



OIG

Office of Inspector General

U.S. Department of State • Broadcasting Board of Governors

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Office of Audits

November 2015

# (U) Management Assistance Report: Progress Made But Action Still Needed to Address Physical Security Deficiencies Reported in FYs 2012 and 2013

## MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE REPORT

**IMPORTANT NOTICE:** ~~This report is intended solely for the official use of the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, or any agency or organization receiving a copy directly from the Office of Inspector General. No secondary distribution may be made, in whole or in part, outside the Department of State or the Broadcasting Board of Governors, by them or by other agencies or organizations, without prior authorization by the Inspector General. Public availability of the document will be determined by the Inspector General under the U.S. Code, 5 U.S.C. 552. Improper disclosure of this report may result in criminal, civil, or administrative penalties.~~

## (U) Summary of Review

(U) During FYs 2012 and 2013, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) issued 12 reports that identified deficiencies in the security posture of 10 posts visited. As part of OIG's audit compliance and follow-up process, OIG assessed the extent to which the Department of State (Department) implemented the 137 recommendations issued in these 12 reports (see Appendix A). Based on the Department's actions and responses to these recommendations as of September 15, 2015, OIG had closed 122 of the 137 recommendations (or 89 percent). However, 15 of these recommendations had remained open, 6 of which were unresolved with no communication from the post or bureau since the reports were issued (see Appendix B).

(SBU) These 15 open recommendations addressed security deficiencies at overseas posts,

(b) (5) DPP  
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Therefore, OIG issued this Management Assistance Report to the Under Secretary for Management, as the Department's designated Audit Follow-up Official.

(U) Based on the Under Secretary for Management's response to a draft of this report (see Appendix D), OIG obtained sufficient information to close the six unresolved recommendations. As a result, OIG has now closed 128 of the 137 recommendations (or 93 percent) from these 12 reports. However, nine recommendations remain open (see Appendix C). These recommendations will be closed when OIG receives and accepts documentation that the recommendations have been fully implemented or an acceptable alternative is found.

(U) With respect to the two recommendations made to the Under Secretary in this report, OIG considers one closed and one open. Specifically, the Under Secretary for Management provided information that helped establish the status of corrective actions for all open recommendations; therefore, this recommendation is closed. However, the Under Secretary did not provide a plan of action to address the implementation of the remaining nine open recommendations. As such, this recommendation will remain open until OIG receives a plan of action from the Under Secretary or obtains sufficient evidence that the nine open recommendations have been fully implemented. In addition, OIG will continue to track the implementation of these open recommendations and report the status in OIG's Semiannual Report to Congress.

## (U) BACKGROUND

(U) During FYs 2012 and 2013, OIG performed two comprehensive audits of Department compliance with physical security standards at selected overseas posts. In performing these audits, OIG conducted physical security surveys at 10 overseas posts to determine their compliance with current

standards. As a result of these audits, between September 2012 and September 2013, OIG issued 2 audit reports and 10 Outline for Action reports, which identified security deficiencies at the 10 posts visited, including physical security deficiencies that required immediate attention.

## (U) Prior Reports

### *(U) Audit of Department of State Compliance With Physical and Procedural Security Standards at Selected High Threat Level Posts* ([Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F))

(SBU) OIG audited Department compliance with physical and procedural security standards at selected high threat level posts to determine the extent to which [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) complied with current physical and procedural security standards. OIG found that posts were not always in compliance with current physical security standards and made recommendations for the Department to address the deficiencies identified.

[Redacted] OIG made 24 recommendations in the report, of which 20 have been closed and 4 remain open (3 resolved and 1 unresolved).

(SBU) As part of this audit, OIG conducted physical security compliance reviews [Redacted] [Redacted] to determine the embassies' and consulate general's compliance with current standards. OIG provided the ambassadors and the consul general at the five selected posts with post-specific "Outline for Action" reports detailing selected deficiencies found during the physical security compliance reviews. The ambassadors and the consul general at the posts took action to address or mitigate many of the deficiencies reported. As of September 15, 2015, 32 of 38 recommendations had been closed and 6 were open.

### *(U) Audit of Department of State Compliance With Physical Security Standards at Selected Posts Within the Bureau of African Affairs* ([Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F))

(SBU) The audit determined the extent to which selected embassies in Africa complied with current physical security standards and whether management officials at these posts used available authorities to effectively implement the posts' security programs. OIG found that posts audited did not comply with all security standards. [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). OIG made two recommendations to AF and one recommendation to the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO). As of September 15, 2015, all three recommendations were open.

(SBU) OIG conducted physical security surveys [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) to determine the embassies' compliance with current standards. OIG provided the ambassadors at the posts with post-specific "Outline for Action" reports detailing selected deficiencies found during the physical security compliance reviews. The ambassadors at the posts took action to address or mitigate many of the deficiencies reported. As of September 15, 2015, 70 of 72 recommendations had been closed and 2 were open.

## (U) Audit Follow-up

(U) The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-50, Audit Followup,<sup>1</sup> requires each agency to ensure that systems are in place for the prompt and proper resolution and implementation of audit recommendations, including written corrective actions plans, where appropriate. Likewise, the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM), Volume 1, establishes Departmental policies for audit resolution, follow-up, and closure. The Under Secretary for Management is designated as the Department's Audit Follow-up Official and is responsible for ensuring that (1) timely responses are made to all OIG recommendations, regardless of implementation responsibilities; (2) disagreements are resolved; (3) and corrective actions are actually taken.

(U) OIG considers a recommendation "unresolved," "resolved," or "closed" based on the actions that the Department has taken or plans to take with respect to the recommendation. An unresolved recommendation is one for which the Department has neither taken action nor stated how it plans to implement the recommendation. A resolved recommendation is one for which the Department has agreed to implement the recommendation or one in which the Department has begun, but not yet completed, actions to fully implement the recommendation. Open recommendations include both unresolved and resolved recommendations. A closed recommendation is one for which the Department has completed actions necessary to implement the recommendation and OIG has determined that no additional action is required.

(U) With the issuance of a final report, OIG instructs action entities, responsible bureaus, and overseas posts to provide a written response to OIG to each recommendation within 30 days from the date of issuance. OIG instructions state that each response should include a management decision for each recommendation indicating agreement or disagreement with the recommended action. For agreement, the response should include corrective actions taken or planned, and actual or target dates for completion. For disagreement, responses are to include reasons for disagreement, and any alternative proposals for corrective action. OIG reviews the responses and

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<sup>1</sup> (U) OMB Circular No. A-50 Revised, *Audit Followup* (Sept. 29, 1982).

any supporting documentation and sends a reply to the action entity. After the initial response, updates on corrective actions and responses to subsequent OIG correspondence are to be sent on a schedule that usually ranges from 30 to no more than 90 days. Thus, for any recommendation open for more than 1 year, the responsible bureau or post should have provided at least four updates in the first year after a report has been issued.

(U) In accordance with the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, OIG is required to report to Congress semiannually a summary of each OIG report issued for which no management decision was made during the previous 6-month period. Heads of agencies are required to report to Congress on significant recommendations from previous reports where final action has not been taken for more than 1 year from the date of management decision, together with an explanation of delays.

## (U) RESULTS

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### (U) The Department Has Made Progress Toward Implementing Recommendations, But Further Action Is Needed

(U) As of September 15, 2015, OIG had closed 122 of the 137 recommendations (or 89 percent) from these 12 reports based on the Department's responses to the recommendations and documented evidence of completed corrective actions.<sup>2</sup> These include 118 recommendations that had been implemented (86 percent) and 4 recommendations that were no longer relevant because of changes in circumstances or standards. As a result, the Department's corrective actions have significantly enhanced the protection of personnel, facilities, and national security information. [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]

(SBU) However, 15 of these recommendations had remained open for more than 2 years and addressed security deficiencies at overseas posts, such as: [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) [Redacted] (see Appendix B). Further, OIG had not received a response from the responsible post for five recommendations that OIG identified as requiring immediate attention. Additionally, OIG had not received an update from a responsible Bureau on one other open recommendation (these six recommendations were unresolved).<sup>3</sup> Therefore, OIG elevated the 15 recommendations to the attention of the Under Secretary for Management as the Department's Audit Follow-up Official and recommended that the Under Secretary review and report on the status of corrective actions and the reasons for delays in completing corrective actions

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<sup>2</sup> (U) Based on information received from the Under Secretary for Management in response and subsequent to a draft report, OIG closed six unresolved recommendations. As a result, as of October 30, 2015, OIG had closed 128 of the 137 recommendations (or 93 percent) from these 12 reports.

<sup>3</sup> (U) Based on information received from the Under Secretary for Management subsequent to and in the response to the draft report, OIG closed the six unresolved recommendations.



*(U) Audit of Department of State Compliance with Physical and Procedural Security Standards at Selected High Threat Level Posts [Redacted]*

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

(U) AF had not responded to the report and its unresolved recommendation since the report was issued more than 2 years ago. OIG sent AF monthly reports on its open recommendations. In addition, OIG has notified Department management and Congress of these open recommendations in its Semiannual Reports to Congress. OIG also has been in contact with AF officials during FYs 2014 and 2015 regarding compliance for open recommendations from other reports, including the two recommendations from [Redacted] as described later in this report.

(U) In response to a draft of this report, the Under Secretary for Management stated that:

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

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<sup>4</sup> (U) The Accountability Review Board Report on the Events of September 11, 2012, at U.S. Consulate General Benghazi stated the following: "[T]he Chief of Mission bears 'direct and full responsibility for the security of [his or her] mission and all the personnel for whom [he or she is] responsible,' and thus for risk management in the country to which he or she is accredited. In Washington, each regional Assistant Secretary has a corresponding responsibility to support the Chief of Mission in executing this duty."

*(U) Outline for Action: Physical Security Concerns*

(SBU) OIG identified physical security issues that required the embassy's immediate attention and made recommendations to address findings regarding

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) provided a response to the draft report and the 10 recommendations OIG made with information on completed corrective actions and a schedule to complete the remaining actions. Based on this response, OIG closed five recommendations and considered the other five recommendations – resolved, pending further action. These five resolved but open recommendations addressed immediate physical security deficiencies [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) (see Appendix B).

(U) As of September 15, 2015, OIG had not received a response or an update as to the status of actions taken in response to these open recommendations since the report was issued. OIG's most recent correspondence [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) reminded the Embassy of these open recommendations and provided notice that their status would be changed to unresolved unless a response was received by July 23, 2015. Since no such response was received, OIG changed the status of these five recommendations to unresolved.

(U) In response to the draft of this report, the Under Secretary for Management provided information on a cable providing information about the corrective actions taken to address these five recommendations. The cable was addressed to the Department and requested that the Department pass the cable to OIG; however, OIG did not receive this cable and the information about corrective actions until September 17, 2015. Based on the information provided by the Under Secretary, OIG closed these five recommendations on September 23, 2015.

*(U) Nine Resolved Recommendations Pending Final Action*

(U) The remaining nine open recommendations are awaiting final actions by post or Bureau [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). While the responsible bureaus and posts agreed to these nine open recommendations, final action has not occurred and OIG has not been informed when they are expected to be completed. Specifically (see Appendix C), two of the nine resolved recommendations originally made [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>5</sup> (U) *Audit of Department of State Implementation of the Vital Presence Validation Process* (AUD-SI-15-37).



[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) more than 2 years ago are awaiting action by the Bureaus of Diplomatic Security (DS) and Overseas Buildings Operations (OBO), [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). In addition, [Redacted] is still evaluating alternative options to OIG's recommended action more than 2 years later. Also, although DS and OBO developed recommended guidance clarifying security [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) requirements, DS has not yet updated the FAM to reflect these revisions. [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). [Redacted] Finally, for the last open recommendation, DS' response did not represent a sufficient action plan to correct or mitigate the underlying deficiency noted.

*(U) Outline for Action: Physical Security Concerns* [Redacted], [Redacted]

(SBU) OIG identified physical security areas that required the embassy's immediate attention and made recommendations to address findings regarding [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). [Redacted] provided a response to the draft report and to OIG's 10 recommendations that also included information on completed corrective actions. Based on this response and subsequent correspondence [Redacted], OIG closed nine recommendations and resolved one recommendation. Only [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). [Redacted].

*(SBU) Actions on* [Redacted] *subsequent to final report.*<sup>6</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]

<sup>7</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>8</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

(U) Outline for Action: Physical Security Concerns [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

(SBU) OIG identified physical security deficiencies that required the embassy's immediate attention and made recommendations to address findings regarding [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) provided a response to the draft report and to OIG's 16 recommendations that also included information on completed corrective actions. Based on this response and subsequent correspondence [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) closed 15 recommendations and resolved 1 recommendation. Recommendation 2, related to a [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) deficiency, remains open.

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) deficiency, remains open.

(SBU) Actions on Recommendation 2 subsequent to final report.<sup>9</sup> In its [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) response to the draft report, [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) reported that OBO was developing a scope of work to address the [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) deficiency.

(U) Outline for Action: Physical Security Concerns [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

(SBU) OIG identified physical security deficiencies that required the embassy's immediate attention and made recommendations to address findings regarding [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) 12 [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>9</sup> (SBU) Recommendation 2. OIG recommended that [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) address a physical security issue related to [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>10</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>11</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>12</sup> (SBU) [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) provided a response to the draft report and to OIG's 11 recommendations that also included information on completed corrective actions. Based on this response and subsequent correspondence [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F), OIG closed 10 recommendations and resolved 1 recommendation. Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F), remains open.

*(SBU) Actions on Recommendation [Redacted] subsequent to final report.<sup>13</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)*

*(U) Audit of Department of State Compliance With Physical and Procedural Security Standards at Selected High Threat Level Posts [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)*

(SBU) OIG found that physical security deficiencies at posts audited occurred for a variety of reasons, ranging from changes in physical security standards to design, construction, and maintenance issues. OIG also found that guidance [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) needed clarification. Therefore, in addition to specific recommendations to posts made in Outline for Action reports, OIG made 24 recommendations to responsible bureaus<sup>14</sup> within the Department to address common underlying causes for the physical security deficiencies OIG found at posts visited. Based on responses from the responsible bureaus, OIG subsequently closed 20 of the 24 recommendations made. [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] The three remaining open recommendations were directed to DS. These recommendations addressed the need for [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

*(SBU) Actions on Recommendation [Redacted] subsequent to final report.<sup>15</sup> DS's most recent response dated April 22, 2015, stated that [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)*

<sup>13</sup> (SBU) Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>14</sup> (U) Recommendations [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) were directed to DS. Recommendations [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) were directed to OBO. Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) was directed to AF and Recommendation 24 was directed to M/PRI.

<sup>15</sup> (SBU) Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). OIG recommended that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

An August 17, 2015, memorandum from OBO with OBO and DS responses to Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) the *Audit of Department of State Compliance With Physical Security Standards at Selected Posts Within the Bureau of African Affairs* (AUD-HCI-13-40) stated that [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

~~(SBU)~~ Actions on Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) subsequent to final report.<sup>16</sup> DS's most recent response dated April 22, 2015, stated that [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

~~(SBU)~~ Actions on Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) subsequent to final report.<sup>17</sup> DS's most recent response dated April 22, 2015, stated that [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

The DS response also noted that an Action Memorandum outlining the recommended revisions to the FAM section [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) was signed by the DS Deputy Assistant Secretary [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F), awaiting signature by OBO's Deputy Director, after which it would be circulated for Department clearances and eventual publication. [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) and establish a plan of action to correct or mitigate this deficiency to comply with physical security standards respective to the posts' threat levels.

<sup>16</sup> ~~(SBU)~~ Recommendation [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F). OIG recommended that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, in coordination with the Bureau of Overseas Buildings Operations, develop a prioritized post list for the installation of [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) and establish a plan of action to correct or mitigate this deficiency.

<sup>17</sup> ~~(SBU)~~ Recommendation 22. OIG recommended that that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security provide Regional Security Officers with guidance [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) to meet the intent of the guidance contained in the Foreign Affairs Handbook [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

<sup>18</sup> [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

*(U) Audit of Department of State Compliance With Physical Security Standards at Selected Posts Within the Bureau of African Affairs* ([Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F))

(SBU) OIG found that the seven posts audited did not comply with all current security standards. [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

These deficiencies occurred for several reasons [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

standards. Therefore, in addition to specific recommendations to posts made in Outline for Action reports, OIG made two recommendations to AF and one recommendation to OBO to address common causes for the physical security deficiencies OIG found at posts visited. [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

*(U) Actions on Recommendations*, [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) subsequent to final report.<sup>19</sup> Both AF and OBO in their last responses to this report, [Redacted]

## (U) CONCLUSION

(U) OIG acknowledges the Department's efforts to address OIG's physical security recommendations in a timely manner. As of October 30, 2015, the Department has implemented 128 of 137 recommendations (93 percent) made by OIG in these 12 reports, although 9 recommendations remain open. Prompt and timely corrective action by the Department has resulted in several positive outcomes, [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]. However, more than 2 years later, nine of these recommendations remain open. While the responsible bureaus and posts agreed to the other nine open recommendations, final action has not occurred. [Redacted]

<sup>19</sup> (SBU) Recommendations [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) OIG recommended that AF, OBO, and DS assess the security posture for all posts in AF [Redacted]

**Table 1** Demographic characteristics of study population

**OIG Reply:** (U) With respect to the Under Secretary's statement that "this exercise is redundant," the purpose of this Management Assistant Report is to prompt action to close all open recommendations associated with the aforementioned reports. Although OIG considers the open recommendations referenced in this report resolved because the responsible bureaus and posts agreed to implement them, the fact is that more than 2 years has passed and nine recommendations [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F) remain open. For this reason, OIG raised these open recommendations with the Under Secretary for Management and recommended a plan of action to complete corrective actions.

(U) OIG considers this recommendation resolved because the Under Secretary has taken action to assist OIG with closing six previously open recommendations. However, this recommendation will remain open until OIG receives a plan of action from the Under Secretary to address the nine remaining open recommendations or obtains sufficient evidence that the recommendations have been fully implemented.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

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**Recommendation 1:** (U) OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Management provide a report to OIG within 60 days of report issuance on the status of corrective actions and the reasons for delays in completing corrective actions on the nine open recommendations listed in Appendix C.

**Recommendation 2:** (U) OIG recommends that the Under Secretary for Management provide a plan of action to complete corrective actions, including appropriate milestones, to address the remaining nine open recommendations listed in Appendix C.



(U) APPENDIX A: NUMBER OF RECOMMENDATIONS BY REPORT

[illegible]

(U) **Source:** Generated by OIG from OIG's Recommendation Database.

(U) APPENDIX B: OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS AS OF  
SEPTEMBER 15, 2015

[illegible]

[illegible]

U) R = Resolved and U = Unresolved.

<sup>2</sup> (U) Based on information received from the Under Secretary for Management in response and subsequent to a draft of this report, this recommendation has been closed.

(U) Source: Generated by OIG.

(U) APPENDIX C: OPEN RECOMMENDATIONS AS OF OCTOBER 30, 2015

[illegible]

[illegible]

<sup>\*</sup> (U) R = Resolved and U = Unresolved.  
(U) **Source:** Generated by OIG.

## APPENDIX D: UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE FOR MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

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United States Department of State

*Under Secretary of State  
for Management*

*Washington, D.C. 20520*

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

SEP 28 2015

**Memorandum**

TO: OIG – Steve Linick

FROM: M – Patrick F. Kennedy *PK*

SUBJECT: Response to Management Assistance Report: Progress Made but Action Still Needed to Address Physical Security Deficiencies OIG Reported in FY 2012-2013

~~(SBU)~~ Thank you for the opportunity to respond to this Management Alert. The Department values information related to potential vulnerabilities, however the value of this report is in doubt when OIG informs of 15 open recommendations, 9 of which OIG considered resolved. If OIG agrees with the Department's planned way forward for these 9 recommendations, then additional attention from this office is not needed.

~~(SBU)~~ Further, the OIG report recommends that the "Under Secretary for Management provide a report to OIG on the status of corrective actions and the reasons for delays." If OIG already considers those recommendations resolved, then a separate report is unnecessary. OIG should refer to the most recent compliance updates provided by the bureaus and posts in question. Also, OIG recommends the Under Secretary for Management "provide a plan of action to complete corrective actions, including appropriate milestones, to address the 15 open recommendations." Again, if OIG already considers a recommendation resolved and thus agrees with the planned way forward, this exercise is redundant.

**Resolved Recommendations (9)**

~~(SBU)~~ The Department must pay careful attention to physical security deficiencies and acknowledge that it is taking some time to complete these 9 open recommendations. ~~[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)~~

~~[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)~~

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[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)



(SBU) Action Offices/Bureaus send OIG regular compliance updates,

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)



M will encourage DS and OBO to expedite these paperwork actions.

(SBU) [Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)



~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~



~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~

4

[Redacted] (b) (5), [Redacted] (b) (7)(F)

[Redacted]. The Department recently completed its first round of annual VP2 analyses for all AF high threat, high risk posts. Finally, Regional Bureau Executive Offices constantly work with posts to ensure they have adequate resources, and EX coordinates with DS, M, and other domestic offices. The Department requests OIG close this recommendation.

~~SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED~~



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