Federal Reports

This Office of Inspector General (OIG) Healthcare Facility Inspection program report describes the results of a focused evaluation of the care provided at the Eastern Oklahoma VA Health Care System in Muskogee. This evaluation focused on five key content domains:
•    Culture
•    Environment of care
•    Patient safety
•    Primary care
•    Veteran-centered safety net

The OIG issued three recommendations for VA to correct identified deficiencies in two domains:
1.    Environment of care
•    Clean and safe environment
2.    Patient safety
•    Service-level workflows for test result communication
•    Effectiveness of the patient notification process

Management and performance challenges facing the Commission and briefly assesses management's progress

What Was Reviewed
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Office of Inspector General contracted with the independent public accounting firm RMA Associates, LLC (RMA) to conduct the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA) Performance Audit of the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 to evaluate the effectiveness of the DFC’s information security program and practices, and determine what maturity level DFC achieved for each of the core metrics and supplemental metrics outlined in the FY 2025 Inspectors General (IG) FISMA Reporting Metrics v2.0 (April 2025).

Our objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the DFC’s information security program and practices and determine the maturity level DFC achieved for each of the core metrics and supplemental metrics outlined in the FY 2025 IG FISMA Reporting Metrics v2.0 (April 2025).

What Was Found
In this Performance Audit of DFC, RMA determined that DFC’s information security program and practices were effective for FY 2025, as DFC’s information security program met the criteria required to be assessed at a maturity level of Managed and Measurable (Effective). RMA’s tests of the information security program identified two findings that fell within the data protection and privacy and information security continuous monitoring domains.

VHA’s VA Health Connect modernization initiative of 2020 was to transform medical facilities’ call centers into regionally managed units called clinical contact centers. The centers were expected to integrate operations and provide veterans 24-hour access to four core services by December 31, 2021: primary care scheduling, pharmacy support, clinical triage, and virtual provider care. Center staff were to answer at least 95 percent of calls promptly, answer at least 80 percent of primary care scheduling and pharmacy calls within 30 seconds, and answer at least 80 percent of clinical triage calls within 120 seconds.

The OIG team conducted its review from October 2024 through July 2025, with a focus on operations during FY 2024, and found that only clinical triage met both standards; it exceeded the call timeliness standard, with 82 percent of calls answered within 120 seconds. Most centers had not fully integrated operations by September 2022, and some did not provide 24-hour pharmacy or scheduling services in FY 2024. Additionally, some medical facilities did not route all incoming calls to their regional contact center.

The review team found that centers did not always adequately oversee schedulers, monitor the time schedulers spent on individual calls or on follow-up, or monitor the percentage of time schedulers were unavailable—all of which affect call abandonment rates and timeliness.

In December 2024, centers were allowed to request a temporary exemption from VA Health Connect requirements, but the waiver policy did not specify what information to include with the request or require VHA’s chief operating officer to review waivers.
To address the problems identified, the OIG made nine recommendations. VHA concurred with eight and concurred in principle with one.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) Standard Programs and Processes 04.050, Investment Recovery, defines surplus material as material or equipment considered excess at a site that cannot be sold back to the original supplier or manufacturer.  Before items are considered surplus, TVA personnel are responsible for determining if the materials have a forecasted usage at the site or within the TVA fleet within 3 years.  From October 1, 2020, through March 31, 2025, TVA transferred approximately 370,000 inventory items to surplus with a book value of $34.7 million.  TVA’s Investment Recovery group is responsible for managing surplus inventory in a manner that recovers as much of TVA’s original capital investment as possible. 

Due to the significant investment TVA makes in inventory, we conducted an audit of TVA’s surplus inventory.  Our objective was to determine if TVA surplus inventory was managed in accordance with TVA policies and procedures.  The scope of this audit was inventory items transferred to surplus from October 1, 2020, through March 31, 2025. 

We determined, in general, TVA managed its surplus inventory in accordance with policies and procedures; however, we identified two opportunities for improvement. We found TVA policies and procedures could be improved by clearly defining how to determine forecasted usage across TVA. We also noted opportunities to improve the management of surplus inventory related to documentation completion.

The Office of Inspector General initiated this audit to evaluate $334,425,291 of costs claimed by Nuclear Waste Partnership LLC (NWP) from October 1, 2019, through September 30, 2020.

NWP managed and operated the Office of Environmental Management’s Waste Isolation Pilot Plant under a contract with the Department of Energy from October 1, 2012, through February 3, 2023. The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant was built to safely dispose of the nation’s defense-related transuranic radioactive waste.

Specifically, our audit objective was to determine if costs charged to Department Contract No. 
DE-EM0001971 during fiscal year 2020 were allowable, allocable, and reasonable, in accordance with contract terms, applicable laws, and regulations.

We identified three material noncompliances and internal control deficiencies. We questioned nearly $7 million of costs claimed by NWP in its Statement of Costs Incurred and Claimed for fiscal year 2020. We questioned proposed labor and procurement costs due to unsupported bonus costs, executive compensation over the approved compensation limits, lobbying and procurement costs that exceeded subcontract ceilings. The internal control deficiencies were related to NWP’s accounting for unallowable costs and inadequate oversight of labor costs, invoice reviews, and various procurement processes.

To address the issues identified in this report, we made five recommendations that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that costs charged to the Department are allowable, allocable, and reasonable, in accordance with contract terms. Further, we recommend that the contracting officer work with NWP to resolve nearly $7 million in questioned costs identified in this report.

NWP concurred with the recommendations. However, NWP did not concur with the questioned costs.

In January 2023, the General Services Administration (GSA) announced that a portion of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Chattanooga Office Complex (COC), which consists of five buildings (Signal Place, Lookout Place, Missionary Ridge (MR), Blue Ridge (BR), and Monteagle Place), was being considered for the site of a new federal courthouse.  In anticipation of a possible move, TVA created a stand-alone project to vacate MR and BR and consolidate (Vacate and Consolidate) into the other three COC buildings.  In March 2024, TVA requested public input on four alternatives identified for the COC as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.  Public input was to inform TVA decision makers about expected environmental consequences related to each alternative.  On February 13, 2025, the TVA Board approved MR and BR for surplus and in July 2025, TVA made the decision to remain in three buildings at the COC.

We determined that TVA’s analysis of the options for the COC could have been improved.  Specifically, (1) TVA did not compare the financial impacts of the four alternatives identified in the National Environmental Policy Act process to determine the best course of action before starting a project, and (2) the economic analysis for the Vacate and Consolidate project was flawed because it did not include all relevant costs and included an inaccurate input that was not reviewed for reasonableness by TVA.  During TVA’s process for evaluating alternatives for the COC, we informed management of our findings.  Subsequently, TVA took interim actions to address the concerns before making a final decision. 

AmeriCorps OIG investigated allegations that individuals posing as AmeriCorps employees on social media sites offered grant funds in exchange for a fee, such as gift cards or cell phones, as part of a scheme known as "advance fee fraud." The evidence collected through the investigation supports the finding that the fraud suspects executed the schemes by utilizing fake social media profiles, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) phone numbers, fake email addresses, and Virtual Private Networks (VPNs). At the conclusion of the investigation, AmeriCorps OIG made six recommendations to AmeriCorps, which concurred with five of the six.

AmeriCorps Office of Inspector General (OIG) investigated allegations that Corp Regional de Guayama de Servicios a la Comunidad (CRGSC), located in Cayey, PR, drew down grant funds through the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Payment Management System (HHS-PMS) for its Foster Grandparent Program (FGP) without corresponding supporting documentation as required by 2 CFR 200.430.

In April 2015, the United States Environmental Protection Agency published the Disposal of Coal Combustion Residuals [CCR] from Electric Utilities (commonly referred to as the CCR Rule), which set forth national regulations for the safe disposal of coal ash from coal-fired power plants.  On May 8, 2024, the United States Environmental Protection Agency finalized changes to the CCR Rule to include additional classes of regulated CCR storage facilities.  The CCR Rule requires that applicable CCR units be inspected both weekly for any appearances of actual or potential structural weakness and annually to ensure that the design, construction, operation, and maintenance of the CCR unit is consistent with recognized engineering standards.  In addition, the CCR Rule requires monthly monitoring of all CCR unit instrumentation for surface impoundments.  

We determined TVA performed required inspections and maintenance of CCR storage facilities.  Additionally, inspections identified no significant deficiencies, and all deficiencies and high priority instrumentation maintenance issues identified were resolved timely or had plans in place for resolution. However, we also determined (1) TVA did not maintain a comprehensive list of instrumentation requiring monitoring, (2) some issues were not identified in inspections and some instrumentation issues were not resolved, (3) remediation of minor issues identified during annual inspections was not documented, (4) annual inspection reports did not document review of weekly inspections, and (5) some inspectors did not have required training.

Former SEC Contract Specialist falsely claimed Virginia residency while living in and working from 
Florida, collecting higher locality pay for years

Veteran Readiness and Employment (VR&E) is a VBA program that provides job training and other services to rehabilitate veterans who have an employment handicap, which federal law defines as a service connected disability limiting the veteran’s “ability to prepare for, obtain, or retain employment consistent with [their] abilities, aptitudes, and interests.” The goal of VR&E is to help veterans live independently and, as much as possible, help them become employable, find a suitable job, and stay employed.

The OIG audit team reviewed claims processed from April 1, 2023, through September 30, 2023, and found that, although the program manual and staff training generally capture the regulatory requirements for determining eligibility and entitlement, VR&E counselors—staff who conduct comprehensive initial evaluations to make an employment handicap decision and process the claims—did not clearly document their decisions. Sufficient documentation is necessary to ensure consistent and accurate decisions by counselors. The evidence available to the OIG to support claims was insufficient to assess the accuracy of entitlement decisions, resulting in $309.5 million in questioned costs. VR&E’s executive director acknowledged that VR&E has not asked VA’s Office of General Counsel to comprehensively review VR&E processes, meaning the program may not be conforming with all legal requirements.

The OIG recommended that the under secretary for benefits coordinate with VA’s Office of General Counsel to assess and, if necessary, update the eligibility and entitlement decision process to ensure veterans’ eligibility periods are properly verified and entitlement decisions are sufficiently clear. Other recommendations to ensure that only veterans eligible and entitled to VR&E receive these benefits included developing a standard documentation method for deferrals, extensions, and overall eligibility decisions; making sure VR&E staff are appropriately trained; and ensuring VR&E develops a process to monitor eligibility decisions for accuracy. VA concurred with the recommendations.

This report presents the results of our audit of Postal Service Management of Overtime Hours.

Background

The Postal Service designates overtime hours as any workhours an employee has worked in excess of a standard workday and/or workweek. The Postal Service generally categorizes overtime hours as either regular overtime or penalty overtime. Regular overtime is paid at time and a half to eligible employees, while penalty-overtime is paid to eligible employees at double the employee’s hourly rate under specific conditions spelled out in collective bargaining agreements. Facility management is required to manage overtime hours efficiently, as overtime hours represent a significant cost for the organization. During fiscal years (FY) 2021 through 2024, the Postal Service paid $24.3 billion in total overtime costs.

What We Did

Our objective was to evaluate the Postal Service’s management of overtime hours and assess whether the corrective actions taken in response to prior overtime audits sufficiently addressed the issues identified. For this audit, we analyzed nationwide overtime data and compared actual overtime to planned overtime hours during FY 2021 through FY 2024. We reviewed overtime hours of 20 judgmentally selected facilities and held interviews with headquarters, district/division, and local officials to gain an understanding of the overtime documentation process including unauthorized overtime.

What We Found

Overtime hours have declined from 172.9 million in 2021 to 117.8 million in 2024. Even with this decline, opportunities continue to exist to improve the management of unauthorized overtime in the Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS) and further reduce overtime hours. Specifically, facility management did not always properly identify, categorize, and document regular and penalty overtime transactions in TACS by the end of the pay week, as required. Additionally, although total overtime hours declined by more than 30 percent from 2021 to 2024, the Postal Service used 5.7 million overtime hours, or 5 percent more than originally planned, in FY 2024.

OIG conducted an evaluation of the Volunteer Delivery System to assess the challenges Peace Corps has recently faced in recruiting, selecting, and placing Volunteers. To perform this evaluation, OIG reviewed the agency’s strategic planning and performance documents, recruiting and hiring data, and documentation related to various recruiting strategies. OIG also conducted in-person and virtual interviews with headquarters-based and regional recruitment staff. The evaluation also included an overseas staff survey and a review of relevant documentation. The report contains seven recommendations along with a summary of the effectiveness of Peace Corps’ recruitment strategies and approaches.

The U.S. AbilityOne Commission Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an investigation in response to an anonymous complaint alleging that a sole source contract was improperly awarded.

The objective of our review was to determine whether the U.S. Department of Education (Department) complied with transfer of funds and reprogramming requirements under appropriations laws. To achieve our objective, we identified the Department’s transfer and reprogramming activities from November 5, 2024, through January 20, 2025, and the extent to which these activities complied with applicable appropriations laws.  We found that the Department did not fully comply with transfer of funds and reprogramming requirements under applicable appropriations laws. We identified a total of six transactions, consisting of five transfers and one reprogramming, that occurred from November 5, 2024, through January 20, 2025. We determined that two of these transactions—one of the transfers and the one reprogramming—were made using authorities granted under applicable appropriations laws. For these two transactions, we found that the transfer was compliant with applicable requirements; the reprogramming was not. Specifically, we found that the Department did not consult or notify Congress of the reprogramming as required by the appropriations laws. The remaining four transfers were appropriately made under other statutory authorities. The Department’s failure to comply with applicable statutory transfer authorities and reprogramming requirements may result in Federal funds not being used as originally intended by Congress, funds being deemed unavailable for obligation, and potential violations of the Antideficiency Act. Additionally, failure to notify Congress of transfers of funds and reprogrammings hinders congressional oversight of how agencies execute their budgets and fulfill their missions. We recommended that the Department establish appropriate controls to ensure that transfers of funds and reprogrammings comply with all applicable statutory authority requirements, including notifications to the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. 

To ensure the continued operations of the International Space Station and the safety of the crew, NASA and its spacesuit support contractor must ensure the suits used for spacewalks, designed more than 50 years ago, are well-maintained and reliable. The contractor, Collins Aerospace, has struggled to ensure sufficient life support components for the suits are delivered when needed and within budget and that meet quality expectations. While Collins’ performance over the last several years has declined, NASA has limited leverage to incentivize improved performance.

OIG contracted an Independent Public Accounting firm to review the Rural Utilities Service’s process for evaluating and prioritizing the level of service provided for its broadband program, as well as how the current mapping software addresses previously identified programming errors.

In August 2022, the PACT Act significantly expanded veterans’ eligibility for benefits and services for conditions related to toxic exposure. The expansion added further complexity to VBA’s claims determination process, particularly given the voluminous guidance issued for nonpresumptive conditions—those conditions for which service connection cannot be granted on a presumptive basis. Notably, the law opened a new path for service connection for veterans with nonpresumptive conditions related to toxic exposure risk activity (TERA). The VA OIG conducted this review from October 2023 through May 2025 to determine whether VBA staff processed decisions in compliance with TERA procedures under the PACT Act that denied nonpresumptive conditions. The OIG focused on denials because of the potential impact of incorrect decisions on benefits received by veterans.

The review found VBA’s oversight lagged in ensuring accurate processing of nonpresumptive conditions under the PACT Act. While VBA took steps to improve PACT Act claims processing, these efforts have not remedied the problem of various inaccuracies related to nonpresumptive conditions. An OIG statistical analysis estimated 61 percent of all nonpresumptive, TERA-related decisions under the PACT Act that VBA denied from May 1 through August 31, 2023, had processing errors—some of which could have affected veterans’ benefits. For example, some errors showed that claims processors did not accurately identify toxic exposure claims, research and verify veterans’ participation in a TERA, request a medical exam and opinion regarding toxic exposure, or appropriately include key information in decisions for nonpresumptive conditions. Furthermore, PACT Act guidance is difficult for staff to navigate because it is frequently updated and spread among several different sources. VBA needs to improve its oversight to mitigate and prevent inconsistencies and errors. VBA concurred with the OIG’s three recommendations to correct processing errors, consolidate guidance, and evaluate controls.

The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, authorized $1 billion in appropriations for the purchase and installation of renewable energy, energy storage, and other grid technologies. The Department of Energy’s Grid Deployment Office (GDO) will administer the $1 billion through the Puerto Rico Energy Resilience Fund (PR-ERF) Program, which focuses on energy resilience investments to grow Puerto Rico’s clean energy economy, while pursuing the goal to meet 100 percent of its electricity needs with renewable energy by 2050.
We initiated this inspection to determine the GDO’s readiness to implement the PR-ERF Program.

We found that the GDO was not fully prepared to implement the PR ERF Program, as it had not developed the requisite oversight tools and resources to conduct separate and appropriate oversight to ensure that it will meet its intended goals and objectives. We identified six areas related to the GDO’s implementation of the PR-ERF Program where additional oversight and resources are needed.

The lack of preparedness and planned oversight occurred due to the GDO’s reliance on other entities. Specifically, while the GDO delegated management and execution duties to other entities, it did not assess the readiness and ability of these entities to oversee the PR-ERF Program, nor prepare a plan to oversee the work performed by these entities.

The GDO’s ability to achieve PR-ERF Program objectives is vulnerable without the establishment of independent, robust oversight, and resources.

To address the issues identified in this report, we have made one recommendation that, if fully implemented, should help ensure that the GDO’s oversight tools and resources are adequate for the PR-ERF Program.  

What Was Inspected
The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted an inspection of two DFC loan finance agreements. The agreements reviewed involved the FS India Solar Ventures Pvt. Ltd. (First Solar) and Biological E Limited (Bio E) projects, which are both based in India. DFC’s loan agreements with First Solar and Bio E totaled $500 million and $50 million, respectively. The OIG’s inspection objective was to evaluate each project’s compliance with agreement terms and progress with established impact metrics. 

What Was Found
The OIG found that DFC officials did not receive the annual environmental and social (E&S) reports for Bio E required under the finance agreement. Additionally, DFC’s oversight of the First Solar project could be strengthened to monitor ongoing E&S compliance with deliverable requirements under the finance agreement. The OIG found mixed progress on the impact outcomes for both projects. Both the Bio E and First Solar agreements required the submission of specific document deliverables 
throughout each project’s lifecycle and annual reporting on established impact outcomes.

The OIG inspection determined that:
•  DFC did not adhere to established internal policies and procedures, resulting in insufficient E&S monitoring of the $50 million Bio E investment.
•  DFC officials did not receive the annual E&S reports for Bio E required under the finance agreement, and one deliverable was received three months after the deadline specified in the finance agreement.
•  DFC officials did not follow policies and procedures for maintaining the required project deliverables within Insight.
•  DFC did not obtain required annual audits from several of First Solar’s supply chain material and component supplier vendors, nor did it verify that identified monitoring procedures for the construction of the First Solar facility were followed with respect to labor and working condition standards.
• The Bio E project made progress meeting two core impact projections, while the First Solar project is still in the process of achieving its impact projections.
 

The VA Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted a healthcare inspection to determine whether leaders and staff followed required procedures related to suspected elder abuse of a community living center (CLC) resident at the St. Albans VA Medical Center in Queens, part of the VA New York Harbor Healthcare System (system). 

The OIG determined leaders and staff failed to follow procedures to report suspected abuse. A nursing assistant witnessed another nursing assistant allegedly abuse a resident but failed to immediately notify a supervisor, due to being “scared.” Nursing leaders and staff did not immediately ensure the resident’s safety, and did not report the suspected abuse to a unit social worker, VA Police, the resident’s family, and the New York State Department of Health. A nurse practitioner evaluated bruises on the resident and did not document a complete physical exam, consider whether the bruises were related to abuse, or inform the resident’s family. Staff described a culture of silence in the CLC in which staff generally did not report, or underreported, patient safety incidents due to fear of reprisal or administrative burdens. 

Leaders conducted two factfinding investigations into the alleged abuse; however, neither factfinding was thorough, which led to inaccurate conclusions. Factfinding 2 was completed approximately five months after the alleged abuse, exceeding a 14-day completion requirement. An accurate conclusion would have indicated the allegation of patient abuse was plausible and required system leaders to conduct an administrative investigation board. 

The OIG found additional reporting deficiencies related to other incidents of suspected resident abuse; insufficient staff training; substandard documentation by staff, which hindered reviews and investigations; and omissions in Veterans Health Administration and system abuse-related policies. 

The OIG made one recommendation to the Under Secretary for Health, who concurred in principle, and six recommendations to the System Director.
 

Our objectives were to determine whether the Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction (Wisconsin) designed and implemented (1) application processes that adequately assessed nonpublic schools’ eligibility for Emergency Assistance to Nonpublic Schools (EANS)-funded services or assistance and complied with other applicable requirements, and (2) oversight processes to ensure that EANS-funded services or assistance were used for allowable purposes. Although we found Wisconsin’s processes to assess nonpublic schools’ eligibility for EANS-funded services and assistance ensured that funds were obligated within 6 months of receipt and that applications for the EANS programs were generally approved or denied timely in accordance with Federal regulations, we found that Wisconsin allocated ARP EANS funds to nonpublic schools that did not meet program eligibility requirements and did not verify some information that nonpublic schools provided in their applications for EANS funds. Additionally, Wisconsin’s oversight of its contractor’s administration of EANS expenditures and inventory processes could be improved. Specifically, Wisconsin did not effectively monitor its contractor to ensure that expenditures were properly accounted for, supporting documentation was maintained, and assets purchased with EANS funds were tracked. Further, Wisconsin’s processes did not ensure that fees charged to the nonpublic schools’ EANS funds were reasonable and appropriate. However, Wisconsin’s oversight was adequate to ensure that EANS-funded services and assistance were for allowable purposes.  Wisconsin’s improper approval of ineligible nonpublic schools’ applications resulted in providing over $20 million in ARP EANS-funded services and assistance to 184 nonpublic schools. Further, because Wisconsin did not verify certain information in nonpublic schools’ applications, it provided $838,829 for EANS-funded services and assistance to one ineligible school and did not have assurance that all schools that were approved to participate in the programs had a nonprofit status. We made seven recommendations to address the issues we identified in Wisconsin’s administration and oversight of its EANS programs.

The objective of our audit was to determine whether West Virginia Department of Education (WVDE) implemented selected components of its statewide accountability system in accordance with West Virginia’s approved Every Student Succeeds Act State plan and any approved amendments. The selected components were (1) indicators used to measure student academic achievement and school success, (2) annual meaningful differentiation, and (3) identification of schools needing additional support. We evaluated WVDE’s processes for implementing selected components of West Virginia’s statewide accountability system for school year 2021–2022.  We found that WVDE generally implemented selected components of the statewide accountability system in accordance with West Virginia’s State plan and amendments and WVDE’s policies and procedures and correctly allocated additional funding to local educational agencies (LEA) with schools identified in the fall of 2022 as needing additional support. However, WVDE incorrectly identified for additional support and improvement 12 schools that were not eligible for additional support services. Additionally, WVDE did not always keep records showing that it provided additional support services, such as planning and collaboration, diagnostic and monitoring activities, and technical assistance, to LEAs with schools identified as needing additional support. We made three recommendations to strengthen WVDE’s implementation of selected components of its statewide accountability system.

The objective of our audit was to determine whether Connecticut State Department of Education (CSDE) implemented selected components of its statewide accountability system in accordance with Connecticut’s approved Every Student Succeeds Act State plan and any approved amendments. The selected components were (1) indicators used to measure student academic achievement and school success, (2) annual meaningful differentiation, and (3) identification of schools needing additional support. We evaluated CSDE’s processes for implementing selected components of Connecticut’s statewide accountability system for school year 2021–2022. We found that CSDE implemented two (student academic achievement and school success indicators and annual meaningful differentiation) of the three selected components of the statewide accountability system and provided additional funding and support services to local educational agencies with identified schools in accordance with Connecticut’s approved State plan and CSDE’s policies and procedures. However, its implementation of certain aspects of the third selected component (identification of low-performing schools) of the accountability system deviated from the plan. As a result, CSDE did not identify all schools for comprehensive support and improvement that it should have identified in the fall of 2022. Additionally, CSDE did not always identify or correctly identify the student subgroups needing additional targeted support and improvement in accordance with Connecticut’s approved State plan, which it attributed to a system coding error for additional targeted support and improvement. We recommended that CSDE amend Connecticut’s State plan by updating its procedures for identifying schools for CSI to ensure they align with the procedures in CSDE’s “Using Accountability Results to Guide Improvement” and the definition of a school identified for CSI in the ESEA and provide support to the five Title I schools that should have been identified for CSI. We also recommend that the Department verify that CSDE implemented corrective actions to fix the system coding error to ensure that it correctly identifies student subgroups needing ATSI in the future.

Observations on the SEC’s Rulemaking Process, Report No. 588

Over the last 5 years, the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) has been unable to pass a financial audit, receiving disclaimers of opinion year after year. The independent public auditor has been unable to offer an opinion on the financial state of SBA because it has not received sufficient evidence to support a number of balances. We reviewed SBA’s history of disclaimers and material weaknesses from fiscal years 2020 to 2024, open recommendations, and SBA’s new strategy for addressing material weaknesses and obtaining a clean audit opinion.

SBA’s accounting deficiencies were primarily related to administering an unprecedented amount of disaster assistance aid and guaranteed loan funds to help eligible small business owners and entrepreneurs adversely affected by the pandemic. Over the course of 18 months, the agency delivered 22.1 million pandemic assistance loans and grants, totaling $1.2 trillion. To address the systemic financial reporting deficiencies, SBA launched its Financial Statement Audit Remediation Strategy in January 2025 to resolve the seven material weaknesses and 56 open audit recommendations.

We made four recommendations to enhance implementation of SBA’s financial statements remediation strategy. We recommended the Administrator appoint a senior executive to lead the effort and emphasize audit remediation priorities through consistent agencywide communication. We also recommended that the remediation strategy be incorporated into SBA’s next strategic plan and individual performance plans to ensure accountability. SBA management agreed with all four recommendations.

Under a contract monitored by this office, the Office of the Inspector General engaged Castro, an independent public accounting firm, to perform the Fiscal Year 2025 Independent Evaluation of the Smithsonian Institution’s Information Security Program. 
 

Smithsonian Enterprises (SE) oversees the majority of the revenue-generating operations of the Smithsonian Institution
(Smithsonian). It is an essential source of unrestricted funds— monies without donor-imposed or legal restrictions on their use. SE provides unrestricted funds to the Smithsonian through the operation of revenue-generating activities.
In SE's fiscal year (FY) 2023, SE generated $150.8 million in net revenue, including more than $63 million from 32 retail stores, approximately $10.7 million of which were cash transactions.

OIG made four recommendations for Smithsonian Enterprises management to improve compliance with policies and procedures related to document retention, audits over cash management, system access for separated employees, and discounts. Management concurred with all four recommendations.

The OIG received a hotline allegation that the Veterans Service Center manager at the Philadelphia VA Regional Benefit Office permitted a senior veterans service representative (VSR) to “blindly” approve hundreds of rating decisions for disability benefits claims each day without conducting the required reviews. The OIG team substantiated the allegation. From at least fiscal year 2022 through 2024, this senior VSR authorized about 85,300 claims—about 19 times the national average. The senior VSR spent an average of 4.7 minutes reviewing each claim authorized during this three-year period, versus a national average of about 21 minutes. The OIG obtained data showing that the senior VSR rarely opened necessary documents to verify claim information prior to authorization. The senior VSR contributed more than 35 percent each year toward the regional office’s claims completions goal, a metric that is part of regional office executive directors’ performance standards.

Based on the results of a statistical sample of 32 rating decisions that the senior VSR authorized from January 1, 2024, through June 30, 2024, the team estimated that approximately 13,200 decisions (84 percent) had at least one error. Some of the errors likely occurred because the senior VSR did not open and review the necessary documents. Monetary impact errors resulted in an estimated $2.2 million in improper payments during this period.

Officials from the regional office, the Northeast District, and the central office were aware of the Philadelphia senior VSR’s unusually high authorization rate. However, they overlooked opportunities to strengthen internal controls and effectively respond to the associated risks. The OIG recommended the under secretary for benefits review the errors the OIG team identified, correct these errors, and evaluate the effectiveness of controls for authorization rate outliers.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review based upon Office and Management Budget Circular A-50, which states that the resolution and follow-up of audit, inspection, and evaluation recommendations is an integral part of effective management and is a shared responsibility of agency management officials and auditors. Our objective was to review and summarize the Commission's open recommendations, identify any challenges to closing recommendations, and consider alternative actions for recommendations that may no longer be relevant due to changes in the Commission's policies and procedures. 

To accomplish our objective the OIG, analyzed the open recommendations from prior reports, reviewed applicable criteria related to the resolution of recommendations, and conducted interviews. The audit covered the period December 1, 2020, through August 31, 2025. The audit was performed in accordance with the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards. 

The Commission is working to modernize the AbilityOne Program, including implementing its new Cooperative Agreements with the Central Nonprofit Agencies (CNA) and updating its Program policies. As a result of the modernization efforts and updated agreements and policies, the OIG agreed to close 20 of the 55 open recommendations. Additionally, the Commission and the OIG have a renewed understanding that should improve communication and collaboration during future audits and closure process.

The OIG has no specific recommendations associated with this report.

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review to identify AbilityOne Program data generated or maintained by Central Nonprofit Agencies (CNA) and/or Nonprofit Agencies (NPA), that is not currently available to the U.S. AbilityOne Commission (Commission).

The evaluation team reviewed and analyzed the new 2024 Cooperative Agreements between the Commission and CNAs, as well as Commission policies and procedures related to data collection and reporting.

The OIG found no data had been collected in the new electronic systems at the time of our re-view. Based on the updated Cooperative Agreements between the Commission and CNAs, the Commission anticipates having access to relevant program data and the new CNA electronic data systems October 1, 2025. The Commission stated it anticipates collecting data using the new electronic systems for approximately one year so that they have enough data points to ensure they are receiving the appropriate data and identifying various trends and patterns within the data.

Through this evaluation, the OIG observed that if the Commission wants to meet its deadline of implementing the electronic data collection and data dashboard by October 1, 2025, it needed to improve communication with DWG. Specifically, clear communication between the Commission and DWG is needed to ensure that relevant data is displayed on the dashboards once they are created.

The OIG has no specific recommendations associated with this report.

This report presents the results of our audit of U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s Expense Purchase Card Use. 

Background

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service, an investigative agency within the Postal Service, uses purchase cards for local buying of general goods and services when day-to-day operational needs cannot be satisfied. Expense purchase cards can be used to purchase items for events, including on-site or off-site official meetings, training, employee recognition and appreciation events, and all event-related expenses. However, cardholders must comply with policies and procedures, such as obtaining approval for purchases and maintaining accurate records for three years. Adhering to these policies is critical to ensure financial integrity and to maintain the public trust and reputation of the U.S. Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service.

What We Did

Our objective was to assess the U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s expense purchase card use. To accomplish our objective, we reviewed 379 purchase card transactions, valued at $367,462, and interviewed Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service Headquarters management.

What We Found

We found opportunities to improve the Postal Inspection Service’s management of the purchase card program. Specifically, Postal Inspection Service personnel made restricted purchases and purchases that may not align with the organization’s business needs. Also, the Postal Inspection Service did not enter awards and gifts presented to employees into the award system. Controls over purchase cards are important to prevent misuse and promote accountability.

The independent public accounting firm of RMA Associates, LLC, under contract with the Office of Inspector General, audited EAC’s information security program for fiscal year 2025 in support of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 (FISMA). The objective was to determine whether EAC implemented an effective information security program.

OIG reviewed the Agricultural Marketing Service’s monitoring over grantees’ use of funds within the Farm and Food Workers Relief Grant Program.

This report presents a review of the U.S. Postal Regulatory Commission’s (PRC) information security program and practices for fiscal year (FY) 2025. The Federal Information Security Modernization Act, amended in 2014 (FISMA) requires agencies to develop, implement, and document agencywide information security programs and practices. FISMA also requires inspectors general to conduct annual reviews of their agencies’ information security programs and report the results to the Office of Management and Budget. 

In September 2025, the OIG issued a special report on the Peace Corps’ Information Technology environment. OIG contracted with technical subject matter experts to conduct three cybersecurity tests from January 2025 to March 2025. The three tests included a simulated phishing campaign, a review of the agency’s internal vulnerability management practices, and penetration tests that targeted critical Peace Corps systems.

While observing the agency’s security processes throughout the assessment, OIG found that the Peace Corps’ monitoring capabilities were able to identify the testing activities and demonstrate its incident response procedures. However, the cybersecurity tests also uncovered multiple vulnerabilities and misconfigurations, ranging from informational issues to critical severity risks that the Peace Corps needs to review and address.

From October 2023 through September 2024, VHA processed almost 114,000 manual journal vouchers, representing about $71.2 billion in healthcare-related accounting transactions. Manual journal vouchers are used to record salary accruals, expenditure transfers, and other adjustments where processing cannot be automated. Although these journal vouchers are intended to support accurate records, they introduce the risk of error and misclassification because they rely on manual input, a vulnerability the OIG has highlighted in the past.

The OIG found that staff at 172 medical centers did not follow VHA financial policy in processing manual journal vouchers. The OIG estimated that 76 percent of manual journal vouchers lacked one or more required elements, such as clear justification, and estimated that at least $27 billion in transactions were processed using manual journal vouchers that lacked the required documentation or approvals. Reasons included limited staff training, ineffective use of a journal voucher generator tool, and inconsistent oversight at the regional level of medical facilities’ financial teams. Some staff reported never receiving formal journal voucher training, and no refresher training or onboarding instruction was required. Moreover, use of the tool was not mandatory, and some staff used outdated versions or used the tool incorrectly. In terms of regional financial managers, their responsibilities were not clearly delineated. Oversight was therefore inconsistent, with limited monitoring of facility compliance. As a result, a large volume of transactions were at elevated risk of misstatement.

The OIG recommended developing a plan to ensure manual journal vouchers are justified, documented, and approved before they are entered into the Financial Management System (VA’s official system of record), and then reviewed after posting. In addition, VHA should require ongoing training, clarify use of journal voucher tools, and define clear oversight responsibilities for regional financial managers. VHA concurred with all four recommendations.

At the request of the Tennessee Valley Authority’s (TVA) Supply Chain, we examined the cost proposal submitted by a contractor for (1) outage and supplemental maintenance and modification services and (2) support services at TVA’s nuclear plants.  Our examination objective was to determine if the cost proposal was fairly stated for a planned $975 million contract.

In our opinion, the contractor’s cost proposal was overstated.  Specifically, we determined the application base for the contractor’s proposed markup rate for the recovery of general and administrative (G&A) costs did not reflect TVA’s intent as provided for in the request for proposal (RFP).  We notified TVA of the inconsistencies for use in their negotiations.  Subsequently, TVA informed us the parties agreed to (1) apply the G&A markup rate to unburdened noncraft wages to more accurately reflect TVA’s intent for reimbursing G&A costs, (2) reduce the G&A rate, and (3) remove the G&A application on noncraft staff augmentation labor.  In addition, the contractor did not propose a rate for long-term temporary assignments, as requested in the request for proposal. 

VHA provides outpatient services to veterans at community-based outpatient clinics (CBOCs) nationwide. The VA OIG conducted this review to assess contract oversight of staffing and appointment cancellation performance measures at five Loma Linda Healthcare System CBOCs in California.

The OIG found that VA leaders in the Loma Linda healthcare system did not ensure contractor compliance with performance standards for staffing or for the number of appointments canceled by the clinics during FYs 2022 and 2023. Specifically, Loma Linda officials did not effectively monitor contractor-staffed primary care Patient Aligned Care Teams to ensure contract compliance. The contractor did not meet required staffing levels at any of the five contracted CBOCs for at least 22 of 24 months in FYs 2022 and 2023; two CBOCs were noncompliant 100 percent of the time, and the remaining three were noncompliant more than 90 percent of the time.

The contractor also did not consistently meet the appointment cancellation performance standard regarding appointments canceled by clinics at contracted CBOCs. In FYs 2022 and 2023, all five CBOCs under the contract were noncompliant with appointment cancellation standards at least 79 percent of the time, and two CBOCs were noncompliant 100 percent of the time. Finally, the OIG found that the contracting officer’s attempt to recover government funds associated with using VA personnel to cover shortages at the contracted clinics was insufficient.

Contract noncompliance occurred, in part, because the assistant director did not provide effective oversight of the contracting officer’s representative (COR) or the CBOC nurse coordinator. The OIG also found that the assistant director did not effectively coordinate with the COR and the contracting officer to ensure that the contractor’s contingency plan requirement was sufficiently enforced during staffing shortages. The OIG made nine recommendations for VA to improve oversight of CBOC contracts.

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) does not have an adequate process for managing, tracking, and monitoring staff qualification records. The OIG found that NRC offices use inconsistent information-gathering methods, driven by changes in management’s workforce planning and individual office preferences for using separate information systems. As a result, the NRC may face reduced efficiency in retrieving qualification records and may lack full visibility into staff qualification gaps─factors that could adversely impact the agency’s ability to carry out its mission.
Additionally, the OIG found that refresher training is tracked informally, with many staff relying on personal reminders to complete mandatory requirements. This informal approach exists because the NRC lacks a structured, agency-wide system for managing refresher training. The absence of such a system could result in decreased staff productivity, non-compliance with safety and security requirements, and lower employee morale and retention. Refresher training is essential for maintaining up-to-date knowledge, skills, and safety practices, which are critical to ensuring that staff can perform their duties effectively and safely.
This report makes three recommendations to improve the NRC’s process for managing, tracking, and monitoring its qualification programs.

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) contracted with Sikich CPA LLC (Sikich) to audit the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board’s (DNFSB) Implementation of the Federal Information Security Modernization Act of 2014 for Fiscal Year 2025. The objective was to assess the effectiveness of the information security policies, procedures, and practices of the DNFSB.  The findings and conclusions presented in this report are Sikich’s responsibility.  The OIG’s responsibility was to oversee the contractor’s work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Based on their review for the period of October 1, 2024, through June 30, 2025, Sikich found that the DNFSB has not established an effective agency-wide information security program and practices.  There are weaknesses that impact the agency’s ability to protect the DNFSB’s systems and information adequately.

As a result of the weaknesses noted in this audit, Sikich made seven new recommendations to assist the DNFSB in strengthening its information security program and practices in addition to the six prior-year recommendations that remain open.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

The Office of Inspector General is issuing this report to present the results of our evaluation of the U.S. Small Business Administration’s (SBA) processes to forecast and request appropriation dollars for its disaster loans program account.

We found that SBA did not 1) adequately forecast funding needs for the disaster loan program in the annual budget request; 2) ensure that monthly reports submitted to Congress were clearly interpreted, always submitted timely, and in compliance with all the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 636k(a); or 3) notify Congress, in writing, regarding the need for supplemental funding as soon as a shortfall was anticipated.

We recommended SBA ensure 1) historical factors are considered when developing the budget request, 2) monthly reports comply with 15 U.S.C. § 636k(a), 3) monthly reports are enhanced to clearly explain the information, and 4) Congress is notified, in writing, of the need for supplemental disaster loan program funds as soon as the agency anticipates a shortfall.

SBA management agreed with all four recommendations. Management’s planned action for Recommendations 1 through 4 satisfy the intent of the recommendations and are resolved.

The audit objectives were to determine whether program funds were managed in accordance with the ARC and Federal grant requirements.

To view this interactive report, visit: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/audit-federal-bureau-prisons-efforts-place-inmates-close-home

U.S. Postal Service employees who sustain a workrelated injury or occupational disease are covered by the Federal Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), which provides monetary and medical benefits and assistance in returning employees to work. These benefits include wage-loss compensation, medical and rehabilitation services, and death benefit payments to surviving dependents.

The Postal Service encourages employees to report any work-related injuries or illness to their supervisors as soon as possible. Additionally, the Postal Service manages efforts to return injured employees to work through its Injury Compensation Program by monitoring their medical status and identifying suitable work. The Department of Labor (DOL) Office of Workers’ Compensation Program (OWCP) has the exclusive authority to administer, implement, and enforce FECA, including paying claims on behalf of injured employees.

The Postal Service’s workers' compensation costs per workhour have been consistently higher when compared to the private industry. This white paper is intended to provide an update on the Postal Service’s workers’ compensation activity since the last audit report, which included a summary of trends in costs from chargeback year (CBY) 2017 through CBY 2022, and employees on the periodic rolls from fiscal year (FY) 2017 through FY 2022. Specifically, the following sections show how workers’ compensation costs for the Postal Service continued to rise over the last two years.