Federal Reports

Why We Did This Report

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General initiated this project to describe the lessons we have identified from select EPA OIG and U.S. Government Accountability Office, or GAO, oversight reports to help inform the EPA’s future efforts to prepare for and respond to natural disasters.

Summary of Findings

We reviewed 26 EPA OIG and GAO reports that include findings related to the EPA’s prior disaster response actions. From those, we identified seven programmatic themes: (1)interagency and external stakeholder cooperation, (2) risk communication to the public,(3)data collection and characterization of risks, (4) policy development, (5) resource limitation, (6)contract management, and (7) resilience of contaminated sites and infrastructure. These themes had lessons that may allow the EPA to be better prepared for and respond to a natural disaster in the future. These reports made 79 recommendations to the EPA. Although we did not evaluate the timeliness or quality of the EPA’s corrective actions to these recommendations, it is imperative that the EPA implement recommendations that could provide a more efficient and effective response to future natural disasters.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

This report presents the results of our audit of U.S. Postal Service’s financial controls and safeguarding assets at selected retail units.

The Postal Service operates approximately 31,000 retail units that provide services to customers nationwide. Retail unit employees are required to adhere to policies and procedures regarding financial reporting and the safeguarding of assets. All retail units must report their financial activity to Accounting Services daily, and retail unit management is responsible for the security of accountable items. Controls over these processes are essential for ensuring financial information is reliable and assets are protected. During a prior audit, we identified potential security matters and financial control issues at selected retail locations. As a result, we visited 10 additional retail units to determine compliance with policies and procedures and whether issues were remediated.

What We Did

Our objective was to determine compliance with policies and procedures regarding financial controls and safeguarding assets at selected Postal Service retail units. Specifically, we interviewed Postal Service management and retail associates, observed the safeguarding of assets, reviewed Postal Service (PS) Form 1412 supporting documentation, and inventoried arrow keys present at the retail units.

This review examines whether medical facilities in VISN 12 (the VA Great Lakes Health Care System covering parts of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, and Wisconsin) correctly identified veterans eligible for community care, informed them of their care options, and delivered timely care.

The OIG found that during the first quarter of fiscal year 2024, VISN 12 did not consistently offer veterans required information about care options for direct VA or community care. Schedulers also did not always accurately determine a veteran’s eligibility for community care, inform veterans of their eligibility, or correctly process requests for care and appointments. These deficiencies occurred primarily because schedulers lacked the means to identify all available appointments within or outside VISN 12. Another factor was uneven VHA guidance, requiring schedulers to check all eligibility criteria for new patients but only wait times for established patients.

VISN 12 did not reliably provide timely care to veterans during the review period. From scheduling to appointment took on average 44 days for community care (the goal is 30 days) and 35 days for care within VA (with goals of 20 or 28 days depending on the type of care). VISN 12 also had about 250 consults, including both types of care, that had not been completed for a year. These delays risked some veterans not receiving care when needed.

The VISN 12 director concurred with the OIG’s four recommendations to improve the community care program. The OIG is also conducting two national follow-up reviews: the first examines how VISNs determine eligibility and inform veterans of care options and the second compares the timeliness of care received at VA with community care. Because these national audits will include recommendations beyond VISN 12, no national recommendations related to these concerns are offered in this report.

Improved Documentation and Guidance Can Help Strengthen Corporation Finance’s Disclosure Review Program, Report No. 586

The OIG found that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) effectively uses operating experience (OpE) information to inspect Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) at operating nuclear power plants. However, the agency could strengthen the Reactor OpE Program by updating guidance and assessing the program, and ensuring the EDG Technical Review Group (TRG) members know their roles and responsibilities.
Currently, the guidance provided in Office Instruction LIC-401, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) Reactor Operating Experience, and NRR’s Operating Experience Staff Handbook is outdated. In addition, the NRC does not have an assessment process for the Reactor OpE Program. Assessing the Reactor OpE Program periodically could help staff and management determine whether the program meets its objectives and staff are using relevant guidance to process OpE information. Moreover, the NRC lacks policies and procedures for the EDG TRGs, which may lead to inconsistent practices, reduced productivity, and missed opportunities to disposition EDG-related OpE information.
The OIG makes seven recommendations to strengthen the Reactor Operating Experience Program implementation process.

The Department of Energy’s Loan Programs Office (LPO) provides debt financing in the form of loans and loan guarantees to support innovative clean energy, advanced transportation, and tribal energy projects in the United States. To help carry out its mission, the LPO utilizes contractors and third-party advisors to assist with loan application processing, which increases the risk for conflicts of interest.

Given the LPO’s reliance on contractors and third-party advisors, we initiated this audit to determine whether the LPO had an
effective framework in place for managing conflicts of interest for contractors providing support and advisory services to its Office.

We found that the LPO did not have an effective framework in place for managing conflicts of interest for contractors providing support to the LPO. Specifically, the LPO was not aware of all the relationships that could cause conflicts of interest. We also found that the LPO did not ensure adequate management of conflict of interest disclosures and waiver requests, and did not ensure its prime contractor fully implemented key aspects of its strategy for managing potential conflicts of interest.

These issues occurred because the LPO did not have controls in place to identify and manage conflicts of interest. Specifically, the LPO had not developed and implemented a formal, centralized tracking system or policies and procedures for managing conflicts of interest. Additionally, the LPO relied upon third-party advisors and other contractors to self-identify conflicts of interest and did not ensure adequate oversight of its prime contractor.

To address the issues identified in this report, we have made two recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that decisions about awarding and managing loans and loan guarantees are in the Government’s and the public’s best interest.

This report presents the results of our audit of Cardboard Mail Transport Equipment Recycling Program. 

The U.S. Postal Service uses significant quantities of cardboard mail transport equipment (MTE) for transportation of mail and packages. In its Delivering for America 2.0 strategic plan, the Postal Service aims to divert 75 percent of waste from landfills by fiscal year (FY) 2030. In FY 2024, the Postal Service diverted 66 percent of its total waste from landfills, with cardboard waste accounting for 31 percent of this diversion. This initiative helped the Postal Service avoid over $10.8 million in costs related to cardboard MTE trash services. Despite incurred costs of approximately $11.8 million, they generated about $6.5 million in revenue from recycled materials, yielding net savings of $5.5 million. Efficient recycling and reuse practices for materials such as cardboard MTE, reduce waste and support the Postal Service’s sustainability target.
 

Our objective was to assess the efficiency of the Postal Service’s purchasing and recycling of cardboard MTE. We conducted observations at 11 mail processing facilities and interviewed facility management. We also reviewed contracts and data for purchasing and recycling of cardboard MTE from FY 2022 through FY 2024.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) continues to evaluate and obtain critical technology needed to identify, assess, breach, and remediate cross-border tunnels and has made progress in its efforts since our 2021 audit on border technology.   The Department of Homeland Security in January 2020 and January 2024 approved testing by the Cross-Border Tunnel Threat program of two critical tunnel detection technologies to evaluate whether they are functional and viable solutions.  At the time of this audit, these technologies were being tested for effectiveness in operational conditions and eventual vendor selection.   Based on CBP’s progress, it was too early for us to audit the effectiveness of these technologies and therefore we made no recommendations.  We note, however, that once CBP selects its tunnel detection technology solutions, the program’s success will require adequate program resources and effective coordination between CBP offices. 

• For more than a decade, the Postal Service has needed new delivery vehicles to replace its iconic Long-Life Vehicles (LLVs) and Flex-Fuel Vehicles (FFVs).
   
• The process to select, acquire, and deploy a custom Next Generation Delivery Vehicle (NGDV) took around six years longer than planned.
   
• While the Postal Service’s commitment to acquiring a significant number of electric delivery vehicles aligns with decisions made by other delivery organizations, USPS must deal with a variety of factors such as organizational needs, vehicle operational capabilities, financial resources, and regulatory environments that similarly situated organizations do not.
   
• USPS’s experience with EV investments offers key lessons for future large procurement efforts, including setting clear goals and timelines that align with market dynamics, securing funding early, and considering commercially available solutions when feasible.
   
• The EV rollout also highlights the need for effective coordination with external stakeholders and the benefits of balancing process transparency and risk management with timely execution.

OWF did not efficiently manage IIJA fuels management funds, and the bureaus did not always expend IIJA funds in accordance with the Act.

This report provides the results of Objective 1, in which we determined whether the State of Illinois used FNS SNAP administrative funds to provide benefits to participants.

This report provides the results of Objective 1, in which we determined whether the State of California used FNS SNAP administrative funds to provide benefits to participants.

OIG conducted a review of recent human capital-related recommendations made to the agency and their corresponding reported statuses. The goal of this review was to help the Peace Corps leverage existing reviews and recommendations in determining where and how to direct its resources to better address its overarching human capital management challenge.

We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security’s enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems.  

DOI’s OCIO was provided recommendations to improve DOI’s enterprise-wide threat hunting capability and strengthen DOI’s IT security program. 

In November 2024, we conducted onsite, unannounced inspections at four U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) facilities in Southern Arizona and California:  • Two U.S. Border Patrol (Border Patrol) facilities — Yuma soft- sided facility (SSF) and Wellton station — housed 510 detainees  at the time of our inspection.   • Two Office of Field Operations (OFO) ports of entry (POE) —  Calexico West and San Luis — housed 21 detainees at the time of  our inspection.   

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s mission is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation’s mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. According to the Postal Inspection Service strategic plan, the key mission and business priorities were developed through research and represent critical and emerging issues affecting the Postal Service’s employees, infrastructure, and products, as well as the success of the Postal Inspection Service’s mission. 

The VA Nebraska–Western Iowa Health Care System has a graduate medical education affiliation agreement with a local university. Under the agreement, the university provides the services of health professions trainees (residents) to the Omaha VA Medical Center, and VA reimburses the university for the residents’ services. Reimbursement is based on daily rates and fringe benefits provided by the medical center, which must document and certify VA-approved educational activities in educational activity records.

The medical center received a complaint alleging that a university official falsified records to inflate the time worked and signed the records as the VA site director, an act that would constitute a conflict of interest. The VA Office of Academic Affiliations asked the OIG to review six years of potential overbillings of residents’ time totaling about $1.9 million and examine the potential conflict of interest.

The OIG found the medical center did not have educational activity records for July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2020, as required. The OIG attempted to verify the progress notes the medical center used in the place of educational activity records but found them unreliable. Without reliable records, the audit team could not verify the attendance of the residents and could not determine whether the invoices were supported as required. Therefore, VA has no assurance that the residents participated in clinical and educational activities from July 1, 2016, through June 30, 2020, and may have overpaid for resident services.

For the period when the medical center did keep educational activity records, beginning July 1, 2020, the OIG was able to verify residents’ attendance and found no overbillings. Further, the OIG team did not find any conflicts of interest. Because educational activity records were implemented in July 2020, the OIG did not have any recommendations for the medical center.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

We evaluated the Department of Homeland Security’s enterprise-wide security program for Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information intelligence systems. 

The OIG conducted an administrative investigation into allegations of misconduct by Judith Dawson, former Chancellor of the VA Acquisition Academy, in connection with an August 2023 acquisition training symposium held at a conference center hotel in Aurora, Colorado, and attended by over 1,200 contracting personnel.

The OIG found that Ms. Dawson knowingly accepted multiple impermissible gifts from the conference center and violated VA policy by improperly directing staff to solicit and accept gifts of sponsored social events at the symposium, purportedly on behalf of VA. The OIG also found that Ms. Dawson at times discouraged her executive assistant from raising questions or seeking guidance regarding potential ethical violations in connection with the symposium, which was contrary to legislative direction that supervisors are to foster an environment in which VA employees could express concerns. Further, the investigation revealed that Ms. Dawson did not report the spa services she received from the conference center as gifts on her annual public financial disclosure report for 2023, even though the value of the gifts exceeded the reporting threshold. Instead, Ms. Dawson indicated that she had no reportable gifts.

Due to Ms. Dawson’s retirement from VA, the OIG made no recommendations with respect to possible administrative action against her. However, the OIG recommended that VA determine whether any additional steps need to be taken regarding Ms. Dawson’s 2023 public financial disclosure based on the findings in this report. The OIG also recommended VA consider additional training on sponsorships for VA events and acceptance of free meals. VA concurred with the OIG’s recommendations and noted that it plans to issue a memorandum regarding whistleblower protections, direct the relevant senior executives to complete conference policy training and report their oversight activities within ten days following a conference, and amend Ms. Dawson’s 2023 financial disclosure report.

The OIG inspection team assessed whether the Superintendent of Documents (SuDoc) is meeting the intent of 44 United States Code (U.S.C.) Section 1909 to “make firsthand investigation of conditions for which need is indicated” with the Public Access Assessments (PAA) of the Federal Depository Libraries (FDL).

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Healthcare Facility Inspection program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the care provided at the VA Texas Valley Coastal Bend Healthcare System in Harlingen. 

This evaluation focused on five key content domains:
     •    Culture
     •    Environment of care
     •    Patient safety
     •    Primary care
     •    Veteran-centered safety net

The OIG issued three recommendations for VA to correct identified deficiencies in two domains:
   1.    Environment of care
     •    Toxic exposure screenings
   2.    Patient safety
     •    Service-level workflows for test result communication
     •    Peer Review Committee meeting attendance

Our Objective(s)
To evaluate single audit reports uploaded to the Federal Audit Clearinghouse between April 1, 2025 and June 30, 2025, and identify findings that affect directly awarded Department of Transportation (DOT) programs.
Why This AuditOIG performs oversight of independent, non-Federal auditors' single audit reports. Over the past 3 fiscal years, on average over 250 single audit reports were issued that included findings related to programs directly funded by DOT. We issue memoranda that summarize the single audit reports' significant findings and recommendations that require priority action by DOT. When warranted, we also recommend that DOT recover funds that were inappropriately expended by non-Federal entities.

What We Found
Auditors reported 20 findings related to 11 grantees that included significant noncompliance with Federal guidelines that require prompt actions from DOT's Operating Administrations.
Of the 20 findings, 8 were repeat findings related to 4 grantees.
Auditors identified questioned costs totaling $27,114 for 1 of the 11 grantees.
We identified nonmonetary repeat findings that caused a disclaimer of opinion for one entity and a qualified opinion for another.

Recommendations
We made 2 recommendations to OST to resolve and close the findings and recover questioned costs, if applicable.

Two Amtrak employees were sentenced in August 2025 and a third pleaded guilty in July 2025 for their roles in a health care fraud conspiracy investigated by Amtrak’s Office of Inspector General (OIG). In addition, a New York-based physical therapist pleaded guilty in June 2025 for her role in the scheme. Since May 2025, Amtrak has terminated 17 other employees who took part in the scheme but were not criminally charged. In total, 71 employees have resigned or were terminated since the inception of this investigation.

Amtrak employees Damany Walker of Gloversville, New York, and David McBrien, of Levittown, Pennsylvania, were sentenced August 20, 2025, and August 21, 2025, respectively, to two years of probation. Walker was ordered to pay $428,523 in restitution and McBrien was ordered to pay $234,778. Amtrak employee Gregory Richardson, 35, of Roosevelt, New York, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud on July 17, 2025, in U.S. District Court, District of New Jersey. Walker, McBrien, and Richardson accepted cash kickbacks from health care providers for the use of their insurance information to file false and questionable medical claims for services that were never provided or not medically necessary.

Taejin Kim, a licensed physical therapist of Bayside, New York, was one of at least four health care providers who participated in the scheme. Kim pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit health care fraud on June 11, 2025. Kim submitted false and fraudulent claims to Amtrak’s insurance plan, and Amtrak paid approximately $2,253,453 as a result.

VA medical facilities use automated dispensing cabinets to help manage medication inventory and allow clinical staff to dispense medications to patients near the point of care. The OIG conducted this national review to evaluate whether controls at VHA medical facilities ensure accountability over high-risk medications when clinical staff remove them from these cabinets using generic information, such as codes or nonpatient information.

The OIG estimated that in fiscal year 2024, VA medical facilities could not fully account for 46 percent of medications removed with generic information from cabinet A (one of two types of cabinets reviewed, called A and B in the report). Facilities had the most issues tracing propofol to specific patients. Cabinet B transactions could not be projected due to data limitations, but these transactions may also be at risk of not being traceable to a patient. These issues occurred because medical facilities’ standard operating procedures and local policies did not address monitoring of medication removals from cabinets using generic information. Some staff reported using generic information out of convenience or to be more efficient.

The OIG reviewed 40 transactions in which staff removed controlled substances using generic information and found one instance in which a facility could not trace a controlled substance to a specific patient. VHA policy does not prohibit using cabinets to store controlled substances, but it does require facilities to maintain full accountability over them through an electronic record that tracks the medication’s removal from a cabinet to its final dispensation. Removing medications without using a patient’s name increases the risk of drug diversion, so this practice should be closely monitored.

VHA concurred with the OIG’s three recommendations to enhance local guidance on, compliance with, and monitoring of these transactions.
 

Why We Did This Report

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Inspector General conducted this audit to determine to what extent the EPA National Center for Radiation Field Operations, or NCRFO, has the capability—including appropriate management and internal control, resources, and staff qualifications—to successfully fulfill its roles and responsibilities in preparing for and responding to radiological incidents. 

Summary of Findings

We found that the NCRFO needs to take steps to improve its preparedness to respond to radiological emergencies. While the NCRFO successfully conducted nonemergency responses, such as site assessments, we found that it was not fully prepared for the one emergency response it conducted during the period we reviewed.

This report provides the results of Objective 1, in which we determined whether the State of Michigan used FNS SNAP administrative funds to provide benefits to participants.

This report summarizes the results of Sikich’s independent evaluation and contains ten new recommendations that will assist the agency in improving the effectiveness of its information security and its privacy programs and practices. NCUA management concurred with and has identified corrective actions to address the recommendations.

Our Objective(s)
To perform a quality control review (QCR) of KPMG LLP's examination of the Enterprise Services Center's (ESC) description of its system and the suitability of the design and operating effectiveness of controls for the period October 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025. We reviewed KPMG's report, dated July 31, 2025, and related documentation.

Why This Audit
ESC provides financial management services to the Department of Transportation (DOT) and other agencies and operates under the direction of DOT's Chief Financial Officer. The Office of Management and Budget requires ESC, as a service organization, to either provide its user organizations with independent audit reports on the design and effectiveness of its internal controls or allow user auditors to perform tests of its controls. We contracted with KPMG LLP to conduct this examination subject to our oversight.

What We Found
The independent auditor, KPMG, found that in all material respects:
the description fairly presents ESC's system that was designed and implemented throughout the period October 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025;
the controls related to the control objectives stated in the description were suitably designed to provide reasonable assurance that the control objectives would be achieved if the controls operated effectively throughout the period October 1,2024, to June 30, 2025; and user entities applied the complementary controls assumed in the design of ESC's controls throughout the period October 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025; and
the controls operated effectively to provide reasonable assurance that the control objectives stated in the description were achieved throughout the period October 1, 2024, to June30, 2025, if complementary user entity controls assumed in the design of ESC's controls operated effectively throughout the period October 1, 2024, to June 30, 2025.

Our QCR disclosed no instances in which KPMG did not comply, in all material respects, with generally accepted Government auditing standards.

Recommendations
KPMG made no recommendations.
The underlying report has been marked and/or withheld as Controlled Unclassified Information to protect sensitive information that may be exempt from public disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S. Code 552.

The OIG conducted a healthcare inspection to assess the quality of care provided to a patient while hospitalized at the Overton Brooks VA Medical Center (facility). The OIG also identified concerns with a quality review completed after facility leaders became aware of staff’s mismanagement of a patient’s distressed behaviors.

The OIG found deficiencies with the clinical management of the patient while hospitalized. Deficiencies included a physician who lacked a complete understanding of the patient’s diagnosis and clinical response to a medication prior to discontinuing the medication. Further, facility staff mismanaged the patient’s distressed behaviors. Specifically, staff did not: (1) implement one-to-one observation according to facility policy, (2) activate a behavioral patient record flag (an established safety tool for distressed behaviors), or (3) use the electronic health record as a communication tool between disciplines, according to Veterans Health Administration (VHA) policy.

The Facility Director chartered a root cause analysis (RCA); however, the RCA team’s application of the RCA process did not align with VHA requirements. The RCA team’s failure to follow VHA-required guidelines for the composition and the execution of RCA steps and the RCA’s timeliness affected the reliability of the RCA team’s assessment and conclusion. This finding was similar to one published in an April 2025 VA OIG report on this facility.

The Facility Director concurred with the five recommendations the OIG made related to a comprehensive review of the patient’s hospitalization, obtainment of outside medical records, adherence to one-to-one observation policy, interim behavioral patient record flag processes, and accurate documentation of behavioral events.

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 requires Federal agencies to develop, implement, and manage agency-wide information security programs. Agencies are also required to provide acceptable levels of security for the information and systems that support their operations and assets.

The Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 also mandates that the Office of Inspector General conduct an independent evaluation to determine whether the Department of Energy’s unclassified cybersecurity program adequately protected its data and information systems in accordance with Federal and Department requirements.

Our fiscal year 2024 Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 evaluation determined that the Department, including the National Nuclear Security Administration, had taken actions to address some of the previously identified weaknesses related to its unclassified cybersecurity program. While actions were taken to close 19 of 63 (30 percent) recommendations from our prior year audits and evaluations, 44 prior year recommendations remained open. We also issued 79 new recommendations throughout the fiscal year related to various areas of cybersecurity programs.

The weaknesses identified occurred for a variety of reasons. For instance, findings at some Department sites had occurred due to vulnerability management processes that were not fully effective in identifying, addressing, and/or remediating vulnerabilities. We also found that several sites had not fully developed and/or maintained policies and procedures to help facilitate the design and implementation of security controls.

Without improvements to address the weaknesses identified in our report, the Department may be unable to adequately protect its information systems and data from compromise, loss, or modification.

When fully implemented, the 123 recommendations made during fiscal year 2024 should help to enhance the Department’s unclassified cybersecurity program. The Department should emphasize closing findings in a timely manner, especially those findings repeated from prior years. As cybersecurity remains an ongoing challenge, it is important that the Department take action to implement the latest Federal cybersecurity requirements and enhancements to assist in ensuring adequate protection of the Department’s data and information systems at risk to emerging threats and vulnerabilities.
 

We initiated this report to address allegations on failures of the Department of Energy to provide effective oversight of travel card use by a political appointee. This report also presents findings related to a limited number of other political appointees and Department senior executives (collectively, “Executives”).

Our review substantiated four of the five items noted in the allegation regarding misuse or abuse of the rules and regulations related to the political appointee. We did not substantiate the allegation related to use of split disbursements.

Additionally, our review found that weaknesses were not just limited to the individual identified in the allegation but extended to a small number of other Executives within the Department. We found that certain Executives misused their Government-issued travel cards by making personal purchases using the cards and maintaining delinquent travel card account balances. Upon notification of travel card issues by the Office of Travel Management, we found that Executive leadership did not always act on the derogatory information provided related to travel card misuse. Notably, the misuse and lack of leadership action was not limited to any one program but identified across many Department program elements.

This report provides areas of consideration for the Department, specifically focused on enhancing controls in this area, including ensuring that timely and appropriate actions are taken in response to reported travel card misuse and delinquencies.

Priority Mail Express (PME), formerly Express Mail, was introduced in the 1970s as the U.S. Postal Service’s fastest product, and as the best option for customers to send time-sensitive documents and packages by offering a next-day to two-day service guarantee. Recent transformations to postal operations under the Delivering for America plan are changing the service standards for this premium product. Specifically, in October 2023, the Postal Service deployed a major operational change called Local Transportation Optimization (LTO) that reduced the number of transportation trips to and from select post offices. With LTO, mail collected at optimized post offices remained overnight, delaying its entry into sorting operations. As a result, most optimized post offices can no longer offer PME with a next-day service guarantee. To support this change, on April 1, 2025, the Postal Service revised PME to a one-to-three-day service guarantee. 

We conducted a performance audit of the Michigan Arts and Culture Council (Council) for the period of October 1, 2020 through September 30, 2023.  Based on our review, we determined the Council met program requirements for each award and generally complied with award criteria.  However, we identified opportunities for improvement in the Council’s subawarding and award management procedures and controls, and issues with select subrecipient costs.  We provided 12 recommendations to address the report findings – five to the Council and seven to the Arts Endowment.  We believe these recommendations, if implemented, will help ensure the Council meets Federal and Arts Endowment requirements and better manages its awards.

Crowe identified areas where opportunities exist for the NRC to improve its oversight of decommissioning trust funds (DTFs).  
Specifically, the four areas focus on creating policies and procedures, workflows, and other support to enhance the oversight of the use of DTFs: 
1. Additional monitoring or detailed review on the use of the DTFs; 
2. Additional financial oversight assistance when reviewing and monitoring the use of DTFs; 
3. Documented policies, procedures, and workflows; and,  
4. Master list of sites with license conditions. 
We also identified best practices developed by the NRC for the use of DTFs when licensees are restarting nuclear reactors that
were formerly in decommissioning status.  Key best practices include a universal process for establishing a regulatory hold
point, tracking the level of effort, and instituting a license condition for the restarting plant related to the use of its DTFs.

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a national review to examine the infrastructure and oversight of Veterans Health Administration (VHA) oncology programs.

The OIG found inconsistent implementation of VHA requirements for oncology programs. Not all Veterans Integrated Service Networks (VISNs) had an established multidisciplinary cancer committee, and none of the VISNs had submitted an inventory of oncology services or facility points of contact within the last year to the National Oncology Program Office.

Additionally, only 66 percent of facilities had an established cancer committee or had partnered with another facility or VISN to provide the required committee functions. Further, the OIG learned that a majority of VISNs did not fully comply with the requirement for complexity level 1 and 2 facilities to pursue membership in the National Cancer Institute, National Clinical Trials Network, or National Cancer Institute Community Oncology Research Program.

The OIG found a lack of oversight contributed to the inconsistent implementation of oncology program requirements. Insufficient oversight occurred with the National Specialty Care Program Office’s oversight of National Oncology Program implementation, National Oncology Program Office’s oversight of VISN and facility oncology program implementation, and VISN oversight of cancer care at VA medical facilities. 

The OIG made five recommendations to the Under Secretary for Health related to VISN‑ and facility-level multidisciplinary cancer committees; annual VISN submissions of an inventory of oncology services and facility points of contact to the National Oncology Program Office; facility pursuit of membership in the National Cancer Institute, National Clinical Trials Network or National Cancer Institute Community Oncology Research Program; and a review of oncology-related program offices to ensure the required oversight of VISN and facility oncology programs.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) did not clearly assign law enforcement roles to its program offices, which led to internal disagreements and friction between TSA’s Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service (LE/FAMS) Insider Threat Section (ITS) and TSA Investigations related to referring and investigating allegations of misconduct.  TSA’s conflicting management directives resulted in impeded collaboration and deconfliction of investigations into risks to the Nation’s transportation system, potentially jeopardizing TSA’s ability to mitigate insider threats. 

OIG reviewed Food and Nutrition Service's plans for reassessing the Thrifty Food Plan in 2026 and assessed how well FNS integrated recommendations from the GAO’s 2022 report into the planning process

To see our report, click on the link below

A red cap based in Tampa, Florida, was terminated from employment on August 14, 2025, following an administrative hearing. Our investigation found that the former employee violated company policy by not disclosing six criminal convictions on his employee background check during the hiring process and by being dishonest with our agents during his interview.

OIG assessed the adequacy of the CACFP meal reimbursement claims process in fiscal year 2023 for child care centers, the appropriateness of FNS approval of CACFP waivers over monitoring controls, and meal claims made at a sample of child care centers in a selected State.

Veterans can submit compensation claims for disabilities associated with active service, and if they disagree with VA’s decision on the claim, they may appeal it. The Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA) was passed to improve the processing of these appeals. The AMA also required the VA Secretary to submit an initial comprehensive plan to Congress for implementing a new appeals system. To support this new appeals system, VA adopted a technology system called Caseflow. The VA OIG conducted this audit to assess the Office of Information and Technology’s (OIT) program management of Caseflow.

Overall, the OIG found VA lacked an enterprise-wide governance structure over Caseflow, which limited oversight during development and led to inefficiencies in reporting and functionality. This lack of clear direction made it difficult to implement requirements during development. Caseflow functionality was also affected by the contractor’s development process, which involved lengthy timelines and limited communication between developers and users. Furthermore, the team discovered contractor staffing was inconsistent with the requirements of the Caseflow contract. As a result of these program management concerns, some VA offices have either questioned using Caseflow or decided not to use it.

The OIG made one recommendation to the assistant secretary for enterprise integration, in conjunction with the assistant secretary for information and technology and chief information officer, to evaluate whether VA should establish an enterprise-wide governance structure for Caseflow development. The OIG also made two recommendations to the assistant secretary for information and technology and chief information officer to develop a roadmap for future Caseflow development and enforce contract requirements. VA concurred with these recommendations.

We audited the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), Office of Public and Indian Housing’s (PIH) Housing Choice Voucher Program to assess public housing agencies’ (PHA) controls to prevent and combat source of income discrimination. In limited circumstances, Federal law and regulations prohibit source of income discrimination in certain HUD-assisted housing.  As of January 2025, 23 states and the District of Columbia had passed statewide laws prohibiting source of income discrimination by officially designating source of income as a protected class, with 16 of them explicitly prohibiting discrimination against housing choice voucher holders.  Meanwhile, 152 cities/counties in 27 states have passed local ordinances which prohibit source of income discrimination, including cities and counties in 19 states without a statewide law.  Our audit objective was to assess the extent to which PHAs with Housing Choice Voucher Programs in states with a statewide source of income discrimination law implemented controls to prevent and combat source of income discrimination.

PIH has no requirement for PHAs to document source of income discrimination complaints.  While PIH uses lease-up rates in overseeing PHAs, PIH does not task PHAs with investigating complaints of source of income discrimination.  In the 16 states with a statewide source of income discrimination law that explicitly includes housing choice voucher holders, PHAs reported receiving few source of income discrimination complaints, and most PHAs had guidance for staff and other processes to act on such complaints. Most PHAs’ policies and procedures contained detailed actions for responding to a complaint, while some PHAs only had general statements that the PHA would assist participants.  Varying degrees of training and education efforts for staff, program participants, and landlords were observed at the selected PHAs, which some PHA officials believed was an effective means of preventing and combating source of income discrimination.  Most PHAs did not have a method for documenting or recording the complaints they received, which PIH encourages as a way PHAs can track complaints and monitor for patterns of discrimination.  PIH also encourages PHAs to (1) work with landlords to resolve complaints and (2) inform voucher holders of their right to file a complaint with the appropriate local fair housing organization if complaints are not resolved.

The report contains no recommendations.

OIG assessed whether the Risk Management Agency provided adequate oversight and ensured that all required high-dollar indemnity reviews were conducted. 

Our Objective(s)
To assess FTA's oversight of State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) compliance with Federal requirements. Specifically, we assessed FTA's (1) communication of its SSO audit oversight methodology, (2) SSO audit process, and (3) reliability of SSO audit data in its recommendation tracking system.

Why This Audit
FTA plays a significant role in promoting the safety of our Nation's public transit systems through its oversight of States' implementation of its SSO program. This program is required for eligible States with rail transit systems in their jurisdiction that receive Federal funding. FTA is responsible for oversight of SSOAs' compliance with Federal requirements and is required to triennially audit the operations of each SSOA as part of its oversight. In response to a directive in House of Representatives Report 117-99, which asked us to analyze SSOAs, we initiated this audit.

What We Found
FTA has not communicated its oversight methodology to SSOAs.
FTA oversees SSO programs primarily through SSO audits.
Although FTA communicates its oversight process to SSOAs, it has not shared the indicators the auditors will look at or the steps they will take to evaluate the SSO program. Therefore, FTA is not meeting its statutory requirement to convey a methodology to SSOAs that describes how it will monitor their effectiveness.
FTA met its requirement to perform SSO oversight, but gaps reduced audit utility.
Since 2019, FTA has successfully completed 38 SSO audit reports that provided 221 findings.
However, for 29 of the 54 findings within our scope of our review, FTA did not include sufficient evidence to support the finding or provide suitable criteria, as recommended under commonly used auditing standards.
FTA's audit documentation did not demonstrate that audits were consistently conducted and that important program risk areas were addressed uniformly.
These issues resulted from insufficient quality control in the audit process.
FTA's recommendation tracking system data for SSO audits is not reliable.
FTA's system for tracking SSO audit recommendations, OTrak, is missing records from the first 2 years of the program because FTA did not populate OTrak with audit findings from prior to fiscal year 2021.
FTA's supervision of OTrak entries is insufficient to provide reasonable assurance that data from 2021 onward are accurate.

Recommendations
We made 5 recommendations to improve FTA's oversight of SSOA compliance with Federal requirements.

The Office of Inspector General is issuing this audit report to determine the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) efforts to collect on delinquent Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Economic Injury Disaster Loans (EIDL) with collateral and personal guarantors.

We found that SBA did not perfect its security interest on borrower deposit accounts, conduct post-default site visits, report all delinquent obligors to credit bureaus, or refer debts to the U.S. Department of Justice for litigation.

We recommended SBA conduct a study to determine the minimum loan dollar thresholds for performing site visits, implement policies and procedures based the results of that study, and ensure post-default site visits are conducted and available collateral is liquidated on delinquent COVID-19 EIDLs; verify that all delinquent COVID-19 EIDL obligors are reported to credit bureaus in a timely manner; and confer with the U.S. Department of Justice to establish a reasonable standard for referring delinquent COVID-19 EIDLs for litigation.

SBA management agreed with one recommendation and disagreed with two. Management’s planned action resolved Recommendation 2; however, management’s response did not resolve Recommendations 1 and 3.