jerusalem has already implemented policies and will provide further details in response to the published report.

**OIG Recommendation 11:** Consulate General Jerusalem should comply with Department standards for motor pool driver duty limits. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees and has already altered driver schedules. Details regarding changes will be included in response to the published report.

**OIG Recommendation 12:** Consulate General Jerusalem should bring all high-rise residential properties into compliance with Department fire safety standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 13:** Consulate General Jerusalem should conduct and document Post Occupational Safety and Health inspections in accordance with Department standards. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 14:** Consulate General Jerusalem should schedule semiannual safety, health and environmental management committee meetings and maintain all related meeting minutes. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees and complies. Further explanation of Post action will be sent in response to the published OIG report.

**OIG Recommendation 15:** Consulate General Jerusalem should transfer the responsibility for safeguarding and disbursing shuttle bus coupons and gas cards from the Class B cashier to another section. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 16:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for Information Systems Security Officers duties. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees and is taking action. More details will be provided in post's upcoming response to the OIG report.

**OIG Recommendation 17:** Consulate General Jerusalem should update and test the information technology contingency plans for the unclassified and the classified networks, and develop a process for periodically updating the plans as systems environments and resources change. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 18:** Consulate General Jerusalem should conduct initial and annual refresher contingency training for personnel based on their classified and unclassified information technology contingency planning roles and responsibilities. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 19:** Consulate General Jerusalem should reconfigure the Information Systems Center to limit access to the workspace to authorized personnel. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 20:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for recording and tracking helpdesk requests for the unclassified and dedicated internet networks. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Substantial action on this recommendation has already occurred, which Post will detail in its next response.

**OIG Recommendation 21:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures for managing mobile devices that include authorization, issuance, tracking and inventory. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Consulate General Jerusalem has already substantially complied and will provide additional information in its next response.

**OIG Recommendation 22:** Consulate General Jerusalem should implement standard operating procedures to manage, track, and register its dedicated internet networks. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 23:** The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Consulate General Jerusalem, should upgrade the radio network coverage for the West Bank to meet Department standards. (Action: IRM, in coordination with DS and Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

**OIG Recommendation 24:** Consulate General Jerusalem should relocate the telecommunication demarcation point outside the controlled access telephone frame room in the Post One facility. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Consulate General Jerusalem, recognizing the importance of this request, has already taken action. Details of completion will be provided in Post's next response.

**OIG Recommendation 25:** Consulate General Jerusalem should establish safe and secure diplomatic mail and pouch sorting spaces. (Action: Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** Post agrees with no suggested changes.

The point of contact for this memorandum is Management Counselor Andrea Baker.




United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

JUN 2 2017

**UNCLASSIFIED MEMORANDUM**

TO:           OIG/ISP – Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for  
                  Inspections

FROM:        OBO/RM – Jürg E. Hochuli, Deputy Director 

SUBJECT:     Response to OIG Draft Report – Inspection of Consulate  
                  General Jerusalem

OBO has reviewed the draft OIG inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to recommendation provided by OIG.

**Recommendation 4:** The Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem, should bring the General Services Annex/Warehouse into compliance with Department standards. (Action OBO, in coordination with Consulate General Jerusalem)

**OBO Response:** OBO, in coordination with A/LM is assisting post to identify warehouse space requirements and find a warehouse solution that is in compliance with Department standards until a new purpose built warehouse is constructed on the recently purchased Arnona compound.

UNCLASSIFIED





UNCLASSIFIED

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

May 22, 2017

TO: OIG – Sandra Lewis, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections

FROM: IRM/PDCIO – Robert L. Adams 

SUBJECT: Response to Draft IG Report – Inspection of Consulate General Jerusalem

The Bureau of Information Resource Management has reviewed the draft OIG Inspection report. We provide the following comments in response to the recommendations provided by OIG:

**OIG Recommendation 23:** The Bureau of Information Resource Management, in coordination with the Bureau of Diplomatic Security and Consulate General Jerusalem, should upgrade the radio network coverage for the West Bank to meet Department standards. (Action: IRM, in coordination with DS and Consulate General Jerusalem)

**Management Response:** IRM agrees with the OIG recommendation to upgrade the post radio repeater network and provide increased coverage to the West Bank areas of Nablus, Ramallah, and Hebron. IRM/Radio Programs Branch (RPB) has placed the needed equipment order with the vendor. After equipment arrival, assembly, and shipment to post, RPB anticipates the installation to occur sometime in September, 2017. Consulate General Jerusalem and DS have been informed of this timeline.

The point of contact for this memorandum is Craig Hootselle.



## APPENDIX C: FY 2016 STAFFING AND FUNDING BY AGENCY

Agency	U.S. Direct-hire Staff	U.S. Locally Employed Staff	Foreign National Staff	Total Staff <sup>a</sup>	Funding (\$)
<b>Department of State</b>					
Diplomatic & Consular Programs (D&CP)	36	2	11	49	4,776,440
Consular	10	2	30	42	2,695,100
International Cooperative Administrative Support System	8	12	313	333	27,641,351
Public Diplomacy	8	1	18	27	3,209,297
Diplomatic Security	11	1	56	68	4,489,890
Marine Security	9	0	4	13	395,087
Representation	0	0	0	0	54,178
Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO)	0	0	0	0	4,832,592
Population, Refugee, and Migration	1	0	1	2	260,037
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement	4	1	13	18	55,133,721
D&CP – U.S. Security Coordinator	11	1	4	16	1,674,990
OBO – U.S. Security Coordinator	0	0	0	0	343,664
INL – U.S. Security Coordinator	5	0	0	5	543,385
Subtotal	103	20	450	573	106,049,732
<b>Other</b>					
Social Security Administration	0	0	5	5	507,543
<b>Department of Justice</b>					
Legal Attaché's Office	1	0	0	1	0
<b>Department of Homeland Security</b>					
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Services	2	0	1	3	0
Subtotal	3	0	6	9	507,543
<b>Total</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>456</b>	<b>582</b>	<b>106,557,275</b>

Source: Generated by OIG from data provided by the Department.

## ABBREVIATIONS

---

ARSO-I	Assistant Regional Security Officer–Investigator
COM	Chief of Mission
DINs	Dedicated Internet Networks
DPO	Deputy Principal Officer
FAH	Foreign Affairs Handbook
FAM	Foreign Affairs Manual
FAST	First- and Second-Tour
ICS	Integrated Country Strategy
IM	Information Management
INL	Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
INL-J	International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs –Jerusalem
ISSO	Information Systems Security Officer
LE	Locally Employed
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USSC	U.S. Security Coordinator

## OIG INSPECTION TEAM MEMBERS

---

Kenneth Brill, Team Leader  
Michael Greenwald, Deputy Team Leader  
Richard Behrend  
William Booth  
Pat Capriglione  
Jill Derderian  
Martha Fikru  
Martha Haas  
Paul Houge  
Mark Jeleniewicz  
Tanya Manglona  
Shawn O'Reilly  
Chuck Rowcliffe

UNCLASSIFIED



# HELP FIGHT FRAUD. WASTE. ABUSE.

1-800-409-9926

**[OIG.state.gov/HOTLINE](https://oig.state.gov/HOTLINE)**

If you fear reprisal, contact the  
OIG Whistleblower Ombudsman to learn more about your rights:  
**[OIGWPEAOmbuds@state.gov](mailto:OIGWPEAOmbuds@state.gov)**

**[oig.state.gov](https://oig.state.gov)**

Office of Inspector General • U.S. Department of State • P.O. Box 9778 • Arlington, VA 22219

UNCLASSIFIED